CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The Debate over Police Reform: Examining Minority Support for Citizen Oversight and Resistance by Police Unions

Steve Wilson & Kevin Buckler

Received: 21 September 2009 /Accepted: 1 February 2010 / Published online: 5 August 2010 # Southern Criminal Justice Association 2010

Abstract Researchers have argued that the creation of citizen oversight often involves debate between those that support its use and the police which do not. Police unions, for example, have a long history of objecting to the creation of oversight, especially during collective bargaining. Minority demands for police reform, on the other hand, can lend support for its implementation, especially after a highly publicized case of misconduct between the police and minority citizens. Using a retrospective approach, this study examined the extent to which these opposing forces influenced the existence of oversight. Findings suggest that departments that engage in collective bargaining were no more likely to use an oversight agency than departments that did not engage in collective bargaining. Cities with large percentages of African Americans, however, were more likely to have an existing oversight agency.

Keywords Police unions . Collective bargaining . Group position thesis .

Citizen oversight

Introduction

Police misconduct is a critical issue that undermines perceptions of trust and legitimacy in the profession (Greene 2007; International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000; Walker 2001).1 In response a good number of reforms have been developed to keep the police accountable for their actions. Walker (2005), for example, identified several specific approaches commonly used to control misconduct, including administrative rules designed to reduce discretion, open and accessible citizen complaint systems, civil law suits, and early intervention systems.

Am J Crim Just (2010) 35:184–197 DOI 10.1007/s12103-010-9079-x

1As defined by Palmiotto [2001] police misconduct is an act of wrongdoing that can be criminal, non- criminal, unethical, immoral, or a violation departmental policy. Specific incidents include but are not limited to violation of civil right, corruption, the commission of a crime, and excessive use of force.

S. Wilson (*) : K. Buckler Department of Criminal Justice, University of Texas at Brownsville, 80 Fort Brown, Brownsville, TX 78520, USA e-mail: [email protected]

Among reforms used to control police misconduct, the use of citizen oversight has grown in popularity.2 Advocated by critics who believe that the police are not capable of performing fair investigations into complaints of misconduct against their coworkers, citizen oversight is a procedure designed to: 1) provide input into the complaint process by individuals who are not sworn officers, 2) inform citizens about the complaint process, and 3) break down the self-protective isolation of the police (Walker 2001). Proponents have argued that citizen oversight of the police is also compatible with the democratic principles of the United States (Greene 2007; Philips and Trone 2002; Stone and Bobb 2002; Terrill 1990; Terrill 1996; Walker 2007) and with the philosophy of community policing (International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000).

Researchers have argued that new proposals for citizen oversight often involve debate between those who support its use and police unions which often do not (Bobb 2003; Finn 2001; Walker 2001). Numerous and recent cases of union resistance have also been documented by researchers and news reporters (Boren 2007; King 2005; Nalder and Kamp 2006; Sewall 2008; Steele 2008a, b; Tal 2003). Several recent manuals have been published designed to inform police administrators on how to overcome union resistance when creating an external oversight agency (Finn 2001; International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000; Polzin and DeLord 2006).

Other researchers, however, have argued that while the resistance to oversight still exists, growth trends indicate that the police are losing the debate (Walker 2001). Finn (2001) argued that some unions actually support the use of citizen’s review or find it an unavoidable inevitability. Arguments supporting the “losing debate” hypothesis, however, have been based on examination of a few specific cases. To date, a national level statistical analyses (one that controls for relevant covariates) has not been used to determine whether or not unions have been successful at opposing external oversight. There have been enough documented cases of resistance to warrant a national level quantitative approach.

