Lesson Plan (Multicultural Issues in Moral Development Assignment)

Multicultural Issues in Moral Development Assignment

OVERVIEW

You will summarize the assigned readings and devise a lesson plan in the context of higher education. Teaching skills are essential in academia. Reading for comprehension is one thing, and reading for the purpose of teaching is another. You will be given opportunities to read for the purpose of teaching in the context of higher education while thinking about and devising plans for how to deliver of the content of the readings.

INSTRUCTIONS

Details:

Read Chapter 15-18

1. While completing the assigned readings for the Module: Week, think about which topic to cover in your lecture for college students. State your topic and come up 3-4 objectives. The first heading in the paper should be “Topic and Objectives.” When listing objectives, start with “After this lecture, students will be able to…”

2. The second heading should be “Summary of the Lecture Content.” Citing the assigned readings (with pages as necessary), summarize the content to be delivered in class. Your summary should be at least 2 pages, double-spaced. Do not go over 3 pages. The goal is not to discuss all of the details to be discussed in class but to summarize the lecture content noting the most important concepts in a coherent manner (showing their connections to the overall topic and objectives).

3. Provide a 2-page, double-spaced, lesson plan for an hour-long lecture on the chosen topic. You can be creative here, but provide an outline of the lecture followed by concrete in-class activity/discussion ideas.

Further instructions:

1. This assignment is for your future teaching opportunities, so think concretely about your teaching context as a doctoral-level instructor and make it as useful for you as possible.

2. Use current APA format with appropriate citations and headings as well as a reference page, but do not include the title and abstract.

Please see the Summary and Lesson Plan page under the Summary and Lesson Plan Resources for a link to Bloom’s Taxonomy information to consider as your write your objectives.

Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the Turnitin plagiarism tool.

CH. 15 Gender, Sexual Orientation, and Discrimination Based on Gender

and Sexual Orientation

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2010, on average, women earned 37% less than men who were in equivalent jobs with equivalent levels of education. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011) Currently, lesbian and gay couples can obtain a legal, state recognized civil marriage or civil union (with equal state benefits associated with civil marriage for heterosexual couples) in only 17 states and the District of Columbia within the U.S. Conversely, as of 2012, 27 states have passed constitutional amendments banning marriage and/or any form of relationship recognition for same-sex couples, essentially making any laws that might protect same-sex couples unconstitutional in those states. (Movement Advancement Project, 2012)

As evidenced by citations from the U.S. Census Bureau (2011) and Movement Advancement Project (2012), differential or discriminatory treatment based on gender and sexual orientation is pervasive in the United States. While gender and sexual orientation are foundational dimensions of one’s identity, they are also salient social categories used by individuals to make sense of their social worlds and to make decisions regarding everyday social situations and interactions (Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2006). Given the importance of gender and sexual orientation as social categories, people often base their attitudes and behaviors toward others on their beliefs, stereotypes, and expectations related

to gender and sexual orientation. In some instances, individuals view differential attitudes and behaviors as inherently unfair, prejudicial, or discriminatory. In many instances, however, individuals justify their attitudes or behavior as legitimate based on their perception of the inherent differences amongst people related to gender or sexual orientation (e.g., men and women just like different things) or based on their beliefs about “appropriate” and “normal” roles and behaviors for men and women in a given culture or society (e.g., heterosexuality is the only natural or normal form of sexuality).

Discrimination has been defined as the unjust or prejudicial treatment of others based on group membership or social category (Oxford, 2012). Despite the fact that discrimination is inherently a moral issue, individuals’ beliefs and attitudes about differential treatment of others based on gender and sexual orientation are complex and involve both moral and nonmoral elements. That is, discrimination related to gender and sexual orientation involves individuals’ beliefs about what is fair and just. It also includes their beliefs about the fundamental nature of gender and sexual orientation as inherent and biologically determined properties of human beings, their historically and culturally mediated attitudes and beliefs about gender roles and what it means to be a man or woman in a particular society, as well as their stereotypes associated with these social identities (Horn, 2012).

