

related topics in the fold
d Machines," in *Dimen-*
Hook, New York, 1960,
Behavior," in *Analytical*
l. Ronald Butler, Oxford,
ie Mental Life of Some
y, *Minds, and Perception*,
, Detroit, 1967, pp. 177–

did the vexed question of
and *pain states*. I only re-
common argument *against*
—viz., that a pain can be
'the organism) cannot be
1 to be fallacious.

own remarks by Alonzo
se remarks do not bear (as
) on the identification of
classes as such, but rather
ormal semantics) it is nec-
inction between the nor-
e of expressions. That is,
cept of temperature *is* the
d 'temperature,' we must
rror of supposing that 'the
is synonymous with 'the
ord "temperature"—for
ature' and 'der Begriff der
synonymous, which they
that 'the concept of tem-
onymy-class of the word
articular reconstruction);
ot as "the synonymy class
word belongs," but in an-

other way (e.g., as the synonymy-class whose mem-
bers have such-and-such a characteristic use).

4. In "The Mental Life of Some Machines" a further, and somewhat independent, characteristic of the pain inputs is discussed in terms of automata models—namely the spontaneity of the inclination to withdraw the injured part, etc. This raises the question, which is discussed in that paper, of giving a functional analysis of the notion of a spontaneous inclination. Of course, still further characteristics come readily to mind—for example, that feelings of pain are (or seem to be) *located* in the parts of the body.
5. Cf. the discussion of "super-spartans" in "Brains and Behavior."

READING QUESTIONS

1. Putnam begins by describing four reasons why some have to objected to "pain = brain state." Briefly explain each of these reasons and why Putnam rejects them.
2. Briefly explain the general approach or method that Putnam uses to argue that pain is not identical to a brain state. Putnam claims that being in pain is a functional state; what does he mean by this?
3. If the identity theory is correct, what must it prove or show? Why does Putnam think it unlikely that the theory will be able to prove this?
4. Why does Putnam think functional characterizations of the mental are supported by behavioral considerations? Why does Putnam resist behaviorism?