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Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Diversity in municipal police agencies: a national examination of minority hiring and promotion Joseph Gustafson,
Article information: To cite this document: Joseph Gustafson, (2013) "Diversity in municipal police agencies: a national examination of minority hiring and promotion", Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 36 Issue: 4, pp.719-736, https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-01-2013-0005 Permanent link to this document: https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-01-2013-0005
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Diversity in municipal police agencies: a national examination of minority hiring and promotion
Joseph Gustafson Criminal Justice, Westfield State University,
Wesfield State, Massachusetts, USA
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to better understand the institutional and external factors associated with African-American and Latino representation in policing at the line and managerial ranks. Line representation analyses utilize new data sources and a full range of theoretically informed covariates. Managerial representation analyses provide the first comprehensive attempt to understand the dynamics behind minority promotion. Design/methodology/approach – Portions of the 2000 US Census of Population and Housing Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Tabulation, Division of Governmental Studies, and Services (DGSS) survey and Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey were combined to produce a sample of 180 cities/municipal departments for analysis. Findings – Results indicate that the representation of minorities in political office and their presence in police leadership positions are among the most influential predictors of line officer diversity. Proportions of minorities in administrative police roles are greater in larger departments paying higher salaries. There is also evidence that the career advancement of minorities can be limited when multiple minority groups compete for the same promotional opportunities. Originality/value – This study provides a thorough examination of minority officer line representation and the first multivariate examination of minority representation in managerial positions using a national sample.
Keywords Management, Police, Police culture, Legitimacy, Organization, Middle-management
Paper type Research paper
Introduction At different points in its history, American police have experienced crises of legitimacy, primarily in non-white urban communities, that have culminated in major expressions of civil disobedience like the Watts (Kerner Commission, 1968) and “Rodney King” Riots (Christopher Commission, 1991) in Los Angeles. More generally, compromised police legitimacy has been expressed in the form of non-cooperation and perceptions of distrust among the minority urban public (e.g. Jacob, 1971; Kane, 2005). Over several decades, research has consistently found African-American residents of structurally disadvantaged communities to be the least satisfied with police services received and the most likely to perceive unfair treatment by the police (Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969; Jacob, 1971; Hagan and Albonetti, 1982; Sampson and
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1363-951X.htm
Received 10 January 2013 Revised 7 March 2013
1 April 2013 Accepted 2 April 2013
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management
Vol. 36 No. 4, 2013 pp. 719-736
r Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X
DOI 10.1108/PIJPSM-01-2013-0005
The author wishes to sincerely thank Jack McDevitt, Phil He and Robert Kane for guiding this research. He is especially grateful to Nicholas Lovrich and Solomon Zhao for allowing him access to portions of their data, without which this study would not be possible. George Higgins and Deborah Vegh offered valuable feedback on early drafts, and deserve thanks as well. Finally, this manuscript benefitted tremendously from the thoughtful comments and suggestions provided by the anonymous reviewers; thank you for your service to the field and careful attention to my submission.
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Bartusch, 1998; Weitzer, 1999, 2000; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Weitzer and Tuch, 2004). More recent examinations of Latino attitudes toward police draw similar conclusions (Carter, 1983; Webb and Marshall, 1995; Lundman and Kaufman, 2003; Hagan et al., 2005; Reitzel et al., 2004; Schuck and Rosenbaum, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2008).
The enduring disconnect between the police and minorities has been a subject of research and policymaking since the Civil Rights Era. President Johnson’s Kerner Commission found “deep hostility between police and ghetto communities” to be a major cause of the “grievance, tension, and ultimately disorder” that defined this period (Kerner Commission, 1968, p. 299). Its members ultimately recommended the hiring of more minority officers and their placement in minority neighborhoods (Brown and Frank, 2006) as the natural solution. Hiring minorities, it is theorized, has the potential to destroy stereotypes and increase perceptions of legitimacy by increasing constructive interactions between white and non-white officers, helping the former to appreciate minority culture and view minority communities more positively (Smith, 2003). Agencies reflecting the demographics of their surroundings will contain police who better understand the perspectives of minorities and can communicate with them more effectively (Fridell and Scott, 2005). Racial and ethnic diversity in policing, then, helps close broad gaps in social distance between what has traditionally been a white, middle-class police culture and the minority cultures served (Strecher, 1971; Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969; Banton, 1964). Recent research by Weitzer and Tuch (2006) lends support to this view – the authors found the public tends to associate racially mixed policing with impartiality, fairness and trustworthiness in the delivery of police services.
