phy

From Book IV

Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage; and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.  How do you mean?  Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf.  No one, he replied, would ever think of any other.  Certainly not.  The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either the one or the other.  The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and this is what you term courage.  I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.  I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.  Salvation of what?  Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words 'under all circumstances' to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does notlose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?  If you please.  You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other colour.  Yes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.  Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection, and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure --mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents. And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.  But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave --this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have another name.  Most certainly.  Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe?  Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words 'of a citizen,' you will not be far wrong; --hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are we w seeking not for courage but justice; and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough.  You are right, he replied.  Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State-first temperance, and then justice which is the end of our search.  Very true.  Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?  I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance first.  Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request.  Then consider, he said.  Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding.  How so? he asked.  Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of 'a man being his own master' and other traces of the same notion may be found in language.  No doubt, he said.  There is something ridiculous in the expression 'master of himself'; for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.  Certainly.  The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle,which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse --in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.  Yes, there is reason in that.  And now, I said, look at our newly created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realised; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words 'temperance' and 'self-mastery' truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.  Yes, he said, I see that what you say is true.  Let me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the freemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.  Certainly, he said.  Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the best born and best educated.  Very true. These two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner desires of the are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.  That I perceive, he said.  Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?  Certainly, he replied.  It may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?  Yes.  And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the question who are to rule, that again will be our State?  Undoubtedly.  And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found --in the rulers or in the subjects?  In both, as I should imagine, he replied.  Do you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a sort of harmony?  Why so?  Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule of either, both in states and individuals.  I entirely agree with you.  And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a state virtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.  The inference is obvious.  The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and ifyou see her first, let me know.  Would that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just eyes enough to, see what you show him --that is about as much as I am good for.  Offer up a prayer with me and follow.  I will, but you must show me the way.  Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must push on.  Let us push on.  Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.  Good news, he said.  Truly, I said, we are stupid fellows.  Why so?  Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands --that was the way with us --we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her.  What do you mean?  I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of justice, and have failed to recognise her.  I grow impatient at the length of your exordium.  Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted; --now justice is this principle or apart of it.  Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.  Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us.  Yes, we said so.  Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?  I cannot, but I should like to be told.  Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.  That follows of necessity.  If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject, --the quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not being a busybody, would claim the palm --the question is not so easily answered.  Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.  Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.  Yes, he said.  And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?  Exactly.  Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits at law?  Certainly.  And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?  Yes; that is their principle.  Which is a just principle?  Yes.  Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?  Very true.  Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?  Not much.  But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians,for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.  Most true.  Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?  Precisely.  And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice?  Certainly.  This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.  I agree with you.  We will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual --if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls.  That will be in regular course; let us do as you say.  I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?  Like, he replied.  The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?  He will.  And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?  True, he said.  And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner?  Certainly, he said. 

From Book VI

What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this --higher than justice and the other virtues?  Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present --nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmostclearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!  A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge?  Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have of been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all otherthings become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?  Assuredly not.  You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge  Yes.  And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?  How ridiculous!  Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it --for the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term 'good' --this is of course ridiculous.  Most true, he said.  And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.  Certainly.  And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?  True.  There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved.  There can be none.  Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good --the reality is what they seek; in the case of the good, appearance is despised by every one.  Very true, he said.  Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things, --of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance?  Certainly not, he said.  I am sure, I said, that he who does not know now the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.  That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.  And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be perfectly ordered?  Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either.  Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.  True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling his own.  Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?  Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.  And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?  Very true.  And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will tell you of brightness and beauty?  Glaucon - SOCRATES  Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.  Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fall, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear --otherwise, not.  By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.  I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a care that i do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceivingyou.  Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.  Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.  What?  The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them 'many' is applied.  True, he said.  And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.  Very true.  The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen.  Exactly.  And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?  The sight, he said.  And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?  True.  But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?  No, I never have, he said.  Then reflect; has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?  Nothing of the sort.  No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses --you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?  Certainly not.  But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen?  How do you mean?  Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see; colour being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colours will be invisible.  Of what nature are you speaking?  Of that which you term light, I replied.  True, he said.  Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?  Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.  And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?  You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.  May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?  How?  Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?  No.  Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?  By far the most like.  And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?  Exactly.  Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by sight.  True, he said.  And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind.  Will you be a little more explicit? he said.  Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them towards objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of vision in them?  Very true.  But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them?  Certainly.  And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence?  Just so.  Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour yet higher.  What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good?  God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view?  In what point of view?  You would say, would you not, that the sun is only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?  Certainly.  In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.