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O R I G I N A L P A P E R

Public Attitudes Toward Social Spending in the United States: The Differences Between Direct Spending and Tax Expenditures

Christopher Faricy • Christopher Ellis

Published online: 24 March 2013

� Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract This paper uses a survey experiment to examine differences in public attitudes toward ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ government spending. Federal social welfare

spending in the USA has two components: the federal government spends money to

directly provide social benefits to citizens, and also indirectly subsidizes the private

provision of social benefits through tax expenditures. Though benefits provided

through tax expenditures are considered spending for budgetary purposes, they

differ from direct spending in several ways: in the mechanisms through which

benefits are delivered to citizens, in how they distribute wealth across the income

spectrum, and in the visibility of their policy consequences to the mass public. We

develop and test a model explaining how these differences will affect public atti-

tudes toward spending conducted through direct and indirect means. We find that

support for otherwise identical social programs is generally higher when such

programs are portrayed as being delivered through tax expenditures than when they

are portrayed as being delivered by direct spending. In addition, support for tax

expenditure programs which redistribute wealth upward drops when citizens are

provided information about the redistributive effects. Both of these results are

conditioned by partisanship, with the opinions of Republicans more sensitive to the

mechanism through which benefits are delivered, and the opinions of Democrats

more sensitive to information about their redistributive effects.

Keywords Government spending � Social policy � Social welfare � Public opinion

C. Faricy

Syracuse University, 100 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA

C. Ellis (&) Bucknell University, Moore Avenue, Lewisburg, PA 17837, USA

e-mail: [email protected]

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Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76

DOI 10.1007/s11109-013-9225-5

This paper examines public attitudes towards government spending in the USA.

There is, of course, a wealth of excellent scholarship regarding public support for

spending programs (e.g., Cook and Barrett 1992; Gilens 1999; Jacoby 1994, 2000;

Rudolph and Evans 2005; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Stimson 2004; Wlezien 1995).

This line of research, however, focuses almost exclusively on direct social

spending—the funding of social benefits through budgetary appropriations—

ignoring public opinion towards federal involvement in private social welfare

programs (but see Haselswerdt and Bartels 2011; Mettler 2011). This focus on direct

spending alone limits our understanding of public opinion towards government

spending, given that the federal government finances social welfare benefits not only

through direct public appropriations, but also by subsidizing the private provision of

social benefits through the use of targeted tax expenditures.

The distinction between public and private benefits in the United States’ ‘‘divided’’

(Hacker 2002) social system is important for several reasons. First, there are partisan

differences in how policymakers finance social programs, as Democrats prefer to

finance public social programs through direct appropriations, while Republicans prefer

to finance private programs through tax expenditures (Faricy 2011). Second, there are

policy differences between direct social spending and social tax expenditures: direct

spending and tax expenditures are produced through different policy processes, assist

different populations, and redistribute federal money to different economic and social

groups (e.g., Hacker 2002; Howard 1997). Finally, there may be differences in the public

visibility of direct spending versus tax expenditures: some have argued that tax

expenditure programs (and the redistributive effects of such programs) are ‘‘hidden’’

from public view in a way that makes public preferences on these programs less well-

informed than preferences on direct spending (Mettler 2008, 2011). In ignoring the

private social system and the tax subsidies that finance it, public opinion scholars miss

the opportunity to understand attitudes toward a substantial portion of the American

welfare state, and are unable to gauge differences in how the public perceives programs

financed through public or private means.

This paper addresses these issues experimentally, focusing on differences in how

citizens view government spending done through direct appropriations and spending

done through tax expenditures. Our goal is to see how support for the exact same

social programs changes when the delivery mechanism of those programs (direct

spending or tax expenditures) changes, and the information that citizens are

provided about the redistributive effects of those programs changes.

We derive three expectations. First, we expect that citizens will be less likely to

support upward-redistributing social programs when provided information about

such programs’ redistributive effects. Second, we expect that programs which are

portrayed as being delivered through tax expenditures will be more popular than

identical programs portrayed as delivered through direct spending. Third, we expect

that Republicans and Democrats will react in different ways to both the

redistributive- and delivery-mechanism frames: changes in the ‘‘redistributive’’

frame should be particularly important to the attitudes of Democrats, while changes

in the ‘‘delivery’’ frame should be most important to the attitudes of Republicans.

The results demonstrate that citizens’ support for social spending programs is in part

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driven by both how programs are delivered and whether citizens are thinking about

the programs’ redistributive effects. More importantly, the results shed light on the

‘real world’ ways in which policymakers frame social spending policies, and the

ways in which citizens evaluate such policies.

Direct Social Spending and Social Tax Expenditures

The USA has a divided social welfare state in that the federal government uses both

direct and indirect means of spending to finance the provision of social benefits.

While direct spending is easily recognizable as money spent by the federal

government on programs and agencies such as Social Security, Medicare, the

Department of Education, and Temporary Aid to Needy Families—the concept of

social tax expenditures requires a bit more explanation.

Social tax expenditures refer to efforts by the federal government, through the

use of targeted tax breaks, to incentivize the private provision and consumption of

social benefits. 1

These activities provide tax incentives for individuals to purchase

social benefits from private companies—by, for example, contributing to

401(k) plans, purchasing employer-based health insurance policies, or taking out

and paying interest on a home mortgage—in lieu of having the government provide

those benefits directly. The government, in other words, can choose to finance social

benefits either through direct spending (by writing a check to citizens or otherwise

directly covering the cost of those benefits), or through tax expenditures (by

allowing some citizens who use government-approved private social services to

write smaller checks to the federal government in the form of income taxes).

The Divergent Policy Effects of Direct Social Spending and Social Tax Expenditures

While tax expenditures, like direct spending, are utilized to deliver popular social

benefits to citizens, the two spending types diverge in how they deliver benefits, and

to whom those benefits tend to accrue. The majority of tax expenditures have

regressive effects on the national income distribution. Since tax deductions are

typically claimed against a progressive income tax structure, benefits accrue

disproportionately to those in higher marginal-rate tax brackets. Social welfare

benefits directed through tax deductions, exclusions, and non-refundable tax credits

1 Budget experts argue that targeted tax breaks of this sort should be considered ‘‘expenditures’’ since

this policy tool shares many characteristics of direct spending: targeting money to specific populations or

activities, and having an economic effect on beneficiaries, the market, and the budget (Howard 1997;

Burman, Geissler, and Toder 2008). Formally, tax expenditures are counted as revenue losses to the US

Treasury, and allow for the side-by-side comparison of programs funded through the tax code and those

funded through the appropriations process (Surrey 1974). While some social tax expenditures are used to

make public social benefits such as Social Security tax free; the vast majority of these programs are used

to subsidize the private sector.