Minority support for oversight is also an important part of the debate for external review of the police. Oversight agencies, for example, often begin with a demand by minority and civil rights leaders after a highly publicized case that involves allegations of police misconduct, many of which involve African American citizens (Finn 2001; International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000; Miller and Merrick 2002; Philips and Trone 2002; Police Assessment Resource Center 2005). Research has also found that African Americans: 1) tend to believe that misconduct is common (Buckler and Unnever 2008; Rice and Piquero 2003; Walker 1997; Weitzer and Tuch 2004b, 2005b), 2) have more negative opinions toward controversial policing tactics, such as racial profiling (Buckler and Unnever 2008), and 3) are more supportive of police reform in general (Weitzer and Tuch 2004a). Some have argued that oversight is related to civil rights issues (Terrill 1996). Yet, like police resistance, much of the research that examines the role that minorities have played in the battle over citizen oversight of police has relied on trends derived from just a few cases.

Using a retrospective approach, this study combined data on municipal police departments employing 100 or more sworn officers from the 2003 Law Enforcement

2 Also referred to as civilian review, citizen review, citizen oversight, civilian review boards, citizen review boards, and external oversight.

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Management and Administrative Statistics with macro-level municipal data from the 2000 Census to examine the effect of police resistance and minority presence on the use of citizen-based police oversight. Recent evidence seems to suggest that unions are using the ability to engage in collective bargaining as a forum to resist oversight (King 2005; Nalder and Kamp 2006; Sewall 2008; Steele 2008a, b). Therefore, to test the “losing debate hypothesis,” the basic premise was that collective bargaining would have a null effect; that is, it would not be a predictor of having an oversight agency. And assuming that minority presence in cities is a measure of support for police reform (see Weitzer and Tuch 2004a), the presence of large minority populations would have a positive relationship with the presence of oversight.

Literature Review

Research has found that the use of citizen oversight has grown substantially since the 1970s. A report published by the International Association of Chiefs of police (2000), for instance, indicated that the number of agencies that used some form of citizen review of complaints grew from one in 1970 to 98 in 1997. Other estimates reported nearly 100 oversight agencies operating in the United States (Finn 2001; International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000; Walker 2001).

Experts have noted that starting an oversight agency has not been an easy task. It has routinely involved debate and compromises between parties who oppose the oversight and those who support it (Finn 2001; Miller and Merrick 2002; Philips and Trone 2002; Terrill 1990; Walker 2001). Advocates of citizen oversight have pointed out that the police are not capable of self oversight (Bobb 2003; Greene 2007). That is, internal investigations have been too secretive and susceptible to peer pressure (Greene 2007; Philips and Trone 2002). Some advocates have claimed that external oversight by citizens has been more effective than internal affairs at investigating and discouraging police misconduct, although Walker (2001) pointed out that these conclusions lack support by empirical evidence. Others have claimed that the use of citizens to review complaints can improve public relationships with the police, increase the public’s awareness and understanding of police work, reassure citizens that the complaints against officers will be taken seriously and investigations into allegations of misconduct are thorough and fair (Finn 2001; Greene 2007; Miller and Merrick 2002; Philips and Trone 2002).

Opponents have argued that oversight agencies are redundant; that is, they perform functions that the police already effectively handle (Hudson 1972). Some have argued that because many employees of oversight agencies do not have a law enforcement background, there is no way they can understand police policy and procedures (International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000). Thus oversight is less effective than internal affairs. Experts have predicted that, in places where citizen oversight is implemented, officers may avoid conflict in order to reduce potential allegations of misconduct and chiefs would have their authority threatened, leaving questions as to who should be blamed when something goes wrong (Bobb 2003; International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000; Terrill 1990). Finally, critics have felt that police work, as a profession, should have a degree of autonomy; in this regard, civilian review is viewed as being intrusive on police professionalism (Bobb 2003; Finn 2001; International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000; Weitzer and Tuch 2004a, b).

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Resistance by the Police

A recent study of police in Carbondale, Illinois found that only 22% of the sampled officers supported citizen oversight in their city, whereas nearly 55% strongly opposed oversight (Wells and Schafer 2007). Officers also expressed very little support for citizen oversight with independent authority to investigate complaints, subpoena witnesses, and recommend sanctions. The greatest level of support was for the lowest level of citizen involvement. More specifically, only 6% supported oversight authority to investigate and 13% supported citizen authority to subpoena witnesses. Fifty-five percent, in contrast, supported citizens having the authority to only review the findings of internal affairs and 63% supported citizens mediating conflicts between themselves and citizens (Wells and Schafer 2007).

