Graduate level writing

What is Strategy?

by Michael E. Porter

Reprint 96608

Harvard Business Review

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1996

Reprint Number

Harvard Business Review MICHAEL E. PORTER WHAT IS STRATEGY? 96608

STEPHEN S. ROACH THE HOLLOW RING OF THE PRODUCTIVITY REVIVAL 96609

NIRMALYA KUMAR THE POWER OF TRUST IN 96606 MANUFACTURER-RETAILER RELATIONSHIPS

JAMES WALDROOP AND TIMOTHY BUTLER THE EXECUTIVE AS COACH 96611

AMAR BHIDE THE QUESTIONS EVERY ENTREPRENEUR MUST ANSWER 96603

ROB GOFFEE AND GARETH JONES WHAT HOLDS THE MODERN COMPANY TOGETHER? 96605

MICHAEL C. BEERS HBR CASE STUDY THE STRATEGY THAT WOULDN’T TRAVEL 96602

THOMAS TEAL THINKING ABOUT… THE HUMAN SIDE OF MANAGEMENT 96610

ALAN R. ANDREASEN SOCIAL ENTERPRISE PROFITS FOR NONPROFITS: FIND A CORPORATE PARTNER 96601

PERSPECTIVES THE FUTURE OF INTERACTIVE MARKETING 96607

ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER BOOKS IN REVIEW AND BARRY J. NALEBUFF INSIDE INTEL 96604

For almost two decades, managers have been learning to play by a new set of rules. Companies must be flexible to respond rapidly to compet- itive and market changes. They must benchmark continuously to achieve best prac- tice. They must outsource aggres- sively to gain ef- ficiencies. And they must nur - ture a few core competencies in the race to stay ahead of rivals.

Positioning – once the heart of strategy – is reject- ed as too static for today’s dynamic markets and changing technologies. According to the new dog- ma, rivals can quickly copy any market position, and competitive advantage is, at best, temporary.

But those beliefs are dangerous half-truths, and they are leading more and more companies down the path of mutually destructive competition. True, some barriers to competition are falling as regulation eases and markets become global. True, companies have properly invested energy in becom- ing leaner and more nimble. In many industries, however, what some call hypercompetition is a self-inflicted wound, not the inevitable outcome of a changing paradigm of competition.

The root of the problem is the failure to distin- guish between operational effectiveness and strat-

egy. The quest for productivity, quality, and speed has spawned a remarkable number of management tools and techniques: total quality management, benchmarking, time-based competition, outsourc-

ing, partnering, r e e n g i n e e r i n g , change manage- ment. Although the resulting op- erational improve- ments have often

been dramatic, many companies have been frustrated by their inability to

translate those gains into sustainable profitability. And bit by bit, almost imperceptibly, management tools have taken the place of strategy. As manag- ers push to improve on all fronts, they move farther away from viable competitive positions.

Operational Effectiveness: Necessary but Not Sufficient

Operational effectiveness and strategy are both essential to superior performance, which, after all, is the primary goal of any enterprise. But they work in very different ways.

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 Copyright © 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved.

HBR NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1996

I. Operational Effectiveness Is Not Strategy

What Is Strategy?

Michael E. Porter is the C. Roland Christensen Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School in Boston, Massachusetts.

by Michael E. Porter

A company can outperform rivals only if it can establish a difference that it can preserve. It must deliver greater value to customers or create compa- rable value at a lower cost, or do both. The arith- metic of superior profitability then follows: deliver- ing greater value allows a company to charge higher average unit prices; greater efficiency results in lower average unit costs.

Ultimately, all differences between companies in cost or price derive from the hundreds of activities required to create, produce, sell, and deliver their products or services, such as calling on customers, assembling final products, and training employees. Cost is generated by performing activities, and cost advantage arises from performing particular activi- ties more efficiently than competitors. Similarly, differentiation arises from both the choice of activi- ties and how they are performed. Activities, then, are the basic units of competitive advantage. Over- all advantage or disadvantage results from all a company’s activities, not only a few.1

Operational effectiveness (OE) means performing similar activities better than rivals perform them. Operational effectiveness includes but is not limit- ed to efficiency. It refers to any number of practices that allow a company to better utilize its inputs by, for example, reducing defects in products or devel- oping better products faster. In contrast, strategic positioning means performing different activities from rivals’ or performing similar activities in dif- ferent ways.

Differences in operational effectiveness among companies are pervasive. Some companies are able

to get more out of their inputs than others because they eliminate wasted effort, employ more ad- vanced technology, motivate employees better, or have greater insight into managing particular activ- ities or sets of activities. Such differences in opera-

tional effectiveness are an important source of dif- ferences in profitability among competitors be- cause they directly affect relative cost positions and levels of differentiation.

Differences in operational effectiveness were at the heart of the Japanese challenge to Western com- panies in the 1980s. The Japanese were so far ahead of rivals in operational effectiveness that they could offer lower cost and superior quality at the same time. It is worth dwelling on this point, be- cause so much recent thinking about competition depends on it. Imagine for a moment a productivity

frontier that constitutes the sum of all existing best practices at any giv- en time. Think of it as the maximum value that a company delivering a particular product or service can cre- ate at a given cost, using the best available technologies, skills, man- agement techniques, and purchased inputs. The productivity frontier can

apply to individual activities, to groups of linked activities such as order processing and manufactur- ing, and to an entire company’s activities. When a company improves its operational effectiveness, it moves toward the frontier. Doing so may require capital investment, different personnel, or simply new ways of managing.

The productivity frontier is constantly shifting outward as new technologies and management ap- proaches are developed and as new inputs become available. Laptop computers, mobile communica- tions, the Internet, and software such as Lotus Notes, for example, have redefined the productivity

62 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996

Operational Effectiveness Versus Strategic Positioning

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Relative cost position

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high Productivity Frontier (state of best practice)

A company can outperform rivals only if it can establish a difference that it can preserve.

This article has benefited greatly from the assistance of many individuals and companies. The author gives special thanks to Jan Rivkin, the coauthor of a related paper. Substantial research contributions have been made by Nicolaj Siggelkow, Dawn Sylvester, and Lucia Marshall. Tarun Khanna, Roger Martin, and Anita Mc- Gahan have provided especially extensive comments.

Japanese Companies Rarely Have Strategies

frontier for sales-force operations and created rich possibilities for linking sales with such activities as order processing and after-sales support. Similarly, lean production, which involves a family of activi- ties, has allowed substantial improvements in manufacturing productivity and asset utilization.

For at least the past decade, managers have been preoccupied with improving operational effective- ness. Through programs such as TQM, time-based competition, and benchmarking, they have changed how they perform activities in order to eliminate inefficiencies, improve customer satisfaction, and achieve best practice. Hoping to keep up with shifts in the productivity frontier, managers have embraced continuous improvement, empowerment, change management, and the so-called learning organization. The popularity of outsourcing and the virtual corporation reflect the growing recogni- tion that it is difficult to perform all activities as productively as specialists.

As companies move to the frontier, they can often improve on multiple dimensions of performance at the same time. For example, manufacturers that adopted the Japanese practice of rapid changeovers in the 1980s were able to lower cost and improve differentiation simultaneously. What were once be- lieved to be real trade-offs – between defects and costs, for example – turned out to be illusions cre- ated by poor operational effectiveness. Managers have learned to reject such false trade-offs.

