

BOOK II.

WHEN I had made these remarks I thought we had done with discussing: whereas it seems it was only a prelude. For Glaucon, with that eminent courage which he displays on all occasions, would not acquiesce in the retreat of Thrasymachus, and began thus: Socrates, do you wish really to convince us that it is on every account better to be just than to be unjust, or only to seem to have convinced us?

If it were in my power, I replied, I should prefer convincing you really.

Then, he proceeded, you are not doing what you wish. Let me ask you: Is there, in your opinion, a class of good things of such a kind that we are glad to possess them, not because we desire their consequences, but simply welcoming them for their own sake? Take, for example, the feelings of enjoyment and all those pleasures that are harmless, and that are followed by no result in the after time, beyond simple enjoyment in their possession.

Yes, I certainly think there is a class of this description.

Well, is there another class, do you think, of those which we value, both for their own sake and for their results? Such as intelligence, and sight, and health; all of which are welcome, I apprehend, on both accounts.

Yes.

And do you further recognize a third class of good things, which would include gymnastic training, and submission to medical treatment in illness, as well as the practice of medicine, and all other means of making money? Things like these we should describe as irksome, and yet beneficial to us; and while we should reject them viewed simply in themselves, we accept them for the sake of the emoluments, and of the other consequences which result from them.

Yes, undoubtedly there is such a third class also; but *what then?*

In which of these classes do you place justice?

358 I should say in the highest; that is, among the good things which will be valued by one who is in the pursuit of true happiness, alike for their own sake and for their consequences.

Then your opinion is not that of the many, by whom justice is ranked in the irksome class, as a thing which in itself, and for its own sake, is disagreeable and repulsive, but which it is well to practise for the credit of it, with an eye to emolument and a good name.

I know it is so: and under this idea Thrasyarchus has been for a long time disparaging justice and praising injustice. But apparently I am a dull scholar.

Pray then listen to my proposal, and tell me whether you agree to it. Thrasyarchus appears to me to have yielded like a snake to your fascination sooner than he need have done; but for my part I am not satisfied as yet with the exposition that has been given of justice and injustice; for I long to be told what they respectively are, and what force they exert, taken simply by themselves, when residing in the soul, dismissing the consideration of their rewards and other consequences. This shall be my plan then, if you do not object: I will revive Thrasyarchus's argument, and will first state the common view respecting the nature and origin of justice; in the second place, I will maintain that all who practise it do so against their will, because it is indispensable, not because it is a good thing; and thirdly, that they act reasonably in so doing, because the life of the unjust man is, as men say, far better than that of the just. Not that I think so myself, Socrates: only my ears are so dinning with what I hear from Thrasyarchus and a thousand others, that I am puzzled. Now I have never heard the argument for the superiority of justice over injustice maintained to my satisfaction; for I should like to hear a panegyric upon it, considered simply in itself: and from you if from any one, I should expect such a treatment of the subject. Therefore I will speak as forcibly as I can in praise of an unjust life, and I shall thus give you a specimen of the manner in which I wish to hear you afterwards censure injustice and commend justice. See whether you approve of my plan.

Indeed I do; for on what other subject could a sensible

ke better to talk and to hear others talk, again and

airably spoken! So now listen to me while I speak
first theme, the nature and the origin of justice.
commit injustice is, they say, in its nature, a good
and to suffer it an evil thing; but the evil of the
exceeds the good of the former; and so, after the two-
perience of both doing and suffering injustice, those 359
annot avoid the latter and compass the former find
edient to make a compact of mutual abstinence from
ce. Hence arose legislation and contracts between
nd man, and hence it became the custom to call
hich the law enjoined just, as well as lawful. Such,
ell us, is justice, and so it came into being; and it
midway between that which is best, to commit
ce with impunity, and that which is worst, to suffer
ce without any power of retaliating. And being a
between these two extremes, the principle of justice
arded with satisfaction, not as a positive good, but
se the inability to commit injustice has rendered it
le; for they say that one who had it in his power to
just, and who deserved the name of a man, would
be so weak as to contract with any one that both
arties should abstain from injustice. Such is the
t account, Socrates, of the nature of justice, and of
cumstances in which it originated.

truth of my second statement—that men practise
unwillingly, and because they lack the power to
it, will be most readily perceived, if we make a
sition like the following. Let us give full liberty to
st man and to the unjust alike, to do whatever they
, and then let us follow them, and see whither the
tion of each will lead him. In that case we shall
se the just man in the act of travelling in the same
on as the unjust, owing to that covetous desire, the
cation of which every creature naturally pursues as
l, only that it is forced out of its path by law, and
ained to respect the principle of equality. That
erty of action would, perhaps, be most effectually
d if they were invested with a power which they
as in old time possessed by the ancestor of Gyges
rdian. He was a shepherd, so the story runs, in
vice of the reigning sovereign of Lydia, when one

day a violent storm of rain fell, the ground was rent asunder by an earthquake, and a yawning gulf appeared on the spot where he was feeding his flocks. Seeing what had happened, and wondering at it, he went down into the gulf, and among other marvellous objects he saw, as the legend relates, a hollow brazen horse, with windows in its sides, through which he looked, and beheld in the interior a corpse, apparently of superhuman size; from which he took nothing but a golden ring off the hand, and therewith made his way out. Now when the usual meeting of the shepherds occurred, for the purpose of sending to the king their monthly report of the state of his flocks, this shepherd came with the rest, wearing the ring. And, as he was seated with the company, he happened to turn the hoop of the ring round towards himself, till it came to the inside of his hand. Whereupon he became invisible to his neighbours, who fell to talking about him as if he were gone away. While he was marvelling at this, he again began playing with the ring, and turned the hoop to the outside, upon which he became once more visible. Having noticed this effect, he made experiments with the ring, to see whether it possessed this virtue; and so it was, that when he turned the hoop inwards he became invisible, and when he turned it outwards he was again visible. After this discovery, he immediately contrived to be appointed one of the messengers to carry the report to the king; and upon his arrival he seduced the queen, and, conspiring with her, slew the king, and took possession of the throne.

360 If then there were two such rings in existence, and if the just and the unjust man were each to put on one, it is to be thought that no one would be so steeled against temptation as to abide in the practice of justice, and resolutely to abstain from touching the property of his neighbours, when he had it in his power to help himself without fear to any thing he pleased in the market, or to go into private houses and have intercourse with whom he would, or to kill and release from prison according to his own pleasure, and in every thing else to act among men with the power of a god. And in thus following out his desires the just man will be doing precisely what the unjust man would do; and so they would both be pursuing the same path. Surely this will be allowed to be

strong evidence that none are just willingly, but only by compulsion, because to be just is not a good to the individual; for all violate justice whenever they imagine that there is nothing to hinder them. And they do so because every one thinks that, in the individual case, injustice is much more profitable than justice; and they are right in so thinking, as the advocate of this doctrine will maintain. For if any one having this licence within his grasp were to refuse to do any injustice, or to touch the property of others, all who were aware of it would think him a most pitiful and irrational creature, though they would praise him before each other's faces, to impose on one another, through their fear of being treated with injustice. And so much for this topic.

But in actually deciding between the lives of the two persons in question, we shall be enabled to arrive at a correct conclusion, by contrasting together the thoroughly just and the thoroughly unjust man,—and only by so doing. Well then, how are we to contrast them? In this way. Let us make no deduction either from the injustice of the unjust, or from the justice of the just, but let us suppose each to be perfect in his own line of conduct. First of all then, the unjust man must act as skilful craftsmen do. For a first-rate pilot or physician perceives the difference between what is practicable and what is impracticable in his art, and while he attempts the former, he 361 lets the latter alone; and moreover, should he happen to make a false step, he is able to recover himself. In the same way, if we are to form a conception of a consummately unjust man, we must suppose that he makes no mistake in the prosecution of his unjust enterprises, and that he escapes detection: but if he be found out, we must look upon him as a bungler; for it is the perfection of injustice to seem just without really being so. We must therefore grant to the perfectly unjust man, without any deduction, the most perfect injustice: and we must concede to him, that while committing the grossest acts of injustice he has won himself the highest reputation for justice; and that should he make a false step, he is able to recover himself, partly by a talent for speaking with effect, in case he be called in question for any of his misdeeds, and partly because his courage and strength, and his com-

mand of friends and money, enable him to employ force with success, whenever force is required. Such being our unjust man, let us, in pursuance of the argument, place the just man by his side, a man of true simplicity and nobleness, resolved, as Æschylus¹ says, not to seem, but to be good. We must certainly take away the seeming; for if he be thought to be a just man, he will have honours and gifts on the strength of this reputation, so that it will be uncertain whether it is for justice's sake, or for the sake of the gifts and honours, that he is what he is. Yes; we must strip him bare of everything but justice, and make his whole case the reverse of the former. Without being guilty of one unjust act, let him have the worst reputation for injustice, so that his virtue may be thoroughly tested, and shewn to be proof against infamy and all its consequences; and let him go on till the day of his death, steadfast in his justice, but with a lifelong reputation for injustice, in order that, having brought both the men to the utmost limits of justice and of injustice respectively, we may then give judgment as to which of the two is the happier.

Good heavens! my dear Glaucon, said I, how vigorously you work, scouring the two characters clean for our judgment, like a pair of statues.

I do it as well as I can, he said. And after describing the men as we have done, there will be no further difficulty, I imagine, in proceeding to sketch the kind of life which awaits them respectively. Let me therefore describe it. And if the description be somewhat coarse, do not regard it as mine, Socrates, but as coming from those who commend injustice above justice. They will say that
 362 in such a situation the just man will be scourged, racked, fettered, will have his eyes burnt out, and at last, after suffering every kind of torture, will be crucified; and thus learn that it is best to resolve, not to be, but to seem, just. Indeed those words of Æschylus are far more applicable to the unjust man than to the just. For it is in fact the unjust man, they will maintain, inasmuch as he devotes himself to a course which is allied to reality, and does not live with an eye to appearances, who 'is resolved not to seem, but to be,' unjust,

¹ Seven against Thebes, 574.

'Reaping a harvest of wise purposes,
Sown in the fruitful furrows of his mind;'

being enabled first of all to hold offices of state through his reputation for justice, and in the next place to choose a wife wherever he will, and marry his children into whatever family he pleases, to enter into contracts and join in partnership with any one he likes, and besides all this, to enrich himself by large profits, because he is not too nice to commit a fraud. Therefore, whenever he engages in a contest, whether public or private, he defeats and overreaches his enemies, and by so doing grows rich, and is enabled to benefit his friends and injure his enemies, and to offer sacrifices and dedicate gifts to the gods in magnificent abundance: and thus having greatly the advantage of the just man in the means of paying court to the gods, as well as to such men as he chooses, he is also more likely than the just man, as far as probabilities go, to enjoy the favour of heaven. And therefore they affirm, Socrates, that a better provision is made both by gods and men for the life of the unjust, than for the life of the just.

When Glaucon had said this, before I could make the reply I was meditating, his brother Adeimantus exclaimed, You surely do not suppose, Socrates, that the doctrine has been satisfactorily expounded.

Why not, pray? said I.

The very point which it was most important to urge has been omitted.

Well then, according to the proverb, 'May a brother be present to help one,' it is for you to supply his deficiencies, if there are any, by your assistance. But indeed, for my part, what Glaucon has said is enough to prostrate me, and put it out of my power to come up to the rescue of justice.

You are not in earnest, he said: pray listen to the following argument also; for we must now go through those representations which, reversing the declarations of Glaucon, commend justice and disparage injustice, in order to bring out more clearly what I take to be his meaning. Now I apprehend that when parents and others set forth the duty of being just, and impress it upon *their children or those in whom they feel an interest, they do not praise justice in itself, but only the respectability*

which it gives; their object being that a reputation of justice may be gained, and that this reputation may bring in the preferment, the marriages, and the other good things which Glaucon has just told us are secured to the just man by his high character. And these persons can add the advantages of a good name still further; for, by introducing the good opinion of the gods, they are enabled to describe innumerable blessings which the gods, they say, grant to the pious, as the excellent Hesiod tells us, and Homer too; the former saying, that the gods cause the oak-trees of the just

‘On their tops to bear acorns, and swarms of bees in the middle.
Also their wool-laden sheep sink under the weight of the fleeces².’

with many other good things of the same sort: while the latter, in a similar passage, speaks of one,

‘Like to a blameless king, who, godlike in virtue and wisdom, Justice ever maintains; whose rich land fruitfully yields him Harvests of barley and wheat, and his orchards are beset with fruitage;

Strong are the young of his flocks; and the sea gives him fish in abundance³.’

But the blessings which Musæus and his son Eumolpus represent the gods as bestowing upon the just, are more delectable than these; for they bring them to the abode of Hades, and describe them as reclining on couches at a banquet of the pious, and with garlands on their heads spending all eternity in wine-bibbing, the fairest reward of virtue being, in their estimation, an everlasting carousal. Others, again, do not stop even here in their enumeration of the rewards bestowed by the gods; for they tell us that the man who is pious and true to his oath leaves children’s children and a posterity to follow him. Such, among others, are the commendations which they lavish upon justice. The ungodly, on the other hand, and the unjust, they plunge into a swamp in Hades, and condemn them to carry water in a sieve; and while they are still alive, they bring them into evil repute, and inflict upon the unjust precisely those punishments which Glaucon enumerated as the lot of the just who are reputed

² Hesiod, Works and Days, 231.

³ Homer, Odyssey, xix. 109.

to be unjust,—more they cannot. Such is their method of praising the one character and condemning the other.

Once more, Socrates, take into consideration another and a different mode of speaking with regard to justice and injustice, which we meet with both in common life and in the poets. All as with one mouth proclaim, that to be temperate and just is an admirable thing certainly, but at the same time a hard and an irksome one; while intemperance and injustice are pleasant things and of easy acquisition, and only rendered base by law and public opinion. But they say that honesty is in general less profitable than dishonesty, and they do not hesitate to call wicked men happy, and to honour them both in public and in private, when they are rich or possess other sources of power, and on the other hand to treat with dishonour and contempt those who are in any way feeble or poor, even while they admit that the latter are better men than the former. But of all their statements the most wonderful are those which relate to the gods and to virtue; according to which even the gods allot to many good men a calamitous and an evil life, and to men of the opposite character an opposite portion. And there are quacks and soothsayers who flock to the rich man's doors, and try to persuade him that they have a power at command, which they procure from heaven, and which enables them, by sacrifices and incantations performed amid feasting and indulgence, to make amends for any crime committed either by the individual himself or by his ancestors; and that, should he desire to do a mischief to any one, it may be done⁴ at a trifling expense, whether the object of his hostility be a just or an unjust man; for they profess that by certain invocations and spells they can prevail upon the gods to do their bidding. And in support of all these assertions they produce the evidence of poets: some, to exhibit the facilities of vice, quoting the words—

'Whoso wickedness seeks, may even in masses obtain it
Easily. Smooth is the way, and short, for nigh is her dwelling.
Virtue, Heav'n has ordained, shall be reached by the sweat of
the forehead⁵,'

⁴ *Βλάψαι*, the emendation of Muretus, seems preferable to *βλάψεν*, which is the reading of Bekker and the Zurich Edition.

