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HERE AND NOW THIRD EDITION

POWERFUL IDEAS IN

EVERYDAY LI FE Lewis Vaughn

HERE AND NOW

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING ABOUT PHILOSOPHY HERE AND NOW:

"Above all, Vaughn's text does ,vhac few ochers are able co do, namely, co show chat ph ilosophy actually matters ,vich respect co ho,v we ch ink and live in the wo rld. For all its brevity the book 1nanages co run the gamut of critical topics, and to offer real-world (a nd often hu1norous) examples of each . He does not offer the luxury of viewing d iffic ult questions fro1n a position of abstracted detachment and safety. Rather, he hurls readers straight into the teeth of the sconn and allows che1n co feel the raw terror, wonder, and exh ilaration chat rightly belong co the st udy of philosophy."

- Daniel Bramer, Holy Family University

"Vaughn has chosen the mos t important topics in philosophy. His 1nenu can not be improved upon. W ith a beautiful open ing chapter on the nature of ph ilosophical ch inking and remarkably concise chap ters on the 1n osc engaging issues in philosophy, and with a nice 1n ix of classic and conce1nporary philosophers, chis is a terri fic text. It is visually appealing as well."

- Paul Herrick, Shoreline Community College

"Philosophy Here and Now is written in a clear, engagi ng, and lively style. The author does an excellent job of explain ing abstract and conceptually intricate material to novices. The book introduces students to philosophy as a living enterprise, full of intellectual surprises and relevance to everyday hu1nan concerns."

- Phil ip Robbi ns, University of Missouri

"I can't imagine not using Philosophy Here and Now. My experience w ith the textbook has been completely posit ive. When st udents lee you know how much they like reading the text you know you 1n ade the right decision in adopting the book."

- Teresa Cantrell, University of Louisville

"Th is is the bes t text I have fou nd fo r my int roductory class. Q uest ions and exercises engage the st udents' lives di rectly and ask chem co explain their own understand ing/beliefs about a matter. The appendix on writing ph ilosophy papers can easily stand on its o,vn as the mos t valuable cool I use in my class. I have yet co find anyth ing at chis price with a comparable content."

- Stephen Orr, Solano Community College

PH L PHY HERE AND NOW

POWER FUL IDEAS IN EVERYDAY LIFE

THIRD EDITJC)~

Lewis Vaughn

NEWYORK [ OXFORD OXFORD UN IVERS ITY PRESS

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Names: Vaughn, Lewis} auth o r.

Title: Philosophy here and now : powerful ideas in everyday li fe I Lewis Vaughn. Description: T H IRD EDITION. J New York : Oxford University Press, 20 18. Identifiers: LCCN 20 18014409 I IS BN 9780 190852344 (pbk.) SubjecLs: LCSH: Philosophy- Textbooks. Classificatio n: LCC 8 031 .V38 2018 I DOC 100-dc23 LC record available ar https://lccn.loc.gov/20 180 14409

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• PREFACE XXI

CHAPTER 1 PHILOSOPHY AND YOU 1

CHAPTER 2 GOD AND RELIGION 57

CHAPTER 3 MORALITY AND THE MORAL LIFE 135

CHAPTER 4 MIND AND BODY 205

CHAPTER s FREE WILL AND DETERM INISM 240

CHAPTER 6 KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM 274

CHAPTER 7 AESTHETICS 332

CHAPTER 8 THE JUST SOCIETY 354

CHAPTER 9 THE MEAN ING OF LIFE 406

APPENDIX A THE TRUTH ABOUT PH ILOSOPHY MAJORS 431

APPENDIX B ANSWERS TO EXERCISES 437

APPENDIX c HOW TO WRITE A PHILOSOPHY PAPER 441

NOTES 451

GLOSSARY 457

CRED ITS 461

INDEX of MARGINAL

QUOTATIONS 463

GENERAL IN DEX 465

VII

Preface xxi

CHAPTER 1 PH I LOSOPHY AND YOU l

1.1 PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING 2

The Good of Philosophy 2

Philoso phical Terra in 4 What Do You Believe? Your Philosophica l Beliefs 5 Essay/Discussion Questions 7

1.2 SOCRATES AND THE EXAMINED LIFE 8

Philosophers at Work: Pl ato 9

PLATO: The Republic 10 Philosophers at Work: The Pre-Socratics 12

Essay/Discussion Questions 14

1.3 THINKING PHILOSOPHICALLY 14

Reasons and Arguments 15 Philosophy Lab 16

Philosophers at Work: Phi losophy Takes on Racism 20

Reading Phil osophy 27 Philosophers at Work: Hypatia 29 Philosophers at Work: Early Women

Philoso phe rs: Themisto cl ea, Ar ignote,

and Theano 31

Fallacious Reason ing 33 Philosophy Now: Phi losophy in the News 34 Essay/Discussion Questions 40

REVIEW NOTES 40

Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own Views 42

KEY TERMS 42

ARGUMENT EXERCISES 43 ix

x Cont ents

NARRATIVE: Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates 47

PROBING QUESTIONS SS

FOR FURTHER READING SS

CHAPTER 2 GOD AND RELIGION 57

2.1 OVERVIEW: COD AND PHILOSOPHY 58

Why Religion Mat te rs 59

Ove rview: The Phi losopher's Quest 59 Philosophy Now: Who Believes in God? 60 What Do You Believe? H ard-W ired for God? 63

Belief and D isbelief 64

Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph i losophica l Views 66

2.2 ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF COD 66

Cosmological Arguments 66

AQUINAS: Summa Theologica 67 Philosophers at Work: St. T homas Aquinas 68 Philosophy Now: Science an d the Uncaused

Universe 69

CRAIG: Reasonable Faith 70

Design Argumen t s 72

PALEY: Natural Theology 72

HUME: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 74 Philosophy Now: Do Scientists Reject Religion? 78

On to logical Arguments 79

ANSELM: Proslogium 79 Philosophy Now: Evo lution and Intelligent

Des ign 80

KANT: Critique of Pure Reason 83 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph i losophica l

2.3 COD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 84

Rowe's Argumen t f rom Evil 84

ROWE: Philosophy of Religion 84

The Free W ill Defense 87

SWINBURNE: Is There a God? 87

The Sou l-Making Defense 88

HICK: Evil and the God of Love 88 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l

2.4 THEISM AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 92

ST. TERESA OF AVILA: The Life of Teresa of Jesus 92

MACKIE: The Miracle of Theism 93 Philosophy Lab 94

ROWE: Philosophy of Religion 95 Philosophy Now: Proof of the Power of Prayer? 96

SWINBURNE: The Existence of God 97 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l

2.5 BELIEF WITHOUT REASON 98

James: Pragmatic Fait h 99

JAMES: "The W ill t o Believe" 100

MARTIN: Atheism: A Philosophical

Justification 106

Pasca l: Betting on God 106

What Do You Believe? Do You Live by Faith? 107

PASCAL: Pensees and Other Writings 107 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l

2.6 EASTERN RELIGIONS 109

Buddh i sm 109

SUMEDHO: Buddha-Nature 11 2

RAHULA: What the Buddha Taught 11 2 Philosophy Now: Bu ddhi sm and Science 114

H induism 116

Philosophy Now: The Caste System 120

Daoism 123

CHUANG TZU: All Things Are One 123

LAO-TZU: Tao -te ching 124 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Phi losoph ica l

Contents x 1

x i i Contents

REVIEW NOTES 126

Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own Views 129

KEY TERMS 129

FICTION: Art hur C. Clarke, "The St ar" 131

PROBING QUESTIONS 133

FOR FURTHER READING 134

CHAPTER 3 MORALITY AND THE MORAL LIFE 135

3.1 OVERVIEW: ETHICS AND THE MORAL DOMAIN 136

Eth ics and Moralit y 136

Moral Theo ries 139

Philosophy Now: Morality and the Low 141 Philosophy Now: The Moral ity of Human

Cloni ng 144

Religion an d Morality 146

SHAFER-LANDAU: Whatever Happened

to Good and Evil? 147 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph i losophica l

Vi ews 148

3.2 MORAL RELATIVISM 148

Su bjective Relativism 149

Cultural Relativism 151

What Do You Believe? Cu ltu ral Re lativi sm

an d Women's Rights 152

Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph i losophica l

Vi ews 155

3.3 MORALITY BASED ON CONSEQUENCES 155

Utilitar ian ism 156

MILL: "Wh at Uti lit arian ism Is" 158 Philosophy Now: Util ita riani sm an d the Death

Penalty 160

Philosophy Lab 164

Eth ical Ego ism 165

Philosophers at Work: John Stuart Mill 165 Philosophy Now: To rture and the Tick ing Bomb

Ter ro rist 166

Writing to Understand: Criti qui ng Philosoph ica l Views 169

3.4 M ORALITY BASED ON DUTY AND RIGHTS 169

KANT: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 170 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l

3.5 MORALITY BASED ON CHARACTER 175

ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics 176

SHAFER-LANDAU: The Fundamentals of Ethics 180

Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l Views 181

3.6 FEMINIST ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF CARE 181

JAGGAR: "Femin ist Eth ics" 182

CROSTHWAITE: "Gender and Bioethics" 182

HELD: The Ethics of Care 184

Philosophers at Work: M ar y Wo ll stonecraft 186

BAIER: "The Need for More T han Justice" 188 Writing to Understand: Critiqui ng Philosoph ica l

3.7 ALBERT CAMUS: AN EXISTENTIALIST VOICE 188

CAMUS: The Myth of Sisyphus 190 Writing to Understand: Criti qui ng Philosoph ica l

3.8 CONFUCIANISM 192

CONFUCIUS: Analects 193

NOSS: A History of the World's Religions 195 Writing to Understand: Criti qui ng Philosoph ica l

REVIEW NOTES 196

Writing to Understand: A rguing You r Own Views 198

KEY TERMS 198

FICTION: Ursula K. Le Guin, " The Ones Who Wa lk Away

from Ornelas" 200

PROBING QUESTIONS 203

FOR FURTHER READING 203

Contents xi ii

x iv Contents

CHAPTER 4 MIND AND BODY 205

4.1 OVERVIEW: T HE M IND-BODY PROBLEM 206

Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph iloso phica l

Vi ews 211

4.2 SUBSTANCE DUALISM 211

DESCARTES: Discourse on the Method of Rightly

Conducting the Reason 2 12

SCHICK: Doing Philosophy 212

DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy 213 What Do You Believe? T he Immortal Soul 2 14

SEARLE: Mind 216

Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph iloso phica l Vi ews 217

4.3 MIND-BODY IDENTITY 217

SMART: "Sensations and Brain Processes" 217

CHALMERS: The Conscious Mind 2 18

NAGEL: "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" 220 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph iloso phica l

Vi ews 221

4.4 THE M IND AS SOFTWARE 222

FODOR: "T he Mind-Body Problem" 222

BLOCK: "Troubles with Functionalism" 223

What Do You Believe? Al an d Human Rights 224

SEARLE: Mind 226

Philosophers at Work: Alan Turing 227 Philosophers at Work: John R. Searle 228 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph iloso phica l

Vi ews 229

Philosophy Now: A l, Ethics , an d War 230

4.5 THE MIND AS PROPERTIES 230

CHALMERS: The Conscious Mind 232 Philosophy Lab 233 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Ph iloso phica l

Vi ews 234

REVIEW NOTES 234

Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own Views 235

KEY TERMS 236

FICTION: Terry Bisson, "They're Made out of Meat" 237

PROBING QUESTIONS 238

FOR FURTHER READING 238

CHAPTER 5 FREE WILL AND DETERMIN ISM 240

5.1 OVERVIEW: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM 241

What Do You Believe? Fate 245 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Phi losoph ica l

5.2 DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM 246

D'HOLBACH: "Of the System of Man's Free Agency" 246

Philosophers at Work: Will iam James 248

JAMES: "The Dilemma of Determin ism" 249 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Phi losoph ica l

5.3 COMPATIBILISM 250

LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 251

STACE: Religion and the Modern Mind 251 Philosophy Now: Does Belief in Free Will Matter? 252

ROWE: "Two Conce pts of Freedom" 254 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Phi losoph ica l

5.4 LIBERTARIANISM 255

Philosophy Now: Science and Free Will 256

VAN INWAGEN: An Essay on Free Will 257 Philosophy Lab 258

TAYLOR: Metaphysics 258 Writing to Understand: Critiquing Phi losoph ica l

5.5 SARTRE' S PROFOUND FREEDOM 261

SARTRE: "Existen tialism Is a Humanism" 262

Writing to Understand: Critiquing Phi losoph ica l Views 266

Contents xv

xvi Contents

REVIEW NOTES 266

Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own V iews 268

KEY TERMS 268

FICTION: Thomas D. Davis, "A Little Omniscience Goes

a Long Way" 270

PROBING QUESTIONS 273

FOR FURTHER READING 273

CHAPTER 6 KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM 274

6.1 OVERVIEW: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 275

What Do You Believe? Cognitive Re lativism Undone 277

Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l

V i ews 280

6.2 THE RATIONALIST ROAD 281

Plat o's Rat iona lism 281

PLATO: Meno 283

Desca rt es' Dou bt 284

DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy 285 Philosophy Now: Livi ng in The Matrix 287 Philosophy Lab 288

Desca rt es' Ce rt ainty 288

DESCARTES: Meditations on First Philosophy 288

Philosophers at Work: Rene Desca rtes 290 Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l

V i ews 292

6.3 THE EMPIRICIST TURN 293

Locke 293

LOCKE: An Essay Concerning Human

Understanding 293

Ber keley 299

BERKELEY: Of the Principles of Human Knowledge 300

Hume 303 Philosophers at Work: David Hume 304

HUME: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 305

Writing to Understand: Crit iqui ng Phi losoph ica l Views 310

6.4 THE KANTIAN COMPROMISE 311

KANT: Critique of Pure Reason 312 Philosophers at Work: Immanuel Kant 313 Philosophy Now: Conceptua lizing the World 316 Writing to Understand: Crit i qui ng Phi losoph ica l

6.5 A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON KNOWLEDGE 319

AINLEY: "Femin ist Phi losophy" 320

ANTONY: " Embod iment and Epistemology" 320

ANDERSON: "Fem inist Epi st emology an d Ph iloso phy of Science" 321

COLE: Philosophy and Feminist Criticism 321 Writing to Understand: Crit iqui ng Phi losoph ica l

REVIEW NOTES 325

Writing to Understand: A rguing You r Own Views 328

KEY TERMS 329

FICTION: Lewis Carroll, "Through the Looking- Glass" 330

PROBING QUESTIONS 330

FOR FURTHER READING 331

CHAPTER 7 AESTHETICS 332

7.1 OVERVIEW: PHILOSOPHY OF BEAUTY 333

Writing to Understand: Crit i qui ng Phi losoph ica l

7.2 WHAT IS ART? 333

Philosophy Now: Is It Art? 334

BELL: Art 335 Writing to Understand: Crit i qui ng Phi losoph ica l

Philosophy Now: Controve rsia l Ar t 336

Contents xv ii

xvii i Contents

7.3 AESTHETIC VALUE 338

Philosophers at Work: Ar thu r C. Dante 339 Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l

Vi ews 34 0

7.4 PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND HUME 340

ARISTOTLE: The Poetics 340 Philosophy Lab 341

HUME: Of the Standard of Taste 343 Philosophy Now: Fem ini st Art 344 Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l

Vi ews 34 8

REVIEW NOTES 349

Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own

KEY TERMS 350

FICTION : Edgar All an Poe, "The Oval Portrait" 351

PROBING QUESTIONS 352

FOR FURTHER READING 352

CHAPTER 8 THE JUST SOCIETY 354

8.1 OVERVIEW: JUSTICE AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 355

What Do You Believe? Polit ica l Vi ews in

Flux 358 Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l

Vi ews 359

8.2 PLATO 'S THEORY: JUSTICE AS MERIT 360

PLATO: The Republic 361 Philosophy Now: Merit or Equa lity: Who Gets

to Live? 363

Writing to Understand: Critiqu i ng Ph i losophica l Vi ews 364

8.3 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES 364

Hobbes 365

Philosophers at Work: Thomas Hobbes 365

HOBBES: Leviathan 366

Locke 370

LOCKE: Second Treatise of Government 371

Rawls 375 Philosophers at Work: John Locke 375

RAWLS: A Theory of justice 376 Writing to Understand: Crit i qui ng Phi losoph ica l

8.4 SOCIALIST THEORIES 379

Philosophy Lab 380 Philosophy Now: Is the Unit ed States a Socialist

Country? 381

MARX and ENGELS: Manifesto of the Communist

Party 381 Writing to Understand: Crit i qui ng Phi losoph ica l

8.5 FEMINISM ANO SOCIAL JUSTICE 387

OKIN: Justice, Gender, and the Family 388

MILLER: Political Philosophy 392 Writing to Understand: Crit iqui ng Phi losoph ica l

REVIEW NOTES 393

Writing to Understand: Argui ng You r Own

KEY TERMS 395

FICTION: Willi am Golding, "Lord of the Flies" 397

PROBING QUESTIONS 405

FOR FURTHER READING 405

CHAPTER 9 THE MEAN ING OF LIFE 406

9.1 OVERVIEW: PHILOSOPHY ANO THE MEAN ING

O F LIFE 407

Philosophy Lab 410

9.2 PESSIMISM: LI FE HAS NO MEANING 411

TOLSTOY: My Confession 411

Contents xix

xx Content s

SCHOPENHAUER: "On the Suffe rings of the Wo rl d" 413

BAGG/NI: What's It All About? 414 Philosophy Now: N ietzsche: Reflections

on Meani ng 415

9.3 OPTIMISM : LIFE CAN HAVE MEANING 416

Meaning from Above 416

TOLSTOY: My Confession 416 Philosophy Now: Is Re li gion Necessary

fo r a Meaningful Life? 4 19

BAGG/NI: What's It All About? 420

Meaning from Below 4 21

EDWARDS: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 421

REVIEW NOTES 426

What Do You Believe? What Can and Cannot Give Life Meaning? 427

Writing to Understand: Argu ing Your Own Vi ews 428

FICTION: Voltaire, "The Good Brahmin " 429

PROBING QUESTIONS 430

FOR FURTHER READING 430

Append ix A: The Truth about Ph ilosophy Majors 431

Append ix B: Answe rs to Exerc ises 437

Append ix C: How t o Write a Phil osophy Pa per 4 41

Notes 451

Glossary 457

Credits 461

Index of Margina l Quotat ions 463

General Index 465

PREFACE ................................... _. ........ _. .... .._ ............ ._ ............................................................... .-................................ _. ........ __. ._ ....................... __. ............... ............ __. ........ __. .......... ........... ......... ................. .... ..... _. ... .