The effort to hire more minority, as well as women, police officers represents one of the longest-running law enforcement initiatives in the history of the field (Walker, 1985) and has led to real increases in the representation of these groups. Four out of every five police agencies (with at least 100 officers) target minorities with special recruitment efforts (Reaves, 2012). Data combining all racial and ethnic minority groups indicate they experienced growth at a rate of approximately 60 percent between 1987 and 2003, representing 15 percent of total officers in the former year and 23.6 percent in the latter (Reaves, 1996; Hickman and Reaves, 2006). The percentage of officers who were female grew at the most significant rate from a low of 2 percent in 1972 to a high of 11.3 percent in 2003 (Walker and Katz, 2008; Hickman and Reaves, 2006).
Despite apparent support for police diversity and the visible success of minority recruitment programs, important questions remain. First, what factors best explain and can promote growth in minority hiring? Do increases in the proportions of minority officers result from mere fluctuations in demographics and police employment opportunities? Could the increases have to do with social structural shifts in the political clout of minority communities? Has the impetus come from within departments, or are departments reacting to external pressures?
Second, what are the factors that influence minority promotion to managerial positions? Have the aforementioned increases in representation extended beyond entry-level positions and into supervisory ranks? Census data show that ethnic and racial minority representation has been greater among “service” or line-level police positions; less integration is seen in “professional and administrative” ranks or managerial positions (Ward, 2006). Although many have studied correlates of minority hiring, few identified researchers have explored the related correlates of minority career advancement (e.g. Lewis, 1989). This is a noteworthy gap as minority managers are believed to play an important role in hiring fellow minorities for entry-level positions (Saltzstein, 1989).
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The present study addresses each of these questions, filling a gap in the current state of knowledge on policing and workforce diversity. It adds to prior research conducted in this area by partitioning police numbers for all sampled agencies into management and line ranks. Such a breakdown permits: a comprehensive examination of minority hiring that utilizes new data sources and a full range of theoretically informed covariates; and the first comprehensive examination of minority promotion to managerial positions.
Literature review Research to date on minority hiring/representation in policing has divided explanatory factors into two categories: those factors having an external influence on the organization and those factors operating from within the organization.
External factors The percentage of minority residents is a very consistent correlate of minority police employment at the city level. Zhao and Lovrich (1998) found percent African-American population to be the strongest and most important predictor of hiring rates of African-American police. Overall, a 0.58 percent increase in the proportion of black citizens resulted in a one percent increase in the representation of black officers, an accelerated ratio. Percent African-American and Latino residents predicted the representation of African-American and Latino officers, respectively, for both Kerr and Mladenka (1994) and Zhao et al. (2005) in their research.
Several studies have empirically tested the link between the race and ethnicity of local government officials and police representativeness, with mixed results. Mayors and city councilors are believed to encourage minority hiring “through the appointment of sympathetic personnel officials and department heads, alteration of personnel policies and rules, or changes in the entire employment climate” (Saltzstein, 1989, p. 540). Lewis (1989) found the presence of a black mayor was the most significant variable associated with the variation of black presence in combined sworn and police patrol ranks. During the period studied, black mayors were also responsible for the appointment of significant numbers of black police chiefs. Percentage of blacks serving on the city legislature, however, did not reach significance in Lewis’ analysis. Saltzstein (1989) studied 105 municipal governments and found that the presence of a black mayor accounted for an additional, significant increase in the representation of blacks in the police force after controlling for percent black residents. Zhao et al. (2005) found the presence of a Latino mayor associated with increases in minority police officer employment, but the results did not hold when an African- American mayor was present. The presence of an African-American mayor was insignificant when other variables were held constant by Zhao and Lovrich (1998), Lott (2000) and Marschall and Shah (2007).
Although most of these studies appear to assign more influence to mayors than city councilors (when significance is found), this is not always the case. Kerr and Mladenka (1994), for example, found black and Latino mayors had a negligible role in the hiring of each respective minority group for protective services positions; minority city council members played a much more important role, albeit an indirect one – over dozens of cities and several years, minority council members were more likely to hire black and Latino administrators, who in turn were more likely to hire black and Latino protective services workers.
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Internal factors The presence of a minority police chief has been consistently related to police diversity. Chiefs are considered the most influential figures in policy formation and implementation overall (Eisenberg et al., 1973; Greisinger et al., 1979; Sparrow, 1988). It has been suggested that these top administrators tend to give preferential assignments to friends and allies in order to informally monitor and maintain control over activities within the department (Walker and Katz, 2008). Lewis (1989) found that black police chiefs were associated with black presence in sworn (but not managerial) ranks. Zhao and Lovrich (1998, p. 274) found an African-American police chief to be the second strongest predictor (after African-American population) of black police employment levels, an indication that these administrators exercise significant power over the hiring process. Both African-American and Latino chiefs were associated with increased hiring rates for members of their respective ethnic groups in Zhao et al. (2005) later study. Taken together, these findings support the assumption that once minority administrators are selected to head a police agency, they play a crucial role in the recruitment of additional minority employees (Kerr and Mladenka, 1994, p. 914).
