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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE

SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

FUSING THE FOUR CORNERS: INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING WITHIN

NEW MEXICO’S RURAL AND TRIBAL COMMUNITIES

Robert Vasquez

December 2018

Co-Advisors: Patrick E. Miller (contractor) Erik J. Dahl

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE FUSING THE FOUR CORNERS: INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING WITHIN NEW MEXICO’S RURAL AND TRIBAL COMMUNITIES

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6. AUTHOR(S) Robert Vasquez

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines how New Mexico’s state fusion center can develop a robust intelligence-led policing and all-hazards model for New Mexico and its rural and tribal communities. The research examines the principles behind intelligence-led policing and identifies best practices established by other local and state law enforcement organizations, focusing on how these practices are followed by fusion centers. Then, it conducts a close analysis of the New Mexico fusion center to determine, in light of best practices, how policies and procedures might be changed to better address rural and tribal concerns. A redefined intelligence and all-hazards mission, as described in this thesis, will provide all participating agencies with a universal definition of intelligence-led policing, will maintain and enhance community-policing efforts, and will establish a platform for contribution to the domestic intelligence cycle—fusing New Mexico’s four-corner region, which is essential for leveraging resources to detect and disrupt organized criminal organizations and terrorism.

14. SUBJECT TERMS intelligence, intelligence-led policing, fusion centers, criminal intelligence, tribal communities, tribal law enforcement, rural communities, policing in rural communities, intelligence centers, all-hazards, and intelligence cycle

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FUSING THE FOUR CORNERS: INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING WITHIN NEW MEXICO’S RURAL AND TRIBAL COMMUNITIES

Robert Vasquez Deputy Chief of Police, Santa Fe Police Department

BA, New Mexico Highlands University, 2012

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2018

Approved by: Patrick E. Miller Co-Advisor

Erik J. Dahl Co-Advisor

Erik J. Dahl Associate Chair for Instruction Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how New Mexico’s state fusion center can develop a robust

intelligence-led policing and all-hazards model for New Mexico and its rural and tribal

communities. The research examines the principles behind intelligence-led policing and

identifies best practices established by other local and state law enforcement

organizations, focusing on how these practices are followed by fusion centers. Then, it

conducts a close analysis of the New Mexico fusion center to determine, in light of best

practices, how policies and procedures might be changed to better address rural and tribal

concerns. A redefined intelligence and all-hazards mission, as described in this thesis,

will provide all participating agencies with a universal definition of intelligence-led

policing, will maintain and enhance community-policing efforts, and will establish a

platform for contribution to the domestic intelligence cycle—fusing New Mexico’s

four-corner region, which is essential for leveraging resources to detect and disrupt

organized criminal organizations and terrorism.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................3 B. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................3

1. What Is Intelligence? .....................................................................3 2. Intelligence-Led Policing ...............................................................6 3. Role of Intelligence Fusion Centers ..............................................8

C. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................12 D. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................12 E. CHAPTER OUTLINE.............................................................................13

II. THE NEW MEXICO INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND ITS CHALLENGES ....................................................................................................15 A. THE NEW MEXICO ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

CENTER ...................................................................................................15 B. NEW MEXICO STATE POLICE ..........................................................20 C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................23

III. KEY INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS ..............................................................25 A. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE COMPONENTS ........................................26

1. Planning and Direction/Requirements .......................................26 2. Collection ......................................................................................28 3. Processing .....................................................................................29 4. Analysis .........................................................................................29 5. Dissemination/Action ...................................................................30 6. Feedback/Reevaluation................................................................31

B. U.S. LIAISON OFFICER PROGRAM .................................................32 C. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S MI5 MODEL .........................................33 D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................37

IV. U.S. LOCAL INTELLIGENCE BEST PRACTICES ......................................39 A. EL PASO MULTI-AGENCY TACTICAL RESPONSE

INFORMATION EXCHANGE ..............................................................39 B. NEW JERSEY REGIONAL OPERATIONS AND

INTELLIGENCE CENTER ...................................................................42 C. CASE STUDY: SANTA FE POLICE DEPARTMENT

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER .............................................46 1. The Problem .................................................................................46

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2. The Plan ........................................................................................47 3. Summary .......................................................................................48

D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ................................................................49

V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION ..............................53 A. RECOMMENDATION #1: REALIGNING THE NMASIC ...............54 B. RECOMMENDATION #2: HYBRID INTELLIGENCE

CYCLE......................................................................................................55 C. RECOMMENDATION #3: INTELLIGENCE LIAISON

OFFICER PROGRAM AND THE DESK OFFICER CONCEPT .....56 D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ................................56 E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................57

LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................59

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................63

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Comparative Illustration of Information and Intelligence .........................5

Figure 2. Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities ........................................................11

Figure 3. HSIN 2016 Annual Report Organization Activity ..................................19

Figure 4. Intelligence Cycle ....................................................................................26

Figure 5. Targeting Intelligence ..............................................................................27

Figure 6. UK MI5 Intelligence Cycle ......................................................................36

Figure 7. ROIC’s Three Intelligence-Led Policing Functions ................................45

Figure 8. Hybrid Intelligence Cycle Process .............................................................55

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

DHSEM Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (New Mexico)

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network ILO intelligence liaison officer ILP intelligence-led policing MATRIX Multi-Agency Tactical Response Information Exchange (El Paso,

Texas) NMASIC New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center NMSP New Mexico State Police ROIC Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (New Jersey)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Collecting and sharing information is the heart of effective intelligence-led

policing. One mechanism for managing law enforcement intelligence is intelligence fusion

centers, which help partners share threat information between the federal, state, tribal, and

local levels. The House Committee on Homeland Security, for example, has called for

greater use of fusion centers, arguing that “these State and locally owned hubs for

information sharing and analysis serve as the connection point between front-line law

enforcement and first responders, and the Intelligence Community.” 1 Today, there are

seventy-nine fusion centers throughout the country, located within several states and major

urban cities.

Although fusion centers were created after 9/11 to combat terrorism, many have

broadened their focus to address all crimes or all hazards. The “all-hazards approach refers

to preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies within the

United States.” 2 This approach allows fusion centers to broaden their areas of

responsibility beyond terrorism and related crime, to include major disasters and

emergencies. Statistically, after all, citizens of free countries are more likely to be victims

of violent crimes than of a terrorist attack. 3

Unlike other state fusion centers, the New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center

(NMASIC)—which is embedded within the New Mexico Department of Homeland

Security and Emergency Management (DHSEM)—has not expanded its mission statement

to include public safety and major criminal threats. The NMASIC’s mission is to serve as

a “cross-jurisdictional partnership between local, state, and federal agencies—including

1 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Advancing The Homeland Security Information Sharing

Environment: A Review of the National Network of Fusion Centers” (majority staff report, House Committee on Homeland Security, November 2017).

2 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, “Considerations for Fusion Center and Emergency Operations Center Coordination: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 502,” FEMA, May 2010, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-3917/cpg_502_ comprehensive_preparedness_guide_considerations_for_fusion_center___eoc_coordination_2010.pdf.

3 Mike German, Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007).

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private sectors—for the collection, analysis, and timely dissemination of terrorism

information.” 4 While cases of potential terrorism have remained consistently low, between

2012 and 2013 New Mexico’s violent crime rate rose 6.6 percent, which was the most

significant increase in the country. 5 This spike in violence shows that the NMASIC may

benefit from an all-hazards approach that provides analytical and intelligence support for

criminal investigations through intelligence-led policing.

The NMASIC serves a population of over two million, including 102 municipalities

and 117 rural communities, which include 25 tribal communities on 122,000 square miles. 6

According to the University of New Mexico’s Bureau of Business and Economic Research,

the state has followed the national trend of losing rural populations to urban areas but has

kept a higher percentage of rural areas compared to the rest of the country. 7 This statistical

data indicates that, compared to other state fusion centers, the NMASIC’s area of

responsibility is unique; therefore, its mission statement may need to reflect the

jurisdictional diversity of rural and tribal communities in the information-sharing process.

The NMASIC’s area of responsibility differs from most other fusion centers in another

way: it covers a largely rural and tribal population.

Research and practice show that intelligence fusion centers should transform to law

enforcement needs and, more specifically, to intelligence-led policing. Furthermore,

intelligence-led policing is no longer a concept confined to urban policing; rural and tribal

communities could benefit from the practice. This research identifies key lessons learned

and provides recommendations and suggestions for future research.

4 “Fusion Center,” New Mexico Department of Homeland Security & Emergency Management,

accessed January 13, 2018, http://www.nmdhsem.org/Fusion_Center.aspx. 5 Alexander Kent and Thomas C. Frohlich, “The Most Dangerous States in America,” USA Today,

January 3, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/01/03/24-7-wall-st-most- dangerous-states/21214169/.

6 Suzan Reagan, “Census Population Estimate Release March 2017,” Bureau of Business & Economic Research, April 6, 2017, http://bber.unm.edu/blog/?p=376.

7 Suzan Reagan, “How Rural Is New Mexico?,” Bureau of Business & Economic Research, December 9, 2016, http://bber.unm.edu/blog/?p=364.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As I write this, I reflect on the day I received the unexpected phone call from

Heather Issvoran saying I had been accepted into this prestigious program. Shocked,

excited, and uncertain if it was a prank call, I eventually realized that this small-town boy

from northern New Mexico was now one of the lucky few applicants to experience this

life-changing journey! Thank you to the City of Santa Fe for allowing me to participate in

this program, and a special thank you to the staff in the Santa Fe Police Department for

enduring the weight during my absence. I would like to recognize my dear friend Steve

Hewitt for taking me under his wing in 2014 and showing me the true meaning of

intelligence. Without you, I wouldn’t have been prepared for this program.

The mighty 1703/1704 Cohortians: this journey would have been impossible

without you. Your encouragement, support, and belief in me kept me motivated and

confident that I would reach the finish line with you. The NPS staff is superb; you created

an atmosphere for success and facilitated an environment to absorb the knowledge each of

you possesses. I am forever grateful to you and will cherish the opportunity you have given

me. My advisors, specifically Dr. Erik Dahl, thank you for guiding me through this process.

Your feedback kept me focused on my objective to better the services for my home state.

Also, I could have never written this document without the painstaking, blunt feedback

from my awesome writing coach, Noel Yucuis. Thank you for taking the time and for your

patience in reviewing my work, and most importantly for your investment in seeing this

thesis through!

To my parents, Robert and Francella Vasquez, thank you for being the parents that

you are. You have always been there for me in challenging and good times. You raised me

to do my best and never give up in tough times, which is what helped get me through this

challenging program.

To my wonderful wife, Jolene, you are the backbone of our family and thank you

for holding down the fort while I traveled through this journey. Working a fulltime job,

completing your dual graduate program, and raising our two awesome boys clearly shows

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you are the backbone of our little family! My two little guys, Gabriel and Isaiah, grab your

fishing rods and let’s go fishing!

And last but not least, to the small town of Penasco and Pueblo of Picuris, New

Mexico. This thesis is dedicated to you and all the rural and tribal communities. I have seen

what the opioid epidemic and organized crime has done to our families. I pray that this

research helps us regain control of our communities and give our children an opportunity

to succeed in this challenging world.

