Psychological and behavioral factors of homegrown terrorists

PAPER

PSYCHIATRY AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Samuel J. Leistedt,1,2,3,4 M.D., Ph.D.

On the Radicalization Process

ABSTRACT: This study aimed to provide an in-depth description of the radicalization process, which is a very important step in terrorist activities. The author proposes a translational analysis that is first based on the author’s experience in the psychological evaluation of terrorist behavior and second on an exhaustive review of the current literature. The search terms “terrorism,” “radicalization,” “social psychology,” and “psychopathology” were used to identify relevant studies in the following databases: Scopus, Medline, PubCentral, and Science Direct. Because of its importance, understanding radicalization process should be one of the priorities of behavioral scientists. International studies should be performed with a focus on several aspects, such as radicalization risk factors, brainwashing, the role of the media, and finally, in de-radicaliza- tion programs.

KEYWORDS: forensic science, radicalization, social psychology, social networks, terrorism, intelligence gathering

The radicalization of young men and women by terrorist organizations has become an overwhelming problem in the world (1–4). Recently, Mohammed Merah and the Kouachi Brothers in France and Mehdi Nemmouche in Belgium appear to have been motivated by a complex mix of politics and faith, and their com- munications illustrate the tactics used to try to recruit other young Europeans and Americans to their cause (1–4). Recently, two 21- year-old men from Birmingham, England were charged with trav- eling to Syria to carry out acts of terrorism. Even more recently, in January of 2014, two 15-year-old boys from France left Tou- louse to join the fighting in Syria. The possibility of French citi- zens returning from Syria as hardened jihadists is the “biggest threat that the country faces in the coming years,” said Manuel Valls, the interior minister (3–5). He added that France and Eur- ope risk being “overwhelmed” by the phenomenon. Mr. Valls estimated that 700 French nationals have either travelled to Syria, have travelled to Syria and returned to France, or are currently en route. Some 21 French nationals have been killed. Shiraz Maher, a senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College London, estimated recently that up to 50 British fighters have already returned home (2–5). A few months ago, Richard Walton, the head of Scotland Yard’s counter-terrorism command, said there were already indications that Britons were returning from Syria with orders to carry out attacks, with the Metropolitan Police carrying out a “huge num- ber of operations” to protect the public (2–5).

As introduced in the above examples, this study deals with the radicalization process in terrorist activities. In fact, in light of these facts, and in order to optimally counter terrorists, it is imperative to have a clear understanding of the psychology underlying their actions. In recent years, research efforts have investigated radicalization, de-radicalization, and disengagement (2–5). In this report, the author describes findings from a litera- ture review and analyzes the factors that are involved in the pro- cess of terrorist recruitment, focusing on the radicalization process.

Sources and Database

Based on the author’s experience in evaluating terrorist psy- chology and on an exhaustive literature review, the aim of this study was to describe and discuss the radicalization process in a translational manner. The search terms “terrorism,” “radicalization,” “social psy-

chology,” and “psychopathology” were used to identify relevant studies in the following databases: Scopus, Medline, PubCentral, and Science Direct (the latter is a science-based web portal). Several textbooks were examined, and manual searches of the reference lists of relevant studies were used to identify additional studies.

The Radicalization Process as a Complex Phenomenon

In the author’s opinion, to better understand the radicalization process, several elements must be considered: • Risk factors must be present. As described below, the author

prefers to discuss the concept of risk factors rather than the concept of a terrorist profile or personality.

• When risk factors are present, persuasion techniques/brain- washing must be used for radicalization to occur.

• Although these two elements are important, they are insuffi- cient for radicalization. In the modern world of “new terrorism,” networks, communication, social engineering, and

1Forensic Mental Health Hospital “Les Marronniers”, Rue Despars 94, Tournai 7500, Belgium.

2Department of Medicine, ULB, Route de Lennik, 808, 1070, Brussels, Belgium.

3Department of Medicine, UMons, Place du Parc, 20, 7000, Mons, Belgium.

4SPF Justice, Boulevard de Waterloo, 115, 1000, Brussels, Belgium. Received 27 Jan. 2015; and in revised form 20 Aug. 2015; accepted 22

Aug. 2015.

1588 © 2016 American Academy of Forensic Sciences

J Forensic Sci, November 2016, Vol. 61, No. 6 doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.13170

Available online at: onlinelibrary.wiley.com

propaganda using information techniques must be present as well. All of these can be found via the media and on the Internet.

• The use of coercive psychology leads to cognitive modifica- tions. The availability cascade is a good example of the potential influence of the media on cognitive functions.