Numerous cases of union resistance to the practice of oversight have been documented (Nalder and Kamp 2006; Tal 2003; Walker 2001). Oversight in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for example, has undergone opposition by the police since its creation. After its inception in 1958, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) filed several law suits that were instrumental in the committee’s temporary disbandment in 1969 (Tal 2003), The oversight committee was reestablished about 20 years later after several police scandals and pressure from civil rights organizations. The union fired back with a second round of lawsuits; however, these were largely unsuccessful (Tal 2003).

In recent years, confrontation over proposals for citizen oversight has taken place by police unions while engaged in collective bargaining. Recent media accounts have documented union resistance during collective bargaining in places like Austin, Texas; Columbia, Missouri; Seattle, Washington; and Spokane, Washington (King 2005; Nalder and Kamp 2006; Sewall 2008; Steele 2008a, b). In many cases union representatives were either completely opposed to the development of citizens’ oversight or were concerned with the authority and role citizens would have in investigating and disciplining officers.

According to a recent report by the American Civil Liberties Union (1997, p. 9), opposition by police occurs in three stages. During the “over our dead bodies” stage, the police announce that they will never accept any type of citizen oversight. The “magical conversion” stage is next, when, after they realize that they can’t stop citizen oversight from being adopted, the police suddenly become experts in the area and propose the weakest possible models. Finally, the “post-partum resistance” stage occurs when the newly established citizens oversight are forced to fight police opposition to its budget, authority, access to information, etc. (American Civil Liberties Union 1997, p.9).

The “Losing Debate” Hypothesis

Despite cases of opposition to citizen oversight by police, some experts have argued that unions are losing the debate over oversight. Finn (2001) (p. 117), for example, wrote “Police unions have increasingly been unable to defeat citizen review proposals. In some jurisdictions, unions have either chosen not to oppose oversight proposals or even supported them. Opposition has declined in part because leaders have decided that a review system is inevitable...”

Walker (2001) has suggested that a growth in the use of oversight during the end of the century is in part related to loosing debates over oversight; that is, police

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unions were less able to defeat oversight proposals. He noted several reasons why. First, the Rodney King incident gave the oversight movement a big boost. An increase in African American political power at the municipal level also helped. The philosophy of public partnership associated with community policing may have changed the attitudes of some police leaders. And finally, several historical incidents, including the Rodney King incident, had caused a growth in support for police accountability, thus spawning a new era of less tolerance of police misconduct.

Several recent cases exemplify arguments based on the “losing debate” hypothesis. King County sheriff deputies, for example, represented by their union, was staunchly opposed a proposed civilian oversight system. A lawyer speaking on behalf of union was quoted by the Seattle Post Intelligencer, “people without law enforcement experience shouldn’t be overseeing police work” (Nalder and Kamp 2006, p. 2). Later, the union threatened the county council that creating citizen oversight without union approval in collective bargaining would be illegal as it represented a change in working conditions. The union threatened to file a law suit for unfair labor practices, however, representatives later came to an agreement to hold collective bargaining negotiations early so the issue of civilian oversight could be discussed (Sims 2006). Two years later deputies finally agreed on a new contract, which included oversight, interesting however, the contract also included large raises for the deputies, for each year of the contract (Clarridge 2008).

A recent endorsement by Columbia Police Officers Association (COPA) is an example of Finn’s claims. In 2008, the president wrote the following statement to the media,

The COPA has said and continue to say that we have absolutely nothing to hide. We have stated publicly that we are not opposed to some forms of civilian oversight. We remain confident that any truly neutral people who review our actions will become our biggest supporters. Today we go a step further and say that we are actually IN FAVOR of civilian review of the Columbia Police Department administration, for the sake of all involved, the police and citizens alike (Weaver 2008, p.2).