I. INTRODUCTION

Collecting and sharing information is the heart of effective intelligence-led

policing. As David L. Carter explains, “It is logical that each law enforcement agency must

develop an effective mechanism to record and manage this array of information that is

distinct from or segregated from other records in the agency’s records management

system.” 1 One such mechanism for managing law enforcement intelligence is intelligence

fusion centers, which help partners share threat information between the federal, state,

tribal, and local levels. The House Committee on Homeland Security, for example, has

called for greater use of fusion centers, arguing that “these State and locally owned hubs

for information sharing and analysis serve as the connection point between front-line law

enforcement and first responders, and the Intelligence Community.” 2 Today, there are

seventy-nine fusion centers throughout the country, located within several states and major

urban cities.

Originally, fusion centers were designed after 9/11 to identify and disrupt potential

terrorist events. However, as Mike German explains, “Citizens of free countries are victims

of terrorism…. But they are also victims of murder, robbery, rape, and other violent crimes

and at a much higher statistical rate.” 3 In essence, citizens of free countries are statistically

more likely to be victims of violent crimes than of a terrorist attack. Today, many fusion

centers have broadened their focus to address all crimes or all hazards. The “all-hazards

approach refers to preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies

within the United States.” 4 This approach allows fusion centers to broaden their areas of

1 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence Operations: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal

Law Enforcement Agencies, second ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2009), 117. 2 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Advancing the Homeland Security Information Sharing

Environment: A Review of the National Network of Fusion Centers” (majority staff report, House Committee on Homeland Security, November 2017).

3 Mike German, Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007).

4 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, “Considerations for Fusion Center and Emergency Operations Center Coordination: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 502,” FEMA, May 2010, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-3917/cpg_502_ comprehensive_preparedness_guide_considerations_for_fusion_center___eoc_coordination_2010.pdf.

responsibility beyond terrorism and related crime, to include major disasters and

emergencies.

Unlike other state fusion centers, however, the New Mexico All Source Intelligence

Center (NMASIC) has not expanded its mission statement to include public safety and

major criminal threats. Embedded within the New Mexico Department of Homeland

Security and Emergency Management (DHSEM), the NMASIC’s mission is to serve as a

“cross-jurisdictional partnership between local, state, and federal agencies-including

private sectors for the collection, analysis, and timely dissemination of terrorism

information.” 5 Yet the NMASIC’s mission is centered primarily on terrorism and lacks an

all-hazards approach, which includes criminal acts. While cases of potential terrorism have

remained consistently low, between 2012 and 2013 New Mexico’s violent crime rate rose

6.6 percent, which was the most significant increase in the country. 6 This spike in violence

shows that the NMASIC may benefit from an all-hazards approach that provides analytical

and intelligence support for criminal investigations through intelligence-led policing.

The NMASIC serves a population of over two million, including 102 municipalities

and 117 rural communities, which include 25 tribal communities on 122,000 square miles. 7

According to the University of New Mexico’s Bureau of Business and Economic Research,

the state has followed the national trend of losing rural populations to urban areas but has

kept a higher percentage of rural areas compared to the rest of the country. 8 This statistical

data indicates that, compared to other state fusion centers, the NMASIC’s area of

responsibility is unique; therefore, its mission statement may need to reflect the

jurisdictional diversity of rural and tribal communities in the information-sharing process.

5 “Fusion Center,” New Mexico Department of Homeland Security & Emergency Management

(DHSSEM), accessed January 13, 2018, http://www.nmdhsem.org/Fusion_Center.aspx. 6 Alexander Kent and Thomas C. Frohlich, “The Most Dangerous States in America,” USA Today,

January 3, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/01/03/24-7-wall-st-most- dangerous-states/21214169/.

7 Suzan Reagan, “Census Population Estimate Release March 2017,” Bureau of Business & Economic Research, April 6, 2017, http://bber.unm.edu/blog/?p=376.

8 Suzan Reagan, “How Rural Is New Mexico?,” Bureau of Business & Economic Research, December 9, 2016, http://bber.unm.edu/blog/?p=364.

The NMASIC’s area of responsibility differs from most other fusion centers in another

way: it covers a largely rural and tribal population.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

How can New Mexico implement an all-hazards, intelligence-led policing model

for rural and tribal policing to benefit all government stakeholders? In particular, how can

that model be applied at the NMASIC?

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review evaluates the most relevant academic literature available to

provide a universally accepted definition of intelligence-led policing for New Mexico’s

rural and tribal law enforcement. The material is from a variety of sources such as academic

literature, reports from subject matter experts, professional journals, census data, the

Department of Justice/Bureau of Justice Assistance program, and the Bureau of Justice

Statistics.

1. What Is Intelligence?

Law enforcement’s use of criminal intelligence in the United States developed in

the early 1900s. For example, criminal intelligence successfully disrupted the Black Hand

Society, a criminal organization involved in extorting money from Italian immigrants in

New York City during the early 1900s. As a result, fewer Italian immigrants were

victimized and crimes involving Italian immigrants significantly decreased. 9 By the end of

the twentieth century, law enforcement accepted criminal intelligence as an effective tool

to address organized crime. 10 In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal

Justice Standards and Goals encouraged “every law enforcement agency and every state to

immediately establish and maintain the capability to gather and evaluate information, and

to disseminate intelligence in a manner that protects every individual’s right to privacy

9 Marilyn Peterson, Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture, NCJ 210681

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, September 2005). 10 Richard Wright et al. (eds.), Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century: A Guide for Intelligence

Professionals (Sacramento, CA; Richmond, VA: Law Enforcement Intelligence Units; International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis, 2011).

while it curtails organized crime and public disorder.” 11 The use of criminal intelligence

has resulted in hundreds of deportations and thousands of arrests. 12

The definition of the word intelligence has changed over the years, and has often

been conflated with the term information. 13 According to Mark Lowenthal, although

intelligence may seem no different than information to outsiders, understanding the

difference between the two is crucial. He categorizes information as anything that is

already known and intelligence as information that fulfills the needs of policymakers. 14

“All intelligence is information,” he says, but “not all information is intelligence.” 15 For

information to become intelligence, it must be analyzed and vetted. Marilyn Peterson offers

the same definition in a simple equation: “information plus analysis equals intelligence.” 16

According to Carter, law enforcement intelligence is “the product of an analytic process

that provides an integrated perspective to disparate information about crime, crime trends,

crime and security threats, and conditions associated with criminality.” 17 Figure 1 provides

a comparative illustration of information and intelligence. Additionally, the term is

interpreted differently by those with operations or analysis functions. For instance, patrol

officers believe intelligence has minimal relevance to their daily function and is viewed as

a tool “mainly used by specialized units employing wiretaps and surveillance.” 18 For

senior police officers, however, intelligence is a valuable mechanism that supports strategic

decision-making and investigation. Nevertheless, to criminal intelligence analysts,

intelligence “represents a rare objective voice that understands the criminal

environment.” 19

11 Wright et al. 12 Wright et al. 13 Peterson, Intelligence-Led Policing. 14 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, seventh ed. (Los Angeles: CQ Press,

2017). 15 Lowenthal. 16 Peterson, Intelligence-Led Policing. 17 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence, 12. 18 Jerry Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing (London: Willan, 2008). 19 Ratcliffe.

Figure 1. Comparative Illustration of Information and Intelligence 20

Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes, Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police, provides

a different perspective on intelligence. He identifies intelligence as “the synthesis of known

data/information and analytical reasoning to create a determination about the overall

operating environment.” 21 Fuentes also finds that intelligence is often incorrectly used by

law enforcement officers, who interchangeably use the terms data or information in the

same context. 22 Robert Smith supports Fuentes, recognizing intelligence as an acquired

20 Source: Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence, 12. 21 Joseph R. Fuentes, “New Jersey State Police Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing” (report,

New Jersey State Police, September 2016), 44. 22 Fuentes.

role for law enforcement agencies following 9/11. 23 Another pioneer in the literature of

intelligence, Brian Jackson, defines criminal intelligence “as efforts by government

organizations to gather, assess, and act on information about individuals or organizations

in the United States or U.S. persons elsewhere that are not related to the investigation of a

known past criminal act or specific planned criminal activity.” 24

Despite the various interpretations, the essential definition remains the same:

intelligence pertains to the collection of information, analysis of the collected information,

and finally its actionable dissemination. Using this basic, functional concept, all levels of

law enforcement ought to have an understanding of intelligence. This thesis accepts the

simplest understanding of intelligence as defined by Lowenthal: “All intelligence is

information, not all information is intelligence.” 25 This basic understanding allows law

enforcement personnel and leadership to collectively understand that intelligence is a

product of evaluated, vetted, and synthesized information. Patrol officers, senior officers,

and criminal intelligence analysts should have this same understanding, which provides the

essential framework and applications for intelligence-led policing.

2. Intelligence-Led Policing

Intelligence-led policing is now broadly adopted by law enforcement agencies as a

fundamental public safety function, but there remains ambiguity about its definition and

essential concepts in the literature. 26 For example, Carter defines it as “the collection and

analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting

in an actionable intelligence product designed to assist law enforcement in developing

tactical responses to threats and strategic planning related to emerging or changing

23 Robert A. Smith, “Law Enforcement Intelligence: Its Evolution and Scope Today,” Journal of U.S.

Intelligence Studies 20, no. 3 (Spring/Summer 2014): 59–63, https://www.afio.com/publications/SMITH_ Robert_Law_Enforcement_Intelligence_FINAL_2014July14.pdf.

24 Brian A. Jackson and Agnes Gereben Schaefer (eds.), The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society: A Multidisciplinary Look at the Creation of a U.S. Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009).

25 Lowenthal, Intelligence. 26 Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing.

threats.” 27 Meanwhile, Jerry Ratcliff defines intelligence-led policing as “a business model

and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an

objective decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction,

disruption, and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement

strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.” 28 Although these definitions vary in

perspective, they share the common elements of the collection, analysis, and the delivery

of actionable intelligence.

Intelligence-led policing emerged in the United States because of the 9/11 terrorist

events. 29 As a result, the national strategy for homeland security “required all levels of law

enforcement to detect, deter, prevent, respond to and mitigate criminal and terrorist

activities.” 30 Adopting the framework from the British National Intelligence Model, the

U.S. Department of Justice provides the following intelligence-led-policing, or ILP,

framework:

American ILP relies on analytically understanding multijurisdictional crime threats, developing a pathway toward solving the crime problems, and relying on proactive information sharing, both within the agency and externally with other law enforcement agencies, to maximize the number of law enforcement personnel who may identify indicators of threats and intervene. 31

Following 9/11, organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police

recommended that local, state, and tribal law enforcement agencies adopt intelligence-led

policing. 32 At the time, “ILP was envisioned as a tool for sharing information that would

aid law enforcement agencies in identifying threats and developing responses to prevent

27 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence. 28 Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing. 29 Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Reducing Crime through Intelligence-Led Policing,” National

Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, accessed November 16, 2018, https://www.ncirc.gov/documents/ public/Reducing_Crime_Through_ILP.pdf.

30 Smith, “Law Enforcement Intelligence.” 31 Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Reducing Crime.” 32 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence.

those threats from reaching fruition in America’s communities.” 33 However, intelligence-

led policing is sometimes confused with other policing strategies, such as Compstat and

problem-oriented policing. 34 And since the intelligence-led policing concept was adopted

in American policing, the methodology has become a buzzword. 35

As further explained by Richard Wright, “the primary aim of intelligence-led

policing is the prevention of crime and arrest of prolific offenders, and it seeks a more

objective decision-making system based on data and intelligence analysis to determine

priorities.” 36 The key component in American intelligence-led policing is information

sharing. Sharing information within an agency and externally with law enforcement

partners is essential for detection, prevention, and response to criminal and terrorist threats.