Constant improvement in operational effective- ness is necessary to achieve superior profitability. However, it is not usually sufficient. Few compa- nies have competed successfully on the basis of op- erational effectiveness over an extended period, and staying ahead of rivals gets harder every day. The most obvious reason for that is the rapid diffusion of best practices. Competitors can quickly imitate management techniques, new technologies, input improvements, and superior ways of meeting cus- tomers’ needs. The most generic solutions – those that can be used in multiple settings – diffuse the fastest. Witness the proliferation of OE techniques accelerated by support from consultants.

OE competition shifts the productivity frontier outward, effectively raising the bar for everyone. But although such competition produces absolute improvement in operational effectiveness, it leads to relative improvement for no one. Consider the $5 billion-plus U.S. commercial-printing industry. The major players – R.R. Donnelley & Sons Com- pany, Quebecor, World Color Press, and Big Flower Press – are competing head to head, serving all types of customers, offering the same array of printing technologies (gravure and web offset), investing heavily in the same new equipment, running their presses faster, and reducing crew sizes. But the re- sulting major productivity gains are being captured by customers and equipment suppliers, not re- tained in superior profitability. Even industry-

WHAT IS STRATEGY?

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 63

The Japanese triggered a global revolution in opera- tional effectiveness in the 1970s and 1980s, pioneering practices such as total quality management and con- tinuous improvement. As a result, Japanese manufac- turers enjoyed substantial cost and quality advantages for many years.

But Japanese companies rarely developed distinct strategic positions of the kind discussed in this article. Those that did – Sony, Canon, and Sega, for example – were the exception rather than the rule. Most Japanese companies imitate and emulate one another. All rivals offer most if not all product varieties, features, and ser- vices; they employ all channels and match one anoth- ers’ plant configurations.

The dangers of Japanese-style competition are now becoming easier to recognize. In the 1980s, with rivals operating far from the productivity frontier, it seemed possible to win on both cost and quality indefinitely. Japanese companies were all able to grow in an ex- panding domestic economy and by penetrating global

markets. They appeared unstoppable. But as the gap in operational effectiveness narrows, Japanese compa- nies are increasingly caught in a trap of their own making. If they are to escape the mutually destructive battles now ravaging their performance, Japanese companies will have to learn strategy.

To do so, they may have to overcome strong cultural barriers. Japan is notoriously consensus oriented, and companies have a strong tendency to mediate differ- ences among individuals rather than accentuate them. Strategy, on the other hand, requires hard choices. The Japanese also have a deeply ingrained service tradition that predisposes them to go to great lengths to satisfy any need a customer expresses. Companies that com- pete in that way end up blurring their distinct posi- tioning, becoming all things to all customers.

This discussion of Japan is drawn from the author’s research with Hirotaka Takeuchi, with help from Mariko Sakakibara.

leader Donnelley’s profit margin, consistently higher than 7% in the 1980s, fell to less than 4.6% in 1995. This pattern is playing itself out in indus- try after industry. Even the Japanese, pioneers of the new competition, suffer from persistently low profits. (See the insert “Japanese Companies Rarely Have Strategies.”)

The second reason that improved operational effectiveness is insufficient – competitive conver- gence – is more subtle and insidious. The more benchmarking companies do, the more they look alike. The more that rivals outsource activities to efficient third parties, often the same ones, the more generic those activities become. As rivals im- itate one another’s improvements in quality, cycle times, or supplier partnerships, strategies converge and competition becomes a series of races down identical paths that no one can win. Competition based on operational effectiveness alone is mutu-

ally destructive, leading to wars of attrition that can be arrested only by limiting competition.

The recent wave of industry consolidation through mergers makes sense in the context of OE competition. Driven by performance pressures but lacking strategic vision, company after company has had no better idea than to buy up its rivals. The competitors left standing are often those that out- lasted others, not companies with real advantage.

After a decade of impressive gains in operational effectiveness, many companies are facing dimin- ishing returns. Continuous improvement has been etched on managers’ brains. But its tools unwitting- ly draw companies toward imitation and homo- geneity. Gradually, managers have let operational effectiveness supplant strategy. The result is zero- sum competition, static or declining prices, and pressures on costs that compromise companies’ ability to invest in the business for the long term.

WHAT IS STRATEGY?

64 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996

II. Strategy Rests on Unique Activities Competitive strategy is about being different. It

means deliberately choosing a different set of activ- ities to deliver a unique mix of value.

Southwest Airlines Company, for example, offers short-haul, low-cost, point-to-point service be- tween midsize cities and secondary airports in large cities. Southwest avoids large airports and does not fly great distances. Its customers include busi- ness travelers, families, and students. Southwest’s frequent departures and low fares attract price- sensitive customers who otherwise would travel by bus or car, and convenience-oriented travelers who would choose a full-service airline on other routes.

Most managers describe strategic positioning in terms of their customers: “Southwest Airlines serves price- and convenience-sensitive travelers,”

for example. But the essence of strategy is in the ac- tivities – choosing to perform activities differently or to perform different activities than rivals. Other- wise, a strategy is nothing more than a marketing slogan that will not withstand competition.

A full-service airline is configured to get passen- gers from almost any point A to any point B. To reach a large number of destinations and serve pas- sengers with connecting flights, full-service air- lines employ a hub-and-spoke system centered on major airports. To attract passengers who desire more comfort, they offer first-class or business- class service. To accommodate passengers who must change planes, they coordinate schedules and check and transfer baggage. Because some passen- gers will be traveling for many hours, full-service airlines serve meals.

Southwest, in contrast, tailors all its activities to deliver low-cost, convenient service on its par- ticular type of route. Through fast turnarounds at the gate of only 15 minutes, Southwest is able

to keep planes flying longer hours than rivals and provide frequent de- partures with fewer aircraft. South- west does not offer meals, assigned seats, interline baggage checking, or premium classes of service. Auto- mated ticketing at the gate encour- ages customers to bypass travel agents, allowing Southwest to avoid

their commissions. A standardized fleet of 737 air- craft boosts the efficiency of maintenance.

Southwest has staked out a unique and valuable strategic position based on a tailored set of activi- ties. On the routes served by Southwest, a full-

The essence of strategy is choosing to perform activities differently than rivals do.

Finding New Positions: The Entrepreneurial Edge

service airline could never be as convenient or as low cost.

Ikea, the global furniture retailer based in Swe- den, also has a clear strategic positioning. Ikea tar- gets young furniture buyers who want style at low cost. What turns this marketing concept into a stra- tegic positioning is the tailored set of activities that make it work. Like Southwest, Ikea has chosen to perform activities differently from its rivals.

Consider the typical furniture store. Showrooms display samples of the merchandise. One area might contain 25 sofas; another will display five dining tables. But those items represent only a frac- tion of the choices available to customers. Dozens of books displaying fabric swatches or wood sam- ples or alternate styles offer customers thousands of product varieties to choose from. Salespeople of- ten escort customers through the store, answering questions and helping them navigate this maze of choices. Once a customer makes a selection, the order is relayed to a third-party manufacturer. With luck, the furniture will be delivered to the cus- tomer’s home within six to eight weeks. This is a value chain that maximizes customization and service but does so at high cost.

In contrast, Ikea serves customers who are happy to trade off service for cost. Instead of having a sales associate trail customers around the store,

Ikea uses a self-service model based on clear, in- store displays. Rather than rely solely on third- party manufacturers, Ikea designs its own low-cost, modular, ready-to-assemble furniture to fit its posi- tioning. In huge stores, Ikea displays every product it sells in room-like settings, so customers don’t need a decorator to help them imagine how to put the pieces together. Adjacent to the furnished showrooms is a warehouse section with the prod- ucts in boxes on pallets. Customers are expected to do their own pickup and delivery, and Ikea will even sell you a roof rack for your car that you can return for a refund on your next visit.

