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Post-disaster recovery dilemmas: challenges in balancing short-term and long-term needs for vulnerability reduction

Jane C. Ingram *, Guillermo Franco, Cristina Rumbaitis-del Rio, Bjian Khazai

Earth Institute, Columbia University, 405 Low Library, MC 4335, 535 West 116th Street, New York, NY 10027, United States

e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 9 ( 2 0 0 6 ) 6 0 7 – 6 1 3

a r t i c l e i n f o

Published on line 18 October 2006

Keywords:

Sri Lanka

Disaster recovery

Vulnerability

Tsunami

a b s t r a c t

Following disasters, governments often clamor to quickly reduce risk, rebuild communities

and restore permanence. The pressure to urgently address complex, difficult decisions can

result in reactive policies that may increase long-term vulnerability of affected populations.

Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the 26 December 2004 tsunami represents such an example: a

hastily designed coastal buffer zone policy has incited massive relocation of affected

populations and resulted in social, economic and environmental problems that threaten

the well-being of poor coastal communities. We review the impacts of this policy from its

inception, days after the tsunami hit the island, until its revision, approximately 10 months

following the disaster. We then apply a framework to conceptualize the components of

vulnerability within Sri Lanka’s coastal, human–environment system and to identify where

post-disaster policies should focus to reduce vulnerability of coastal populations more

effectively. From this analysis, it is apparent that the buffer zone policy gave dispropor-

tionate attention to reducing exposure to future tsunamis and, subsequently, did not

address the critical social, economic and institutional factors that influenced sensitivity

to the hazard. Post-disaster policies aimed at sustainable re-development should be

informed by an analysis of the components of vulnerability that comprise a system and

how these can be most effectively influenced during the separate short-term and long-term

phases of rebuilding.

# 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

avai lab le at www.sc iencedi rec t .com

journal homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /envsc i

1. Introduction

The world witnessed a series of large-scale coastal disasters in

2004 and 2005. After such events, the public and their leaders

often clamor to re-build quickly, yet better than before

(Comfort, 2005). However, reactive policies generated under

urgent pressures often fail to address the root causes of

vulnerability1 and, in the long term, may even amplify the

social, economic and environmental weaknesses that turn

natural hazards into large-scale disasters. The Sri Lankan

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 917 843 2770. E-mail address: [email protected] (J.C. Ingram).

1 Vulnerability refers to the capacity of an individual or group to ant hazard and is composed of a variety of factors that determine the de (Blaikie et al., 1994). 1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2006.07.006

coastal buffer zone policy that was devised in the period

immediately following the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 may

well be an example of such a policy. In this paper, we review Sri

Lanka’s coastal land-use policy before the tsunami and the

evolution and impacts of the short-lived post-tsunami buffer

zone policy on socio-economic disparities, livelihoods, com-

munities and the environment. We then present a vulnerability

framework to guide post-disaster policy decisions and avoid the

problems associated with hastily devised post-disaster policies.

The discussion highlights the complex challenges and tradeoffs

icipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural gree to which lives and livelihoods are put at risk by such events

.

e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 9 ( 2 0 0 6 ) 6 0 7 – 6 1 3608

that policymakers face in the aftermath of disasters and

suggests that, amidst these difficult decisions, it is necessary

to keep vulnerability reduction as a fundamental focus of

recovery efforts. This discussion has direct application for other

communities that have recently been devastated by disasters.

2. Post-tsunami policy: the coastal buffer zone

Only days after the tsunami struck Sri Lanka on December 26,

2004, the government of the island nation established a ‘‘no

reconstruction’’ coastal buffer zone that varied in width, from

100 m in the South to 200 m in the East and North

(Samarasinghe, 2005, Government of Sri Lanka and Develop-

ment Partners, 2005). Repair or reconstruction of homes

within this zone was prohibited. However, hotels that had

suffered less than 40% structural damage were allowed to

remain within this area (Ministry of Urban Development and

Water Supply et al., 2005). Soon after the policy was decreed,

the construction of semi-permanent and permanent homes

began at government-designated resettlement sites located

outside of the buffer zone. However, reconstruction was

unevenly distributed and paced throughout the country. In

some cases, reconstruction has progressed with little atten-

tion to pre-existent development regulations, land-use poli-

cies (IUCN, 2005a) or the social impacts of resettling people,

often unwillingly, kilometers away from their home commu-

nity (Shanmugaratnam, 2005). This policy has been identified

as one of the primary reasons for Sri Lanka’s sluggish recovery

process and has been a major obstacle to the equitable

rebuilding of homes and livelihoods (Charny and Martin, 2005;