Furthermore, intelligence-led policing has promoted innovation, allowing law enforcement

leadership to supplement traditional community-policing services with innovative

applications. 37 The use of technological solutions―such as cell phone analysis, social

media covert operations, surveillance cameras, and global positioning devices―has

allowed law enforcement to target individuals and organizations proactively. The mixture

of innovative investigative strategies and information sharing allows police to adapt to

modern threats.

3. Role of Intelligence Fusion Centers

The fusion center concept began in the major urban area jurisdictions of Arizona,

Georgia, New York, and Los Angeles with efforts to “fill the void of combining

information and intelligence sources at the local level to ferret out terrorist activity, thereby

underpinning a national effort to share information that could be used in overall

33 Carter. 34 Wright et al., Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century. 35 Jerry Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-Led Policing and the Problems of Turning Rhetoric into Practice,”

Policing and Society 12, no. 1 (2002): 53–66. 36 Wright et al., Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century. 37 Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Reducing Crime.”

preparedness efforts.” 38 Currently, there are several fusion centers serving the local, state,

and regional “information sharing and analytic function” efforts. 39 As of January 2013,

there were well over seventy fusion centers, which include twenty-six major urban area

fusion centers and fifty-three state fusion centers. 40 On December 11, 2018, the

Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative

reiterated the Presidential Guideline 2 Report about the common framework for fusion

centers, stating that fusion centers take the following responsibilities:

1. Share information to address national security and criminal investigations in a manner that protects privacy, civil liberties, and other legal rights of individuals protected by United States law, while ensuring the security of the information shared.

2. Foster a culture of fusing “all crimes with national security implications” with “all hazards” information in order to capture criminal activity that may be a precursor to a terrorist plot.

3. Support efforts to detect and prevent terrorist attacks by maintaining situational awareness of threats, alerts, and warnings.

4. Develop critical infrastructure protection plans to ensure the security and resiliency of infrastructure operations.

5. Prioritize emergency management, response, and recovery planning activities based on likely threat scenarios and at-risk targets.

6. Determine the allocation of funding, capabilities, and other resources.

7. Develop training, awareness, and exercise programs. 41

38 Justin Lewis Abold, Ray Guidetti, and Douglas Keyer, “Strengthening the Value of the National

Network of Fusion Centers by Leveraging Specialization: Defining ‘Centers of Analytical Excellence,’” Homeland Security Affairs 8, article 7 (June 2012), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/223.

39 House Committee on Homeland Security, “National Network of Fusion Centers” (majority staff report, House Committee on Homeland Security, July 2013).

40 House Committee on Homeland Security. 41 Department of Homeland Security, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Department of Homeland

Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative” (assessment, Department of Homeland Security, 2008).

It is commonly expressed by fusion center critics that all fusion centers are similar;

if you have seen one, you have seen them all. However, as explained in the Homeland

Security Affairs Journal, “While it remains important that fusion centers maintain uniform

baseline capabilities, today there is a renewed interest in acknowledging the value

individual fusion centers can provide with unique expertise and specializations.” 42 The

American Civil Liberties Union also acknowledges that it is difficult to generalize fusion

centers because “no two fusion centers are alike.” 43 However, “Each fusion center is

responsible for determining who within their area of responsibility (AOR) requires

information and intelligence products that address threat and risk related to crime, counter-

terrorism, and homeland security.” 44 Also, as depicted in Figure 2, the fusion center

baseline capabilities are defined by two sections: fusion process capabilities and

management, and administrative capabilities. The former outlines the standards for the

fusion center’s intelligence process and the latter enables its functional concept. 45

Chapter III of this thesis will highlight the importance of the intelligence cycle process for

local, state, tribal, and federal partners.

42 Abold, Guidetti, and Keyer, “Strengthening the Value of the National Network of Fusion Centers.” 43 Michael German and Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? (New York: American Civil

Liberties Union, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf. 44 Abold, Guidetti, and Keyer, “Strengthening the Value of the National Network of Fusion Centers.” 45 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, “Baseline Capabilities for State and

Major Urban Area Fusion Centers” (supplement, Department of Homeland Security, September 2008).

Figure 2. Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities 46

There remain questions about the role and integrity of fusion centers. A report from

the House Committee on Homeland Security in 2017 stresses new challenges that could

affect the fusion center’s ability to assess and share threat information. 47 Some of those

challenges include the social media policies restricting fusion centers from valuable data,

and the restriction of some local and state law enforcement agencies from collaborating

with federal partners. 48 Furthermore, the report also recommends that the Department of

Homeland Security and Department of Justice collaborate with the national network to

review and update fusion center guidelines and capabilities to “accurately reflect the threat

environment and promote … continued growth.” 49

Lastly, the fusion center’s core function involves outreach and information sharing

with local, state, and tribal stakeholders within the center’s area of responsibility.

46 Adapted from Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice. 47 House Homeland Security Committee, “Advancing the Information Sharing Environment.” 48 House Homeland Security Committee. 49 House Homeland Security Committee.

Nevertheless, it is difficult for fusion centers to establish and maintain direct contact with

individuals from many jurisdictions. 50 Therefore, state fusion centers have developed a

liaison officer program to facilitate the information-sharing process. 51 This program is

explored in Chapter IV, which outlines the function and benefits of a liaison officer

program as seen in the NMASIC.

C. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis examines the principles of intelligence-led policing and determines best

practices as they have been established by other local and state law enforcement

organizations, focusing on how these practices are followed by fusion centers. Then, it

conducts a close analysis of the New Mexico fusion center to determine, in light of best

practices, how policies and procedures might be changed to better address rural and tribal

concerns.

D. ARGUMENT

To develop a robust intelligence-led policing model, this thesis argues that New

Mexico must adopt all-hazards and intelligence-led policing strategies to incorporate rural

and tribal communities into the information-sharing process. The reorganization of the

NMASIC will enhance the New Mexico network, which is essential for leveraging

resources to detect and disrupt organized criminal organizations and terrorism. With a

redefined NMASIC mission, all participating agencies will have a universal intelligence-

led policing definition, maintain and enhance community-policing efforts, and establish a

platform for contribution to the domestic intelligence cycle, essentially fusing New

Mexico’s four-corner region.

50 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, Establishing a Fusion Center Liaison

Officer Program: A Guide and Workbook of Planning and Development Considerations (Vienna, VA: Lafayette Group, October 2009).

51 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice.

E. CHAPTER OUTLINE

Following this introduction, Chapter II examines the New Mexico intelligence

system and its challenges. Chapter III highlights the key intelligence functions with a

review of the intelligence recommendations provided by the Department of Justice and

experts cited in the literature review, a review of the liaison officer programs, and a look

at the United Kingdom’s MI5 intelligence model. Chapter IV is an analysis of U.S. local

intelligence best practices, specifically the El Paso, Texas, Multi-Agency Tactical

Response Information Exchange (MATRIX), the New Jersey Regional Operations and

Intelligence Center Task Force, and the Santa Fe Police Department’s Criminal

Intelligence and Analysis Center. Finally, Chapter V identifies key lessons learned and

provides recommendations and suggestions for future research.

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II. THE NEW MEXICO INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND ITS CHALLENGES

In 2003, in the aftermath of 9/11, the New Mexico Office of Homeland Security

was created and began working with the Office of Emergency Management. In 2007, the

New Mexico legislature joined the two offices, essentially creating the Department of

Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHSEM). Today, the DHSEM is the

state’s primary organization for responding to emergencies and disasters. 52 The New

Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC), the state fusion center, falls under

DHSEM and incorporates an all-hazards approach. However, unlike other fusion

intelligence centers, the NMASIC lacks an effective and efficient law enforcement

authority to fulfill an all-hazards model. This chapter first provides an in-depth review of

the NMASIC’s operational policies and procedures from the author’s professional

observations as the NMASIC intelligence liaison officer coordinator. Then, it reviews the

intelligence system within the NMASIC and the New Mexico State Police (NMSP),

particularly the problems.

A. THE NEW MEXICO ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CENTER

The intelligence cycle is the core of the NMASIC’s function and it has five essential

components: collecting, analyzing, collating, disseminating, and reevaluating information.

Of the five intelligence-cycle components, collection has been the most difficult. The

NMASIC uses a variety of data sources; it does not rely on a single source for information

collection. Similar to other state and major fusion centers, the NMASIC gathers tips and

leads from the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, as well as from local,

state, and federal entities, the private sector, and the public safety and public health sectors.

For standard information collection, the NMASIC uses two forms: requests for information

(RFIs) and requests for product (RFPs). An RFI is a specific source to help “narrow the

intelligence gaps for threat assessments, criminal investigations and other tactical and

52 “New Mexico Department of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, accessed July 12,

2018, http://www.nmdhsem.org/.

strategic intelligence products,” and RFPs are intelligence product requests from other

organizations. 53

At the time of its implementation in 2017, New Mexico Statute Chapter 9, Article

28, classified DHSEM as a criminal justice–law enforcement agency with the objectives

to:

(1) consolidate and coordinate homeland security and emergency management functions to provide comprehensive and coordinated preparedness, mitigation, prevention, protection, response and recovery for emergencies and disasters, regardless of cause, and acts or threats of terrorism;

(2) act as the central primary coordinating agency for the state and its political subdivisions in response to emergencies, disasters and acts or threats of terrorism; and

(3) act as the conduit for federal assistance and cooperation in response to emergencies, disasters and acts or threats of terrorism. 54

The statute continues:

B. The department shall be considered a criminal justice law enforcement agency in order to accomplish the purposes provided in Subsection A of this section. 55

Although DHSEM is classified as a law enforcement agency and given statutory authority,

the personnel assigned to the DHSEM do not have authority to act as law enforcement

officers; for instance, they cannot obtain court-ordered arrest and search warrants.

Additionally, this statutory authority is specific to disasters and threats of terrorism only;

it does not give DHSEM—or therefore the NMASIC—authority in the criminal realm.

This statutory clause has been at the center of debate between the law enforcement

community and DHSEM personnel. Despite the DHSEM’s statutory authority, New

53 New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC), “New Mexico All Source Intelligence

Center Operations Manual” (manual, New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center, July 2014). 54 NM Stat § 9–28-2 (2017), https://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/2017/chapter-9/article-28/

section-9-28-2/. 55 NM Stat § 9–28-2.

Mexico’s local, state, and tribal law enforcement organizations have been hesitant to share

law enforcement–sensitive information or information about ongoing criminal

investigations with the DHSEM. Most agency partners do not recognize the DHSEM as an

equivalent law enforcement agency. As such, DHSEM personnel have repeatedly been

refused assistance with RFIs—including simple requests such as a driver’s license check.

Therefore, DHSEM personnel rely on the assistance of the few law enforcement personnel

who are willing to share information or contribute to the fusion center’s mission.

Compounding the problem is a contradicting section within the NMASIC’s

operational manual that lists informants and citizen sources as a form of information

collection: unlike its local law enforcement partners, the NMASIC does not have the law

enforcement authority to manage informants or citizen sources. Without this human

intelligence component, the NMASIC has limited ability to collect valuable information,

which increases its dependence on law enforcement organizations that do have this

capability.