Affirmative action programs may be formal and court ordered or informal and voluntary, but the former variety has been shown to have the greatest effect on recruitment of minorities (Stokes and Scott, 1996). For court-ordered programs, Lewis (1989) found the presence of consent decrees to be a significant predictor of black presence in law enforcement, but not black managerial representation. Lott (2000) found the number of years a consent decree was in effect dramatically increased minority representation and Sass and Troyer (1999) found a relationship between external legal constraints and minority police hiring decisions in the 1980s. Saltzstein (1989), Zhao and Lovrich (1998) and Zhao et al. (2005), however, failed to find either informal or court-ordered affirmative action programs significant when other explanatory variables were introduced.
Inconsistencies in the significance of affirmative action policies across models could occur if the hiring of various minority groups is a zero-sum game (McClain and Karnig, 1990). “That is, with a limited number of employees to hire, an increase in the hiring of African-American officers, for example, may mean a decrease in the recruitment of Latino officers” (Zhao et al., 2005, p. 380). Empirical support for this hypothesis has been sparse and mixed. Ramirez (1997) found increases in African-American and female police officers related to decreases in proportions of Latino police officers, but the opposite was true for Zhao et al. (2005, p. 384), who found “the hiring of one ethnic group did not exclude the hiring of another group or White female officers.” Kerr and Mladenka (1994) also concluded that African-American population did not exert a statistically significant impact upon Latino job share in their study models.
Another common institutional predictor of employment of minority officers in US cities is the availability of slack resources, or competition for scarce personnel resources. Zhao et al. (2005, p. 380) note, “it is reasonable to postulate that police agencies are more likely to hire minority officers if there are openings available to fill than if employment opportunities are scarce.” The presence of slack resources reflects the financial health of a police organization and has been operationalized in terms of fluctuations in department personnel and budget allocations (Zhao et al., 2005; Ramirez, 1997; Saltzstein, 1989). Zhao et al. (2005) found that increases in the number of police positions predicted increases in the representation of Latino – but not African-American – officers. Regarding budgetary variations, Ramirez (1997) found the recruitment of Latino officers negatively associated with the percentage of city
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budget allocated to law enforcement. Saltzstein (1989), too, found that budgetary expenditures were negatively associated with the hiring of African Americans and explained this relationship as a product of the desirability of high-paying law enforcement work to white applicants; departments spending more on officer salaries may be the same ones that attract non-minority applicants.
Other covariates Other correlates of minority police hiring examined include city size and geographic region. Though primarily used as a control measure in most studies, city population size is consistently associated with the hiring of minority police officers (e.g. Lewis, 1989, Zhao and Lovrich, 1998; Zhao et al., 2005). As Warner et al. (1989, p. 567) explain, larger cities tend to hire more minority officers because they “have traditionally offered a wider array of employment opportunities, and in most cases contain sizable subpopulations of well-educated and civic-minded persons who are predisposed to support affirmative action as a goal of public policy.” Recent descriptive data support this theory and the related empirical findings; larger cities do tend toward higher than average levels of minority and female police representation (Reaves and Hickman, 2002).
Geographic region is another control variable occasionally included in minority police hiring models (e.g. Lewis, 1989; Zhao and Lovrich, 1998). Wilson (1968) has argued that regional effects are important to consider because political context often shapes police organizational policies (although see Zhao et al., 2006, who dispute the relevance of his theory in modern times). In addition, racial and ethnic minorities who form the pool of potential applicants are not evenly distributed across the USA; African Americans are concentrated in the South and in larger cities while Latinos tend to live in particular cities in the Southwest, East and South (Walker and Katz, 2008, p. 137). Some empirical support exists that cultural and economic variations between regions are associated with compliance to affirmative action (Warner et al., 1989, p. 567; Steel and Lovrich, 1987). Southern location was negatively associated with African Americans holding city or police administrative positions for Zhao and Lovrich (1998). Regional variables were insignificant for Lewis (1989) when used to explain African- American hires, but significant in explaining the representation of minority managers.
Methodology Sources of data and sampling Data for the present study are assembled from a series of archived cross-sectional data sets aggregated at the city/agency level, including US Census of Population and Housing Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Tabulations, The Division of Governmental Studies and Services study (DGSS), Law Enforcement Administrative and Management Statistics (LEMAS), sections of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and US Census data. Files were merged to create an original master data set for analysis. The DGSS Master File combines data from the DGSS, EEO, LEMAS, UCR and Census surveys for 2000. DGSS cases were matched by place name to cases in EEO, LEMAS and Census and by ORI (originating agency identifier) codes to the UCR. The final sample was thus constrained by the total number of cases that matched across data sets. Of the 281 cities in the original DGSS file[1], 193 matches with the EEO file resulted. An additional 13 cases were lost when LEMAS was merged. UCR and Census figures were available for all remaining cities, preventing further case attrition. The final sample stands at 180 cities with at least 100 officers serving populations of 50,000 or more.