Although much of its low-cost position comes from having customers “do it themselves,” Ikea of- fers a number of extra services that its competitors do not. In-store child care is one. Extended hours are another. Those services are uniquely aligned with the needs of its customers, who are young, not wealthy, likely to have children (but no nanny), and, because they work for a living, have a need to shop at odd hours.

The Origins of Strategic Positions Strategic positions emerge from three distinct

sources, which are not mutually exclusive and often overlap. First, positioning can be based on

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 65

Strategic competition can be thought of as the process of perceiving new positions that woo cus- tomers from established positions or draw new cus- tomers into the market. For example, superstores of- fering depth of merchandise in a single product category take market share from broad-line depart- ment stores offering a more limited selection in many categories. Mail-order catalogs pick off customers who crave convenience. In principle, incumbents and en- trepreneurs face the same challenges in finding new strategic positions. In practice, new entrants often have the edge.

Strategic positionings are often not obvious, and finding them requires creativity and insight. New en- trants often discover unique positions that have been available but simply overlooked by established com- petitors. Ikea, for example, recognized a customer group that had been ignored or served poorly. Circuit City Stores’ entry into used cars, CarMax, is based on a new way of performing activities – extensive refur- bishing of cars, product guarantees, no-haggle pricing,

sophisticated use of in-house customer financing – that has long been open to incumbents.

New entrants can prosper by occupying a position that a competitor once held but has ceded through years of imitation and straddling. And entrants com- ing from other industries can create new positions be- cause of distinctive activities drawn from their other businesses. CarMax borrows heavily from Circuit City’s expertise in inventory management, credit, and other activities in consumer electronics retailing.

Most commonly, however, new positions open up because of change. New customer groups or purchase occasions arise; new needs emerge as societies evolve; new distribution channels appear; new technologies are developed; new machinery or information systems become available. When such changes happen, new entrants, unencumbered by a long history in the in- dustry, can often more easily perceive the potential for a new way of competing. Unlike incumbents, new- comers can be more flexible because they face no trade-offs with their existing activities.

producing a subset of an industry’s products or ser- vices. I call this variety-based positioning because it is based on the choice of product or service vari- eties rather than customer segments. Variety-based positioning makes economic sense when a com- pany can best produce particular products or ser- vices using distinctive sets of activities.

Jiffy Lube International, for instance, specializes in automotive lubricants and does not offer other

car repair or maintenance services. Its value chain produces faster service at a lower cost than broader line repair shops, a combination so attractive that many customers subdivide their purchases, buying oil changes from the focused competitor, Jiffy Lube, and going to rivals for other services.

The Vanguard Group, a leader in the mutual fund industry, is another example of variety-based posi- tioning. Vanguard provides an array of common stock, bond, and money market funds that offer pre- dictable performance and rock-bottom expenses. The company’s investment approach deliberately sacrifices the possibility of extraordinary perfor- mance in any one year for good relative perfor- mance in every year. Vanguard is known, for exam- ple, for its index funds. It avoids making bets on interest rates and steers clear of narrow stock groups. Fund managers keep trading levels low, which holds expenses down; in addition, the com- pany discourages customers from rapid buying and selling because doing so drives up costs and can force a fund manager to trade in order to deploy new capital and raise cash for redemptions. Vanguard also takes a consistent low-cost approach to manag- ing distribution, customer service, and marketing. Many investors include one or more Vanguard funds in their portfolio, while buying aggressively managed or specialized funds from competitors.

The people who use Vanguard or Jiffy Lube are re- sponding to a superior value chain for a particular type of service. A variety-based positioning can serve a wide array of customers, but for most it will meet only a subset of their needs.

A second basis for positioning is that of serving most or all the needs of a particular group of cus-

tomers. I call this needs-based positioning, which comes closer to traditional thinking about targeting a segment of customers. It arises when there are groups of customers with differing needs, and when a tailored set of activities can serve those needs best. Some groups of customers are more price sen- sitive than others, demand different product fea- tures, and need varying amounts of information, support, and services. Ikea’s customers are a good

example of such a group. Ikea seeks to meet all the home fur nishing needs of its target customers, not just a subset of them.

A variant of needs-based position- ing arises when the same customer has different needs on different occa- sions or for different types of transac- tions. The same person, for example, may have different needs when trav- eling on business than when travel-

ing for pleasure with the family. Buyers of cans – beverage companies, for example – will likely have different needs from their primary supplier than from their secondary source.

It is intuitive for most managers to conceive of their business in terms of the customers’ needs they are meeting. But a critical element of needs- based positioning is not at all intuitive and is often overlooked. Differences in needs will not translate into meaningful positions unless the best set of activities to satisfy them also differs. If that were not the case, every competitor could meet those same needs, and there would be nothing unique or valuable about the positioning.

In private banking, for example, Bessemer Trust Company targets families with a minimum of $5 million in investable assets who want capital preservation combined with wealth accumulation. By assigning one sophisticated account officer for every 14 families, Bessemer has configured its ac- tivities for personalized service. Meetings, for ex- ample, are more likely to be held at a client’s ranch or yacht than in the office. Bessemer offers a wide array of customized services, including investment management and estate administration, oversight of oil and gas investments, and accounting for race- horses and aircraft. Loans, a staple of most private banks, are rarely needed by Bessemer’s clients and make up a tiny fraction of its client balances and income. Despite the most generous compensation of account officers and the highest personnel cost as a percentage of operating expenses, Bessemer’s differentiation with its target families produces a return on equity estimated to be the highest of any private banking competitor.

WHAT IS STRATEGY?

66 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996

Strategic positions can be based on customers’ needs, customers’ accessibility, or the variety of a company’s products or services.

Citibank’s private bank, on the other hand, serves clients with minimum assets of about $250,000 who, in contrast to Bessemer’s clients, want convenient access to loans – from jumbo mort- gages to deal financing. Citibank’s account man- agers are primarily lenders. When clients need oth- er services, their account manager refers them to other Citibank specialists, each of whom handles prepackaged products. Citibank’s system is less customized than Bessemer’s and allows it to have a lower manager-to-client ratio of 1:125. Biannual of- fice meetings are offered only for the largest clients. Both Bessemer and Citibank have tailored their ac- tivities to meet the needs of a different group of pri- vate banking customers. The same value chain can- not profitably meet the needs of both groups.

The third basis for positioning is that of seg- menting customers who are accessible in different ways. Although their needs are similar to those of other customers, the best configuration of activi- ties to reach them is different. I call this access- based positioning. Access can be a function of cus- tomer geography or customer scale – or of anything that requires a different set of activities to reach customers in the best way.

Segmenting by access is less common and less well understood than the other two bases. Carmike Cinemas, for example, operates movie theaters ex- clusively in cities and towns with populations un- der 200,000. How does Carmike make money in markets that are not only small but also won’t sup- port big-city ticket prices? It does so through a set of activities that result in a lean cost structure. Carmike’s small-town customers can be served through standardized, low-cost theater complexes requiring fewer screens and less sophisticated pro-

jection technology than big-city theaters. The com- pany’s proprietary information system and manage- ment process eliminate the need for local adminis- trative staff beyond a single theater manager. Carmike also reaps advantages from centralized purchasing, lower rent and payroll costs (because of its locations), and rock-bottom corporate overhead of 2% (the industry average is 5%). Operating in small communities also allows Carmike to prac- tice a highly personal form of marketing in which the theater manager knows patrons and promotes attendance through personal contacts. By being the dominant if not the only theater in its markets – the main competition is often the high school football team – Carmike is also able to get its pick of films and negotiate better terms with distributors.