Harris, 2005; Luthra, 2005a,b). Criticisms of the policy derived

from the lack of community consultations in establishing the

buffer zone boundary and in the relocation process (Shanmu-

garatnam, 2005; World Bank, 2005). In many locations, the

buffer zone did not correlate with tsunami damage or take into

account relevant landscape features that influence exposure

to hazards (Jayasuriya et al., 2005). The government’s defense

of the buffer zone policy was that it needed to act quickly

before people moved back to risk-prone areas and that

application of a uniform buffer was the fairest and quickest

way to do so (Jayasuriya et al., 2005).

Approximately 10 months after the tsunami, the govern-

ment decided to revise this policy, citing land scarcity issues as

the primary impetus for reconsideration (Government of Sri

Lanka and Development Partners, 2005). However, the details of

a new policy remain unclear to many affected communities,

leaving continued confusion as to where building will be

allowed and when it will proceed (Luthra, 2005a,b). Though

short-lived, the impacts of the buffer zone policy may remain

long after its revision. Negative impacts on equality, livelihoods

and the environment (Oxfam, 2005) have already resulted from

the policy, which has potentially increased vulnerability of

affected populations in the long-term rather than decreasing it.

3. Coastal land-use policy before the tsunami

The concept of protecting a margin of coastal land from over-

development and removing populations from hazard-prone

areas has been hailed in the past not only as a plausible

measure to reduce damage from tsunamis and other coastal

hazards (Preuss, 1983), but also as an effective way to preserve

coastal ecosystems. In the 1980’s, a set-back policy was

enacted in Sri Lanka as part of a coastal zone management

plan that aimed to reduce coastal erosion, conserve coastal

ecosystems and protect areas of cultural importance (Hettiar-

achchi and Samarawickrama, 2005). Construction without a

permit was theoretically restricted within a 300 m distance

from the high water mark. However, due to lack of enforce-

ment, ocean-front lands were developed, often in high

densities. These unregulated lands close to the sea and the

ample livelihood opportunities provided by the coastal zone

created ideal conditions for the growth of low-income

communities. Hotels and other tourism-related businesses

also expanded into the ‘‘restricted area’’.

4. Impacts of the post-tsunami buffer zone

4.1. Socio-economic disparities

Through building restrictions, the post-tsunami buffer zone

has amplified pre-tsunami socio-economic disparities that

were exposed by the discriminating impact the wave(s) had on

poorly constructed buildings. Most of the homes completely

destroyed by the tsunami were one-story houses occupied by

low-income families. These houses were poorly built with

weak brick and mortar walls that had no structural connection

to the foundation and, thus, were swept from their footings or

collapsed completely. In contrast, stronger multi-story rein-

forced concrete buildings, such as many of the mid to high-

end hotels, resisted the impact with only slight non-structural

damages (Khazai et al., 2006). Wealthier people who owned

these well-constructed buildings typically were able to repair

them. In contrast, most of the poor fishing communities had

nothing left to repair and have been forced to relocate away

from the buffer zone and their livelihood source, in order to

receive government sponsored housing. An example of these

disparities can be seen in Arugam Bay, located on the eastern

coast of Sri Lanka, which was once a fishing and tourism-

based community. In May of 2005 the only structures that were

still standing were a few concrete homes and a group of small

two- or three-story hotels that were undergoing repairs and

expansion in the midst of the recovery confusion. Without

money, government support or clarity about where they

would be resettled, many poor people who had lived inside the

buffer zone prior to the tsunami were still waiting for

information on where they would be resettled.