Like most intelligence centers, the NMASIC uses the intelligence cycle “to extract

structured and unstructured data from multiple sources, perform synthesis, fusion, and

analysis on this data, and disseminate the processed critical information (or intelligence) to

decision-makers in support of their tactical, operational and strategic planning.” 56 The

NMASIC’s intelligence network structure incorporates two vital components in support of

its intelligence liaison officer (ILO) program: the executive advisory board—made up of

local, state, and tribal leaders—and the intelligence-working group—which consists of

mid-level management and first-line supervisors from the ILO agency. 57 The NMASIC’s

ILO framework is an effort to fulfill the House Committee on Homeland Security

Committee’s recommendation, which states that the National Fusion Center Association

“should work with fusion centers to continue to expand their outreach efforts to

stakeholders outside of law enforcement, tailor their trainings and outreach to specific

sectors targeted, and proactively find ways to continue engagement with TLOs, and similar

56 NMASIC, “Operations Manual.” 57 NMASIC.

partners, after initial training.” 58 However, a majority of the NMASIC’s ILOs represent

federal partners as well as medium-sized law enforcement agencies located in New

Mexico’s urban centers. Law enforcement agencies within rural and tribal communities do

not fully engage in the ILO program. While the NMASIC successfully incorporated eighty

ILOs in 2015, only one of approximately twenty-three tribal law enforcement agencies

contributes to the program.

For the NMASIC, email and the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)

both serve as portals of communication with New Mexico ILOs. In December 2002, a

collaborative law enforcement group instituted a database called the Joint Regional

Information Exchange System; in 2004 it was transferred to the Department of Homeland

Security and renamed HSIN. HSIN is designed to share sensitive but unclassified

information with agencies across the local, state, tribal, and private-sector levels. 59 In

addition, HSIN unites people, processes, and technologies needed for mission success;

many communities rely on its information for day-to-day operations, domestic and

international events, critical incident management, disaster planning and response, and

public safety. 60 By allowing all participating organizations to collaborate and share

information, the HSIN database has been useful for catastrophic events, such as the

Deepwater Horizon oil spill in May 2010, and major public events, such as presidential

inaugurations and the Super Bowl. 61 Although HSIN is designed to unite people from

various law enforcement agencies and private-sector partners, not all law enforcement

agencies access or contribute to HSIN as designed.

As the Department of Homeland Security noted in 2016, local law enforcement

account for 34 percent of HSIN users; federal organizations account for 29 percent, state

58 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Advancing Information Sharing.” 59 “What Is HSIN?,” Department of Homeland Security, July 6, 2009, https://www.dhs.gov/what-hsin. 60 “HSIN Basics,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 13, 2017,

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSIN-Fact-Sheet-HSIN-Basics.pdf. 61 “2016 Annual Report: Delivering Mission Success,” Homeland Security Information Network,

accessed November 21, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSIN-2016%20Annual %20Report-FINAL-electronic.pdf.

organizations for 18 percent, and the private sector for 15 percent. 62 HSIN claims to

provide tribal communities an opportunity to overcome geographic and communication

challenges, but tribal partners make up only 0.5 percent of users, as shown in Figure 3. 63

Figure 3. HSIN 2016 Annual Report Organization Activity 64

New Mexico’s HSIN membership allows users to access the state’s ILO program

and law enforcement portals, which provide information on border security, cyber threats,

domestic terrorism/extremism, international terrorism/extremism, gangs, general crime,

and organized/transnational crime. 65 The NMASIC routinely updates the HSIN law

enforcement portal, but the ILO portal is underutilized; its information was not updated

between July 2015 and June 2017. 66 HSIN was designed for information sharing, but the

NMASIC HSIN portal lacks a state information-sharing database equivalent to the state

police’s Criminal Justice Information System, which is a robust information collection and

sharing database. DHSEM does not have access to this state database, however, because

62 Homeland Security Information Network. 63 Homeland Security Information Network. 64 Adapted from Homeland Security Information Network. 65 Homeland Security Information Network, accessed March 28, 2018, https://auth.dhs.gov. 66 Homeland Security Information Network.

the state police department does not recognize DHSEM as a law enforcement agency;

without such a recognition, DHSEM is not authorized to obtain the law enforcement–

sensitive information contained within this database.

The ILO program does effectively collect information from multiple jurisdictions,

such as rural and tribal communities, but only when the law enforcement agencies from

those communities choose to participate in the process. New Mexico is plagued with

various forms of crime that affect all communities and, as General Stanley McChrystal

says, “it takes a network to defeat a network.” 67 Although an effective ILO program may

help target criminal networks, the NMASIC has failed to fulfill this vital fusion center

concept due to poor cooperation and acceptance from the wider law enforcement

community.

To engage with its law enforcement partners, NMASIC created a “core product

line” to enhance situational awareness across agencies. 68 The product line includes risk

assessments, special event/threat assessments, intelligence bulletins, priority bulletins,

weekly executive summaries, joint products, reference aids, and suspicious activity

reporting analysis. Unfortunately, the NMASIC lacks the capability to provide actionable

intelligence products to local, state, and tribal law enforcement. Also, the NMASIC

employs a twenty-four-hour emergency schedule to support national, state, or regional

emergencies, should they occur; however, this schedule lacks the functional capability of

a watch center, as explored in Chapter IV. 69

B. NEW MEXICO STATE POLICE

The New Mexico State Police (NMSP) has changed its mission and law

enforcement services since its incorporation. In 1935, the New Mexico Motor Patrol was

rebranded as the New Mexico State Police and given peace officer authority to enforce all

state laws. To the state, NMSP created twelve districts and assigned one commanding

67 Stanley McChrystal, Team of Teams (London: Penguin, 2015), 84. 68 NMASIC, “Operations Manual.” 69 NMASIC.

officer to each district to manage day-to-day operations. Moreover, the NMSP may cross

jurisdictions with tribal territory in criminal cases because of recognized “cross

deputization agreements.” 70 NMSP shares this understanding with the Navajo Region,

which is policed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which covers Utah, Colorado, a

majority of Arizona, and New Mexico. However, no intelligence component supports the

Navajo Region or connects any of the twelve tribal regions.

NMSP’s jurisdiction expands beyond the state and tribal territories as well; an

NMSP representative serves as a coordinator for the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. In

comparison to other New Mexico law enforcement agencies, the NMSP is thus positioned

to collaborate with all levels of government.

Within NMSP, intelligence and analysis is the responsibility of the Criminal

Investigations Bureau. The following is a breakdown of the NMSP analysis and

intelligence collection function:

ANALYSIS

Crime Analysis Unit (CAU)—Conducts detailed research to identify crime trends activity distribution, effectiveness of in-progress or proposed enforcement strategies, legislative impact studies, and special projects as required.

Strategic Analysis—Analysis involving in-depth research of long-term crime trends, which assist in generating projections of increases or decreases in crime. Examples include proactive criminal threat assessments and predicting trends and patterns of current and future criminal activity.

Tactical Analysis—Analysis that assists immediate law enforcement needs and supports short-range purposes, usually conducted in support of a specific criminal investigation, i.e., link analysis, financial analysis, telephone toll analysis, etc. 71

70 “Tribal Law Enforcement,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, accessed September 27, 2017,

https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=75. 71 New Mexico Department of Public Safety, “Analytical Services,” Policy Number OPR:11 (internal

document, New Mexico Department of Public Safety, January 4, 2010).

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Criminal Intelligence—Information compiled, analyzed and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity.

Strategic Intelligence—Information concerning existing patterns or emerging trends of criminal activity designed to assist in criminal apprehension and crime control strategies, for both short- and long-term investigative goals.

Tactical Intelligence—Information regarding a specific criminal event that can be used immediately by operational units to further a criminal investigation, plan tactical operations and provide for officer/public safety. 72

These processes are designed to effectively and efficiently address criminal trends and

criminal activity within the state, but NMSP lacks a critical infrastructure component like

DHSEM’s. Also, NMSP does not operate a state fusion center; instead, the operational

units submit their intelligence reports to the Criminal Justice Information System database

and, if necessary, to the NMASIC. 73

Herein lies the problem with the New Mexico intelligence function. DHSEM,

which facilitates the NMASIC, is exceptionally capable in responding to potential threats

to the state’s critical infrastructure but lacks the ability to address organized crime and

threats of terrorism. Law enforcement agencies who choose to share information with the

NMASIC only when necessary are steering the state blindly in addressing the crimes and

threats affecting local, state, and tribal communities.

The NMSP has three regional communication centers throughout the state, in Las

Vegas, Las Cruces, and Albuquerque, and more than 100 staff members. Each of the

centers has the ability to provide communication channels for local, state, and federal

entities with public safety services, which include law enforcement, emergency

72 New Mexico Department of Public Safety, “Intelligence Collection,” Policy Number OPR:02

(internal document, New Mexico Department of Public Safety, February 24, 2011). 73 New Mexico Department of Public Safety.

management, and fire services. 74 However, NMSP regional communication centers lack

abilities seen in the other intelligence centers, such as “maintaining situation awareness of

events locally and throughout the world; completing time-sensitive requests from vetted

partners; and, coordinating the dissemination of information.” 75 Realigning NMSP

regional communication centers may enhance current analysis abilities and, most

advantageously, enhance asset management around the state to address all hazards and all

threats. Furthermore, realignment would effectively allocate NMSP assets and resources,

allowing leadership to deploy readily available resources in the event of an emergency or

to address criminal activity.

C. CONCLUSION

Since 2003, New Mexico has attempted to incorporate an intelligence component

for local, state, and tribal law enforcement by creating the NMASIC. The NMASIC has

initiated an ILO program as a tool for outreach to law enforcement agencies and has utilized

the HSIN database as a platform for information sharing. However, these two approaches

have been unsuccessful and the fusion center’s core mission remains unfulfilled. The

highlight of this chapter is the importance of information sharing. Like several New

Mexico law enforcement agencies, the NMSP submits its intelligence reports to the

NMASIC “if necessary.” 76 Carter et al. argue, however, that “state, local, and tribal law

enforcement agencies play a critical role in securing the homeland, and understanding and

improving the intelligence practices of these agencies will enhance public safety.” 77

Analysis and intelligence collection are an unrealized gold mine for NMSP. With access

to tribal communities through tribal jurisdiction agreements and a critical role in the FBI

Joint Terrorism Task Force, NMSP is in a position to receive and disseminate information

74 “Communications Bureau,” New Mexico State Police, accessed July 13, 2018,

https://www.sp.nm.gov/index.php/dispatch-centers. 75 El Paso Police Department, “MATRIX—El Paso Fusion Center Procedures and Protocols”

(retrieved via personal communication, MATRIX Director, June 28, 2018). 76 El Paso Police Department. 77 David Carter et al., “Understanding the Intelligence Practices of State, Local, and Tribal Law

Enforcement Agencies” (report, U.S. Department of Justice, May 2012), 2.

across all levels of government and fulfill the critical role of a state intelligence center. The

following chapter explores the key functions of an intelligence center, with an emphasis on

the intelligence cycle components, the liaison officer program, and the United Kingdom’s

intelligence model.

III. KEY INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

In 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice released the “National Criminal

Intelligence Sharing Plan,” which encourages all law enforcement agencies to have an

intelligence capability. 78 Although agencies would likely agree that working together is a

force multiplier for detecting, disrupting, and dismantling criminal and terrorist

organizations, not all agencies have the budgets or resources to create an intelligence

function. Many law enforcement agencies that cannot implement such a component choose

to participate in fusion center liaison officer programs, which allow participating agencies

to contribute information from their local jurisdictions and, in return, receive information

from the intelligence center that affects their areas of responsibility.