The formation of individuals’ beliefs and attitudes regarding their own and others’ gender and sexual orientation begins at a very young age and continues to develop throughout childhood and adolescence (Horn, 2007a; Martin & Ruble, 2002). Because of this, stereotypes and prejudice based on gender and sexual orientation and the factors related to whether individuals view differential treatment based on these social categories as a moral issue often originate during these developmental periods. Examining how young people reason about discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation is an important undertaking in terms of offering solutions for more equitable treatment of all individuals.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to review research regarding children and adolescents’ social reasoning about their interpersonal and intergroup interactions based on gender and sexual orientation and the factors related to how individuals’ construct an understanding of these interactions as moral. The chapter has four sections. First, we will discuss the relevant theoretical frameworks related to discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation in childhood and adolescence. Second, we will briefly define what we mean by gender and sexual orientation. Third, we will review current developmental research regarding differential attitudes, expectations, behaviors, and interactions related to gender and sexual orientation.

Finally, we will discuss the implications of this research for educational policy and practice, young people’s development, as well as future avenues for research.

Theoretical Background

Social cognitive domain theory (Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 2011; Turiel, 1983, 1998), a developmental framework frequently used to investigate heterogeneity in individuals’ social judgments and reasoning, is inherently suited to increasing an understanding of discrimination. This theory can account for complexity and variation in social reasoning both within and between individuals and provides a strong framework for studying stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination related to gender, gender identity/expression, and sexual orientation (Horn & Nucci, 2006; Sinno & Killen, 2011).

CH. 16 Morality, Exclusion, and Prejudice

So what is fairness?. . . . Central to it must be a demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, taking note of the interests and concerns of others as well, and in particular to need to avoid being influenced by our respective vested interests, or by our personal priorities or eccentricities or prejudices. It can broadly be seen as a demand for impartiality.(Sen, 2009, p. 54)

Discriminatory practices prevent society from making use of the contributions of all individuals. (Graves, 2001, p. 10)

Morality emerges early in childhood. As has been well documented, other social cognitive competencies also develop in early childhood, including an awareness of social groups, categorization of individuals by group membership, and a sense of one’s own identity (Killen & Rutland, 2011). Further, children develop psychological knowledge about intentionality and the mental states of others, which bears on their moral judgments (Decety & Howard, this volume; Lagattuta & Weller, this volume; Mulvey, Hitti, & Killen, 2013). The focus of this chapter is on how the emergence of morality along with other social cognitive developments bear on the emergence of prejudicial attitudes, biases, and forms of discrimination in development.

Given that morality develops early, it might be expected that young children would not display prejudicial attitudes toward others based on categories such as gender, race, and ethnicity. After all, morality refers to principles about how to treat others with respect to equality, fairness, and justice. If young children hold a value that everyone should be treated equally then we would expect that children would not display unequal treatment in the form of exclusion, for example. Yet empirical research, as well as anecdotal observations, has shown that children’s reactions to others, social exclusion decisions, and

in-group preferences reflect varying degrees of bias and prejudice based on gender, race,

Ethnicity, and cultural membership. What makes this possible when evidence demonstrates that children care and reason about equality and fairness? We draw from current research on the development of social identity as well as research on the psychological understanding of the intentions of others to provide an explanation for this conflict. Rather than view morality as a conflict of being “selfish” versus “moral” (which we—and others—have argued is a false dichotomy; see Turiel, 1983), we will argue that the application of moral principles to everyday social interactions is complex, requiring judgments about groups, social relationships, and mental states of others. Social psychological research on groups has demonstrated that group identity has a normative aspect to it. In addition, social psychological research has also provided extensive evidence for the way that categorization and group identity, as part of human development, contributes to the manifestation of prejudice in adulthood (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). For over 50 years, in fact, social psychological theories about prejudice in adulthood have demonstrated that prejudicial attitudes are reflective of social attitudes, group processes, group norms, and social identity (Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005). This approach does not ignore the extreme conditions of social exclusion that occur in adulthood such as genocide and acts of terrorism (Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1990). Understanding the everyday events that reflect social exclusion based on group membership, however, requires information about the basic social and cognitive processes associated with becoming a member of a group (Nesdale, 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). We argue that these processes begin in childhood, and we review this literature from the lens of moral developmental theories. Social groups perpetuate attitudes, often in the form of biases and stereotypes, in order to maintain hierarchies, power, and status. Allport (1954) theorized that attitudes about the out-group were an outcome of the desire to enhance the in-group that resulted in negative attitudes about the out-group. Extensive research has shown that positive contact with the out-group, particularly in the form of cross-group friendships, helps to reduce prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Tropp & Prenovost, 2008). Intergoup attitude research with adults has focused on the factors related to egalitarian attitudes, without examining the developmental origins.

