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OCTOBER 2OO4

Public Allies Building the Infrastructure for Growth

Summary

Strong support from AmeriCorps, fees from organizations who sponsor “Allies,”

and clearly documented program results have propelled Public Allies’ growth. Over

the years, Public Allies has worked hard to find the appropriate level of control and

decentralization with its branches, and the organization recently decided to migrate

all of its sites to a licensee model in which organizations or universities manage

local programs, relieving some of the administrative and financial burden on local

sites. Public Allies also is planning future growth with a new, lower cost model and

a more targeted approach to site development.

Organizational Snapshot

Organization: Public Allies

Year founded: 1992

Headquarters: Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Mission: “Public Allies advances diverse young leaders to strengthen

communities, nonprofits, and civic participation.”

Program: Public Allies identifies talented young adults (known as “Allies”) ages 18

to 30 from diverse and underrepresented backgrounds and develops their

leadership potential through a 10-month program of full-time, paid apprenticeships

in nonprofit organizations, weekly leadership trainings, and team service projects.

The organization aims to change community leadership with a new generation of

young adults from diverse and underrepresented backgrounds committed to

careers working for community and social change and with practices emphasizing

collaboration, diversity and inclusion, identifying assets, continuous learning and

integrity. Public Allies believes such leadership will unite people and groups

together, create more effective and responsive organizations, engage the assets of

more citizens, and ultimately build a more just and equitable society. In 2004, 203

Allies served nonprofit organizations and local communities in 11 sites. Over the

organization’s history, over 600 nonprofits have been served and 1,523 Allies have

graduated from the program. Eighty-two percent of Ally graduates continue careers

in community and public service with very high levels of civic engagement. Ninety-

six percent of partner organizations report that their Ally’s impact met or exceeded

their expectations and 83 percent reported that they would sustain the services

expanded and enhanced by their Allies.

Size: $7.3 million in revenue; 12 employees in the national headquarters, and 55

employees across the entire organization (as of 2003).

Revenue growth rate: Compound annual growth rate (1999-2003): 9 percent;

highest annual growth rate (1999-2003): 39 percent in 2001.

Funding sources: In 2003, more than 70 percent of Public Allies’ network

revenues come from an almost even split of government funding (AmeriCorps) and

earned-income fees that it charges partners for employing an Ally. In previous

years, foundations, corporations and individuals played a larger role than they did

in 2003. The national office receives about 20 percent of its funding from

AmeriCorps.

Organizational structure: Public Allies started with a branch structure, with all

sites operating under one 501(c)(3), but it is now in the process of transitioning to a

licensee structure, with each site operating under a host organization’s 501(c)(3). It

operates in 10 locations: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Chicago, Illinois; Cincinnati, Ohio;

New York City, New York; Los Angeles, California; Wilmington, Delaware; Raleigh-

Durham, North Carolina; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Milpitas, California (Silicon

Valley); and Estes Park, Colorado (Eagle Rock).

Leadership: Paul Schmitz, president and CEO, was the first leader of the Public

Allies Milwaukee site and is the third leader of the organization.

More information: www.publicallies.org

Key Milestones

1992: Founded; launched its first apprenticeship program in Washington,

D.C.

1993: Expanded to Chicago with a National Service demonstration grant

from President Bush’s Commission on National and Community Service

1994: Received funding from the new AmeriCorps program; expanded to

Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina; and Wilmington,

Delaware

1995: Expanded to Silicon Valley, California

1998: Expanded to Cincinnati, Ohio

1999: Expanded to Los Angeles, California and New York City, New York

2000: Schmitz became CEO; expanded to Taos, New Mexico through a

partnership with the Rocky Mountain Youth Corps’ Public Allies Delaware

affiliates with the University of Delaware’s Center for Community Research

and Service

2001: Public Allies North Carolina paused due to a financial struggles;

created program baselines and standards, and completed strategic plan to

strengthen and grow the program model and to mobilize alumni through new

programs

2002: Expanded to Eagle Rock; introduced online evaluation tools; began

alumni programming

2003: Closed Taos site

2004: Opened Connecticut site; closed Washington, D.C. site

Growth Story

In 1992 Vanessa Kirsch and Katrina Browne, at the time two recent college

graduates, founded Public Allies with the aim of correcting stereotypes about

“slacker” GenXers. They saw that many talented young people were committed to

active citizenship and community change, but that nonprofits had a hard time

meaningfully tapping into this talent pool of emerging leaders. With help from

hundreds of volunteers, Kirsch and Browne created Public Allies to recruit, train,

and support diverse young leaders, and to prepare them to assume national and

community leadership on pressing public issues.