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thus reduce the progressivity of the tax structure. 2

For example, recent reports from

the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) find that households in the top 20 % of the

income distribution receive 80 % of the income benefits from tax deductions related

to employer-based retirement plans (JCT 2011). In contrast, public social programs

largely aid lower-income citizens and have progressive effects on income

distribution (Kelly 2009).

In addition, the demographic profile of those who receive social services through

direct spending and through tax expenditures are generally different. White collar,

full-time employees in large companies are much more likely to be offered, enrolled

in, and utilize company health and pension benefits (and the federal tax subsidies

that finance them) than are other workers (Faricy 2011). According to studies from

the Employee Benefits Research Institute (2009), the modal recipient of an

employer-based retirement plan was a white male with a college education, earning

over $50,000, and working in a large firm. This ‘government welfare’ recipient

stands in stark contrast to the types of citizens who typically receive direct federal

social benefits—who tend to be comparably poorer and older (Howard 2007). It also

stands in contrast to the type of person that the public often perceives as receiving

government assistance—poor, out of work, and a member of a racial minority group

(e.g., Iyengar 1994; Gilens 1999; Kellstedt 2000).

The two types of social spending also represent two distinct views of the proper

role of the government in the economy. Social tax expenditures are used to

predominantly subsidize private business and tend to privilege market (as opposed

to directly government-based) solutions to social problems, while direct spending

advocates for a direct government role in providing social benefits as a means to

address societal inequalities (Hacker 2002). Consistent with what might be

expected, we see partisan differences with respect to the choice of spending tool

used to finance social benefits: when Republicans control the elected branches of the

federal government, the percentage of all social spending devoted to social tax

expenditures increases. When Democrats are in control, the opposite is true (Faricy

2011).

Public Attitudes Toward Government Spending

What affects citizens’ attitudes toward government spending on social programs? A

substantial amount of literature has been devoted to answering this question (e.g.,

Gilens 1999; Jacoby 1994, 2000; Stimson 2004; Wlezien 2004). This research

shows broad support for federal involvement in the provision of social goods and

services. The idea that the government should play a role in providing housing for

the poor, pensions for the elderly, education for all children, and a variety of other

social benefits is popular with the public, even among Republicans and

2 For example, if a worker in the 35 % bracket is allowed to exclude $10,000 from her income as part of

a tax deduction program, she receives a tax expenditure of $3,500. If a similar worker in the 15 % bracket

is allowed to exclude the same $10,000 from her income, her tax break is only $1,500. Additionally,

wealthier households are more likely to both itemize their taxes (thus claiming tax deductions) and to be

enrolled in employment-based social programs.

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Conservatives (e.g., Stimson 2004). 3

Citizens tend to prefer a government that does

more to equalize wealth over one that does less (Page and Jacobs 2009).

At the same time, though, the public tends to dislike ‘the government’ in a

symbolic sense, and (despite favoring increased spending on nearly all major

government social welfare programs), expresses abstract preferences for a smaller,

leaner, government (Ellis and Stimson 2012). This ‘ambivalence’ (Cantril and

Cantril 1999) toward the federal government’s role in providing social benefits has

been the subject of much research in American public opinion (e.g., Free and Cantril

1969; Schiffer 2000; Stimson 2004; Ellis and Stimson 2012).

Most of this literature, however, focuses exclusively on government spending for

public programs such as Social Security or welfare. To date, there has been little

empirical research on public preferences towards social tax expenditures. While

both direct spending and tax expenditures are government-based programs designed

to provide social benefits to citizens, the two types of spending vary in both the role

that they accord to the government and the types of benefits that they provide.

The public policy literature provides reason to think that citizens might view

direct social spending and social tax expenditure programs differently. In particular,

many policy scholars are concerned about the relative lack of visibility and

transparency of tax expenditure programs, and the resultant effects on how the

public views such programs (Mettler 2008). Citizens are clearly not deeply informed

about the particulars of any sort of social policy, whether funded through direct

spending or tax expenditures (Gilens 2001). But there is reason to think that tax

expenditures—and the policy processes that create them—are particularly shielded

from public view. Hacker (2002), for example, refers to the policy process that

creates tax expenditures as ‘‘subterranean,’’ since tax expenditures are created

outside the formal budget process and the administration of benefits is activated

through a complex mix of public and private actors.

The resulting low visibility of tax expenditures makes it difficult for citizens to

understand what this sort of social policy does and what effects it has. Social tax

expenditures, in other words, may be ‘government actions’ that are not recognized

as such by the public. Mettler (2010), for example, shows that most citizens who

receive social benefits through the tax code are unaware that they are even receiving

government social benefits. This work finds that a majority of respondents who

claimed to have used a tax expenditure program (such as the mortgage deduction or

child care credit) also claimed to have never benefited from a federal social program

of any sort. Recipients of direct spending programs, by contrast, were more likely to

acknowledge that the government had helped them in a time of need.

The implication of this is that tax expenditure programs, though they provide

government-directed benefits to citizens, are not viewed as ‘government programs’

in the same way as programs financed through direct appropriations. As a result, the

experimental work of Haselswerdt and Bartels (2011) suggests that providing

citizens information about the explicit governmental role in facilitating social goals

3 For example, Page and Jacobs (2009) show that a majority of Republicans support federal involvement

in ‘‘spending whatever is necessary to ensure that all children have really good public schools.’’

Additionally, Ellis and Stimson (2012) find that a substantial majority of self-identified Conservatives

advocate more government spending on a variety of social programs and services.

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such as homeownership (through the mortgage interest tax deduction) leads citizens

to consider these issues in a different light. In addition, some recent work suggests

that the ‘submerged’ nature of tax expenditure policies leads citizens to be largely

unaware of the redistributive effects of tax expenditures (e.g., Hacker and Pierson

2010), and that prompting citizens to think about particular social policies through

the lens of redistribution—as opposed to the goal that it is trying to facilitate or the

social norms that it is helping to promote—leads citizens to consider the policies

differently as well (Mettler 2011).

