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Pragmatic Arguments

JEFFREY JORDAN

As with so much in philosophy, the fi rst recorded employment of a pragmatic argument is found in Plato. At Meno 86b - c, in response to the paradox of the knower, Socrates tells Meno that believing in the value of inquiry is justifi ed because of the positive impact upon one ’ s character:

Meno : Somehow or other I believe you are right.

Socrates : I think I am. I shouldn ’ t like to take my oath on the whole story, but one thing I am ready to fi ght for as long as I can, in word and act – that is, that we shall be better, braver, and more active men if we believe it right to look for what we don ’ t know than if we believe there is no point in looking because what we don ’ t know we can never discover.

Meno : There too I am sure you are. (Plato 1961 )

Socrates ’ point is if being better, braver, and more active are among our desires, and if believing that inquiry is permissible facilitates our becoming better, braver, and more active, then we have pragmatic reason to believe that inquiry is permissible. Socrates ’ argument is an argument in support of cultivating a certain belief. Pragmatic argu- ments are practical in orientation, justifying actions that are thought to facilitate the achievement of our goals. If among your goals is A, and if doing such and such results in your achieving A, then, all else equal, you have reason to do such and such:

a1. doing α helps to bring about β , and a2. it is in your interest that β obtain. So, a3. you have reason to do α .

There are two kinds of pragmatic arguments having to do with the action of belief formation (see Jordan 2006 , pp. 39 – 42). The fi rst is an argument that recommends taking steps to believe a proposition because, if it should turn out to be true, the benefi ts gained from believing that proposition will be impressive. This fi rst kind of pragmatic argument we can call a “ truth - dependent ” pragmatic argument, or more conveniently a “ dependent - argument, ” since the benefi ts are obtained only if the relevant belief is true. The prime example of a dependent argument is an argument that uses a calcula- tion of expected utility and employs the expectation rule to recommend belief:

A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, edited by Charles Taliaferro, et al., John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tccd-ebooks/detail.action?docID=480428. Created from tccd-ebooks on 2020-07-09 10:26:10.

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In a decision situation where both probability and utility values can be assigned, one should choose to do an act which has the greatest expected utility.

Pascal employs this rule in his best - known version of the wager: no matter how small the probability that God exists, as long as it is a positive, non - infi nitesimal prob- ability, the expected utility of a theistic belief will dominate the expected utility of disbelief.

The second kind of pragmatic argument, which can be called a “ truth - independent ” pragmatic argument, or more conveniently, an “ independent - argument, ” is one which recommends taking steps to believe a certain proposition simply because of the benefi ts gained by believing it, whether or not the believed proposition is true. This is an argu- ment that recommends belief cultivation because of the psychological, moral, religious, or social benefi ts gained by virtue of believing it. In David Hume ’ s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion , for example, Cleanthes employs an independent argument, “ religion, however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals that we never ought to abandon or neglect it ” (Hume 1779 , p. 219). Perhaps the best - known example of an independent argument is found in William James ’ celebrated “ Will - to - Believe ” argument in which he argues that, in certain circumstances, it is rationally and morally permissible to believe a proposition because of the benefi ts thereby generated.

Unlike independent pragmatic arguments, dependent ones are, in an important sense, truth - sensitive. Of course, being pragmatic arguments, dependent arguments are not truth - sensitive in an evidential sense; nevertheless they are dependent on truth since the benefi ts are had only if the recommended belief is true. In contrast, independ- ent pragmatic arguments, yielding benefi ts whether or not the recommended beliefs are true, are indifferent to truth. Independent arguments, we might say, are belief - dependent and not truth - dependent. And notice that the benefi ts may involve the good of others, and even the common good. Thus, pragmatic arguments cannot be easily dismissed as nothing but selfi sh appeals to base considerations.

Pascal ’ s Wager

The most celebrated example of a dependent pragmatic argument is due to the French philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623 – 62).

Let us examine this point and declare: “ Either God is or He is not. ” But to which view shall we incline? Reason cannot decide this question. Infi nite chaos separates us. At the extrem- ity of this infi nite distance a game is in progress, where either heads or tails may turn up. How will you wager? … Let us weigh the gain and the loss involved by wagering that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you win, you win all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Do not hesitate then, wager that He does exist. (Pascal 1670 , pp. 150 – 1)

There are at least three different versions of the wager found in the complete Pens é es passage (see Hacking 1972 ; McClennen 1994 ; and Jordan 2006 ). One version, which might be called a weak dominance argument, can be paraphrased so:

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One cannot lose when wagering on the existence of God, rather than against. In the event that God exists, one who believes does very well; in the event that God does not exist, one who believes does no worse than one who does not believe.