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Dependent variables The dependent measures in the present study are line and management diversity. Line diversity is operationalized as percentage African-American and Latino officers[2]. Managerial diversity is operationalized with counts of African-American and Latino managers[3]. All figures were calculated from 2000 Census of Population and Housing EEO Tabulations counts of line law enforcement officers (Census Occupation Category 385) and first-line supervisors/managers of police and detectives (Census Occupation Category 371). The counts represent the number of citizens who reported working as a police officer or manager in a given city on their 2000 Census forms[4] (Table I).
Independent variables Several external and institutional explanatory variables were selected to explain variation in their respective dependent measures. The percent black/Latino population, presence of black/Latino mayors, length of black/Latino mayor’s tenure and percent black/Latino city councilors comprise the external measures; the presence of black/Latino police chiefs, formal/informal affirmative action policies, unions and other minority groups comprise the institutional measures. These variables were included due to their theoretical significance and consistent empirical correlations with minority police officer representation.
The percent black/Latino population figures were collected from Census 2000 Summary File 1 and represent the bloc voting power of each minority group (e.g. Eisenger, 1982). The DGSS study provided data on whether a black or Latino mayor had held office in 2000, coded dichotomously (0¼no, 1¼yes). Figures from 1993 and 1996 were used to construct a minority mayor tenure variable; a black (or Latino) mayor was given one point for being present in each of the three available years (1993, 1996 and 2000). For example, when a Latino mayor served in 1993 and 1996, but not 2000, this was scored a two out of a possible three. DGSS also provided data on the percent of city councilors who were black or Latino in 2000.
Preliminary correlation matrices and multicollinearity diagnostics indicated fairly strong associations between these variables, resulting in variance inflation factors (VIFs) that exceeded the accepted limit of four (Fisher and Mason, 1981; Studenmund, 2001). A principal components analysis was performed to remedy this issue and revealed that each of the four variables was essentially measuring the same underlying theoretical construct – minority political power. A minority political power scale was then created for both African-American and Latino influence by summing the z-scores for each variable (a¼0.880 for Black scale, a¼0.868 for Latino scale). For all constructs, higher values represent greater minority political control[5].
DGSS also provided data on the presence of black or Latino chiefs (0¼no, 1¼yes) and formal and informal affirmative action programs (0¼no, 1¼yes) for 2000. Formal
Line officers n Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Diversity variables Percent black 180 0 70.6% 12.3% 0.121 Percent Latino 180 0 66.1% 8.6% 0.115 Managers (counts) Black 180 0 404 18.5 43.982 Latino 180 0 246 9.4 27.231
Table I. Dependent variables
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programs are defined as either formal voluntary programs with specific goals and timetables for hiring minorities and women or formal programs reflecting a consent decree or court-ordered system of preferential consideration for minorities and women. Informal programs, on the other hand, are defined as informal voluntary programs with specific goals and timetables for hiring minorities and women. Departments were asked to select from these options the one that best characterized their program at the time. EEO percent minority officer and manager data were used in various combinations to assess the impact of multiple minority groups competing for scarce positions and promotions (i.e. to test the zero-sum game hypothesis; McClain and Karnig, 1990). For example, where Latino line officer percents were modeled, percent African-American line was controlled; when Latino manager counts were modeled, percent black managers was controlled (Table II).
New independent measures examined in the present study are officer and manager average salary, percent minority line/percent minority management and union presence. Officer salary is operationalized as the average of minimum and maximum annual salaries for officers as reported in the 2000 LEMAS; manager salary equals the average annual salaries for sergeants. Officer salaries indicate the desirability of employment with a given department, and therefore, the amount of competition to be expected from majority group applicants. Similarly, salaries of mid-level managers influence competition for desirable promotions (e.g. Saltzstein, 1989). EEO data for percent minority officers and managers (defined above in “Dependent variables”) enter models as predictors of one another; percent minority line appears in models for minority promotion, and percent minority managers in those for minority hiring (e.g. Lewis, 1989). Union presence is measured with 2000 LEMAS figures for whether or not a given department engaged in collective bargaining that year (0¼no, 1¼yes). As Walker (1985, p. 567) notes, unions “have represented white officers challenging affirmative action plans in courts.” Collective bargaining groups such as the Fraternal
External Expected sign n Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Independent variables Percent black þ 180 0.4% 89.5% 19.5% 18.590 Black mayor þ 180 0 1 0.144 0.353 Percent Black Council þ 180 0 100% 19.8% 21.221 Percent Latino þ 180 1.1% 76.6% 15.9% 15.604 Latino mayor þ 180 0 1 0.073 0.260 Percent Latino council þ 180 0 77.8% 6.4% 12.316 Institutional Black chief þ 180 0 1 0.188 0.391 Latino chief þ 180 0 1 0.085 0.280 Formal AA program þ 180 0 1 0.301 0.460 Informal AA program þ 180 0 1 0.205 0.405 Officer salary � 180 23,203 70,061 41,453 8481.125 Manager salary � 180 29,844 84,164 54,692 11205.704 Police unions � 180 0 1 0.778 0.417 Percent minority line þ 180 Percent minority managers þ 180 See Table I Other minority groups � 180
Note: AA, affirmative action Table II.