Although each intelligence center applies the intelligence cycle differently, the core

of each model, as shown in Figure 4, consists of planning for, collecting, processing,

analyzing, disseminating, and reevaluating actionable intelligence. Carter defines the

intelligence cycle as “a systemic, scientific, and logical methodology to comprehensively

process information to ensure that the most accurate, actionable intelligence is produced

and disseminated to the people who provide an operational response to prevent a criminal

threat from reaching fruition.” 79 This process allows decision makers and investigative

staff to collaborate and address criminal threats. A local intelligence system must

accomplish several key functions: apply the intelligence cycle, use liaison officers and

other methods to reach out to constituents and stakeholders, use intelligence-led policing,

and follow an all-hazards model. This chapter identifies the key functions of an intelligence

center and examines the recommendations from the Department of Justice and intelligence

experts cited in the literature review. The chapter also examines the United Kingdom’s

MI5 intelligence model for useful concepts.

78 Department of Justice, “The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan: Solutions and

Approaches for a Cohesive Plan to Improve Our Nation’s Ability to Develop and Share Criminal Intelligence” (report, Department of Justice, October 2003), https://it.ojp.gov/documents/National_ Criminal_Intelligence_Sharing_Plan.pdf.

79 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence, 57.

Figure 4. Intelligence Cycle 80

A. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE COMPONENTS

1. Planning and Direction/Requirements

Law enforcement agencies in the United States have varied missions and

intelligence needs based on their jurisdictions. Local, state, and tribal police departments

exercise traditional community-oriented policing services, conduct patrols, and carry out

criminal investigations, while other law enforcement agencies, such as the NMSP, enforce

traffic laws to promote vehicle and pedestrian safety. Federal law enforcement

organizations such as the FBI primarily conduct criminal investigations. Intelligence

centers use risk assessment to identify and prioritize threats, vulnerabilities, and

consequences; law enforcement, however, typically uses a targeting intelligence approach

to identify individuals and groups involved in criminal activity. The fusion center risk-

assessment model is a functional concept for an all-hazards and all-crimes application,

which means fusion centers incorporate all potential threats that may affect their areas of

responsibility. Such a model is not effective for law enforcement organizations which need

80 Adapted from: Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, “Baseline

Capabilities.”

a more aggressive approach to deal with criminal organizations. The targeting intelligence

methodology, shown in Figure 5, provides leadership with multiple options for addressing

criminal activity. As Frank Root explains, the targeting method is “the process of

developing and selecting criminal and criminally related targets in response to the mission

manager’s guidance and the law enforcement mission objectives.” 81 Targeting splits the

criminals’ activities into manageable challenges for law enforcement. 82 A blend of both

models—risk assessment and targeting—benefits all levels of law enforcement and fulfills

the fusion center’s functional concept.

Figure 5. Targeting Intelligence 83

81 Frank S. Root, Law Enforcement Intelligence Critical Elements (San Luis Obispo, CA: F.S. Root,

2006). 82 Root. 83 Adapted from Root.

2. Collection

Law enforcement collects information from a variety of sources, which include, to

name a few, daily observations, surveillance, victim/witness statements, electronic

databases, cell phone analysis, confidential sources, and informants. Michael Bazzell

explains that information may be obtained through a search warrant or through publicly

available (open-source) options; the information is “collected, exploited and timelessly

disseminated to an appropriate audience to address a specific intelligence requirement.” 84

During a narcotics investigation, for example, a detective may obtain a search warrant for

a cell phone to collect information and develop leads, and then send the information to a

criminal intelligence analyst, who examines the data and provides a social networking

analysis. An example of open-source information—accessible to anyone—is postings on

social media sites; accessing this information does not infringe on a U.S. citizen’s

constitutional right to protection from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth

Amendment.

Law enforcement is prohibited from collecting information from or on individuals

unless probable cause has been established. Brian Jackson and Agnes Schaefer suggest that

intelligence designs, policies, and capabilities require an understanding of the types of

information that may be collected and how the information may be used. 85 For example,

they explain that the role of personal information depends on the investigative method:

Specific: A person of interest is identified, and information is sought on that individual. The information may include personal information about other people—e.g., the people he or she knows….

Relational: A person of interest is identified. Information is then sought on those who may have a connection with that person….

84 Michael Bazzell, Open Source Intelligence Techniques: Resources for Searching and Analyzing

Online Information (Charleston, SC: CCI, 2014), 3. 85 Jackson and Schaefer, The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society.

General: This methodology is based on the assumption that potential terrorism suspects can be identified by dint [the mark] of the unique pattern of transactions in which they engage. 86

Bound by the Constitution and challenged by technological advancements, law

enforcement specifically identifies the targets and their networks to effectively apply

investigative efforts with minimal resources. The connection of individuals and businesses

allows personnel to explore all available investigative avenues.

3. Processing

Before information can be analyzed, it must go through a vetting process.

Processing is the function of separating relevant from irrelevant data and then labeling

relevant data within a usable system. 87 As explained by Carter, the intelligence process

has four essential components: reliability, validity, method, and deconfliction. The

reliability and validity of the source of information are essential for determining

appropriate investigative and operational planning. For example, if a confidential

informant provides information on an individual who is involved in drug trafficking, the

investigating officer must determine the reliability and validity of the source’s information,

which requires corroborating information through other means, such as surveillance. If the

source of information is unreliable, the information may be inadmissible in prosecutorial

proceedings and jeopardize investigative efforts. The failure to deconflict information may

jeopardize ongoing investigations for law enforcement organizations, may duplicate effort,

and, most importantly, may lead to unattended consequences for officers.

4. Analysis

There is no question that adequate analysis is the key to effective intelligence. As

previously defined, information must be analyzed to become intelligence. 88 Therefore,

86 Jackson and Schaefer. 87 Christopher Cleary, “Strategy for Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Improve Collection,

Analysis, and Dissemination of Terrorist Information” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/2892.

88 Wright et al., Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century.

practitioners must make every effort to confirm that unprocessed information meets quality

standards. In other words, the reliability and validity of the collected information determine

the quality of analysis. 89 Analyzing raw information is not an easy task; it requires the

expertise of a qualified intelligence analyst. Intelligence analysts contribute to the unit by

guiding investigators into untouched areas routinely unnoticed by traditional law

enforcement efforts. 90

Intelligence officers also collect and analyze information. Most intelligence officers

are sworn personnel who have already gained valuable experience in the traditional

policing model. 91 However, the way the U.S. Department of Homeland Security uses

intelligence offers differs from their use in law enforcement. The Department of Homeland

Security intelligence officers partner with state and major urban fusion centers for two

essential purposes: to facilitate the “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area

Fusion Centers” and to manage the intelligence cycle within their area of responsibility by

sharing information between local, state, tribal, and federal partners. 92 Law enforcement

intelligence officers also manage the intelligence cycle in their jurisdictions, but unlike

Department of Homeland Security officers, they have the authority to petition the courts

for search and arrest warrants to further their investigative objectives.

5. Dissemination/Action

The final stage of the intelligence cycle is providing actionable intelligence to those

with a right and need to know. This process balances the sharing of information and the

withholding of intelligence. If intelligence is inadvertently released, it could be detrimental

to an investigation. 93 Actionable intelligence is based on two fundamental applications,

tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence. Wright et al. describe tactical intelligence as

89 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence. 90 Wright et al., Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century. 91 Wright et al. 92 “Deployed Intelligence Officers and Protective Security Advisors,” Department of Homeland

Security, last modified March 2014, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Deployed%20 Intelligence%20Officers%20and%20Protective%20Security%20Advisors_0_0.pdf.

93 Cleary, “Strategy for Local Law Enforcement.”

collected and analyzed information, which includes an individual’s name, address,

affiliates, or any other personal information. 94 “This tactical intelligence is produced on

an ongoing basis and should be readily available as an effective and valuable resource for

investigators working on criminal investigations.” 95 Vetted, analyzed information is

valuable for active criminal investigations. For example, accurate information about a

witness, a suspect, and the suspect’s vehicle may help a homicide detective develop leads

or corroborate evidence. Strategic intelligence, on the other hand, is designed to provide a

bigger picture about current criminal activity/threats and long-term planning. Wright et al.

explain, “Strategic intelligence provides a broader view of the abilities, strengths,

weaknesses, and trends of criminal enterprises.” 96 Strategic intelligence gives decision-

makers options for addressing potential threats.

Information may be disseminated through rapid intelligence, a new concept within

law enforcement. Rapid intelligence is the use of technological solutions and intelligence

resources to support and parallel the criminal investigation. The Santa Fe Police

Department’s Criminal Investigations Division applies this methodology to high-profile

investigations such as homicides and kidnappings. For example, in a homicide

investigation, detectives arrive on the scene and conduct a traditional criminal investigation

by completing a walkthrough, interviewing witnesses, and collecting evidence.

Meanwhile, intelligence personnel perform cell tower dumps, cell phone analysis,

computer analysis, social media searches, and other technological analysis.

6. Feedback/Reevaluation

Feedback and reevaluation comprise the final step in the intelligence cycle. This

final process updates the threat, identifies vulnerabilities and consequences, and assesses

94 Wright et al., Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century. 95 Wright et al. 96 Wright et al.

the effectiveness of disseminated intelligence. 97 According to the Department of Justice’s

“Fusion Center Guidelines,” the

reevaluation assesses current and new information, assists in developing an awareness of possible weak areas as well as potential threats, and strives to eliminate previously identified weaknesses that have been hardened as a result of the fusion center process. Overall, this step provides an opportunity to review the performance or effectiveness of the fusion center’s intelligence function. 98

Essentially, for intelligence analysts or law enforcement leadership to effectively target a

criminal organization or disrupt criminal activity, the intelligence product and investigative

results must be evaluated to measure the success of applied resources and investigative

efforts.

B. U.S. LIAISON OFFICER PROGRAM

It is difficult for fusion centers to establish and maintain direct contact with

individuals from multiple jurisdictions. Therefore, state fusion centers have developed a

liaison officer program to facilitate the information-sharing process to connect with law

enforcement agencies and other organizational partners. 99 In Establishing a Fusion Center

Liaison Officer Program, the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice

identify the following benefits:

• Improving the quality and efficiency of information exchange between the fusion center and outside agencies

• Increasing awareness of terrorism and criminal indicators, in accordance with applicable privacy and civil rights/civil liberties (CRCL) protections

• Expanding awareness of the intelligence cycle and its underpinnings

97 Patrick Miller, “How Can We Improve Information Sharing among Local Law Enforcement

Agencies?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/ 10945/1961.

98 Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New World” (guidelines, Department of Justice, July 2005), 27, http://www.ialeia.org/docs/Fusion_Center_Guidelines_for_Law_Enforcement.pdf.

99 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, Establishing a Fusion Center Liaison Officer Program.

• Increasing opportunities to detect, deter, and prevent crime and terrorist threats

• Increasing participation in fusion center activities, specifically for non-law enforcement partners or smaller agencies

• Developing a cadre of subject-matter experts (SME)

• Augmenting the capabilities of the fusion center by providing the opportunity to allow real-time Intelligence and information exchange during incidents and on-scene response.

• Strengthen[ing] and enhanc[ing] community oriented policing efforts. 100

Although there are several benefits of a liaison officer program, the programs are

not consistently implemented and receive minimal direction from national fusion center

leadership; instead, individual fusion centers tend to select a model that fulfills their basic

functions. 101 Also, a 2017 study conducted by the House Committee on Homeland

Security showed that the range of liaison officers varied from twenty active members in

one fusion center to 11,000 liaison officers in another. 102 The terminology used for liaison

officer programs also differs among fusion centers; some personnel are referred to as fusion

liaison officers, others terrorism liaison officers, intelligence liaison officers, field

intelligence officers, and so on. As previously discussed, NMASIC has an intelligence

liaison officer (ILO) program to establish and maintain communication with local, state,

and tribal law enforcement.

C. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S MI5 MODEL

The United Kingdom’s MI5, formerly known as the Secret Service Bureau, was

established in 1909. From its modest beginnings, it grew into an effective and professional

intelligence agency. MI5 has played a vital role in the intelligence cycle during historical

events such as World War II, the Cold War, and recent terrorist events. 103 MI5’s roles and

100 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice. 101 William F. Wickers Jr., “A Comprehensive Fusion Liaison Officer Program: The Arizona Model”

(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45272. 102 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Advancing Information Sharing.” 103 “History,” MI5, accessed April 17, 2018, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/history.

responsibilities are outlined in the United Kingdom’s Security Service Act of 1989, which

identifies three essential functions:

1. To protect national security against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers, and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means;

2. To safeguard the economic well-being of the UK against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Isles; and

3. To act in support of the activities of the police forces and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime. However, since the establishment of the Serious Organised Crime Agency and subsequently the National Crime Agency, MI5 has suspended work on serious crime in order to concentrate more resources on counter terrorism. 104

The first two functions are similar to the FBI’s mission to protect the country from

terrorism and foreign powers. However, the third function is an example of how each U.S.

intelligence center is responsible for providing intelligence products to address threats

within their jurisdictions.

Unlike local, state, and tribal law enforcement, MI5 has no arrest powers; rather, it

collects information, produces intelligence products, and provides those products to law

enforcement agencies. In return, the law enforcement agencies use the information to

initiate parallel investigations. MI5 officers are unarmed and rarely participate in any

criminal proceedings, but they fulfill the essential role of collecting, analyzing, and

disseminating actionable intelligence to law enforcement decision-makers. As explored in

Chapter II, unlike the MI5 model, the NMASIC is not a recognized investigative

component and is dependent on other agencies for the collection of information. This

practice limits the NMASIC’s capability as an intelligence center, requiring the center to

rely on contributing agencies.

MI5’s intelligence cycle has changed over the years and adapted to terrorist

techniques, tactics, and procedures. This transformation became more relevant and

104 “Security Service Act 1989,” UK National Archives, accessed July 19, 2018,

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/5/contents.

valuable following the London bombings of July 7, 2005, when the United Kingdom faced

a new homegrown terrorist threat. 105 The United Kingdom’s intelligence cycle is similar

to the United States’; as explained by Paul Smith, however, the UK model consists of only

four elements: requirements, collection, analysis, and action (see Figure 6). 106 The MI5’s

intelligence cycle appears to be more simplistic and efficient for applying tactical

intelligence to crime and terrorism. MI5’s intelligence cycle excludes the dissemination

component as seen in the U.S. model. MI5 has determined that dissemination alone is not

actionable; dissemination requires law enforcement personnel to use the produced

intelligence through either covert or overt operations. A few examples of MI5’s covert

operations include the use of eavesdropping/technical coverage, surveillance,

interceptions, and human intelligence. 107 Meanwhile, overt operations may consist of

financial warnings, checkpoints, arrests, and the use of the public. 108 The application of

overt and covert actions allows intelligence and investigative components to be aggressive

and reassures that the produced intelligence is effectively used.

105 Paul Smith, “MI-5 / Domestic Intelligence for the United States Discussion,” (classroom

discussion,

Naval Postgraduate School, April 11, 2018). 106 Paul Smith, “The Real Intelligence Cycle” (class lecture, Comparative Government, Naval

Postgraduate School, April 11, 2018). 107 Smith. 108 Smith.

Figure 6. UK MI5 Intelligence Cycle 109

MI-5 uses a unique operational concept known as the desk officer system. The role

of a desk officer is similar to that of the U.S. fusion center’s intelligence analyst, with an

emphasis on collecting and disseminating intelligence, assessing threats, and collaborating

with and advising other agencies to address threats. 110 However, unlike U.S. intelligence

analysts, desk officers aggressively investigate individuals or groups. 111 An investigative

expert, the desk officer has the overall understanding needed to determine the level of threat

an individual or group presents. 112 Also, the United Kingdom’s law enforcement and

intelligence communities provide the desk officer with all intelligence related to their

targets. According to Smith, MI5 and the law enforcement agency participate in a dual-

track investigation: MI5 operates as an intelligence component and the law enforcement

agency conducts the traditional investigation. At the time of arrest, the desk officer lends

interview advice to the police and evaluates collected information and intelligence to

identify additional threats. 113

109 Adapted from Smith. 110 Paul Jonathan Smith, “Counter-Terrorism in the UK—Counterterrorism Structure and the Pursuit

of Terrorists,” Center for Homeland Defense and Security, May 3, 2017, https://www.chds.us/ed/items/ 1190.

111 Smith. 112 Smith. 113 Smith.

D. CONCLUSION

The most significant difference between the U.S. intelligence cycle and MI5’s

process is that the U.S. model contains six components while the MI5 process contains

only four, and results in an aggressive response. In MI5, investigators collect information

and analysts validate and analyze the data to further investigative efforts. Moreover, this

streamlined process expedites investigative efforts by allowing law enforcement to apply

targeting intelligence operations to combat criminal organizations and rapidly respond to

criminal activity. However, one benefit of the U.S. intelligence cycle is that it provides

leadership with strategic options to prepare for future threats and to adapt to crime trends.

The U.S. intelligence liaison officer program and MI5’s desk officer system both

have their roles within the intelligence function. However, the desk officer concept fulfills

more of an investigative support role; the MI5’s dual-track process, which differs from the

U.S. liaison officer programs (which are primarily used for information collection and

information sharing), enhances investigative efforts by paralleling ongoing investigations

and trusting analytical personnel with maintaining all information. This may explain why

Smith brags that when “colleagues from across the globe, in law enforcement and

intelligence, look to the United Kingdom as a model[,] many of them are, quite frankly,

envious.” 114

The following chapter examines the use of intelligence-led policing and highlights

the best practices from local U.S. intelligence centers, which include the El Paso, Texas,

Multi-Agency Tactical Response Information Exchange, New Jersey Regional Operations

and Intelligence Center, and the Santa Fe Police Department Intelligence Center. An

intelligence function in each organization is examined to illuminate best practices that

could be used in the NMASIC.

114 Smith.

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IV. U.S. LOCAL INTELLIGENCE BEST PRACTICES

This chapter evaluates the similarities, differences, and best practices between two

U.S. local intelligence centers: the El Paso, Texas, Police Department’s Multi-Agency

Tactical Response Information Exchange (MATRIX) and the New Jersey Regional

Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC). It also evaluates how each intelligence center

operates and supports stakeholders within its area of responsibility, with an understanding

that the core of most intelligence centers today consists of state and local law enforcement

and criminal intelligence. 115 The final section of the chapter examines how the Santa Fe

Police Department has applied best practices from other local intelligence centers to

address crime within its jurisdiction.

A. EL PASO MULTI-AGENCY TACTICAL RESPONSE INFORMATION EXCHANGE

With a 450-mile radius and population of 2.7 million, El Paso, Texas, is the largest

metropolitan area on the U.S.–Mexican border. El Paso is surrounded, as well, with a

regional population of approximately 17.8 million, covering New Mexico, western Texas,

eastern Arizona, and northern Mexico. 116 The city has justifiably allocated resources to

ensure the safety of its constituents and critical infrastructure. 117 To fulfill this

commitment, the El Paso Police Department created MATRIX, whose mission is to “serve

as an all-crimes/all hazards tactical information and intelligence hub for the El Paso Police

Department and Participating Agencies.” 118 In developing MATRIX, the department’s

objective was to facilitate more effective and efficient use of sworn law enforcement

115 John Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, CRS Order Code RL34070

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf. 116 “Population,” El Paso Texas, accessed June 23, 2018, https://www.elpasotexas.gov/economic-

development/business-services/data-and-statistics/population. 117 El Paso Police Department, “MATRIX El Paso Fusion Center Concept of Operations” (retrieved

via personal communication, MATRIX Director, June 28, 2018). 118 El Paso Police Department, “‘MATRIX’ Fusion Center” (retrieved via personal communication,

MATRIX Director, October 13, 2011).

personnel and resources, and collect information for local criminal investigations. 119 The

El Paso Police Department focuses primarily on local crime; the fusion center therefore

created a counterterrorism capability to share information with other state fusion

centers. 120 This simultaneously provides a framework for maximizing resources to address

local crime, which could be shared with other fusion centers.

Like the rest of the country’s fusion centers, the primary function of MATRIX

involves information sharing and intelligence-led policing. MATRIX’s goal is to “provide

support and direction through information and intelligence analysis for law enforcement in

order to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of investigations.” 121 This process

allows the police department to analyze crime threats in its jurisdiction while maximizing

its personnel for identifying threats and crime. Furthermore, the collected and analyzed

information may be shared with other agencies in the region, allowing several

organizations to collectively target crime.

MATRIX capitalizes on four critical capabilities: gathering local information,

receiving classified and unclassified information from federal partners, analyzing local

implications and threats, and disseminating threat information to government organizations

and private sector partners. El Paso’s unique geographic location allows for all levels of

government to benefit from the analyzed data, which may include drug cartel activity,

illegal immigration, or threats of terrorism.

MATRIX also implements a watch process, which helps to “prevent, reduce, and

disrupt crime and terrorism through the early warning of all-crimes, all-hazards, and all-

threats.” 122 According to the El Paso Police Department, “The Watch is the eyes and ears

of the Fusion Center; the most critical operational element within the center.” 123 The

119 El Paso Police Department, “MATRIX Center Concept of Operations.” 120 El Paso Police Department. 121 El Paso Police Department. 122 El Paso Police Department, “Critical Operating Capability Policy—Gather: Ability to Gather

Locally-Generated Information, Including Suspicious Activity Reporting, Based on Time-Sensitive and Emerging Threats” (retrieved via personal communication, MATRIX Director, June 28, 2018).

123 El Paso Police Department, “MATRIX—Procedures and Protocols.”

personnel assigned to the watch assist with emergency responses to critical incidents and

investigations and are tasked with the following responsibilities:

1. Maintaining situation awareness of events locally and throughout the world;

2. Completing time-sensitive requests from our vetted partners; and,

3. Coordinating the dissemination of information, as delineated in this document. 124

The watch process enhances the police department’s situational awareness regarding local

and global threats that may affect its jurisdiction. The combination of real-time intelligence

for local and regional needs with situational awareness of national and global events creates

a dome of knowledge for understanding all threats and all hazards.

Using local personnel for information gathering allows leadership to understand the

issues and threats occurring within their jurisdiction. However, the ability to receive

classified and unclassified information from federal partners is also vital to both the local

and national perspective. MATRIX supports the foundational elements of the “National

Strategy for Information Sharing,” which focuses on “improving the information sharing

of homeland security, terrorism, law enforcement information related to terrorism, within

and among all levels of governments and the private sector.” 125 Access to the

government’s most sensitive, controlled, and restricted information is essential for local

law enforcement to have a clear understanding of all threats affecting their jurisdiction.

MATRIX collaborates with the El Paso Joint Operations and Intelligence Center to

analyze and disseminate information “on current crime trends and patterns and establish

forecasts or predictions of future crimes.” 126 Furthermore, MATRIX employs two

functional concepts for sharing information:

124 El Paso Police Department. 125 “National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-

Related Information Sharing,” Department of Justice, October 2007, https://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/ National_Strategy_for_Information_Sharing.pdf.