The idea of this argument is that the one wagering in favor of God existing will, by believing, in no case be in a position worse off than one who does not. The one who wagers against, however, will in some cases be worse off. A weak dominance argument has a “ sure - thing ” appeal: one cannot lose by wagering in favor of God existing (see Pascal 1670 , pp. 150 – 1).

A second version adds probability values to the wagering context, which allows a calculation of expected utilities:

If the probability of God existing is equal to that of God not existing, and given that the utility of theistic belief, if God exists, is infi nite, then the expected utility of believing swamps that of disbelief.

The key point of this version is that, since the expected utility of disbelief is, presumably, fi nite, theistic belief will always be recommended (see Pascal 1670 , p. 151).

A third version of the wager, and perhaps the best - known version, does not presup- pose an equiprobability between God existing and not existing:

As long as there is some positive probability that God exists, it follows, since infi nity mul- tiplied by any fi nite amount generates an infi nity, that the expected utility of believing that God exists swamps that of disbelief.

The idea here is that no matter how small one takes the odds to be that God exists, believing that God exists carries an infi nite expected utility (see Pascal 1670 , p. 151).

Pascal ’ s wager is not an argument that God exists. The wager is an argument that it is rational to form the belief that God exists. Rationality is understood here as a kind of prudential rationality as opposed to what could be called epistemic rationality. Prudential rationality concerns what is in one ’ s interest, while epistemic rationality is strictly connected to evidence. The distinction between prudential rationality and epis- temic rationality is a more general form of the distinction made above between prag- matic arguments and truth - directed arguments.

One objection to the wager is a partitioning complaint: the wager, as it is framed, neglects all sorts of relevant alternatives. Possible religious hypotheses include not just the existence of the Christian God, but also the existence of the Islamic God, and the god of the Druids, and even that deity, if such should exist, who would grant eternal life to atheists and condemn to perdition all who believe in a deity. Indeed, given the cooked - up hypothesis just mentioned, we could come up with any number of incompat- ible god - possibilities, each condemning the devotees of every other deity to perdition. This objection to the wager is called the “ many - gods objection ” and the point of it is that the wager proves too much: given a possible infi nite utility and a positive pro- bability, no matter how small, an infi nite expected utility is generated. Hence, the wager, instead of singularly recommending a religious hypothesis to believe, seems to

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recommend any number of incompatible religious hypotheses, each with an infi nite expected utility, and no obvious way to choose among them.

The friend of the wager has at least two ways of dealing with this embarrassment of Pascalian riches (see Jordan 2006 , pp. 73 – 101). The fi rst is to deny that mere logical possibility entails a positive probability. Or, to put the point another way, when calcu- lating probabilities it is common and proper to ignore remotely small probabilities. Consider fl ipping a fair coin. We say it ’ s fi fty - fi fty heads or tails, even though there are other possible occurrences: the coin might land on its edge, it might vanish, it might transform into an elephant, and so on. This point holds even if we accept the notion of an infi nite utility since when deliberating whether to take an umbrella or not, we ignore the vanishingly small possibility that doing so, or not doing so, could generate an infi - nite disutility.

A second way of saving Pascal ’ s partitioning of the alternatives is to limit the rele- vant choices to “ live hypothesis ” only. A live hypothesis is any proposition not thought to be false and is such that one could believe it without extensive and far - reaching revisions in one ’ s web of beliefs. A live hypothesis can be accommodated more easily than one which is not. The restriction to live hypotheses only entails a person - relativity – a hypothesis live to one person may not be so for another. Understood this way, the wager would be a last step in an apologetic case rather than the fi rst: once the relevant alternatives have been narrowed down to theism and naturalism, the wager is a tie - breaker that recommends theistic belief.

A second objection to the wager involves the wager ’ s use of infi nite utilities. The problem here is twofold: what sense, if any, can be made of the idea of an infi nite utility; and can standard, axiomatic decision theory accommodate infi nite utilities?