The organization launched its first apprenticeship program in Washington, D.C.,

placing 15 young people in positions of influence in the city’s nonprofit sector. The

following year, Public Allies Chicago began with 30 more Allies. In 1994, people

like current Public Allies President and CEO Paul Schmitz lobbied Public Allies to

create sites in their cities, and so Public Allies helped them start local chapters in

Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina; and Wilmington,

Delaware. The organization opened in San Jose/Silicon Valley, California in 1995;

Cincinnati, Ohio in 1998; Los Angeles, California and New York City, New York in

1999; Taos, New Mexico in 2000; and Estes Park, Colorado in 2002. Public Allies

has explored other sites over the past decade with the availability of AmeriCorps

and private funds often driving final decisions.

The organization always intended to be national, but between 1992 and 1996

growth was opportunistic, often resulting from partners asking to replicate Public

Allies’ program in their communities or from Kirsch or Browne expressing interest

in a specific location. In fact, Schmitz recalls that when he was head of the

Milwaukee office, he did not have the support of the national board which did not

wish to expand there or in Delaware. “The ironic thing is that Milwaukee and

Delaware are two of the strongest sites, because the challenges they put up to us

in the beginning forced us to build something stronger than perhaps anyone else in

the network had built.”

In 1992, President Bush named the group one his “Demonstration Projects for

National Service,” and in 1994 it was one of the initial organizations that received

funding from the newly created AmeriCorps program. Presidents Bill Clinton and

George W. Bush have both honored the group’s work over the years. All the

attention led to strong interest from funders, and with it, strong pressure to grow.

Public Allies made Schmitz vice president of strategy and expansion in 1997, and

Schmitz met with leaders in six communities who had contacted Public Allies about

expansion. His uncle, then the president of Xavier University in Cincinnati, had

invited him to explore opening a site there. After gaining the support of dozens of

community organizations and leaders, Public Allies received multi-year gifts from

Procter & Gamble and its chairman. The organization also created a binder that

included detailed information on program methods and best practices to share with

the new site. “We felt like it was our first time doing things right — all of our sites

were struggling financially, but we saw Cincinnati and were like, ‘Wow! This is how

it could be done.’”

The CEO and the board decided New York and Los Angeles were the next logical

cities for expansion, due to the amount of national funding coming from New York

and the presence of two board members in Los Angeles. “At that time we decided

if we were going to be truly national, we needed the two biggest cities,” he says.

(See Figure 1 for the growth in Allies graduating from the program.)

But with limited standards and management, sites evolved in their own directions,

starting additional programs and making operating decisions without consulting

with the national office even though the national office was ultimately liable.

Despite inconsistencies in their program models, local sites achieved positive

results and were championed in their communities, which made national

interventions more difficult. Monitoring sites was also challenging due to the lack of

national infrastructure. One local director, after a review that noted her lack of

compliance with organizational policies, said that she thought she was running a

local organization not a national program. “We grew the idea of Public Allies before

we grew a clearly defined program or organizational model,” added Schmitz.

This information is confidential and was prepared by The Bridgespan Group solely for the use of our client; it is not to be relied on by any 3rd party without The Bridgespan Group’s prior written consent.

Figure 1

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

127 124 148 142 147

201 214

203

238

203

100

200

300

Number of Allies

Graduates

Non- graduates

Number of sites

Graduation rate

88%

89%

83%

89%

87%

80%

87%

73%

77%

86%

85%

88%

Source: Organization internal data

In 2001, growth paused as the organization conducted a strategic plan. “We ran

out of money,” Schmitz explains, referring to Public Allies’ financial crisis in 2000

(see Capital section). No one would help fund the planning process, so Public

Allies surveyed 170 stakeholders on its own. It learned that alumni were an under-

tapped and under-developed resource, so the organization developed a plan to

continue supporting the leadership development of alumni. The study also

revealed that the organization needed to raise its profile and better report the

results stakeholders saw from the program.

The plan called for expanding to 20 cities by 2006, primarily through “franchise-

like” affiliations. Under this arrangement, the Public Allies national office would

license other nonprofit organizations to run Public Allies sites under the umbrella of

the licensee’s 501(c)(3). Public Allies would provide the program, training,

technical assistance, and assessment tools and processes. The Delaware site was

the first licensee created under the new plan, operating out of the University of

Delaware starting in September 2000.