Effectively, the short-lived buffer zone policy initiated a

process of gentrification in which wealthier hôteliers and the

tourism industry benefited from rapid expansion while

fishing communities were marginalized from the littoral

area (Rice, 2005). This situation has increased pre-disaster

socio-economic disparities that were revealed by the patterns

of tsunami destruction across poor and wealthy homes

(Oxfam, 2005). It has also served to create distrust regarding

the government’s dedication to meet the needs of poor

communities affected by the tsunami (Shanmugaratnam,

2005).

e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 9 ( 2 0 0 6 ) 6 0 7 – 6 1 3 609

Fig. 1 – (a) The site of a resettlement camp for tsunami

victims who lived in the coastal zone of Hambantota, (b)

the environment surrounding the resettlement camp and

(c) the coastal zone of Hambantota. The resettlement site

is approximately 2 km away from the coast and has a

terrestrial natural resource base of scrub forest compared

to the coconut trees and fish resources in the coastal zone,

where the future camp residents have lived for

generations.

4.2. Livelihoods

Theurgetoresettlepeopleoutsideof thebufferzonehascreated

tensions between immediate concerns of another tsunami, a

relatively rare event for the Indian Ocean, and long-term well-

beingwithrespect to livelihoodopportunitiesandhabitabilityat

relocationsites.Althoughthebufferzonepolicywasintendedto

protect people from an improbable tsunami risk, it has had

unintended consequences of threatening coastal livelihoods

and exposing people to other more persistent hazards, such as

flooding, at resettlement camps. Shortly after the tsunami, a

government resettlement camp had been established in

Hambantota more than 2 km from the ocean and was heralded

as a reconstruction success due to the speed at which a large

number of new, high-quality homes had been built (Fig. 1). Yet,

fishermen who were relocating to this site were deeply

concerned about how they would continue fishing and did

not foresee any other livelihood options. These concerns have

also been echoed at other resettlement camps, where people

havebeen relocated far fromthe fishingcommunity where their

livelihoods were based (Shanmugaratnam, 2005).

The natural environment surrounding the camp in Hama-

bantota was sparsely vegetated by a scrub forest, but lacked

other natural resources of use to people, which is an extreme

contrast to the resource rich coastal zone inhabited by fishing

communities for generations. Thus, life in this new setting will

require new livelihood alternatives and support for livelihood

adaptation. Other resettlement camps have been sited in

harsh environments or in wetland areas, which are likely to

experience flooding during the rainy season (Charny and

Martin, 2005). Although camps located kilometers from the

ocean may be safe from a future tsunami, there are a variety of

other, potentially more pervasive challenges that inhabitants

will have to face in these new environments.

4.3. Disruption of communities

In addition to relocating communities to a foreign natural

environment, the resettlement process incited by the buffer

zone has also resulted in unfavorable social conditions. For

example, at the Dickwella resettlement camp in the Matara

district of southern Sri Lanka more than 1000 people of different

social, economic and cultural backgrounds were brought to live

together. This is a drastic change from the small traditional

villages of a few hundred residents where people lived before

the tsunami. A sense of community is difficult to attain in large

resettlement camps with non-traditional groupings of socio-

economic and cultural classes. Thus, community networks,

which are crucial for fostering adaptation and learning from a

disaster (Adger et al., 2005; Miller, 2005) may have been severely

disrupted. A failure to address long-term needs such as social

and cultural issues when selecting resettlement camp locations

for coastal communities has potentially made it difficult for

people to cope with the trauma of the disaster and may increase

vulnerability to social conflicts.

4.4. Environmental impacts

The buffer zone policy had clear impacts on human commu-

nities, however, its impact on the environment has been less

straight forward. Although the policy was designed as a

preventative measure against future tsunamis, it could have

positive impacts on the environment by reducing human

pressure on coastal resources. However, resource pressures

were being displaced alongside the relocation of coastal

communities and, thus, were threatening inland ecosystems.

e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 9 ( 2 0 0 6 ) 6 0 7 – 6 1 3610

The protection of the coastal environment is critical

since coastal natural resources are fundamental compo-

nents to livelihoods and human security as a physical

protection from the tsunami, storms and erosion. For

example, communities located inland of reefs degraded

from years of coral mining suffered higher damage and loss

of life than communities located a short distance away on

the same coastline, but sited inland of intact coral reefs

(Fernando and McCulley, 2005). Similarly, sand dunes played

a critical role in saving people’s lives. The Yala Safari Game

Lodge, a beachside hotel where dunes had been removed to

create an unobstructed ocean view, was completely deci-

mated with high mortality rates (Liu et al., 2005, authors’

observations). A few hundred meters away at the Yala

Village hotel, located on the same stretch of beach but

protected by an extensive natural sand dune system, little

damage was recorded. Although the reduction of homes in

the buffer zone would likely relax pressure on coastal

resources, the vacancy created by the displacement of local

populations is, in many places, being filled by expanding

hotels, which as the Yala example demonstrates, can have a

significant impact on the natural environment (Rice, 2005).