⁵ *Hesiod, Works and Days, 287.*

and by a long and up-hill road ; while others, to prove the gods may be turned from their purpose by men adduce the testimony of Homer⁶, who has said :

‘Yea, even the gods do yield to entreaty;
Therefore to them men offer both victims and meek supplications,
Incense and melting fat, and turn them from anger to mercy
Sending up sorrowful prayers, when trespass and sin is committed.’

And they produce a host of books written by Musæus and Orpheus, children, as they say, of Selene and of the Muses, which form their ritual,—persuading not individuals merely, but whole cities also, that men may
365 absolved and purified from crimes, both while they are still alive and even after their decease, by means of certain sacrifices and pleasurable amusements which they call Mysteries: which deliver us from the torments of the other world, while the neglect of them is punished by awful doom.

When views like these, he continued, my dear Socrates are proclaimed and repeated with so much variety, concerning the honours in which virtue and vice are respectively held by gods and men, what can we suppose is the effect produced on the minds of all those young men of good natural parts who are able, after skimming like birds, as it were, over all that they hear, to draw conclusions from it, respecting the character which a man must possess, and the path in which he must walk, in order to live the best possible life? In all probability a young man would say to himself in the words of Pindar: ‘Shall I by justice or by crooked wiles climb to a lofty stronghold, and, having thus fenced myself about, live a long life?’ For common opinion declares that to be just without being also thought just, is no advantage to me, but only entails manifest trouble and loss; whereas if I am unjust and get myself a name for justice, an unspeakably happy life is promised me. Very well then; since it has the outward semblance, as the wise inform me, of overpowering the inward reality, and is the sovereign dispenser of

⁶ *Iliad*, ix. 497.

⁷ This passage is not found in Pindar’s extant works.

city, to this I must of course wholly devote myself: I must draw round about me a picture of virtue to serve as a frontage and exterior, but behind me I must trail the fox, of which that most clever Archilochus tells us, with its cunning and shiftiness⁸. Yes but, it will be objected, it is not an easy matter always to conceal one's wickedness. No, we shall reply, nor yet is anything else easy that is great: nevertheless, if happiness is to be our goal, this must be our path, as the steps of the argument indicate. To assist in keeping up the deception, we will form secret societies and clubs. There are, moreover, teachers of persuasion, who impart skill in popular and forensic oratory; and so by fair means or by foul, we shall gain our ends, and carry on our dishonest proceedings with impunity. Nay but, it is urged, neither evasion nor violence can succeed with the gods. Well, but if they either do not exist, or do not concern themselves with the affairs of men, why need *we* concern ourselves to evade their observation? But if they do exist, and do pay attention to us, we know nothing and have heard nothing of them from any other quarter than the current traditions and the genealogies of poets; and these very authorities state that the gods are beings who may be wrought upon and diverted from their purpose by sacrifices and meek supplications and votive offerings. Therefore we must believe them in both statements or in neither. If we are to believe them, we will act unjustly, and offer sacrifices from the proceeds of our crimes. For if we are just, we shall, 366 it is true, escape punishment at the hands of the gods, but we renounce the profits which accrue from injustice: but if we are unjust, we shall not only make these gains, but also by putting up prayers when we transgress and sin, we shall prevail upon the gods to let us go unscathed. But then, it is again objected, in Hades we shall pay the just penalty for the crimes committed here, either in our own

⁸ The difficulty of this passage, which appears to be fairly chargeable with confusion of metaphors, is increased by our ignorance of the fable of Archilochus, to which reference is made by other writers as well as Plato. It is probable, however, that the fox is here simply the emblem of selfish cunning, an application of which Archilochus set the first example in Greek literature.

persons or in those of our children's children. Nay, my friend, the champion of the argument will continue the mystic rites, again, are very powerful, and the absorbing divinities, as we are told by the mightiest cities, and by the sons of the gods who have appeared as poets and inspired prophets, who inform us that these things are

What consideration, therefore, remains which should induce us to prefer justice to the greatest injustice? Suppose if we combine injustice with a spurious decorum, we stand in fare to our liking with the gods and with men, in this and the next, according to the most numerous and highest authorities. Considering all that has been said, what device, Socrates, can a man who has any advantage either of high talent, or wealth, or personal appearance or birth, bring himself to honour justice, instead of standing when he hears it praised? Indeed, if there is any one who is able to shew the falsity of what we have said, and who is fully convinced that justice is best, far from being angry with the unjust, he doubtless makes great allowance for them, knowing that, with the exception of those who may possibly refrain from injustice through the disgust of a godlike nature or from the acquisition of genuine knowledge, there is certainly no one else who is willingly unjust but it is from cowardice, or age, or some other infirmity that men condemn injustice, simply because they lack power to commit it. And the truth of this is proved by the fact, that the first of these people who comes to power is the first to commit injustice, to the extent of his ability.

And the cause of all this is simply that fact, which my brother and I both stated at the very commencement of this address to you, Socrates, saying; With much respect be it spoken, you who profess to be admirers of justice, beginning with the heroes of old, of whom accounts have descended to the present generation, have every one of them without exception, made the praise of justice and condemnation of injustice turn solely upon the reputation for honour and gifts resulting from them: but what each of them, by its own peculiar force as it resides in the soul of its possessor, unseen either by gods or men, has never in poetry or in prose been adequately discussed, so as to shew that injustice is the greatest bane that a soul can receive into itself, and justice the greatest blessing. 1

this been the language held by you all from the first, and had you tried to persuade us of this from our childhood, we should not be on the watch to check one another in the commission of injustice, because every one would be his own watchman, fearful lest by committing injustice he might attach to himself the greatest of evils.

All this, Socrates, and perhaps still more than this, would be put forward respecting justice and injustice, by Thrasymachus, and I dare say by others also ; thus ignorantly reversing, in my opinion, the inherent efficacy of each. For my own part, I confess (for I do not want to hide anything from you) that I have a great desire to hear you defend the opposite view, and therefore I have exerted myself to speak as forcibly as I can. So do not limit your argument to the proposition, that justice is superior to injustice, but shew us what is that influence exerted by each of them on its possessor, whereby the one is in itself a blessing, and the other a bane ; and deduct the estimation in which the two are held, as Glaucon urged you to do. For if you omit to withdraw from each quality its true reputation and to add the false, we shall declare that you are praising, not the reality, but the semblance of justice, and blaming, not the reality, but the semblance of injustice ; that your advice, in fact, is to be unjust without being found out, and that you hold with Thrasymachus, that justice is another man's good, being for the interest of the stronger ; injustice a man's own interest and advantage, but against the interest of the weaker. Since then you have allowed that justice belongs to the highest class of good things, the possession of which is valuable, both for the sake of their results, and also in a higher degree for their own sake,—such as sight, hearing, intelligence, health, and everything else which is genuinely good in its own nature and not merely reputed to be good,—select for commendation this particular feature of justice, I mean the benefit which in itself it confers on its possessor, in contrast with the harm which injustice inflicts. The rewards and reputations leave to others to praise ; because in others I can tolerate this mode of praising justice and condemning injustice, which consists in eulogizing or reviling the reputations and the rewards which are connected with them ; but in you I cannot, *unless you require it*, because you have spent your whole

life in investigating such questions, and such only. Therefore do not content yourself with proving to us that justice is better than injustice; but shew us what is that influence exerted by each on its possessor, by which, whether gods and men see it or not, the one is in itself a blessing, and the other a bane.

- 368 Much as I had always admired the talents both of Glaucon and Adeimantus, I confess that on this occasion I was quite charmed with what I had heard; so I said: Fitly indeed did Glaucon's admirer address you, ye sons of the man there named, in the first line of his elegiac poem, after you had distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara, saying:

'Race of a famous man, ye godlike sons of Ariston.'

There seems to me to be great truth in this epithet, my friends: for there is something truly god-like in the state of your minds, if you are not convinced that injustice is better than justice, when you can plead its cause so well. I do believe that you really are not convinced of it. But I infer it from your general character; for judging merely from your statements I should have distrusted you: but the more I place confidence in you, the more I am perplexed how to deal with the case; for though I do not know how I am to render assistance, having learnt how unequal I am to the task from your rejection of my answer to Thrasymachus, wherein I imagined that I had demonstrated that justice is better than injustice; yet, on the other hand, I dare not refuse my assistance: because I am afraid that it might be positively sinful in me, when I hear Justice evil spoken of in my presence, to lose heart and desert her, so long as breath and utterance are left in me. My best plan, therefore, is to succour her in such fashion as I can.

Thereupon Glaucon, and all the rest with him, requested me by all means to give my assistance, and not to let the conversation drop, but thoroughly to investigate the real nature of justice and injustice, and which is the true doctrine with regard to their respective advantages. So I said what I really felt: The inquiry we are undertaking is no trivial one, but demands a keen sight, according to my notion of it. Therefore, since I am not a clever per-

think we had better adopt a mode of inquiry which is thus illustrated. Suppose we had been ordered to read small writing at a distance, not having very good sight, and that one of us discovered that the same thing was to be found somewhere else in larger letters, upon a larger space, we should have looked upon it as a piece of luck, I imagine, that we could read the first, and then examine the smaller, and observe whether the two were alike.

Doubtless we should, said Adeimantus; but what can you see to this, Socrates, in our inquiry after justice?

I will tell you, I replied. We speak of justice as residing in an individual mind, and as residing also in an city, do we not?

Certainly we do, he said.

Well, a city is larger than one man.

Yes, he said. Perhaps, then, justice may exist in larger proportions in the greater subject, and thus be easier to discover: so, if it is easier, let us first investigate its character in cities; afterwards let us apply the same inquiry to the individual, regarding for the counterpart of the greater as it exists in the mind of the less.

Good, he said, I think your plan is a good one.

When we were to trace in thought the gradual formation of a city, should we also see the growth of its justice and its injustice?

Perhaps we should.

Yes, if this were done, might we not hope to see more clearly the object of our search?

Yes, much more easily.

Will you give your advice, then, that we should attempt to carry out your plan? It is no trifling task, I imagine; therefore consider it well.

I have considered it, said Adeimantus; yes, do so by all means.

Well then, I proceeded, the formation of a city is due, I imagine, to this fact, that we are not individually independent, but have many wants. Or would you assign any other cause for the founding of cities?

I agree with you, he replied.

Thus it is, then, that owing to our many wants, and because each seeks the aid of others to supply his various requirements, we gather many associates and helpers into one dwelling-place, and give to this joint dwelling the name of city. Is it so?

Undoubtedly.

And every one who gives or takes in exchange, whatever it be that he exchanges, does so from a belief that he is consulting his own interest.

Certainly.

Now then, let us construct our imaginary city from the beginning. It will owe its construction, it appears, to our natural wants.

Unquestionably.

Well, but the first and most pressing of all wants is that of sustenance to enable us to exist as living creatures.

Most decidedly.

Our second want would be that of a house, and our third that of clothing and the like.

True.

Then let us know what will render our city adequate to the supply of so many things. Must we not begin with a husbandman for one, and a house-builder, and besides these a weaver? Will these suffice, or shall we add to them a shoemaker, and perhaps one or two more of the class of people who minister to our bodily wants?

By all means.

Then the smallest possible city will consist of four or five men.

So we see.

To proceed then: ought each of these to place his own work at the disposal of the community, so that the single husbandman, for example, shall provide food for four, spending four times the amount of time and labour upon the preparation of food, and sharing it with others; or
 370 must he be regardless of them, and produce for his own consumption alone the fourth part of this quantity of food, in a fourth part of the time, spending the other three parts, one in making his house, another in procuring himself clothes, and the third in providing himself with shoes, saving himself the trouble of sharing with others, and doing his own business by himself, and for himself?

To this Adeimantus replied, Well, Socrates, perhaps the former plan is the easier of the two.

Really, I said, it is not improbable; for I recollect, myself, after your answer, that, in the first place, no two persons are born exactly alike, but each differs from each in natural endowments, one being suited for one occupation, and another for another. Do you not think so?

I do.

Well; when is a man likely to succeed best? When he divides his exertions among many trades, or when he devotes himself exclusively to one?

When he devotes himself to one.

Again, it is also clear, I imagine, that if a person lets the right moment for any work go by, it never returns.

It is quite clear.

For the thing to be done does not choose, I imagine, to tarry the leisure of the doer, but the doer must be at the beck of the thing to be done, and not treat it as a secondary affair.

He must.

From these considerations it follows, that all things will be produced in superior quantity and quality, and with greater ease, when each man works at a single occupation, in accordance with his natural gifts, and at the right moment, without meddling with anything else.

Unquestionably.

More than four citizens, then, Adeimantus, are needed to provide the requisites which we named. For the husbandman, it appears, will not make his own plough, if it is to be a good one, nor his mattock, nor any of the other tools employed in agriculture. No more will the builder make the numerous tools which he also requires: and so of the weaver and the shoemaker.

True.

Then we shall have carpenters and smiths, and many other artisans of the kind, who will become members of our little state, and create a population.

Certainly.

Still it will not yet be very large, supposing we add to them neatherds and shepherds, and the rest of that class, *in order that the husbandmen may have oxen for ploughing, and the house-builders, as well as the husbandmen*

beasts of burden for draught, and the weavers and shoemakers wool and leather.

It will not be a small state, either, if it contains all these.

Moreover, it is scarcely possible to plant the actual city in a place where it will have no need of imports.

No, it is impossible.

Then it will further require a new class of persons to bring from other cities all that it requires.

It will.

Well, but if the agent goes empty-handed, carrying with him none of the commodities in demand among those
371 people from whom our state is to procure what it requires, he will also come empty-handed away: will he not?

I think so.

Then it must produce at home not only enough for itself, but also articles of the right kind and quantity to accommodate those whose services it needs.

It must.

Then our city requires larger numbers both of husbandmen and other craftsmen.

Yes, it does.

And among the rest it will need more of those agents also, who are to export and import the several commodities: and these are merchants, are they not?

Yes.

Then we shall require merchants also.

Certainly.

And if the traffic is carried on by sea, there will be a further demand for a considerable number of other persons, who are skilled in the practice of navigation.

A considerable number, undoubtedly.

But now tell me: in the city itself how are they to exchange their several productions? For it was to promote this exchange, you know, that we formed the community, and so founded our state.

Manifestly, by buying and selling.

Then this will give rise to a market and a currency, for the sake of exchange.

Undoubtedly.

Suppose then that the husbandman, or one of the other craftsmen, should come with some of his produce into the market, at a time when none of those who wish to

an exchange with him are there, is he to leave his occupation and sit idle in the market-place?

By no means: there are persons who, with an eye to this contingency, undertake the service required; and these in well-regulated states are, generally speaking, persons of excessive physical weakness, who are of no use in other kinds of labour. Their business is to remain on the spot in the market, and give money for goods to those who want to sell, and goods for money to those who want to buy.

This demand, then, causes a class of retail dealers to spring up in our city. For do we not give the name of retail dealers to those who station themselves in the market, to minister to buying and selling, applying the term merchants to those who go about from city to city?

Exactly so.

In addition to these, I imagine, there is also another class of operatives, consisting of those whose mental qualifications do not recommend them as associates, but whose bodily strength is equal to hard labour: these, selling the use of their strength and calling the price of it hire, are thence named, I believe, hired labourers. Is it not so?

Precisely.

Then hired labourers also form, as it seems, a complementary portion of a state.