Understanding Attitudes Toward Spending: An Experimental Approach

This discussion has several implications for understanding why citizens support or

oppose particular social spending programs. We know that citizens generally

support greater spending on social programs in part because they see value in the

ends—better education, retirement security, and the like—that spending on social

programs promises (Jacoby 2000). But the impulse to support direct social spending

conflicts with the public’s long-standing skepticism toward ‘‘government interven-

tion’’ in the market economy (Sears and Citrin 1981; Ellis and Stimson 2012). Tax

expenditures, by contrast, comport well with public demands for a smaller direct

governmental role in managing the economy. But most tax expenditures, in practice,

lead to regressive redistributive effects that citizens tend to dislike.

Taken together, this implies that the design and delivery mechanism of particular

public policies—and the degree to which the effects of those policies are visible—

should be important determinants of whether citizens respond positively to them

(Mettler 2010). More specifically, it suggests that the way a social program is

presented and framed to the public will have a substantial impact on citizens’

support for it. In what follows, we work to understand how the framing of social

spending programs affects public support for them. Our approach is experimental:

we wish to see whether differences in how policy programs are framed have an

impact on public support or opposition, and whether the effect of framing will vary

across people with different political values. We first develop hypotheses regarding

how the framing of social spending programs will affect support for such programs.

We then develop and discuss the results of a survey experiment designed to test

these hypotheses.

First, we expect that the redistributive effects of government benefits—and

citizens’ awareness of those redistributive effects—matters to public support.

Citizens generally tend to dislike government programs that redistribute wealth

upward, particularly to social groups that they do not view as deserving of

government aid. By contrast, citizens are generally tolerant of (if not entirely

supportive of) programs that redistribute wealth downward (e.g., Cantril and Cantril

1999; Page and Jacobs 2009). Citizens are not often aware, however, of how and to

whom government programs redistribute wealth, and this general lack of awareness

is particularly true for programs that rely on tax expenditures (Mettler 2010). Taken

together, this suggests that citizens will be less likely to support certain kinds of

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spending programs if they were made aware of the regressive redistributive effects

of such programs. We thus expect that:

Hypothesis 1 For social programs which redistribute wealth upward, providing information about such programs’ redistributive effects will decrease public support

for them.

We do not expect, by contrast, that providing information to respondents about a

downward-redistributing program should negatively affect support for the program.

The notion that government should be redistributing wealth downward and

providing services to those who need them is, at least on balance, popular with

the American public (Ellis and Stimson 2012). 4

Next, we expect that the mechanism of delivery of benefits matters to how

citizens view social programs. Benefits distributed through tax expenditures are not

often perceived as being government-provided—even by recipients of such benefits.

This implies that citizens do not necessarily view tax expenditures as an explicit

government-based effort to intervene in social outcomes (nor do they view

beneficiaries of tax expenditure programs as recipients of ‘‘government assis-

tance’’), but rather view tax expenditures as ways through which citizens ‘‘help

themselves’’ and save on their taxes as a result. 5

Because of this, a tax expenditure

program is less likely to be viewed through the prism of ‘‘government’’ and

‘‘government spending’’—with all of the negative connotations that those phrases

contain—than is direct spending.

This implies that, all else equal, a program that is portrayed as providing tax

credits from the government to individuals for engaging in particular behaviors will

be received more positively by the public than one portrayed as providing direct

payments from the government to the same individuals for the same behaviors. We

thus expect that:

Hypothesis 2 Social programs portrayed as ‘‘tax expenditures’’ will be supported more strongly than social programs portrayed as ‘‘direct spending.’’

Third, we expect Democrats and Republicans to react differently to both the

delivery-mechanism and redistributive effects frames. Differences in how Demo-

crats and Republicans view these programs manifest themselves clearly at the elite

level: Democrats tend to prioritize direct spending, and Republicans tax expendi-

tures, when deciding how to best provide social benefits (Faricy 2011). In addition,

inequality on average increases at a faster rate during Republican presidencies than

Democratic ones, suggesting a greater tolerance for inequality among elite

Republicans than among elite Democrats (Hacker and Pierson 2006; Bartels 2008).

4 An additional hypothesis, then, might suggest that priming respondents with information about the

redistributive effects of downward-distributing programs might increase support for such programs. This

makes sense, but it is important to note that most Americans view ‘government spending’ as almost by

definition downward-redistributing (Jacoby 1994; Stimson 2004), so providing this information would

not, on balance, provide respondents additional information on which to evaluate the program. 5

The work of Haselswerdt and Bartels (2011), which finds that citizens are less supportive of a program

to help people buy homes when it is framed as a ‘‘government grant’’ as opposed to a ‘‘tax savings,’’

reinforces the notion that framing matters to support on programs such as this.

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At the mass level, there are also many reasons to think that Democrats and

Republicans would view social spending—and how social spending is framed—

differently. Mass party identifiers differ in how they view the proper role and scope

of government in remediating social inequality. Though Republicans are on balance

tolerant of government efforts to redistribute wealth downward (Page and Jacobs

2009), they are also more strongly opposed to governmental intervention in the

economy, and more strongly prize individualism as a core political value, than

Democrats (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Franklin and Jackson 1993; Ura and Ellis

2012). While Democrats are not exactly ‘‘pro-government,’’ they are typically more

supportive of government efforts to help poor citizens and groups, and less likely to

react negatively to the idea of activist government. They are also more likely than

Republicans to espouse the value of egalitarianism, and to resist policies that benefit

wealthier citizens over poorer ones (Goren 2001).

Taken together, these differences in values suggest that Republicans and

Democrats will react differently to how social spending programs are framed. For

Republicans, we expect that whether a program is portrayed as ‘‘direct spending’’ or

‘‘tax expenditures’’ will have a substantial impact on program support. Even if they

are the same in cost and intent, tax expenditures—given that they are perceived as a

decrease in the amount of one’s owntax burden—are easier to view as a reward for

one’s own individual initiative and effort (as opposed to being viewed as

‘government assistance’) than direct spending—which is realized as a direct

payment from the government to an individual. An awareness of the regressive

redistributive effects of a program, by contrast, should be less important to

Republicans.

For Democrats, we expect the reverse to be true. The portrayal of a program as

being financed through direct spending or tax expenditures means should matter less

for Democrats, given greater levels of abstract support for activist solutions to social

problems. The awareness of the redistributive effects of a program, by contrast,

should matter more to Democrats than it does to Republicans. While citizens of both

parties are generally unaware of the redistributive effects of most tax expenditure

programs, making citizens aware of such effects is more likely to conflict with

egalitarian values among Democrats, and thus more likely to dampen support for

these programs. More formally, we expect that:

Hypothesis 3 For social programs which redistribute wealth upward, providing information about a program’s redistributive effects will decrease support for the

program more strongly among Democrats than among Republicans.