Developmental research over the past 15 years has examined the connections between group identity and moral judgment (as well as affect) to understand the origins of prejudice. This has been part of a larger area of research on developmental intergroup attitudes, which has investigated the origins of stereotyping, discrimination, and bias (Dunham & Degner, 2010; Killen & McKown, 2005; Levy & Killen, 2008; Quintana & McKown, 2008; Rutland, Abrams, & Levy, 2007). The central focus of research designed to address the question that began this chapter is: How is it that children who hold moral values also act in ways that violate the underlying principles of these values, particularly with respect to prejudice and discrimination?

Theoretical Framework

Morality is at the core of what it means to be social. The acquisition of moral principles about fairness and justice is a fundamental aspect of human development that has been studied by developmental, social, cognitive, and comparative psychologists, as well as experimental philosophers and behavioral economists. Drawing on philosophical theories (Nussbaum, 1999; Rawls, 1971), morality has been defined by developmental psychologists as principles for how individuals should treat one another with respect to another’s welfare, fairness, justice, and rights. Piaget’s (1932) seminal book on the moral judgment of the child remains one of the most cited sources for the origins of developmental theory about morality.

Piaget (1932) incorporated philosophical definitions of morality into his psychological inquiry of the origins of moral thinking. He demonstrated that children develop a morality independent of authority expectations by illustrating their ability to critique adult mandates that violate moral norms about fairness or equality. Morality is not defined by the group or by adults but exists as a set of independent principles by which to judge and evaluate social actions and events. Piaget (1932) argued that moral norms, if they exist, must be independent from group norms. This is because many societal norms are incompatible with notions of fairness, justice, and equality. For example, societal norms about unilateral power relationships and hierarchies are often in conflict with theories about fairness, equal treatment, and justice, which Piaget (1932) articulated when analyzing the child’s world of rules and regulations. In his theory, societal norms refer to broad ideologies held by a nation, or specific norms held by a child’s peer group.

CH.17 Lying, Morality, and Development

Whether lying is morally right or wrong has been debated for centuries (e.g., Augustine, 1952; Bentham, 1843; Kant, 1949; Plato, 1991). This chapter will provide a survey of research over the last 3 decades on the development of the morality of lying. As the literature on children and lying encompasses a broad swath of issues, we will specifically focus on studies that are pertinent to moral development in keeping with the general goal of this handbook. More specifically, we will review research on children’s concepts and moral judgments of lying, children’s actual lying behaviors, and the relation between the two. We will use the speech act theory (Grice, 1980; Searle, 1969) as the framework for examining the existing evidence on children and lying because this theory not only provides the best theoretical framework for organizing and integrating the existing voluminous literature,

but it also offers the most parsimonious interpretations of the seemingly disparate and often contradictory findings.

The study of children and lying has a long history. The first scientific report on the topic was by Charles Darwin (1877). In “A Biographical Sketch of an Infant” Darwin described his son’s first lie at the tender age of 2 and the child’s clumsy attempt at hiding his deceit when confronted. This report, though rather personal and not at all objective, sowed the seeds of modern scientific research on the development of lying in children. In the decades that followed, considerable effort was devoted to examining the issue of children and lying by none other than the founding fathers of developmental psychology such as Hall (1890), Stern and Stern (1909), and Piaget (1932/1965). Research on the issue reached its first pinnacle when Hartshorne and May produced their monumental work on children’s honest behavior (Hartshorne & May, 1928), and Piaget published his landmark book, The Moral Judgment of the Child, which systematically examined children’s concepts and moral judgments of lying for the first time (Piaget, 1932/1965).

Despite its auspicious beginning, the research on the development of lying stalled for the next 6 decades, perhaps due to the dominance of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. While Kohlberg did utilize moral dilemmas about lying and the breaking of a promise, the focus of his investigation concerned the process of children’s moral judgments rather than the content of the stories (e.g., lying). By the 1980s, developmental researchers began to show renewed interests in this issue in response to new ideas regarding child development. Among these new ideas was the increased awareness among developmentalists about the crucial roles that intentionality (e.g., Astington, 1986; Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988) and social convention (e.g., Turiel, 1983) play in cognitive and moral development in general and the development of lying specifically. These ideas ushered in a new era of scientific research on the development of lying. As a result, we now have an increasingly clearer and more comprehensive picture of the development of lying in children. Thus, it is high time to take stock of what we have learned over the last 3 decades and to look ahead and identify the future directions for research in this field. This is the aim of this chapter.