126 El Paso Police Department, “Critical Operating Capability Policy—Analyze: Ability to Assess Local Implications of Threat Information through the Use of a Formal Risk Assessment Process” (retrieved via personal communication, MATRIX Director, June 28, 2018).

• Define Requirements: Identify and prioritize analytic production requirements, information needs, and corresponding gathering and reporting efforts, and;

• Inform Decision-makers: Provide appropriate information to inform leadership on tactical, operational, and strategic decisions to mitigate threats. 127

These concepts, as part of the intelligence cycle, are designed to efficiently help decision-

makers understand their options.

Finally, MATRIX plays an important role in the intelligence community and the

mission of homeland security by providing actionable intelligence to state, local, and

private sector partners. The El Paso Police Department recognizes that information sharing

allows the department to

• Provide local context to a given threat report originating from the Federal Government;

• Provide operational and tactical guidance in the form of recommendations; and

• Archive threat information for future review and analysis. 128

Through this practice, the El Paso Police Department makes its contribution to the

information sharing process and sustains an all-hazards model. The flow of local raw data

to the intelligence community allows the federal government to transition from a 50,000-

foot view to the frontline perspective for a clearer understanding of the issues affecting

local jurisdictions.

B. NEW JERSEY REGIONAL OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE CENTER

In 2005, the New Jersey State Police’s criminal investigations branch was

researching options for increasing its efficiency and effectiveness; at the time, only a few

127 El Paso Police Department. 128 El Paso Police Department, “Critical Operating Capability Policy—Disseminate: Ability to

Further Disseminate Threat Information to State, Local and Private Sector Entities” (retrieved via personal communication, MATRIX Director, June 28, 2018).

personnel had been tasked with collecting and sharing intelligence. 129 In 2006, the

department opened the Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC). In addition

to the newly developed fusion center, the department developed the “Practical Guide to

Intelligence-Led Policing,” which is “currently being integrated within the State Police to

create a mission capable force in an ‘all crimes, all hazards, and all threat’

environment.” 130 The New Jersey State Police intelligence effort has four main

components:

1. The reorganization of the investigations division for the rapid deployment of intelligence and investigative assets

2. The implementation of the intelligence cycle process

3. The formation of a Regional Operations and Intelligence Center to provide tactical analysis and situational awareness;

4. and the use of strategic planning and intelligence-driven analyses to set priorities and allocate resources. 131

Realigning an organization is tedious and requires thorough planning. In doing so, the New

Jersey State Police relied on a five-stage process to ensure success:

1. An architectural realignment of the organization to remove barriers and promote intelligence and information exchange.

2. A cultural shift to embrace intelligence-led policing philosophies and practices.

3. The re-tooling of the distribution and management of the Statewide Intelligence Management System (SIMS).

4. The creation of a “fusion center,” known as the Regional Operations and Intelligence Center.

5. The implementation of regional accountability plans for managing intelligence and enforcement operations related to organized criminal activities. 132

129 Fuentes, “Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing.” 130 Fuentes. 131 Fuentes. 132 Fuentes.

The department had to cautiously overcome concerns from the public and

leadership that an intelligence-led policing model would take away from traditional

community policing efforts. Before 9/11, the state police, and other local law enforcement

agencies, primarily followed a community-policing designed to build relationships with

the community, address community problems, and enhance the quality of life for all

citizens. 133 However, after the 9/11, the 9/11 Commission criticized local law enforcement

and the intelligence community for failing to share information. 134 To fill this intelligence

gap, law enforcement organizations collaborated to collect and share information: a

policing model that has become known as intelligence-led policing. On July 30, 2007,

Chief Mark A. Marshall from the Smithfield, Virginia, Police Department, perhaps said it

best:

Naturally, there have been repeated calls for federal authorities to coordinate, develop, and implement a solution. Given the nature and context of policing in the U.S. however, “a federal ‘top-down’ answer would not be effective. It is local and state law enforcement that provides the majority of law enforcement service in this country. It is the local, tribal, county and state agencies that capture and retain the vast majority of data from which ‘nuggets of information’ can be mined to protect our homeland.” 135

Although state fusion centers and federal law enforcement may be the collectors—and

sharers—of information, local and state law enforcement are at the tip of the spear in

addressing crime and terrorism. Arguably, the homeland security mission would be

insufficient without the involvement of local and state law enforcement.

The New Jersey State Police deploys overt and covert operations to collect

information. As defined by Carter, covert action is “influencing events and behavior in

other states or groups without revealing one’s involvement.” 136 Examples of covert

133 Jack Greene, “Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure, and Function of

the Police,” Policies, Process, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice System 3 (2000): 299–370. 134 Sam McGhee, “Impacting the Evolution of Information Sharing in the Post-9/11 United States,”

The Police Chief Magazine (February 2015): 26–31. 135 Mark A. Marshall, “Understanding the National Data Exchange (N-DEx) System,” Police One,

July 30, 2007, https://www.policeone.com/communications/articles/1295732-Understanding-the-National- Data-Exchange-N-DEx-System/.

136 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence Operations.

operations include the use of undercover personnel, surveillance, eavesdropping, wiretaps,

jail recordings, global positioning devices, and cell phone analysis. However, overt

operations, which are obvious investigative methods, use the “collection of intelligence

openly without concealment”—for example, a police detective publicly executing a search

warrant on a suspect’s vehicle. 137 This application of information collection is more

effective than the traditional fusion center process of relying on other agencies and open-

source data. This research has determined that both overt and covert applications are

effective tools utilized by local intelligence centers and regional organizations such as MI5.

The ROIC’s three intelligence-led functions are watch operations, analysis, and

asset management. 138 As highlighted by Fuentes, “During daily operations, these

functions are performed to create a complete picture of the current operating environment

throughout the state of New Jersey, including external factors that may also present

immediate concerns as well as the resources available to address them.” 139 Figure 7 depicts

the ROIC’s functions.

Figure 7. ROIC’s Three Intelligence-Led Policing Functions 140

137 Free Dictionary, s.v. “Overt Operation,” accessed June 24, 2018, https://www.thefreediction

ary.com/overt+operation. 138 Fuentes, “Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing.” 139 Fuentes. 140 Adapted from Fuentes.

Watch operations are coordinated with the intelligence analyst to provide the fifty-foot-

view concept for the jurisdiction, and to help officers receive and respond to alerts. 141 The

analyst, in turn, provides tactical and operational intelligence for the department as a whole,

along with its partners. Meanwhile, the asset management section is responsible for

maintaining awareness of all department and partner assets “for the purpose of coordinated

response to threats and incidents.” 142 Together, these three functions provide situational

awareness of potential threats, analytical ability to address emerging threats, and the ability

to deploy resources during an emergency. During an interview, Colonel Fuentes explained

how the ROIC plays an essential role in intelligence-led policing, which he calls a useful

information collection and analysis tool, adding, “The ROIC has successfully blended

information and analysis to produce intelligence for the good of the state, not just on

homeland security/terrorism levels, but also along the lines of traffic control, anti-gang

initiatives and community policing.” 143 The ROIC is a perfect example of how local law

enforcement can incorporate intelligence-led policing while also maintaining community-

policing initiatives. The best practices from the ROIC and recommendations identified in

the New Jersey State Police’s “Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing” are used for

analysis in the following case study.

C. CASE STUDY: SANTA FE POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER

1. The Problem

Santa Fe is the capital of and fourth largest city in New Mexico. 144 Even still, from

July 1, 2014, to July 1, 2016, its police department began to respond to newly annexed

areas encompassing approximately 5,173.42 acres, a population of 13,891, and 4,767

141 Fuentes. 142 Fuentes. 143 New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, “Welcome to the ROIC,” OEM Bulletin NJ (Fall

2008): 1–2, www.ready.nj.gov. 144 “About Santa Fe,” City of Santa Fe, New Mexico, accessed June 21, 2018, https://www.santafe

nm.gov/about_santa_fe.

housing units. 145 Currently, the Santa Fe Police Department has approximately thirty

vacant positions; these vacancies, combined with population growth, has created new crime

challenges. Furthermore, the city of Santa Fe has been unable to track organized crime

trends beyond the jurisdiction, has lacked technological solutions to effectively target

emerging crime trends, and, most importantly, has non-existent regional information

sharing with other local, state, and tribal law enforcement organizations. In 2017, the

department’s command staff sought a modern tactic to supplement the traditional policing

efforts to address the increase in crime.

2. The Plan

In February 2017, the Santa Fe Police Department decided to evaluate the

effectiveness of its criminal investigations division and identify best practices from other

agencies to maximize available resources. As a result, the department’s intelligence-led

policing project developed the following objectives:

• Reorganize criminal investigations to close information and intelligence

gaps

• Implement technological solutions, to include social media monitoring,

access capabilities to public school surveillance cameras, video

enhancement software, person and business search databases, covert

surveillance cameras, etc.

• Implement targeting capabilities for identifying, disrupting, and

dismantling criminal organizations

• Create a privacy policy and intelligence guidelines as required by 28 CFR

Part 23, with clear procedures for implementation and training for all

criminal investigations division personnel

145 City of Santa Fe GIS, “Annexation Areas” (internal document City of Santa Fe, New Mexico,

April 28, 2010).

• Aggressively pursue information collection capabilities and share

actionable intelligence products with investigative personnel

• Establish a rapid intelligence component to support traditional

investigative efforts 146

The command staff determined that the rapid deployment of intelligence was key to

targeting/responding to threats. In rapid intelligence, sworn investigative personnel

assigned to the criminal intelligence unit are tasked with paralleling the traditional criminal

investigation approach—for example, they may analyze social media or gather information

from cell phone towers.

The Santa Fe Police Department reorganization involved three tasks. First, the

department needed to find a location to facilitate information sharing between multiple

intelligence personnel—the location had to house an intelligence officer, multiple

detectives with criminal intelligence responsibilities, and several wall monitors and

workstations. Second, to enhance intelligence knowledge and expertise, all assigned

personnel attended intelligence courses provided by the Department of Homeland Security

and other accredited training organizations. Finally, to facilitate information sharing among

agencies within the region, the department held an opening ceremony for all local, state,

and tribal law enforcement agencies to display the intelligence center’s technological

capabilities. Like many rural and tribal police departments around the country, these

agencies have limited personnel, resources, and communications; this ceremony therefore

stimulated interest and participation.

3. Summary

As a result of the reorganization, the Santa Fe Police department was able to close

information and intelligence gaps, establish proficient technological solutions, and enhance

146 Matthew Champlin, Jimmie Montoya, David Webb, and Steve Cosban, “Criminal Investigations

Division SWOT Analysis” (retrieved via personal communication, City of Santa Fe Police Department, June 13, 2018).

information sharing with regional law enforcement organizations. For instance, the

department was able to:

• Disrupt a Mexican drug cartel trafficking organization

• Solve of a series of robberies committed by a violent juvenile gang

• Provide intelligence support during Special Weapons And Tactics

(SWAT) operations

• Provide surveillance systems to city public schools

• Advanced its cell phone analysis capabilities

• Enhance its video and digital media applications

D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Although each of the three reviewed intelligence centers—El Paso’s MATRIX,

New Jersey’s Regional Operations Center, and the Santa Fe Police Department—shares

information with local partners, maintains intelligence functions, operates under a

hierarchy, and incorporates best practices, they are not all the same. This chapter highlights

how important it is for intelligence centers to adjust their missions to support the other law

enforcement organizations in their areas.

MATRIX and the ROIC take on an independent role to address an operational gap

with already established resources. Rather than soliciting additional resources, the

organizations simply realigned their investigative personnel to fulfill an intelligence role.

