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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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Preventing the preventable: Strengthening international controls to thwart radiological terrorism

Kenneth C. Brill & John H. Bernhard

To cite this article: Kenneth C. Brill & John H. Bernhard (2020) Preventing the preventable: Strengthening international controls to thwart radiological terrorism, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 76:4, 206-209, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2020.1778371

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2020.1778371

Published online: 20 Jul 2020.

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FEATURE

Preventing the preventable: Strengthening international controls to thwart radiological terrorism Kenneth C. Brill and John H. Bernhard

ABSTRACT The current global approach to securing potentially dangerous radioactive material needs to be strengthened. Highly radioactive sources have multiple uses globally in medicine, industry, and academic research, but terrorist and other violent groups could also use them to make a “dirty bomb,” in which highly radioactive material is dispersed with conventional explosives. While global radiological security arrangements have improved since 2001, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national regulators still report regular incidents of highly radioactive materials that are stolen, lost, or missing. Currently, global radiological security is largely based on the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, which countries are under no obligation to follow or implement. The time has come to make the code of conduct a legally binding agreement that would promote national accountability and help prevent radiological terrorism.

KEYWORDS Nuclear terrorism; radioactive material; dirty bomb; IAEA; radioactive dispersal device

In 1995, Chechen insurgents buried a cesium 137 “dirty bomb” under the entrance to a well-trod park in Moscow. Though the package was discovered and removed without incident, the rebel leader responsi- ble for planting it threatened that he had more radio- active material in his arsenal and wasn’t afraid to use it.

Although no dirty bomb – more properly called a radiological dispersal device – has ever been detonated, history proves that the threat is real. While global radiological security arrangements have improved since 2001, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national regula- tors still report regular incidents of highly radio- active materials that are stolen, lost, or missing. Creating a dirty bomb would require little more than combining these materials with conventional explosives.

Global efforts to keep radioactive materials secure are largely based on an IAEA code of con- duct that countries are under no obligation to fol- low or implement. The time has come to make this code of conduct a legally binding agreement that would promote national accountability and help prevent radiological terrorism. A treaty would be more effective than a voluntary code of conduct because countries take legally binding commit- ments more seriously, which would influence how they implement and finance the requirements for radiological material security.

The radiological risk

Terrorist and non-state actor violence is more likely to increase in the coming decades than it is to decline. An attack using a radioactive dispersal device is an all too realistic option for groups that want to use spectacular acts of violence to promote themselves and their agen- das. Dirty bombs have been called “weapons of mass disruption” because they would most likely not immedi- ately kill many people, but could make a large or impor- tant area within a city (for example a port area or the financial district) unusable until very expensive and lengthy cleaning and remediation operations were com- pleted. The cost of such cleanup operations could poten- tially range in the tens to hundreds of billions of dollars (University of Southern California 2012). Unlike a run-of- the-mill improvised explosive device, the effects of a dirty bomb would be a long lasting and economically costly reminder of a terrorist group’s action.

Extremists’ interest in radiological terrorism is not merely a thing of the past. The FBI and local police in the United States made arrests or uncovered plans in 2002, 2008, and 2013 of white nationalist and Islamic extremists pursuing dirty bombs. Following the invasion of Iraq, US forces found plans for such devices and detained Al Qaeda operatives who said they knew how to make them. In the United Kingdom, police made dirty bomb–related arrests in 2004 and 2006; authorities in the Republic of Georgia arrested two people in 2014 for trafficking in radioactive materials; and in 2010,

CONTACT Kenneth C. Brill [email protected]

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 2020, VOL. 76, NO. 4, 206–209 https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2020.1778371

© 2020 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Canadian authorities arrested two people, one of whom worked in a hospital with many radiological sources, who police said were suspected of plotting a terrorist bombing campaign.

