Discussion Covert Action and Intelligence2

National Security Directive, 1948

“A new Office of Special Projects shall be created within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct covert operations …

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Original Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2. Top Secret. Although undated, this directive was approved by the National Security Council at its June 17 meeting and the final text, incorporating changes made at the meeting, was circulated to members by the Executive Secretary under a June 18 note. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. NSC 10/2 and the June 18 note are also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman, pp. 213-216., Available at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d292.

“Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to:

propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”

Definition: Covert Actions

Because it is Secret and carried out by traditional intelligence agencies, is covert action a subset of intelligence? Or is it another action available to policy makers and deciders that is supported by intelligence? (Lowenthal argues that policy driven actions are paramount in this arena)

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Info Needs

Processors

(Process, Exploit,

Analyze, Finish)

Intelligence

Collectors

(Gather)

Deciders

(Plan and Act)

Info Needs

Raw Info

War

Low-Intensity War

Pre-emptive Missile

Drones

Deploy Mil Forces

Covert Action

Foreign Aid

Development

Treaty

Diplomacy

Sanctions

Info Ops

Assassination

X

Intelligence Supported “Actions”

Lowenthal describes CA as the “Third Option” (Nothing and War the other two). A clear policy objective needs to be delineated. Covert Action is actually one of many actions a decision maker can make. Should the intelligence community be able to take “Actions” without any approval process? If so, which actions? What are the problems? Does this jeopardize objectivity, mission, or infringe on the mission of others? Is there an inherent conflict with the information provider, advisor, and executor all being an intelligence agency (E.g. objective analysis?)

Assassination – Outlawed in 1976, renewed in EO 2008.

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Covert vs. Warlike

Think of what is needed for Warlike actions? Congressional Approval? Reporting to the Public? Why?

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Paramilitary Operations

Propaganda

Coups

Sabotage

Economic Activity

Political Activity

VIOLENCE

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Lowenthal, p. 187

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Covert Action Ladder

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Congress – Notification but not approval, budget

Congress – May see covert action via the annual budget process

President – Approval and Findings in writing except emergency

Findings delivered to Congressional Intelligence Committees, or subset via Memo of Notification

Finding: Document that states the action is : “necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States, and is important to he national security of the United States.”

Process

Discussion: Is it better to have covert actions done by the military, by the CIA, or by private contractors?

50 USC 413b – Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions

Presidential findings

The President may not authorize the conduct of a covert action by departments, agencies, or entities of the United States Government unless the President determines such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States, which determination shall be set forth in a finding that shall meet each of the following conditions:

50 USC 414 – Funding of Intelligence Activities

(c) Presidential finding required for expenditure of funds on covert action

No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any covert action…unless and until a Presidential finding required by … section 413b of this title has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance with that subsection.

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50 USC 413b – Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions (Paraphrased)

…

shall be in writing except in emergency, then follow in writing

Cannot authorize a covert action that already occurred

Specify every USG Org that has significant participation

Specify whether non-government organization or contractor is anticipated to participate in a significant way

No authorization of an action that violates the Constitution or other US Statute

Process – Presidential Finding

Discussion: Is it better to have covert actions done by the military, by the CIA, or by private contractors?

50 USC 413b – Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions

Presidential findings

The President may not authorize the conduct of a covert action by departments, agencies, or entities of the United States Government unless the President determines such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States, which determination shall be set forth in a finding that shall meet each of the following conditions:

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Risk vs. Benefit

Some factors:

Plausible Deniability

Blowback

Who is executing

Nature of the threat or intended target

Damage on target

Ends justify the means

Failure

Decision Factors

All actions in the national security realm have a risk versus benefit.

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Overt Options (e.g. pre-emptive missile strikes into Afghanistan and Sudan)

See for world reaction: (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cruise_missile_strikes_on_Afghanistan_and_Sudan_(August_1998))

Ethics – Should we support actions that seem to contradict our national philosophy? (E.g. alter elections, support regimes with a history of human rights violations?)

Decision Factors

What is plausible deniability and how does presidential approval undermine it?

How did Congress try to limit plausible deniability in 1974?

What is the recourse if the president does not comply with this law?

What does this tell us about questions of whether CIA was authorized to carry out covert actions?

How can plausible deniability let subordinates hijack policy?

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Covert Actions

Warlike Actions

Decision Factors

Risk vs. Benefit

What is the National Security PURPOSE for America?

Much time on risk, little on defining benefit

War and other non-covert actions have extensive

Process and oversight to make sure the PURPOSE/BENEFIT

Are clear and for the Country

As you look at some examples, ask

what the benefit is

whom it benefits

All actions in the national security realm have a risk versus benefit.

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CIA – has “operational responsibility. DNI – Seems to have notification only, but operational responsibility is ambiguous. Can review at request of president.

CIA or DoD. ” Rumsfeld wanted DoD. Sometimes involved.

DoD – Could be considered an act of war by international law. DoD could blur lines between covert action and war.

CIA – less comprehensive resources than DoD. Covert op may require DoD assets to support or execute successfully. Lack of assets may compromise mission.

9/11 Commission recommended Spec Ops Cmd execute. Bush decided against in 2005.

Legal funding issues – DoD (Title 10) and CIA (Title 50)

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Process - Execution

Discussion: Is it better to have covert actions done by the military, by the CIA, or by private contractors? Bureaucratic fighting? Is there Accountability with a deniable operation ? Avenues?

CIA advantages. Fast, cheap, agile, covert. Disadvantage, limited funds and capability. DOD has greater capability and new funding to support special operations. But legal constraints on DOD, including Geneva convention and desire to protect POWs. Also harder to keep covert once exposed.

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What does this mean?

Does it ever exist, or have real meaning?

How does it shape operations?

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Plausible Deniability

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One Definition:

Non-attribution to the United States for covert operations was the original and principal purpose of the so-called doctrine of "plausible denial." Evidence before the Committee clearly demonstrates that this concept, designed to protect the United States and its operatives from the consequences of disclosures, has been expanded to mask decisions of the president and his senior staff members.

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Plausible Deniability

Church Committee Reports United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Senate, Nov. 20, 1975, II. Section B Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation Page 11 .

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Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) to Adm. John Poindexter

Nunn: “Admiral, you've used the term during the course of the last four or five days a good many times, the term `plausible deniability.‘”

Poindexter: “Correct.”

Nunn: “Everybody I've talked to in the intelligence community and around town . . . tells me that the definition of that term is that when you set up plausible deniability for someone . . . they know the facts in question, but they can deny the knowledge, and that the denial is believable.”

PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY Series: The Iran-Contra Hearings: The Tenth Week of Testimony

Iran Contra Defines PD

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1953 - Iran (Mossadeq  Shah)

1954 - Guatemala (Arbenz)

1954 1948 - North Vietnam

1957 1973 - Laos

1961 - Congo (Lumumba  Mobutu)

1963 - Dominican Republic (Bosch)

1964 - Brazil (Goulart)

1965 - Indonesia (Sukarno  Suharto)

1970 - Cambodia

1973 - Chile (Allende  Pinochet)

1975 - Australia

1979 - Nicaragua (Sandinistas)

1986 - Iran Contra

A Short List of CA

PBSUCCESS – CIA trained Guat military force to overthrow Democratically elected Arbenz government

Arbenz wanted land reform which would effect United Fruit (now Chiquita), a large US Company.

Arbenz replaced by military junta headed by Colonel Carlos Castillo

Eisenhower authorized. CIA Director (A. Dulles) was board member of UF. Secretary of State (JF Dulles) law firm represented UF.