Hypothesis 4 The framing of a program as ‘‘direct spending’’ as opposed to ‘‘tax expenditures’’ will decrease support for that program more strongly among

Republicans than among Democrats.

Experimental Design

To address these hypotheses, we develop an experiment which allows us to view the

effects of two different kinds of frames—a ‘‘spending type’’ frame (i.e., whether a

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program is portrayed as direct spending or tax expenditures) and a ‘‘redistributive

type’’ frame (i.e., whether respondents are given some information about the

redistributive impact of a program)—on public support for three types of social

programs. Though we greatly simplify these programs when describing them to

respondents, all three programs mirror existing federal programs in cost, intent, and

actual redistributive effects. The programs are:

(a) Mortgage interest tax deduction. This program allows individuals who itemize

their tax returns to deduct their mortgage interest payments from their federal

taxes. The mortgage interest deduction is one of the largest tax expenditure

programs in the USA, and has been the subject of considerable scholarly

research because of both its size and its upward redistribution effects (Hacker

2002; Howard 1999; Mettler 2010, 2011).

(b) Retirement savings tax deduction. This program allows individuals to

contribute to employer-provided retirement plans on a pre-tax basis. This

program is also widely considered to redistribute wealth upward: it is available

only to those who are employed in benefits-eligible positions, and gives the

most benefits to those who are able to save the most money for retirement. In

addition, by incentivizing investment in private retirement plans—rather than

using the same amount of money to increase government-provided retirement

benefits—this program privileges private- rather than public-sector solutions

for saving for retirement (Kelly 2009; Ellis and Faricy 2011).

(c) Food stamps. This program, a component of the federal welfare system that is

administered by states, provides financial assistance for families to purchase

groceries and other necessities. This program is currently constituted as a

direct spending program, one which provides direct payments rather than tax

credits to recipients. As a means-tested program, it redistributes wealth

downward rather than upward.

It is important to note the differences between the first two types of programs and

the third one. First, the mortgage interest and retirement security programs are

currently delivered through the tax code, while the food stamp program is currently

delivered through direct spending. In addition, the programs differ in their relative

familiarity to citizens. Despite being two of the largest federal tax expenditure

programs, the mortgage interest and retirement spending programs are often cited as

examples of the ‘submerged’ welfare state (Mettler 2011), programs for which even

beneficiaries are often unaware of their functioning or existence. The food stamp

program, by contrast, one for which most citizens have at least a passing (if limited)

understanding of its intent, target beneficiaries, and distributive effects (e.g., Gilens

1999, 2001). In fact, the food stamp program is one of the small set of programs—

those which explicitly redistribute wealth to the poor—that the public most closely

connects with the broader concept of ‘‘government spending’’ (e.g., Cook and

Barrett 1992; Jacoby 2000).

For each of these programs, we develop a short description of them that

summarizes their intent and cost. We then vary the description of each in two ways.

First, we vary the delivery mechanism of the program—i.e., whether the program’s

benefits will be delivered through tax credits (tax expenditures) or government

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payments (direct spending). Second, we vary the information about redistribution

that respondents are provided about the programs, either saying nothing about

redistributive effects or describing briefly the population to which the benefits of the

program will mostly accrue. Each program can thus be presented in four ways: (1)

as a tax expenditure, with no redistributive effects, (2) as tax expenditures, with

redistributive effects, (3) as direct spending with no redistributive effects, or (4) as

direct spending with redistributive effects. For example, the four questions for the

mortgage interest program are:

Tax Expenditure Some have endorsed a program that would provide individuals

and families assistance in making the monthly payments on their homes. Under

this program, homeowners would be allowed to deduct their mortgage interest

payments from their federal taxes, helping to offset the amount of money that

they pay in interest on their mortgage. The total cost of this program is expected

to be about $100 billion per year.

Direct Spending Some have endorsed a program that would provide individuals

and families assistance in making the monthly payments on their homes. Under

this program, homeowners would receive annual payments from the federal

government to help to offset the amount of money they pay in interest on their

mortgage. The total cost of this program is expected to be about $100 billion per

year.

Tax Expenditure, Redistributive Some have endorsed a program that would

provide individuals and families assistance in making the monthly payments on

their homes. Under this program, homeowners would be allowed to deduct their

mortgage interest payments from their federal taxes, helping to offset the amount

of money that they pay in interest on their mortgage. The tax deductions will be

provided only to those who own homes, with the largest deductions typically

going to those who own the most expensive homes (and thus pay the most in

mortgage interest). The total cost of this program is expected to be about $100

billion per year.

Direct Spending, Redistributive Some have endorsed a program that would

provide individuals and families assistance in making the monthly payments on

their homes. Under this program, homeowners would receive annual payments

from the federal government to help to offset the amount of money they pay in

interest on their mortgage. These payments will be provided only to those who

own homes, with the largest payments typically going to those who own the most

expensive homes (and thus pay the most in mortgage interest). The total cost of

this program is expected to be about $100 billion per year.

Wording for the other two questions is available in the Appendix. Each question

ends by asking respondents whether they ‘‘strongly support,’’ ‘‘somewhat support,’’

‘‘neither support nor oppose,’’ ‘‘somewhat oppose,’’ or ‘‘strongly oppose’’ each

program.

Respondents for the survey experiment were recruited from undergraduate

classes at a large university in the Pacific Northwest, and were offered extra course

credit for their participation in the experiment. Upon agreeing to complete the

survey, respondents were directed to an online questionnaire. After completing a

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series of basic demographic questions, respondents were randomly assigned

(separately for each program) to one of the four question types for each social

spending program, and asked for their views on (in order) mortgage interest,

retirement savings, and food stamps. After answering the experimental questions on

the four social spending programs, respondents then completed a short battery of

other attitudinal and demographic questions.

The survey yielded 373 total respondents (158 females, 188 males). As a

convenience sample employing student respondents, the sample is clearly not ideal

in many respects. But the sample was politically diverse (32 % of respondents

identified as Republican, 36 % as Independent, and 32 % as Democratic), and held

political and social values that reflect those of the USA at large. We can certainly

imagine ways in which students might understand and process information about

these social programs differently than other citizens (and might even hold different

aggregate distributions on them). 6

But we see little theoretical reason to think that

the use of our sample will systematically affect the direction or significance of the

framing effects across different types of questions, the main threat to drawing

inferences from randomized experiments conducted on non-representative samples

(Druckman and Kam 2011). 7

Top-Line Results

As one would expect given the political diversity of the sample, attitudes toward

these three programs were quite mixed. Averaging across all experimental

conditions, the food stamp program was the most popular of the programs, with

6 To get a basic sense of how our respondents compared to the population at large, we included on our

survey several politics-related questions that mirror those on the 2008 American National Election Study.