Th is third ed ition of Philosophy Here and Now stays true to the aspirations and char- acter of the first and second. From the beginning, the text has been designed to p rov ide a n extraordina ry amount of encouragement an d guidance to students \vho a re encountering p h ilosophy for the first (and perhaps last) time. !rs ambitious aim is to get such students to take some big steps tO\vard understa nd ing, appreciating, and even doi ng p hilosophy. Philosophy Here and Now thus tries to do a great deal more th an most other texts o r readers. To foster a serious understanding of philosophy, it includes solid coverage of critical th inking skills a nd argument basics as well as guid- a nce and p ractice in read ing p hilosoph ical works. Studenrs of cou rse can appreciate the point and power of philosophy as they comprehend p h ilosoph ical \vritings, but their app reciation blossoms when they see ho\v ph ilosoph ical issues and reason ing play out in contempora ry society a nd how ph ilosophical insig hts apply to their O\vn lives. So the book's coverage a nd pedagogical features help students grasp philoso- phy's relevance and t imel iness. Studenrs learn how to do ph ilosophy-to think a nd write p h ilosophically-\vhen they get encouragement and practice in analyzing a nd critiq u ing their own vie\vS a nd those of the ph ilosophers they study. To this end, Phiwsophy Here and Now emphasizes philosophical writi ng, reinforced with step- by-step coach ing in how to \vrite argumentative essays a nd supported by multiple opport unities to hone basic sk ills.

I n add ition to these core elements, Philosophy Here and Now further engages today's learners \Vith abunda nt illustrations a nd colo r graph ics; marginal notes, questions, and quotes; p rofi les of a diverse a rray of p h ilosophers; and ample repre- sentation of non-Western and nont raditional sources.

TOPICS AND READINGS

N ine chapters cover the existence of God, morality and the moral life, mind and body, free wi ll and determinism, knowledge and skepticism, aesthetics, political philosophy, and the meaning of life. These topics are explored in read ings from seventy-five traditional a nd contemporary ph ilosophers integrated into the main text, featuring both indispensable standards a nd ne\ver selections. The standards include Plato, Aristotle, Aqu inas, Pascal, Anselm, Descartes, Hume, H obbes, Locke, Berkeley, Kant, d'H olbach, Paley, James, Sa rtre, Marx, and others. Among t he more recent voices are Sea rle, C halmers, C raig, Swinburne, H ick, Mack ie, Rowe, Ga rd- ner, Blu m, Dersho\vitz, Rahula, Jaggar, H eld, Baier, Nagel, Block, Van l n\vagen, Taylo r, D u Sau toy, Ducasse, Cole, Ainley, Rawls, O kin, a nd Schopen hauer.

All these selections are juxtaposed with e nd-of-chapter pieces of fiction or narrative-stories meant to explore and d ramatize the philosoph ical issues encou ntered

xxi

xxii Preface

in the chapters. They include some classic sto ries such as "The Good Brahmin" by Volta ire, "The Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas" by Ursula Le Gu in, and "They're Made Out of Meat" by Terry Bisson, as \veil as lesser-kno\vn fiction by notable writers like Arthur C. Clarke and William Golding. Each story is accompanied by discus- sion/essay questions designed to dra\v out irs philosophical implications.

MAIN FEATURES

• A comprehensive introductory chapter that lays the groundwork for philo- sophical thinking. Through examples drawn from philosophical literature and everyday life, th is chapter explains clearly the nature and scope of philosophy and ho\v it relates to students' lives. This much, of course, is \vhat any good text in this field should do. But this first chapter also shows how to devise and evalu- ate arguments and gu ides students in critically thinking, reading, and \vriting about philosoph ical issues.

• Critical thinking questions that correspond to relevant passages in the main text or readings. These questions, located in the margins of the text, invite stu- dents to ponder the implications of the material and to th ink critical ly about the assumptions and arguments found there. The questions are numbered and highlighted and easily lend themselves to both \vriting assignments and class d iscussion. The po int of their marginal placement is to prompt students to think carefully and analytically as they read.

• Four types o f text boxes that d emonstrate the value and relevance of philoso - phy in the modern world:

• "Philoso p h y Now" -These boxes contain news items and research reports that illustrate ho\v each chapter's philosoph ical issues permeate everyday life. They demonstrate that philosophical concerns arise continual ly in science, society, eth ics, religion, politics, medicine, and more. Each box ends \vith questions that prompt critical thinking and philosophical reflection.

• "What Do You Believe?"-Prompting student engagement and reflec- tion, these boxes explore issues related to the chapter's topics and challenge students' beliefs.

• "P hiloso p hers at Work'' -These boxes profi le the lives and wo rk of com- pelling figu res in philosophy, past and present, Western and non-Western or nontraditional, men and women. Some feature philosophers from the past \vhose story adds a human and historical dimension to the ideas discussed in the chapter, and some profile contempo rary thinkers who are g rappling \vith the important issues of the day. The point of these features is, of course, to sho\v that philosophy is very much a living, relevant enterprise.

• " Philoso p h y Lab"-These boxes present simple thought experiments chal- lenging students to think through scenarios that can reveal deeper philo- sophical insights or perspectives.

• In-d epth coverage of philosophical writing includes step-by-step coaching in argument basics and multiple opportunities to hone critical thinking skills.

• "Writing to Understand: Critiquing Philosophical Views" -These boxes appear at the end of each section and cons ist of essay questio ns that p rompt st udents to critically exam ine the strengths and weaknesses of th e vie\vS dis- cussed in the sections.

• "Writing to Understand: Arguing Your Own Views" - These boxes prompt studen ts to explain a nd defen d thei r O\vn views on the chapter's topics in short essays.

• " How to Write a Philosophy Paper" -This append ix offers concise, step- by-step guidance in crafting an effective philosoph ical essay.

• A final chapter on ''The Meaning of Life." Th is chapter discusses how philoso- p hers have clarified and explored the topic of life's meani ng. It covers th e main p hilosophical perspectives on the subject an d samples the views of ph ilosophers past and p resent.

All these feat ures a re supplemented \Vith other elemen ts to make the material even more engaging and accessible:

• Marginal quotes. These pithy, compelli ng quotes from an array of ph ilosophers appear th roughou t the text, inviting students to join the ongo ing conversation of philosophy.

• Key Terms, m arginal d efinitions, and end -of-book Glossary. Key Terms in each chapter appear in boldface at their first appearance in a chapter, an d mar- gi nal defi nitions help st udenrs learn the terms with in th eir immediate context. A list of the chapter's Key Terms appears at the end of each chapter, along \vith th e page n umbers o n which the term and irs definition fi rst appear. Last, a Glossary of those Key Terms and defi nitions provides an essential reference for st udents as they review and prepare fo r tesrs as well as draft their own p hilosophical essays and argumenrs.

• Chapter O bjectives. This list at the begin ning of each chapter helps to scaffold st udent learni ng by provid ing both structure and suppo rt for previewing, note taking, an d retention of content.

• End-of-chapter reviews. Concluding each ch apter, th is feature revisits th e Chapter Objectives, e ncouraging students to reflect an d revie\v.

• An index o f marginal quotes. This supplemental index helps studen ts locate th e wo rds of ph ilosophers th at seem especially insightful or inspiri ng to th em.

• For Further reading. Located at the end of each chapter, these useful referen ces poi nt studen ts to sources that \viii enhance thei r understan d ing of chapter issues and argumenrs.

• Tim eline. Featuring ph ilosophers' lives and important events, this visual learn- ing tool helps studen ts appreciate the histo ric significan ce of philosoph ical ideas by placi ng them \vithi n a larger context.

• Charts, tables, and color photos. Appearing th roughout the book, these have been selected o r created to deepen studen t engagement with and u nderstanding of complex ideas and abstract co nceprs. In additio n, captions fo r these images incl ude b rief, open-ended questions to help studen rs "read" visuals \Vith the same critical attentio n they learn to b ring to written texrs.

Preface xx11 1

xxiv Preface

NEW TO THIS EDITION

• An expanded chapter on aesthetics ( Chapter 7). Jc covers issues relating to the definition of art, objective and subjective standards, femi nist art, controvers ial artworks, on line art, and the philosophical exam inatio n of art by Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Gardner, Ducasse, and D an to. Several new photos illustrate fem inist art, co ntroversial art, and art that p rovokes discussion about what art is and isn't.

• Expanded coverage in Chapter 9 {The Meaning of Life) . In addition to in- cluding readings by Tolstoy, Schopenhauer, Baggini, and Ed\vards {and com- mentary on Niet2Sche), the text now adds four more philosophers who debate the objectivity of meaning in life. Klemke and Lucretius lay o ut their case for subjectivist mean ing, and Wolf and Belshaw argue fo r objectivist meaning.

• More history of philos ophy in Chapter 1. No\v there's coverage of the pre- Socratics Thales, Empedocles, and Parmenides, as well as fou r early women ph i- losophers: Hypatia, Themistoclea, Arignote, and Theano.

• More text boxes adding depth to discussions or demonstrating how philo- sophical thinking can tackle tough contemporary issues. These cover human rights for robots, to rturing terrorists, racism, Buddhism and science, belief in God, and scientists and religion.

ANCILLARIES

The Oxford University Press Ancillary Resou rce Center {ARC) {www.oup-a rc.com/ vaughn-philosophy-here-and-no\v) houses a \vealth of instructor resources, includ- ing an Instructor's Manual with sample syllabi, read ing summaries, essay/discussion questions, s uggested Web links, and a glossary of key terms from the text; a Com- puterized Test Bank \Vith fifty or more multiple-cho ice and true/false questions per chapter {also available as a traditional "pencil-and-paper" Test Bank in the Instruc- tor's Manual); and PowerPoint lecture outlines.

A compa nion website {www.oup.com/us/vaughn) contains study materials for students, including level-one and level-nvo practice quizzes with multiple-choice and true/false questions taken from the Test Bank, essay/discussion questions, read- ing s ummaries, flashcards of key terms from the text, and suggested Web links.

All instructor and student resources are a lso available as cartridges for Learning Management Systems. For more information, please contact your Oxford University Press Sales Representative at 1-800-280-0280.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A text like th is is not possible \Vithout the help of a lot of talented and consci- entio us people. At the top of the list a re my fine editors at Oxford University Press-most notably Robert Miller and Meg Botteon, as well as Alyssa Palazzo

and Sidney Keen. Throughout the fo rmative stages of this text, many astute re- viewers provided invaluable suggestions and criticisms, and the book is much the better for it. Many thanks to:

Kristin Borgwald Miami Dade College

Dan iel Bramer Holy Family University

Jeremy Byrd Tarrant County College

Teresa Cantrell University of Louisville

A lberto Gonzalez College of the Canyons

Aaron Rizzieri Yavapai College

Stephen Russell Orr Solano Community College

A llen Shonvell Ivy Tech Community College

John Shuford Lin.field College

Russell S\vanson Florida South Western State College

Rabbi Doug Weber Castleton University

Steve Wyre Mohave Community College

Preface xxv

CHAPTER

PHILOSOPHY AND YOU

CHAPT ER OBJECTIVES

1.1 PH ILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTAND ING

• Know the p ractical and theoretica l benefits of studying philosophy.

• Take an inventory of your philosophical belie fs.

• Know the four main d ivisions of philosophy and the kinds of questions they examine.

1.2 SOCRATES ANO THE EXAMINED LIFE

• Understand why Socrates declared that "the unexam ined life is not worth living."

• Explain the Socratic method and how Socrates used it in search of understand ing.

• Relate how Socrates showed that Thrasymachus's notion o f justice was wrong.

• Exp lain how reductio ad absurdum arguments work.

1.3 THINKING PHILOSOPHICALLY

• Define argument, statement, conclusion, and premise.

• Know the two conditions that must be met for an argument to be good.

• Define deductive argument, inductive argument, valid, sound, cogent, strong, and weak. Understand inferences to the best explanat ion and how their strengt h is evaluated .

• Be able to ident ify arguments in the fo rm o f modus ponens, modus to/lens, affirm ing the consequent, and denying the antecedent .

• Be able to ident ify arguments in various contexts and tell whether they a re valid o r invalid , sound or not sound , strong or weak, and cogent or n ot cogent.

• Understand the guidelines for reading and appreciating philosophy.

• Be aware o f common fa llacies and know how to identify them in various contexts .

2 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Science gives us know·

ledge, bur o nly philosoph y can give us wisd o m. -Will Durant

1 Suppose you had a fundamen tal belief that t he mind, or soul, does not survive the death of the body. What other beliefs would this fundamen- tal belief be like ly to support?

Philosophy sho uld be responsive ro human ex·

pcricncc and yet c ritical of the defective thinking it sometimes encounte rs.

-Martha Nussbaum

1.1 PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING

The title of chis text, Philosophy Here and Now, is meant co emphas ize chat philoso- phy is, well, here and now-chat is, relevant and current. This means chat philoso- phy, even with its ancient lineage and seemingly remote concerns, applies co your li fe and you r times and your world. Philosophy achieves chis immediacy by being many good t hings at once: it is enlightening, choughc-provoking, life-changing, liberating, theoretical, and practical. The world is fu ll of scudencs and teachers ,vho can attest co these clai ms. More importantly, you will find p roof of chem in the remainder of chis text-and in the writings of the great philosophers, in you r g rasping what they say and the reasons they give fo r saying it, and in your o,vn honest accempcs co app ly philosophy co your life.

Philosophy is the name chat philosophers have given co both a d iscipline and a process. As a discipline, philosophy is one of the humanities, a field of study out of which several ocher fields have evolved-physics, b iology, political science, and many ochers. As a p rocess, philosophy is a penetrating mode of reflection fo r understanding life's most important truths. This mode is what ,ve may call the philosophical method-the systemat ic use of critical reason ing co cry co find answers co fundamenta l questions about reality, morality, and kno,vledge. The method, however, is not a master key used exclusively by professional philosophers co unlock mysteries hidden from com mon fo lk. The philosophical method is the birthright of every person, fo r ,ve are all born with the cap acity co reason, co ques- tion, co discover. For thousands of years, great minds like Ar iscocle, Plato, Confu- cius, Descartes, Aqu inas, and Sa rtre have used it in their search for wisdom, and ,vhac they found has changed countless lives. Bue amateur philosophers like you have also used it-and continue co u se it-to ach ieve life-alte ring understanding chat ,vould have eluded chem othe rwise.

The Good of Philosophy

Ph ilosophy is not just about ideas; it's about fundamental ideas, chose upon which ocher ideas depend. A fundamental belief logically supporcs ocher bel iefs, and the mo re beliefs it supporcs the more fundamental it is. Your belief or disbelief in God, fo r exa mple, might support a hose of ocher beliefs about mora lity, life after death, heaven, hell, free will, science, evolution, p rayer, abortion, m iracles, homo- sexualit y, and more. Thanks co your upbringing, your culture, your peers, and ocher influences, you alread y have a head fu ll of fundam ental beliefs, some of chem true, some false. Whether true o r false, they constitute the framewo rk of your ,vhole belief system, and as such they help you make sense of a wide range of important iss ues in life-issues concern ing what exists and what doesn't, what actions a re right or ,vrong (or neither), and ,vhac kinds of things we can k no,v and not kno,v. Funda- mental beliefs, therefore, make up your "philosophy of life," wh ich informs your chinking and guides your actions.

Perhaps now you can better app reciate philosophy's greatest practical benefit: it gives us che intellectual wherewithal co improve ou r lives by improv ing our

Phi losophy: The Quest for Understand ing 3

philosophy of life. A faulty philosophy of life-that is, o ne that comprises a great many false fundamental beliefs-can lead to a misspent or m isdirected life, a life less mean ingful than it could be. Philosophy is the most powerful instrument we have for evaluating the worth of our fundamental beliefs and fo r ch anging them fo r the better. Through philosophy we exert control over the t rajectory of our lives, making major course corrections by reason and refl ection.

The G reek philosopher Socrates (469-399 BCE), one of Wester n civil ization's great intellectual heroes, says, "An unexamined life is not \VOrth living." To examine your life is to scrutinize the core ideas that shape it, and the d eepest fo rm of scr utiny is exercised through philosophy. This search for answers goes to the heart of the tradi- tio nal conception of philosophy as a search for wisdom (the term phiwsophy is d erived from G reek words meaning " love of wisdom"). With the attainment of wisdom, we come to understand the true nature of reality and how to apply that understanding to living a good life.

Philosophy's chief theoretical ben efit is the same one that most other fields of inqu iry pu rsue: understanding for its own sake. Even if philosophy had no p ract ical applications at a ll , it wou ld sti ll hold great value fo r us. We want to know how the wo rld works, what t ruths it hides, just for the sa ke of know ing. And philoso-

Figure 1.1 Socrates (469-399 ace).

phy obliges. Astronomers sea rch the s ky, physicists study subatomic part icles, and a rch aeologists search fo r ancient ruins, all the while knowing that what they find may have no practical implications at all . We humans wonder, and that's often all the reason we need to search for ans\vers. As the great ph ilosophe r Aristotle says, "Fo r it is owing to thei r wonde r that people both no\v begin and at first began to philosoph ize."