Furthermore, the tremendous construction needs and land

requirements for relocation sites have presented an array of

additional environmental threats for both coastal and

inland ecosystems (IUCN, 2005b). The materials required

to build more than 90,000 homes may degrade natural

systems through intensified pressure and exploitation of

sand dunes, coral reefs and forests for rebuilding materials

(such as sand for cement, coral for limestone and trees for

timber) (IUCN, 2005b). The location of some resettlement

sites in or near ecologically sensitive areas, such as

wetlands, or located near national parks also threatens

environmental conservation in these places (IUCN, 2005c).

For example, mangroves have been cleared for resettlement

sites (IUCN, 2005b), despite their demonstrated importance

as a physical buffer to the tsunami throughout South East

Asia (Dahdouh-Guebas et al., 2005). Such events have

supported post-tsunami fears that many policies on land

use and deforestation would be ignored due to urgent

pressures to rebuild (IUCN, 2005a,b,d). Such pressures and

land-use violations could result in a net negative impact for

Sri Lanka’s natural environment. Terrestrial and coastal

environmental degradation and conservation should be

considered in concert (Stoms et al., 2005), particularly, in an

island system such as Sri Lanka. Although a coastal buffer

zone is one way to protect coastal ecosystems, often it is not

feasible to exclude people from the lands they have

inhabited for many years without significant social and

environmental repercussions, especially in places like Sri

Lanka where land is limited. In such cases, natural resource

management plans that involve local people and support

programs that address the root causes of coastal environ-

mental degradation, such as poverty, livelihood practices

and education, may offer more sustainable protection of

these important ecosystems and their functions in the long-

term. Policies that aim to balance sustainable human use of

coastal natural resources and human habitation in the

foreshore area may introduce fewer social and environ-

mental problems than quick fix measures.

5. A vulnerability framework to guide post- disaster policy

The hasty application of post-disaster policies with long-term

repercussions may only amplify socio-economic inequalities

and compromise livelihoods, community structure and

complicate environmental protection, as the Sri Lankan

example has demonstrated. Instead, it is crucial that cautious

analysis be given to developing an adaptive plan that aims to

reduce long-term vulnerability to future hazards by consider-

ing the many social, physical, environmental, economic and

political components that interact to influence vulnerability

(Turner et al., 2003). Turner et al. (2003) outlined a framework

for understanding how the components of vulnerability

interact and influence each other, which permits identifica-

tion of where effective actions can be taken to reduce overall

vulnerability. A variety of researchers have conceptualized the

components of vulnerability as exposure, resistance and

resilience (Pelling, 2003) or exposure, coping capacity and

recovery potential (Bohle et al., 1984). In their framework,

Turner et al. (2003) describe and elucidate the interacting

components of vulnerability as exposure, sensitivity and

resilience (coping/response, impact/response, adjustment/

adaptation response). Here, we apply this framework to the

coastal human–environment system in Sri Lanka to broadly

illustrate how the buffer zone policy has influenced human

vulnerability and to identify system components that could be

influenced to more effectively reduce vulnerability (Fig. 2).

Such a framework may be applied and adapted to other post-

disaster situations to help guide recovery policies.