I think so.

Shall we say then, Adeimantus, that our city has at length grown to its full stature?

Perhaps so.

Where then, I wonder, shall we find justice and injustice in it? With which of these elements that we have contemplated, has it simultaneously made its entrance?

I have no notion, Socrates, unless perhaps it be discoverable somewhere in the mutual relations of these same persons.

Well, perhaps you are right. We must investigate the matter, and not flinch from the task.

Let us consider then, in the first place, what kind of life will be led by persons thus provided. I presume they *will produce corn and wine, and clothes and shoes, and build themselves houses*; and in summer, no doubt, they

will generally work without their coats and shoes in winter they will be suitably clothed and shod they will live, I suppose, on barley and wheat, cakes of the meal, and kneading loaves of the flour spreading these excellent cakes and loaves upon straw or on clean leaves, and themselves recline upon rude beds of yew or myrtle-boughs, they will make themselves and their children, drinking their wine and wearing garlands, and singing the praises of the gods, and living in one another's society, and not begetting children by their means, through a prudent fear of poverty or want.

Glaucón here interrupted me, remarking, Apparent you describe your men as feasting without any relish their bread.

True, I said, I had forgotten :—of course they will want something to relish their food ; salt, no doubt, and oil, and cheese, together with the country fare of boiled fowls and cabbage. We shall also set before them a deal of figs and pease and beans ; and they may roast myrtle-berries and beech-nuts at the fire, taking with their fruit in moderation. And thus passing their lives in tranquillity and sound health, they will, in all probability, live to an advanced age, and dying, bequeath to their children a life in which their own will be reproduced.

Upon this Glaucon exclaimed, Why Socrates, if you were founding a community of swine, this is just the life in which you would feed them up !

How then, said I, would you have them live, Glaucon ?

In a civilized manner, he replied. They ought to live on couches, I should think, if they are not to have the life of swine, and dine off tables, and have the usual and dessert of a modern dinner.

Very good ; I understand. Apparently we are considering the growth not of a city merely, but of a luxurious city. I dare say it is not a bad plan : for by this discussion of our inquiry we shall perhaps discover how that justice and injustice take root in cities. It appears to me that the city which we have described is the genuine and, so to speak, healthy city. But
 373 I wish us also to contemplate a city that is suffering from inflammation, there is nothing to hinder us. Some will not be satisfied, it seems, with the fare or the life which we have described, but must have,

tion, couches and tables and every other article of furniture, as well as viands, and fragrant oils, and perfumes, and courtesans, and confectionary; and all these in plentiful variety. Moreover, we must not limit ourselves now to essentials in those articles which we specified at first, I mean houses and clothes and shoes, but we must set painting and embroidery to work, and acquire gold and ivory, and all similar valuables: must we not?

Yes.

Then we shall also have to enlarge our city, for our first or healthy city will not now be of sufficient size, but requires to be increased in bulk, and filled out with a multitude of callings, which do not exist in cities to satisfy any natural want; for example, the whole class of hunters, and all who practise imitative arts, including many who use forms and colours, and many who use music, poets also, with those of whom the poet makes use, rhapsodists, actors, dancers, contractors; lastly, the manufacturers of all sorts of articles, and among others those which form part of a woman's dress. We shall similarly require more personal servants, shall we not? that is to say, tutors, wet-nurses, dry-nurses, tire-women, barbers, and cooks moreover and confectioners? Swineherds again are among the additions we shall require,—a class of persons not to be found, because not wanted, in our former city, but needed among the rest in this. We shall also need great quantities of all kinds of cattle, for those who may wish to eat them; shall we not?

Of course we shall.

Then shall we not experience the need of medical men also, to a much greater extent under this than under the former regime?

Yes, indeed.

The country too, I presume, which was formerly adequate to the support of its then inhabitants will be now too small, and adequate no longer. Shall we say so?

Certainly.

Then must we not cut ourselves a slice of our neighbour's territory, if we are to have land enough both for pasture and tillage, while they will do the same to ours, if they, like us, permit themselves to overstep the limit of necessities, and plunge into the unbounded acquisition of wealth?

It must inevitably be so, Socrates.

Will our next step be to go to war, Glaucon, or how will it be?

As you say.

At this stage of our inquiry let us avoid asserting either that war does good or that it does harm, confining ourselves to this statement, that we have further traced the origin of war to causes which are the most fruitful sources of whatever evils befall a state, either in its corporate capacity, or in its individual members.

Exactly so.

Once more then, my friend, our state must receive an accession of no trifling extent, I mean that of a whole
174 army, which must go forth and do battle with all invaders in defence of its entire property, and of the persons whom we were just now describing.

How? he asked; are not those persons sufficient of themselves?

They are not, if you and all the rest of us were right in the admissions which we made, when we were modelling our state. We admitted, I think, if you remember, that it was impossible for one man to work well at many professions.

True.

Well then, is not the business of war looked upon as a profession in itself?

Undoubtedly.

And have we not as much reason to concern ourselves about the trade of war as about the trade of shoemaking?

Quite as much.

But we cautioned the shoemaker, you know, against attempting to be an agriculturist or a weaver or a builder besides, with a view to our shoemaking work being well done; and to every other artisan we assigned in like manner one occupation, namely, that for which he was naturally fitted, and in which, if he let other things alone, and wrought at it all his time without neglecting his opportunities, he was likely to prove a successful workman. Now is it not of the greatest moment that the work of war should be well done? Or is it so easy, that any one can succeed in it and be at the same time a husbandman or a shoemaker or a labourer at any other trade

whatever, although there is no one in the world who could become a good draught-player or dice-player by merely taking up the game at unoccupied moments, instead of pursuing it as his especial study from his childhood? And will it be enough for a man merely to handle a shield or any other of the arms and implements of war, to be straightway competent to play his part well that very day in an engagement of heavy troops or in any other military service, although the mere handling of any other instrument will never make any one a true craftsman or athlete, nor will such instrument be even useful to one who has neither learnt its capabilities nor exercised himself sufficiently in its practical applications.

If it were so, these implements of war would be very valuable.

In proportion, then, to the importance of the work which these guardians have to do, will it require peculiar freedom from other engagements, as well as extraordinary skill and attention.

I quite think so.

Will it not also require natural endowments suited to this particular occupation?

Undoubtedly.

Then, apparently, it will belong to us to choose out, if we can, that especial order of natural endowments which qualifies its possessors for the guardianship of a state.

Certainly; it belongs to us.

Then, I assure you, we have taken upon ourselves no trifling task; nevertheless, there must be no flinching, so long as our strength holds out.

No, there must not.

Do you think then, I asked, that there is any difference, 375
in the qualities required for keeping guard, between a well-bred dog and a gallant young man?

I do not quite understand you.

Why, I suppose, for instance, they ought both of them to be quick to discover an enemy, and swift to overtake him when discovered, and strong also, in case they have to fight when they have come up with him.

Certainly, all these qualities are required.

Moreover, they must be brave if they are to fight well.

Undoubtedly.

But will either a horse, or a dog, or any other animal,

be likely to be brave if it is not spirited⁹? or have you failed to observe what an irresistible and unconquerable thing spirit is, so that under its influence every creature will be fearless and unconquerable in the face of any danger?

I have observed it.

We know then what bodily qualities are required in our guardian.

We do.

And also what qualities of the mind, namely, that he must be spirited.

Yes.

How then, Glaucon, if such be their natural disposition are they to be kept from behaving fiercely to one another and to the rest of the citizens?

Really it will be difficult to obviate that.

Nevertheless, they certainly ought to be gentle to their friends, and dangerous only to their enemies: else they will not wait for others to destroy them, but will be the first to do it for themselves.

True.

What then shall we do? Where shall we find a character at once gentle and high-spirited? For I suppose gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one?

Apparently it is.

Nevertheless a man who is devoid of either gentleness or spirit cannot possibly make a good guardian. And if they seem to be incompatible, the result is, that a good guardian is an impossibility.

It looks like it, he said.

Here then I was perplexed, but having reconsidered our conversation, I said, We deserve, my friend, to be puzzled; for we have deserted the illustration which was set before us.

How so?

⁹ The reader will gather from the context the true meaning of the important word *θυμοειδής*. We have adopted the word 'spirited,' as the received and the least objectionable English rendering of it. This obliges us to translate *θυμός*, in the same sentence, 'spirit;' otherwise 'anger' would be a nearer English equivalent to it. A reference to any lexicon will shew the difficulty of conveying the force of *θυμοειδής* in a single English word: but its meaning is sufficiently indicated by Plato himself.

It never struck us, that after all there are natures, though we fancied there were none, which combine these opposite qualities.

Pray where is such a combination to be found?

You may see it in several animals, but particularly in the one which we ourselves compared to our guardian. For I suppose you know that it is the natural disposition of well-bred dogs to be perfectly gentle to their friends and acquaintance, but the reverse to strangers.

Certainly I do.

Therefore the thing is possible; and we are not contradicting nature in our endeavour to give such a character to our guardian.

So it would seem.

Then is it your opinion, that in one who is to make a good guardian it is further required that his character should be philosophical as well as high-spirited?

How so? I do not understand you.

You will notice in dogs this other trait, which is really marvellous in the creature.

What is that?

Whenever they see a stranger they are irritated before they have been provoked by any ill-usage; but when they see an acquaintance they welcome him, though they may never have experienced any kindness at his hands. Has this ever excited your wonder?

I never paid any attention to it hitherto; but no doubt they do behave so.

Well, but this instinct is a very clever thing in the dog, and a genuine philosophic symptom.

How so, pray?

Why, because the only mark by which he distinguishes between the appearance of a friend and that of an enemy is, that he knows the former and is ignorant of the latter. Now, I ask, can the creature be other than fond of learning when it makes knowledge and ignorance the criteria of the familiar and the strange?

Beyond a question, it must be fond of learning.

Well, is not the love of learning identical with a philosophical disposition?

It is.

Shall we not then assert with confidence in the case of *man also*, that if he is to shew a gentle disposition

towards his relatives and acquaintances, he must have a turn for learning and philosophy?

Be it so.

Then in our judgment the man whose natural gifts promise to make him a perfect guardian of the state will be philosophical, high-spirited, swift-footed, and strong.

Undoubtedly he will.

This then will be the original character of our guardians. But in what way shall we rear and educate them? And will the investigation of this point help us on towards discovering that which is the object of all our speculations, namely, the manner in which justice and injustice grow up in a state? For I wish us neither to omit anything useful, nor to occupy ourselves with anything redundant, in our inquiry.

Hereupon Glaucon's brother observed, Well, for my part, I fully anticipate that this inquiry will promote our object.

If so, I said, we must certainly not give it up, my dear Adeimantus, even though it should prove somewhat long.

Indeed we must not.

Come then, like idle story-tellers in a story, let us describe the education of our men.

Yes, let us do so.

What then is the education to be? Perhaps we could hardly find a better than that which the experience of the past has already discovered, which consists, I believe, in gymnastic for the body, and music for the mind.

It does.

Shall we not then begin our course of education with music rather than with gymnastic?

Undoubtedly we shall.

Under the term music, do you include narratives, or not?

I do.

And of narratives there are two kinds, the true and the false.

Yes.

377 And must we instruct our pupils in both, but in the false first?

I do not understand what you mean.

Do you not understand that we begin with children by

ling them fables? And these, I suppose, to speak generally, are false, though they contain some truths: and we employ such fables in the treatment of children at an earlier period than gymnastic exercises.

True.

That is what I meant when I said that music ought to be taken up before gymnastic.

You are right.

Then are you aware, that in every work the beginning is the most important part, especially in dealing with anything young and tender? for that is the time when any impression, which one may desire to communicate, is most readily stamped and taken.

Precisely so.

Shall we then permit our children without scruple to hear any fables composed by any authors indifferently, and so to receive into their minds opinions generally the reverse of those which, when they are grown to manhood, we shall think they ought to entertain?

No, we shall not permit it on any account.

Then apparently our first duty will be to exercise a superintendence over the authors of fables, selecting their good productions, and rejecting the bad. And the selected fables we shall advise our nurses and mothers to repeat to their children, that they may thus mould their minds with the fables even more than they shape their bodies with the hand. But we shall have to repudiate the greater part of those which are now in vogue.

Which do you mean? he asked.

In the greater fables, I answered, we shall also discern the less. For the general character and tendency of both the greater and the less must doubtless be identical. Do you not think so?

I do: but I am equally uncertain which you mean by the greater.

I mean the stories which Hesiod, and Homer, and the other poets, tell us. For they, I imagine, have composed fictitious narratives which they told, and yet tell, to men.

Pray what kind of fables do you mean, and what is the fault that you find with them?

A fault, I replied, which deserves the earliest and gravest condemnation, especially if the fiction has no beauty.

What is this fault?

It is whenever an author gives a bad representation of the characters of gods and heroes, like a painter whose picture should bear no resemblance to the objects he wishes to imitate.

Yes, it is quite right to condemn such faults: but pray explain further what we mean, and give some instances.

In the first place, the poet who conceived the boldest fiction on the highest subjects invented an ugly story, when he told how Uranus acted as Hesiod¹⁰ declares he did, and also how Cronus had his revenge upon him. And again, even if the deeds of Cronus¹¹, and his son's treatment of him, were authentic facts, it would not have been right, I should have thought, to tell them without the least reserve to young and thoughtless persons: on the contrary, it would be best to suppress them altogether: or, if for some reason they must be told, they should be imparted under the seal of secrecy to as few hearers as possible, and after the sacrifice, not of a pig¹², but of some rare and costly victim, which might aid to the utmost in restricting their number.

Certainly, these are offensive stories.

They are; and therefore, Adeimantus, they must not be repeated in our city. No: we must not tell a youthful listener that he will be doing nothing extraordinary if he commit the foulest crimes, nor yet if he chastise the crimes of a father in the most unscrupulous manner, but will simply be doing what the first and greatest of the gods have done before him.

I assure you, he said, I quite agree with you as to the impropriety of such stories.

Nor yet, I continued, is it proper to say in any case—what is indeed untrue—that gods wage war against gods, and intrigue and fight among themselves; that is, if the future guardians of our state are to deem it a most disgraceful thing to quarrel lightly with one another: far less ought we to select as subjects for fiction and embroidery, the battles of the giants, and numerous other feuds of all sorts, in which gods and heroes fight against their own

¹⁰ Hesiod, Theogony, 154.

¹¹ Ibid. 459.

¹² A pig was the usual victim at the Mysteries.

kith and kin. But if there is any possibility of persuading them, that to quarrel with one's fellow is a sin of which no member of a state was ever guilty, such ought rather to be the language held to our children from the first, by old men and old women, and all elderly persons: and such is the strain in which our poets must be compelled to write. But stories like the chaining of Hera by her son, and the flinging of Hephæstus out of heaven for trying to take his mother's part when his father was beating her, and all those battles of the gods which are to be found in Homer, must be refused admittance into our state, whether they be allegorical or not. For a child cannot discriminate between what is allegory and what is not; and whatever at that age is adopted as a matter of belief, has a tendency to become fixed and indelible, and therefore, perhaps, we ought to esteem it of the greatest importance that the fictions which children first hear should be adapted in the most perfect manner to the promotion of virtue.