For many people, the quest for understand ing through philosophy is a spiri- tual, transformative endeavo r, an ennobling pu rsuit of truths at the core of life. Thus, several philosophers speak of ph ilosophy as something that e nriches or nur- tu res the soul o r mind. Socrates, speaking to the jurors who condemned him fo r practicing philosophy on the streets of Athens, asked, "Are you not ash amed that, while you take care to acquire as much wea lth as poss ible, with honor and glory as \vell , yet you take no care or thought for understanding o r t ruth, or for the best poss ible state of your soul?" In a similar vein, the Greek ph ilosopher Epicurus (341-270 BCE) said , "Let no young man delay the study of philosophy, and let no old man beco me \veary of it; for it is never too early no r too late to ca re fo r the well-bei ng of the sou l." And in our own era, the philosopher Walter Kaufmann (1921- 1980) declared, "Ph ilosophy means liberation from the two d imensions of ro utine, soa ring above the well kno\vn, seei ng it in ne\v perspectives, a rousing wonder and the wish to fl y."

Along with ph ilosophical inquiry comes freedom. We begin our lives at a partic- u lar place and time, steeped in the ideas and values of a particular culture, fed ready- made beliefs that may or may not be true and that \Ve may never think to question.

2 Is it possib le to lead a mean ingfu l life w ith· out se lf-exam ination?

Philosophy is the highest music.

-Plato

4 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

If you pass ively accept such beliefs, then those beliefs are not really yours. If they are not really yours, and you let them guide your choices and actions, then they-not you-a re in cha rge of you r life. You thus forfeit your personal freedom. But phi- losophy helps us rise above th is p red icament, to transcend the narro,v and obstructed standpoint from which we may vie,v everything. It helps us s ift our hand-me-dow n beliefs in the light of reason, look beyond the prejudices that blind us, and see what's real and true. By using the ph ilosophical method, we may learn that some of our beliefs a re on solid g round and some a re not. In either case, through philosophy ou r beliefs become truly and authentically our own.

Philosophical Terrain

Figure 1.2 Aristotle (384-322 BCE).

Philosophy's sphere of interest is vast, encompassing funda- mental beliefs drawn from many places. Philosophical ques- tions can arise anywhere. Part of the reason for th is is that ordinary bel iefs that seem to have no connection with philoso- phy can become philosophical in short order. A physiologist may ,vant to know ho,v our brains ,vork, but she ventu res into the philosophical a rena ,vhen she wonders ,vhether the bra in is the same th ing as the m ind-a quest ion that science alone

To teach how to live

w itho u t certainty and ycr

w itho u t being paralysed by h esitation is perhaps ,he

c hief thing that p hiloso· phy, in our age, can do fo r those wh o srudy it.

-Benrand Russell

3 Has your thin king recent ly led you to reflect on p hilosophi- cal questions? If so, how d id the thought process beg in, and what f undamental belief d id you end u p contemplating?

Metaphysics is the study of reality in ,he broadest

sense, an inquiry into rhc clcmcnral naru rc of rhc

u niverse a n d the things JO It.

cannot answer. A lawyer studies how the death penalty is ad- min istered in Texas, but he does philosophy when he cons iders whether capital pun- ishment is ever morally perm iss ible. A med ical scientist wants to kno,v ho,v a human fetus develops, but she finds it d ifficult to avoid the ph ilosoph ical query of ,vhat the moral status of the fetus is. An astrophysicist studies the Big Bang, the cataclysmic explosion thought to have brought the un iverse into being-but then asks whether the Big Bang shows that God cause.cl the universe to ex ist. On CNN you see the horrors of ,var and famine, but then you find you rself g rappling with ,vhether they can be squared with the existence of an all-po,verful, all-knowing, and all-good God. Or you ,vonder ,vhat your mora l obligations a re to the poor and hungry of the ,vorld. O r you ponder whether government shou ld help people in need or leave them to fend for themselves.

We can div ide philosophy's subject matter into four main divisions, each of ,vhich is a branch of inquiry in its o,vn right ,vith many subcategories. H ere's a b rief rundown of these divis ions and a sampling of the kinds of quest ions that each asks.

Metaphysics is the study of reality in the broadest sense, an inqui ry into the elemental nature of the un iverse and the things in it. Though it must take into ac- count the findings of science, metaphysics generally focuses on basic questions that science ca nnot add ress. Questions of interest: Does the ,vorld consist on ly of matter, or is it made up of other basic things, such as ideas or minds? Is there a spiritual, ideal real m that exists beyond the material world? Is the mind the same thing as the body?

Phi losophy: The Quest for Understand ing 5

WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE?

Your Philosophical Beliefs

Where do you stand on the fun d amencal issues in philosophy? Here is your chance co cake inventory of your vie,vs. After you finish chis course, cake the survey again co see if your perspective has changed or become ,nore nuanced. AnS\ver ,vich chese numbers: 5 = true; 4 = probably crue; 3 = neither probable nor i1nprobable; 2 = probably false; I = false.

I. Ac lease so,ne 1noral nonns or principles are objectively true or valid for everyone.

2. Mora l standards are relative co what individuals or cu ltures bel ieve. __ 3. Mi nd and body consist of nvo fu nda,nencally d iffere nt kinds of scuff- non physical

scuff and physica l scuff. __ 4. The 1n ind, or sou l, can exist ,vichouc che body. __ 5. Our mental scares are nothing bu r bra in scares (,n ind scares are identical co bra in scares).

6. No one has free ,vi ii. __ 7. Persons have free will (so,ne of our actions are free). __ 8. Although our actions are determined, they can still be free (free ,viii and decenn inis,n

are nor in confl ict). __ 9. The God of crad icional Western religions (an all-knowing, all-po,verful, all-good deity)

exists. __ 10. The a pparent design of the universe shows char it had an intell igent designer. __ 11. Right actions are chose co,nmand ed by God; ,vrong actions are chose forbidden by

God. __

12. God does nor ,na ke actions right or ,vrong by comma nd ing chem co be so. __ 13. We can know some th ings a bout che external world. __ 14. We cannot know anything about che externa l world. __ 15. The theory of evolution is a beccer explanation of t he apparent design of biologica l life

chan che theory of "incelligenc design." __ 16. Truth about someth ing depends on what a person or culture believes. __ 17. Libercarianis,n is che correct political t heory. __ 18. Welfare liberalis,n is che correct moral theory. __ 19. Mean ing in life comes from outside ourselves, fro,n God or so,ne o cher transcendent

real ity. __ 20. Mean ing in life comes from ,vich in ourselves. __

How are mind and body related? Do people have immortal souls? Do humans have free wi ll, or are o u r actions determ ined by forc es beyo nd our control? Can actions be both free and deter mined ? Does God exist? How ca n both a good God and evil exist simultaneously? What is the nat ure of causality? Can an effect ever precede its cause? What is the nature of time? Is time travel possible?

And w hat, Socrates, is the food of che soul> Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of che soul. - Plato

6 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

MAIN DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

DIVISION

Metaphysics

Epistemology

A xiology

Log ic

Epistemology is the study of knowledge.

Axiology is the study of value, including bo th aesthetic value and moral

value. Ethics is the study of moral value using the methods of philosophy.

QUESTIONS

Does the world consist only of matter, or is it made up of other basic th ings, such as ideas or mind? Is there a spiritual, ideal realm that exists beyond the material world? Is the mind the same thing as the body? How are mind and body related? Do people have immorta l souls? Do humans have free wi ll, or are our actions determ ined by forces beyond our control? Can actions be both free and deter- mined? Does God exist? How can both a good God and evi l exist simultaneously? What is the nature of causal ity? Can an effect ever precede its cause? What is the nature of time? Is time trave l possible?

What is knowledge? What is truth? Is knowledge possible- can we ever know any- thing? Does knowledge require certa inty? What are the sources of knowledge? Is experience a source of knowledge? Is mysticism or faith a source? Can we gain knowledge of the empirical world through reason a lone? If we have knowledge, how much do we have? When are we justified in saying that we know something? Do we have good reasons to believe that the world exists independently of our minds? Or do our minds constitute reality?

What makes an action right (or wrong)? What th ings are intrinsically good? What is the good life? What gives life mean ing? What makes someone good (or bad)? What moral principles shou ld gu ide our actions and choices? Wh ich is the best moral theory? Is killing ever mora lly perm issible? If so, why? Are mora l standards objective or subjective? Is an action right merely because a culture endorses it? Does morality depend on God? What makes a society just?

What are the ru les for drawing correct inferences? What are the nature and struc- ture of deductive arguments? How can propositional or predicate log ic be used to evaluate arguments? Upon what log ical principles does reason ing depend? Does logic describe how the world is- or just how our minds work? Can conclusions reached through inductive logic be rationally justified?

Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Questions of interest: What is knowl- edge? What is truth? Is kno\vledge possible-can \Ve ever kno\v anythi ng? Does knowledge require certainty? What are the sources of kno\vledge? Is experience a sou rce of knowledge? Is mysticism or faith a source? Can we ga in kno\vledge of the empi rical \vorld through reason alone? If \Ve have kno\vledge, how much do \Ve have? When are we justified in saying that \Ve know something? Do we have good reasons to believe that the \vorld exists independently of our minds? Or do our minds con- stitute reality?

Axiology is the study of value, including both aesthetic value and moral value. The study of moral value is kno\vn as eth ics. Ethics involves inquiries into the nature of moral judgments, virtues, values, obligations, and theories. Questions of interest: What makes an action right (or wrong)? What things are intrinsically good? What is the good life? What gives life meaning? What makes someone good (or bad)? What moral principles should guide our actions and cho ices? Which is the best moral

Phi losophy: The Quest for Understand ing 7

theory? Is ki lling ever morally perm issible? If so, why? A re moral standa rds objective or subjective? Is a n ac- t io n right merely because a cultu re end orses it? Does morality depend o n God? W hat makes a society just?

Logic is the st udy of correct reasoning. Ques- tions of interest: W hat are the rules for d raw ing cor- rect inferences? W h at are the nature and structure of deductive a rgumen ts? How can propositio nal o r pred- icate logic be used to evaluate a rgumenrs? Upon wh at logical principles does reasoning depend? D oes logic describe ho,v the world is-or just ho,v our minds work? Can conclusions reached through induct ive logic be rationally justifi ed?

I n additio n to these divisions, there are subdivi- s io ns of ph ilosophy whose job is to examine critically the ass umptions a nd principles that u nderlie other fi elds. Thus ,ve have the p h ilosophy of science, the ph ilosophy of la,v, the ph ilosophy of mathematics, the ph ilosophy of h istory, the ph ilosophy of language, a nd many others. When those labo ring in a discipline beg in question ing irs most basic ideas-ideas that define irs subject matter and principles of inquiry- ph ilosophy, the most elemental mode of investigation, steps 1n.

Figure 1.3 Plat o, point ing u pward t oward t h e h igher realm of i deas, and Aristotle, gesturing down toward t h e t h ings of t his earth.

ESSAY/ DISCUSS IO N QUESTIO N S SECTION 1.1

1. W h at is the ph ilosophical method ? W ho can make use of this app roach to important questions? Can on ly p hilosophers use it? H ave you used it? H o,v?

2. W h at a re some funda mental beliefs that are part of your ph ilosophy of life? H o,v do these beliefs influence you r life?

3. W h at is ph ilosophy's greatest practical benefit? Do you think studying ph ilosophy could ch ange you r life goals or your fundamental beliefs? W hy or why not?

4. H ow can p hilosophy enhance you r personal freedom? What are some of you r fu ndamental beliefs that you have never fully examined? What might be the result of never examining a fu ndamental belief?

5. W h ich of the fo ur mai n divisions of ph ilosophy interests you the most? W hy? W hat ph ilosophical ques tions listed in this section would you most ,vant to have ans,vers to?

Logic is t he study of correct reasoning.

There's a d ifference

between a philosophy and a bumper sticker.

- Charles M. Schulz

8 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

The point of philosophy

is to start with something so simple as not to seem worrh stating. and to end with something so para-

doxical that no one will believe it. - Bertrand Russell

4 Socrates says that a good man can never be harmed. W hat do you t hink h e means by this?

The Soc ratic m ethod is a q ucstion -and .. answcr

d ialogue in w hich proposi- tions a rc method ically scru tinized to uncover the

tru rh.

The chicfbcncfir, which rcsuk< from philosophy, arises in an indirect man ..

ncr, and proceeds more

from its secret> insensible

inAucncc, than from its immediate application.

- David Hume

1.2 SOCRATES AND THE EXAMINED LIFE

There is no better way to understand and appreciate the philosoph ical quest for knowledge than to study the life and work of Socrates, one of philosophy's greatest practitioners and the most revered figure in irs history. Socrates wrote no ph ilosophy, but ,ve know about his thinking and character through his famous pupil Plato, who portrayed him in severa l dialogues, or conversations (notably in Euthyphro, Crito, and Apology). For two and a half millennia Socrates has been inspi ring generations by his devotion to philosophical inquiry, his relentless search for ,visdom , and his deter mination to live according to his o,vn high standards. As mentioned earl ier, he famously said that "the unexam ined life is not worth living," and he became the best

example of someone living h is life by that maxim. Thus, at a time when most phi- losophy was di rected at cosmological specu lations, he turned to critically examin ing people's basic conceprs, common beliefs, and moral thinking.

For Socrates, an unexamined life is a tragedy because it resulrs in grievous harm to the soul, a person's true self or essence. The sou l is harmed by lack of kno,vledge- ignorance of one's o,vn self and of the most important values in life (the good). But knowledge of these things is a mark of the soul's excellence. A clear sign that a per- son has an unhealthy soul is her exclusive pursuit of social status, ,vealth, po,ver, and pleasure instead of the good of the sou l. The good of the soul is attained on ly through an uncomprom ising search for what's true and real, through the wisdom to see what is most vital in life. Such ins ight comes from rational self-exam ination and critical questioning of facile assumptions and unsupported beliefs. To get to the truth, Socrates thought, we must go around the fa lse certitudes of custom, tradition, and superstition and let reason be our guide. Thus he played the role of philosophi- cal gadfly, an annoying pest to the people of Athens, prodding them to wake up and seek the wisdom within thei r g rasp.

We know very little about Socrates' life. H e spent a ll his days in Athens except for a term of military service in which he sold iered in the Peloponnesian War. H e ,vas married and had three sons. He spent much of his time roaming the streets of Athens, speaking ,vith anyone who would listen. His habit was to ask people seem- ingly simple questions about their views on virtue, religion, justice, or the good, challenging them to think critically about their bas ic assumptions. This sort of question-and-answer dialogue in which propositions are methodically scrutinized to uncover the truth has become known as the Socratic method. Usually when Socrates used it in conversations, or dialogues, with his fellow Athenians, thei r views ,vou ld be exposed as false or confused. The main point of the exercise for Socrates, ho,vever, was not to w in arguments but to get closer to the truth. He thought people ,vho pursued this noble aim as he did should not be embarrassed by being sho,vn to be wrong; they should be delighted to be weaned from a false opinion. Nevertheless, the Socratic conversations often ended in the humiliation of eminent Athenians. They were enraged by Socrates, ,vhile many youths grav itated to him.

Eventually Socrates ,vas arrested and charged ,vith disrespecting the gods and corrupting the youth of the city. He was tried before five hundred jurors, a majority

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

Plato

No p h ilosopher- with che possible exception of Ariscocle-has had a deeper an d more lasting effect on Western choughr chan Plato (c. 427- 347 BCE). He ,vas born in Athens in to an inAuen cial ariscocracic fa,nily and grew up d uring che perilous years of che Peloponnesian War, a s truggle between Athens and the Pelopon nesian scares. He was a s tuden t and admirer of Socrates, who turned Plato's

Socrates and the Examined Life 9

Figure 1.4 Plat o (c. 427- 347 8C£).

m ind coward philosophy and che pursuit of wisdom. H e ,vas horrified by Socrates' execution in 399 for irnpiery and corruption of Athenian youth, so he left Athens and traveled ,videly, possibly co Sicily and Egypt. When he returned co Athens, he founded the Acad emy, a reaching college regard ed as che firs t university, and devoted che rest of his life co reach ing and writing p h ilosophy. (The Academy end ured for hun dreds of years until ic ,vas abo lished by che Eastern Roman ernperor Justi nian I.) The Acade,ny's ,nose renowned studen t ,vas Ariscocle, who en tered the school a r age seventeen and re,nained for C\ven ry years.

Plato's ch inking is e,nbod ied in his dia logues, nvenry-five of which exist in cheir co,nplece form. They were ,vrircen durin g a span of fifty years and have been d ivided into t h ree periods: early, midd le, a nd lace. The early dia logues include Eurhyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno , and Gorgias. Th ese early works portray Socrates as a brill ia nt and principled deAarer of h is contemporaries' bogus clai,ns ro k nowl- edge. The midd le d ialogues include Phaedo, Republic, a nd Theneretur; che lace ones consist of Critias, Pnrmenides, Sophirt, Laws, and ochers.

of whom voted co conv ic t h im . H is sentence was d eath o r exile; he chose death by poison rather than leave h is beloved Athen s. In h is d ialogues Crito a nd Phaedo, Plato recounts che events of che trial, including Socrates' ad dress co che ju rors. Socrates is portrayed as a man of brill iant intellect and unshakeable integrit y who wou ld not compromise his principles, even co escape death.