The key to preventing radiological terrorism is to keep highly radioactive material out of the hands of terrorists. Making a dirty bomb does not require sophisticated scientific knowledge or engineering skills. Terrorists around the world have demonstrated mastery of making improvised explosive devices from a variety of materials, and making a dirty bomb is no more difficult. Given the global threat of terrorism, the global availability of highly radioactive sources, and the consequences of a radiological attack, the international community should already have a strong global system to ensure the security of such material; unfortunately, that is not the case.

The IAEA code of conduct

The principal international agreement for radiological security is the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (There are also two Supplementary Guidances, covering the import and export of radioactive sources and the management of “disused” radioactive sources.) Among other things, the code of conduct asks states to carefully record and monitor all radioactive materials within their borders and to set up a regulatory body to oversee the manage- ment and protection of those materials. It also asks states to report any incidents involving radioactive materials to the IAEA and to have plans for how to recover lost materials.

More than 130 different countries have signed on to the code of conduct. Unfortunately, however, the agree- ment is political in nature, meaning it is not legally binding. Countries can sign up and implement the reg- ulations as they wish; the IAEA cannot require countries to take any action in this area. The IAEA also offers technical support, but again governments are under no obligation to allow expert teams to visit, or to take any action on the findings and recommendations that may come out of such a visit.

The September 11 terrorist attacks spurred increased attention to radiological security. A March 2003 Vienna conference on the subject led to a June 2003 G-8 statement calling for strengthened security for radioactive sources and the approval in September 2003 of a revised code of conduct that had stronger security provisions (IAEA 2004). These steps were useful, but ongoing gaps in the system are evident in the amount of material that is not under control (Khripunov 2017). The IAEA’s Incident and

Trafficking Database reported that in 2018 there were 253 incidents in 49 countries of unauthorized use or activity involving nuclear and other radioactive mate- rial. That same database reported that between 1993 and 2018 there were almost 3,500 such incidents, of which 285 involved a confirmed or likely act of traffick- ing or malicious use (IAEA 2019). The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimates that over 250 radio- active sources go missing or are stolen annually in the United States, while the EU estimates at least 70 radi- ological sources within its jurisdiction “fall out of con- trol” annually. The estimate of the total number of these so-called orphan sources is in the thousands (US General Accounting Office 2003).

From voluntary to legally binding agreements

The fundamental weakness of the current global approach to the security of highly radioactive material is that it is based on voluntary action with no account- ability for performance.

The voluntary nature of commitments to secure radioactive material affects how governments imple- ment them. Governments give a lower priority, particu- larly in terms of allocating financial resources, to voluntary commitments than to those that are legally binding, as both the legal literature and our direct experience in multilateral and bilateral negotiations demonstrate (Bodanski 2015, 161).1 As a result, many governments may take some steps consistent with the code of conduct, but may not necessarily do all that is needed to fully secure radioactive material under appro- priate controls during and after its useful life.

Legally binding agreements, by contrast, generally signal stronger commitment. They have a more potent impact on domestic parliaments and bureaucracies and also help to mobilize domestic advocates on the con- cerned issue. Further, parties to legally binding agree- ments often establish a mechanism to assess one another’s implementation, such as those in the Convention on Nuclear Safety or the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Protect the Ozone Layer, or have an international organization report on compliance, such as the IAEA’s role for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The elements of good security practices are not in dispute internationally. The IAEA’s code of conduct is generally regarded as the right approach substantively, and the IAEA has established mechanisms to support countries’ implementation of it. But clearly implementa- tion needs to be strengthened. The most effective and timely way to strengthen the global system of security for highly radioactive material would be to make the code of conduct legally binding.

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There are several ways to do so. The first and simplest would be for those countries that already adhere to the code of conduct to agree to make it a stand-alone, legally binding treaty or international convention. That could be a relatively straightforward and swift process, since the countries involved are already familiar with the code of conduct’s requirements and have at least some experience in implementing it.

