Project Management Group Case Study#4

Few projects start with an explosion. Even fewer start with a deliberate explosion. Yet every time the space shuttle is launched into space, five tremendous explo- sions in the rocket engines are needed to hurl the orbiter into orbit around the earth. In just over ten minutes, the orbiter vehicle goes from zero miles an hour to more than 17,500 miles per hour as it circles the Earth.

Shuttle launches are a very dangerous business. The loss of the second shut- tle on February 1, 2003, shocked everyone. It is apparent now that some fuel-tank insulation dislodged during liftoff and struck the orbiter during its powered ascent to earth orbit, and that the insulation punched a fatal hole in the leading edge of the left wing. This hole allowed superheated gases, about 10,000°F, to melt the left wing during the re-entry phase of the mission. The loss of the orbiter was the result of the loss of the left wing.

Reading through the results of the disaster, one cannot help but conclude how simple and straightforward the project risks can be that are handled by most project managers. As an example, we can consider the writing of software. Writing and delivering computer software has its challenges, but the risks are not on the same scale of a space shuttle launch. Even the standard risk response

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The Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster1

1© 2005 by Randall R. Kline, MBA, PMP, Qualtek Software Development, Inc. Reproduced by per- mission of Randall R. Kline.

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strategies (avoidance, transference, mitigation and acceptance) take on new meanings when accelerating to achieve speeds of more than 15,000 mph. For example:

� Avoidance is not possible. � Acceptance has to be active, not passive. � Transference is not possible. � Mitigation entails a lot of work, and under massive constraints.

For the space shuttle, risk analysis is nonlinear, but for most software projects, a simple, linear impact analysis may be sufficient. The equation for lin- ear impact analysis can be written as follows:2

Risk impact � (Risk probability) � (Risk consequence)

For a given risk event, there is a probability of the risk occurring and a con- sequence expressed in some numerical units of the damage done to the project cost, timeline, or quality. This is a simple linear equation. If one of the factors on the right side of the equation doubles, the risk impact doubles. For a given set of factors on the right, there is one answer, regardless of when the risk occurs. So, based on the equation, impact can be understood and planned for.

Most of the computer software projects have relatively simple functions that either happened or did not happen. The vendor either delivered on time or did not deliver on time. If a particular risk event trigger appeared, then there usually ex- isted a time period, usually in days, when the risk response could be initiated. There might be dozens of risks, but each one could be defined and explained with only two or three variables.

This linear approach to risk management had several advantages for com- puter software projects:

� The risks were understandable and could be explained quite easily. � Management could understand the process from which a probability and

a consequence were obtained. � There was usually one risk impact for a given risk event. � No one was aware that one risk event may require dozens of strategies to

anticipate all the possible consequences.

One valid argument is that the risk of external collisions with the space ve- hicle as it accelerates to make orbital speed results in a multivariant, multidimen-

454 THE SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA DISASTER

2Kerzner, H., Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling and Controlling, 8th ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), p. 653.

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sional, nonlinear risk function that is very difficult to comprehend, much less manage. This is orders of magnitude more complex than the project risks en- countered when managing computer software development projects.

RISK DEFINITIONS AND SOME TERMS

For this case study, risks and related terms will be defined according to the Project Management Institute’s PMBOK® Guide (Project Management Body of Knowledge).

� Risk: An uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on a project’s objectives.

For this discussion, the focus will be on negative risks. This family of nega- tive risks can have detrimental consequences to the successful completion of the project. These risks may not happen, but if they do, we know the consequences will make it difficult to complete the project successfully. The consequences may range from a minor change in the timeline to total project failure. The key here is that for each risk, two variables are needed: probability of occurrence and a measurement.

� Risk triggers: These are indicators that a risk event has happened or is about to happen.

� Risk consequence(s): What could happen if the risk is triggered? Are we going to lose a few dollars, lose our job, or lose an entire business?

To analyze these standard terms, additional terms can be included. These terms are needed to adequately support managing risks that are multivariant, mul- tidimensional, and nonlinear risk functions:

� Risk scope: What parts of the project are affected if the risk is triggered? Does this risk jeopardize a task, a phase, or the entire project? Is the risk confined to one project or an entire portfolio of projects?

� Risk response rules: Given that the event occurred, and based on avail- able information, what is the best response? Can we derive rules to make intelligent decisions based on the information acquired when the risk event triggers or even the risk events occur?

� Risk response levels: Based on the variables and the response rules, the level of concern may range from not a problem to total destruction.

� Risk timeline: If the risk event or risk trigger occurs, how much time is available to make a decision about the best response to the risk? Are there two days to make a decision, or two seconds?

Risk Definitions and Some Terms 455

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All we know is that if the risk event is “triggered” or occurs, bad things can and will happen. Our goal is to minimize the consequences. Our plan is that by early identification and rigorous analysis of the risks, we will have time to de- velop a portfolio of responses to minimize the consequences from a risk event.

BACKGROUND TO THE SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCH

The three liquid fuel motors consume an amazing quantity of super cooled fuel. The main fuel tank is insulated to ensure that the fuel stays hundreds of degrees below the freezing point of water. It is this insulation that had a history of com- ing off the fuel tank and hitting the orbiter. It most cases, it caused very minor damage to the orbiter because the foam was usually the size of popcorn. In one or two previous launches, the foam was able to knock a tile off the orbiter. Fortunately, the orbiter was able to return safely. So for most of the launch team, the news that Columbia had been struck by foam was of minor concern.

After all, if the risk was not a major problem in one hundred previous launches, then it could not be a problem in this launch. Reviewing, our linear im- pact equation:

Risk impact � (Risk probability) � (Risk consequence)

The risk probability was very high, but the consequences were always ac- ceptable. Therefore, the conclusion was that it would always be an acceptable risk. This is what happens when there is only one risk consequence for the life of the risk event. People want to believe that the future is just the same history wait- ing to happen.

