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Peter Ashwin Principal

Event Risk Management Solutions (ERMS)

Protecting Crowded Places: Secure by Design – Integrating People, Process & Technology for Safer Events

Session Focus Topics

• Translating Risk – Security Risk Management & Enterprise Risk Management Models

• Risk Control Measures – The Relationship between Likelihood & Vulnerability

• Security Risk Profiles – Not All Events are Equal • Hostile Vehicle Mitigation: Secure by Design through

People, Process & Technology Integration • Q & A

Salt Lake 2002 Winter Olympic Games

Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games 3

A Global Journey

“Secure by Design” Protecting Crowded

Places

“we bring large crowds of fans, friends, family & our community together on a predictable basis “

Deputy Chief Eugene Smith, Boise Police Dept

4IFEA 63rd Convention & Expo - Protected Crowded Places(Peter Ashwin)

Terrorism “Terrorism poses the greatest security threat to the Games. Experience indicates that global sporting events provide an attractive and high profile target for terrorist groups.” Contest: The UK Strategy for Countering Terrorism – 2011

Salt Lake 2002 HQ Winter Olympic Games (post 9/11/2001)

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“Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know.

We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.

But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know what we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.”

Donald Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense February 12, 2002*

* DOD Briefing – regarding the lack of evidence linking the government of Iraq with the supply of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups

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Translating Risk: Security Risk Management (SRM) & Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Models

ISO 31000: Risk Management Framework

Risk = Likelihood x Consequence

HB 167:2006 Security Risk Management

RISK = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence

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& Expo - Protected Crowded

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Risk Based Decisions – What’s that about?

The practice of risk management allows for a systematic & comprehensive approach to

(homeland security) decision making” DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010

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Quantitative Analysis & Prioritizing Risk Risk = Likelihood (T x V) x Consequence

LIKELIHOOD RISK LEVEL

ALMOST CERTAIN

(5)

LOW (5)

MEDIUM (10)

HIGH (15)

VERY HIGH (20)

VERY HIGH (25)

LIKELY (4)

LOW (4)

MEDIUM (8)

HIGH (12) HIGH(16)

VERY HIGH (20)

POSSIBLE (3)

LOW (3)

MEDIUM (6)

MEDIUM (9)

HIGH (12) HIGH(15)

UNLIKELY (2)

LOW (2)

LOW (4)

MEDIUM (6) MEDIUM(8)

HIGH (10)

RARE (1)

LOW (1)

LOW (2)

LOW (3)

MEDIUM (4)

MEDIUM (5)

CONSEQUENCES INSIGNIFICANT(1) MINOR

(2) MODERATE

(3) SIGNIFICANT

(4) SEVERE

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& Expo - Protected Crowded

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Yesterday’s Incident is Tomorrow’s Risk™

Route 91 Harvest Festival, Las Vegas 10-01-2017

San Antonio Fiesta Festival sniper shooting 04-29-1979

Modifying Risk through Control Measures

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What are Risk Control Measures? Control Measure - any process, policy, device, practice, or other action that modifies risk – reduces likelihood or severity of consequences

Critical Controls – not all controls are equal, focus on those controls critical to mitigating the risk

Types of Risk Control Measures

• Preventative: reduces the likelihood of the risk

• Detective: - identifies failures or gaps in existing

control measures - detects the onset of the risk

• Corrective: reduces the severity of consequences after the event occurs

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Active Shooter Risk Controls (Counter Measures) Preventative

• Training in hostile surveillance detection & situational awareness

• Security screening – people & bag checks (vehicles & logistics)

• High visibility patrols in the “Last Mile” - Police, K9 teams & private security

• Perimeter security - fencing, CCTV & signage

• Access control protocols • Terms & conditions of entry - no

weapons policy • “Whole of Community”

integration

Detective • Threat reporting processes

“See something, Say something” - unusual behavior

• Background checks • CCTV surveillance • Quality assurance audits – test

effectiveness of prohibited items detection

• Deployment of visible security patrols from build-out to tear- down

• Monitoring social media

Corrective • Active Shooter insurance • Emergency Response

Procedures (ERPs) – Evacuation / Shelter in place / Security Lockdown

• Operational readiness - TTXs with stakeholders to validate plans & C3 protocols

• Pre-event “just in time” team leads training & drills - ERPS

• Front line staff trained in ”Stop the Bleed” + bleed control kits onsite

• EMS team • Mass Casualty Incident Plan13IFEA 63rd Convention & Expo - Protected Crowded Places(Peter Ashwin)

Security Risk Management:

The Relationship between Likelihood &

Vulnerability

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Security Risk Profiles – Not all Events are Equal

Baku 2015 European Games , Azerbaijan Gratitude Migration Festival, Hello Beach, Keansburg, NJ

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Establishing a Security Risk Profile & Baseline Based on London 2012 quantitative analysis methodology - Comparative Risk Assessment Model (CRAM)

• 10 assessment criteria • Rating from 1 – 5 with descriptive criteria • Tiering rating from 1 to 4 • Protective security measures allocated based on Tiering • Resourcing & budget aligned with Tiers

The Games are a sporting event, not a security event, and we are putting in place policing and security plans that are reassuringly visible but discreet. Our aim is to police in a way that is consistent across the country and keeps the sporting and cultural events centre stage during this historic occasion.”