The key to understanding Pascal ’ s contention that theistic belief carries, if true, an infi nite utility is to remember that, according to Christian theology, life in heaven is an endless, sublime existence of which each succeeding moment of existence is as saturated in happiness as each preceding one (see Chapter 74 , Resurrection, Heaven, and Hell). Since such an afterlife is unending, summing to infi nity as it were, it is not too much of a stretch to term this mode of existence an infi nite gain. It is a payoff which surpasses any fi nite good. Is the idea that there are infi nite utilities compatible with standard axiomatic systems of Bayesian decision theory? It is not. The introduction of infi nite utilities will generate problems with several of the axioms found in the standard constructions. Is this an intractable problem for the Pascalian? Probably not. For one thing, there is no construction of decision - theory which is without controversy. For another, it is not surprising that theories constructed for fi nite utilities cannot accommodate infi nite ones. Moreover, remembering that the wager is protean, the Pascalian can point out that rational decisions can be framed independent of the standard axiomatic theories, especially since the Pascalian can present the wager argument in any of its several guises, being limited to neither any one version of the argument nor, apart from the concept of an infi nite utility, dependent upon any controversial decision - theoretic principles. Indeed, versions of the wager shorn of the infi nite are possible, although uncommon (see Jordan 2006 , pp. 123 – 6).

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Other Prominent Pragmatic Arguments

Another example of a pragmatic argument is the “ Will - to - Believe ” argument of the American pragmatist William James (1842 – 1910). According to James, there are occasions in which it is rationally and morally permissible to believe a proposition, even in the absence of adequate evidence supporting that proposition (see James 1897 , p. 11; see also Chapter 15 , American Pragmatism).

It is important to notice that James does not endorse the idea that one can properly believe a proposition despite the evidence against it. In the essay “ The Will to Believe, ” James specifi es two conditions that must apply before one can properly believe a hypothesis, James ’ term for a proposition, that lacks adequate evidence (see James 1897 , pp. 2 – 4). The fi rst condition concerns the evidence for or against a proposition. According to James, whenever a proposition ’ s truth or falsity cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds, it is intellectually indeterminate. A proposition is intel- lectually indeterminate in either of two ways. The fi rst includes situations in which the evidence, pro and con, is balanced. This would be a case of epistemic parity: a tie between the evidence pro and con. The second way occurs when there is no evidence known, whether evidence against the proposition or evidence in support of it. The two ways can both be understood as involving intellectual indeterminacy in either an in - principle sense or an in - practice sense, and James ’ argument can use either sense of indeterminacy. The fi rst condition is, then, that the proposition be intellectually indeterminate.

The second condition concerns what James would call a “ genuine option. ” An option is a choice concerning which of two propositions to believe and it is genuine just in case it involves a choice which is living, momentous, and forced. An option is living whenever the choice involves propositions that are real possibilities of belief. For example, whether or not to be a theist is probably a real possibility for most Westerners; but the option of being a Druid or not is so remote a possibility that it is dead. Momentous options are those choices upon which something of great importance depends, or are choices which are irreversible once made, or are singular opportunities that are unlikely to be repeated. A forced option obtains whenever one cannot avoid making a decision by suspending judgment. With regard to any proposition the choice of whether to believe that proposition true or false is avoidable: one can suspend belief regarding its truth value. However, if some signifi cant consequence can be had only if one believes a certain proposition, then the choice of whether to believe that proposition or not is forced. If one can receive x only by believing that p , then whether or not to believe that p is forced: if one suspends judgment toward p , one will not receive x .

The principle endorsed by James can be stated thus:

for any person S and proposition p , S can permissibly believe p if p is (i) intellectually inde- terminate, and (ii) is part of a genuine option. (James 1897 , p. 11)

Notice that this principle is compatible with the rule that one should believe a proposi- tion if that proposition has the support of evidence in its favor. The normative concept

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involved in James ’ principle is best understood as including both rational and moral permissibility.

The application of James ’ principle to philosophy of religion is as follows. The reli- gious option, according to James, consists of two claims. The fi rst is that what is best or supreme is eternal, and the second is that we are better off even now if we believe the fi rst claim (James 1897 , pp. 25 – 6). Though vague, the idea, expressed differently, is that God exists and, if we believe, we are the immediate recipients of assurance and hope and other benefi cial states of mind. And, according to James, the option of whether to believe the religious option or not is living, momentous, and forced – in a word, a genuine option. Moreover, the evidence, pro and con, is indeterminate. From this it follows that the religious believer is well within her intellectual rights by believing that God exists.

James ’ argument provides us with an example of an independent pragmatic argu- ment. James, unlike Pascal, is not gambling on the truth of the claim that God exists. James is banking that theistic belief provides immediate benefi t. There is also a hint in James, which is not developed fully, that it is only by fi rst believing that one will have any real chance of discovering decisive intellectual evidence concerning the existence of God. Believing in the absence of adequate evidence may be, this idea goes, necessary in order to get oneself a perspective from which additional evidence is obtainable (see James 1897 , pp. 24 – 5, 27 – 8; and Wainwright 1995 ). If something like this is correct, then the chasm between prudential rationality and epistemic rationality is, at certain points, bridgeable.