Independent variables
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Order of Police have filed amicus briefs against affirmative action policies, with varying degrees of success across municipalities (Warner et al., 1989, p. 567). One would therefore hypothesize a negative relationship between police unions and the hiring of minorities. Despite the suggestion of a theoretical basis, no identified researchers have examined the impact of unions on the hiring of racial or ethnic minorities. Unionization has thus far only been included in research on female representation (e.g. Riccucci, 1986; Warner et al., 1989; Sass and Troyer, 1999).
City size, a theoretically and empirically relevant variable, was ultimately excluded as an external measure due to its high correlation (r¼0.943) with department size, a key control measure. Budget and slack resources were also highly correlated with department size (r¼0.960, r¼0.738, respectively). In light of this result, neither variable was entered into models. Budgets may not necessarily be spent on hiring and promotion and there is no reason to believe that available openings will be filled in a manner that either advantages or disadvantages minority applicants. Finally, geographic region is not considered in this research. Results of Zhao et al.’s (2006) recent test of Wilson’s (1968) theory of political culture suggest that any regional differences in policing style have all but disappeared since the publication of his influential book in the late 1960s, in part due to the modern-day uniformity of police training and “tough on crime” policy.
Control variables An organizational structure variable is included to help isolate the effects of independent measures. How a police organization is structured can impact its hiring and promotion policies and patterns. Police bureaucracies are often large, complex organizations characterized by the differentiation of tasks, a hierarchical chain of command and written rules and regulations (Walker and Katz, 2008). Organizational structure is measured through the creation of a department size/complexity scale (similar to Eitle et al., 2005; Maguire, 2003) comprised of five z-scored variables (a¼0.700): organization size (total full-time employees), task scope (services and functions performed), functional differentiation (no. of special units), spatial differentiation (no. of district stations) and height (chief salary less officer salary/officer salary). Higher scores indicate a greater degree of bureaucratization. The 2000 LEMAS survey provided the necessary data for each component variable (or its calculation).
It is hypothesized that larger and more complex agencies will display more bureaucratic structures, and therefore, tendencies. Bureaucracies have been associated with impersonality, efficiency and appointment and promotion based on seniority and technical merit, so more bureaucratic departments could show less bias in patterns of hiring and promotion. Reiss (1971) though, argues that more bureaucratic departments tend to be less responsive to citizens and politicians, neutralizing civic power. Further, police organizations have been known to promote in their personnel commitment to the bureaucratic ideal over commitments to friends, kin or members of the same racial or ethnic group (Manning, 1997), making it less likely that minorities will recruit and promote other minorities (Table III).
Analytic techniques The present study employs a combination of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and count data regression procedures to explain variations in racial and ethnic diversity. OLS regression is appropriate when dependent measures are continuous and unbounded. The percent black and Latino variables examined in line models are quantitative
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measures capable of taking on a wide range of values and therefore meet this assumption in principle (Lewis-Beck, 1995; Studenmund, 2001). Early diagnostics of the normality of the distribution of minority managerial proportions, however, indicated that they were highly skewed toward zero. Based upon this finding, it was decided that a count data model was more appropriate and could better address the limitations of these dependent variables. For dependent count measures that represent relatively rare events and tend toward a value of zero, OLS regression is inappropriate because its assumptions are violated. Using OLS under these circumstances produces inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates (Long, 1997). Poisson regression is one option that can overcome such shortcomings, making it a more appropriate procedure for working with the counts of minority managers examined in this study. Preliminary Poisson output indicated overdispersion in all models of minority manager representation (the overdispersion parameter was significant). When these conditions exist, negative binomial regression is the more appropriate analytical procedure (Long, 1997; Osgood, 2000). Final analyses of minority managerial representation proceeded with negative binomial regression models created using LIMDEP 7.0.