While examples can be found, a major problem with the “losing debate” hypothesis is that they have been based on trends derived from just a few cases. Recently, however, nationwide data on the use of citizen oversight has surfaced with the 2003 LEMAS survey. These data now allow for more sophisticated statistical analysis on external review of the police, one that can control for covariance and can be generalized to a larger population. The current research on the battle over oversight should not be the final word on this subject; there have been enough documented cases of resistance by unions to warrant a quantitative study to test whether or not the “losing debate” hypothesis hold up under multivariate analyses.

Minority Support for Citizen Oversight

Experts have also noted that the creation of citizen oversight typically begins with demands by minority groups after a high-profile case of police misconduct, often followed by allegations of discrimination, a loss in confidence, distrust, and a perception that the police did a poor job at rendering justice upon guilty officers (Finn 2001; International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000; Miller and Merrick

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2002; Philips and Trone 2002; Police Assessment Resource Center 2005; Walker 2001). For illustrative purposes, consider the case of the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority. The MCPRA was established in 1990 after African American leaders led a protest at city hall following the deaths of two elderly African American who were killed in a police raid (Finn 2001).

Minority support for police reform has been explained by extending Bulmer’s (1958) group-position thesis to attitudes toward police reform (Weitzer and Tuch 2004a). Based on the conflict perspective, Blumer argued that racial prejudice is rooted in competition over scarce resources which create a “group position” that conflicts with those of other racial groups. The dominate group’s position is that they have rights to valued resources and therefore need to defend themselves against threats to their interests by minority groups. The subordinate group, on the other hand, believes that the exclusionary position by the dominate group is unfair and thus they support securing a greater share of the pie. Weitzer and Touch (2004a) extended the hypotheses to explain support for police reform. Because the dominate group believes they are entitled to valued resources, they tend to have an “affinity” toward institutions, namely the police, who can serve their interests. Minorities, on the other hand, are more inclined to believe that the police contribute to their subordination through both legal and by improper means, like misconduct. Thus, police reforms are supported by minorities who view police reform, in general, and citizen-based oversight, in particular, as a mechanism to guard against police contribution to their continued subordination and disparate social position.

Weitzer and Tuch (2004a) found support for the group-position thesis. Their analyses of a nationwide survey of public attitudes examined support for several types of reform, including accountability, which was an index measure of various questions concerning the monitoring and punishment of police officers.3 Analyses found that African Americans and Hispanics were more supportive of types of police reform in general. Yet interestingly, Hispanics were more like Whites in their view of police accountability. The current study adds to the existing body of knowledge concerning the group-position thesis by examining the role of racial populations in the development and use of oversight. To some degree, therefore, this study also tested many of Weitzer and Tuch (2004a) findings, however, using macro rather than individual levels of measurement.

Methods

The Data

The data used in the current study were gathered from the 2003 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) database and the 2000 Census data collected by the Bureau of Census. The databases were downloaded through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and the Bureau of Census web pages and were merged at the city level using the Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk Data. The unit of analysis in this study was municipal

3 Respondents in Weitzer and Tuch’s [45] study were not asked about citizen oversight.

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police departments employing over 100 sworn officers as defined in the 2000 LEMAS survey. After merging the two data sets, the sample size was 474 agencies.

Dependent and Independent Variables

The dependent variable was the use of citizen oversight. This measure was developed from a LEMAS question that asked agencies whether or not they used a “civilian complaint review board” empowered to “review use of force complaints against officers” (1 = yes; 0 = no).

The independent variables were arranged to measure union resistance and minority support. Police resistance was a dichotomous measure derived from LEMAS that asked agencies if collective bargaining was authorized for sworn employees (1 = the agency used collective bargaining; 0 = the agency did not use collective bargaining). Census data allowed for the development of two indirect measures of the group-position theory.4 The variable percent Black citizens was a measure of the percentage of the total population of the municipality that are African American. The variable percent Hispanic citizens was a measure of the percent of the total population that is Hispanic. Consistent with the “losing battle” hypothesis, it was expected that collective bargaining would not be associated with the presence of oversight. In addition, and consistent with the group-position thesis, it was predicted that African American and Hispanic populations would have a positive relationship with the use of oversight.