In one form or another, che Socratic method has been pare of Western e.ducacion fo r centuries. l e is one of che ways ch at ph ilosophy is done, a powerful procedure fo r applying critical chinking co many scacemencs chat seem out of reason's reach . As Socrates used it, che method typically ,vould go like chis: (1) someone poses a q ues- tio n abou t che meaning of a concept (for example, "What is justice?"); (2) Socrates' companion gives a n answer; (3) Socrates raises questions about che answer, proving chat che a nswer is inadequ ate; (4) co avoid che problems inherent in chis answer, che companion offers a second ans,ver; (5) seeps (3) a nd (4) are repeated a nu mber of

10 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Figure 1.5 The Death of Socrates by Jacques-Louis David.

times, ultimately revealing that the companion does not kno\v \vhat he thought he

knew. To Socrates, this negative outcome is actually a k ind of p rogress. False answers are elim inated, opinions are improved, and perhaps the truth is a little closer than before.

Let's watch Socrat es in action. Here is his conversation with Thrasymachus, a teacher eager to demonstrate that Socrates is not as \vise as people say he is. The ques- tion is "What is justice?" and Thrasymachus insisrs that justice is whatever is in the interest of the strongest-that is, might makes r ight.

Pl ato, The Republic

Listen, then, he [Thrasymachus] said; I proclaim t hat justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you won't.

Let me first understand you, I [Socrates] replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You can not mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast [an athlete), is stronger t han we are, and fi nds the eating of beef conducive to his bod ily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is , and right and just for us?

That's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense wh ich is most damaging to t he argument.

Not at all , my good sir, I sa id; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you wou ld be a little clearer.

Socrates and the Examined Life 11

Well , he said, have you never heard that fo rms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

Yes, I know. And t he government is the ruli ng power in each state? Certai nly. And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical,

tyrannical, with a view to t heir several interests; and these laws, which are made by t he m for t heir own interests, are the j ustice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who t ransgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law and unj ust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the on ly reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere t he re is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.

Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me re mark, t hat in defining justice you have yourself used the word " interest" which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words "of t he stronger" are added.

A small addition, you must allow, he said. Great or small , never mind about tha t: we must first inqu ire whether what you are

saying is the truth. Now we are bot h agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say "of the stronger"; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.

Proceed. I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey t he ir rulers? I do. But are the ru lers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err? To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err. Then in ma king their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes

not? True. When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when

t hey are mistaken, contrary to their in terest; you admit t hat? Yes. And the laws which they ma ke must be obeyed by t he ir subjects- and that is what

you call justice? Doubtless. Then justice, according to your argument, is not on ly obedience to the interest of

t he stronger but the reverse ? What is that you are saying? he asked. I am on ly repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not

admitted tha t the rulers may be mistaken about t heir own interest in what they com- mand, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

Yes. Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for t he interest of t he

stronger, when the rulers un in tentionall y command things to be done which are to t he ir own injury. For if, as you say, just ice is the obedience which the subject renders to t he ir commands, in that case, 0 wisest of men, is there any escape fro m the conclusion t hat the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for t he interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?•

Astonishment is chc root

of philosophy. -Paul Tillich

5 Socrates never seems adversaria l or combat- ive in h is d ia logues. What effect do you t h ink t h is approach has on those who enter into dialogue wit h h im?

12 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

PH I LOSO PH ERS AT WORK

The Pre-Socratics

Philosophy began in ancient Greece in rhe sixth century BCE a,nong thinkers ,vho broke with age-old tradition co ponder important ,narrers in an entirely novel ,vay. For centuries, hu,nans had been devising allS\vers co fundamental questions: What is rhe nature of the world? Whar is ir ,nade of-one kind of scuff or ,nany kinds? Does rhe ,vorld have an orig in or has it always existed? Why is the world rhe ,vay it is? What ,nakes things happen-gods, magic, or something else? What is rhe reality behind rhe appearances of reality? Their answers ,vere generally drawn fro,n 1nyrhology and rradirion, from old stories about rhe gods or from hand-me-down lore and law. But rhe first philosophers-called pre-Socratics because most of the,n came before Socrates (fifth century BCE)-refused to rake th is parh. It is mosrly rheir way of seeking answers about the world, rather rhan the answers the,nselves, char distinguished chem and 1nade chem rhe first philosophers. Once chis philo- sophical fire was lie, ir spread co lacer thinkers in rhe ancient ,vorld, a period of about a thousand years, from approximately 600 BCE co around 500 CE. Ir ,vas in chis era char Western phi losophy first established itself, defined almost all irs main areas of study, and gave us ph ilosophica l heroes (most notably, Socrates, Plaro, and Arisrorle) who continue co inAuence our ch inking on imporranr ideas and issues.

So,ne of rhe more notable pre-Socratics: Thales (c. 625-547 BCE). Accord ing co tradition, Thales ,vas rhe first philoso-

pher. In ancient Greece he and his new ,vay of chinking garnered a great deal of

Figure 1.6 Thales of Miletus (c. 625-547 ace).

respect for an odd reason: he ,vas said co have predicted rhe solar eclipse of 585 BCE and co have derived his prediction ,virhour appeals to d ivine or orherworldly forces. On th is account he has also been called rhe first scienrisr, for in chose ri,nes rhere ,vas no clear distinction between ph ilos- ophy and science. Thales' grearesr conrriburion to both philosophy and science ,vas his method. He sec out co look for natural-nor myth ic-explanations for natu- ral pheno,nena, and he insisted char such accounts be as simple as possible, preferably accounting for everyth ing by positing a sin- gle substance or element. This, as it turns our, is also rhe preferred approach of ,nodern science.

Empedocks (c. 495- c. 435 BCE). In rhe n inereenrh century Charles Danvin propounded rhe theory of bio logical evolution, explaining char evolution op- erates through whar he called "natural selection." The basic ourlines of natural selection, however, did n't originate ,virh Darwin. They ,vere first arriculared in rough fonn rwenry-five centuries ago by a pre-Socratic philosopher na,ned Em- pedodes. Using observation and imagi- nation, Empedocles ,nainrained char an i,na ls were nor created whole by a deiry and placed on rhe earrh-rhey evolved.

Parmenides (c. 515-450 BCE). Par- menides ,vas rhe ,nose groundbreaking and inAuenrial philosopher of rhe pre- Socrarics. We know lirrle about his life- nor much more rhan char he lived in Elea (a Greek colony on rhe southern coast of Italy) and raughr rhe famous master of par- adoxes, Zeno. We also kno,v char through rhe centuries he won rhe arrenrion and ad- m iration of several em inent thinkers, fro,n Plato co Plutarch co Hegel. Like rhe ocher pre-Socratics, he conrribured more co rhe shape of philosophica l inquiry rhan co its conrenr. Parmen ides' clai,n co fame rests mosrly on his sysremaric e1nploy1nenr of deductive argu,nenr. He seems co have been rhe first thinker outside rhe fiel d of marhe,narics co reason deductively and consisrenrly from basic prem ises co inrer- esring conclusions. In rhe process, he ce- mented basic d istinctions char have been essential co philosoph ica l inquiry co chis day. For one rhing, he conrrasred reason and rhe senses. He contended char knowl- edge of rhe world could be acquired only through reason, only through a deductive chain of reasoning such as he himself used.

Figure 1.7 Empedocles (c. 49x. 4 35 see).

Socrates and the Examined Life 13

The senses, however, were unreliable. Fig. 1.8 Parmenides (c. 515-450 see).

14 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Red11ctio ad abs11rdu111 is an argumc nr fo rm in which a set of stateme nts to be proved false is as· sumed , and absurd or false stateme nts arc d educed from the set as a whole}

s howing that the original stateme nt mus t be false .

Socrates uses h is famo us question-and-anS\ver approach to prove that Thrasy- machus's defin ition of justice is \vrong. In particula r, he applies a common form of argument called redttctio ad absurdu»z. (Other a rg ument forms a re discussed in the fo llow ing section.) The basic idea beh ind it is if you ass ume that a set of statements is true, and yet you ca n deduce a false or absurd statement fro m it, then the o rigi nal set of statements as a whole must be false. So, in the p receding d ialogue, Socrates says in effect, Let's ass ume that Thrasymachus is right that justice is whatever is in the interest of the powerful, and that people a re just if they obey the laws made by the powerfu l. It is clear, ho\vever, that the powerfu l sometimes make mistakes and demand obedience to la\vS that a re not in their best interest. So if Thrasymachus's defi nition of justice is correct, then it is right for people to do what is in the interest of the po\verfu l, a nd it is also right to do \vhat is not in the interest of the powerful. H is id ea of j ustice then lead s to a logical contrad iction and is therefore false.

ESSAY/ DISCUSSION Q UESTIO NS SECTION 1.2

1. Could the execution of someone for saying u npopular things happen in this country? W hy or why not? Are there countries in the \vorld where such things happen regu larly? Is the execution of someone for his o r her offensive speech ever justified? Expla in.

2. What do you th ink Socrates would think about modern consumer societies?

3. Socrates is often regard ed as the noblest of the great ph ilosophers. Is th is opinion justified? W hy or why not?

4. W rite an imaginary Socratic dialogue benveen yoursel f a nd a friend . Imagine that your friend declares, "Everyone lies. N o one ever tells the truth," and you want to sho\v that those statemen ts are false.

5. W rite a Socratic dialogue between two fictional characters. Imagine that the opening statement is, "C.ourresy to others is always a cynical attempt to ser ve you r own interests. Respect for people has nothing to do with courtesy."

1.3 THINKING PHILOSOPHICALLY

As we have seen, to think ph ilosophically is to b ring you r po\vers of critical reasoning to bear on fundamental questions. W hen you do this, you are usually clarifying the mean ing of concepts, constructing a nd evaluating ph ilosophical theories, or devis- ing a nd evaluating logical argu ments. This latter task constit utes the principal labor of ph ilosophy. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Desca rtes, a nd other great th inkers do not deliver their p hilosoph ical insights to us without argument, as if we a re automatically to accept their vie\vS \Vith no questions asked. Ph ilosophers provide reasons for think- ing their ideas a re plausible-that is, they give us a rgumen ts. And if we believe wh at

Thinking Philosophically 15

they say, it should be because there are good reasons for doing so. Like\vise, if we expect intelligent people co accept our philosoph ical vie\vS, \Ve must argue ou r case. Since the ph ilosophy we read \vill most likely contain arguments, our understand- ing of the text will hang on our abil ity co identify and understand chose arguments.

Reasons and Arguments

As you m ight have guessed, the term argument does not refer co heated d isagreemenrs o r emotional squabbles. An a rgumen t is a group of statements in \vhich one of chem is meant co be supported by t he others. A statem ent (or cla im) is an assertion chat someth ing is or is not the case and is therefore the kind of utterance chat is either t rue or fa lse. In an argument, the statement bei ng supported is the con clu sion , and the scacemenrs supporting the conclusion a re the premises. The p rem ises are meant co p rovide reasons fo r believing chat the conclus ion is true. A good argument g ives us good reasons for accepting a conclus ion; a bad argument fa ils co provide good reasons. In philosophy-and in any ocher kind of rational inqui ry-accepting a conclus ion (statement) \Vithout good reasons is an elementary mistake in reason ing. Believing a statement w ithout good reasons is a recipe for error; believing a statement for good reasons increases your chances of uncovering the truth.

When we do philosophy, then, we are likely at some point co be grappli ng with a rgumenrs-we are trying co either (1) devise an argument co support a statement o r (2) evaluate an argument co see if there really are good reasons for accepting irs conclus ion.

Note chat argument in the sense used here is not synony- mous with pem,asion. An argument provides us with reasons for accepting a claim; it is an attempted "proof" fo r an asser- tion. But persuasion does not necessarily involve giving any reasons at all for accepting a claim. To persuade is co influence people's opinions, \vhich can be accomplished by offering a good argument but a lso by misleading with logical fallacies, explo iting emotions and prejud ices, dazzling with rhetori- cal gimmicks, h iding or distorting the faces, threaten ing or coercing people-the list is long. Good arguments prove someth ing \vhether or not they persuade. Persuasive ploys can change m inds but do not necessarily prove anything.

No\v consider these nvo s imple arguments:

Argum ent 1 It's wrong to take the life of an innocent person. Abortion takes the life of an innocent person . Therefore abortion is wrong.

An a.rgume.nt is a s tate· men, cou pled wh h o,her statements that arc meant

to s upporr th at statemen t. A s tatement (claim) is an asscrrio n that something

is o r is not the case and L~ therefore the kind of urrer- ancc that is either true or false. A conclusion is the sra,emen, being suppon ed. A premise is a sratcmcn t supporting the conclusio n.

Argum ent2 God does not exist. After a ll , most coll ege stu dents believe that that is the case.

Figure 1.9 Hit ler was a master persuader, relying not on good arguments but on emotional rhetoric. How many people t oday would be persuaded by a contem- porary politician w ith Hitler's rhetorical talents?

16 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Philosophy asks ,he simple question, what is it all about? -Alfred North \'qhicehead II I II I II 111111111111 Ill II I II I II I II I II Ill 1111111

PHILOSOPHY LAB - Do you live an examined life? The follo,ving srarements express some fundamenral beliefs-beliefs char countless people have bur may never have thought much abour. Read each sraremenr and select che ones char you sincerely believe. Then rry ro recall if you have ever seriously questioned these beliefs. (Passing thoughts and idle revelry do not counr.) Be honesr. Th is liule experiment could be very revealing-and help- ful as you chink abour your life and values.

I. God exists and ,varches over me. 2. God somerimes answers prayers. 3. There is a heaven. 4. I have both a body and an im morral soul. 5. My emotions are not under my control; rhey just happen . 6. It is ,vrong co criticize ocher cultures. 7. It is ,vrong co judge or her people's acrions. 8. The mora l principles chat I ,vas raised ro bel ieve are the right ones. 9. Political conservatives are wrong about most issues.

10. Political liberals are wrong about most issues. 11. I make free choices; all my decisions are up co me. 12. I can come ro kno,v some things by fa ith alone. 13. My emotions are my best guide co what is morally right or ,vrong. 14. People are basically bad. 15. People are basically good.

In Argument I, the conclusion is "abortion is wrong," and it is backed by nvo

premises: "Ir's ,vrong to take the life of an innocent person" and "Abortion t akes t he life of an innoce nt person." In Argument 2, the conclusion is " God does not exist,"

,vhich is s upported by the premise "After all, most college students believe that that is t he case." D espite the differences between these nvo p assages (differences in con- tent, the number of premises, and the order of their parts) , they are both arguments because they exemplify basic argument struc ture: a conclusion supported by at least one premise.

Though the compo nenrs of an a rgument seem clea r enough, people often fa il to distingu ish benveen a rgumenrs and stro ng statemenrs t hat contain no arg uments at all. Suppose we change Argument I into this:

Abortio n is wrong. I ca n' t believe how m any people think it's m orally okay. The world is insane.

Now there is no a rgument, just an expression of exasperat io n or anger. There are no statem ents giving us reasons to believe a conclusio n. What we h ave are some un- suppo rted assertions that may m erely appear to make a case. If we ig no re t he distinc- tion between genuine arguments and nonargumentative material, critical reason ing is undo ne.

Thinking Philosophically 1 7

The simplest way co locate an a rgument is co find its conclusion first, then its premises. Ze roing in on conclusions and p remises ca n be a lot easier if you keep an eye out for indicator uJords. Indicato r words often tag a long \vich arguments and ind icate that a conclusion o r premise may be nearby.

H ere a re a fe\v conclusion indicator \vords:

consequently

thus

therefore

it follows chat

as a result

hence

\vhich means chat

H ere a re some premise ind icator words:

in view of the fact assum ing chat

because since

due co the fac e that for

inasmuch as given that

Just remember chat indicator words do not guarantee the presence of conclusions and prem ises. They are simply telltale signs.

Assuming we can recognize an a rgument when we see it, ho\v can we cell ifit is a good one? Fortunately, the general criteria for judging the merirs of an a rgument are s imple and clear. A good argument-one chat gives us good reasons fo r believing a cla im-muse h ave (1) solid logic and (2) true p remises. Requi rement (1) means chat the conclusion should follow logically from the p rem ises, chat there muse be a proper logical connection between the supporting scacemenrs and the statement supported. Requ irement (2) says chat what the p remises assert must in fact be the case. An a rgu- ment that fails in either respect is a bad argument.

There are two basic kinds of arguments-deductive and inductive-and ou r two requirements hold for both of chem, even though the logical connect io ns in each t ype are distinct. D eductive argumen ts are incende.d co give logically conclusive s upport co t heir conclusions so chat if the premises are true, t he conclusion absolutely must be true. Argument I is a deductive argument and is therefore supposed co be const ructed so that if t he two premises are true, its conclus io n cannot possibly be false. H ere it is with irs structure laid ba re:

Argumen t 1

1 . It's wrong to take the life of an innoce nt perso n. 2. Abortio n takes the li fe of an innocent person. 3. Therefore, abortion is wrong.

Do you see that, given t he form or structure of this argument, if t he premises a re true, then the conclusio n has to be true? It would be very strange-illogical, in fact-to agree that the two p rem ises are true but that the conclusion is fa lse.

One's p hilosophy is no t best expressed in word s; it is exp ressed in chc ch o ices

o ne makes . .. and the choices we make arc ultim ~

arcly out responsibility. -£lea.nor Roosevelt

6 Recall some stat e- ments t hat you have heard or read in which st rong assert io ns were made but no argument was p resented . Did the asse rt ions p rove a ny- thi ng? W hat was your reaction at t he t i me? We re you persuaded o r imp re ssed by them?

A d eductive argument is an argument inte nded to give logically conclusive

support to its conclusio n.

18 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Ph ilosophy, when super- fi cially studied, excite.< doubt; w hen t horoughly explo red, it dispels it. -Francis Bacon

An inductive argume.nt is an argume nt intended to

give probable support ro its conclus ion.