In his posthumously published essay, “ Theism, ” J. S. Mill (1806 – 73) proffers two adoptive pragmatic arguments in support of the legitimacy of hoping that an attenu- ated form of theism might be true. The fi rst of Mill ’ s two pragmatic arguments is similar to James ’ argument, though unlike James, Mill neither carefully crafts the circum- stances in which it is permissible to adopt a positive stance toward theism, nor believes that one can permissibly believe religiously. Mill advocates the adoption of hope toward the doctrines and ideals of theism. Like James, Mill is clear that it is permissible to invoke pragmatic considerations only in the absence of strong evidence contra theism (see Mill 1874 , p. 81).

Mill ’ s second pragmatic argument is that theistic belief serves the important function of motivating morality:

There is another and a most important exercise of imagination which, in the past and present, has been kept up principally by means of religious belief and which is infi nitely precious to mankind, so much so that human excellence greatly depends upon … it. This consists of the familiarity of the imagination with the conception of a morally perfect Being, and the habit of taking the approbation of such a Being as the norma or standard to which to refer and by which to regulate our own characters and lives. (Mill 1874 , p. 82)

Mill does not argue that religious belief is logically necessary for moral reasoning, but he does argue that religious belief has historically facilitated moral motivation. Religious belief provides a moral heuristic and an ideal, both of which render moral reasoning more concrete and more accessible. So, according to Mill, although there is not enough evidence to render religious belief rationally permissible, one can hope that theism is

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true and this hope will provide the same benefi ts that religious belief historically pro- vided (see Mill 1874 , pp. 82 – 7).

Pragmatic Arguments and the Ethics of Belief

There is a widespread and infl uential tradition found in Western philosophy, a tradition that we can call “ evidentialism, ” which holds that

for all persons S and propositions p , it is permissible for S to believe that p only if p is sup- ported by adequate evidence.

Endorsing this evidentialist imperative, many philosophers have held that pragmatic reasons for belief - formation are illegitimate since such reasons do not themselves provide adequate evidence for the truth of the belief (for more on evidentialism, see Conee and Feldman 2005 and Chapter 80 , Evidentialism). Perhaps the most - quoted statement of the evidentialist imperative is that of W. K. Clifford (1845 – 79): “ it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insuffi cient evidence ” (Clifford 1879 , p. 186). Clearly enough, Clifford formulated the evidentialist imperative in a moral sense: it is morally impermissible to believe something which lacks suffi cient evidence. The normative sense of the imperative can also be understood in a cognitive sense: to believe something lacking suffi cient evidence is irrational. Understood either way, is the evidentialist imperative an obstacle to a principled use of pragmatic arguments?

It is far from clear that it is. For one thing, the evidentialist imperative is at most a prima facie obligation. And if the evidentialist imperative is a prima facie obligation, then it is possible, if the pragmatic considerations were to override the epistemic ones, that a use of pragmatic arguments would be compatible with the evidentialist imperative.

Moreover, depending on the precise sense of adequate used in the imperative and remembering both Pascal ’ s second version of the wager and the “ Will - to - Believe ” argu- ment of James, pragmatic arguments can be used even if the evidentialist imperative is one ’ s actual duty. As long as pragmatic arguments are employed only when a situation of evidential parity exists, there will be no violation of the evidentialist imperative since the pragmatic arguments are employed merely as tie - breakers.

In addition, pragmatic belief formation could be one ’ s moral duty. This is evident in what we might call the stranded alpine hiker case:

A hiker, because of an avalanche and a blinding blizzard, is stranded on a desolate moun- tain path facing a chasm. The hiker cannot return the way he came because of the ava- lanche, yet if he stays where he is, he will freeze as the temperature plummets. The hiker ’ s only real hope is to jump the chasm. Knowing that exertion generally follows belief the hiker realizes that his attempt will be half - hearted, diminishing his chance of survival, unless he brings himself to the belief that he can make the jump (adapted from James 1895 ).

The hiker is morally justifi ed in forming beliefs motivated by pragmatic reasons, and in suppressing other beliefs ( “ I cannot make the jump ” ), again motivated by pragmatic

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reasons. And if it is true that no one is irrational in doing one ’ s moral duty, then prag- matic belief - formation is sometimes both morally and intellectually permissible.