Chris Allison Gold Commander, Asst Commissioner Olympics & Paralympics

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Event Security Risk Profile Methodology 1. Event Recognition (iconic or

symbolic) – known locally, nationally or Internationally, media profile

2. Crowd Size & Demographics 3. Location & Proximity – crime,

civil tension, proximity facilities, activities or hazards which introduce “downstream” risks

4. Historical Profile – history of previous incidents or at like events

5. Event duration - frequency of exposure, one day vs multi-day

6. Political Sensitivity – attractiveness to issue motivated groups

7. Dignitary / VVIPs Attendance 8. Access to the Public -

opportunity to conduct hostile reconnaissance

9. Impact / Demand on Transportation & Traffic

10. DHS & Police Threat / Event Assessments plus historical incidents or occurrences at “like” events

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“Secure by Design” Protecting Crowded Places

from Hostile Vehicles

Evolution of Threat Tactic’s: VBIED to HVA

NYC – 31 October 2017

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Impaired Driver Vehicle Intrusions into Crowded Places

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18 May 2017 18 May 2017

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London 2012 Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) Project

• 19 Venues • Project cost USD$27.67million • 18 month design & procurement timeline • Types of HVM deployed / installed had to

account for permeability of vehicles & pedestrians

HVM Design & Planning Considerations • Engage early - risk based planning in conjunction with security partners

(Police & DHS) & site design architects • Crowd movement & flows [ALICE-D] • Design site layout / orientation to utilize existing features to reduce avenues of

high speed approach • Integrate & layer “soft measures” with “hard measures” • Accessible & inclusive environment requirements • Mitigation measures proportionate to threat

Baseline Security Protocols: Six Keys to the Gate

1. Master Delivery Schedule – scheduling & deconfliction

2. Identity Assurance - driver & occupants

3. Vehicle Access Control - venue access & parking permitting system

4. Security Seals - deliveries & logistics

5. Search of vehicles and occupants prior to venue entry

6. Secure Load Pass (remote screening)

ÇATDIRILMA DELIVERY

6 ÇATDIRILMA DELIVERY

ÇATDIRILMA DELIVERY

1. Road closures & restrictions (notifications)

2. Venue Access & Parking Permits & Resident Permits

3. Vehicle Permit Checkpoints – SEC & armed Police

4. HVM measures on high speed approaches

5. Plan for “unknown” vehicles within the CAZ e.g. tow trucks on call or K9 teams

6. Delivery windows & vehicle movements deconflicted from crowds

Controlled Access Zone (CAZ) – Hostile Vehicle Counter Measures

Santa Monica Farmers Market 16 July 2003

10 fatalities + 63 injured $21 million civil lawsuit settlements

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Integrated Design: People, Process & Technology

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Temporary Vehicle Security Barrier Solutions

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Installation & Design Challenges - Underground Utilities . Industry solution - shallow mount (8” deep), 12” diameter bollard with PAS 68 (UK)/ K4 (US Dept. of State) rating – 15,000lb vehicle @ 30mph, penetration limited to 2ft

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Video - Surface Guard Deployment & Set-up

Deployable, Modular Solution – ATG Surface Guard K4 rating – set-up in 20mins C.$24,000 – 34 ft road span

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Calpipe Internal Locking Removable Bollard

Matador Surface Mount Automated Bollard system

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Designing in counter terrorism measures is the most cost effective way to enhance protective security of crowded places; it is far more expensive to

add protective security measures at a later date. UK Home Office

Parting Thoughts

• Engage early & pro-actively with external partners • Risk based approach to prioritize efforts – to mitigate credible

threat scenarios • Mitigate hostile vehicle attack (HVA) risks through site design &

orientation • Protect crowd movement throughout the continuum – ALICE-D

(Arrival, Last mile, Ingress, Circulation, Egress & Departure) • Last Mile & whole of community approach • “Trust but Verify” – assurance audits to validate the effectiveness of

risk controls

Resources

• Security of Soft Targets and Crowded Places–Resource Guide (2018). National Protection and Programs Directorate Office of Infrastructure Protection. DHS

• Hostile Vehicle Guidelines for Crowded Places - A Guide for Owners, Operators & Designers (2017). Commonwealth of Australia.

• Integrated Security - A Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation, 2nd. (2014). Center for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI). UK Govt

• Working Together to Protect Crowded Places (2010). UK Govt.

Peter Ashwin Principal Event Risk Management Solutions [email protected] M:+1 617.396.0788 www.facebook.com/ermsglobal/

Risk Management and Event Security Solutions for Todays Uncertain World

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