Risk Factors

In the 1970s, the view of terrorism as a clinical disorder was popular. In the 1980s and the 1990s, this view was often dis- missed outright but, interestingly, there was insufficient evidence supporting the dismissal (6). The earlier, more heavy-handed characterization of terrorists was replaced by the subtler notion that while terrorists could not really be characterized by a partic- ular personality type, they often almost had certain personality traits. For example, narcissism and paranoia are the two traits most commonly associated with terrorists in this particular literature (6). Contemporary scholars of terrorism consider much of that

research quite dated and even obscure. The fact that the lessons that emerged from early studies have almost disappeared from contemporary psychological research on terrorism raises trou- bling questions about the state of affairs in terrorist psychology today (6,7). Nevertheless, at this point, it may be worth summa- rizing some basic assertions (6–9):

• Explanations of terrorism at the individual level, in terms of psychology/psychopathology, are insufficient for understand- ing why people become involved in terrorism. This is not exactly the same as saying that psychological explanations alone are insufficient in accounting for why people turn to terrorism, because it seems that the “terrorist personality” issue needs to be temporarily isolated as far as its explicit and implicit purported importance is concerned, at least in this context. Although the frustration-aggression hypothesis and its derivatives have found their way into several political science theories of terrorism, there is a persistent lack of acknowledgment of the conceptual problems that are involved (8,9).

• By themselves, personality traits are insufficient in terms of explaining why some people become terrorists and others do not, or, more generally, why people join terrorist groups. This point is not the same as the first point. This assertion is related to the inherent attractiveness, and yet the danger, in placing too much emphasis on the “needs-fulfillment” stance, for the same conceptual reasons that might be used to criti- cize other trait-based approaches (and the interpretations of personality type and traits in this context altogether). In main- stream contemporary psychology, trait theories do not attempt to be all encompassing or to explain all behavior, and the same mistakes should not be made when applying such mod- els to explain terrorism. Future attempts at developing indi- vidual terrorist profiles ought to bear this in mind. Whether terrorist profiles ought ideally to be described in terms of demographics or even in terms of psychological types (as opposed to characterization of actual behavior) merits real consideration. Profiles that comprise behavioral analysis may ultimately be more productive in terms of offering a means of detecting, and thus controlling, terrorism (6–9).

• There are conceptual, theoretical, and methodological prob- lems with explaining terrorism in terms of personality traits that suggest why some people become terrorists and others

do not. Such explanations are not only inconsistent; they demonstrate a lack of understanding of basic psychological concepts. The author’s experience in Europe has been that people who are radicalized have some common experiences or characteristics (e.g., Mohammed Merah in France, Mehdi Nemmouche in Belgium, the Kouachi brothers in France, etc.) (i) They come from immigrant families (second or third generation); (ii) they have previous police records (for vari- ous offenses, such as juvenile delinquency); (iii) they have been in jail (sometimes for short periods, prisons have proved fertile recruitment grounds for Muslim radicals); (iv) they have social difficulties, including family problems, economi- cal difficulties, and identity crises; and (v), most have trav- eled to and returned from a country in which ISIS or another extremist group is active.

• Because of these commonalities, the author prefers to speak of risk factors rather than of a terrorist personality per se.

These last assertions are derived from the observations of the author of people who have been radicalized, that is, who returned to Europe and committed terrorist acts.

Brainwashing

Clearing a person of previously held beliefs, that is, “washing their brains” in order to replace the beliefs with an alien set of perspectives, is often used to explain how reasonably well- adjusted citizens can become violent terrorists (10,11). A number of terms are used to describe this process, including brainwash- ing, thought reform, coercive persuasion, mind control, a coordi- nated program of coercive influence and behavioral control, and exploitive persuasion. This perspective puts people such as Osama Bin Laden and the Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin in roles that have only been clearly portrayed in fiction, such as in Du Maurier’s story of the opera singer Trilby, who is controlled by the manipulative Svengali. There are real cases of brainwashing, such as Mao Tse-tung’s thought-reform program, which was implemented at Chinese revolutionary universities, and the tac- tics used by Charles Manson and his “family.” However, many other studies show that it is difficult to demonstrate that such quasi-occult powers exist (10,11). Thus, thought reform is a concerted effort to change a person’s

way of looking at the world, which will then change their behav- ior. It is distinguished from other forms of social learning by the conditions under which it is conducted and by the techniques of environmental and interpersonal manipulation that are meant to suppress certain behaviors and to elicit and train others. It does not consist of only one program. There are many ways and meth- ods to conduct thought reform, such as (i) destabilizing a per- son’s sense of self; (ii) forcing a drastic reinterpretation of the subject’s life history, resulting in a radically altered worldview, and a new version and causality; and (iii) developing dependence on the group, thereby turning the individual into a deployable agent of the organization (12). Singer’s six conditions describe what is needed to create an atmosphere that permits brainwashing to take place. The degree to which these conditions are present increases the level of restriction enforced by the group and the overall effectiveness of the program. These conditions are as fol- lows (12): (i) keep the person unaware that there is an agenda to control or change the person; (ii) control time and the physical environment (contact with family); (iii) create a sense of power- lessness, fear, and dependency; (iv) suppress old behaviors and attitudes; (v) instill new behaviors and attitudes; and (vi) put forth