DESCRIPTION OF WHAT HAPPENS AS THE SHUTTLE RE-ENTERS THE ATMOSPHERE

If getting the orbiter into space is one problem, then getting the orbiter back is an- other problem. Re-entry is a complex set of computer-guided maneuvers to change the speed of the vehicle into heat. And as the heat grows, the speed de- creases. Since the metal components of the shuttle melt around 2,000°F, the lead- ing edges of the orbiter are covered in ceramic tiles that melt at about 3,000°F. The tiles keep the 10,000°F re-entry heat from penetrating the vehicle. If all goes well, the computers bring the orbiter to a slow enough speed that a human being can land the vehicle.

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In Columbia’s launch, the foam knocked several of the tiles off the leading edge of the left wing and created a hole where the tiles had been attached. Upon re-entry, the hot gases entered Columbia’s left wing and melted the internal struc- ture. When enough of the wing melted, the wing collapsed and the orbiter blew apart.

THE RISK FUNCTION

What are some of the variables needed to understand the risk of foreign objects colliding with the vehicle from the time the rocket engines start until the rocket engines are jettisoned from the orbiter some ten minutes later?

Since the linear risk-impact equation may not be applicable, what kind of questions should we ask if we are to find a risk impact equation that could work?

Exhibit I examines what you need to measure and/or track if an object strikes the shuttle:

The Risk Function 457

Exhibit I. Concerns if an object strikes a space shuttle

1. What are the attributes of the foreign object? � What was it that you collided with? � What is the length, width, thickness? � What is the mass of the object? � What is the density of the object? � How hard is the object? � How is the mass of the object distributed? � Is it like a cannon ball, or dumbbells, or sheet of paper?

2. What are the attributes of the collision? � Where did it hit? � Were there multiple impact points? � How much damage was done? � Can the damage be verified and examined? � Is this an isolated event, or the first of many? � What was the angle of the collision? Was it a glancing blow or a direct contact? � Did the object hit and leave the area, or is it imbedded in the vehicle? � Why did the shuttle collide with it? Are you off course? Is something coming apart?

3. What are the attributes of the vehicle? � How fast was it going at the time of the collision? � Was it in the middle of a complex maneuver? � Did the collision damage a component needed in the current phase of the mission? � Did the collision damage a component needed later in the mission?

This is certainly not an exhaustive list, but it is already orders of magnitude more complex compared to most project managers’ experiences in risk manage- ment. Unfortunately, the problem is even more complex.

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The acceleration of the vehicles adds another dimension to the risk function. A collision with an object at 100 mph is not the same as that which occurs when the vehicle is going 200 mph. The damage will not be twice as much as with a linear equation (i.e., if you are going twice as fast, then there will be twice the damage). These risk functions have now become nonlinear. The damage caused when the speed doubles may be sixteen times more, not just twice as much. This has a significant impact on how often you track and record the ongoing events.

Time is also a critical issue. Time is not on your side in a project that moves this fast. It is not just the fact that the risks are nonlinear, but the response enve- lope is constantly changing. In a vehicle going from 0 to 15,000 mph, a lot can happen in a very short time.

Now let’s look at what happens to the simple risk–impact equation:

Risk impact � (Risk probability) � (Risk consequence)

One probability for a risk event may be sufficient, but the risk consequences are now a function of many variables that have to be measured before an impact can be computed. Also, the risk consequence may be a non-linear function. This is a much more complex problem than trying to identify one probability and one consequence per risk event.

CONCLUSIONS

It may be necessary to compress the risk consequence function into some rela- tively simple equations and then combine the simple equations into a much more complex mathematical statement. For example, consider the variables of dimen- sions, weight, and speed. What type of rules can we define to make the risk im- pact easily derived and of value in making responses to the risk? We might apply the following parameters:

Rule 1: If the sum of the three dimensions (length � width � height) is less than 30, then the risk level is “10.”

Rule 1: If the sum of the three dimensions (length � width � height) is more than 30, the risk level is “20.”

Rule 2: If the weight is more than 500 grams, then the Risk-Level is multi- plied by 1.5.

Rule 3: For every 5 seconds of flight, the risk level doubles.

This process can be continued for all relevant variables. Risk response level (RRL) is the sum of the individual risk levels computed.

If the RRL is less than 50, the event is taken as noncritical. If the RRL is less than 100, procedures A, B, and C should be initiated, and so on.

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This exercise provides us with “rules” to initiate action. There is no discus- sion or guessing as to the proper response to a hazardous event. There is no ne- cessity to contact management for approval to start further actions. There are no stare downs with management to minimize the event for political or other considerations.

The more complicated things get, the more important rules and preplanned responses become to successfully managing project risk.

LESSONS LEARNED

In reviewing articles on the space shuttle events before and after its destruction, several things were learned:

� Debris had hit the shuttle during its powered ascent in previous launches. Management believed that because there were few problems in the past, the risk impact was known and would not change in the future.

� The lesson learned is not to make the same mistake. � Risks can be very complex. � The lesson learned is to study more about risk and how to document

the impact so even managers unfamiliar with risk management concepts can grasp complex impact functions.

� The shuttle crew never knew the spacecraft was doomed. By the time they were aware of the danger, the shuttle disintegrated.

� The lesson learned is that life is like that, and probably more often than you realize.

REFERENCES

1. Peter Sprent, Taking Risks—The Science of Uncertainty (Penguin Books, 1988).

2. Daniel Kehrer, The Art of Taking Intelligent Risks (Times Books, 1989). 3. William Langewiesche, “Columbia’s Last Flight,” The Atlantic Monthly

(November, 2003).

References 459

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