Both centers identify the importance of the intelligence cycle to address local crime trends

but also remain committed to the homeland security mission of information sharing with

all levels of government.

Watch operations—seen in all three centers—provide real-time, open-source

information that has been historically untouched during day-to-day law enforcement

operations. A watch center provides situational awareness not only to intelligence

personnel, but also to command staff tasked with making life-saving/life-taking decisions.

For example, the Santa Fe Police Department’s intelligence center is not a 24/7 watch

center like those in MATRIX or the ROIC; however, it is activated during high-risk

incidents such SWAT deployment and follows a four-phase, high-risk operation process:

first, the personnel pre-plan for high-risk operations by collecting all information on

targeted individuals and their associates, as well as information about the identified

location. Next, they deploy covert operations, such as activating the target’s cell phone to

track his or her GPS movement, or deploying covert surveillance cameras to actively

monitor the activity at the targeted location. Third, during the operation itself, intelligence

personnel aggressively monitor surveillance cameras to provide real-time information to

the SWAT commander about changes and potential threats. Finally, once the operation is

complete, intelligence personnel debrief anyone who was arrested, provide access to the

scene for investigation, and analyze all seized electronic devices. In return, all analyzed

information is given to investigative personnel highlighting incriminating content and

identifying additional individuals who could be targeted for their criminal involvement.

Another similarity between MATRIX and the ROIC is their use of analysis and

technology. Both provide intelligence support for investigations, threat assessments,

intelligence reports and briefings, crime analysis, and critical infrastructure threat analysis.

New Jersey and El Paso each have unique infrastructure requirements that, in turn, require

unique risk assessment and expertise. MATRIX and the ROIC identified the importance

for decision makers to quickly utilize resources to address any potential threats to its critical

infrastructure and link any potential threats to a criminal element.

The key argument of this research is that investigative and criminal analytical

capability—as seen with MATRIX and the ROIC—does not exist within the NMASIC.

The ROIC and MATRIX realigned investigative personnel, along with other personnel, to

enhance intelligence capabilities. In developing the Santa Fe Police Department

intelligence center, command staff mirrored the best practices identified in MATRIX and

the ROIC and followed suit, realigning investigative personnel to establish an efficient

intelligence function. Furthermore, in today’s modern policing, the intelligence function

requires technological applications and software for the collection of information. For

example, the Santa Fe Police Department intelligence center prioritized its technology and

software for the analysis of social media, surveillance video, other open-source data, cell

phones, and cell towers. Understanding the importance of information collection, the

department command staff solicited funds to purchase and deploy cell phone analysis

software to its personnel assigned to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Force.

Now, SFPD intelligence personnel are obtaining valuable information from cell phones

seized from individuals involved in drug trafficking.

The ROIC and MATRIX also successfully manage resources. In the event of a

public safety crisis, critical incident, or terrorist attack, both intelligence centers are fully

capable of quickly identifying, tracking, and deploying the necessary resources for the

unfolding event. Some of these resources may include armored vehicles, hazardous

material equipment, or other emergency equipment stored in key locations.

In conclusion, although modern intelligence centers have taken on an all-hazards

approach, the essential function of fusion centers involves the tactical and strategic analysis

of crime. Moreover, this research has proven the importance of fusion centers breaking

away from the status quo and adapting to modern policing tactics. The next, and final,

chapter in this thesis provides policy recommendations and suggests areas for future

research.

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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This research project embarked with a few preconceived notions and

expectations—primarily, that an intelligence-led policing model was not a function of an

intelligence fusion center and that intelligence fusion centers were designed specifically to

share information regarding threats of terrorism. This research has shown, however, that

several fusion centers have maintained the primary mission of combating terrorism while

still broadening their focus to address all crimes or all-hazards.

In Chapter II, this thesis examined the New Mexico intelligence system and its

challenges. Chapter III highlighted key intelligence functions as recommended by the

Department of Justice and other experts, including a review of liaison officer programs and

the United Kingdom’s MI5 intelligence model. Chapter IV provided an analysis of U.S.

local intelligence best practices, looking specifically at the El Paso Multi-Agency Tactical

Response Information Exchange, the New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence

Center, and the Santa Fe Police Department’s Criminal Intelligence and Analysis Center.

Finally, this chapter identifies key lessons learned and provides the following

recommendations for New Mexico:

1. Realign the NMASIC to fall within the authority of NMSP

2. Implement a hybrid intelligence cycle to support the local, state, tribal, and

federal missions

3. Restructure the intelligence liaison officer program and apply the desk

officer concept in each of NMSP’s twelve districts

4. Pursue future research on the implementation of an intelligence center for

the United States’ twelve tribal regions

A. RECOMMENDATION #1: REALIGNING THE NMASIC

Although this recommendation may lead to political controversy, the NMASIC

must be realigned under the NMSP if the state wants to serve its unique and diverse

population effectively. This research has shown that the current state intelligence center

cannot collect and share valuable information among local, state, tribal, and federal

organizations. The common theme in this research is that information sharing is the heart

of intelligence—a vital function New Mexico currently lacks.

Shifting NMASIC personnel to NMSP gives them full access to law enforcement–

sensitive information and would provide intelligence support for ongoing operations. As

explained in Chapter IV, the HSIN database has not been effective; although it is essential

for the sharing of NMASIC core line products, it does not provide the tactical analysis

needed for local, state, and tribal law enforcement operations—which is essential for

situational awareness and threat assessment. Although the HSIN is an important tool,

access to the NMSP Criminal Justice Information System database is also needed to limit

intelligence gaps in rural and tribal communities.

Moving NMASIC under the NMSP will also improve the center’s emergency

response capability. New Mexico’s law enforcement routinely addresses critical incidents

such as SWAT team deployments, covert and overt operations, high-risk operations, and

incidents affecting New Mexico’s arterial roadways. Adopting a watch concept like that of

other centers would allow NMASIC to take advantage of rapid intelligence resources

staged at NMSP’s three regional communications centers.

Finally, a realignment would increase NMSP’s networking and coverage within the

state and national arena. NMSP supports the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force full time and

coordinates state involvement within the task force. Also, NMSP assists tribal governments

through the application of “cross deputization agreements,” which allows NMSP personnel

to enter tribal territory to collect and share valuable information about ongoing

investigations. No other New Mexico law enforcement or DHSEM has this unique

authority.

B. RECOMMENDATION #2: HYBRID INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The intelligence cycle is the underlining framework for any intelligence center.

However, effective intelligence centers tend to modify their intelligence cycles to serve the

needs of the organizations within their area of responsibility. Along these lines, the

NMASIC should incorporate a hybrid intelligence cycle to facilitate the information

collection and sharing efforts of all stakeholders. Figure 8 is a diagram of the proposed

hybrid intelligence cycle.

Figure 8. Hybrid Intelligence Cycle Process

This proposed model allows leadership to maintain strategic analysis and

forecasting capabilities to address all hazards and threats, as depicted in the outer layer of

the intelligence cycle, while also supporting the tactical intelligence function for first

responders and investigative operations, defined within the core of the hybrid intelligence

cycle. This core allows law enforcement to apply targeting intelligence operations to

combat criminal organizations and rapidly respond to criminal activity. The hybrid model

blends tactical and strategic analysis, which allows local, state, and tribal law enforcement

to engage in day-to-day operations by identifying individual targets and groups while

simultaneously collecting information to contribute to the national information sharing

initiative.

C. RECOMMENDATION #3: INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICER PROGRAM AND THE DESK OFFICER CONCEPT

It is difficult for fusion centers to establish and maintain direct contact with several

jurisdictions. Like many state fusion centers, the NMASIC developed its ILO program to

facilitate the information-sharing process. 147 Transitioning the NMASIC to the NMSP

allows the ILO program to expand on its current local, state, and tribal partners.

As previously mentioned, the NMASIC has had trouble recruiting rural and tribal

law enforcement due to staffing shortages, which inhibits the continuity of the program.

However, if NMSP intelligence and analysis staff in each of the twelve districts were

realligned into desk officer roles (like in the UK model) the department could provide

support and organizational outreach to rural and tribal law enforcement agencies. The role

of a desk officer is much like the role of an intelligence analyst, with an emphasis on

collecting and disseminating information, assessing threats, collaborating with other

agencies, and advising. 148 However, unlike U.S. intelligence analysts, desk officers are

aggressive investigators. 149 A desk officer system allows intelligence officers to work in

concert with the officers who are conducting a traditional investigation. Such a system

would further allow NMSP to collect vital information from rural and tribal communities

to proactively target criminal organizations around the state.

D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Further research should focus on the creation of intelligence centers equivalent to

state fusion centers for the twelve tribal regions in the United States. For example, the

Navajo Region, which is policed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, covers Utah, Colorado,

a majority of Arizona, and New Mexico. The Bureau of Indian Affairs provides traditional

law enforcement services, including patrol, criminal investigations, and community-

oriented policing. However, no intelligence component supports the Navajo Region or

147 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, Establishing a Fusion Center

Liaison Officer Program. 148 Smith, “Counter-Terrorism in the UK.” 149 Smith.

connects any of the twelve tribal regions. Identifying an avenue for the creation of an

intelligence center in each of these regions would not only enhance local, state, and federal

organizations’ information collection and sharing initiatives but would also provide a

pathway for tribal communities to participate in and benefit from the information-sharing

process.

E. CONCLUSION

Research and practice show that intelligence fusion centers should conform to law

enforcement needs, particularly intelligence-led policing. Intelligence-led policing is no

longer a concept confined to urban policing; rural and tribal communities could benefit

from the practice as well. To develop a robust intelligence-led policing model for the state

and its rural and tribal communities, New Mexico must adopt an all-hazards approach for

the information sharing process. The reorganization of the NMASIC will enhance the New

Mexico network, which is essential for leveraging resources to detect and disrupt organized

criminal organizations and terrorism. With a redefined NMASIC mission, all participating

agencies will have a universal intelligence-led policing definition, maintain and enhance

community-policing efforts, and establish a platform for contribution to the domestic

intelligence cycle, essentially fusing New Mexico’s four-corner region.

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I. introduction

A. RESEARCH QUESTION
B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. What Is Intelligence?
2. Intelligence-Led Policing
3. Role of Intelligence Fusion Centers

C. RESEARCH DESIGN
D. ARGUMENT
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE

II. the new mexico intelligence system and its challenges

A. THE nEW MEXICO ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE CENTER
B. NEW MEXICO STATE POLICE
C. CONCLUSION

III. KEY INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

A. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE COMPONENTS

1. Planning and Direction/Requirements
2. Collection
3. Processing
4. Analysis
5. Dissemination/Action
6. Feedback/Reevaluation

B. u.S. LIAISON OFFICER PROGRAM
C. the United Kingdom’s MI5 MODEL
D. conclusion

IV. U.S. LOCAL Intelligence BEST PRACTICES

A. EL PASO MULTI-AGENCY TACTICAL RESPONSE INFORMATION EXCHANGE
B. NEW JERSEY REGIONAL OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE CENTER
C. CASE STUDY: SANTA FE POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER

1. The Problem
2. The Plan
3. Summary

D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

V. policy RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

A. RECOMMENDATION #1: realigning THE NMASIC
B. RECOMMENDATION #2: HYBRID INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
C. RECOMMENDATION #3: INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICER PROGRAM AND THE DESK OFFICER CONCEPT
D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
E. CONCLUSION

List of References
initial distribution list