Another approach would be to incorporate the code of conduct as a protocol of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, which is already legally binding and has over 150 state parties. This would have the advantage of putting the security of nuclear and radioactive materials in one international agreement. Such an approach could produce security synergies and reduce regulatory over- lap for governments and organizations. Participants, including government officials, in an NGO-led workshop in Latin America in 2019 reacted positively to this idea, noting it would help their governments better manage work on these issues.2

A third way would be to incorporate the code of conduct as a protocol of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel, which already has some 70 state parties. Such a protocol would bring the front end and back end of the radioactive source lifecycle together in one international agreement. This approach also has the potential for creating synergies and regulatory efficien- cies for governments.

A key benefit of a legally binding agreement would be increased accountability. Accountability for countries’ performance could be handled through peer reviews in which experts from other parties to the agreement per- iodically assess a country’s compliance with the elements in the new convention or protocol. This peer review process would complement and support the IAEA’s exist- ing expert review process for the code of conduct. The concept and utility of peer review by parties to an inter- national agreement is well established. For example, peer reviews are already an integral (and successful) part of the Joint Convention and of the Nuclear Safety Convention as well as other international treaties.

The combination of legally binding commitments and peer review accountability would over time significantly strengthen the global security system for dangerous radioactive material and make it less likely terrorists could acquire and use such materials to produce a dirty bomb.

Preventing the preventable

The world should not wait for a dirty bomb attack in a major city before it decides to change the

unsatisfactory status quo. The elements of a strong sys- tem of international security for radioactive material exist, but they need a new, legally binding format. Those countries concerned about global security should be taking the lead to strengthen existing international arrangements.

The United States should be first among them. The Trump administration has made preventing such terror- ism a priority in its National Security Strategy (White House 2017, 7). It should turn rhetoric into action by leading the initiative toward a legally binding agree- ment. Some countries will resist moving from voluntary to legally binding commitments, but others in the inter- national community would welcome and support US leadership on this issue, as would the NGO community. Active US leadership can produce increased support for a legally binding approach to radiological security. Once such an agreement enters into force, it will attract a growing number of countries that wish to demonstrate to their domestic constituencies and the international community that they are responsible stewards of dan- gerous materials. There are a number of opportunities at the IAEA, such as Board of Governor meetings, the annual General Conference meeting, or meetings of the parties to the code of conduct, where the issue could be raised and a decision could be made to launch the necessary negotiations.

It is certain that a dirty bomb attack anywhere would lead to immediate calls everywhere for action to strengthen the security of such materials to ensure it never happens again, along with questions about why more was not done sooner. The world can succeed in preventing such attacks, but doing so requires leader- ship to forge international agreement to strengthen security arrangements and accountability for highly radioactive material – and doing so before terrorists exploit the current vulnerabilities.

Notes

1. Additionally, both authors have had direct experience in negotiations with officials from developed and develop- ing countries who have said that their governments would make best efforts to fund activities related to complying with an international agreement, but could only be counted on as doing so if the commitments were legally binding.

2. One of the authors spoke at this workshop, which included NGO and governmental representatives from seven Latin American countries.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

208 K. C. BRILL AND J. H. BERNHARD

Notes on contributors

Kenneth C. Brill is a former career diplomat, US ambassador to the IAEA, and founding director of the US National Counterproliferation Center, which is in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

John H. Bernhard is a former Danish Ambassador to the IAEA and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as a former legal advisor in the Danish Foreign Ministry.

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Instruments.” In Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime, edited by S. Barrett, C. Carraro, and J. de Melo. London: CEPR Press. https://voxeu.org/sites/default/files/ file/bodansky.pdf

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 2004. “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.” https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/ PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 2019. “Incidents of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Out of Regulatory Control: 2019 Fact Sheet.” IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/04/ itdb-factsheet-2019.pdf

Khripunov, I. 2017. “Nuclear Security Culture for Users of Radioactive Sources: Model, Self-Assessment, Enhancement.” University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security, August. http://spia.uga. edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CRP-report-final- November-2017.pdf

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