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a closed system of logic. In parallel with Singer’s six conditions are the eight psychological themes that psychiatrist Robert Lifton identified as being central to the thought reform environment, including the environment created by terrorist groups, that invoke these themes for the purpose of promoting behavioral and attitu- dinal changes (13): (i) milieu control (total control of communi- cation); (ii) loading the language (the group’s jargon); (iii) demand for purity (an “all-or-nothing” belief system); (iv) confes- sion (to lead members to reveal past and present behavior and history); (v) mystical manipulation (“you have been chosen to be here”); (vi) doctrine over person (false memory syndrome); (vii) sacred science (“respected and historical leaders with connections with Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, the Buddha”); and (viii) dis- pensing existence (the terrorist total environment clearly empha- sizes that the members are part of an elite group). Schein’s three stages describe the process of changing attitudes through thought reform: “unfreezing, changing, and refreezing.” In unfreezing, which is the first stage, past attitudes, choices, and behavior are destabilized by the group. Many terrorist groups use a “hot seat” technique or other forms of criticism to attain the goal of under- cutting and destabilizing. In the second stage, which is changing, the person senses that the group’s solutions provide a path. Peer pressure is very important in this stage. Finally, in refreezing, which is the last stage, the group reinforces the desired behavior with social and psychological rewards and punishes unwanted attitudes and behaviors with harsh criticism, group disapproval, social ostracism, and the loss of status (14). These practices by terrorist leaders and their subordinates

imply a very strong hierarchy that is indeed very similar to that of a rigid military structure or cult organization. In general, as with illegal groups (especially those spread over a wide area), it is not possible to maintain the top-down discipline that is classi- cally found in a standing army (15). Instead, what Atran calls a “Hydra-headed network” is much more likely to be the norm (16). Mullins illustrates the evolving structure of such networks and how they can develop into something that resembles a busi- ness when they involve frequent kidnaping activities, as described by Mullins and Phillips (17,18).

The Role of the Media

It is well known that the media has many effects on people, especially on young people, such as instigating aggression, pro- moting social stereotypes, and contributing to cognitive develop- ment, among others (19). In terms of social and terrorist network theories, it is clear that new technologies allow terrorists to com- municate more efficiently, to broaden their message, and to wield unconventional weapons in unexpected ways, all of which are central characteristics of asymmetrical warfare. Because of incremental improvements in communications and computer technologies, terrorists and their supporters will continue to use them extensively. Likewise, the increasing availability of compo- nents for weapons of mass destruction will continue to soften terrorists’ reluctance to use them (20). The Internet provides opportunities for commercial, private, and

political interests to spread their messages and communicate with outsiders. In fact, information technologies are being invented and refined constantly and will continue to be central to the New Ter- rorism, providing networks between groups and cells and spread- ing specific tactics, instructions about overall goals, new bomb- making techniques, and so forth. However, information and com- puter technologies can also be used offensively. Terrorists today can adopt cyber warfare techniques to destroy information and

communication systems. Cyber terrorism may very well become a central facet of the terrorist environment in the near future (20). Today more than ever, terrorist networks can be viewed as a “bunch of grapes” that are strongly interconnected by the media (electronic communications mainly).

Cognition Modification: The Availability Cascade

An “availability cascade” is a self-reinforcing cycle that explains the development of certain kinds of collective beliefs (21,22). A novel idea or insight, especially one that seems to explain a complex process in a simple or straightforward manner, gains rapid currency in the popular discourse by its very simplicity and by its apparent insightfulness. Its rising popularity triggers a chain reaction within the social network: individuals adopt the new insight because other people within the network have adopted it, or because, superficially, the idea seems plausible. The reasons for the increased use and popularity of the new idea involve both the availability of the previously obscure term or idea and the need of the individuals who use the term or idea to appear to be current with the stated beliefs and ideas of others, regardless of whether they in fact fully believe in the idea that they are expressing. Their need for social acceptance, and the apparent sophistication of the new insight, overwhelm their critical thinking (21). From our perspective, and in other words, an availability cas-