There is certainly reason in this. But if any one were to proceed to ask us what these fictions are, and what the fables which convey them, how should we answer him?

To which I replied, My dear Adeimantus, you and I are not poets, on the present occasion, but founders of a state. 379 And founders ought certainly to know the moulds in which their poets are to cast their fictions, and from which they must not be suffered to deviate; but they are not bound to compose tales themselves.

You are right; but to use your own words, what should these moulds be in the case of Theology?

I think they may be described as follows: It is right, I presume, always to represent God as he really is, whether the poet describe him in an epic or a lyrical or a dramatic poem.

Yes, it is right.

Then surely *God* is good in reality, and is to be so represented?

Unquestionably.

Well, but nothing that is good is hurtful, is it?

I think not.

And does that which is not hurtful hurt?

By no means.

And does that which hurts not, do any evil?

I answer as before, no.

And that which does no evil cannot be the cause of any evil either?

How should it be?

Well: is that which is good beneficial?

Yes.

Then it is a cause of well-being?

Yes.

Then that which is good is not the cause of all things, but only of what is as it should be, being guiltless of originating evil.

Exactly so.

If that be so, then God, inasmuch as he is good, cannot be the cause of all things, according to the common doctrine. On the contrary, he is the author of only a small part of human affairs; of the larger part he is not the author: for our evil things far outnumber our good things: and the good things we must ascribe to no other than God, while we must seek elsewhere, and not in him, the causes of the evil things.

That seems to me the exact truth.

Then we must express our disapprobation, if Homer, or any other poet, is guilty of such a foolish blunder about the gods, as to tell us that two jars

‘By Zeus at his threshold are planted;
All good fortunes the one, all evil the other containeth¹³.’

And that he for whom Zeus mixes and gives of both,
‘One day lighteth on evil, and one day meeteth with blessing:’
but as for the man for whom there is no mixture, but who receives of one sort only,

‘Him over God’s wide earth fell ravenous hunger pursueth.’

Nor must we admit that

‘Zeus hath been made unto men both of weal and of woe
the dispenser.’

And if any one assert that the violation of oaths and treaties¹⁴, of which Pandarus was the author, was brought

¹³ *Iliad*, XXIV. 527.

¹⁴ *Iliad*, II. 69.

about by Athene and Zeus, we shall refuse our approbation: nor can we allow it to be said that the strife and trial of strength between the gods¹⁵ was instigated by Themis and Zeus, nor, again, must we let our young people hear that, in the words of Æschylus,

‘When to destruction God will plague a house,
He plants among its members guilt and sin¹⁶.’

But if a poet writes about the sufferings of Niobe, as Æschylus does in the play from which I have taken these lines, or the calamities of the house of Pelops, or the disasters at Troy, or any similar occurrences, either we must not allow him to call them the work of a god, or if they are to be so called, he must find out a theory to account for them, such as that for which we are now searching, and must say, that what the god did was righteous and good, and the sufferers were chastened for their profit; but we cannot allow the poet to say, that a god was the author of a punishment which made the objects of it miserable. No: if he should say that because the wicked are miserable, these men needed chastisement, and the infliction of it by the god was a benefit to them, we shall make no objection: but as to asserting that God, who is good, becomes the author of evil to any, we must do battle uncompromisingly for the principle, that fictions conveying such a doctrine as this, whether in verse or in prose, shall neither be recited or heard in the city, by any member of it, young or old, if it is to be a well-regulated city; because such language may not be used without irreverence, and is moreover both injurious to us and self-contradictory.

I vote with you, he said, for this law, which pleases me.

Then one of those theological laws or moulds, in accordance with which we shall require our speakers to speak, and our authors to write, will be to this effect, that God is not the author of all things, but only of such as are good.

You have proved it quite satisfactorily, he replied.

Well, here is a second for you to consider. Do you think that God is a wizard, and likely to appear for special purposes in different forms at different times, some-

¹⁵ *Iliad*, xx,

¹⁶ In a lost Tragedy,

times actually assuming such forms, and altering his own person into a variety of shapes, and sometimes deceiving us and making us believe that such a transformation has taken place; or do you think that he is of a simple essence, and that it is the most unlikely thing that he should ever go out of his own proper form?

I cannot answer you all at once.

Then answer me this: If anything passes out of its proper form must not the change be produced either by itself or some other thing?

It must.

And is it not the case that changes and motions, communicated by any thing else, affect least the things that are best? For instance, the body is changed by meat and drink and exertion, and every plant by sunshine and wind, and similar influences; but is not the change slightest in the plant or the body which is healthiest and strongest?

381 Undoubtedly it is.

So of the mind, is it not the bravest and the wisest that will be the least disturbed and altered by any influence from without?

Yes.

Moreover, I conceive that the same principle applies to all manufactured things, such as furniture, houses, and clothes: those that are well made and in good condition, are least altered by time and other influences.

That is true.

So that everything which is good either by nature or by art, or by both, is least liable to be changed by another thing.

So it would seem.

But surely God and the things of God are in every way most excellent.

Unquestionably.

Then God will be very unlikely to assume many shapes through external influence.

Very unlikely indeed.

But will he change and alter himself?

Clearly he must, if he alters at all.

Does he then, by changing himself, attain to something better and fairer, or to something worse and less beautiful than himself?

Something worse, necessarily, if he alters at all: for we

shall not, I presume, affirm that there is any imperfection in the beauty or the goodness of God.

You are perfectly correct; and this being the case, do you think, Adeimantus, that any god or any man would voluntarily make himself worse than he is, in any respect?

It is impossible.

Then it is also impossible for a god to be willing to change himself, and therefore it would seem that every god, inasmuch as he is perfect to the utmost in beauty and goodness, abides ever simply and without variation in his own form.

The inference is inevitable, I think.

Then, my dear friend, let no poet tell us that

‘Gods in the likeness of wandering strangers,
Bodied in manifold forms, go roaming from city to city¹⁷.’

And let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, or introduce in tragedies or any other poems, Hera transformed, collecting in the guise of a priestess,

‘Alms for the life-giving children of Inachus, river of Argos¹⁸.’

Not to mention many other similar falsehoods, which we must interdict. And once more, let not our mothers be persuaded by these poets into scaring their children by injudicious stories, telling them how certain gods go about by night in the likeness of strangers from every land; that they may not by one and the same act defame the gods, and foster timidity in their children.

No, let that be forbidden.

But perhaps, I continued, though the gods have no tendency to change in themselves, they induce us, by deception and magic, to believe that they appear in various forms.

Perhaps they do.

Would a god consent to lie, think you, either in word, 382 or by an act, such as that of putting a phantom before our eyes?

I am not sure.

Are you not sure that a genuine lie, if I may be allowed the expression, is hated by all gods and by all men?

¹⁷ *Homer, Odyssey, XVII, 485.*

¹⁸ *Supposed to be quoted from a lost play of Æschylus.*

I do not know what you mean.

I mean, that to lie with the highest part of himself, and concerning the highest subjects, is what no one voluntarily consents to do; on the contrary, every one fears above all things to harbour a lie in that quarter.

I do not even yet understand you.

Because you think I have some mysterious meaning; whereas what I mean is simply this: that to lie, or be the victim of a lie, and to be without knowledge, in the mind and concerning absolute realities, and in that quarter to harbour and possess the lie, is the last thing any man would consent to; for all men hold in especial abhorrence an untruth in a place like that.

Yes, in most especial abhorrence.

Well, but, as I was saying just now, this is what might most correctly be called a genuine lie, namely, ignorance, residing in the mind of the deluded person. For the spoken lie is a kind of imitation and embodiment of the anterior mental affection, and not a pure, unalloyed falsity; or am I wrong?

No, you are perfectly right.

Then a real lie is hated not only by gods, but likewise by men.

So I think.

Once more: when and to whom is the verbal falsehood useful, and therefore undeserving of hatred? Is it not when we are dealing with an enemy? Or when those that are called our friends attempt to do something mischievous in a fit of lunacy or madness of any kind, is it not then that a lie is useful, like a medicine, to turn them from their purpose? And in the legendary tales of which we were talking just now, is it not our ignorance of the true history of ancient times which renders falsehood useful to us, as the closest attainable copy of the truth?

Yes, that is exactly the case.

Then on which of these grounds is lying useful to God? Will he lie for the sake of approximation, because he knows not the things of old?

No; that would be indeed ridiculous.

Then there is no place in God for the poet's falsehood.

I think not.

Then will he lie through fear of his enemies?

Far from it.

Or because his friends are foolish or mad?

Nay, said he; no fool or madman is a friend of the gods.

Then there is no inducement for a god to lie.

There is not.

In every way then the nature of gods and godlike beings is incapable of falsehood.

Yes, wholly so.

God then is a Being of perfect simplicity and truth, both in deed and word, and neither changes in himself nor imposes upon others, either by apparitions, or by words, or by sending signs, whether in dreams or in waking moments.

I believe it to be so myself, he said, after what you have 383 stated.

Then do you grant that a second principle, in accordance with which all speaking and writing about the gods must be moulded, is this: That the gods neither metamorphose themselves like wizards, nor mislead us by falsehoods expressed either in word or act?

I do grant it.

Then while we commend much in Homer, we shall refuse to commend the story of the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon¹⁹, as well as that passage in Æschylus²⁰, where Thetis says that Apollo singing at her marriage,

‘Dwelt on my happy motherhood,
The life from sickness free, and lengthened years.
Then all-inclusively he blest my lot,
Favoured of heaven, in strains that cheer’d my soul.
And I too fondly deem’d those lips divine
Sacred to truth, fraught with prophetic skill;
But he himself who sang, the marriage-guest
Himself, who spake all this, ’twas even he
That slew my son.’

When a poet holds such language concerning the gods, we shall be angry with him, and refuse him a chorus²¹, neither shall we allow our teachers to use his writings for

¹⁹ Iliad, II. 1.

²⁰ From a lost play.

²¹ ‘To give a chorus,’ was to authorize and supply the means of a stage representation, of which the chorus formed the most expensive element.

the instruction of the young, if we would have our guardians grow up to be as godlike and godfearing as it is possible for man to be.

I entirely acquiesce, said he, in the propriety of these principles, and would adopt them as laws.

BOOK III.

cerning the gods, then, I continued, such, as it appear, is the language to be held, and such the age to be forbidden, in the hearing of all, from good upwards, who are hereafter to honour the gods their parents, and to set no small value on mutual ship.

s, he said; and I think our views are correct.

proceed then: if we intend our citizens to be brave, we not add to this such lessons as are likely to pre- them most effectually from being afraid of death? you think a man can ever become brave who is ed by the fear of death?

, indeed, I do not.

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: certainly must.

en we shall expunge the following passage, and with that are like it:

would e'en be a villein, and drudge on the lands of a master,

nder a portionless wight, whose garner was scantily furnished,

ooner than reign supreme in the realm of the dead that have perished¹.

¹ *Odyssey*, xi. 489.

BOOK III.

CONCERNING the gods, then, I continued, such, as it would appear, is the language to be held, and such the language to be forbidden, in the hearing of all, from childhood upwards, who are hereafter to honour the gods and their parents, and to set no small value on mutual friendship.

Yes, he said; and I think our views are correct.

To proceed then: if we intend our citizens to be brave, must we not add to this such lessons as are likely to preserve them most effectually from being afraid of death? or do you think a man can ever become brave who is haunted by the fear of death?

No, indeed, I do not.

Well, do you imagine that a believer in Hades and its terrors will be free from all fear of death, and in the day of battle will prefer it to defeat and slavery?

Certainly not.

Then apparently we must assume a control over those who undertake to set forth these fables, as well as the others, requesting them not to revile the other world in that unqualified manner, but rather to speak well of it, because such language is neither true, nor beneficial to men who are intended to be warlike.

We certainly must.

Then we shall expunge the following passage, and with it all that are like it:

‘I would e’en be a villein, and drudge on the lands of a
master,
Under a portionless wight, whose garner was scantily furnished,
Sooner than reign supreme in the realm of the dead that
have perished¹.’

¹ *Odyssey*, xi. 489.

And this ;

‘ And those chambers be seen both by mortal men and im-
mortals,
Terrible, dank, and mouldering,—even to gods an abhor-
rence².’

And,

‘ Well-a-day ! Truly there are, yea e’en in the dwellings o
Hades,
Souls and phantom forms ; but no understanding is in
them³.’

And,

‘ Wisdom is *his* alone, ’mid the flitting and shadowy phan-
toms⁴.’

And,

‘ Vanish’d the soul from the limbs, and flew to the nether
most Hades,
Sadly her destiny wailing, cut off in the ripeness of man-
hood⁵.’

And,

387 ‘ Gibbering, under the ground his spirit fled, like a vapour⁶.

And,

‘ As when bats, in the depth of a cavern’s awful recesses,
Haply if one fall off from the rock where they hang in
a cluster,
Squealing flutter about, and still cling fast to each other,
Thus did the ghosts move squealing together⁷.’

These verses, and all that are like them, we shall intreat Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we censure, not because they are unpoetical, or otherwise that agreeable to the ear of most men ; but because, in proportion as they are more poetical, so much the less ought they to be recited in the hearing of boys and men, whom we require to be freemen, fearing slavery more than death.

By all means let us do so.

² *Iliad*, XX. 64.

⁴ *Odyssey*, X. 495.

⁶ *Iliad*, XXIII. 100.

³ *Iliad*, XXIII. 103.

⁵ *Iliad*, XVI. 856.

⁷ *Odyssey*, XXIV. 6.

we must likewise cast away all those terrible and g names which belong to these subjects, the Coccynd Styxes⁸, and infernals, and anatomies, and all words coined after this stamp, the mention of nakes men shudder to the last degree with fear. say that for some other purpose they may be use: we are afraid for our guardians, lest the terrors in n should render them more spiritless⁹ and effemi- an they ought to be.

our fears are not groundless.

then we are to discard those expressions, are we?

to speak and write after the model which is the of this?

ply so.

shall we also strike out the weepings and the s of the heroes of renown?

we must, if we strike out the former.

consider, whether we shall be right or not in g them out. What we maintain is, that a good ill not look upon death as a dreadful thing for r good man, whose friend he also is, to undergo.

to maintain it.

if so, he will not lament over such a person as if readful disaster had befallen him.

ainly not.

over, we say this also, that such a man contains himself, in the highest degree, whatever is neces- r a happy life, and is distinguished from the rest world by his peculiar independence of external es.

is.

it is less dreadful to him than to any one to lose or a brother, or worldly wealth, or anything else kind.

ed it is.

, he is also less likely than any one to complain,

e etymology of these words connects them with 'wailing,' iteful.'

: prefer to read, with Ast, ἀθυμότεροι. But θερμότεροι, ding of the Zurich Text, might be rendered, 'less

and will rather bear it with all meekness, whenever any such calamity has overtaken him.

Yes, quite so.

Then we shall do well to strike out the dirges put in the mouths of famous men, and make them over to women (and those not the best of their sex), and to the baser sort
388 of men, in order that those whom we profess to be training up to be the guardians of their country may scorn to act like such persons.

It will be well to do so.