The plan helped further efforts over time to more clearly define the Public Allies

model and organizational structure. Public Allies sites had created their own vision

and mission statements until 1996. Program methods and best practices were first

pulled together into a handbook in 1998 by a team of program staff representing

each site. Program baselines and standards for each component of the program

and a process for monitoring site quality were established in 2000. Financial

policies were established in 2001, common program evaluation tools and systems

were established in 2002, and site operating standards were created in 2003.

With hindsight, Schmitz recognizes that more clearly defined program and

management systems would have helped when he was running the Milwaukee

office. “Early in our history, we had to seize the opportunity that existed for us to

grow or we wouldn’t be in many of our sites. Having a consistent program model at

that time would have been great, but the experimentation that came from these

new sites are what developed the successful model we have today.”

“I think there was a lot of work in making sure we had a very firm foundation on

which to build things, but we’ve been building it and trying to live in it at the same

time with very limited capacity until recently,” says Dawn Hutchison, vice president

for marketing and development. “As we start expanding [again, we need to] have

our program and management expectations clearly defined with the right support

to help people successfully implement them from day one.”

Schmitz believes that capacity and culture are important considerations in growth.

“The problem was that over time, we developed this very decentralized culture with

very limited national management either from lack of experience or from lack of

capacity. For instance, in 1995 when there were five Public Allies sites, we had 13

national office staff and they were all young people who were new to the field. And

in 2000, we had grown to 10 sites, but we only had seven national office staff. The

culture that evolved and the lack of standard management systems conflicted with

our structure as a single 501(c)(3). As we sought to build our national office

infrastructure, standards, and management systems, there was great resistance

from sites who wanted more support but wanted to retain control.”

While building standards and systems in recent years, Public Allies has worked

hard to address the underlying structural issues and to become more strategic

about growth. The Monitor Group recently led the creation of a new Public Allies

strategic plan, and the organization has met with leaders from McKinsey,

Bridgespan, YouthBuild, Teach for America, City Year, City Cares, Jumpstart and

others to learn more about national-local structures and growth-related operational

issues. As a result, Public Allies chose to migrate all of its sites to the licensee

structure, and to grow its impact through new licensee sites and through

dissemination of its leadership development approach to other organizations.

Another recent change is that Public Allies now uses a more rigorous way of

evaluating new geographic opportunities. Potential sites apply through an

extensive, albeit collaborative, process with Public Allies. The organization

received three detailed applications for new sites from a 2003 nationwide call for

proposals, and selected only one. The first site developed through this method was

recently launched through a licensee relationship with a group in Connecticut.

One of Public Allies’ key assets in growing its model has been its efforts to track

Allies’ outcomes. It does so with three tools, all of which collect data electronically

via the organization’s intranet: The Personal Impact Service Documentation (PISD)

system; 360 Degree Feedback Assessments; and frequent surveys of both Allies

and partner organizations. In addition to the electronic tools, Allies participate in

Presentations of Learning at the end of the year when they defend how they have

achieved the organization’s outcomes. Public Allies commissions an annual “Year

End Evaluation Report,” written by the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee using

the data collected through these tools. Public Allies also actively tracks the

performance of its alumni through annual surveys.

Public Allies developed their current online evaluation system with the help of a

few “Cisco Fellows”, employees Cisco Systems, Inc. “loaned” to the organization.

Claire Thompson, director of continuous learning, says, “The Cisco fellows were

the impetus for this electronic system. They piloted an online system at the Silicon

Valley site, helped us find the consultants, planted the seeds of change, and we

took it from there and ran with it … The idea was that we needed to measure and

report impact better, share information among sites, and streamline administrative

processes.” Paul Schmitz credits the Cisco Fellows with keeping the costs

manageable: “Our process was very inexpensive. We could not have had it done

anywhere else.” Public Allies has documented its technology transformation in a

case study called “Recipe for Replication,” which is available on the organization’s

website along with a presentation on its PISD and other evaluation tools.

Hutchison, vice president for marketing and development, says the outcome

measurement has been valuable in sustaining and growing funding from

AmeriCorps and other sources, at the national and site levels: “The PISD is an

incredible, powerful tool … The sector is asking for that information, and we are

able to deliver it.”

CONFIGURATION

Public Allies started as a branch organization, with each site operating under the

501(c)(3) of the national office. Lack of experience and capacity among national

staff members early on and Public Allies’ mission of developing local community

leadership, however, created a culture that gave sites a great deal of control. “If

your culture is all about local leadership, it is tough to have one centralized

organization,” says Schmitz.