cade is a self-sustaining chain of events, which may start from media reports of a relatively minor event and lead to public panic and large-scale government action. On some occasions, a media story about a particular risk catches the attention of a seg- ment of the public, which becomes aroused and worried. This emotional reaction becomes a story in itself, prompting addi- tional coverage in the media, which in turn produces greater concern and involvement. The cycle is sometimes perpetuated deliberately by “availability entrepreneurs,” that is, individuals or organizations who work to ensure a continuous flow of wor- rying news. The danger is increasingly exaggerated as the media compete for attention-grabbing headlines. Scientists and others who try to dampen the increasing fear and revulsion attract little attention, most of it hostile: anyone who claims that the danger is overstated is suspected of association with a “heinous cover- up.” The issue becomes politically important because it is on everyone’s mind, and the response of the political system is guided by the intensity of public sentiment (21). How is an availability cascade linked to terrorism? In his book,

Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman notes that terrorism “speaks directly to System,” generating an availability cascade that ratchets up an unreasonable level of fear that system has difficulty counter- ing. But there is more to the perceived threat of terrorism than availability. One approach to terrorism is to see it as the use of vio- lence to trigger and amplify communication: the ultimate target of terrorist actions is not the people who are attacked but rather audi- ences that learn about the attack. The mass media are implicated in this process, because their own assessments of what is newsworthy give undue attention to violence compared to peaceful protest. In order to fully understand the popular response to terrorism, we must understand both the psychological dynamics, such as avail- ability cascades, and the media dynamics, as well as other factors such as the internal politics of terrorist groups (23–26).

A Prevalent and Particular Situation: The Lone Wolf

There has been a change in terrorist threats that parallels the rise of “lone wolves” who are terrorists acting on their own; they

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may be motivated by various radical ideas, but they are not con- trolled by terrorist groups (27). Examples of lone wolves include the Tsarnaev brothers, who attacked the Boston Marathon in 2013, and Maj. Hasan, who went on a shooting rampage at Fort Hood. Lone wolves are, by definition, more difficult to spot in advance of their acts; as such, detecting them raises difficult questions about the balance between civil liberties and preven- tive surveillance (27). Unpredictability makes lone wolf attacks very hard to prevent.

Potential perpetrators are difficult to profile and lack the social, operational, and financial networks that can be used to catch groups of terrorists. Large-scale terrorist attacks such as the 7/7 London bombings and the attacks in Mumbai (2008) and at the Westgate mall in Kenya (2013) require extensive planning, intelligence gath- ering, and financing, all of which increase the chance of discovery. An Internet connection and a knife may be all that are needed for an individual to perform a terrorist act (27). For these reasons, inciting lone wolf terrorism is an ideal tactic

for a group such as ISIL. Contrary to many views in the West, ISIL propaganda does not represent an unstoppable force, and only a tiny fraction of Muslims have answered ISIL’s call to rise up and attack their Western neighbors. However, its propaganda can cov- ertly radicalize a small number of susceptible individuals who may then decide to act. Those individuals may be poorly trained or even act spontaneously, but, most importantly, their actions sow fear in civilian populations at minimal cost (27).

Conclusion and Future Perspectives

The radicalization process is an increasing and complex phe- nomenon. It implies several aspects that are multidimensional (on the individual and societal levels) and heterogeneous, such as some individual risk factors, the brainwashing, and cognitive modifications (i.e. the role of the media in general). In terms of perspectives, counter-radicalization programs, such

as those run by Saudi Arabia and Sweden, have shown mixed results. The most successful efforts in Britain have been the efforts of the so-called Channel program, which is part of the British government’s counter-terrorism strategy, to divert young people from extremism. Such efforts, which involve the police, social services, and local authorities working together, draw on methods used to help young people leave gangs. Not all of those returning from radical countries will have

blood on their hands. Governments need to offer a way out for those who realize that they have made a mistake, and Western countries may benefit from an even softer approach. Chastened returning fighters may be the very best people to persuade more young men to forgo the fight. No one yet knows whether today’s European jihadists who are fighting for IS will become tomorrow’s murderers on the streets of Western cities. On a more practical note, it is clear there are currently not enough

detailed case studies of terrorists to inform psychological analyses or even to conduct comprehensive reviews of the literature.

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Additional information and reprint requests: Samuel J. Leistedt, M.D., Ph.D. Forensic Mental Health Hospital “Les Marronniers” Rue Despars 94 Tournai 7500 Belgium E-mail: [email protected]

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