Results Minority line representation (Table IV) Several consistencies are evident across African-American and Latino line officer representation models. First, the minority political power constructs are extremely powerful explanatory factors in both cases. The amount of political power and
Expected sign n Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Department size/complexity Department size 7 180 93 16,466 865.444 1738.376 Task scope 7 180 9 18 14.106 1.544 Height 7 180 0.6 5.1 2.071 0.755 Functional differentiation 7 180 0 19 9.490 3.652 Spatial differentiation 7 180 0 25 2.139 3.729 Formalization 7 180 4 8 7.533 0.688 Civilianization 7 180 0 1 0.319 0.149
Table III. Control variable
African American Latino Variable b SE b SE
Minority political power 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.001 Formal AA program Informal AA program Minority chief 0.015 0.006 0.018 0.007 % other minority line % minority management 0.067 0.017 0.092 0.019 Department size/complexity Union �0.013 0.005 Average salary (line) o0.001 o0.001 R
2 0.638 0.666
Notes: AA, affirmative action. Italicized values indicate highest b’s. Dependent variable, log of respective minority group’s percent representation
Table IV. Line representation
models
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representation that a group enjoys is closely related to the hiring of officers belonging to these same groups. Second, minority leadership plays a very large role in the hiring of minority line officers. African-American and Latino police chiefs each explained a significant proportion of the variance in their respective groups’ line representation. While it was predicted that minority chiefs and managers would both explain minority line officer presence, it was not expected that the latter would exert a greater degree of explanatory power (in terms of b’s) than the former. For both models, this was the next strongest correlate of line diversity after the minority political power construct. Perhaps mid-level police managers are more direct participants in the recruitment and screening process than farther-removed police chiefs. For example, these managers may be responsible for conducting many of the intermediate steps involved in the hiring process, including background checks and panel interviews, granting them more control over final selection decisions. Third, notice that the presence of other minority groups in line positions is not an encumbrance. Results consistently contradict the zero-sum game hypothesis. Fourth, higher salaries are associated with more Latino line officer presence, and not less. Recall the hypothesis presented earlier that higher salaries would increase competition from whites who found police positions desirable (Saltzstein, 1989). It could be that majority group members are less willing to endure the danger, physicality and sleaze (e.g. Bayley, 1994) that are part of police work, despite the field’s attractive compensation, benefits and job security[6]. Fifth, while police unions have a detrimental effect on the representation of African-American officers in line positions, there is no discernible effect on Latino representation. The control measure – department size/ complexity – explained no additional variance (Table V).
Minority managerial representation Consistencies are also evident across minority management representation models. The first observation concerns a striking lack of significance for the minority political power constructs. One of the central predictors in line models, this variable has no impact whatsoever on the promotion of blacks or Latinos. That political power explains hiring and not promotions could be interpreted to mean that diversity initiatives are insincere and based primarily upon a superficial access-and-legitimacy diversity perspective (Thomas and Ely, 2001). The political demands of minorities may be satisfied when the more visible ranks of police agencies are reflective of the race and ethnic makeup of a given city; minority
African American Latino Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Minority political power Formal AA program 1.091 0.473 Informal AA program �0.813 0.402 Minority chief % other minority management �4.721 1.853 % minority line 4.877 1.99 Department size/complexity 0.203 0.098 0.273 0.082 Union Average salary (manager) o0.001 o0.001 o0.001 o0.001 McFadden Pseudo-R
2 0.623 0.649
Notes: AA, affirmative action. Dependent variable, minority count in each respective group
Table V. Managerial representation models
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officers are therefore hired to gain access to a minority community and enhance perceptions of legitimacy there.
Both managerial models are also consistent in their emphasis on department size/ complexity and average salary as key covariates. Large and bureaucratically complex agencies are most likely to be staffed by minority managers of both race and ethnic combinations. This finding lends more support to the argument that larger agencies reflect larger populations whose minority concentrations and openness to affirmative action encourage the promotion (but not hiring, apparently) of minority police officers to more prestigious and better-paying management jobs. The same explanation for the relationship between minority line representation and average officer salary can be applied in the context of minority managers. Perhaps policing represents a blue-collar profession with white-collar pay and benefits; this unique status could make the field more appealing to minority applicants who subsequently form the pool of potential candidates for promotion.
The minority management models find affirmative action policies significant for African-American – but not Latino – managers. Recall that affirmative action policies are completely insignificant in line representation models. Perhaps these varied findings reflect how affirmative action policies are narrowly tailored, as required by law, and thus influence the recruitment of certain groups under certain circumstances while not benefitting others in any substantive way. Where affirmative action policies are significant in the African-American model, it appears that only formal policies have a positive impact; informal policies actually reduce diversity. Formal policies could have this effect because they set specific goals and timetables, and in some cases, are enforced by law. Informal policies lacking a clear focus, mechanisms for gauging success or the “teeth” of legal recourse might prove counterproductive by creating an impression of equal opportunity that is not backed up with real change in the composition of personnel.