Then once more, we shall request Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles, the son of a goddess, as 'tossing'¹⁰ now on his side, and now once more on his back, now on his face; and then as rising up and 'pacing in frenzy the shore of the waste untameable ocean;' nor yet as taking in both hands black burnt-out ashes¹¹, and pouring them over his head; nor as otherwise indulging in all that weeping and wailing which Homer has attributed to him: and not to describe Priam, whose near ancestor was a god, as making supplication, and

'Rolling in dung, and by name to every man loudly appealing'¹²;

and still more earnestly we shall beg them, whatever they do, not to represent the gods as complaining and saying,

'Wretch that I am! who bare to my sorrow the bravest of children'¹³,—

or, if they will not so far respect all the gods, at least we shall entreat them not to presume to draw so unlike a picture of the highest of the gods, as to make him say,

'Well-a-day! Him whom I love, pursued round the walls of the city,

Thus with these eyes I behold, and my heart is troubled within me'¹⁴.

And,

'Ah! woe's me for the doom, that the dearest of mortals, Sarpedon,

Must by Patroclus, Menoetius' son, be slain in the combat'¹⁵.

¹⁰ *Iliad*, XXIV. 10.

¹² *Iliad*, XXII. 168.

¹⁴ *Iliad*, XXII. 168.

¹¹ *Iliad*, XVIII. 23.

¹³ *Iliad*, XVIII. 54.

¹⁵ *Iliad*, XVI. 433.

For if, my dear Adeimantus, our young men were to listen seriously to such accounts, instead of laughing at them as unworthy descriptions, it would be very unlikely that any one of them should look upon himself, that is but a man, as above such behaviour, and rebuke himself if he were ever betrayed into it, either in word or act: nay rather, unchecked by shame or fortitude, he will chant a multitude of dirges and laments over even trivial misfortunes.

You speak with great truth.

But he ought not so to do, as we have just been taught by our argument; to which we must give heed, until some one can persuade us by another and a better one.

Certainly, he ought not.

Again, our guardians ought not to be given to laughter, for when any one indulges in violent laughter, such excess almost universally invites an equally violent reaction.

I think so.

Then if a poet represents even men of any consideration as overcome by laughter, our approval must be withheld; much more if gods are so described. 389

Much more indeed.

That being the case, we shall not allow Homer to speak of the gods in such terms as the following:

'Straight 'mid the blessed gods brake forth unquenchable
laughter,
When they beheld Hephæstus go bustling from chamber to
chamber¹⁶.'

We must not sanction such language, according to your principles.

If you like to call them mine, he replied: no doubt we must not sanction them.

But again, a high value must be set also upon truth. For if we were right in what we said just now, and falsehood is really useless to the gods, and only useful to men in the way of a medicine, it is plain that such an agent must be kept in the hands of physicians, and that unprofessional men must not meddle with it.

Evidently.

¹⁶ *Iliad*, I. 599.

To the rulers of the state then, if to any, it belongs of right to use falsehood, to deceive either enemies or their own citizens, for the good of the state: and no one else may meddle with this privilege. Nay, for a private person to tell a lie to such magistrates, we shall maintain to be at least as great a mistake as for a patient to deceive his physician, or a pupil his training-master, concerning the state of his own body; or for a sailor to tell an untruth to a pilot concerning the ship and the crew, in describing his own condition or that of any of his fellow-sailors.

Most true.

If then the authorities find any one else guilty of lying in the city,

‘Any of those that be craftsmen,
Prophet and seer, or healer of hurts, or worker in timber¹⁷,’

they will punish him for introducing a practice as pernicious and subversive in a state as in a ship.

Yes, he said, if performance follow upon profession.

Once more, will not our young men need to be temperate?

Undoubtedly they will.

And does not sobriety, as generally understood, imply the following principal elements: first, that men be obedient to their governors; and secondly, that they be themselves able to govern the pleasures which are gratified in eating, and drinking, and love?

I think so.

Then we shall approve, I imagine, of all language like that which Homer puts in the mouth of Diomedes:

‘Friend, sit down in silence, and give good heed to my sayings¹⁸,’

and of the lines that follow,

‘Wrath-breathing march’d the Achæans,
Silently dreading their captains:’

¹⁷ *Odyssey*, XVII. 383.

¹⁸ *Iliad*, IV. 412. The second clause of the next quotation is from the same book, line 431, but the first clause is now found in book III. 3. Plato himself probably quotes from memory, as *Socrates* is supposed to be doing.

nd of every thing else of the same kind.

Yes, we shall.

But can we approve of such language as this,

‘Drunken sot, who the face of a dog and the heart of a deer
hast¹⁹,’

nd of what follows, and all the other insolent expressions 390
which in prose or in poetry are put into the mouths of in-
feriors towards those in authority?

No, we cannot.

Because, I imagine, they do not tend to promote so-
riety in youth. If on other accounts they give any grati-
fication we need not be surprised. Is this your opinion?

It is.

But tell me: when the wisest of men is represented as
saying that it appears to him the finest sight in the world,
when

‘Tables are loaded

Both with bread and with flesh, and the cup-bearers draw
from the wine-bowl

Sparkling draughts, which they carry around, and replenish
the goblets²⁰,’

do you think that being told this will aid a young man in
acquiring self-control? or this—

‘’Tis most wretched by famine to die, and one’s doom to
encounter²¹.’

Or what do you think of representing Zeus as so readily
forgetting, in the eagerness of his desire, all that he had
been meditating, as he watched alone, while all others,
gods and men, were asleep; and so smitten at the sight of
Hera, that he would not even defer the gratification of his
passion till they should enter into their chamber, saying
that he was possessed by a stronger passion than even
then, when at first they met without the knowledge of
their dear parents? And what say you to the story²² how
Ares and Aphrodite were bound in fetters by Hephæstus
as a consequence of a similar proceeding?

Upon my word, he replied, such stories strike me as
very improper to be told.

¹⁹ *Iliad*, I. 225.

²⁰ *Odyssey*, IX. 8. This is said by Ulysses.

²¹ *Odyssey*, XII. 342.

²² *Odyssey*, VIII. 266.

But whatever acts of fortitude under all trials in deed and word are ascribed to men of renown, these we will contemplate and listen to, as for instance,

'Smiting his breast, to his heart thus spake he in accents
chiding,
Patience, I pray thee, my heart: thou hast borne even
worse provocation²³.'

Yes, by all means.

Further, we must not permit our men, I presume, to be receivers of bribes or lovers of money?

Certainly not.

Then we must not sing to them that

'Gods are persuaded by gifts, by gifts dread kings are persuaded²⁴.'

Nor must we praise Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, or allow that he spoke with wisdom when he advised him²⁵ to aid the Achæans if he received presents from them, but without presents not to dismiss his anger. And we should not believe or allow that Achilles himself was so avaricious as to take gifts from Agamemnon, and at another time to give up a dead body only on condition of receiving a price for it.

No; it is not right to commend such stories.

It is only my regard to Homer, I continued, that makes me slow to assert that it is a positive sin to say the things of Achilles, or to believe them when others say them: or again, to believe that he said to Apollo,

'Thou, far-worker, hast harmed me, no god so destructive thou art:

Verily, had I the power, I would take vengeance upon thee²⁶.'

and that he behaved in so refractory a manner to the river²⁷, who was a god, as to be prepared to fight with him; and that he said of the hair that was consecrated to the other river Spercheius,

'Fain would I offer this hair as a gift to the hero Patroclus²⁸,

²³ *Odyssey*, XX. 17.

²⁵ *Iliad*, IX. 515.

²⁷ *Iliad*, XXI. 130.

²⁴ Supposed to be from Hesiod.

²⁶ *Iliad*, XXII. 15.

²⁸ *Iliad*, XXIII. 151.

was then a corpse, and that he fulfilled his purpose; these tales are not to be believed. And again, all the tales²⁹ of his dragging Hector round the tomb of Patroclus and of his immolation of the captives on the funeral pile we shall unhesitatingly declare untrue; and we shall allow our young men to be persuaded that Achilles, son of a goddess and of Peleus,—who was a most distinguished prince, and third in descent from Zeus,—and the son of Cheiron, that wisest of teachers, was yet such a compound of confusions, as to combine in himself two opposite maladies as mean covetousness and arrogant contempt of gods and men.

You are right.

Then let us not believe, once more, or allow it to be said, that Theseus the son of Poseidon, and Peirithous the son of Zeus, went forth to commit so dire a rape; nor any other god-sprung hero could have ventured to perpetrate such dreadful impieties as at the present day are falsely ascribed to them: rather let us oblige our poets to admit, either that the deeds in question were not theirs, or else that they were not children of gods; but let us beware of combining the two assertions, and of attempting to make our young men believe that the gods are parents of evil, and that heroes are no better than common men: for, as we said above, these statements are at once irreverent and untrue; for we have proved, I believe, that evils cannot originate with the gods.

Undoubtedly we have.

And besides, such language is pernicious to the hearers: every one will be indulgent to vice in himself, if he is convinced that such were and still are the practices of the gods who are

‘Kinsfolk of gods, not far from Zeus himself,
Whose is the altar to ancestral Zeus
Upon the hill of Ida, in the sky;
And still within their veins flows blood divine³⁰.’

And these accounts we must suppress such fables, lest they engender in our young men a great aptitude for wickedness.

²⁹ *Iliad*, XXII. 394; and XXIII. 175.

³⁰ From the Niobe of Æschylus.

I entirely agree with you.

What class then still remains, I continued, to complete our description of the kinds of narratives which may or may not be circulated? We have already stated what rules must be regarded in speaking of the gods, and the demigods, and heroes, and the souls of the departed.

We have.

Then the mode of speaking about men will be the remaining subject, will it not?

Yes, obviously.

It is quite impossible, my friend, to settle this at the present stage of our inquiry.

How so?

Because, I imagine, we shall assert that in fact poets and writers of prose are alike in error in the most important particulars, when they speak of men,—making out that many are happy, though unjust, and many just, yet miserable, and that injustice is profitable if it be not found out, whereas justice is a gain to your neighbour, but a loss to yourself: and I imagine we shall forbid the use of such language, and lay our commands on all writers to express the very opposite sentiments in their songs and their legends. Do you not think so?

Nay, I am sure of it.

Then, as soon as you admit that I am right in that, shall I not fairly maintain that you have admitted the very proposition which is the subject of our inquiry?

Your assumption is correct, he replied.

Then must we not postpone coming to an agreement as to the terms to be employed in speaking of men, till we have first discovered the real nature of justice, and proved that it is naturally profitable to its possessor, whether he have the character of being just or not?

You are perfectly right.

Let us then here close our discussion of the subject-matter of narratives: our next task, I imagine, is to investigate the question of their form; and this done, we shall have thoroughly considered both what ought to be said, and the mode of saying it.

Here Adeimantus remarked, I do not understand what you mean by that.

Well, but it is important that you should, said I. Per-

haps you will see it better when I put it in this way. May not all the compositions of poets or legend-writers be described as narrations of past, present, or future events?

What else could they be?

Then does not the author obtain his object, either by narration simple, or by narration conveyed through the medium of imitation, or by a mixture of both?

This also, he said, still requires to be made more intelligible to me.

Apparently I am a ridiculously unintelligible teacher. I will therefore proceed like a man who has not the gift of making speeches; I will not attempt the general question, but I will detach a particular instance, and endeavour thereby to make my meaning clear to you. Tell me then, are you well acquainted with the beginning of the *Iliad*, in which the poet tells us that Chryses besought Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that Agamemnon was angry with him; whereupon Chryses, finding his suit denied, prayed to his god to avenge him on the Achæans?

393

I am.

You know then that down to the lines,

‘ He petitioned all the Achæans,
Chiefly the twain that marshalled the host, the children of
Atreus,’

the poet speaks in his own person, and does not even attempt to divert our thoughts into supposing that the speaker is any other than himself: but in what follows he speaks in the person of Chryses, and endeavours, so far as he can, to make us believe that it is not Homer who is speaking, but the aged priest. And in this style, as nearly as may be, he has constructed all the rest of his narrative of the Trojan war, as well as of the events that took place in Ithaca, and throughout the *Odyssey*.

Just so.

It is equally narration, is it not, whether the poet is reciting the occasional speeches, or describing the intermediate events?

Undoubtedly it is.

But when he delivers a speech in the character of another man, shall we not say that on every such occasion

he aims at the closest resemblance in style to the person introduced as the speaker?

We shall, of course.

And when one man assumes a resemblance to another, in voice or look, is not that imitation?

Undoubtedly it is.

Then in such a case it appears that both Homer and other poets carry on the narration through the medium of imitation.

Certainly they do.

But if the poet nowhere concealed his own personality, he would have completed his composition and narration wholly without imitation. That you may not say again that you do not understand how this would be, I will tell you. If Homer,—after saying that Chryses came, bringing his daughter's ransom, in the character of a suppliant to the Achæans, and above all to the kings,—had continued to speak, not as if he had become Chryses, but as if he were Homer still, that, you know, would have been not imitation, but simple narration. The story would have run in something like the following manner. I shall tell it in prose, for I am no poet. The priest came and prayed that the gods might grant to the Greeks the capture of Troy, and a safe return, if only they would release unto him his daughter, accepting the ransom, and reverencing his god. And when he had thus spoken, all the rest were moved with awe, and were willing to consent; but Agamemnon was wroth, and charged him to depart, and come again no more, lest the staff and the wreaths of the god should avail him nought; and ere his daughter should be set free, he said, she should grow old with him in Argos; so he bade him begone, and avoid provoking him, if he wished to reach home unhurt. And
394 the old man, when he heard it, was afraid, and went away in silence; but when he was clear of the camp he prayed much to Apollo, calling upon the god by his titles, and putting him in remembrance, and asking to be repaid, if ever he had presented an acceptable offering to him in the building of temples or the sacrifice of oblations: in consideration of which things he prayed that he would avenge his tears upon the Achæans, by shooting his arrows among them. In this, my friend, we have simple narration without imitation.

I understand, he said.

I would further have you understand, that the opposite result ensues, when you strike out the poet's own words that stand between the speeches, leaving only the alternate dialogue.

Yes, I understand : tragedies are a case of this sort.

You are perfectly right in your supposition. Now I think I can make you see clearly what before I could not, that one branch of poetry and legend-writing consists wholly of imitation, that is, as you say, tragedy and comedy ; another branch employs the simple recital of the poet in his own person, and is chiefly to be found, I imagine, in dithyrambic poetry ; while a third employs both recital and imitation, as is seen in the construction of epic poems, and in many other instances, if I make you understand me.

Yes, I quite comprehend now what you meant by that first remark.

Now then recall what we said previously ; which was, that having settled the question of the matter of composition, it only remained for us to consider the manner.

I remember.

This then was precisely what I meant ; that it was incumbent on us to come to an agreement, whether we should allow our poets, in telling their story, to employ imitation exclusively, or partially, (and, if so, by what criterion they should be guided,) or not at all.

I divine, said he, that you are speculating whether we shall admit tragedy and comedy into our city, or not.

It may be so, I replied : and it may be that other claims will be questioned besides those of tragedy and comedy : in fact, I do not yet know myself ; but we must go where the argument carries us, as a vessel runs before the wind.

You are quite right.

Here then is a question for you to consider, Adeimantus,—Ought our guardians to be apt imitators, or not ? Or does it follow, from our previous admissions, that any individual may pursue with success one calling, but not many ; or, if he attempts this, by his meddling with many he will fail in all, so far as to gain no distinction in any ?

That would undoubtedly be the case.