Now look at this one:

Argument 3

1. All dogs are mammals. 2. Rex is a dog. 3. Therefore, Rex is a mammal.

Again, there is no way fo r t he premises to be t rue while the conclusion is fa lse. The deductive form of t he argument guarantees this.

So a deductive a rgument is intended to have this sort of airtight st ructure. If it actually does have th is structure, it is said to be valid. Argument I is deductive because it is intended to p rov ide logically conclusive support to its conclusion. It is valid because, as a mat ter of fact, it does offer this kind of support. A deductive a rgu- ment that fails to provide conclusive s upport to its conclusion is said to be invalid. In such an argument, it is possible fo r the p remises to be true and the conclusion false. Argument 3 is intended to have a de.ductive fo rm, and because it actually does have this form, the argument is also valid.

An elementary fact about deductive arguments is that their valid ity (or lack thereof) is a separate issue from the truth of the premises. Validity is a structu ral matter, depending on how an argument is put together. Truth concerns the nature of the claims made in the premises and conclusion. A deductive argument is s up- posed to be built so that if the p remises are true, the conclusion must be true-but in a particular case, the p rem ises might not be true. A valid argument can have true or false premises and a true or false conclusion. (By defin ition, of course, it cannot have true premises and a false conclusion.) In any case, being invalid or having false premises dooms a deductive a rgument.

Inductive arguments are supposed to g ive probable support to their conclusions . Unlike deductive a rgumenrs, they are not designe.d to s upport their conclusio ns deci- sively. They can establish only that, if their p rem ises are true, their conclusions are probably true (more likely to be t rue than not). Argument 2 is an inductive a rgu- ment meant to d emonstrate the p robable truth that "God does not ex ist." Like a ll in- ductive arguments (and unlike deductive o nes), it can have true p remises and a false conclusion. So it's possible for the sole p rem ise-"After all, most college studenrs bel ieve that that is the case"-to be true wh ile the conclusion is fa lse.

If inductive a rgumenrs s uccee.d in lend ing very probable support to their conclu- sions, they are said to be strong. Strong a rguments are such that if their p remises are true, their conclusions a re very probably true. If they fail to provide th is probable support, they are terme.d iueak. Argument 2 is a weak a rgument because its prem- ise, even if t rue, does not show that more likely than not God does not ex ist. What college st udenrs (or any other group) believe about God does not constit ute good evidence for or agai nst God's existence.

But consider this inductive argument:

Argument 4

1. Eighty-fi ve percent of the students at th is univers ity are Republica ns. 2. Sonia is a student at this univers ity. 3. Therefore, Son ia is probably a Republican.

Thinking Philosophically 1 9

This argument is strong. If its premises are true, irs conclusion is likely to be true. If 85 percent of the un iversit y's students are Republicans, and Sonia is a university student, she is more likely than not to be a Republican too.

When a valid (d eductive) argument h as true prem ises, it is a good argument. A good d eductive argument is sa id to be sound. A rgument I is valid, but we cannot say whether it is sound until ,ve d eter mine the t ruth of t he premises. A rgument 3 is valid, and if its premises a re true, it is sound. When a st rong (inductive) argument h as true premises, it is also a good argument. A good inductive argument is said to be cogent. Argument 2 is ,veak, so there is no way it can be cogent. Argument 4 is st rong, and if irs premises are t rue, it is cogent.

Checking the validit y or strength of an argument is often a plain, commonsense undertaking. Using our natural reasoning ability, ,ve can examine ho,v the premises a re linked to the conclusion and can see quickly whether the conclusion fo llows from the premises. We are most likely to make an easy job of it when the argumenrs are s imple. Many times, ho,vever, we need some help, and help is available in the form of methods and g u idel ines fo r evaluating arguments.

Having a fam il iarit y with common arg ument patterns, or forms, is especially useful ,vhen assess ing the validity of deductive a rgumenrs. We are likely to encoun- ter these fo rms again and again. H ere is a prime example:

Argument 5

1 . If the surgeon operates, t hen the patient will be cured. 2 . The surgeon is operating. 3. Therefore, the patient will be cured.

This argument form contains a conditional premise-that is, a premise consist- ing of a conditional, or if-then, statement (actually a compound statement composed of nvo constituent statements). Premise 1 is a conditional statement. A conditional statement has two parrs: the part beginning with if (called the antecedent), and the part beginning ,vith then (known as the consequent). So the antecedent of Premise 1 is "If the surgeon operates," and the consequent is "then the patient w ill be cured."

The best ,vay to appreciate the structure of such an a rgument (or any deductive ar- gument, fo r that matter) is to t ranslate it into traditional argument symbols in ,vhich each statement is symbolized by a letter. H ere is the symbolizatio n for Argument 5:

, . If p, then q. 2 . p. 3. Therefore, q.

We ca n see that p represenrs "the s urgeon operates," and q represents " t he patient wi ll be cured." But notice that we ca n use this same symbolized argument form to represent countless other arguments-arguments with different statemen rs but hav- ing the same basic structure.

It just so happens that the underlying argument form for Argument 5 is extremely common-common enough to have a name, modus ponens (or affirming the anteced- ent). The truly useful fact about modus ponens is that any a rgument having this form is valid. We can plug any statemenrs we ,vant into the formula and the result will be a valid argument, a circumstance in which if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true.

Philosophy is like trying to o~n a safe w ith a com~ bination lock: each linle adjustmen, of the dials

seems to achieve nothing, only w he n everything is in place docs the doo, open. -Ludwig \'7iugenstein

20 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

PH I LOSO PH ERS AT WORK

Philosophy Takes on Racism So,ne people have no patience for philosophy's preoccupation ,vith conceptual anal- ysis, fine distinctions, and argument niceties- the fussy murmurings of pedants and bores, they might say. Bue chis attitude underesci,naces the power of philosophical precision and che good work it does on some of che weightiest issues of our rime.

Consider the issue of racis,n, a 1nonscrous evil co d ispel from society and often a hard topic co discuss ,vichouc raising voices and elevating blood pressures. What can philosophy possibly say about ch is issue char cou ld be helpful or en lightening?

Apparently, a great dea l. The distinguished phi losopher Lawrence Blu,n, au- thor of che book "I'm Nor a Racist But . .. ", dra,vs anencion co che "conceptual in- Aacion" of che terms racist and racism. He and ocher scholars observe char che words are so overused and 1nisapplied chat they are losing their moral po,ver co indict and co sha,ne. Their reckless use causes 1nisunderscanding and resenunent. Blum says:

Some fee l that the word [racist] is t h rown around so muc h that anything involving "race" that someone does not like is liable to castigatio n as "racist." ... A loca l newspaper called certain blacks "racist" for criticizing other blacks who s u pported a white over a black cand idate for m ayor. A whi te girl in Virgini a said t hat it was "racist" for a n African Am erican teacher in her school to wear African attire .... Merely men tio ning som eone's race (or racial designatio n), using the word "Oriental" for Asians witho u t recog- nizing its origins and its capacity for insu lt, or socializing only with members of one's own racial group are called "racist.'"

Blum cues through popu lar confusion about racis,n by offering a plausible definition of che word. All forms of racism, past and present, he says, involve cwo key elements: (I) an anicude or belief char another race is inferior or (2) antipathy (hatred, hoscilicy) coward char race.

lnferiorizat io n is linked to historical racist doctrine and racist social systems. Slavery, segregatio n, imperiali sm, aparthe id, and Nazism all treated certain groups as inferior to other grou ps ....

An equally prevalent argument fo rm is modus to/lens (or denying the consequent). For example:

Arg ument 6

1. If the dose is low, the n the hea ling is slow.

2. The healing is not slow. 3, Therefore, the dose is not low.

Thinking Philosophically 21

Though race-based antipathy is less related to the original

concept of "racism," today the term unequivocally encompasses racial bigotry, hostility, and hatred. Indeed, t he racial bigot is many peop le's paradigm image of a " racist." . ..

Historica l systems of racism d id of course inevitably involve racial antipathy as well as inferiorization. Hatred of Jews was cen- tral to Nazi philosophy; and it is impossible to understand Ameri- can racism without seeing hostility to blacks and Native Americans as integral to the nexus of attitudes and emotions that shored up slavery and segregation .t

If racism ahvays involves either inferiorization or antipathy, as Blu,n argues, then 1nany actions t hat people call racist actually ,nay be so,neching else.

Not every instance of racia l conflict, insensitivity, discomfort, miscommunication, exclusion, injustice, or ignorance should be called "racist." Not all racial incidents are racist incidents . . . . We need a more varied and nuanced mora l vocabulary for talking about the domain of race .. . . All forms of racial ill s should elicit concern from responsible individ uals. If someone displays racial insensitiv- ity, but not racism, people should be able to see that for what it is)

Blum is careful co point out chat we can't conclude from this "conceptual inflation" chat racism and inequa lity have been overstated. Ind irect or veiled racism, he says, is likely worse cha n ,ve ,n ight think.

The point here is not chat Blum is right about racism (he may or ,nay not be), but chat ph ilosophica l th inking like chis is powerful and can yield very useful in- sights into real problems.

• Lawrence Blum, "I'm Not a Racist B11t . . . :" 7he Moral Quandary of Race {Ithaca, NY: Cornell Universiry Press, 2002), 1- 2.

l Blum, 8. I Blum, 9.

···························································································································•••;yl'-. .. ,,.

, . If p, then q.

2. Not q. 3. Therefore, not p.

Modus tollens is a lso a valid form, a nd any argument using this form must also be valid.

•

22 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

7 Before read ing this chapter, would you have found any of t he invalid argument forms persuasive? Why or why not?

The essence of philosophy is that a man sho uld so live that his happiness shall depend as little as possible o n external things. -Epictetus

There are a lso common argument forms that are invalid. Here a re two of them :

Argument 7 (Affirming the Consequent)

1. If the m ind is an immaterial substance, then ESP is rea l. 2. ESP is rea l. 3- Therefore, the mind is an immaterial substance.

1. If p, then q. 2. q. 3- Therefore, p.

Argument 8 (Denying the Antecedent)

1. If morality is relative to persons (that is, if moral rightness or wrongness depends on what people believe), then moral disagree- ment between persons wou ld be nearly im poss ible.

2. But morality is not relative to persons. 3- Therefore, moral disagreement between persons is not nearly

im poss ible.

1. If p, then q. 2. Not p. 3- Therefore, not q.

The advantage of being able to recogn ize these and other common a rgument forms is that you can use that skill to readily determine the validit y of many deduc- tive arguments. You kno\v, for example, that any a rgument having the sam e fo rm as modus ponens or modus to/lens must be valid, and any argument in one of the com- mon invalid forms must be invalid.

Inductive arguments also have distinctive forms, and being fam iliar with the forms can help you eval uate the arguments. In enumerative induction, we arrive at a

generalization about an enti re g roup of things after observing just some members of the g roup. C,onsider these:

Argument9

Every formatted disk I have bought from the computer store is defective.

Therefore, a ll fo rmatted d isks sold at the computer store are probably defective.

Argument 10

All the hawks in th is wild li fe sanctuary that I have observed have had red tai ls.

Therefore, all the hawks in this sanctuary probably have red tails.

Argument 11

Sixty percent of the Bostonians I have interviewed in various parts of the city are pro-choice.

Therefore, 60 percent of a ll Bostonians are probably pro·choice.

As you can see, enu merative induction has this form :

X percent of the observed members of group A have property P.

Therefore, X percent of all members of group A probably have property P.

Thinking Philosophically 23

The observed members of the g roup a re s imply a sample of the entire g roup. So based on wh at we k now about this sample, \Ve can genera lize to all the members. But how do \Ve k no\v \vhether such an a rgument is strong? Everything depends on the sample. If the sample is large enough and rep resentative enough, \Ve can safely ass ume that ou r generalization dra\vn from the sample is probably a n accurate refl ec- tion of the whole g roup of members. A sample is represen tative of a n entire g roup o nly if each member of the group has an equal chance of being include.cl in the sample. In general, the larger the sample, the greater the p robability that it accur- ately refl ects the nature of the group as a \vhole. Often common sense tells us when a sample is too small.

VALID AND INVALID ARGUMENT FORMS

VALID ARGUMENT FORMS

Affirming the Antecede nt (Modus Ponens)

If p, then q.

p .

Theref ore, q.

Example: If Spot barks, a burg lar is in t he

house.

Spot is bark ing .

Theref ore, a burg lar is in t he house.

INVALID ARGUMENT FORMS

Denying the Co nsequent (Modus To/lens)

If p, t hen q .

Not q.

Therefore, not p.

Example: If Spot barks, a burg lar is in the

house.

A burg lar is not in the house.

Therefore, Spot is not bark ing .

Affirming the Consequent Denying the Antecedent If p, then q. If p, t hen q .

q . Not p.

Theref ore, p. Therefore, not q.

Example: Example: If t he cat is on t he mat, sh e is asleep. If the cat is on the mat , she is asleep .

She is asleep . She is not on th e mat.

Theref ore, she is on t he mat. Therefore, she is not asleep.

24 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

We do not kno\v ho\v many formatted disks from the computer store a re in the sample mentioned in Argument 9. But if the number is several dozen and the disks \vere bought over a period of weeks or months, the sample is probably sufficiently large and representative. If so, the argument is strong. Like\vise, in Argument 10 \Ve don't kno\v the size of the sample or ho\v it was obtained. But if the sample \vaS taken from all the likely spots in the sanctuary where hawks live, and if several hawks \Vere ob- served in each location, the sample is probably adequate-and the argument is strong. In A rgument 11, if the sample consists of a handful of Boston ians intervie\ved on a few street corners, the sample is definitely inadequate and the argument is weak. But if the sample consists of several hundred people, and if every member of the whole group has an equal chance of being included in the sample, then the sample would be good enough to allo\v us to accurately generalize about the whole population. Typically, se- lecting such a sample of a large population is done by p rofessional polling organizations.

In the argument form kno\vn as analogical induction (or argument by analogy), \Ve reason in this fashion: T\vO or more th ings are similar in several ways; therefore, they a re probably similar in one further \vay. Consider this argument:

Argument 12

Humans can walk upright, use simple tools, learn new skill s, and devise deductive arguments.

Figure 1.10 How much is a watch like the uni- verse? Everything depends on the relevant simi- larit ies and differences.

Ch impanzees can walk upright, use s imple tools, and learn new ski ll s.

Therefore, chimpanzees can probably devise deduc- tive arguments.

This argument says that because chimpanzees are simi- lar to humans in several respects, they probably are sim ilar to humans in one furthe r respect.

Here's an a rgument by analogy that has become a classic in ph ilosophy:

Argument 13

A watch is a complex mechanism with many parts that seem arranged to achieve a specific purpose- a pur- pose chosen by the watch's designer.

In s imilar fashion, the universe is a complex mecha- nism with many parts that seem arranged to achieve a specific purpose.

Therefore, the universe must also have a des igner.

We can represent the form of an argument by analogy in this way:

X has properties P1 , P2, P3, plus the property P 4.

Y has properties P1, P2, and P3,

Therefore, Y probab ly has property P4.

Thinking Philosophically 25

The strength of an analogical induction depends on the relevant similarities be- tween the two things compared. The more relevant similarities there are, the greater the probability that the conclusion is true. In Argument 12, several similarities are note.cl. But there are some unmentioned diss imilarities. The brain of a chimpanzee is smaller and more primitive than that of a human, a difference that p robably inhibirs higher intellectual funct ions such as logical argument. Argument 12, then, is ,veak. A common response co Argument 13 is chat the argument is weak because a lthough the universe resembles a watch in some ,vays, in ocher ,vays it does not resemble a watch. Speci fica lly, the un iverse also resembles a living thing.

The thi rd type of inductive argument is kno,vn as inference to the best explanation (or abduction), a k ind of reasoning chat ,ve a ll use daily and that is at the heart of scientific investigations. Recall chat an argument gives us reasons fo r believing that someth ing is the case. An explanation, on the other hand, states how or ivhy some- thing is the case. It attempts co clarify or elucidate, not offer proof. For example:

1 . Megan definitely understood the material, for she cou ld answer every question on the test.

2. Megan understood the materia l because she has a good memory.

Sentence 1 is an argument. The conclusion is " Megan definitely understood the material," and the reason (premise) given for believing chat the conclusion is true is "for she could answer every question on the test." Sentence 2, though, is an expla- nation. It does not try co present reasons for believing something; it has nothing co prove. Instead, it tries co sho,v why someth ing is the way it is (why Megan understood the material). Sentence 2 assumes chat Megan understood the material then cries co explain ,vhy. Sud, explanations play a crucia l role in inference co the best explanation.

In inference co the best explanation, we begin with premises about a phenom- enon or state of affairs co be explained. Then ,ve reason from chose premises co an explanation for chat state of affairs. We try co p roduce not just any old explanation, but the best explanation among several possibilities. The best explanation is the one most likely to be true. The conclusion of the argument is that the p referred explana- t ion is indee.d p robably true. For example:

Argument 14

Tariq flunked his philosophy course.

The best explanation for his failure is that he didn't read the material.

Therefore, he probably d idn't read the material.

Argument 15

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant was found with t he murder weapon in his hand, blood on his clothes, and the victim's wallet in his pocket. We have an eyewitness putting the defendant at the scene of the crime. The best explanation for all these facts is that the defendant comm itted the murder. There can be very little doubt- he's gu il ty.

The object of studying p hilosophy is to know one's own mind, not other

people's. -Dean Inge

26 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

The t rue function of phil- osophy is to educate us in

the principles of reasoning and not to put an end to fur the r reasoning by the introduction of fixed conclus ions. -George Henry Lewes

Here's the form of inference to the best explanation:

Phenomenon Q.

E provides the best exp lanation for Q.

Therefore, it is probable that E is true.