The management models also differ in that the percentage of minority line police is not consistently associated with minority promotion, as percentage minority manager is with minority line. Only percent African-American – and not Latino – line figures explain increases in the managerial representation of African Americans. Neither managerial model assigns any influence to the minority police chiefs (who appear to maintain power over hiring decisions only) or unions (which more commonly represent line interests). Finally, there is some evidence that the zero-sum game hypothesis may apply more so to management than line representation. The quantity of black managers shrinks when a greater proportion of Latino managers is present in this study. This effect is not reciprocal, however. In comparison, there was no impact of “other” minority group representation on line representation in hiring models. This could be a factor of the relatively small number of managerial positions available. Opportunities for advancement are exceedingly rare in the field of policing, with most officers remaining in line-level positions throughout their careers (e.g. Bayley, 1994) (Table VI).
Study limitations This examination is certainly not without its methodological limitations, so results should be considered tentative, with the following qualifications in mind. The present study features a sample that is constrained by the availability of data across multiple sources. The use of DGSS data resulted in the loss of 700 cases and a final sample size of 180 cities/agencies. As such, just over a quarter (about 28 percent) of the 638 municipal agencies with 100 or more full-time personnel are represented (see Reaves, 2011). While there is no reason to expect the matching process employed eliminated
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cases in a systematically biased manner, it remains possible that significant differences could exist between those departments whose data are and are not reported. Also, the sample generates results which cannot be generalized beyond large American municipal police organizations. Finally, external validity could suffer due to the age of this data. Since all sources are over a decade old, it is possible that the dynamics affecting the various dependent variables analyzed herein have changed and results will not be replicated in agencies operating in 2013 and beyond.
In the present study, complex social processes are inferred from cross-sectional data. The line and managerial representation analyses do include lagged measures (e.g. mayor tenure), but for the most part, the hiring and promotion of minorities in 2000 is explained using variables that measure various internal and external characteristics of each city/agency at one specific point in time that same year: factors like minority chief presence might take time to manifest in changing patterns of representation; affirmative action policies could be more or less effective depending on when they were instituted and how long they were in effect. At the same time, the same sets of factors the explain minority representation at the ranks of line and management in 2000 might not have the same effect on this representation in prior or later years. In light of this limitation, it is important to clarify that the terms “minority hiring” and “minority promotion” are referring to the actual presence of minorities in line and managerial police roles, respectively, in 2000 and not necessarily the total number of minorities hired or promoted in that year. Minority hiring and promotion are in reality minority line and managerial representation at a specific time and should be understood as such.
Discussion and conclusions Notwithstanding its methodological limitations, this study of the determinants of organizational diversity in municipal police agencies still offers many implications for policy and research. One rather broad social policy suggestion is to promote representation of minorities across the spectrum of public employment. As diversity in public office emerged as one of the most robust correlates of diversity in policing, one of the best ways of ensuring a representative police may be to ensure a representative local government. There is evidence that one way in which minority leaders reward their constituents is by helping them attain local police jobs. A problem with this suggestion, though, is that the presence of minorities in political office tends to be highly correlated with the size (and therefore collective influence) of the minority populations inhabiting a particular community. It is unclear what repercussions this
African American Latino Independent variables Line Management Line Management
Political power þ þ Formal AA program þ Informal AA program � Minority chief þ þ Minority competition � Minority line/managers þ þ þ Department size/complexity þ þ Union � Line/manager salary þ þ þ
Note: AA, affirmative action
Table VI. Minority line and managerial representation model summaries
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finding has for cities that are home to small African-American or Latino populations or the other less prevalent minority groups (e.g. Asians, Native Americans, etc.) not considered here. Agencies actively seeking to recruit a diverse workforce under these conditions should be mindful of the potential effects of political underrepresentation; it may be necessary for them to take deliberate steps to reach out to smaller minority populations and attract a sufficient number of candidates.
A second theme illuminated by the results of line and managerial representation analyses is that key explanatory variables influence different types and levels of minority representation in different ways. Certain factors influence one group’s hiring, but not promotion; others influence outcomes for one group, but not both groups. What this suggests is that “diversity” is not a one-dimensional concept – that race/ethnic and line vs managerial diversity are each unique somehow and therefore require separate lines of theorizing and empirical study. This and prior research has assumed that all diversity is the same and can be explained using the same theoretical bases and set of factors, ignoring the possibility that these might impact some groups and not others or that other, thus far unmeasured variables are associated with the representation of particular groups in particular roles. Future researchers might seek out distinct explanatory factors that are theoretically pertinent to individual minority groups. For example, minority advancement could be a function of the number of opportunities for promotion, officer seniority or the level of education required for management jobs. Alternatively, a conflict point of view may have something to offer as a theoretical basis: are majority groups blocking minority access to more prestigious management positions in an effort to protect their interests in them? Future researchers seeking to answer these important questions might wish to consider a qualitative methodological approach at a more precise level of analysis. An inductive approach can be used to uncover any thus far overlooked explanatory factors and build stronger theory. Research thus far in this area of police organizations remains largely exploratory and atheoretical. At the same time, a deductive approach can enhance the validity of quantitative findings by asking minorities directly whether our interpretations of patterns are correct and represent the real minority experience. Results gleaned could inform hypotheses in future macro-level studies, completing the feedback loop.