Local sites had an independent local advisory board, which the local site director

chose but which shared with national the hiring and firing authority over the

director. The program model was not codified in detail before the initial expansion,

enabling local sites to vary the program model, which several did to a significant

degree. Despite the inconsistencies in their program models, local sites achieved

positive results which fueled their continued growth. AmeriCorps funding led to

some shifts in the model. “Initial program offerings were more advocacy oriented,

but as Public Allies began receiving AmeriCorps funding, it became direct service

oriented and more outcome directed,” says Schmitz.

Further, the reporting structure between the local sites and national office was

unclear, and the national office had little control over “rogue” sites that developed

program priorities or operating decisions which diverged from the national

organization. For example, one local site decided it would be more cost effective to

share space with other nonprofit organizations, so it leased office space large

enough to hold three organizations and planned to sublet the space to other

nonprofits. When the national office finally learned of this, it was unhappy that it

would have to bear the liability of excess real estate if the local site were unable to

lease the space.

Public Allies eventually found its relationship with local sites unsustainable. “Our

model was flawed,” says Hutchison. “We have a very decentralized culture.” Not

only was the national office unable to control local programs, but it was also liable

for the local sites’ persistent budget deficits. Local site directors have minimal

accountability to national because “[the national office] can always bail local sites

out,” says Schmitz. “The home office has all of the responsibility and none of the

control.”

The organization recently announced it would close its Washington, D.C., office,

the site of Public Allies’ first program. “We have come to the conclusion, that even

under the best local leadership, we will struggle locally to raise the necessary

dollars,” said Schmitz in an announcement about the closure. “Our program

achieves great outcomes, but is fairly expensive and too small in scale locally to

justify the infrastructure that would allow us to raise more funds. The struggles we

have faced are structural.” Public Allies is currently working with D.C. alumni to

identify a partner to re-launch and operate Public Allies D.C. in 2005.

D.C. was not the first site Public Allies has had to close. The Taos site was another

example of a licensee structure, in which the Rocky Mountain Youth Corps (RMYC)

hosted Public Allies. Public Allies closed the site because of the challenges of

operating effectively in a small, rural community and because of the divergent

cultures between Public Allies, a program that embraces the conflicts and

challenges inherent in leadership development, and RMYC, a youth corps program

that is focused on helping young people gain greater discipline.

The Public Allies National Board recently issued an ultimatum: all sites will either

have to become licensees (i.e., operate under another a host organization’s

501(c)(3)) or close, because, says Schmitz, “Either you centralize the culture or

decentralize the structure. Our program’s culture has been a key component of our

success while a more hierarchical structure runs contrary to our purpose.” Their

research showed that many of the sites couldn’t bear the high costs of

incorporating as a 501(c)(3). “A single program that develops 30 leaders a year

cannot justify or build the necessary infrastructure to operate an effective

organization,” says Schmitz. And David Weaver, vice president of leadership

development, believes that branch executive directors who have more limited

fundraising skills would welcome the structure that comes with being a licensee,

because a university or nonprofit partner could help with costs and fundraising.

Schmitz is drawn to elements of a model like Jumpstart, in which a licensee falls

under another organization’s 501(c)(3), such as a university or community

organization. The Public Allies national office would still support local sites with

training, technical assistance, evaluation, and participation in a larger network.

Public Allies experimented with the licensee structure in Delaware, where the local

site is run by the University of Delaware. It found that the arrangement met its

conflicting goals of having local leadership, local control, and local risk bearing

while meeting quality standards, maintaining the brand identity, and representing

our leadership culture. Public Allies sites are all currently in talks with universities

and other nonprofits to begin migrating to the new structure. In addition, Public

Allies is exploring efforts to disseminate their leadership development approaches,

curriculum, and assessment processes to other organizations.

Additionally, Public Allies is using its stepped up outcome evaluation efforts to help

sites manage program quality. The national office tailors the outcome data it tracks

to meet the needs of local offices. According to Thompson, director of continuous

learning, “We look at program improvement options for our sites — where they

stood out, where they fell short — and then we use different venues to share best

practices.” The national office also offers Web-based seminars twice a month that

help sites learn best practices, and continuous learning officers visit sites twice per

year and look for ways to improve programs.