In any argument of this p attern, if the explanation given is really the best, then the a rgument is inductively strong. If the explanation is not the best, the a rgument is inductively weak. If the p remises of the strong a rgument are t rue, then the argu- ment is cogent. If the argument is cogent, then we have good reason to bel ieve that the conclusion is true.

The biggest challenge in using inference to the best explanation is determin ing ,vhich explanation is the best. Somet imes this feat is easy. If ou r car has a flat tire, we may qu ickly uncover the best explanation for such a state of affa irs. If we see a nail sticking out of the flat and there is no obvious evidence of tampering or of any o ther extraordinary cause (that is, there are no good alternative explanations), we may safely conclude that the best explanation is that a nail punctu red the tire.

I n more complicated situations , we may need to do ,vhat scientists do to evalu- ate exp lanations, o r theories-use special criteria to sort through the possibilities. Scientists call these standa rds the criteria of adequacy. Despite this fancy name, these criteria are basica lly just com mon sense, standards that you have probably used yourself.

One of these criteria is cal led conservatism. This criterion says that, all things being equal, the best explanation or theory is the one that fits best ,vith what is al ready kno,vn or established. For example, if a fr iend of yours says-in all seriousness-that she can fly to the moon ,vithout using any kind of rocket o r spaceship, you probably ,vouldn't bel ieve her (and might even think that she need ed psychiatric help). Your rea- sons for doubting her would probably rest on the criterion of conservatism-that ,vhat she says conflicts with everything science knows about spaceflight, human anatomy, aerodynamics, la,vs of nature, and much more. It is logically possible that she really can fly to the moon, but her claim's lack of conservatism (the fact that it conflicts ,vith so much of ,vhat we already know about the ,vorld) casts serious doubt on it.

H ere is another useful criterion fo r judging the worth of explanations: simplicity. Other things being equal, the best explanation is the one that is the simplest-that is, the one that rests on the fe,vest assumptions. The theory making the fe,vest assump- tions is less likely to be false because there are fewer ,vays for it to go ,vrong. In the example about the flat tire, one possible (but strange) explanation is that space aliens punctured the tire. You probably ,vouldn't put much credence in this explanation be- cause you ,vould have to assume too many unknown entities and processes-namely, space al iens ,vho have come from who-kno,vs-,vhere using who-knows-what methods to move about and puncture your ti res. The nail-in-the-tire theory is much simpler (it assumes no unknown entities or processes) and is therefore much more likely to be t rue.

When you a re carefully reading an argument (whether in an essay or some other context), you ,viii be just as intereste.d in whether the prem ises are true as in whether the conclusion fo llows from the prem ises. If the ,vriter is conscientious, he o r she

Thinking Philosophically 27

will try to ensu re that each p rem ise is either well supported or in no need of sup - port (because the premise is obv ious or agreed to by all parties). The needed support will come from the citing of examples, statistics, research, expert opinion, and other kinds of ev idence or reasons. This arrangement means that each premise of the pri- mary argument may be a conclusion supported in turn by premises citing ev idence o r reasons. In any case, you as the reader \vill have to evaluate carefully the truth of all p rem ises and the support behind them.

Reading Philosophy

Unfortunately, arguments in philosophical essays rarely come neatly labeled so you ca n find and evaluate them. You have to do that \vork yourself, a task that requ ires careful reading and th inking. The process can be challenging because in the real world, a rgumenrs can be s imple or complex, clearly stated o r perplex ing, and apparent or hidden. This is t rue for philosophical essays as well as fo r any other kind of \vriting that cont ains arguments. In some ph ilosophical prose, the relatio nship between the conclusion (or conclusions) and the premises can be complicated, and even good arguments can be surrounded by material irrelevant to the arguments at hand. The remedy for these difficulties is instructive examples and plenty of p ractice, some of which you can get in this ch apter.

Let's begin by identifying and analyzing the argument in the fo llowing passage. The issue is whether humans have free will or are compelled by forces beyond their control to act as they do (a topic we take up in C h apter 5). The statemenrs are num- bered fo r ease of reference.

(1) The famous trial lawyer Clarence Darrow (1857- 1938) made a name for hi mself by using the "determi nism defense" to get his clients acqu itted of se rious crimes. (2) The crux of this approach is t he idea that humans are not reall y respo nsible for anything they do because they cannot choose free ly- they are "determi ned," predes- t ined , if you will , by nature (or God) to be the way they are. (3) So in a sense, Darrow says, humans are like wind-up toys with no control over any action or decision . (4) They have no free will. (S) Reme mber t hat Darrow was a renowned agnostic who was skeptical of all reli - gious claims. (6) But Darrow is wrong about human free wi ll for two reasons . (7) First, in our eve ryday moral life, our own commonsense experie nce s uggests that sometimes people are free to make moral decisions . (8) We shou ld not abandon what o ur commonsense ex- perience tells us without good reason- and (9) Da rrow has given us no good reason. (10) Second, Darrow's determinism is not con- fi rmed by science, as he cl aims- but actually conflicts with science. (11) Modern science says that there are many things (at the subatom- ic level of matter) that are not determined at all : (12) they just happe n.

Indicator words are scarce in this argument, unless you count the words " fi rst" and "second" as signifying premises. But the conclusion is not hard t o find; it's

28 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Statement 6: "Darrow is \vrong about human free \viii for nvo

reasons." Locating the conclusion enables us to see that some statements (Statements 1 through 4) are neither conclusion nor premises; they a re just background information on Darrow's views. Most argumentative essays contain some supplemental in-

formation like th is. Statement 5 is irrelevant to the argument; Da rrow's agnosticism has no logical connection to the premises or conclusion. Statement 12 is just a reword ing of Statement 11. After this elim ination process, on ly the fo llowing premises and conclusion (Statement 6) remain:

(6) But Darrow is wrong about human free will for two reasons.

(7) Fi rst, in our everyday moral life, our own common- sense experience suggests that sometimes people are free to make moral decis ions.

Figure 1.11 Cl arence Darrow (1857-1938). (8) We shou ld not abandon what our commonsense expe- rience tell s us without good reason.

Philosophy is a kind of jo urney, ever learning yet

never arriving at the ideal perfection of t ruth. -Albert Pike

(9) Darrow has given us no good reason.

(10) Darrow's determ inism is not confirmed by science, as he cl aims- but actually conA icts with science.

(11) Modern science says that there are many th ings (at the subatom ic level) that are not determined at all.

Statements 7 t hrough 11 are the premises. They are all meant to provide support to Statement 6, but thei r support is of unequal weight. Statement 10 gives indepen- dent support to the conclusion without t he help of any other premises, so it is an independent premise. We ca n say the same t hi ng about Statement 11; it too is an independent premise. But notice t hat Statemenrs 7, 8, and 9 are dependent premises supporting the conclusion. That is, taken separately, they are weak, but together they constitute a p laus ible reason for accepting Statement 6. Statement 10 directly sup-

porrs the conclusion and in turn is supported by Premise 11. Now take a look at th is passage:

(1) As the Is lam ic clerics cli ng to power in Iran, students there are agita ting for greater freedom and less suppression of views that the clerics d islike. (2) Even though ultimate power in Iran rests with the mu ll ahs, it is not at a ll certain where the nation is headed. Here's a rad ical suggestion: (3) the Is lam ic republic in Iran will fall within the next five years. Why do I say this? (4) Because the majority of Iranians are in favor of democratic reforms, (5) and no regime can stand for very long when citizens are demanding access to the political pro- cess. (6) Also, Iran today is a mirror image of the Soviet Un ion before it broke apart- there's widespread d issatisfaction and d issent at a time when the regime seems to be trying to hold the people's loyalty.

Thinking Philosophically 29

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

Hypatia

Hypacia (c. 370-415) was the greatest philosopher of her day. She lived in che Greek cicy of Alexandria, ,vhich in the fourth century was che incelleccual epicen- ter of che ,vorld, excelling in scientific and philosophical learning. Jc also ,vas the home of the famed Library, which contained thousands of scholarly manuscripts dra,vn fro,n the best thinkers of ancient times, including che works of Pla-

Figure 1.12 Hypatia (c. 370-415).

to and Ariscocle. In chis rich environment, Hypacia achieved fame as a Neoplaconisc philosophy teacher, an astronomer, and a mathematician. Ac around age C\Vency- five or thirty she became the director of che school of the reno,vned philosopher Plocinus-a very high honor, since women were cradicionally noc appointed co such offices. Another indication of her sterling reputation ,vas chat she was appointed by a Christian govenunenc even though she was known co be a pagan.

She caught che works of che "pagan" philosophers such as Plato and Aristocle, and students ca,ne from far-Aung places for che privilege of being her students. She also is thought to have ,vricren three commentaries on noted mache,natical treatises.

In 415, she ,vas brutally murdered by a mob of Christian zealots. She ,vas pulled from her chariot, hauled to a church, stripped naked, and skinned alive ,vith oyster shells.

(7) Every nation that has taken such a path has imploded within five years. (8) Finally, the o ld Iranian trick of ga ining support for the government by fomenting hatred of America will not work anymore (9) because Iran is now trying to be friends with the United States.

The conclusion is Statement 3, and the premises are Statements 4 th rough 9. The fi rst nvo statements are extraneous. Statements 4 and 5 are dependent premises and

so are Statements 6 and 7. Statements 8 and 9 constitute an a rgument chat gives sup - port to the passage's ma in conclusion (Statement 3). Statement 8 is the conclusion; Statement 9, the premise. Notice also that the sentence " Why do I say this?" is not a statement.

So remember: When you read a ph ilosophical essay, you are not simply trying to glean some facts from it as you might if you were reading a science text or tech- n ical report. Neither are you follo,ving a storyline as if you were reading a mystery novel (though philosophy papers sometimes contain their share of mysteries). In most cases, you are tracing the steps in an argument, trying to see ,vhat conclusion the ,vriter wants to prove and whether she succee.ds in proving it. Along the way, you

8 Suppose you are present ed w ith w ritten material containing statements and argu- ment s t hat strike you as irreverent or un- ort hodox. Would you be able to read such a text w ith an open mind? Can you recall a case in w hich you did just that?

30 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Small am o unts of ph iloso· phy lead to arhcism , b u t la rger a mo unts bring us

back to God. -Francis Bacon II I II I II 111111111111 II I II I II I II I II I II Ill I 111111

may encounter several premises with their accompanying analyses, clarifications, explanations, and examples. You may even run into a whole chain of arguments. In che end, if you have read \veil and che \vricer has \vriccen \veil, you are left not \vich a ne\v sec of data or a story ending, but a realization-maybe even a revelation-that a conclusion is, or is not, worthy of bel ief.

The best way co learn how co read ph ilosophy \veil is co read philosophy often . You wi ll probably gee p lenty of chances co do chat in your current philosophy course. Having a fe\v rules co gu ide you in your reading, however, may help shorten che learning curve. As you read, keep che follo\v ing in m ind.

1. Approach the text with an open m ind. If you a re studying philosophy for che first time, you are likely-at lease at first-co find a good bit of che material diffi- culc, strange, or exasperating, sometimes all three at once. That's normal. Philosophy is an explo ration of che rugged frontiers of our kno\vledge of fundamental th ings, so much of chis new territory is likely co seem daunting o r unfamiliar. There's also an excellent chance chat your first visits co this terrain will be vex ing, perhaps even infuriating, because you may sometimes disagree \vich what you read.

There is no shame in experienci ng any of these reactions. They come with che territory. Bue if you a re co make any head\vay in philosophy, you need co try your best co counteract these attitudes and feelings. Remember, philosophy at ics best is a fa ir-minded, fear less search for t ruth. Anyth ing chat interferes with this noble quest muse be overcome and case as ide.

Avoid making a judgment about an essay's ideas or arguments until you fully un- dersta nd them and have fai rly considered them . Make sure you a re not reading with che intent co p rove che conclusions false (or true). Be open co che possibil ity that che essay could give you good reasons co change your m ind about someth ing.

T ry co maintain a neutral attitude cowa rd the \vricer, p resum ing neither that she is right nor wrong, neither sinner nor sa int. Don't assume chat everything a renowne.d ph ilosopher says muse be true, and don't p resuppose that everything a philosopher you dislike says muse be false. Give the writer the same attention and respect chat you would give a friend who is discussing a serious issue with you.

If you a re reading che work of a famous ph ilosopher and you find yourself think- ing chat h is or her ideas are obviously s illy o r ridiculous, think again. The odds are good that you a re misunderstanding what you read. Jc is wiser co assume chat the cexc offers something of value (even if you disagree with it) and that you need co read more carefully.

2. Read actively and critically. Philosophical reading is incense. Jc cannot be rushed. Jc cannot be cramme.d. Jc cannot be done while your mind is on automatic pilot.

Philosophical read ing is active reading. Instead of reading just co gee through a p iece of writing, you muse cake your time and ask yourself what key terms and passages mean, ho\v che a rgument is structu red, what the central thesis is, \vhere che premises a re, how certain key ideas are related, whether che main conclusion conflicts \vich propositions you know are true, even how che material compares w ith ocher philosophical writing on the same subject.

Thinking Philosophically 31

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

Early Women Philosophers: Themistoclea, Arignote, and Theano Among the pre-Socratics, Pythagoras (c. 550- 500 BC E) is the most fa,nous (he gave us the Pythagorean theorem, a geo,netry-dass staple) and possibly the ,nose influ- ential. He inspired a long line of followers-Pythagoreans-dat ing fron1 the sixth century BC E ,veil into the ne,v rnillennium . What isn't so ,vell kno,vn is char n1any of these followers were ,vomen, distinguished philosophers in their own right. Here is pare of Mary Ellen Waithe's discussion of three of the,n:

The ancient sources indicate t hat women were active in early

Pythagorean societies and may have played a central role in the development of early Pythagorean philosophy. Diogenes Laertius reports that:

Aristonexus asserts that Pythagoras derived the greater part of his ethical doctrines from Themistoclea , the priestess of Delph i.

Ea rl y Pythagoreans viewed the cosmos or universe as orderly and harmon ious. Everyt hing bears a particular mathematica l relation- ship to everything else. Harmony and order exist when things are in their proper relationship to each other. This relationship can be expressed as a mathematical proportion. One of t he "sacred discourses" is attributed to Pythagoras' daughter, Arignote. According to Arignote:

The eterna l essence of num ber is the most providential cause of the whole heaven, earth and region in betwee n. Likewise it is the root of the continued existence of the gods and daimones, as well as that of divine men.

Arignote's comment is consistent with one attributed to her mother, Theano of Crotona, in that a ll that exists, a ll that is rea l can be distinguished from other things through enumeration. T he eternal essence of number is a lso directly related to the harmoni - ous coexistence of different things. This harmony can be expressed as a mathematica l relationsh ip. In these two ways, number is t he cause of all things .*

• Mary Ellen Waithe, "Early Pythagoreans," in A History of\'(fome11 Philosophers (Dordrccht,

The Netherlands: Marrinus N ijhoff, 1987), 11- 12.

32 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Philosophical read ing is also critical read ing. In c ritica l reading, you ask not just \vhat something means but whether a statement is true and if the reasoning is solid. You ask if the conclusion rea lly follows from the premises, \vhether the p remises are true, if the a nalysis of a term really makes sense, if an argument has been overlooked, if an ana logy is weak, whether there are counte rexamples to key claims, and \vhether the claims agree with other things you have good reason to believe.

3. Identify the conclusion first, t hen t he premises. When you first begin reading philosophica l texts, they may seem to you like dark thickets of propos i- tions into \vh ich you may not ente r without losi ng you r way. But your situation is really not that bad. In a rg umentative \vriting (the kind you are most likely to encounter in philosophy), you can depend on there being, \veil, an argument, a conclusion backed by prem ises . The re could, of course, be severa l arg ume nts that support the main argument, a nd the arguments could be complex, but these sets of conclusion-plus-prem ises wi ll all serve as recognizable g uideposts. If you \Vant to penetrate the thicket, then, you must first identify the a rg ument (or a rg uments). And the key to doing that is to find the co nclusion first, then look for the p remises.

When you find the main conclusion, you thereby identify the main point of the essay, and you then have the number-one clue to the funct ion of a ll the rest of the text. Once you uncover the point that the writer is tryi ng to prove, find ing the supporting premises becomes much easier. And when you isolate the premises, locating the text that explains and amplifies the premises gets easier too. Therefore, the first-and most important-question you can ask about a philosophical essay is, "What claim is the writer trying to prove?"

4. Outline, paraph rase, or summarize the argu ment. Understanding an essay's argument is so important that testing \vhether you really "get it" is crucial. You can test you r g rasp of the argument by outlin ing, paraphrasing, o r summarizing it. If you can lay out an argument's premises and conclusion in an outline, o r if you can accurately paraphrase o r summarize the a rgument, you probably have a pretty good understanding of it. Very often studenrs who think they comprehend an argu- ment are surp rised to see that they cannot devise an adequate outl ine or summa ry of it. Such failu res suggest that, although outl in ing, pa raphrasing, or summarizing may seem to some to be unnecessary, they are not-at least not to those who are ne\v to ph ilosophy.

5. Eval uate t he argument and formulate a tentative judgment. When you read philosophy, understa nding it is just the first step. You also must do something that many beginners find both difficult and alien : you must make an informed judg- ment about what you read. Simply reiterating what the writer has said wi ll not do. Your judgment is what matters here. Mainly, this judgment is you r evaluation of the argument presented by the writer-an assessment of (1) whether the conclusion fo l- lo\vS from the premises and (2) whether the premises a re true. Only when the answer to both of these questions is yes can you say that the conclusion of the argument is worthy of acceptance. This kind of evaluatio n is precisely what you r instructor expects when she asks you to critique an a rg umentative essay in ph ilosophy.