Rural versus urban-based customers are one ex- ample of access driving differences in activities. Serving small rather than large customers or dense- ly rather than sparsely situated customers are other examples in which the best way to configure mar- keting, order processing, logistics, and after-sale service activities to meet the similar needs of dis- tinct groups will often differ.

Positioning is not only about carving out a niche. A position emerging from any of the sources can be broad or narrow. A focused competitor, such as Ikea, targets the special needs of a subset of cus- tomers and designs its activities accordingly. Fo- cused competitors thrive on groups of customers who are overserved (and hence overpriced) by more broadly targeted competitors, or underserved (and hence underpriced). A broadly targeted competitor – for example, Vanguard or Delta Air Lines – serves a wide array of customers, performing a set of ac- tivities designed to meet their common needs. It

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 67

The Connection with Generic Strategies

In Competitive Strategy (The Free Press, 1985), I introduced the concept of generic strategies – cost leadership, differentiation, and focus – to repre- sent the alternative strategic positions in an industry. The generic strategies remain use- ful to characterize strategic positions at the simplest and broadest level. Vanguard, for in- stance, is an example of a cost leadership strat- egy, whereas Ikea, with its narrow customer group, is an example of cost-based focus. Neu- trogena is a focused differentiator. The bases for positioning – varieties, needs, and access – carry the understanding of those generic strategies to a

greater level of specificity. Ikea and Southwest are both cost-based focusers, for example, but Ikea’s focus

is based on the needs of a customer group, and Southwest’s is based on offering a particular service variety.

The generic strategies framework intro- duced the need to choose in order to avoid be- coming caught between what I then described as the inherent contradictions of different strategies. Trade-offs between the activities of incompatible positions explain those con-

tradictions. Witness Continental Lite, which tried and failed to compete in two ways at once.

ignores or meets only partially the more idiosyn- cratic needs of particular customer groups.

Whatever the basis – variety, needs, access, or some combination of the three – positioning re- quires a tailored set of activities because it is al- ways a function of differences on the supply side; that is, of differences in activities. However, posi- tioning is not always a function of differences on the demand, or customer, side. Variety and access positionings, in particular, do not rely on any cus- tomer differences. In practice, however, variety or access differences often accompany needs differ- ences. The tastes – that is, the needs – of Carmike’s small-town customers, for instance, run more to- ward comedies, Westerns, action films, and family

entertainment. Carmike does not run any films rated NC-17.

Having defined positioning, we can now begin to answer the question, “What is strategy?” Strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position, in- volving a different set of activities. If there were only one ideal position, there would be no need for strategy. Companies would face a simple imper- ative – win the race to discover and preempt it. The essence of strategic positioning is to choose ac- tivities that are different from rivals’. If the same set of activities were best to produce all varieties, meet all needs, and access all customers, companies could easily shift among them and operational ef- fectiveness would determine performance.

WHAT IS STRATEGY?

68 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996

III. A Sustainable Strategic Position Requires Trade-offs Choosing a unique position, however, is not

enough to guarantee a sustainable advantage. A valuable position will attract imitation by incum- bents, who are likely to copy it in one of two ways.

First, a competitor can reposition itself to match the superior performer. J.C. Penney, for instance, has been repositioning itself from a Sears clone to a more upscale, fashion-oriented, soft-goods retailer. A second and far more common type of imitation is straddling. The straddler seeks to match the bene- fits of a successful position while maintaining its existing position. It grafts new features, services, or technologies onto the activities it already performs.

For those who argue that competitors can copy any market position, the airline industry is a per- fect test case. It would seem that nearly any com- petitor could imitate any other airline’s activities. Any airline can buy the same planes, lease the gates, and match the menus and ticketing and bag- gage handling services offered by other airlines.

Continental Airlines saw how well Southwest was doing and decided to straddle. While main- taining its position as a full-service airline, Conti- nental also set out to match Southwest on a num- ber of point-to-point routes. The airline dubbed the new service Continental Lite. It eliminated meals and first-class service, increased departure frequency, lowered fares, and shortened turnaround time at the gate. Because Continental remained a full-service airline on other routes, it continued to use travel agents and its mixed fleet of planes and to provide baggage checking and seat assignments.

But a strategic position is not sustainable unless there are trade-offs with other positions. Trade-offs

occur when activities are incompatible. Simply put, a trade-off means that more of one thing neces- sitates less of another. An airline can choose to serve meals – adding cost and slowing turnaround time at the gate – or it can choose not to, but it can- not do both without bearing major inefficiencies.

Trade-offs create the need for choice and protect against repositioners and straddlers. Consider Neu- trogena soap. Neutrogena Corporation’s variety- based positioning is built on a “kind to the skin,” residue-free soap formulated for pH balance. With a large detail force calling on dermatologists, Neu- trogena’s marketing strategy looks more like a drug company’s than a soap maker’s. It advertises in medical journals, sends direct mail to doctors, at- tends medical conferences, and performs research at its own Skincare Institute. To reinforce its posi- tioning, Neutrogena originally focused its distribu- tion on drugstores and avoided price promotions. Neutrogena uses a slow, more expensive manufac- turing process to mold its fragile soap.

In choosing this position, Neutrogena said no to the deodorants and skin softeners that many cus- tomers desire in their soap. It gave up the large- volume potential of selling through supermarkets and using price promotions. It sacrificed manufac- turing efficiencies to achieve the soap’s desired at- tributes. In its original positioning, Neutrogena made a whole raft of trade-offs like those, trade-offs that protected the company from imitators.

Trade-offs arise for three reasons. The first is in- consistencies in image or reputation. A company known for delivering one kind of value may lack credibility and confuse customers – or even under-

mine its reputation – if it delivers another kind of value or attempts to deliver two inconsistent things at the same time. For example, Ivory soap, with its position as a basic, inexpensive everyday soap would have a hard time reshaping its image to match Neutrogena’s premium “medical” reputa- tion. Efforts to create a new image typically cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars in a major industry – a powerful barrier to imitation.

Second, and more important, trade-offs arise from activities themselves. Different positions (with their tailored activities) require different product configurations, different equipment, differ- ent employee behavior, different skills, and dif- ferent management systems. Many trade-offs re- flect inflexibilities in machinery, people, or systems. The more Ikea has configured its activities to lower costs by having its customers do their own assembly and delivery, the less able it is to satisfy customers who require higher levels of service.

However, trade-offs can be even more basic. In general, value is destroyed if an activity is overde- signed or underdesigned for its use. For example, even if a given salesperson were capable of provid- ing a high level of assistance to one customer and none to another, the salesperson’s talent (and some of his or her cost) would be wasted on the second customer. Moreover, productivity can improve when variation of an activity is limited. By provid- ing a high level of assistance all the time, the sales- person and the entire sales activity can often achieve efficiencies of learning and scale.

Finally, trade-offs arise from limits on internal coordination and control. By clearly choosing to compete in one way and not another, senior management makes organiza- tional priorities clear. Companies that try to be all things to all cus- tomers, in contrast, risk confusion in the trenches as employees attempt to make day-to-day operating deci- sions without a clear framework.

Positioning trade-offs are perva- sive in competition and essential to strategy. They create the need for choice and purposefully limit what a company of- fers. They deter straddling or repositioning, because competitors that engage in those approaches under- mine their strategies and degrade the value of their existing activities.