CAPITAL

Public Allies relies on AmeriCorps for about 20 percent of its national office

funding, and about one-third of its local funding. “I don’t know that we could

replace that money,” says Hutchison. “Sites are struggling with the fundraising they

have to do now, and that would be very different without AmeriCorps.”

AmeriCorps funding goes to both the national office and directly to the sites. But

cash flow is tricky to manage, because of the government’s slow schedule of

payments. There is sometimes a delay of up to six months between the time Public

Allies’ national office pays out money to support local sites and when national

receives its money from AmeriCorps.

When AmeriCorps funding was threatened in 2003, Public Allies had to work

doubly hard on advocacy and political negotiating to keep the money. AmeriCorps

has been useful in funding expansion, but the financial risk of depending heavily

on a funding source that can disappear with a change of administration weighs

heavily on Public Allies’ management team and board. Further, the AmeriCorps

money is highly sought after; Public Allies sometimes must compete with

organizations it would prefer to partner with.

Earned-income revenues are almost equal in magnitude to the government

funding stream. Public Allies partners with nonprofit organizations, which agree to

host an “Ally” and pay a portion of his or her salary (AmeriCorps pays the other

portion), as well as a nominal administration fee. AmeriCorps funds non-program

staff, in part, and unrestricted grants fund the rest.

The remaining revenue comes from foundations, corporations and individuals.

“Individual funders have to be in there from the beginning because it shows broad

support, and gets folks engaged and bought into the program,” says Hutchison.

“But it is very high touch and intensive and requires a capacity that our local offices

lack with their limited scale.” (See Figure 2 for a breakdown of Public Allies’

revenue sources.)

Although individuals have not been the largest funders for Public Allies, they have

played an important role, giving mostly unrestricted funds. When a financial crisis

in 2000 almost forced the organization to close, a board member stepped in with

gifts to cover over $200,000 of expenses. The organization moved headquarters to

Milwaukee, which cut operating costs dramatically. It also pared its national office

staff down from seven to four and cut other expenses to eliminate $370,000 in

accumulated debt from sites.

Figure 2

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

$4.2

$5.3 $5.1

$7.1

$8.8

$7.3

$10M

Public Allies revenue

Government Foundation Individual Corporate

Other (incl. partner fees)

Budget surplus (deficit) ($M)

Annual revenue growth

-$0.1M

N/A

-$0.1M

26%

$0.0M

-3%

$1.4M

39%

$1.7M

23%

-$1.4M

-17%

Note: Revenues are recorded on accrual basis in which multi-year pledges are booked in the year received and deficits may be offset by payments of previous pledges Source: Organization internal data

“In our first eight years, Public Allies subsidized $1.2 million of site losses. By

2000, it caught up to us. Things got better for a few years, but in recent years, we

have again had to subsidize site losses with unrestricted funds,” Schmitz says.

“This is an unsustainable and un-strategic way to operate. When you’re in survival

mode, you delay and divert resources from projects that move you forward and

strengthen the organization to instead cover day-to-day costs just to keep the

doors open.”

Public Allies’ local budgets tend to be very tight: Ally stipends and benefits are 57

percent of expenses; personnel (each site has an executive director, one program

manager per 10 Allies and a few sites have an additional administrative position)

are 32 percent of expenses; fixed operating costs (rent, copier rental, etc.) are 7

percent; and the remaining 5 percent covers everything else, including Ally

training, graduation ceremonies, office supplies, postage, and other “discretionary”

expenses. When fundraising shortfalls are discovered, there is little room to cut

expenses, except personnel, and program staff are two-thirds funded by

AmeriCorps. “The structure of our local site budgets makes it difficult to do much

more than cover the losses if you want to complete the program year,” Schmitz

adds.

Public Allies is now working to improve its individual donor strategy, rolling out a

campaign in which sites will receive $1 from national for every $2 they raise. Local

boards are also being encouraged to focus more on fundraising. But this national

fundraising strategy is challenged by the institutional design of local control. Dawn

Hutchison, who was recently hired by the national office to increase individual and

foundation funding and who used to work at Jumpstart, notes, “At Jumpstart we

would say, ‘This is what we’re doing.’ At Public Allies, we say, ‘Here’s an

opportunity — do you want to participate?’”

Public Allies has achieved greater success with foundations, but funding streams

for “leadership development” are challenging to navigate. To Schmitz, the problem

stems from the fact that a “leadership development organization” is difficult to

explain. “The complexity of our model allows us to fit in many funders’ ‘boxes,’ yet

not fit neatly in any one ‘box.’ Local funders are more likely to fund the direct

service of our members than their leadership development. Fundraising for a

leadership development program is more analogous to a school than a direct

service organization, as the impact on our participants grows over time.” Public

Allies has tracked long-term results of their participants which has helped them

make the case for such support.