Does not the same principle apply to imitation, or can the same person imitate many things as well as he can imitate one?

Certainly he cannot.

395 It is very improbable, then, that one who is engaged in any important calling, will at the same time know how to imitate a variety of things, and be a successful imitator: for even two branches of imitation, which are thought to be closely allied, are more, I believe, than can be successfully pursued together by the same person; as, for instance, the writing of comedy and of tragedy, which you described just now as imitations, did you not?

I did; and you are right in saying that the same persons cannot succeed in both.

Nor yet can a man combine the professions of a reciter of epic poetry and an actor.

True.

Nay, the same actor cannot even play both Tragedy and Comedy; and all these are arts of imitation, are they not?

They are.

And human nature appears to me, Adeimantus, to be split up into yet more minute subdivisions than these, so that a man is unable to imitate many things well, or to do the things themselves of which the imitations are likenesses.

Most true.

If then we are to maintain our first view, that our guardians ought to be released from every other craft, that they may acquire consummate skill in the art of creating their country's freedom, and may follow no other occupation but such as tends to this result, it will not be desirable for them either to practise or to imitate anything else; or if they do imitate, let them imitate from very childhood whatever is proper to their profession,—brave, sober, religious, honourable men, and the like,—but meanness, and every other kind of baseness, let them neither practise nor be skilled to imitate, lest from the imitation they be infected with the reality. For have you not perceived that imitations, whether of bodily gestures, tones of voice, or modes of thought, if they be persevered in from an early age, are apt to grow into habits and a second nature?

Certainly I have.

Then we shall not permit those in whom we profess to take an interest, and whom we desire to become good men, to imitate a woman, being themselves men, whether she be young or old, either reviling a man, or striving and vaunting against the gods, in the belief of her own felicity; or taken up with misfortunes, and griefs, and complaints: much more shall we forbid them to imitate one that is ill, or in love, or in labour.

Exactly so.

Again, they must not be permitted to imitate slaves of either sex engaged in the occupations of slaves.

No, they must not.

Nor yet bad men, it would seem, such as cowards, and generally those whose conduct is the reverse of what we described just now; men in the act of abusing and caricaturing one another, and uttering ribaldry, whether 396 drunk or sober, or committing any of those offences against others, or amongst themselves, of which such men both in word and in deed are wont to be guilty. I think also that we must not accustom them to liken themselves to madmen, in word or in act. For though it is right they should know mad and wicked people of both sexes, they ought not to act like them, nor give imitations of them.

Most true.

Again, may they imitate smiths or any other craftsmen, working at their trade, or rowers pulling at the oars in a galley, or their strokesmen, or anything else of the kind?

Impossible, he replied, since they are not to be permitted even to pay attention to any of these occupations.

Once more, shall they give imitations of horses neighing and bulls bellowing, or of roaring rivers and sounding seas, and claps of thunder, or of any such phenomena?

Nay, we have forbidden them either to be mad themselves, or to liken themselves to madmen.

If then I understand what you mean, there is a certain kind of style in narration which an honourable and accomplished man will adopt, whenever he is called upon to narrate anything; and another kind, unlike the former, to which a man who by nature and education is of the opposite character, will on such occasions always adhere.

Pray what are the two kinds? he asked.

The former, or the man of well-regulated character, when he comes, in telling a story, to a speech or action of a good man, will, I think, like to report it as if he were himself the subject of the narrative, and will not be ashamed of this kind of imitation, preferring to imitate the good man when his conduct is steady and sensible, and doing so less frequently and faithfully when he has been thrown off his balance by sickness or love, or it may be by intoxication or some other misfortune: but when he comes to a character that is unworthy of him, instead of being willing seriously to liken himself to his inferior, except perhaps for a short time, when the man is performing a good action, he will be ashamed to do it, partly because he has had no practice in imitating such characters, and partly, because in his deliberate contempt for them he disdains to mould and cast himself after the models of baser men, unless it be for mere pastime.

So one would expect.

Then will he not use that style of narration which we described a little while since by referring to the poems of Homer, so that his style will partake both of imitation and of ordinary narration, the former however making but a small part of a long discourse? Or am I quite wrong?

Nay, you describe accurately what must be the model of such a speaker.

- 397 Then again, the man who is not of this character, the more contemptible he is, will be the more inclined to omit nothing in his narration, and to think nothing too low for him, so that he will attempt, seriously and in the presence of many hearers, to imitate everything without exception, even the phenomena we mentioned just now, claps of thunder and the noise of wind and of hail, and of wheels and pulleys, and the sounds of trumpets and flutes and pipes and all manner of instruments; nay, even the barking of dogs, the bleating of sheep, and the notes of birds: and his style will either consist wholly of the imitation of sounds and forms, or will comprise but a small modicum of narration.

This must also inevitably be the case, he said.

These then are the two kinds of style which I meant.

True, there are two such styles.

Do you see then that the transitions which occur in one

of the two are trifling; and if you can adapt a suitable harmony and rhythm to the style, it is nearly possible for correct recitation to proceed without change of style and in one harmony,—the transitions being inconsiderable,—and also in a similarly unchanging rhythm?

That is precisely the case.

Well, and does not the other kind require, on the contrary, all sorts of harmonies and rhythms, if in its turn it is to be appropriately recited, owing to the infinite variety of its transitions?

Most decidedly it does.

Then do all poets and all who narrate anything fall into one or other of these two types of style, or else into one which is formed by blending these two together?

They must.

What shall we do then? Shall we admit all the three types into our state, or only one of them,—that is to say, either the composite type, or else one or other of the uncompounded?

If my judgment is to prevail, we shall admit only the pure and simple type which imitates the virtuous man.

Nevertheless, Adeimantus, there is an attraction about the composite type; while by far the most attractive of all, to children and the attendants of children and to the vulgar mass, is the opposite of that which you prefer.

It is true.

But perhaps you will say that it is not in harmony with the genius of our commonwealth, because with us there is no twofold or manifold man, since every one has one single occupation.

You are quite right; it would not be in harmony.

And is not this the reason why in a state like ours, and in no other, we shall find the shoemaker a shoemaker, and not a pilot in addition, and the husbandman a husbandman, and not a juryman in addition, and the soldier a soldier, and not a tradesman in addition; and so on throughout?

True.

It is probable then, that if a man should arrive in our city, so clever as to be able to assume any character and 39 imitate any object, and should propose to make a public display of his talents and his productions, we shall pay him reverence as a sacred, admirable, and charming per-

sonage, but we shall tell him that in our state there is no one like him, and that our law excludes such characters, and we shall send him away to another city after pouring perfumed oil upon his head, and crowning him with woollen fillets; but for ourselves, we shall employ, for the sake of our real good, that more austere and less fascinating poet and legend-writer, who will imitate for us the style of the virtuous man, and will cast his narratives in those moulds which we prescribed at the outset, when we were engaged with the training of our soldiers.

We shall certainly do so, if it be in our power.

Now then, my dear friend, it would seem that we have completely done with that branch of music which relates to fabulous and other narratives; for we have described both *what* is to be said, and *how* it is to be said.

I think so too.

Then our next subject, I continued, is that of melody and songs³¹, is it not?

Clearly it is.

Then can it be difficult now for any one to discover what we ought to say about them and their proper character, if we are to be consistent with our previous conclusions?

Here Glaucon smiled, and said, Then I am afraid that I, Socrates, do not come under the term 'any one:' that is, I cannot this moment come to a satisfactory conclusion as to what kinds we must sanction, though I have my suspicions.

I presume, at all events, you feel quite able to affirm so much as this, that a song consists of three parts, the words, the harmony, and the rhythm.

Yes, I can affirm that.

Then I presume that between the words of a song and

³¹ It has been found very difficult to interpret the terms of ancient music in those of the modern science. The reader who desires to learn what is known about Greek Music may refer to the article on that subject in Dr Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities. The word *ἁρμονία* has been rendered in the text by its English form 'harmony;' but it will be seen that it does not strictly correspond in sense with the technical acceptance of the English word.

words not set to music there is no difference, so far as concerns the propriety of their being composed in accordance with the types which we lately appointed, and in the same manner.

True.

And you will grant that the harmony and the rhythm ought to follow the words.

Undoubtedly.

But we said, you know, that in the case of words we did not require dirges and complaints.

No, we do not.

Which then are the plaintive harmonies? tell me, for you are musical.

Mixed Lydian and Hyperlydian, and such as are like these.

These then must be discarded: for they are useless even to women that are to be virtuously given, not to say to men.

Quite so.

And you will grant that drunkenness, effeminacy, and idleness are most unbecoming things in guardians.

Undoubtedly they are.

Which of the harmonies then are effeminate and convivial?

The Ionian and the Lydian, which are called 'lax.'

Will you employ these then, my friend, in the training of men of war? 399

By no means: and if I mistake not, you have only the Dorian and the Phrygian left you.

I do not know the harmonies myself, I said; only see you leave me that particular harmony which will suitably represent the tones and accents of a brave man engaged in a feat of arms, or in any violent operation, who, if he fails of success, or encounters wounds and death, or falls into any other calamity, in all such contingencies with unflinching endurance parries the blows of fortune; leave me also another harmony, expressive of the feelings of one who is engaged in an occupation not violent, but peaceful and unconstrained;—it may be, using persuasion and entreaty, addressing either a prayer to a god, or instruction and advice to a man; or, on the other hand, lending³⁸ himself to the prayers or advice or persuasion of

³⁸ Reading ὑπέχοντα.

another, and after this succeeding to his wish ; and not behaving arrogantly, but acting in all these circumstances with soberness and moderation, and in the same spirit acquiescing in every result. Leave me these two harmonies, the one violent, the other tranquil, such as shall best imitate the tones of men in adversity and in prosperity, in a temperate and in a courageous mood.

Well, said he, you are recommending me to leave precisely those which I just mentioned.

Then we shall not require for our songs and instrumental accompaniments a variety of strings, or an instrument embracing all harmonies.

I believe not.

Then we shall not maintain the makers of harps or dulcimers, or any instrument that has many strings and serves for many harmonies.

Apparently not.

But will you admit into your city flute-makers and flute-players? or am I right in saying that the flute has more strings than any other instrument, and that the panharmonium itself is only an imitation of the flute?

Manifestly you are right.

Then you have the lyre and the guitar remaining, which will be of service in the town ; while in the country the herdsmen will have some kind of pipe.

So at least the argument indicates to us.

Surely we are guilty of no innovation, my friend, in preferring Apollo and Apollo's instruments to Marsyas and *his* instruments.

No, I really think we are not.

Well, I protest, said I, we have been unconsciously purging the city, which we said just now was in too luxurious a condition.

And we have done wisely.

Come then, I continued, let us finish our purgation. Next after the harmonies will follow our law of rhythms, to the effect that we must not aim at a variety of them, or study all movements indiscriminately, but observe what
400 are the natural rhythms of a well-regulated and manly life, and when we have discovered these we must compel the foot and the music to suit themselves to the sense of such a life, and not the sense to suit itself to the foot and

the music. But what these rhythms may be, it is your business to explain, as you did the harmonies.

Nay, but in good faith, he said, I cannot tell. I certainly could say, from what I have observed, that there are three principal kinds into which all movements may be analyzed, as in the case of sounds there are four kinds into which all harmonies may be resolved: but which kinds of rhythm express which kinds of life, I cannot say.

Well, said I, we will call in Damon to our counsels upon the question, what movements are akin to meanness and insolence, or to madness and other vices, and what rhythms are to be left as expressive of the opposite qualities. But I fancy that I have heard him indistinctly alluding to a certain complex warlike rhythm, and another that was dactylic, and a third heroic,—arranging them I know not how, and shewing that the rise and fall of each foot balance one another, by resolving them into short and long syllables; and he gave the name iambus to a certain foot, if I am not wrong, and trochee to another, affixing to them long and short marks. And in some of these, I think, he would blame or praise the march of the foot no less than the rhythm, or perhaps the two taken together: for I cannot speak positively. But let these questions, as I said before, be referred to Damon: for to settle them would require no short discussion; or do you think differently?

No, indeed I do not.

But this point at least you can settle, that grace and awkwardness accompany a good or a bad rhythm?

Of course they do.

And good and bad rhythm are, by a process of assimilation, results of a good style and its opposite respectively; and the same may be said of good and bad harmony, that is to say, if rhythm and harmony are to suit themselves to the words, as was asserted just now, and not the words to them.

No doubt they must suit themselves to the words.

But what do you say of the style and the words? are they not determined by the moral disposition of the soul?

Undoubtedly they are.

And is all the rest determined by the style?

Yes.

Then good language and good harmony and grace and good rhythm all depend upon a good nature, by which I do not mean that silliness which by courtesy we call goodnature, but a mind that is really well and nobly constituted in its moral character.

Precisely so.

Then must not our young men on all occasions pursue these qualities, if we intend them to perform their proper work?

51 Yes, they must.

And such qualities, I presume, enter largely into painting and all similar workmanship, into weaving and embroidery, into architecture, as well as the whole manufacture of utensils in general; nay, into the constitution of living bodies, and of all plants: for in all these things gracefulness or ungracefulness finds place. And the absence of grace, and rhythm, and harmony, is closely allied to an evil style, and an evil character: whereas their presence is allied to, and expressive of, the opposite character, which is brave and soberminded.

You are entirely right.

This being the case, ought we to confine ourselves to superintending our poets, and compelling them to impress on their productions the likeness of a good moral character, on pain of not composing among us; or ought we to extend our superintendence to the professors of every other craft as well, and forbid them to impress those signs of an evil nature, of dissoluteness, of meanness, and of ungracefulness, either on the likenesses of living creatures, or on buildings, or any other work of their hands; altogether interdicting such as cannot do otherwise from working in our city, that our guardians may not be reared amongst images of vice, as upon unwholesome pastures, culling much every day by little and little from many places, and feeding upon it, until they insensibly accumulate a large mass of evil in their inmost souls? Ought we not, on the contrary, to seek out artists of another stamp, who by the power of genius can trace out the nature of the fair and the graceful, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a healthful region, may drink in good from every quarter, whence any emanation from noble works may strike upon their eye or their ear, like a gale wafting health from salubrious lands, and win them imperceptibly

from their earliest childhood into resemblance, love, and harmony with the true beauty of reason?

Such a nurture, he replied, would be by far the best.

Is it then, Glaucon, on these accounts that we attach such supreme importance to a musical education, because rhythm and harmony sink most deeply into the recesses of the soul, and take most powerful hold of it, bringing gracefulness in their train, and making a man graceful if he be rightly nurtured, but if not, the reverse? and also because he that has been duly nurtured therein will have the keenest eye for defects, whether in the failures of art, or the misgrowths of nature; and feeling a most just disdain for them, will commend beautiful objects, and gladly receive them into his soul, and feed upon them, 402 and grow to be noble and good; whereas he will rightly censure and hate all repulsive objects, even in his childhood, before he is able to be reasoned with; and when reason comes, *he* will welcome her most cordially who can recognize her by the instinct of relationship, and because he has been thus nurtured?

I have no doubt, he said, that such are the reasons for a musical education.

You know, I continued, that in learning to read we were considered tolerably perfect, as soon as we could be sure of recognizing the few letters there are, scattered about in all existing words, and that we never treated them with disrespect in either a small word or a great, as if it did not signify to notice them, but were anxious to distinguish them everywhere, believing that we should be no scholars till we were thus qualified.