Within this framework, the ‘‘Adjustment and Adaptation/

Response’’ to a hazard plays a critical role in affecting

vulnerability. An adjustment refers to a purposeful or targeted

action made over a short-period of time for reducing the

effects of a hazard. An adaptation, either biological or cultural,

refers to a response that typically occurs over a longer period

of time and is often not the result of a deliberate decision by an

individual or group (Burton et al., 1978; Mileti, 1999). When the

vulnerability framework is applied to the Sri Lanka case, it is

apparent that the buffer zone policy was an ‘‘adjustment’’ that

focused on swiftly reducing exposure. Exposure is an external

dimension of vulnerability (Füssel and Klein, 2006) that is

typically a product of physical location and the characteristics

of the surrounding built and natural environment (Pelling,

2003). In the proposed framework (Fig. 2), an adjustment or

adaptation designed to reduce vulnerability of affected

populations should ideally influence the system’s sensitivity,

an internal component of vulnerability (Füssel and Klein,

2006). The sensitivity component then interacts with the

exposure component of the system (Fig. 2). By focusing

disproportionately on exposure and not addressing the factors

contributing to sensitivity, such as socio-economic disparities,

poverty, land tenure and lack of economic diversification of

poor communities, the buffer zone policy displaced and

exacerbated many of the core problems that made people

vulnerable to the tsunami at impact and in recovery.

Furthermore, relocating people out of the coastal zone (against

their will) does not promote a long-term process of adaptation.

Attempts to reduce exposure through the implementation

of the buffer zone policy have been highly problematic due to

e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 9 ( 2 0 0 6 ) 6 0 7 – 6 1 3 611

Fig. 2 – The adoption of the Turner et al. (2003) vulnerability framework for the tsunami affected areas of Sri Lanka. Solid

lines represent the interactions between components of vulnerability, as proposed by Turner et al. (2003). Dashed lines

represent a deviation from these interactions in post-tsunami Sri Lanka as a result of the buffer zone policy. Although,

these boxes are not exhaustive in their list of factors that comprise each component of vulnerability, they represent many

of the dominant issues of concern for the most vulnerable populations in the tsunami affected areas of Sri Lanka.

cultural, social, economic and environmental limitations.

Often individuals or social groups live in areas where they

are exposed to hazard risk because there are few other viable

options and the threat of a potential hazard, such as a

tsunami, is less of a risk than the immediate threats of hunger

and poverty (Maskrey, 1989). Thus, people are unlikely to

change their living patterns to reduce their exposure to a

natural hazard if it increases their sensitivity to more pressing,

frequent threats (Degg and Chester, 2005). Such rationale may

explain why many people in the tsunami affected fishing

communities of Sri Lanka do not want to move from the

coastal zone where their livelihoods are based. More sustain-

able exposure mitigation measures in Sri Lanka could include

policies directed towards heightened conservation and

restoration of coastal resources, such as sand dunes, coral

reefs and mangroves, which acted as effective protective

features against the wave(s) and also reduce erosion and

flooding due to monsoons and storm surges. Protection and

management of these resources to reduce exposure may also

act to decrease sensitivity indirectly by protecting a vital

source of food for local people and income for fishermen. Such

policies would require the participation and support of local

communities. Increased technical and logistical assistance for

livelihood alternatives other than destructive income gen-

erating activities, such as illegal coral mining, sand mining

and mangrove cutting, could be a way to enlist local

participation and promote sustainable use practices. These

policies should be developed through community consulta-

tions to determine livelihood alternatives that are preferable

to destructive practices and to identify the incentives

necessary to make more sustainable practices viable within

the local context.

An effective ‘‘Adjustment and Adaptation/Response’’

strategy should directly address the factors that influence

sensitivity to disasters. Such measures could include pro-

grams that offer livelihood support through technical assis-

tance, increase opportunities for low socio-economic groups

to access financial resources, such as micro-finance institu-

tions and insurance measures, and help provide secure access

to land and natural resources (Blaikie et al., 1994). For example,

in Sri Lanka, support for fisherman could include the

education and financing needed to diversify fishing techni-

ques and to form co-operatives, which in times of stress could

provide a more diverse and, thus, potentially, more resilient

social and financial network. Policies directed towards the

sensitivity component of vulnerability may also support

overall development goals and well-being in coastal Sri Lanka.

6. Conclusions

Reactive policies are not uncommon and are understandable

in the context of the urgent policy needs in post-disaster

situations. Relief and short-term recovery efforts should be

e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 9 ( 2 0 0 6 ) 6 0 7 – 6 1 3612

urgent and rapid; however, redevelopment policies should be

cautiously developed upon comprehensive, site-based assess-

ments of risk and vulnerability alongside continual consulta-

tions with all stakeholders. Short-term recovery efforts must

aim to minimize the time needed for people to recover a safe

shelter and livelihood security. During, this ‘‘transitional’’

phase it is critical that communities are consistently sup-

ported, consulted and informed as longer-term plans are

developed to diminish anxiety and frustration associated with

uncertainty. To accomplish the objective of long-term

strategic planning, multi-year and multi-sector policies need

to be developed to facilitate the sustainable management of

coastal resources, livelihood support, strengthening infra-

structure, urban planning, insurance tools and disaster

preparedness at the national, regional and community level.