This is not to say that researchers should discard those correlates which have traditionally been included in representation models; many have had consistently powerful predictive power and a few work well to explain all diversity. Instead, future inquiries should add to the present list of common correlates by experimenting with new ones. This research, for example, offers minority managerial representation as a new covariate for consideration. A fuller understanding of diversity dynamics would appear crucial because those groups whose representation is the least studied and least well understood are the same groups (i.e. minority managers) who remain considerably underrepresented in policing (e.g. Hickman and Reaves, 2006; Ward, 2006). Departments will be better able to diversify their ranks and target specific underrepresented groups if they are aware of what “pushes” and “pulls” draw these individuals into the field and tailor their recruiting strategies accordingly. Developing more complete models of minority promotion may be especially important because mid-level managers were shown to exert even greater influence over the selection of minority line officers than minority chiefs.
Understanding patterns of minority hiring and promotion is worthwhile because it is to all agencies’ advantage to diversify ranks. While it is commendable to promote equal opportunity for its own sake, there is evidence that diversity is capable of
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delivering a wide range of substantive and symbolic operational benefits, not the least of which is better police-minority relations. Research shows that mixed-race policing is overwhelmingly supported by the public (Weitzer and Tuch, 2006); that it can increase perceptions of trust and encourage cooperation from citizens, in particular minorities (US Department of Justice, 2001; Marschall and Shah, 2007). Diverse teams of officers represent the value of racial integration and unity and therefore hold the potential to enhance police legitimacy (Weitzer and Tuch, 2006). Minority advancement could have even stronger effects in this regard. Police managers, unlike line personnel, often possess the power and authority to redirect public resources and influence organizational policies (Marschall and Shah, 2007). As such, they may be uniquely positioned to promote their groups’ interests, even further enhancing perceptions of legitimacy.
Researchers, policymakers and police officials should recognize that diversity comes in many forms. It is a complex phenomenon whose determinants will require further systematic inquiry before firm policy recommendations are in order. The present study’s results are by no means conclusive but they do at least suggest that the continued study of organizational diversity is a promising avenue for inquiry. This research brings the academic community one small step closer to understanding the dynamics of minority hiring and promotion. Future researchers are encouraged to test and build upon the conclusions of this study.
Notes
1. The DGSS data represent a random sample of American municipalities and their police agencies. LEMAS, on the other hand, samples American police agencies, specifically. This explains the discrepancy in their respective n’s.
2. To smooth out and normalize the distribution of percent minority line variables, a log10 transformation was performed. One was added to each percentage to avoid occasional undefined results. This transformation brought skewness and kurtosis figures within acceptable ranges.
3. Counts are utilized for managerial models due to the relative rarity of minority managers. African American and Latino manager percentage variables (even when combined) were not evenly distributed and tended toward zero. The limited nature of these dependent measures made the use of count data models (Poisson, negative binomial regression) more appropriate (see “Analytic techniques”).
4. According to Census, EEO tabulations combine full-time and part-time employees in a given occupational category.
5. It should be noted that “minority political power” represents potential (and not exercised) minority political strength, or ability to unite in common interest. The construct does not measure the city’s dominant political philosophy, which could also be relevant.
6. Police work might also be more attractive to minorities because it has been shown that these groups consistently earn more in the public sector than they do in the private sector (Blank, 1985). Government employers tend to place greater weight on social welfare commitments like affirmative action. As a result, protected groups like race, ethnic@@, and gender minorities are more likely to be hired, promoted, and better paid if they opt for a government career (Blank, 1985). Studies have shown that the gap between white male and minority incomes is smaller in government (as opposed to private) industry (e.g. Asher and Popkin, 1984; Perloff and Wachter, 1984; Smith, 1977) and that blacks are twice as likely as whites to desire a government job (Lewis and Frank, 2002).
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About the author
Dr Joseph Gustafson is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at the Westfield State University and one of the first graduates of Northeastern University’s Doctoral Program in Criminology and Justice Policy. His research focusses on policing (police deviance and workforce diversity, in particular) and he has published articles in this area in outlets including the Journal of Criminal Justice and Justice Quarterly. Dr Gustafson is an active Member of the American Society of Criminology (ASC) and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS) and regularly presents his research at annual conferences. Dr Joseph Gustafson can be contacted at: [email protected]
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: [email protected] Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
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