Thinking Philosophically 33

Fallacious Reasoning

You can become more p roficient in reading and ,vriting ph ilosophy if you kno,v ho,v to identify fa llacies ,vhen you see them . Fallacies are common but bad arguments. They are defective arguments that appear so often in w riting and speech that phi- losophers have given them names and offered instructions on how to recognize and avoid t hem.

Many fallacies a re not just faile.d arguments-they are a lso deceptively p laus ible appeals. They can easily appea r sound o r cogent, mislead ing the reader. Their poten- t ial for slipperiness is another good reason to study fallacies. The best way to avoid being taken in by t hem is to study them until you can consistently pick them out of any random selection of prose. Here are some of the more prevalent ones.

Straw Man

The straw man fa llacy is the m isrepresentation of a person's views so they can be more easily attacked o r d ismissed. Let's say you argue that t he war in Afghanistan is too costly in lives and money, and your opponent replies th is way:

My adversary argues that t he war in Afghanistan is much too difficult for the Un ited States, and that we ought to, in effect, cut and run while we can. But why must we take the coward's way out?

Thus, you r point has been distorted, made to look more extreme or radical than it really is; it is now an easy target. The notion t hat ,ve ought to "cut and run" or "take the co,vard 's ,vay out" does not fallow from the statement that the war in Afghanistan is too costly.

The straw man kind of distortion, of course, proves noth ing, though many people fa ll for it every day. This fallacy is probably the most common type of fa llacious reasoning used in politics. It is also popular in many other k inds of argumentation- including student philosophy papers.

Appeal to the P erson

C losely related to the straw man fa llacy is appeal to the p erson (also known as the ad hominem fallacy). Appeal to the person is the rejecting of a statement on the grounds that it comes from a particular person, not because the statement, o r claim, itself is false or dubious. For example:

You can safely discard anything t hat Susan has to say about govern- ment. She's a dyed-in-the-wool socialist.

Johnson argues that our current welfare system is defective. But don't listen to him- he's a conservative.

Ad hominem arguments often creep into student p hilosophy papers. Part of the reason is that some appeals to the person are not so obvious. For example:

Swinburne's cosmologica l argument is a serious attempt to show that God is the best explanation for the existence of the un iverse.

A fallacy is a common but bad a rgument.

This is paten rl y absurd ; b u t w hoever wishes to become

a philosopher m ust learn not to be fr ightened by

absurdities.

-Bercrand Russell

The straw man is t he fal -

lacy of mis re presenting a

person's views so they can be more easily a ttack ed o r d is missed.

Appeal to the person is th e fall acy of rejecting a starcmcnr o n the grounds

that it comes from a par~ ticular pe rson, n ot because

the statement, o r claim,

itself is false o r d ubious.

34 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

PH I LOSO PHY NOW

Philosophy in the News

Very ofcen, behind rhe headlines ,ve see every day rhere lurks a deeper ph ilosophical issue. And when people reAecr on rhe stories, rhey frequendy find themselves pondering fundame n- tal questions and beliefs. Philosophy is hard ro avoid . Here is a sa,npling of possible headlines paired ,virh rhe philosophical questions rhey raise.

Tea Parry Rejects Enridemenr and Welfare Progra,ns

Man Claims Our-of-Body Experience

Residents De,nand D eath Penalty for Child Killer

Christopher H itchens Book Says "God Is Nor Grear"

Japan Tsuna,ni Kills Thousands

Scien risrn Say "Big Bang" Uncaused

Attorn eys Say Hormones Caused Woman to Kill

Stem Cell Research Banned

Ch ina Says It Muse Be Judged by C hinese Morality

Is libertarianism a v iable political rheory?

Can the mind (soul) exist independendy of rhe body?

Is capital punishment ever morally permissible?

Does God exist? Does religion do more harm rhan good?

Does n atural evil show thar there is no God?

Is Aquinas's fi rsr-cause argument doomed?

Do we have free will? Are all our actions caused by factors beyond our control?

Is rhe fetus a person ,virh full moral righrs fro,n the mo,nent of con ception?

Is morality relative to cultures? D oes "human righrn" apply only to rhe West?

Are most perennia l debates in politics really about fundamenta l philosophi- cal issues that are never discussed? Could these issues be resolved if people,

in good faith, applied the Socratic method?

However, he is a well -known theist, and this fact raises some doubts about the strength of his case.

Dennett argues from the materia list standpoint, so he begins with a bias that we need to take into account.

Some of the strongest arguments aga inst the death penalty come from a few people who are actually on death row. They obviously have a vested interest in showing that cap ita l punishment is mor- all y wrong. We therefore are forced to take their arguments- however convincing- with a grain of sa lt.

Thinking Philosophically 35

Figure 1.13 Politics is rife with fallacie-pecially straw man, appeal to the person, and slippery slope. W hat fallacies in polit ics have you heard or read lately?

Each of these argumenrs is defective because it asks us to reject or resist a cla im solely because of a pe rson's character, backg ro und , or ci rc umsta nces- things that are ge nera lly ir relevant to the truth of claims. A statem ent must sta nd o r fall on its own merits. The personal characterist ics of the person espous- ing the vie,v do not necessarily have a bea ring on its truth. Only if we ca n sho,v that someo ne's dubious tra its somehow make the c laim dubious are we justi- fied in reject ing the claim because of a person's pe rsona l characterist ics. Such a . .

ci rc umsta nce 1s rare.

Appeal to Popularity

The appeal to popularity (or appeal to the masse.s) is another extremely common fallacy. It is a rguing that a claim must be t rue not because it is backed by good rea- sons, but simp ly because many people believe it. The idea is that, somehow, there is t ruth in numbers. For example:

Of course there's a God. Everyone believes that.

Seve nty percent of Americans believe that the pres ident's tax cuts are good for the economy. So don't try to tell me the tax cuts aren't good for the economy.

Most people believe that Jo nes is guilty, so he's gui lty.

In each of these a rgumenrs, the conclusion is thought to be t rue merely because it is believed by an impressive number of people. The number of people ,vho bel ieve a claim , ho,vever, is irrelevant to the claim's truth. What really matters is how much

Appeal to popularity is the fallacy of arguing that a claim m ust be true not because it is backed by good reasons, but simply because m any people bel ieve it.

36 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Genetic fallacy is the fal lacy of arguing that a stateme nt can be judged true o r false based on irs source.

There arc mo re things in

heaven and earth, Horatio,

than arc d ream t of in you r

ph ilosophy. -William Shakespeare

Eq u ivocation is rhe fallacy of assigning two diffe rent meanings to the same

s ignificant word in an

argum en t.

support che claim has from good reasons. Large groups of people have been-and are-wrong about many things. Many people once believed chat the Earth is flat, mermaids are real, a nd human sacrifices help crops grow. They were wrong.

Remember, however, chat the number of people who accept a claim can be rele- vant co its truth if the people happen co be expercs. T wency professional astronomers ,vho p redict an ecl ipse are more reliable than one hundred nonexper cs ,vho swear chat no such eclipse ,vill occur.

Gen et ic Fallacy

A p loy like t he appeal co the person is the gen eti c fallacy-arguing chat a statement can be judge.cl t rue or false base.cl o n its source. In an appeal co the person, some- one's character or circumstance is thought co cell the tale. In che genetic fallacy, t he truth of a statement is supposed co d epend on o rigins ocher than an individual- organizacions, political platforms, g roups, schools of thought, even exceptional states of m ind (like dreams and intuitio ns). Look:

That new military reform idea has gotta be bunk. It comes from a liberal think tank.

At the city counci l meeting He rnando sa id that he had a plan to curb the nu mber of car crashes on Highway 19. But you can bet that what- ever it is, it's half-ba ked- he said the plan came to him when he was stoned on marijuana.

The U.S. Senate is considering a proposal to reform affirmative action, but you know their ideas must be ridiculous. What do they know abou t the rights of the disadvantaged? They're a bu nch of rich , wh ite guys.

Equivocat ion

The fa llacy of eq uivocation is assigning two different meanings co the same sig- nificant ,vord in an a rgument. The ,vord is used in one sense in a premise and in a different sense in another p lace in the argument. The s,vicch in meaning can d eceive che reader and disrupt che argument, rendering it invalid or weaker than it would be ochenvise. H ere's a classic example:

On ly man is rational.

No woman is a man.

Therefore, no woman is rational.

And one ocher:

You are a bad writer.

If you are a bad writer, then you are a bad boy.

Therefore, you are a bad boy.

The first argument equivocates on the word man. In the first premise, man means humankind; in the second, male. Thus, the argument seems co prove chat ,vomen

Thinking Philosophically 37

a re not rational. You can see the trick better if you assign the same meaning to both instances of man. Like th is:

Only humans are rational.

No woman is a human.

Therefore, no woman is rationa l.

In the second a rgument, t he equivocal term is bad. In the first premise, bad means incompetent; in the second, immoral.

Appeal to I gn oran ce

As its name implies, this fallacy tries to p rove something by appealing to what ,ve don't kno,v. The appeal to ignorance is argu ing that eit her (1) a claim is true because it hasn't been proven fa lse or (2) a claim is false because it hasn't been p roven true. For example:

Try as they may, scientists have never been able to disprove the existence of an afterlife. The conclusion to be drawn from th is is that there is in fact an afterlife.

Super Green Algae can cure cancer. No scientific study has ever shown that it does not work.

No one has ever shown that ESP (extrasensory perception) is real. Therefore, it does not exist.

There is no evidence that people on welfare are hardworking and re- sponsible. Therefore, they are not hardworking and responsible.

The fi rst two arguments try to prove a claim by pointing out that it hasn't been proven false. The second two t ry to prove that a claim is fa lse because it hasn't been proven true. Both kinds of arguments are bogus because they assume that a lack of evidence proves something. A lack of evidence, however, can prove nothi ng. Being ignorant of the facts does not enlighten us.

Notice t hat if a lack of evidence could p rove something, then you could prove just about anything you wanted . You could reason, for instance, that s ince no one can prove that horses can't fly, horses must be able to fly. Since no one can disprove that you possess super natural powers, you must possess supernatu ra l powers.

Fal se Dilem ma

In a dilemma, you are force.cl to choose between two unattractive poss ibilities. The fallacy of false dilemma is arguing erroneously that since there are only two alterna- t ives to choose from and one of them is unacceptable, t he other one must be true. C-onsider these:

You have to li sten to reason. Ei ther you must sell your car to pay your rent, or your landlord will throw you out on the street. You obvious ly aren't going to sell your car, so you will be evicted.

Appeal to ignorance is

th e fallacy of a rguing that either ( I ) a claim is true because ir hasn'r been

proven false o r (2) a claim is false because i r has n' r

been proven true.

False dilemma is rhe fallacy of a rguing errone· oudy that s ince there arc

o nly two alternatives to choose fro m and o ne of the m is unacceptable, the

o ther o ne must be true.

38 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Philosophy is at once the most s ub lime an d th e most

trivial of h uman p ursuit'\.

-William James

Begging the q uestion is the fallacy of trying to p rove a conclus io n by us .. ing chat very same con cJu ..

s 1o n as s up po rr.

You have to face the hard facts about the war on drugs. Either we must spend bill ions of doll ars to increase military and law enforce- ment operations aga in st drug cartels, or we mus t legal ize all drugs. We obviously are not going to lega lize all drugs, so we have to spend bill ions on anti-cartel operations.

The fi rst argument says chat there are only two choices co cons ider: either sell your car or gee evicted, and since you \viii not sell your ca r, you wi ll gee ev ic ted. This argument is fallacious because (pres umably) the first p rem ise is false-there seem co be more than just nvo alter natives here. You could gee a job, borro\v money from a friend, or sell your DVD player and TV. If the argument seems convincing, it is because ocher possibilities are excluded.

The second argument asserts ch at there are only nvo ways co go: spe nd bil- lions co attack drug car tels or legalize a ll drugs . Since we won't legalize all d r ugs , \Ve must therefore spend billions co assault the cartels. The first (either/or) prem- ise, however, is fa lse; t here are at lease three oche r options. The bi ll ions could be spent co reduce and prevent drug use, drug produce rs could be given mon- eta ry incentives co switch co non-drug businesses , or only some drugs could be legalized .

Beggin g the Q u es tion

The fallacy of b egging the q uestion is cryi ng co prove a conclusion by using that very same conclusion as support. It is a rg uing in a circle. Th is way of trying co prove something says, in effect, "X is true because X is true." Few people would fall fo r chis fa llacy in such a simple fo rm, but more subtle kinds can be begu iling. For example, here's the classic instance of begging the question:

The Bible says that God exists.

The Bible is true because God wrote it.

Therefore, God exists.

The conclusion here ("God ex ists") is s upported by premises that assume that very conclusion.

Here's another one:

All citizens have the right to a fair trial because those whom the state is obli ged to protect and give consideration are automaticall y due judici al criminal proceed ings that are equ itable by any reasonable standa rd.

This passage may at first seem like a good a rg ument, but it isn't. It reduces co chis unimpressive assertion : "A ll citizens h ave the right co a fair trial because all cit- izens have the right co a fai r t rial." The conclusion is "All citizens have the right co a fa ir trial," but that 's more or less what the premise says. The premise-" chose whom the state is obliged co p rotect and give consideration are automatically due judicial crim inal proceed ings that are equitable by any reasonable scandard"-is equivalent co "All citizens h ave the right co a fair trial."

Thinking Philosophically 39

When circular reasoning is subtle, it can ensnare even its O\vn creators. The fallacy can easily sneak into an argument if the premise and conclusion say the same thing but say it in different, complicate.cl ways.

Slippery Slope

The metaphor behind this fallacy suggests the danger of stepping on a dicey incline, losing your footing, and slid ing to disaster. The fa llacy of slipper y slope, then, is a rguing erroneously that a pa rticular action should not be taken because it wi ll lead inevitably to other actions resulting in some dire outcome. The key word here is er- roneously. A slippery slope scenario becomes fa llacious \vhen there is no reason to believe that the chain of events pred icted wi ll ever happen. For example:

This trend toward gay marriage must be stopped. If gay marriage is permitted, then traditional marriage between a man and a woman wi ll be debased and deva lued, wh ich will lead to an increase in d i- vorces. And higher divorce rates can only harm our children.

This argument is fallacious because there are no reasons for believing that gay marriage will ultimately result in the chain of events descr ibed. If good reasons could be given, the argument might be salvaged.

Composition

Sometimes what is true about the parts of a thing is a lso true of the whole-and sometimes not. The fa llacy of composition is arguing er roneously that what can be sa id of the parts can also be said of the whole. Consider:

Each piece of wood that makes up this house is lightweight. There- fore, the whole house is lightweight.

Each sold ier in the platoon is proficient. Therefore, the platoon as a whole is proficient.

The monthly payments on th is car are low. Hence, the cost of the car is low.

Just remember, sometimes the \vhole does have the same p roperties as the parts. If each pa rt of the rocket is made of steel, the whole rocket is made of steel.

D ivision

If you turn the fa llacy of composition upside down, you get the fallacy of division- a rguing erroneously that what can be said of the whole can be sa id of the parts:

The house is heavy. Therefore, every part of the house is heavy.

The platoon is very effective. Therefore, every member of the platoon is effective.

That herd of elephants eats an enormous amount of food each day. Therefore, each elephant in the herd eats an enormous amount of food each day.

Slip pery slo pe is , he fal - lacy of arguing erroneously that a particular action sh ould no, be taken be- cause it will lead inevitably to other actio ns n:sulting

in some dire outcome.

Com position is the fallacy of arguing erroneously ,hat whar can be said of the pan s can also be said of the whole.

Philosophy should quicken life, no, deaden it. -Susan Glaspell

D ivisio n is the fallacy of a rguing erroneously , hat w hat can be said of the w ho le cm be said of the parts.

40 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

ESSAY/ DISCUSSION Q UESTIO NS SECTION 1.3

1. What is the difference between an argument a nd an explanation? What is the difference between an argument a nd a set of accusations? o r exp ressions of outrage?

2. H o\v is readi ng ph ilosophy different from, say, reading a physics text o r readi ng a novel?

3. Thi nk about the political commentators you've read or listened to. What fa llacies h ave they been guilty of using?

4. The straw man fallacy is rampant in political debates. G ive an examp le of such a tactic being used by commentators or politicians, or make up an example of your O\vn.

5. D evise a n a rgument in favor o f the proposition that people shou ld (or should not) be punished as Socrates was for speaking their m inds.

Review Notes

1.1 PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING

• St udyi ng ph ilosophy has both p ractical and theoretical benefi ts. To some, the p ur- suit of kno\vledge th rough p hilosoph y is a spirit ual quest.

• Taking an inventory of your p hilosophical beliefs at the beginning of th is cou rse will help you gauge your progress as you st udy.

• The fo ur mai n d ivisions of ph ilosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and logic. There are also subdivisions of philosophy that exam ine bas ic issues fou nd in other fields.

1.2 SOCRATES AND T H E EXAMINED LIFE

• For Socrates, an u nexamined life is a tragedy because it res ults in grievous h ar m to the soul , a person's tr ue self or essence. The soul is harmed by lack of kno\vledge- ignorance of one's own self and of th e most important values in life (the good) .

• The Socratic method is a q uestion-an d-answer dialogue in wh ich propositions are methodical ly scrutinized to u ncover the truth . Usually when Socrates used it in conversatio ns with his fe llow Athen ians, thei r views \vould be exposed as false or confused. The main poi nt of the exercise fo r Socrates, however, was not to wi n argu ments, but to get closer to the truth.

• Socrates says, in effect, Let's assume th at Thrasymachus is righ t that justice is \vhat- ever is in the interest of the powerful, and th at people are just if th ey obey the laws made by the powerful. But the powerful sometimes make mistakes and demand obedience to laws that are not in their best interest. So if Thrasymach us's defi n ition of justice is correct, then it is right for people to do what is in the interest of the po\verful, a nd it is also righ t for them to do what is not in th e interest of th e po\verful. His idea of justice then leads to a logical contradiction.