In these endeavors, the community must play a major role in

deciding both short-term and long-term strategies. Especially

for the latter, time is needed to plan and communicate

appropriately; hurried policies with long-term implications

should be avoided, despite the temptation to restore perma-

nence as soon as possible. Hastily designed policies imple-

mented shortly after a disaster may have long-term impacts

that are difficult to undo and may increase human vulner-

ability in the long-term.

It is crucial that within both the transitional phase and

longer-term re-development phase, vulnerability reduction

is the ultimate guiding goal. As the discussion herein has

demonstrated, typical quantitative measures of progress,

such as the number of houses built, often hailed as a proof of

recovery and advancement, may not adequately reflect a

reduction in vulnerability. In fact, it may represent the

opposite in some cases. Vulnerability reduction requires a

holistic understanding of the complex interactions between

the physical, environmental and social factors that

contribute to it (Cardona, 2003). Measures that support

environmental protection, maintenance of desired social

structures and livelihoods can be implemented in both the

transitional and long-term recovery phases, so that pre-

disaster weaknesses are not perpetuated or amplified into

the future.

Due to complications resulting from the buffer zone

policy, the government of Sri Lanka is now revising the post-

tsunami coastal regulations and should be commended for

critically rethinking its policies. Although Sri Lanka’s

challenges are far from over, the revision of this policy

represents a second chance to rebuild in a sustainable and

equitable manner. Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Stan and Wilma,

in their paths of destruction, have created similar massive

relief and reconstruction needs for many coastal commu-

nities. These disasters represent opportunities to address the

pre-existent vulnerabilities of affected communities and to

rebuild in a way that seeks to mitigate these problems in the

future. To be successful, however, these processes require a

combination of short-term recovery and long-term planning

that involve negotiating with affected people on a continual

basis, while maintaining distinct objectives between short-

term and long-term goals. As the Sri Lankan experience has

shown, confusion between these objectives can delay the

recovery process and increase vulnerability of affected

populations.

Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge the Earth Institute at Columbia

University and, particularly, John Mutter for making this work

possible and for continued assistance with this research. We

would also like to thank Art Lerner-Lam for his support of this

work. We are very grateful to Ravihansa Chandratilake, Jothy

K. S. Kannu and Sanath Malalgoda for their assistance and

expertise in Sri Lanka.

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Jane Carter Ingram is a post-doctoral fellow at the Earth Institute at Columbia University where she works within the Center for Environmental Research and Conservation. She has worked on sustainable development and human–environment interactions in Kenya, Costa Rica, the Republic of the Seychelles, Madagascar and post-tsunami Sri Lanka. Her primary foci have included ways in which environmental conservation and poverty reduction can be achieved jointly and the application of satellite imagery and ecological data for understanding the impacts of human use of natural resources.

Guillermo Franco is a post-doctoral research scientist at the Department of Civil Engineering & Engineering Mechanics at Columbia University, and the Research Program Manager of the Center for Hazards and Risk Research at the Earth Institute. He has addressed the issues of infrastructure vulnerability, economic losses, and recovery in disaster scenarios and has been involved in the analysis of earthquake, tsunami, and hurricane event impacts in Turkey, Sri Lanka, and New Orleans, respectively.

Cristina Rumbaitis-del Rio is a post-doctoral fellow at the Earth Institute at Columbia University and Lamont Doherty Earth Obser- vatory. She is a landscape ecologist that has worked on natural resource management issues following large-scale disturbances in United States and Sri Lanka. Her research interests involve integrating ecology into multidisciplinary solutions to poverty through sustainable land management and vulnerability reduc- tion.

Bijan Khazai is a post-doctoral fellow at the Earth Institute at Columbia University where he has been working on sustainable reconstruction methods following disasters in Iran, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the US. He obtained his PhD in civil engineering from the University of California, Berkeley, where he has worked on developing GIS-based earthquake risk assessment models.