As an example, 64 % of our respondents agreed that ‘‘A big problem in this country is that we don’t give

everyone an equal chance,’’ while 58 % of respondents in the 2008 American National Election Study

agreed with this statement. Forty-four percent of our respondents, and 37 % of NES respondents, agree

that the reason government has gotten bigger is because ‘‘because it has gotten involved in things that

people should do for themselves’’ (as opposed to because ‘‘the problems we face have become bigger’’).

A fuller description of the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of our sample is available upon

request. 7

There are two concerns regarding the use of a student sample for this experiment that are particularly

relevant. The first is that since most students have not obtained mortgages or saved for retirement

themselves, they might have less familiarity with these programs than older citizens, and thus might be

more susceptible to framing effects on these issues. While this would not affect the direction of framing

effects relative to the general population, it might exaggerate their magnitude. This is a concern to some

extent, though it is mitigated by Mettler’s (2011) finding that even beneficiaries of tax expenditure

programs like the mortgage interest deduction are often unaware of their existence or function. Second, it

is possible that students—because of their low levels of political interest, engagement, or experience—

will have less stability in their political attitudes, and thus be more susceptible to framing effects in

general. As a basic check on this, we asked students to report their levels of political interest using

questions identical to those on the National Election Study, and find that our sample reports levels of

interest and engagement comparable to those reported by respondents in population at large. In addition,

we have replicated the results stratifying students by levels of interest, and see similar effects across high-

and low-engagement groups. This partially helps to mitigate the concern that the results are driven

primarily by low levels of ‘attitude crystallization’ among students (see also Kam 2005).

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54 % of respondents either ‘strongly supporting’ or ‘supporting’ it, and 30 %

‘opposing’ or ‘strongly opposing it.’ The retirement security program saw 47 % of

respondents supporting it and 26 % opposing it. The mortgage interest deduction

was least popular, garnering 27 % support and 49 % opposition.

Before evaluating our core hypotheses, we first note the factors that predict

attitudes toward each of these spending programs in general, ignoring the question

format to which respondents were exposed. To do so, we run basic regression

models predicting respondents’ level of support for each of these programs (with the

responses scaled such that ‘strongly support’ is coded as 5, and ‘strongly oppose’ is

coded as 1) as a function of a straightforward battery of demographic and political

covariates, as well as a question asking how deserving the target beneficiaries of the

programs are of government assistance.

Table 1 presents the results of these models. While these results are not central to

our hypotheses, it is useful to note that attitudes on each of these three programs are

fairly well predicted by intuitive factors: most important among these factors was a

perception of ‘deservingness’: believing that a program’s particular target group

was deserving of government aid also led to greater levels of support for social

spending across all three programs. In general, Democrats and egalitarians are also

more supportive of these programs than are Republicans and individualists. These

results suggest that attitudes toward these issues are predictable in ways that one

would expect given past research on the determinants of social spending preferences

(Jacoby 2000; Rudolph and Evans 2005). This helps to reassure us that our student

sample is viewing these programs like the adult population would, and provides

some confidence that attitudes toward these issues are not so fleeting that they will

be dictated entirely by question framing. 8

Experimental Results

With these results in hand, we turn to evaluations of our first two hypotheses.

Figure 1 provides a basic look at the results from the experiment, showing mean

levels of support, for each of the three spending programs and each of the four

framing conditions. For mortgage interest and retirement security, these tables show

us that framing matters: basic ANOVA analyses provide evidence that the mean

levels of support are not equal across framing conditions (p \ 0.05 for both programs). For the food stamp program, by contrast (again, the only program that is

in reality constituted as a direct spending program, and the only one with clear

8 This small battery of predictors does a substantially better job of predicting attitudes toward the food

stamp issue than either of the other two issues, suggesting that respondents are better able to view the

food stamp issue in the context of existing beliefs than they are with the other two programs. In particular,

the coefficient for the ‘deservingness’ variable is substantially greater for the food stamp issue than for the

other two issues. One possible interpretation for this, consistent with the work of Gilens (1999), Iyengar

(1990), and others who study public attitudes toward poverty-relief, is that citizens have clear (if often

inaccurate) visions of to what the recipients of government assistance programs of this sort ‘‘look like,’’

and are able to couch their opinions more directly in beliefs of government’s proper role in providing

assistance to such citizens.

64 Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76

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downward redistributive effects), the ANOVA results show no evidence that

question framing matters. We see differences in levels of support for the program

across the four framing conditions that are consistent with our hypotheses. Both the

mortgage interest and retirement security programs are the least popular when the

programs are framed as providing direct payments to recipients and when

respondents are given some information about to whom the benefits are most

likely to accrue.

Table 2 provides a direct evaluation of our first two hypotheses. This table

reports results comparing mean levels of support across the ‘spending type’ and

‘redistributive effects’ conditions for each of the three programs. For both the

mortgage interest and retirement programs, inclusion of some information about

redistributive effects significantly dampens support for the programs, reducing mean

levels of support for the programs by roughly three-tenths of a point on the five-

point scale. In the case of the retirement security program, in fact, this change in

spending frame causes the majority opinion to change: when respondents are not

provided with information about redistributive effects, 56 % of respondents say that

they support this program. Only 42 % of respondents provided with information

about the redistributive effects of retirement security, however, support this

Table 1 OLS models predicting attitudes toward social spending programs

Mortgage interest Retirement security Food stamps

Party identification -0.16* (0.08) -0.05 (0.09) -0.12 ?

(0.08)

Egalitarianism 0.24* (0.14) 0.08 (0.14) 0.42* (0.14)

Support for free-market solutions -0.15 (0.14) -0.24 (0.14) -0.18 ?