Trade-offs ultimately grounded Continental Lite. The airline lost hundreds of millions of dollars, and the CEO lost his job. Its planes were delayed leav- ing congested hub cities or slowed at the gate by baggage transfers. Late flights and cancellations

generated a thousand complaints a day. Continen- tal Lite could not afford to compete on price and still pay standard travel-agent commissions, but neither could it do without agents for its full- service business. The airline compromised by cut- ting commissions for all Continental flights across the board. Similarly, it could not afford to offer the same frequent-flier benefits to travelers paying the much lower ticket prices for Lite service. It com- promised again by lowering the rewards of Conti- nental’s entire frequent-flier program. The results: angry travel agents and full-service customers.

Continental tried to compete in two ways at once. In trying to be low cost on some routes and full service on others, Continental paid an enor- mous straddling penalty. If there were no trade-offs between the two positions, Continental could have succeeded. But the absence of trade-offs is a danger- ous half-truth that managers must unlearn. Quality is not always free. Southwest’s convenience, one kind of high quality, happens to be consistent with low costs because its frequent departures are facili- tated by a number of low-cost practices – fast gate turnarounds and automated ticketing, for example. However, other dimensions of airline quality – an assigned seat, a meal, or baggage transfer – require costs to provide.

In general, false trade-offs between cost and qual- ity occur primarily when there is redundant or wasted effort, poor control or accuracy, or weak co- ordination. Simultaneous improvement of cost and differentiation is possible only when a company be- gins far behind the productivity frontier or when the frontier shifts outward. At the frontier, where

companies have achieved current best practice, the trade-off between cost and differentiation is very real indeed.

After a decade of enjoying productivity advan- tages, Honda Motor Company and Toyota Motor Corporation recently bumped up against the fron- tier. In 1995, faced with increasing customer resis- tance to higher automobile prices, Honda found that the only way to produce a less-expensive car was to skimp on features. In the United States,

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 69

Trade-offs are essential to strategy. They create the need

for choice and purposefully limit what a company offers.

it replaced the rear disk brakes on the Civic with lower-cost drum brakes and used cheaper fabric for the back seat, hoping customers would not notice. Toyota tried to sell a version of its best-selling Co- rolla in Japan with unpainted bumpers and cheaper seats. In Toyota’s case, customers rebelled, and the company quickly dropped the new model.

For the past decade, as managers have improved operational effectiveness greatly, they have inter- nalized the idea that eliminating trade-offs is a good thing. But if there are no trade-offs companies will

never achieve a sustainable advantage. They will have to run faster and faster just to stay in place.

As we return to the question, What is strategy? we see that trade-offs add a new dimension to the answer. Strategy is making trade-offs in competing. The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do. Without trade-offs, there would be no need for choice and thus no need for strategy. Any good idea could and would be quickly imitated. Again, perfor- mance would once again depend wholly on opera- tional effectiveness.

WHAT IS STRATEGY?

70 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996

IV. Fit Drives Both Competitive Advantage and Sustainability Positioning choices determine not only which

activities a company will perform and how it will configure individual activities but also how activities relate to one another. While operational effectiveness is about achieving excellence in indi- vidual activities, or functions, strategy is about combining activities.

Southwest’s rapid gate turnaround, which allows frequent departures and greater use of aircraft, is essential to its high-convenience, low-cost posi- tioning. But how does Southwest achieve it? Part of the answer lies in the company’s well-paid gate and ground crews, whose productivity in turn- arounds is enhanced by flexible union rules. But the bigger par t of the answer lies in how South- west performs other activities. With no meals, no seat assignment, and no interline baggage trans- fers, Southwest avoids having to perform activities that slow down other airlines. It selects airports and routes to avoid congestion that introduces delays. Southwest’s strict limits on the type and length of routes make standardized aircraft possi- ble: every aircraft Southwest turns is a Boeing 737.

What is Southwest’s core competence? Its key success factors? The correct answer is that every- thing matters. Southwest’s strategy involves a whole system of activities, not a collection of parts. Its competitive advantage comes from the way its activities fit and reinforce one another.

Fit locks out imitators by creating a chain that is as strong as its strongest link. As in most compa- nies with good strategies, Southwest’s activities complement one another in ways that create real economic value. One activity’s cost, for example, is lowered because of the way other activities are per- formed. Similarly, one activity’s value to customers can be enhanced by a company’s other activities. That is the way strategic fit creates competitive advantage and superior profitability.

Types of Fit The importance of fit among functional policies

is one of the oldest ideas in strategy. Gradually, however, it has been supplanted on the manage- ment agenda. Rather than seeing the company as a whole, managers have turned to “core” compe- tencies, “critical” resources, and “key” success fac- tors. In fact, fit is a far more central component of competitive advantage than most realize.

Fit is important because discrete activities often affect one another. A sophisticated sales force, for

example, confers a greater advan- tage when the company’s product embodies premium technology and its marketing approach emphasizes customer assistance and support. A production line with high levels of model variety is more valuable when combined with an inventory and order processing system that

minimizes the need for stocking finished goods, a sales process equipped to explain and encour- age customization, and an advertising theme that stresses the benefits of product variations that meet a customer’s special needs. Such complemen- tarities are pervasive in strategy. Although some

Fit locks out imitators by creating a chain that is as strong as its strongest link.

fit among activities is generic and applies to many companies, the most valuable fit is strategy-spe- cific because it enhances a position’s uniqueness and amplifies trade-offs.2

There are three types of fit, although they are not mutually exclusive. First-order fit is simple consis- tency between each activity (function) and the overall strategy. Vanguard, for example, aligns all activities with its low-cost strategy. It minimizes portfolio turnover and does not need highly com- pensated money managers. The company dis- tributes its funds directly, avoiding commissions to brokers. It also limits advertising, relying instead on public relations and word-of-mouth recommen- dations. Vanguard ties its employees’ bonuses to cost savings.

Consistency ensures that the competitive advan- tages of activities cumulate and do not erode or can- cel themselves out. It makes the strategy easier to communicate to customers, employees, and share- holders, and improves implementation through single-mindedness in the corporation.

Second-order fit occurs when activities are re- inforcing. Neutrogena, for example, markets to upscale hotels eager to offer their guests a soap rec- ommended by dermatologists. Hotels grant Neu- trogena the privilege of using its customary packag- ing while requiring other soaps to feature the hotel’s name. Once guests have tried Neutrogena in a luxury hotel, they are more likely to purchase it at the drugstore or ask their doctor about it. Thus Neutrogena’s medical and hotel marketing activi- ties reinforce one another, lowering total market- ing costs.

In another example, Bic Corporation sells a nar- row line of standard, low-priced pens to virtually all major customer markets (retail, commercial, promotional, and giveaway) through virtually all available channels. As with any variety-based posi- tioning serving a broad group of customers, Bic emphasizes a common need (low price for an ac- ceptable pen) and uses marketing approaches with a broad reach (a large sales force and heavy televi- sion advertising). Bic gains the benefits of consis-

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 71

Explanatory catalogues, informative

displays and labels

Self-transport by customers

Limited customer service

Self-selection by customers

Modular furniture design

Low manufacturing

cost

Suburban locations

with ample parking

High-traffic store layout More

impulse buying

Ease of transport and

assembly Self-assembly by customers

“Knock-down” kit packaging

Wide variety with ease of

manufacturing

Limited sales staffing

Increased likelihood of

future purchase

In-house design focused

on cost of manufacturing

Ample inventory on site

Most items in

inventory

Year-round stocking

100% sourcing from

long-term suppliers

Mapping Activity Systems Activity-system maps, such as this one for Ikea, show how a company’s strategic position is contained in a set of tailored activities designed to deliver it. In companies with a clear

strategic position, a number of higher-order strategic themes (in dark purple) can be identified and implemented through clusters of tightly linked activities (in light purple).

tency across nearly all activities, including product design that emphasizes ease of manufacturing, plants configured for low cost, aggressive purchas- ing to minimize material costs, and in-house parts production whenever the economics dictate.