True.

Is it not also true that we shall not know the *images* of letters, as reflected either in still water or in a mirror, until we know the letters themselves, because the knowledge of both the reflections and the originals belongs to the same art and study?

It is perfectly true.

Tell me then, I pray you, to pass from my illustration to the things illustrated, shall we in like manner never become truly musical, neither ourselves, nor the guardians whom we say we are to instruct, until we know the essential forms of temperance and courage and liberality and munificence, and all that are akin to these, and their

opposites also, wherever they are scattered about, and discern them wherever they are to be found, themselves and their images, never slighting them either in small things or in great, but believing the knowledge of the forms and of their images to belong to the same art and study?

It must inevitably be so.

Surely, then, to him who has an eye to see, there can be no fairer spectacle than that of a man who combines the possession of moral beauty in his soul with outward beauty of form, corresponding and harmonizing with the former, because the same great pattern enters into both.

There can be none so fair.

And you will grant that what is fairest is loveliest?

Undoubtedly it is.

Then the truly musical person will love those who combine most perfectly moral and physical beauty, but will not love any one in whom there is dissonance.

No, not if there be any defect in the soul; but if it is only a bodily blemish, he may so bear with it as to be willing to regard it with complacency.

I understand, I said, that you have now, or have had, a favourite of this kind; so I give way. But tell me this has pleasure in excess any fellowship with temperance?

How can it have, when it unsettles the mind no less than pain?

Has it any with virtue generally?

403 Certainly not.

Well; has it anything in common with wantonness and licentiousness?

Most assuredly it has.

Can you mention any pleasure that is greater and more violent than that which accompanies the indulgence of the passion of love?

I cannot; nor yet one that is more akin to madness.

But is it not the nature of legitimate love to desire an orderly and beautiful object in a sober and harmonious temper?

Certainly it is.

Then nothing akin to madness or licentiousness must approach legitimate love?

It must not.

Then the pleasure in question must not approach it.

nor must a lover and his beloved, whose affections are rightly given and returned, have anything to do with it.

They must not, indeed, Socrates.

Apparently then, in the state we are organizing, you will legislate to this effect, that though a lover may be attached to a favourite, and frequent his society, and embrace him as a son, for his beauty's sake, if he can gain his consent; yet in other matters he shall so regulate his intercourse with the person he affects, as that he shall never be suspected of extending his familiarity beyond this, on pain of being censured for vulgarity and want of taste, if he acts otherwise.

We shall do so.

Do you then think with me that our theory of music is now complete? At all events, it has ended where it ought to end: for music, I imagine, ought to end in the love of the beautiful.

I agree with you, he said.

Gymnastic will hold the next place to music in the education of our young men.

Certainly.

No doubt a careful training in gymnastic, as well as in music, ought to begin with their childhood, and go on through all their life. But the following is the true view of the case, in my opinion: see what you think of it. My belief is, not that a good body will by its own excellence, make the soul good; but on the contrary, that a good soul will by its excellence render the body as perfect as it can be: but what is your view?

The same as yours.

Then if we were first to administer the requisite treatment to the mind, and then to charge it with the task of prescribing details with reference to the body, contenting ourselves with indicating no more than the general principles, in order to avoid prolixity, should we be doing right?

Quite so.

We have already said that the persons in question must refrain from drunkenness: for a guardian is the last person in the world, I should think, to be allowed to get drunk, and not know where he is.

Truly it would be ridiculous for a guardian to require a guard.

But about eating:—our men are combatants in a most important arena, are they not?

They are.

404 Then will the habit of body which is cultivated by the trained fighters of the palæstra be suitable to such persons?

Perhaps it will.

Well, but this is a sleepy kind of regimen, and produces a precarious state of health. For do you not observe that men in the regular training sleep their life away, and if they depart only slightly from the prescribed diet, are attacked by serious maladies in their worst form?

I do.

Then a better conceived regimen is required for our athletes of war, who must be wakeful like watch-dogs, and possess the utmost quickness both of eye and ear, and who are so exposed, when on service, to variations in the water they drink and the rest of their food, and to vicissitudes of sultry heats and wintry storms, that it will not do for them to be of precarious health.

I believe you are right.

Then will the best gymnastic be sister to the music which we described a little while ago?

How do you mean?

It will, I imagine, be a simple moderate system, especially that assigned to our fighting men.

What will it be like?

On these points we may take a lesson even from Homer. You know that at the repasts of his heroes, when they are in the field, he never sets fish before them, although they are upon the shore of the Hellespont, nor yet boiled meat, but only roast, which soldiers could of course procure most readily: for anywhere, one may say, there is less difficulty in using mere fire than in carrying about pots and pans.

Certainly.

Neither has Homer, if I remember right, ever said a word about sauces. However, this is as well known, I believe, to all that are in training, as to Homer, that a man who desires to be in good condition must abstain from all such indulgences: is it not?

They do know it, and are right in abstaining from them. Then apparently, my good friend, you do not approve

of a Syracusan table, and of a Sicilian variety of dishes, if you hold such abstinence to be right.

I think I do not.

Then you also disapprove of a taste for the damsels of Corinth, in men who are to be in good bodily condition.

Most assuredly I do.

Then do you also condemn those celebrated delicacies, our Athenian confectionery?

Of course I do.

In fact, it would not be amiss, I imagine, to compare this whole system of feeding and living to that kind of music and singing which is adapted to the panharmonium, and composed in every variety of rhythm.

Undoubtedly it would be a just comparison.

Is it not true, then, that as in music variety begets dissoluteness in the soul, so here it begets disease in the body, while simplicity in gymnastic is as productive of health, as in music it was productive of temperance?

Most true.

But when dissoluteness and diseases abound in a city, 4 are not law-courts and surgeries opened in abundance, and do not law and physic begin to hold their heads high, when numbers even of well-born persons devote themselves with eagerness to these professions?

What else can we expect?

But where can you find a more signal proof that a low and vicious education prevails in a state, than in the fact that first-rate physicians and jurymen are in request, not merely among base-born mechanics, but even among those who lay claim to the birth and breeding of gentlemen? Does it not seem to you a scandalous thing, and a strong proof of defective education, to be obliged to import justice from others, in the character of lords and judges, in consequence of the scanty supply at home?

Nothing can be more scandalous.

Do you think it at all less scandalous, when a man not only consumes the greater part of his life in courts of law as plaintiff or defendant, but actually has the vulgarity to plume himself upon this very fact, boasting of being an adept in crime, and such a master of tricks and turns, of manœuvre and evasion, as always to be able to wriggle out of the grasp of justice, and escape from punishment, and that for the sake of worthless trifles

not knowing how much nobler and better it were so to order his life as never to stand in need of a sleepy judge?

Nay, this is even a greater scandal than the other.

And do you not hold it disgraceful to require medical aid, unless it be for a wound, or an attack of illness incidental to the time of year,—to require it, I mean, owing to our laziness, and the life we lead, and to get ourselves so stuffed with humours and wind, like quagmires, as to compel the clever sons of Asclepius to call diseases by such names as flatulence and catarrh.

To be sure these are very strange and newfangled names for disorders.

Such as did not exist, I imagine, in Asclepius's time. So I infer, because at Troy, when Eurypylus was wounded, his sons did not blame the woman who gave him a
406 draught of Pramnian wine, with a plentiful sprinkling of barley-meal, and with cheese grated over it, which you know would be thought an inflammatory mixture, nor did they rebuke Patroclus who dressed his wounds.

Certainly, said he, it was a strange potion for a man in his state.

Not if you consider that formerly, till the time of Herodicus, as we are told, the disciples of Asclepius did not employ our present system of medicine, which waits upon diseases as the son of a rich man is waited on by his attendant. But Herodicus, who was a training-master, and fell into bad health, made such a compound of physic and gymnastic, that he first and chiefly worried out himself, and then many others after him.

How so?

By rendering his death a lingering one. For he followed his disease, which was a mortal one, step by step, and while he was unable, as I imagine, to cure himself, he devoted his whole time to the business of doctoring himself; living continually in torment, if ever he deviated from his usual diet; and thus struggling against death, was brought by his cleverness to old age.

A noble prize for his art to win him!

It is what one might expect, I continued, from a person ignorant that it was not because Asclepius did not know, or had not tried this kind of medical treatment, that he never discovered it to his descendants; but because he was aware that in all well-regulated communi

ties each has a work assigned to him in the state, which he must needs do, and that no one has leisure to spend his life as an invalid in the doctor's hands : a fact which we perceive in the case of the labouring population, but which, with ludicrous inconsistency, we fail to detect in the case of those who are reputed rich and happy.

How is that ? he asked.

When a carpenter is ill, I replied, he expects to receive a draught from his doctor, that will expel the disease by vomiting or purging, or else to get rid of it by cauterizing, or a surgical operation ; but if any one were to prescribe to him a long course of diet, and to order bandages for his head, with other treatment to correspond, he would soon tell such a medical adviser that he had no time to be ill, and that it was not worth his while to live in this way, devoting his mind to his malady, and neglecting his proper occupation : and then wishing the physician a good morning, he would enter upon his usual course of life, and either regain his health and live in the performance of his business ; or, should his constitution prove unable to bear up, death puts an end to his troubles.

Yes ; and for a man in that station of life this is thought the proper use to make of medical assistance.

Is it because he had a work to do, which, if he failed to perform, it was not worth his while to live ?

Manifestly.

But the rich man, as we say, has no appointed work of such a character, that, if compelled to leave it undone, life is to him not worth having.

No ; it is supposed he has not.

Then you do not listen to Phocylides, when he says, that so soon as a man has got whereon to live, then he ought to practise virtue.

Yes, and before that too, I should think.

Let us have no quarrel with him on this subject, said I ; but let us inform ourselves whether the rich have to practise virtue so that, if they do not, life is worthless to them ; or, whether valetudinarianism, though an obstacle to mental application in carpentering and the other arts, forms no impediment to the fulfilment of the precept of Phocylides

Nay, in very truth, I believe there is no greater impediment to it than that excessive care of the body which extends beyond gymnastic : for it is alike harassing

man, whether he be engaged in domestic business, or serving in the field, or sitting as a magistrate at home.

But quite the worst of it is, that it is a grievous hindrance to studies of all kinds, and reflection, and inward meditation, being ever apprehensive of some headache, or dizziness, which it accuses philosophy of producing; and therefore in so far as virtue is practised and proved by intellectual study, it is a sheer obstacle to it; for it makes a man always fancy himself ill, and never lets him rest from the pangs of anxiety about his health.

Yes, that is the natural effect of it.

Then must we not maintain that Asclepius, knowing all this, revealed the healing art for the benefit of those whose constitutions were naturally sound, and had not been impaired by their habits of life, but who were suffering from some specific complaint, and that he used to expel their disorders by drugs and the use of the knife, without interrupting their customary avocations, that he might not damage the interests of the state; but that where the constitution was thoroughly diseased to the core, he would not attempt to protract a miserable existence by a studied regimen, drawing off from the system, and again pouring into it a little at a time, and suffer his patients to beget children, in all probability as diseased as themselves; thinking medical treatment ill bestowed on one who could not live in his regular round of duties, since such a person is of no use either to himself or to the state?

You make out Asclepius to have been a profound statesman.

408 Clearly so: and because he was a man of that description, his sons, as you must have observed, proved themselves brave men in the battle before Troy, and also employed the healing art in the manner I have described. Or have you forgotten that when Menelaus had been wounded by the spear of Pandarus,

‘Sucking the blood from the gash, they laid mild simples upon it³³.’

But what he was to eat or drink after this, they no more *prescribed* in his case than that of Eurypylus, knowing *that the simples* were sufficient to cure men who before *receiving the wounds* were healthy and regular in their

³³ Iliad IV. 218.

mode of life, even if they happened to drink the next moment a compound of meal, wine, and cheese ; but as for the constitutionally diseased and the intemperate, they thought the existence of such a man no gain either to himself or to others, believing that their art was not meant for persons of that sort, and that it would be wrong to attempt their cure, even if they were richer than Midas.

The sons of Asclepius were, by your account, very brewd fellows.

And it was meet they should be. And yet the tragedians, and Pindar, dissent from us ; and while they assert that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, declare that he was induced by a bribe of gold to raise to life a rich man who was already dead, which was indeed the cause of his being smitten by a thunderbolt. But we, agreeably to our principles, cannot believe both these statements of theirs : on the contrary, we shall maintain, that if he was the son of a god, he was not covetous ; if he was covetous, he was not the son of a god.

In that, he said, we shall be perfectly right. But what say you, Socrates, on this point? ought we not to have good physicians in our city? Now the best physicians, I imagine, will be those who have had the largest practice both among the healthy and among the diseased ; just as the best jurors in like manner will be those who have mixed with men of all varieties of character.

Decidedly, I replied, I am for having good ones : but you know whom I consider such?

I shall if you inform me.

I will try to do so : but your question, I must premise, is made of two dissimilar things in the same words.

How so?

Physicians, it is true, would acquire the greatest experience if from their childhood upwards they not only studied their profession, but also came in contact with the greatest number of the worst cases, and had personal experience of every kind of malady, and were naturally at very healthy. For it is not the physician's body, I imagine, which cures the bodies of others ;—if it were, it would not be suffered at any time to be, or to become, diseased ;—but his mind, which cannot direct any treatment skilfully, if it has become, or always was, depraved.

You are right.

But a juror, my friend, governs mind by mind; his
 409 mind therefore cannot be suffered to be reared from a
 tender age among vicious minds, and to associate with
 them, and to run the whole round of crimes in its own
 experience, in order to be quick at inferring the guilt of
 others from its own self-knowledge, as is allowable in the
 case of bodily disorders: on the contrary, it ought from
 his early youth to have been free from all experience and
 taint of evil habits, if it is to be qualified by its own
 thorough excellence to administer sound justice. And
 this is the reason why good people, when young, appear
 to be simple and easy victims to the impositions of bad
 men, because they have not in their own consciousness
 examples of like passions with the wicked.

Yes, they are exceedingly liable to such imposition.

Therefore, to make a good juror a man must not be
 young, but old; and his knowledge of what injustice is
 should be acquired late in life, not by observing it as an
 inmate of his own soul, but by long practice in discerning
 its baneful nature, as it exists out of himself in the souls
 of others; in other words, guided by *knowledge*, not by
 personal experience.

Certainly, that would seem to be the noblest style of
 juror.

Yes, and a good one too, which is the point in
 question: for he that has a good soul is good. But your
 smart and suspicious juryman, who has been guilty
 himself of many crimes, and fancies himself knowing and
 clever, so long as he has to deal with men like himself,
 betrays astonishing wariness, thanks to those inward
 examples which he has ever in sight: but when he comes
 into communication with men of years and virtue, he
 shews himself to be no better than a fool, with his mis-
 timed suspicions, and his ignorance of a healthy character,
 which are the consequences of his not possessing any
 example of such a phenomenon. But as he falls in
 oftener with wicked than with good men, he seems both
 to himself and others to be rather clever than foolish.

That is most true.