(0.13)

Gender (female) 0.13 (0.12) 0.05 (0.12) -0.06 (0.12)

Deservingness of homeowners

for government assistance

0.61* (0.11)

Deservingness of the elderly

for government assistance

0.45* (0.12)

Deservingness of the poor

for government assistance

0.79* (0.11)

R 2

0.13 0.05 0.28

N 340 342 341

Egalitarianism is measured through responses to the question: which of the following statements comes

closest to your view: ONE, people should care less about their own success and more about the needs of

society, or TWO, people should take care of themselves and their families and let others do the same

Support for free-market solutions is measured through responses to the question: ONE, we need a strong

government to handle today’s complex social problems, or TWO the free market can handle these

problems without government being involved

Deservingness is measured through responses to the following question: Below are a list of groups and

institutions that are often talked about as targets for government assistance. For each, please tell me

whether you believe this group is very deserving, only somewhat deserving, or not at all deserving of

federal government financial assistance (homeowners, the elderly, the poor)

* p \ 0.05, ? p \ 0.10 (one-tailed tests), standard errors in parentheses

Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76 65

123

program. The mortgage program is on balance unpopular regardless of frame, but

support drops from 33 to 21 % when respondents are provided with information

about redistributive effects. 9

Fig. 1 Mean levels of spending support, by framing condition

9 These results reinforce the work of Mettler (2011), who is also interested in role that informing citizens

about the distributive effects of social tax expenditures affects public support for them: her study finds

that providing information about the distributive effects of upward-redistributing programs. Mettler finds

that informing respondents detailed information about the inequality-producing effects of certain types of

66 Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76

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These results are consistent with our hypotheses, showing that providing

respondents information about the wealth distribution effects of major tax

expenditures causes reduces support for those programs. The inclusion of the

redistributive frame, by contrast, has no significant or substantively meaningful

effects for the food stamp program. This result makes sense, given the fact that the

food stamp program, unlike the other two programs, tends to redistribute wealth

downward.

We see similar, but somewhat weaker, results when it comes to the effects of the

‘spending type’ frame. For the retirement security program, framing a program as

providing direct payments rather than tax credits significantly diminishes support

for the program. Again, this shifts the retirement security program from one which

garners majority support to one which garners plurality opposition (54 % of

respondents support the retirement security program when it is framed as a ‘tax

credit,’ while only 40 % support it when it is framed as a ‘government payment’).

The results for the mortgage interest program are in the expected direction (with

‘government payments’ being less popular than ‘tax deductions’), but the mean

levels of support across the two frames are not significantly different from one

another.

Again, the results for these two programs contrast with those for the food stamp

program, where the mean levels of support across the spending conditions are

essentially identical. This runs counter to our hypotheses, since regardless of a

program’s redistributive effects, we expected that framing a program in terms of a

tax credit would be more palatable than framing it as a direct cash payment.

Respondents’ greater familiarity with the food stamp program—and the notion that

the mention of ‘government spending’ causes citizens to think primarily of

Table 2 Mean levels of support for spending programs across framing conditions

Mortgage interest Retirement security Food stamps

Spending frame

Direct spending 2.58 3.10* 3.31

Tax expenditure 2.71 3.38 3.35

Redistributive frame

Redistributive effects mentioned 2.49* 3.08* 3.35

No redistributive effects mentioned 2.81 3.38 3.30

N 370 373 371

Table entries are mean levels of support for each program under the specified framing condition

* Differences between frames are significant at 0.05 level

Footnote 9 continued

social tax expenditures (e.g., ‘‘70 % of the total tax benefits of the mortgage interest deduction goes to

homeowners earning $100,000 per year or more in household income’’) tends to decrease public support

for them. Our frame is much more subtle: the information presented to respondents here talks more

generally about the social groups to which policy benefits will accrue. The significant results suggest that

extensive priming of inequality is not necessary to produce changes in the distribution of opinion on

upward-redistributing policy: even a nod in the direction of redistributing benefits to people generally

considered to be well-off (e.g., ‘owners of expensive homes’) is enough to shift opinions.

Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76 67

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‘redistributive social welfare spending’ such as money spent on food stamps (Jacoby

1994)—suggests that perhaps attitudes on this program are simply more resistant to

framing than they are for the other programs.

In addition to these results, it is useful to note the implications of some of the

differences across the four different types of framing conditions considered

separately. Most importantly, we see that (again, at least for retirement security and

mortgage interest) evidence that framing a program as providing benefits through

‘tax credits’ rather than ‘government payments’ influences not only levels of

support for the program, but also the degree to which citizens will tolerate upward

redistributive effects in the programs. The difference in levels of support for the

‘direct-redistributive’ frame and ‘tax expenditure-redistributive’ frame are partic-

ularly strong and statistically powerful for the retirement security program (and

somewhat weaker for the mortgage interest program). But both models suggest that

citizens will be more willing to support a tax expenditure program that redistributes

wealth upward than a direct payment program that does the same thing. Again, for

the food stamp program, there is little evidence that framing affects program

support.

Taken together, these results provide general support for our first two hypotheses.

For the mortgage interest and retirement programs, providing respondents some

information about the programs’ redistributive effects significantly dampened

support for them. And at least with respect to retirement security, framing the

program as a tax expenditure rather than as a direct payment decreased support as

well. But again, these results do not hold for the food stamp program, where support

remained similar across each of the four framing conditions.

Partisanship and Issue Framing

Our final two hypotheses suggest that partisanship should play a role in how

respondents react to changes in the framing of social spending programs. In

particular, we expect that Republicans will be particularly sensitive to changes in

the spending frame, while Democrats will be more sensitive to changes in the

redistributive effects frame. To test these hypotheses, Fig. 2 presents results

comparing mean levels of support across the redistributive and spending frames for

Democratic and Republican identifiers.

The results are supportive of our hypotheses. 10

For Republicans, the inclusion of

the redistributive effects frame does not significantly lessen support for any of the

three programs (in the case of mortgage interest, stating that the benefits accrue

primarily to owners of expensive homes modestly, though not significantly,

increases support for the program). Republicans, it appears, decide whether to

10 We had no specific expectations for Independents, but we note that Independents were less responsive

to both sets of frames for all issues than were partisans. This is a bit counterintuitive (given that

Independents are generally considered to hold preferences that are more transient and susceptible to

persuasion than partisans). But it is also possible that Independents do not have strong core beliefs (i.e.,

toward the role of government or toward income inequality) that would make the changes in frames

meaningful. In any event, this is a fruitful subject for future research.