Yet Bic goes beyond simple consistency because its activities are reinforcing. For example, the com- pany uses point-of-sale displays and frequent pack-

aging changes to stimulate impulse buying. To han- dle point-of-sale tasks, a company needs a large sales force. Bic’s is the largest in its industry, and it handles point-of-sale activities better than its ri- vals do. Moreover, the combination of point-of-sale

activity, heavy television advertising, and packag- ing changes yields far more impulse buying than any activity in isolation could.

Third-order fit goes beyond activity reinforce- ment to what I call optimization of effort. The Gap, a retailer of casual clothes, considers product avail- ability in its stores a critical element of its strategy. The Gap could keep products either by holding

store inventory or by restocking from warehouses. The Gap has opti- mized its effort across these activi- ties by restocking its selection of ba- sic clothing almost daily out of three warehouses, thereby minimizing the need to carry large in-store invento- ries. The emphasis is on restocking because the Gap’s merchandising

strategy sticks to basic items in relatively few col- ors. While comparable retailers achieve turns of three to four times per year, the Gap turns its inven- tory seven and a half times per year. Rapid restock- ing, moreover, reduces the cost of implementing

72 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996

Wary of small growth

funds

Very low expenses

passed on to client

A broad array of mutual funds excluding some fund categories

Strict cost control

Efficient investment management approach

offering good, consistent performance

Direct distribution

Straightforward client communication

and education

Limited international funds due to volatility and

high costs

Use of redemption

fees to discourage

trading

Employee bonuses tied to

cost savings

No marketing changes

No broker-dealer relationships

No-loads

No commissions to brokers or distributors

Only three retail

locations

In-house management for standard

funds

Limited advertising

budget

Very low rate of trading

No first-class travel for executives

Emphasis on bonds and equity index funds

On-line information

access

Shareholder education cautioning about risk

Long-term investment

encouraged

Vanguard actively

spreads its philosophy

Reliance on word of mouth

Vanguard’s Activity System Activity-system maps can be useful for examining and strengthening strategic fit. A set of basic questions should guide the process. First, is each activity consistent with the overall positioning – the varieties produced, the needs served, and the type of customers accessed? Ask those responsible for

each activity to identify how other activities within the company improve or detract from their performance. Second, are there ways to strengthen how activities and groups of activities reinforce one another? Finally, could changes in one activity eliminate the need to perform others?

The competitive value of individual activities cannot be separated from the whole.

the Gap’s short model cycle, which is six to eight weeks long.3

Coordination and information exchange across activities to eliminate redundancy and minimize wasted effort are the most basic types of effort opti- mization. But there are higher levels as well. Prod- uct design choices, for example, can eliminate the need for after-sale service or make it possible for customers to perform service activities them- selves. Similarly, coordination with suppliers or distribution channels can eliminate the need for some in-house activities, such as end-user training.

In all three types of fit, the whole matters more than any individual part. Competitive advantage grows out of the entire system of activities. The fit among activities substantially reduces cost or in- creases differentiation. Beyond that, the competi- tive value of individual activities – or the associated skills, competencies, or resources – cannot be de- coupled from the system or the strategy. Thus in competitive companies it can be misleading to ex- plain success by specifying individual strengths,

core competencies, or critical resources. The list of strengths cuts across many functions, and one strength blends into others. It is more useful to think in terms of themes that pervade many activi- ties, such as low cost, a particular notion of cus- tomer service, or a particular conception of the val- ue delivered. These themes are embodied in nests of tightly linked activities.

Fit and Sustainability Strategic fit among many activities is fundamen-

tal not only to competitive advantage but also to the sustainability of that advantage. It is harder for a rival to match an array of interlocked activities than it is merely to imitate a particular sales-force approach, match a process technology, or replicate a set of product features. Positions built on systems of activities are far more sustainable than those built on individual activities.

Consider this simple exercise. The probability that competitors can match any activity is often

WHAT IS STRATEGY?

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 73

No meals

No seat assignments

Limited passenger

service

Lean, highly productive ground and gate crews

Very low ticket prices

Short-haul, point-to-point

routes between midsize cities

and secondary airports

Frequent, reliable

departures

High aircraft

utilization

No baggage transfers

No connections with other airlines

15-minute gate

turnarounds

Flexible union

contracts

High compensation of employees

High level of employee

stock ownership

Limited use of travel agents

Automatic ticketing machines

Standardized fleet of 737

aircraft

”Southwest, the low-fare

airline”

Southwest Airlines’ Activity System

Alternative Views of Strategy

Sustainable Competitive Advantage

Unique competitive position for the company Activities tailored to strategy Clear trade-offs and choices vis-à-vis competitors Competitive advantage arises from fit across

activities Sustainability comes from the activity system,

not the parts Operational effectiveness a given

The Implicit Strategy Model of the Past Decade

One ideal competitive position in the industry Benchmarking of all activities and achieving best

practice Aggressive outsourcing and partnering to gain

efficiencies Advantages rest on a few key success factors,

critical resources, core competencies Flexibility and rapid responses to all competitive

and market changes

less than one. The probabilities then quickly com- pound to make matching the entire system highly unlikely (.93.9= .81; .93.93.93.9= .66, and so on). Existing companies that try to reposition or strad- dle will be forced to reconfigure many activities.

And even new entrants, though they do not con- front the trade-offs facing established rivals, still face formidable barriers to imitation.

The more a company’s positioning rests on activ- ity systems with second- and third-order fit, the more sustainable its advantage will be. Such sys- tems, by their very nature, are usually difficult to untangle from outside the company and therefore hard to imitate. And even if rivals can identify the relevant interconnections, they will have difficulty replicating them. Achieving fit is difficult because it requires the integration of decisions and actions across many independent subunits.

A competitor seeking to match an activity sys- tem gains little by imitating only some activities and not matching the whole. Performance does not improve; it can decline. Recall Continental Lite’s disastrous attempt to imitate Southwest.

Finally, fit among a company’s activities creates pressures and incentives to improve operational effectiveness, which makes imitation even harder. Fit means that poor performance in one activity will degrade the performance in others, so that weaknesses are exposed and more prone to get at-

tention. Conversely, improvements in one activity will pay dividends in others. Companies with strong fit among their activities are rarely inviting targets. Their superiority in strategy and in execu- tion only compounds their advantages and raises

the hurdle for imitators. When activities complement one

another, rivals will get little benefit from imitation unless they success- fully match the whole system. Such situations tend to promote winner- take-all competition. The company that builds the best activity system – Toys R Us, for instance – wins, while

rivals with similar strategies – Child World and Li- onel Leisure – fall behind. Thus finding a new stra- tegic position is often preferable to being the second or third imitator of an occupied position.

The most viable positions are those whose ac- tivity systems are incompatible because of trade- offs. Strategic positioning sets the trade-off rules that define how individual activities will be con- figured and integrated. Seeing strategy in terms of activity systems only makes it clearer why organi- zational structure, systems, and processes need to be strategy-specific. Tailoring organization to strat- egy, in turn, makes complementarities more achiev- able and contributes to sustainability.