CAPABILITIES

Public Allies has expanded its national office staffing in recent years beyond what

they planned in 2001. Good people were brought on board and Public Allies

figured out how to use their assets to strengthen the organization. For example,

Schmitz came to the organization as a local site director in Milwaukee, and then

became national vice president of strategy when the organization grew. In 2001,

Schmitz became CEO after Chuck Supple moved to California to work for then-

governor Gray Davis. Schmitz decided he would only take the CEO position if

Public Allies moved its headquarters to Milwaukee. The board agreed.

The organization has had three leaders in a little over 10 years, a level of turnover

that makes it challenging to keep momentum going for the program, and to keep

the new sites aligned with national office’s goals. Schmitz estimates that his time is

split as follows: 30 percent on fundraising, 25 percent on general management, 20

percent on external relations and communications, 10 percent on program

strategy, 10 percent on government relations, and 5 percent on the board.

The organization conducted strategic plans in both 1997 and 2001, both of which

helped guide its hiring. Public Allies hired an IT staff member after working with

Cisco to overhaul its technology infrastructure and to build a system for local site

evaluations. Specialists in development and program evaluation were also brought

in. A government-relations position was added because of the organization’s

reliance on AmeriCorps funding.

Because Schmitz was becoming stretched too thin, over the past two years Public

Allies has added a senior management layer, hiring vice presidents of

development, continuous learning, and leadership development. These additions

have enabled Schmitz to spend more time on fund development activities. The

chief operating officer position has been the hardest position to hire for. One

person hired for the job did not work out, so the organization is still looking.

The 2001 strategic plan did not envision all of these new positions. “As we built our

infrastructure, we outgrew the capabilities of some of our staff, meaning that some

folks needed to be let go with growth,” says Schmitz.

Weaver has put together a new “institute” to train and develop local executive

directors and program staff, with the goal of giving people preparation to move up

the career ladder. After six years, Weaver will be leaving Public Allies in a few

months to pursue either another job in the nonprofit sector or further education.

“People should always be advancing in their careers,” he says. He believes there

should be more internal promotions within Public Allies, or else voluntary turnover,

once people hit an experience ceiling. Additionally, Schmitz has begun planning for

his eventual succession.

Public Allies also changed the nature of its board. Schmitz recalls that during his

early days as CEO, the board had great energy, but it wasn’t very demanding. This

“rubber-stamping” board led Public Allies through the transition to greater

professional management, but it lacked diversity and experience with growing

nonprofit organizations. In 2002, the organization transitioned to a “tough”

governing board, with a new board chair. “The board needs to be managed and

engaged just like the staff,” says Schmitz. “They definitely need more attention.”

Key Insights

Finding the right local structure. Public Allies has struggled with the

appropriate level of control and decentralization with its local sites. The

organization is currently transitioning to a licensee model in which partner

organizations carry more of the administrative and financial burden for local

sites. Public Allies sees itself now as replicating a program not replicating an

organizational model.

Relying on government support. Because it depends heavily on one

funding source (i.e., AmeriCorps), Public Allies has had to invest a great deal

of time and energy into ensuring that that source continues. Diversification

into other sources has not been easy because of a lack of clarity about

leadership programs and how that fits into funders’ priorities.

Planning for growth. In a change from the opportunistic approach to growth

Public Allies pursued historically, the organization is now being more

deliberate about planning for growth. It has established a new licensee

model, a site-evaluation tool, and a geographic expansion process for

potential partners. It also has a more replicable program model with the

appropriate tools, processes, and support to implement it.

Limiting financial risk. Public Allies’ branch structure has made the national

liable for local fundraising shortfalls. The national board expects the sites to

raise their funds and the local advisory boards expect the national to provide

more support. With few costs to cut, the national covers site losses, often

diverting funds from the activities that can build capacity to prevent such

future losses. The new licensee structure will streamline costs, add local

capacity and prevent national from having to cover such losses in the future.

Using low-cost technological solutions. Collecting data electronically via

an intranet has allowed the organization to measure and report impact, to

share information among sites, and to streamline administrative processes.

In-kind contributions from Cisco Systems, Inc. combined with outsourcing

and the online nature of the system helped lower the cost of creating and

maintaining it.