68 Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76

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support or oppose these programs in a way that does not take into account the

degree to which they redistribute wealth. Democrats, by contrast, are significantly

less supportive of both the mortgage interest and retirement security programs when

they are told that benefits accrue primarily to owners of expensive homes and those

who save the most for retirement. These results are consistent with our expectations:

Fig. 2 Effects of spending and redistributive frames, by party identification

Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76 69

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given Democrats’ greater concern with income inequality, it stands to reason that

Democrats would view these programs differently when redistributive effects are

explicitly primed. 11

Again, though, we see no results for the food stamps program: though the

redistributive effects frame reminds respondents that this program helps the poorest

citizens, Republicans are not less likely to support the program as a result. This

makes some sense, given that Republicans are thought to be at least tolerant of

downward redistribution (Page and Jacobs 2009).

When it comes to the spending frame, we also see results consistent with our

hypotheses. Both Republicans and Democrats support the mortgage interest and

retirement programs less when they are framed as direct payments rather than tax

credits. These results make clear sense for Republicans, given traditional

Republican resistance to direct government spending programs. They also fit

broadly with what we know about Democrats’ political values and attitudes toward

government, which are typically more conflicted than those of Republicans. While

Democrats are more receptive than are Republicans to direct government

intervention in the economy, the mainstream Democratic Party still prefers, all

else equal, a smaller and less intrusive government to a more expansive one

(Feldman and Zaller 1992). So it is not surprising that Democrats would prefer

private over public means of achieving the same policy objectives.

But importantly, we see that the effect of the spending frame on Republican

preferences is significantly greater than the effect of framing on Democratic

preferences for both the retirement security and food stamp programs. For the

mortgage interest program, the mean difference in Republican support across

framing conditions (0.43) is greater than the mean difference in Democratic support

(0.28). For the retirement program, the mean difference in Republican support

(0.41) is nearly double the mean difference in Democratic support (0.22). Again,

though, the effects of the spending frame are restricted to these two programs.

Though Republicans do have modestly greater levels of support for the food stamp

program when it is framed as a tax credit rather than a direct payment, neither

Republican nor Democratic support for the program is significantly affected by the

mode of program delivery.

Conclusions

Our examination of the effects of policy framing on preferences for social spending

reveals several things. First, we found that the mechanism through which social

11 Even though levels of support drop more strongly for Democrats when redistributive effects are

mentioned, the mention of these effects does not necessarily make Democrats like these programs less

than Republicans do. For the mortgage interest and retirement programs, there are no significant

differences in between Republican and Democratic support in the ‘redistributive effects’ conditions

(though there are differences, with Democrats more supportive than Republicans, in the ‘no redistributive

effects’ conditions). We have no ready explanation for why this is the case, though it may be in part

because regardless of which frame was chosen, the programs were introduced as ‘‘policy proposals

designed to assist individuals…,’’ which primes the idea of government intervention in the economy in a way that Democrats tend to tolerate while Republicans do not.

70 Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76

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benefits are delivered matters to how much citizens support programs designed to

provide such benefits: support for social spending programs is generally higher

when programs are presented as tax expenditures than when the exact same

programs are presented as direct spending. Second, we found that public support

decreases for social programs which distribute wealth upward when citizens are

made aware of such programs’ redistributive effects. Finally, we found that

Democrats and Republicans reacted to both the delivery mechanism and the

mention of redistributive effects differently, with Republican support more sensitive

to the mechanism through which programs were financed, and Democratic support

more sensitive to the mention of redistributive effects. In all cases, though, we found

framing effects only for the mortgage interest and retirement security programs, and

not for the food stamp program.

Though we cannot generalize to the universe of social programs from these

examples, these results provide some guidance on when and how framing is likely

to matter to public support for such programs. The fact that the ‘redistributive

effects’ frame was more important to opinions for our two upward-redistributing

programs (retirement security and mortgage interest) than our downward-redistrib-

uting program (food stamps) is not surprising: citizens generally assume that

government social spending distributes wealth downward, so explaining that a

particular program actually redistributes wealth upward is more likely on balance to

lead them to reconsider their views on such programs.

Evidence that the delivery-mechanism frame matters to the retirement and

mortgage interest programs also suggests that citizens, all else equal, will more

strongly support social programs financed through the tax code than otherwise

identical programs financed through direct government payments. Counter to our

hypotheses, though, we saw no effect of spending type frame for the food stamp

issue: respondents did not seem to care about how the program was financed. These

results illustrate the limits of framing, and of our hypotheses. They also suggest that

framing is likely to matter more to the support of programs on which citizens have

less familiarity. The retirement security and mortgage interest programs are ones

that some argue are particularly unfamiliar to the public (e.g., Howard 1997; Mettler

2011), while a program such as the food stamp program is more easily recognized

as an archetypical example of ‘government spending’ (Schneider and Jacoby 2005).

It would be useful for future research to explore the impact of framing on other

issues, perhaps singling out direct spending programs (such as those to protect the

environment, or to fund education or scientific research, for example) that are not as

closely associated with the general concept of ‘government spending’ as is food

stamps.

Even with these limitations, the results provide several insights on how citizens

evaluate social spending programs outside of the lab. For example, we find that the

effects of the delivery-mechanism frame on support for social programs was

conditioned by partisanship. The fact that the effects of the delivery-mechanism

frame were stronger for Republicans than Democrats could serve as an explanation

for why Republicans, generally opposed to the idea of ‘big government,’ also on

balance report preferences for higher levels of government spending on specific

social programs (Ellis and Stimson 2012). At least some Republicans might view

Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76 71

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tax expenditure policy as a way to have its policy cake and eat it, too: providing

desirable social benefits while still adhering to the values of individual initiative and

support for the private sector.

Our finding regarding the differential importance of the redistributive frame to

Democrats and Republicans adds nuance to extant findings on how information

about income redistribution impacts attitudes towards social spending. Our results,

which show that highlighting information about the regressive redistributive effects

of tax expenditure programs dampens Democratic support for these programs more

than it does Republican support, makes sense given the parties’ general stances on

the proper role of government in redistributing wealth. It also suggests that while a

strategy to provide citizens more information about the regressive effects of major

tax expenditure programs may decrease overall support for these programs, it would

do so in a way that affects Democrats more than Republicans.