Control Variables

Research has found that young people are more likely to have negative attitudes toward the police (Bridenball and Jesilow 2008; Reisig and Correia 1997; Worall 1999) and the educated tend to be more dissatisfied with the police (Jesilow and Meyer 2001; Weitzer and Tuch 1999). To control for the nature of support for reform by populations that have negative attitudes of the police, the variable percent young males provides a measure of the percentage of male citizens between 15 and 24 and the variable percent citizens with college degree is a measure of the percent population with at least a bachelor’s degree.

As noted earlier, research has found that oversight committees tend to be created in response to specific and highly publicized crisis events or trends of misconduct (International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000; Philips and Trone 2002; Walker 2001). Furthermore, in jurisdictions where police misconduct is infrequent oversight is less likely to emerge (International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000). Public desire for citizen oversight might therefore be represented by the frequency use of force complaints that were filed by citizens. This was measured by incorporating a measure of use of force complaints per 100 officers.5 Complaint rates were expected to have a positive relationship with the use of oversight.

4 Because this study was retrospective and utilized municipal level data, the data did not provide a direct measure of minority support for citizen oversight. 5 The causal pattern of complaint rates against police can be questioned. Rather than a high complaint rate causing citizen demand for oversight, external review of allegations against officers could actually increase complaints as citizens learn about the new process and trust increases.

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Walker (2001) and others have suggested that the size of city budgets may influence the creation and use of citizen oversight. Thus, the ability of an agency to pay was included in the analysis by dividing the total budget of each agency by the number of citizens. This variable has been used as a financial measure by numerous other studies examining the effects of collective bargaining (Bell 1981; Briggs et al. 2008; Spizman 1980; Wilson et al. 2006; Zhao and Lovrich 1997). Departments with larger budgets were predicted to be more likely to use oversight.

Finally and also consistent with the research on collective bargaining, regional variables were included to control for geographical differences in the use of collective bargaining (Zhao and Lovrich 1997). The data were divided into four regions, the South, West, Midwest, and Northeast. Four dichotomous controls were created and entered into the multivariate model: South (1 = municipality in the South; 0 = not in the South); West (1 = municipality in the West; 0 = not in the West); Midwest (1 = municipality in the Midwest; 0 = not in the Midwest); and Northeast (1 = municipality in the Northeast; 0 = not in the Northeast). Because research has found that northeastern departments are more likely than other regions of the country to engage in collective bargaining (Swanson et al. 2008) the Northeast was utilized as the reference category.

Findings

Descriptive Analysis

As reported in Table 1, about 89 (19%) of the agencies used citizen oversight to review use of force complaints against officers. Most or about 74% of the sampled

Table 1 Descriptive analyses of variables

Mean SD Min Max

Dependent Variables

Civilian Oversight .19 .39 0 1

Independent Variable

Collective Bargaining .73 .45 0 1

Percent Black Citizens 17.11 18.12 .20 88.23

Percent Hispanic Citizens 15.71 17.46 .79 91.28

Controls

Percent Citizens with College Degree 26.19 12.61 5.36 76.95

Percent young males 7.71 2.36 3.70 29.86

Use of Force complaints per 100 officers 5.78 7.79 0 66

Budget 211.46 82.18 8.75 676.19

Regional Controls

Northeast .23 .42 0 1

South .34 .47 0 1

Midwest .20 .40 0 1

West .22 .42 0 1

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agencies engaged in collective bargaining. The measures of minority population had good variation; analyses also found that in these large cities, about 17% of the residents were African American on average (S.D.=82.18) and the average Hispanic population was about 16% (S.D. 91.28).