Theoretical Background: Speech Act Theory

Among the major components of speech acts, two are most pertinent to the present discussion:

First, a speech act is an intentional act that is mediated by the intentional states

of the communicator (the intentionality component); second, a speech act is a socially motivated, rule-governed action that is performed to serve an interpersonal function in a social/cultural context (the conventionality component).

The Intentionality Component Speech acts, according to Searle (1969), are intentional behaviors. Due to this “intentionality component,” the meaning and function of a speech act is mediated and determined not only by the literal meaning of a sentence and the actual state of affairs, but also by the intentional states of the communication partners (e.g., the intention or belief of a speaker). Hence, to determine what a specific speech act is and what function it serves, five factors must be considered: the factuality (whether the statement is reflective of reality), the literal meaning (what is actually said), the deeper meaning (the true meaning the speaker wishes the statement to convey), the intention of the speaker (what the speaker aspires to state), and the speaker’s beliefs (speakers beliefs about the state of affairs). By combining these five factors in different ways, we form the intentionality component of various speech acts, which serve different communicative functions (see Table 17.1). Understand

CH. 18 Interrelations Between Theory of Mind and Morality

One central way to predict and explain human behavior is by attending to people’s minds; what they desire, intend, believe, think, and feel emotionally (Dennet, 1987; Wellman, 2011). Because such mentalizing is a ubiquitous part of everyday social interactions, a large focus of cognitive development research has been identifying developmental changes in children’s understanding of the mind, including their reasoning about interrelations between different kinds of mental states and between mind and behavior—what is known as a theory of mind (see Flavell, 2004). People’s behaviors can also be predicted and explained in relation to social norms and moral rules. Because humans live in complex social groups, our decisions are also guided by the rules, obligations, and permissions sanctioned by our families and wider communities. There are certain actions that we should or should not do, things we have to or do not have to do, things we are permitted or not permitted to do, and decisions over which we have personal control or jurisdiction (e.g., Killen & Smetana, 1999; Nucci, 1996; Turiel, 2002). A large body of developmental research reveals significant advances in reasoning about morality, rules, and norms during childhood and adolescence as well (see Smetana, 2006).

Over the past 5 to 8 years, there has been growing empirical attention directed to building

bridges between these two, often independent lines of research. This review summarizes key advances in theory-of-mind research as it relates to children’s understanding of morality. We start with children’s knowledge about intentions and motives, and then move to examine how children’s understanding of false belief, desires and emotions, and thoughts relate to their moral judgments and behavior. Next, we consider additional topics in theory of mind and morality including reasoning about apology, moral status, and trust in testimony. We then examine evidence of interrelations between theory of mind and morality from studies with children and adults with autism, a population known to have deficits in mental state understanding. We also summarize central findings from neuroscience research investigating the extent to which moral judgment and theory of mind tasks recruit overlapping versus independent neural regions. Finally, we discuss connections between children’s theory of mind, moral judgment, and behavior. Although we primarily focus on 3- to 10-year olds, we incorporate research with younger and older age groups as well.

During the first year of life infants begin to track other’s intentional, goal-directed actions (e.g., Leslie, 1994; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000). By 14 to 18 months, children can discriminate, at least on a basic level, between actions done “on purpose” versus “by accident” (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998), and they can recognize what a person is trying to do even when that person fails (Meltzoff, 1995). By the age of 3 years, children develop explicit knowledge about the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors, and they can further discriminate intentional behaviors from desires, mistakes, reflexes, and passive movements (Baird & Astington, 2004; Mull & Evans, 2010). Indeed, children’s understanding of intention is considered a critical cornerstone in the development of folk psychology because it is central for predicting and explaining behaviors (see Wellman, 2011). Intention is also a core feature of moral judgment, in that intentions are often criterial for evaluating the moral status of a person’s actions or character and for assigning blame or praise (Alicke & Rose, 2010). Not surprisingly, then, children’s and adults’ reasoning about intention–morality connections is the most widely studied topic in research bridging theory of mind and morality. Piaget’s (1932) early tests of moral cognition involved presenting young children with scenarios in which a story character either causes minor harm when engaged in a prohibited action (e.g., breaks one dish when trying to sneak a cookie), or causes more severe harm when trying to be helpful (e.g., breaks three dishes when helping to set the table). Piaget documented that whereas young children typically judged the children’s “naughtiness” by the severity of the outcome, children older than 8 or 9 years of age focused on the child’s motives and intentions and judged the “cookie stealer” as more blameworthy even though he caused less damage. Piaget argued from these results that children transition from an objective (focus on severity of the crime) to a subjective view of moral responsibility (focus on intentions).