In addition, and though we are clearly limited by our survey-experimental

approach, we believe that the results here are of value in explaining how ‘real-

world’ policy elites frame proposals for the financing of social benefits. In general,

citizens generally support both the abstract idea of ‘limited government’ and a

strong government role in financing many specific aspects of a strong social welfare

state. In this light, Howard (2007) argues that policymakers, particularly conser-

vative ones, turn to tax expenditures as a way to thread the political needle of

funding popular social goals while seemingly advancing the virtues of individual

initiative and smaller government. The fact that tax expenditures seemingly fit both

roles—small government, and a strong system of social welfare—suggests that such

programs have a ‘framing advantage’ that makes it easier for policymakers to

persuade the public to support private rather than public solutions for social

problems. Tax expenditure programs, in other words, make it possible for

policymakers to claim that a program both finances popular social goals while

also largely avoiding the specter of ‘government involvement.’ Direct social

spending, by contrast, fulfills public demands for more social services, but conflicts

with public impulses to limit government.

This suggests that, at the margins, those in favor of privatizing social services

through tax expenditure policy should have an easier time mobilizing public support

for their plans, particularly if these programs are pitted against similar programs

financed through direct means. It also suggests that those who wish to protect

existing tax expenditure programs, even highly regressive ones, are advantaged by

the fact that such programs will be viewed in a more positive light than they would

be if the same benefits were delivered through direct payments. The fact that even

progressive Presidents have added to or resisted challenging entrenched tax

expenditure programs speaks to the high level of support that such programs have.

Highlighting the upward-redistributing effects of many real or proposed tax

expenditure programs, however, may in part negate the ‘framing advantage’ of tax

expenditure programs. Ellis and Stimson (2012), for example, document the failure,

driven by public backlash, of George Bush to partially privatize Social Security, a

failure that was driven in large part by opponents’ efforts to highlight the

redistributive consequences of such a plan. Generally high levels of abstract public

support for ‘‘letting citizens invest their own payroll tax contributions in private

72 Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76

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retirement accounts,’’ in other words, waned when citizens became aware of the

effects that this would have on the long-standing social safety net for poor- and

middle-class seniors.

The tepid response to Paul Ryan’s plan to partially privatize Medicare illustrates

a similar issue. Opponents’ efforts to highlight who would be hurt by a Medicare

voucher plan—President Obama has attacked this plan as one that would assist

wealthier senior citizens at the expense of the elderly poor—have dampened public

support for it. By highlighting the redistributive effects of such a plan, Obama has

worked to diminish what might be abstract support for a Medicare plan financed

through the private marketplace. In any case, the results suggest that policymakers

behave in a way consistent with what we show here: those in favor of expanding tax

expenditure programs highlight the fact that such programs reduce direct

government influence, while opponents seek to highlight such programs’ often

regressive nature. 12

Acknowledgments The authors wish to thank Bill Jacoby and Matthew Dabros for helpful comments on this project.

Appendix: Question Wording for Retirement and Food Stamp Questions

Retirement

Tax Expenditure Some have endorsed a program that would assist individuals in

saving for retirement while still paying day-to-day bills. Under this plan, individuals

who invest money in a private retirement plan would be able to deduct the amount

that they save for retirement from their taxable income. This tax deduction would

reduce the amount of taxes that workers must pay to the federal government. The

total cost of this program is expected to be roughly $115 billion per year.

Direct Spending Some have endorsed a program that would assist individuals in

saving for retirement while still paying day-to-day bills. Under this plan, individuals

who earn invest money in a private retirement plan would be eligible for government

payments that would help to offset the amount of money that they save for retirement.

The total cost of this program is expected to be roughly $115 billion per year.

Tax Expenditure, Redistributive Some have endorsed a program that would assist

individuals in saving for retirement while still paying day-to-day bills. Under this

plan, individuals who invest money in a private retirement plan would be able to

12 Given these motivations, it seems as if proposals that would be most likely to draw public support

would be those that both spend money through the tax code rather than directly, and also are framed as

not redistributing wealth upward such as refundable tax credits. One such strategy along these lines was

alluded to by President Obama in a 2011 speech: ‘‘the tax code is also loaded up with spending on things

like itemized deductions. And while I agree with the goals of many of these deductions, from

homeownership to charitable giving, we can’t ignore the fact that they provide millionaires an average tax

break of $75,000 but do nothing for the typical middle-class family that doesn’t itemize. So my budget

calls for limiting itemized deductions for the wealthiest 2 % of Americans—a reform that would reduce

the deficit by $320 billion over 10 years’’ (Obama 2011). The fact that Mitt Romney—some months

later—endorsed a plan that would also cap tax deductions for wealthy citizens suggests that such a plan

was perceived as quite popular, at least among some important constituencies.

Polit Behav (2014) 36:53–76 73

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deduct the amount that they save for retirement from their taxable income. This tax

deduction would reduce the amount of taxes that workers must pay to the federal

government. These tax deductions would go to those who save for retirement, with

the largest payments going to those who save the most money for retirement. The

total cost of this program is expected to be roughly $115 billion per year.

Direct Spending, Redistributive Some have endorsed a program that would assist

individuals in saving for retirement while still paying day-to-day bills. Under this plan,

individuals who earn invest money in a private retirement plan would be eligible for

government payments that would help to offset the amount of money that they save for

retirement. These government payments would go to those who save for retirement,

with the largest payments going to those who save the most money for retirement. The

total cost of this program is expected to be roughly $115 billion per year.

Food Stamps

Tax Expenditure Some have endorsed a program that would provide low-income

citizens with assistance in paying for groceries and other necessities. Under this

program, citizens would be eligible to deduct the amount of money that they pay for

groceries from their taxable income. These tax credits would reduce the amount of

federal income tax that these citizens pay each year. The total cost of this program is

expected to be $65 billion per year.

Direct Spending Next, some have endorsed a program that would provide low-

income citizens with assistance in paying for groceries and other necessities. Under

this program, certain citizens would be eligible for cash grants from the federal

government that can be used to purchase groceries. The total cost of this program is

expected to be $65 billion per year.

Tax Expenditure, Redistributive Next, some have endorsed a program that would

provide low-income citizens with assistance in paying for groceries and other

necessities. Under this program, citizens would be eligible to deduct the amount of

money that they pay for groceries from their taxable income. These tax credits

would reduce the amount of federal income tax that these citizens pay each year.

Since the program is designed to help those who struggle to pay for basic

necessities, the largest tax credits would go to those with the lowest incomes. The

total cost of this program is expected to be $65 billion per year.

Direct Spending, Redistributive Next, some have endorsed a program that would

provide low-income citizens with assistance in paying for groceries and other

necessities. Under this program, certain citizens would be eligible for cash grants

from the federal government that can be used to purchase groceries. Since the

program is designed to help those who struggle to pay for basic necessities, the

largest tax credits would go to those with very low or no incomes. The total cost of

this program is expected to be $65 billion per year.

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