With respect to the control variables, on average about 7.71% of the population of the municipalities were young men between 17 and 24 (S.D.=2.36), and on average just over a quarter of the population had a college degree (mean=26.19; S.D.= 12.61). Use of force complaints against police officers varied significantly from zero to 66 complaints per 100 officers (mean=5.78; S.D.=7.79). The average budget for agencies was about 211 dollars per citizen. Finally, descriptive analyses also revealed that sampled departments were nearly evenly distributed throughout the nation. Twenty-two percent of the departments were located in the Western portion of the United States, 20% in the Midwest, 23% in the Northeast, and 34% in the Southern portion (Table 1).

Multivariate Findings

To test the hypotheses, logistic regression analysis was utilized to examine the influence of collective bargaining and minority support on the use of citizen oversight, net control variables. As reported in Table 2, the model was statistically significant (X2−57.83, df=10, p<.001). Consistent with the “losing battle” hypothesis, collective bargaining did not have a significant effect on the use of citizen oversight. Also as expected, findings indicated that percent Black citizens

Table 2 Logistic analysis of variables on use of oversight

B S.E. Odds Ratio

Independent Variable

Collective Bargaining −.029 .376 .971 Percent Black Citizens .029 .008** 1.029

Percent Hispanic Citizens −.004 .010 .996 Controls

Percent Young Male Citizens .095 .050* 1.110

Percent with a College Degree .019 .012* 1.019

Number of Force Complaints per 100 Officers .037 .014** 1.038

Budget .005 .002** 1.005

Regional Controls

South −.911 .456* .402 Midwest .466 .399 1.594

West 1.048 .392** 2.851

Constant −4.555 .771*** .011 Model chi-square 57.828

Neqelkerke R2 .185

n=474

P<.05; P<.01; p<.001 (one tailed tests)

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had a positive relationship with the use of oversight. Unexpectedly the percent Hispanic measure was not significant and opposite of the predicted direction.

Examining control variables, both percent young men and percent citizens with at least a bachelors degree were significant and in the hypothesized direction. Citizen’s complaints ratio also had a significant effect on the use of citizen oversight. The positive sign of the coefficients indicated that departments with more complaints per 100 officers were more likely to use oversight. Police budgets were significant and also had a positive effect; departments with larger budgets were more likely to use citizen oversight. Finally, departments in the Northeast, Midwest, and West were more likely to use citizen oversight than departments located in the South. Also noteworthy, the model predicted 18% of the variance in the use of citizen oversight.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study was designed to examine the tough battle between police unions and minority support for citizen oversight of police misconduct. Using a retrospective approach, two hypotheses were tested. The first was developed from arguments that unions were losing the debate over external review by citizens (Finn 2001; Walker 2001); therefore, departments that engaged in collective bargaining would not be related to the use of oversight. The hypothesis was supported by the analysis. While case studies and newspaper reports have documented union resistance to citizen oversight (Boren 2007; King 2005; Nalder and Kamp 2006; Sewall 2008; Steele 2008a, b; Tal 2003), the current nationwide study suggests that collective bargaining was not significantly related to the use of oversight.

The second hypothesis predicted that percent minority populations would have a have a positive relationship with the use of citizen oversight. Analysis found partial support for the second hypothesis. Percentage of African American citizens was significantly associated with the existence of citizen oversight. These findings were consistent with Weitzer and Tuch (2004a) and the group-position thesis. Results indicated that African American populations were more inclined to believe that their “group interests” would be advanced by greater controls on the police, like citizen oversight. The current study, however, didn’t find a significant relationship between percent Hispanic citizens and the existence of oversight. These results were also consistent with Weitzer and Tuch (2004a) findings that Hispanics were more like Whites in their view of police accountability.

In addition to minority populations, percent young men and percent citizens with at least a bachelor’s degree were significantly related to the use of citizen oversight. These results suggest that public influence of police reform might not be limited to minority communities; other populations that have unfavorable attitudes toward the police might also be important determinates of police reform.