It is not then in a man of this stamp that we must
 look for our good and wise juror, but in one of the former
 class. For vice can never know both itself and virtue;

but virtue, in a well-instructed nature, will in time acquire a knowledge at once of itself and of vice. The virtuous man therefore, in my opinion, and not the vicious man, will make the wise judge.

I quite agree with you.

Then will you not establish in your city the two faculties, of medicine and of law, each having the character we have described, to bestow their services on those only of the citizens whose bodily and mental constitutions are sound and good, leaving those that are otherwise in body to die, and actually putting to death those who are naturally corrupt and incurable in soul? 410

Yes, he said: this has been proved to be the best course both for the patients themselves and for the state.

As for the young men, I continued, it is clear that they will be cautious how they incur any need of law, so long as they use that simple kind of music which, as we stated, generates sobriety in the soul.

Undoubtedly.

If then the accomplished student of music follow this same track in the pursuit of gymnastic, may he not, if he pleases, so far succeed as to be independent of the medical art except in extreme cases?

I think he may.

Moreover, in the exercises and toils which he imposes upon himself, his object will be rather to stimulate the spirited element of his nature than to gain strength; and he will not, like athletes in general, take the prescribed food and exercise merely for the sake of muscular power.

You are quite right.

Then, Glaucon, am I also right in saying that those who establish a system of education in music and gymnastic, are not actuated by the purpose which some persons attribute to them, of applying the one to the improvement of the soul, the other to that of the body?

Why what can be their object, if this is not?

Probably they introduce both mainly for the sake of the soul.

How so?

Do you not observe the characteristics which distinguish the minds of those who have been familiar with gymnastic all their lives, without any acquaintance with

music? and again, of those whose condition is the reverse of this?

To what do you allude?

To the roughness and hardness which mark the one, and the softness and gentleness which mark the other.

O yes. Those who have devoted themselves to gymnastic exclusively, become ruder than they ought to be; while those who have devoted themselves to music are made softer than is good for them.

We know, however, that rudeness is the natural product of the spirited element, which, if rightly nurtured, will be brave; but, if strained to an improper pitch, will in all probability become harsh and disagreeable.

I think so.

Well, and will not gentleness be a property of the philosophic temperament? and a property which, if too much indulged, will produce in it an excess of softness; but which, rightly nurtured, will render it gentle and orderly?

True.

But we say that our guardians ought to combine both these temperaments.

They ought.

Then must they not be mutually harmonized?

Unquestionably.

411 And where this harmony exists, the soul is both temperate and brave?

Certainly.

And where it is wanting, the soul is cowardly and coarse?

Very much so.

Accordingly, when a man surrenders himself to music and flute-playing, and suffers his soul to be flooded through the funnel of his ears with those sweet and soft and plaintive harmonies of which we just spoke, and spends his whole life in warbling and delighting himself with song, such a man at the outset tempers like steel whatever portion of the spirited element he possesses, and makes it useful instead of brittle and useless: if, however, he relaxes not in his devotion, but yields to the enchantment, he then begins to liquefy and waste away, till the spirit is melted out of him, and the sinews of his soul are extirpated, and he is made 'a feeble wielder of the lance.'

Exactly so.

And if he has received a spiritless soul originally from the hand of nature, this result is soon brought to pass: but if the contrary, he so enfeebles his spirit as to render it easily swayed, quickly kindled and quickly slaked by trifling causes. Consequently, such persons, instead of being spirited, are made choleric and irritable, and the prey of morose tempers.

Precisely so.

Well, but if, on the other hand, he devotes himself to hard labour in gymnastic, and indulges to his heart's content in good living, while he keeps aloof from music and philosophy, does not the excellent condition of his body at first inspire him with self-confidence and spirit, and make him surpass himself in courage?

Yes, that it does.

But what is the consequence of thus engaging in this one occupation, to the total exclusion of the Muse's influence? Even supposing him to have possessed at first some taste for learning, yet if that taste is never fed with knowledge or inquiry, and takes no part in rational discourse or any intellectual pursuits, does it not become weak and deaf and blind, from the want of stimulus and nourishment, and because its senses are never thoroughly purged?

Just so.

Consequently such a man becomes a hater of discussion, I imagine, and an illiterate person; and abandoning the use of rational persuasion, he settles all his business like a wild beast by violence and roughness, and lives in ignorance and awkwardness, with no symmetry and no grace.

That is exactly the case.

To correct then, as it would appear, these two exclusive temperaments, the spirited and the philosophic, some god, as I for my part shall maintain, has given to men two arts, music and gymnastic, not for soul and body distinctively, except in a secondary way, but expressly for those two temperaments, in order that by the increase or 412 relaxation of the tension to the due pitch they may be brought into mutual accord.

So it would appear.

Then whosoever can best blend gymnastic with music,

and bring both to bear on the mind most judiciously, such a man we shall justly call perfect in music, and a master of true harmony, much rather than the artist who tunes the strings of the lyre.

Yes, and with good reason, Socrates.

Then will not some such overseer be always needed in our state, Glaucon, if our commonwealth is designed to endure?

Yes, indeed, such an officer will be quite indispensable.

Such then will be the outlines of our system of education and training. For why should one enter into detail respecting the dances which will be in vogue in a state like ours, the hunting and field-exercises, or the sports of the gymnasium and the race-course? It is tolerably clear that these must correspond with the foregoing outline and there will be no further difficulty in discovering them.

Perhaps not, he said.

Very good: then what will be the next point for us to settle? is it not this, which of the persons so educated are to be the rulers, and which the subjects?

Unquestionably it is.

There can be no doubt that the rulers must be the elderly men, and the subjects the younger.

True.

And also that the rulers must be the best men among them.

True again.

Are not the best agriculturists those who are most agricultural?

Yes.

In the present case, as we require the best guardian, shall we not find them in those who are most capable of guarding a state?

Yes.

Then for this purpose must they not be intelligent and powerful, and, moreover, careful of the state?

They must.

And a man will be most careful of that which he loves. Of course.

And assuredly he will love that most whose interests he regards as identical with his own, and in whose prosperity or adversity he believes his own fortunes to be involved.

ust so.

Then we must select from the whole body of guardians these individuals who appear to us, after due observation, to be remarkable above others for the zeal with which, through their whole life, they have done what they have thought advantageous to the state, and inflexibly refused to do what they thought the reverse.

Yes, these are the suitable persons, he said.

Then I think we must watch them at every stage of their life, to see if they are tenacious guardians of this conviction, and never bewitched or forced into a forgetful abandonment of the belief that they ought to do what is best for the state.

What is this abandonment you speak of?

I will tell you. Opinions appear to me to quit the mind either by a voluntary or involuntary act; a false opinion by a voluntary act, when the holder learns his error; but a true opinion invariably by an involuntary act. 413

I understand the notion of a voluntary abandonment, but I have yet to learn the meaning of the involuntary.

Well, then, do you not agree with me, that men are deprived of good things against their will, of evil things with their will? And is it not an evil thing to be the victim of a lie, and a good thing to possess the truth? And do you not think that a man is in possession of the truth when his opinions represent things as they are?

Yes, you are right; and I believe that men are deprived of a true opinion against their will.

Then, when this happens, must it not be owing either to theft, or witchcraft, or violence?

I do not even now understand.

I am afraid I use language as obscure as tragedy. By those who have a theft practised on them, I mean such as are argued out of, or forget, their belief, because, in the one case argument, and in the other, time, privily carries off their opinion. Now, I fancy, you understand?

Yes.

By those who have violence done to them I mean all whose opinions are changed by pain or grief.

That too I understand, and I think you are right.

And those who are bewitched, you would yourself,

believe, assert to be those who change their opinion either through the seductions of pleasure or under the pressure of fear.

Yes; everything that deceives may be said to bewitch.

Then, as I said just now, we must inquire who are the best guardians of this inward conviction, that they must always do that which they think best for the state. We must watch them, I say, from their earliest childhood, giving them actions to perform in which people would be most likely to forget, or be beguiled of, such a belief, and then we must select those whose memory is tenacious, and who are proof against deceit, and exclude the rest. Must we not?

Yes.

We must also appoint them labours, and vexations, and contests, in which we must watch for the same symptoms of character.

Rightly so.

And, as a third kind of test, we must try them with witchcraft, and observe their behaviour; and, just as young horses are taken into the presence of noise and tumult, to see whether they are timid, so must we bring our men, while still young, into the midst of objects of terror, and presently transfer them to scenes of pleasure, trying them much more thoroughly than gold is tried in the fire, to find whether they shew themselves under all circumstances inaccessible to witchcraft, and seemly in their bearing, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have been taught, approving themselves on every occasion true to the laws of rhythm and harmony, and acting in such a way as would render them most useful to themselves and the state. And whoever, 414 from time to time, after being put to the proof, as a child, as a youth, and as a man, comes forth uninjured from the trial, must be appointed a ruler and guardian of the city, and must receive honours in life and in death, and be admitted to the highest privileges, in the way of funeral rites and other tributes to his memory. And all who are the reverse of this character must be rejected. Such appears to me, Glaucon, to be the true method of selecting and appointing our rulers and guardians, described simply in outline, without accuracy in detail.

I am pretty much of your mind.

Is it then really most correct to give to these the name of perfect guardians, as being qualified to take care that their friends at home shall not wish, and their enemies abroad not be able, to do any mischief; and to call the young men, whom up to this time we entitled guardians, auxiliaries, whose office it is to support the resolutions of the rulers?

I quite think so, he said.

This being the case, I continued, can we contrive any ingenious mode of bringing into play one of those seasonable falsehoods of which we lately spoke, so that, propounding a single spirited fiction, we may bring even the rulers themselves, if possible, to believe it, or if not them, the rest of the city?

What kind of fiction?

Nothing new, but a Phœnician story, which has been realized often before now, as the poets tell and mankind believe, but which in our time has not been, nor, so far as I know, is likely to be realized, and for which it would require large powers of persuasion to obtain credit.

You seem very reluctant to tell it.

You will think my reluctance very natural when I have told it.

Speak out boldly and without fear.

Well I will; and yet I hardly know where I shall find the courage or where the words to express myself. I shall say, I say, to persuade first the rulers themselves and the military class, and after them the rest of the city, that when we were training and instructing them, they only fancied, as in dreams, that all this was happening to them and about them, while in reality they were in course of formation and training in the bowels of the earth, where they themselves, their armour, and the rest of their equipments were manufactured, and from whence, as soon as they were thoroughly elaborated, the earth, their real mother, sent them up to its surface; and, consequently, that they ought now to take thought for the land in which they dwell, as their mother and nurse, and repel all attacks upon it, and to feel towards their fellow-citizens as brother children of the soil.

It was not without reason that you were so long ashamed to tell us *your* fiction.

I dare say; nevertheless, hear the rest of the story.

We shall tell our people, in mythical language: You are doubtless all brethren, as many as inhabit the city, but the God who created you mixed gold in the composition of such of you as are qualified to rule, which gives them the highest value; while in the auxiliaries he made silver an ingredient, assigning iron and copper to the cultivators of the soil and the other workmen. Therefore, inasmuch as you are all related to one another, although your children will generally resemble their parents, yet sometimes a golden parent will produce a silver child, and a silver parent a golden child, and so on, each producing any. The rulers therefore have received this in charge first and above all from the gods, to observe nothing more closely, in their character of vigilant guardians, than the children that are born, to see which of these metals enters into the composition of their souls; and if a child be born in their class with an alloy of copper or iron, they are to have no manner of pity upon it, but giving it the value that belongs to its nature, they are to thrust it away into the class of artisans or agriculturists; and if again among these a child be born with any admixture of gold or silver, when they have assayed it, they are to raise it either to the class of guardians, or to that of auxiliaries: because there is an oracle which declares that the city shall then perish when it is guarded by iron or copper. Can you suggest any device by which we can make them believe this fiction?

None at all by which we could persuade the men with whom we begin our new state: but I think their sons, and the next generation, and all subsequent generations, might be taught to believe it.

Well, I said, even this might have a good effect towards making them care more for the city and for one another; for I think I understand what you mean. However, we will leave this fiction to its fate: but for our part, when we have armed these children of the soil, let us lead them forward under the command of their officers, till they arrive at the city: then let them look around them to discover the most eligible position for their camp, from which they may best coerce the inhabitants, if there be any disposition to refuse obedience to the laws, and repel *foreigners*, if an enemy should come down like a wolf on the fold. And when they have pitched their camp, and

offered sacrifices to the proper divinities, let them arrange their sleeping-places. Is all this right?

It is.

And these sleeping-places must be such as will keep out the weather both in winter and summer, must they not?

Certainly: you mean dwelling-houses, if I am not mistaken.

I do; but the dwelling-houses of soldiers, not of moneyed men.

What is the difference which you imply?

I will endeavour to explain it to you, I replied. I presume it would be a most monstrous and scandalous proceeding in shepherds to keep for the protection of their flocks such a breed of dogs, or so to treat them, that owing to unruly tempers, or hunger, or any bad propensity whatever, the dogs themselves should begin to worry the sheep, and behave more like wolves than dogs.

It would be monstrous, undoubtedly.

Then must we not take every precaution that our auxiliary class, being stronger than the other citizens, may not act towards them in a similar fashion, and so resemble savage monsters rather than friendly allies?

We must.

And will they not be furnished with the best of safeguards, if they are really well educated?

Nay, but they are *that* already, he exclaimed.

To which I replied, It is not worth while now to insist upon that point, my dear Glaucon: but it is most necessary to maintain what we said this minute, that they must have the right education, whatever it may be, if they are to have what will be most effectual in rendering them gentle to one another, and to those whom they guard.

True.

But besides this education a rational man would say that their dwellings and their circumstances generally should be arranged on such a scale as shall neither prevent them from being perfect guardians, nor provoke them to do mischief to the other citizens.

He will say so with truth.

Consider then, I continued, whether the following plan is the right one for their lives and their dwellings, if they are to be of the character I have described. In the first

place, no one should possess any private property, if it can possibly be avoided: secondly, no one should have a dwelling or storehouse into which all who please may not enter; whatever necessities are required by temperate and courageous men, who are trained to war, they should receive by regular appointment from their fellow-citizens, as wages for their services, and the amount should be such as to leave neither a surplus on the year's consumption nor a deficit; and they should attend common messes and live together as men do in a camp: as for gold and silver, we must tell them that they are in perpetual possession of a divine species of the precious metals placed in their souls by the gods themselves, and therefore have no need of the earthly ore; that in fact it would be profanation to pollute their spiritual riches by mixing them with the possession of mortal gold, because the world's coinage has been the cause of countless impieties, whereas theirs is undefiled: therefore to them, as distinguished from the rest of the people, it is forbidden to handle or touch gold and silver, or enter under the same roof with them, or to wear them on their dresses, or to drink out of the precious metals. If they follow these rules, they will be safe themselves and the saviours of the city: but whenever they come to possess lands, and houses, and money of their own, they will be householders and cultivators instead of guardians, and will become hostile masters of their fellow-citizens rather than their allies; and so they will spend their whole lives, hating and hated, plotting and plotted against, standing in more frequent and intense alarm of their enemies at home than of their enemies abroad; by which time they and the rest of the city will be running on the very brink of ruin. On all these accounts, I asked, shall we say that the foregoing is the right arrangement of the houses and other concerns of our guardians, and shall we legislate accordingly; or not?

Yes, by all means, answered Glaucon.