One implication is that strategic positions should have a horizon of a decade or more, not of a single planning cycle. Continuity fosters improve- ments in individual activities and the fit across ac- tivities, allowing an organization to build unique capabilities and skills tailored to its strategy. Conti- nuity also reinforces a company’s identity.

Conversely, frequent shifts in positioning are costly. Not only must a company reconfigure indi- vidual activities, but it must also realign entire sys-

WHAT IS STRATEGY?

74 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996

Strategic positions should have a horizon of a decade or more, not of a single planning cycle.

The Failure to Choose Why do so many companies fail to have a strat-

egy? Why do managers avoid making strategic choices? Or, having made them in the past, why do managers so often let strategies decay and blur?

Commonly, the threats to strategy are seen to emanate from outside a company because of changes in technology or the behavior of competi- tors. Although external changes can be the prob- lem, the greater threat to strategy often comes from within. A sound strategy is undermined by a mis- guided view of competition, by organizational fail- ures, and, especially, by the desire to grow.

Managers have become confused about the ne- cessity of making choices. When many companies operate far from the productivity frontier, trade-offs appear unnecessary. It can seem that a well-run company should be able to beat its ineffective rivals on all dimensions simultaneously. Taught by popu- lar management thinkers that they do not have to make trade-offs, managers have acquired a macho sense that to do so is a sign of weakness.

Unnerved by forecasts of hypercompetition, managers increase its likelihood by imitating ev- erything about their competitors. Exhorted to think in terms of revolution, managers chase every new technology for its own sake.

The pursuit of operational effectiveness is seduc- tive because it is concrete and actionable. Over the past decade, managers have been under increasing pressure to deliver tangible, measurable perfor- mance improvements. Programs in operational ef- fectiveness produce reassuring progress, although superior profitability may remain elusive. Business publications and consultants flood the market with information about what other companies are doing, reinforcing the best-practice mentality. Caught up in the race for operational effectiveness, many managers simply do not understand the need to have a strategy.

Companies avoid or blur strategic choices for other reasons as well. Conventional wisdom within an industry is often strong, homogenizing competi- tion. Some managers mistake “customer focus” to mean they must serve all customer needs or re- spond to every request from distribution channels. Others cite the desire to preserve flexibility.

Organizational realities also work against strate- gy. Trade-offs are frightening, and making no choice is sometimes preferred to risking blame for a bad choice. Companies imitate one another in a type of herd behavior, each assuming rivals know some- thing they do not. Newly empowered employees, who are urged to seek every possible source of im- provement, often lack a vision of the whole and the perspective to recognize trade-offs. The failure to choose sometimes comes down to the reluctance to disappoint valued managers or employees.

The Growth Trap Among all other influences, the desire to grow

has perhaps the most perverse effect on strategy. Trade-offs and limits appear to constrain growth. Serving one group of customers and excluding oth- ers, for instance, places a real or imagined limit on revenue growth. Broadly targeted strategies empha- sizing low price result in lost sales with customers sensitive to features or service. Differentiators lose sales to price-sensitive customers.

Managers are constantly tempted to take incre- mental steps that surpass those limits but blur a company’s strategic position. Eventually, pressures to grow or apparent saturation of the target market lead managers to broaden the position by extending product lines, adding new features, imitating com- petitors’ popular services, matching processes, and even making acquisitions. For years, Maytag Cor- poration’s success was based on its focus on reli- able, durable washers and dryers, later extended to include dishwashers. However, conventional wis-

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 75

V. Rediscovering Strategy

tems. Some activities may never catch up to the vacillating strategy. The inevitable result of fre- quent shifts in strategy, or of failure to choose a dis- tinct position in the first place, is “me-too” or hedged activity configurations, inconsistencies across functions, and organizational dissonance.

What is strategy? We can now complete the an- swer to this question. Strategy is creating fit among

a company’s activities. The success of a strategy depends on doing many things well – not just a few – and integrating among them. If there is no fit among activities, there is no distinctive strategy and little sustainability. Management reverts to the simpler task of overseeing independent functions, and operational effectiveness determines an organi- zation’s relative performance.

dom emerging within the industry supported the notion of selling a full line of products. Concerned with slow industry growth and competition from broad-line appliance makers, Maytag was pressured by dealers and encouraged by customers to extend its line. Maytag expanded into refrigerators and cooking products under the Maytag brand and ac- quired other brands – Jenn-Air, Hardwick Stove, Hoover, Admiral, and Magic Chef – with disparate positions. Maytag has grown substantially from $684 million in 1985 to a peak of $3.4 billion in 1994, but return on sales has declined from 8% to 12% in the 1970s and 1980s to an average of less than 1% between 1989 and 1995. Cost cutting will improve this performance, but laundry and dish- washer products still anchor Maytag’s profitability.

Neutrogena may have fallen into the same trap. In the early 1990s, its U.S. distribution broadened to include mass merchandisers such as Wal-Mart Stores. Under the Neutrogena name, the company expanded into a wide variety of products – eye-

makeup remover and shampoo, for example – in which it was not unique and which diluted its im- age, and it began turning to price promotions.

Compromises and inconsistencies in the pursuit of growth will erode the competitive advantage a company had with its original varieties or target customers. Attempts to compete in several ways at once create confusion and undermine organization- al motivation and focus. Profits fall, but more rev- enue is seen as the answer. Managers are unable to make choices, so the company embarks on a new round of broadening and compromises. Often, ri- vals continue to match each other until desperation breaks the cycle, resulting in a merger or downsiz- ing to the original positioning.

Profitable Growth Many companies, after a decade of restructuring

and cost-cutting, are turning their attention to growth. Too often, efforts to grow blur uniqueness,

76 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996

Reconnecting with Strategy

Most companies owe their initial success to a unique strategic position involving clear trade-offs. Activities once were aligned with that position. The passage of time and the pressures of growth, however, led to compromises that were, at first, almost imper- ceptible. Through a succession of incremental changes that each seemed sensible at the time, many established companies have compromised their way to homogeneity with their rivals.

The issue here is not with the companies whose his- torical position is no longer viable; their challenge is to start over, just as a new entrant would. At issue is a far more common phenomenon: the established com- pany achieving mediocre returns and lacking a clear strategy. Through incremental additions of product varieties, incremental efforts to serve new customer groups, and emulation of rivals’ activities, the existing company loses its clear competitive position. Typical- ly, the company has matched many of its competitors’ offerings and practices and attempts to sell to most customer groups.

A number of approaches can help a company recon- nect with strategy. The first is a careful look at what it already does. Within most well-established compa- nies is a core of uniqueness. It is identified by answer- ing questions such as the following: M Which of our product or service varieties are the most distinctive?

M Which of our product or service varieties are the most profitable? M Which of our customers are the most satisfied? M Which customers, channels, or purchase occasions are the most profitable? M Which of the activities in our value chain are the most different and effective?

Around this core of uniqueness are encrustations added incrementally over time. Like barnacles, they must be removed to reveal the underlying strategic po- sitioning. A small percentage of varieties or customers may well account for most of a company’s sales and es- pecially its profits. The challenge, then, is to refocus on the unique core and realign the company’s activi- ties with it. Customers and product varieties at the periphery can be sold or allowed through inattention or price increases to fade away.

A company’s history can also be instructive. What was the vision of the founder? What were the products and customers that made the company? Looking back- ward, one can reexamine the original strategy to see if it is still valid. Can the historical positioning be im- plemented in a modern way, one consistent with to- day’s technologies and practices? This sort of thinking may lead to a commitment to renew the strategy and may challenge the organization to recover its distinc- tiveness. Such a challenge can be galvanizing and can instill the confidence to make the needed trade-offs.

create compromises, reduce fit, and ultimately un- dermine competitive advantage. In fact, the growth imperative is hazardous to strategy.