An important variable that might explain why these populations are important is media exposure. The media plays an important role in shaping attitudes toward the police (Dowler and Zawilski 2007; Kaminski and Jefferis 1998; Tuch and Weitzer 1997; Weitzer and Tuch 1999a, 2004a, b, 2005a, b). For example, research has found that repeated media exposure to police misconduct increased perceptions concerning the frequency of misconduct and perception of police bias toward

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minorities (Weitzer and Tuch 2004b, 2005b). Research has also found that found that exposure to mass media reports on police misconduct was one of the strongest predictors of support for police reform in general (Weitzer and Tuch 2004a). It is probable; therefore, that media exposure to incidents (or a particular incident) of misconduct may cause young people and the educated, who already have negative attitudes toward the police, to rally behind demands for citizen oversight.6 The data used in this study did not include a measure of media exposure; therefore, this important hypothesis needs further research.

The current study is also limited by the nature of the LEMAS data. The dichotomous dependent variable, for example, does not capture varying models of authority oversight committees have over the police (Finn 2001; Goldsmith 1988; Quinn 2004; Stone and Bobb 2002). Walker (2001), for example, identified several varieties of oversight agencies. Class I agencies have investigatory authority. They conduct an initial investigation after a complaint has been filed and then forward a report of their findings to the police for final disposition. This type of oversight is the most independent of police influence and is the least used. Class II agencies, on the other hand, do not have investigatory authority. Instead, their role is to review investigations conducted by internal affairs. After a review, Class II oversight agencies may contribute to the process by making recommendations concerning the final disposition of each case. Type III agencies are the least independent; this type of agency is designed to hear appeals by citizens who are not satisfied with the final outcome of their cases. It should be noted that although the above are the most common types of citizen oversight agencies, other types exist. Research, for example, has found that many jurisdictions have a blended systems that combine two or more types (Finn 2001) or have blended internal and external review of citizens complaints (Philips and Trone 2002). In most cases, oversight authority has been restricted to reviewing cases previously investigated by the police and commenting on the cases to the department (Bobb 2003). It is reasonable to assume that while unions have been unsuccessful at stopping oversight, some may have been successful at reducing the power that oversights committees have in the investigative process. This study should be not be considered the last word on union resistance; therefore, and further research is needed.

Policy Implications

Results stemming from the group-position hypothesis emphasize the importance of police integrity and having open, thorough, and professional investigations of police misconduct. Clearly a system of accountability that achieves minority confidence in the police should be a principal goal of all law enforcement agencies. Without that trust, racial tensions could easily give way to demands for police reform. As noted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), “Police chiefs who foster a culture that will not tolerate misconduct, acknowledge misconduct when it occurs and implement reform when necessary, will enjoy the respect and confidence

6 It should be noted that in Weitzer and Tuch’s [46] study, the group-position thesis stood out, even after controlling for media exposure.

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of the people they serve, often without formalized citizen review” (International Association of Chiefs of Police 2000, p. 3).

Implementing early warning systems may also be helpful at fostering confidence in the police and creating a culture of accountability. These data-based systems are designed specifically to “red flag” problematic behavior so that departments can intervene before disciplinary behavior is needed (Walker et al. 2001). Studies have found that early warning systems have had a significant effect on reducing citizen complaints among those officers who are subject to early intervention (Walker et al. 2001). Insofar as the program reduces citizen complaints, it is consistent with goals of maintaining good relations with the community and trust in the police.

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Steve Wilson Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Texas at Brownsville. His research interests include public opinion of the police, victimization of police, and the outcomes of collective bargaining. He has published research in the following journals: Journal of Criminal Justice, Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, Homicide Studies, and the American Journal of Criminal Justice.

Kevin Buckler Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Texas at Brownsville. His research interests include public opinion, race and criminal justice, courts systems and processes, and criminal justice theory.He has published research in the following journals: Journal of Criminal Justice, Journal of Criminal Justice Education, Journal of Crime and Justice, American Journal of Criminal Justice, and Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture.

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