Or consider counterexamples to the evidentialist imperative drawn from studies in medicine. Research has shown a correlation between the level of reported pain (felt pain) and one ’ s expectation of the pain. In short, if one anticipates a painful event, the felt pain is higher than if one lacks that expectation (Vase et al. 2003 ). Or consider well - recognized placebo effects in which the expectation of the disappearance of pain is instrumental in its disappearance (Wall 2000 ). Parents often tell their children that removing the Band - Aid won ’ t hurt much, doing so with the hope that the felt pain is thereby reduced. Clearly, if there is a general duty to reduce suffering, one would be obligated to form beliefs or to inculcate beliefs in others if doing so would lower the level of pain. Or think of sports psychology. Since exertion generally follows belief (a theme often invoked by James), much of sports psychology involves inculcating beliefs that lack adequate evidentiary support. By believing that one can make the play, one is more likely to make an optimal effort. Having the belief that one will succeed often helps bring it about that one does. These considerations cast doubt on the evidentialist imperative.

Finally, some philosophers have argued that the evidentialist imperative, though venerable, is in sore need of revision. In particular, some have argued that pragmatic reasons can supplement epistemic reasons in determining whether it is rational to believe a proposition. This idea is based upon the distinction between (1) a proposition being rational to believe, and (2) believing being the rational thing to do. Although a particular proposition may not be rationally believable, it could be, nonetheless, that believing that proposition is the rational thing, all things considered, to do. In this way the acquisition of a particular belief can be rationally mandated by either (1) or (2), depending upon the circumstances and the person involved (see Nozick 1993 , pp. 64 – 93). If this proposal is correct, then the distinction between epistemic rationality and prudential rationality is narrowed once again.

Works cited

Clifford , W. K. Lectures and Essays , vol. 2 ( London : Macmillan , 1879 ). Conee , E. , and Feldman , R. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology ( Oxford : Oxford University Press ,

2005 ). Hacking , I. “ The Logic of Pascal ’ s Wager , ” American Philosophical Quarterly 9 ( 1972 ): 186 – 92 . Hume , D. Dialogues concerning Natural Religion ( 1779 ), ed. N. Kemp Smith (Indianapolis, IN :

Bobbs - Merrill , 1947 ). James , W. “ Is Life Worth Living? ” ( 1895 ), in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular

Philosophy (New York : Dover , 1959 ), pp. 32 – 62 . James , W. “ The Will to Believe ” ( 1897 ), in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy

( New York : Dover , 1959 ), pp. 1 – 31 . Jordan , J. Pascal ’ s Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God ( Oxford : Oxford University Press ,

2006 ). McClennen , E. “ Pascal ’ s Wager and Finite Decision Theory , ” in Gambling on God: Essays on

Pascal ’ s Wager , ed. J. Jordan ( Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefi eld , 1994 ), pp. 115 – 37 . Mill , J. S. Theism ( 1874 ), ed. R. Taylor ( Indianapolis, IN : Bobbs - Merrill , 1957 ).

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Nozick , R. The Nature of Rationality ( Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press , 1993 ). Pascal , B. Pens é es ( 1670 ), trans. A. J. Krailsheimer ( London : Penguin Books , 1966 ). Plato . “ Meno , ” in Plato: The Collected Dialogues , ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns , trans. W. K. C.

Guthrie ( Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press , 1961 ), pp. 354 – 84 . Vase , L. , Robinson , M. E. , Verne , G. N. , and Price , D. D. “ The Contributions of Suggestion, Desire,

and Expectation to Placebo Effects in Irritable Bowel Syndrome Patients: An Empirical Investigation , ” Pain 105 ( 2003 ): 17 – 25 .

Wainwright , W. J. Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason ( Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press , 1995 ).

Wall , P. Pain: The Science of Suffering ( New York : Columbia University Press , 2000 ).

Additional recommended readings

Adams , R. “ Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief , ” in Rationality and Religious Belief , ed. C. Delaney ( Notre Dame, IN : University of Notre Dame Press , 1979 ), pp. 116 – 40 .

Adler J. Belief ’ s Own Ethics ( Cambridge, MA : MIT Press , 2002 ). McCarthy , G. , ed. The Ethics of Belief Debate ( Atlanta, GA : Scholars Press , 1986 ). Meiland , J. “ What Ought We to Believe? ” American Philosophical Quarterly 17 ( 1980 ): 15 – 24 . Pojman , L. Religious Belief and the Will ( London : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1986 ). Rescher , N. Pascal ’ s Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology ( Notre Dame,

IN : University of Notre Dame Press , 1985 ). Wernham , J. James ’ s Will - to - Believe Doctrine ( Montreal : McGill - Queen ’ s University Press , 1987 ). Wood , A. “ W. K. Clifford and the Ethics of Belief , ” in Unsettling Obligations: Essays on Reason,

Reality and the Ethics of Belief ( Stanford, CA : CSLI Publications , 2002 ), pp. 1 – 40 .

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