What approaches to growth preserve and rein- force strategy? Broadly, the prescription is to con- centrate on deepening a strategic position rather than broadening and compromising it. One ap- proach is to look for extensions of the strategy that leverage the existing activity system by offering features or services that rivals would find impossi- ble or costly to match on a stand-alone basis. In oth- er words, managers can ask themselves which ac- tivities, features, or forms of competition are feasible or less costly to them because of comple- mentary activities that their company performs.

Deepening a position involves making the com- pany’s activities more distinctive, strengthening fit, and communicating the strategy better to those customers who should value it. But many compa- nies succumb to the temptation to chase “easy” growth by adding hot features, products, or services without screening them or adapting them to their strategy. Or they target new customers or markets in which the company has little special to offer. A company can often grow faster – and far more prof- itably – by better penetrating needs and varieties where it is distinctive than by slugging it out in po- tentially higher growth arenas in which the com- pany lacks uniqueness. Carmike, now the largest theater chain in the United States, owes its rapid growth to its disciplined concentration on small markets. The company quickly sells any big-city theaters that come to it as part of an acquisition.

Globalization often allows growth that is consis- tent with strategy, opening up larger markets for a focused strategy. Unlike broadening domestically,

expanding globally is likely to leverage and rein- force a company’s unique position and identity.

Companies seeking growth through broadening within their industry can best contain the risks to strategy by creating stand-alone units, each with its own brand name and tailored activities. Maytag has clearly struggled with this issue. On the one hand, it has organized its premium and value brands into

separate units with different strategic positions. On the other, it has created an umbrella appliance company for all its brands to gain critical mass. With shared design, manufacturing, distribution, and customer service, it will be hard to avoid ho- mogenization. If a given business unit attempts to compete with different positions for different prod- ucts or customers, avoiding compromise is nearly impossible.

The Role of Leadership The challenge of developing or reestablishing a

clear strategy is often primarily an organizational one and depends on leadership. With so many forces at work against making choices and trade- offs in organizations, a clear intellectual framework to guide strategy is a necessary counterweight. Moreover, strong leaders willing to make choices are essential.

In many companies, leadership has degenerated into orchestrating operational improvements and making deals. But the leader’s role is broader and far more important. General management is more than the stewardship of individual functions. Its core is strategy: defining and communicating the company’s unique position, making trade-offs, and forging fit among activities. The leader must pro- vide the discipline to decide which industr y changes and customer needs the company will re- spond to, while avoiding organizational distrac- tions and maintaining the company’s distinctive- ness. Managers at lower levels lack the perspective and the confidence to maintain a strategy. There will be constant pressures to compromise, relax trade-offs, and emulate rivals. One of the leader’s

jobs is to teach others in the organi- zation about strategy – and to say no.

Strategy renders choices about what not to do as impor tant as choices about what to do. Indeed, setting limits is another function of leadership. Deciding which target group of customers, varieties, and needs the company should serve is fundamental to developing a strat- egy. But so is deciding not to serve

other customers or needs and not to offer certain features or services. Thus strategy requires con- stant discipline and clear communication. Indeed, one of the most important functions of an explicit, communicated strategy is to guide employees in making choices that arise because of trade-offs in their individual activities and in day-to-day decisions.

WHAT IS STRATEGY?

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 77

At general management’s core is strategy: defining a company’s position, making trade-offs, and forging fit among activities.

Improving operational effectiveness is a neces- sary part of management, but it is not strategy. In confusing the two, managers have unintentionally backed into a way of thinking about competition that is driving many industries toward competitive convergence, which is in no one’s best interest and is not inevitable.

Managers must clearly distinguish operational effectiveness from strategy. Both are essential, but the two agendas are different.

The operational agenda involves continual im- provement everywhere there are no trade-offs. Fail- ure to do this creates vulnerability even for compa- nies with a good strategy. The operational agenda is the proper place for constant change, flexibility, and relentless efforts to achieve best practice. In contrast, the strategic agenda is the right place for defining a unique position, making clear trade-offs, and tightening fit. It involves the continual search for ways to reinforce and extend the company’s po- sition. The strategic agenda demands discipline and continuity; its enemies are distraction and compromise.

Strategic continuity does not imply a static view of competition. A company must continually im- prove its operational effectiveness and actively try to shift the productivity frontier; at the same time, there needs to be ongoing effort to extend its uniqueness while strengthening the fit among

its activities. Strategic continuity, in fact, should make an organization’s continual improvement more effective.

A company may have to change its strategy if there are major structural changes in its industry. In fact, new strategic positions often arise because of industry changes, and new entrants unencum- bered by history often can exploit them more easily. However, a company’s choice of a new position must be driven by the ability to find new trade-offs and leverage a new system of complementary activ- ities into a sustainable advantage.

1. I first described the concept of activities and its use in understanding competitive advantage in Competitive Advantage (New York: The Free Press, 1985). The ideas in this article build on and extend that thinking.

2. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts have begun to explore the economics of systems of complementary functions, activities, and functions. Their fo- cus is on the emergence of “modern manufacturing” as a new set of com- plementary activities, on the tendency of companies to react to external changes with coherent bundles of internal responses, and on the need for central coordination – a strategy – to align functional managers. In the lat- ter case, they model what has long been a bedrock principle of strategy. See Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, “The Economics of Modern Manu- facturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization,” American Economic Review 80 (1990): 511-528; Paul Milgrom, Yingyi Qian, and John Roberts, “Complementarities, Momentum, and Evolution of Modern Manufactur- ing,” American Economic Review 81 (1991) 84-88; and Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, “Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure, and Orga- nizational Changes in Manufacturing,” Journal of Accounting and Eco- nomics, vol. 19 (March-May 1995): 179-208.

3. Material on retail strategies is drawn in part from Jan Rivkin, “The Rise of Retail Category Killers,” unpublished working paper, January 1995. Nicolaj Siggelkow prepared the case study on the Gap.

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78 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996

Emerging Industries and Technologies

Developing a strategy in a newly emerging industry or in a business undergoing revolutionary technologi- cal changes is a daunting proposition. In such cases, managers face a high level of uncertainty about the needs of customers, the products and services that will prove to be the most desired, and the best configu- ration of activities and technologies to deliver them. Because of all this uncertainty, imitation and hedging are rampant: unable to risk being wrong or left behind, companies match all features, offer all new services, and explore all technologies.

During such periods in an industry’s development, its basic productivity frontier is being established or reestablished. Explosive growth can make such times profitable for many companies, but profits will be temporary because imitation and strategic conver- gence will ultimately destroy industry profitability. The companies that are enduringly successful will be those that begin as early as possible to define and em-

body in their activities a unique competitive position. A period of imitation may be inevitable in emerging industries, but that period reflects the level of uncer- tainty rather than a desired state of affairs.

In high-tech industries, this imitation phase often continues much longer than it should. Enraptured by technological change itself, companies pack more fea- tures – most of which are never used – into their prod- ucts while slashing prices across the board. Rarely are trade-offs even considered. The drive for growth to sat- isfy market pressures leads companies into every product area. Although a few companies with funda- mental advantages prosper, the majority are doomed to a rat race no one can win.

Ironically, the popular business press, focused on hot, emerging industries, is prone to presenting these special cases as proof that we have entered a new era of competition in which none of the old rules are valid. In fact, the opposite is true.