• The basic idea beh ind reductio ad absurdum is if you assume that a set of statements is true, and yet you can deduce a false o r absurd statement from it, then the o rig inal set of statements as a whole must be false.

1.3 THINKING PHILOSOPH ICALLY

• An argument is a g roup of statemenrs in which one of them is mean t to be sup- po rted by the others. A statement (or claim) is an assertion that someth ing is o r is not the case and is therefore the kind of utterance that is either true o r false. In an argument, the Statement being suppo rted is the co ncl usion, and the statements supporti ng the conclusio n are the prem ises.

• A good argumen t must have ( I) solid logic and (2) true premises. Requi rement ( I) means that the co nclusion should follo\v logical ly from the p remises. Requi re- ment (2) says that what the prem ises assert must in fact be the case.

• A deductive argument is intended to give logically conclusive suppo rt to its con- clusio n. An inductive argumen t is intended to g ive probable support to its con- clusio n. A deductive a rgument with the p roper struct ure is said to be valid; a deductive a rgument that fails to have this structu re is said to be inval id. If ind uc- tive argumenrs succeed in len d ing p robable suppo rt to their co nclusio ns, they a re said to be strong. If they fail to provide this p robable support, they are termed \veak. When a valid (deductive) a rgu ment has true p remises, it is said to be sound. When a strong (i nd uctive) argument has true p remises, it is said to be cogent. In inference to the best explan ation, we begin \Vith premises about a phenomeno n o r state of affai rs to be explained. Then we reaso n from those premises to an explan a- tion for that state of affairs. We try to produce not just an y explan atio n, but th e best explanation amo ng several possibilities. The best explan ation is th e one most like! y to be true.

• The guidel ines for reading p hilosophy are: ( I) Approach the text with an open m ind; (2) read actively and critically; (3) identify the conclusion first, then th e p remises; (4) o utline, paraphrase, or summarize the argument; and (5) evaluate th e argument and formulate a tentative judgment.

Review Notes 41

42 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

ARGU ING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 1

1. Do you believe, as Thrasymachus did, that might makes right, that morality is not about objective right and wrong but about who has the most po\ver? Devise an argument to support your belief.

2. C hoose one of you r fundamental beliefs that you have not thought much about and write an argument defend ing it or rejecting it.

3. Socrates said to his ju rors, "Are you not ashamed that, while you take care to acqui re as much wealth as possible, \vith honor and glory as well, yet you take no ca re or thought for understanding or truth, or for the best possible state of your soul?" Do you agree with this attitude? Why o r \vhy not?

4. What is the difference between the way philosophy approaches impor- tant questions and the \vay that religion does?

5. Argue the case for using (or not using) the Socratic method in education.

Key Terms

appeal to ignorance The fallacy of argu- ing that either ( 1) a claim is true because it hasn't been p roven fulse or (2) a claim is fulse because it hasn't been proven true. (37)

appeal to popularity The fallacy of arguing that a claim must be true not because it is backed by good reasons, but s imply because many people be- lieve it. (35)

appeal to the person The fallacy of re- jecting a statement on the grounds that it comes from a particular person, not because the statement, or claim, itsel f is false or dubious. (33)

argument A statement coupled with other statements that are me.ant to sup- po rt that statement. ( 15)

axiology The study of value, including both aesthetic value and moral value. (6)

begging the question The fallacy of try- ing to prove a conclus ion by us ing that very same conclusion as support. (38)

composition The fallacy of arguing er- roneously that \vhat can be said of the parts can also be said of the \vhole. (39)

conclusion In an argument, the state- ment being supported. (15)

deductive argument An argument in- tended to give logically conclusive sup- po rt to its conclusion. (17)

division The fallacy of arguing errone- ously that what can be said of the whole can be said of the parts. (39)

ep istemology The study of knowledge. (6)

equivocation The fal lacy of assigning two different meanings to the same sig- nificant word in an argument. (36)

ethics (moral philosophy) The study of morality using the methods of p hilosophy. (6)

fullacy A common but bad argument. (33)

false dilemma The fallacy of argu ing erroneously th at since there are o nly nvo alt ernat ives to choose from, and one of them is unacceptable, the oth er one m ust be t rue. (37)

genetic fallacy The fallacy of argu ing that a statement can be judged tru e o r false based on irs source. (36)

inductive argument An argument in- t ended to give probable support to irs conclus ion. (18)

logic The st udy of co rrect reasoning. (7)

metaphysics The study of reality, an in- quiry into the fundamen tal nature of th e un iverse an d the th ings in it . (4)

premise In an argument, a statement supporting th e co nclusion. (15)

A rgument Exe rcises

(Answers in Appendix B)

Exercise 1.1

redttctio ad absttrdtt»i An argument of th is form : If you assume th at a set of st at ements is t rue, and yet you can de- d uce a false o r absurd Statement from it, then the original set of statements as a wh ole must be false. (14)

slippery slop e The fallacy of argu- ing erroneously that a particular action should not be taken because it w ill lead inevitably t o oth er actio ns resulti ng in some di re out come. (39)

Socratic method Q uest ion-an d-ans\ver dialogue in w hich propositions are me- thodical ly scrutinize.cl t o u ncover th e t r uth. (8)

statement (claim) An assertio n that

someth ing is or is not th e case and is therefore th e ki nd of utterance that is ei- ther t r ue o r false. (15)

straw man The fallacy of misrepresent- ing a person's views so they can be mo re easily attacked or dismissed. (33)

For each of the passages that follow, indicate whether it constitutes an argu ment. For

each argument, sp ecify both t he conclusion a nd t he premises.

1. Faster-than-light t ravel is not possible. It would violate a law of nature. 2 . You h ave neglected your duty on several occasions, and you have been absent

from work too many times. Therefore, you a re not fit to serve in you r current capactty.

3. Racial profili ng is not an issue for white people, but it is an issue for blacks. 4. The flu ep idemic on t he East C,oast is real. Govern ment health officials say so.

A nd 1 personally h ave read at least a dozen ne,vs stories t hat characterize the sit uatio n as a "flu epidemic."

5. C,ommunism is bu nk. On ly na"ive, impressionable p inheads believe that stuff.

Argument Exercises 43

44 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

6. C urrent-day Christians use violence to spread thei r right-to-life message. These C h ristians, often referred to as the relig ious right, are well k nown for violent demonstrations against Plan ned Parenthood and other abortion cl in- ics. Docto rs and other personnel are threatened with death, clinics have been bombed, there have even been cases of doctors being murdered.-Letter to the editor, Arizona Daily Wildcat

7. I am writi ng about the cost of concert tickets. I am outraged at how much ticket p rices are increas ing every year. A few years ago, o ne cou ld attend a popular concert for a decent price. Now some musicians are ask ing as much as $200 to $300.-Letter to the edito r, Buffalo News

8 . H omela nd security is a cruel cha rade for unborn child ren. Some 4,000 per day a re ki lled in thei r mother's \vomb by abortion. This American holocaust \vas legalized by the Supreme Cou rt in an exercise of raw judicial power.- Letter to the ed itor, Buffalo News

9. W itches are real . They a re mentioned in the Bible. There are ma ny people today \vho claim to be witches. A nd h isto rical records reveal that there \vere \Vitches in Salem.

10. Stretched upon the dark sil k night, bracelets of city lights glisten brig htly.

Exercise 1 .2

For each passage that fo llows, list the conclusion and p remises.

1. There a re those \vho mainta in .. . that even if God is not required as the autho r of the moral la\v, he is nevertheless required as the enforcer of it, for \Vithout the threat of divine punish ment, people wi ll not act morally. But this pos ition is [not plausible]. In the first p lace, as an empirical hypothesis about the psychology of huma n beings, it is questionable. There is no u n- ambiguous ev idence that theists are more mora l than no ntheists. Not only have psychological st udies failed to fi nd a sign ificant correlation between frequency of religious worsh ip and moral conduct, but convicted criminals are much [more] likely to be theists than atheiscs. Second, the threat of divine punishment can not impose a moral obligation, for might does not make right. Threats extort; they do not create a moral duty.-Free Inquiry, Summer 1997

2. I love Reason [magazine], but [regarding a previous article by Nick G illespie] I'm wondering if al l the illegal drugs that Nick Gillespie used to take are fi nally getting to him. He has a right to speak out against President Bush, but \vhen he refers to him as "the m illionaire president \vho waited out the Vietnam War in the Texas A ir Natio nal Guard," it rem inds me of the garbage rhetoric that I might see if I \vere readi ng Ted Rall, o r Susan Sontag, or one of the other hate-mongering, America-bashing, leftist wh iners. That k ind of ad homi nem attack is not o nly disrespectful to a man who is doing a damned good job as commander-in-chief (with approval ratings of more than 80 percent); it detracts from the whole poi nt of the article.-Letter to the edito r, Reason, July 2002

3. The fi fth way [of p roving that God ex ists) is taken from the governa nce of the \vorld. We see th at things which lack k nowledge, such as natu ral bodies, act

for an end, and chis is evident from their acting a hvays, o r nearly always, in the same \vay, so as co obtain che best result. H ence it is p lain chat they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now \vhacever lacks knowledge cannot move cowards an end, unless it be directed by some being endo\ved with knowledge and intelligence; as che a rrow is directed by the archer. There-

fore some intelligent being exists by \vhom all natural things are di rected co their end; and chis bei ng we call God.-Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica

4. The fi rst thing chat muse occur co anyone studying mora l subjectivism [the view that the rightness o r \vrongness of an action depends on che beliefs of an individual o r g roup] ser iously is chat che view allows che possibility that an action ca n be both right and not right, or wrong and not wrong, etc. Th is possibility exists because, as \Ve have seen, the subjectivist claims chat che moral character of an action is determined by individual subjective states; and these states can vary from person co person, even \vhen di rected coward the same action o n che same occasion. H ence one and che same action can evidently be determined co have-simultaneously-radically different moral cha racters . ... [If] subjectivism ... does generate such contradicto ry conclu- sions, the position is certainly uncenable.-Phillip Montague, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, June 1986

5. A Flo rida judge dismissed a la\vsuit that accused che Vatican of hiding instances of sexual abuse by priests. The suit was thro\vn out because Florida's statute of

limitations had run out on the case. I submit that the d ismissal was proper and ethical considering che community stature and funct io n of priests and che ben- efits chat accrue co society in the aftermath of che decision. Lee's consider com- mun ity stature first. The community st ature of priests muse always be t aken into account in these abuse cases. A priest is not just anybody; he performs a special role in society-namely, co provide spiritual guidance and co remind people that there is both a moral o rder and a divine order in the \vorld. The priest's role is special because it helps co underpin and secure society itself Anything that could undermine this role muse be neutralized as soon as possible. Among those things that can weaken the priestly role a re publicity, public debate, and legal actions. Abuse cases a re better handled in private by those who are keenly a\vare of the importance of a positive public image of priests. And what of che benefits of cu rtail ing che legal proceedings? The benefits co society of dismissing che legal case outweigh al l the alleged disadvantages of continuing with public hear- ings. The primary benefit is the continued nurturing of che community's fa ith,

without \vhich che community would cease co function effectively.

Exercise 1.3

In the following passages, identify any fallacies. Some passages may contain more than one fallacy.

1. The New York Times reported that o ne-chi rd of Republican senators have been guilty of Sen ace ethics violations. But you know chat's fa lse-the Times is a notorious liberal rag.

Argument Exercises 45

46 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

2. Geraldo says that st udenrs who cheat on exams should not automatically be expelled from school. But it's ridiculous co insist chat students should never be pu nished for cheating.

3. My sweater is blue. Therefore, the acorns chat make up the sweater a re blue. 4. Kelly says chat many women who live in predomi nantly M uslim countries a re

discriminated against. Bue how the heck would she know? She's not a M uslim . 5. The st udy fou nd that 80 percent of women ,vho cook the d rug daily had no

recurrence of b reast ca ncer. But that doesn't mean anything. The study ,vas funded in part by the company chat makes the dr ug.

6 . The only proof capable of being g iven chat an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The on ly p roof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the ocher sources of ou r experience. I n like ma nner, I apprehen d, the sole evidence it is possible co p roduce chat anything is desirable, is chat people actually desire ic.-John St uart Mill

7. Grem lins ex ist, chat's for sure. No scientist h as ever proved that they don't exist.

8 . The fo rmer mayor was convicted of drug possession, a nd he spent ti me in jai l. So you can safely ignore a nything he has to say about legalizing drugs.

9. I believe chat baby-carrying storks a re real creatures. N o one h as ever p roved chat they don't exist.

10. O nly man has morals. No woman is a man. Therefore, no woman has morals.

The Tria l and Death of Socrates 47

NARRATIV E

The Trial and Death of Socrates Plato

The ancient Greek philosopher Plato (c. 427- 347 see} is one of the most influe ntial thinkers of Western civilization. He was the student of Socrates, teacher of Aristotle, and timeless inspiration to a ll who sought wisdom through phi losophy. In this nar- rative, one of his many d ialogues, Plato relates Soc rates' address to the jury at his famous trial for corrupting Athenian youth and d isrespecting the gods.

How you, 0 Athenians, have been affected by my ac- cusers, I cannot tel l; but I know that they almost made me forget who I was- so persuasively did they speak; and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. Bu t of the many falsehoods told by them, there was one which quite amazed me- I mea n when they said that you shou ld be upo n your guard and not a ll ow your- selves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To say this, whe n they were certain to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and proved myself to be anyth ing but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless- un less by the force of eloquence they mea n the force of truth; for if such is their meaning, I admit that I am e loquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarce ly spoken the truth at all ; but from me you shall hear the whole truth: not, however, delivered after their man- ner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No, by heaven ! bu t I sha ll use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment; for I am confident in the justice of my cause: at my time of life I ought not to be appearin g before you, 0 men of Athens, in the character of a juveni le orator- let no one expect it of me. And I must beg of you to grant me a favo ur: lfl defend myself in my accustomed man ner, and you hear me using the words which I have been in the habi t of using in the [market], at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere e lse, I would ask you not to be surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time in a court of law, I am qu ite a stranger to the language of the place; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were real ly

From Plato, The Apology, in Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Oxford, 1896.

a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country: Am I maki ng an unfair req uest of you? Never mind the ma nner, which may or may not be good; but t hi nk on ly of the truth of my words, and give heed to that : let the speaker speak truly and the jud ge decide justly ....

Well, then, I must make my defence, and endeavor to clear away in a short time, a slander which has lasted a long time. May I succeed, if to succeed be for my good and yours, or likely to avail me in my cause! The task is not an easy one; I quite understand the nature of it. And so leaving the event with God, in obedience to the law I will now make my defence.

I will begin at the beginni ng, and ask what is the accusation which has given rise to the slander of me, and in fact has encouraged Meletus to prefer this charge aga inst me. Well, what do the s landerers say? They shall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their words in an affidavit: 'Socrates is an evi l-doer, and a curious person, who searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doc- trines to others.' Su ch is the nature of the accusation: it is just what you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, who has introduced a man who m he calls Socrates, going about and saying that he walks in air, and talking a deal of nonsense concerning mat- ters of which I do not pretend to know either much or little- not that I mean to speak disparagingly of any one who is a student of natural philosophy. I s ho uld be very sorry if Meletus cou ld bring so grave a charge aga inst me. But the simple truth is, 0 Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical specu latio ns. Very many of those here present are witnesses to the truth of th is, and to them I appeal. Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell your neighbo urs whether any of you have ever known me hold fort h in few words or in many

48 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

upon such matters .... You hear their answer. And from what they say of th is part of the charge you will be able to judge of the t ruth of t he rest.

As little foundation is there for the repo rt t hat I am a teacher, and ta ke money; this accusation has no more truth in it than t he other. Although, if a m an were really able to instruct mankind , to receive money for giving instruction would, in my op inion, be an hon - our to him. There is Gorgias of Leontium, and Prod icus of Ceos , and Hipp ias of Elis , who go the round of t he cities , and are able to persuade the young men to leave t heir own citizens by whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to them whom they not on ly pay, but are t hankful if t hey may be allowed to pay them ....

I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you will reply, 'Yes , Socrates , but what is the origin of t hese accusations which are brought against you; t here must have been something strange which you have been doing? All these rumours and t his talk abo ut you wou ld never have arisen if you had been li ke other men: tell us , t hen, w hat is the cause of them, for we shou ld be sorry to judge has tily of you.' Now I regard this as a fa ir cha ll enge, and I wil l endeavour to exp lain to you the reason why I am ca ll ed wise and have such an evil fame. Please do attend the n. And althou gh some of you may thin k that I am joki ng, I declare that I will tell you t he entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of m ine has come of a certa in sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may perhaps be attained by man , for to t hat extent I am in cli ned to be li eve t hat I am wise; whe reas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom, which I may fa il to describe, because I have it not myself ; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is takin g away my cha racter. And here, 0 men of Athens, I m ust beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word which I wil l speak is not mi ne. I w ill refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit; t hat w itness shall be the God of Delphi- he will tell you about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must have known Chaerephon; he was ea rly a friend of m ine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the recent exil e of t he people , and returned with you . Well , Chaerephon , as you know, was very impetuo us in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked t he oracle to tell him whether- as I was saying, I must beg you not to

interrupt- he asked t he o racle to tell him w hethe r any one was wiser t han I was , and the Pythian prop hetess answered, that there was no man w iser. Chaerep hon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confi rm t he truth of what I am saying.

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to ex- plain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard t he answer, I said to myself, W hat can t he god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know t hat I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god , and cannot lie; that wou ld be against his nature. After long consideration, I thou ght of a method of trying the question. I reflected t hat if I cou ld only fi nd a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, 'Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.' Accord ingly I went to one who had the reputation of w isdom, and observed him- his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination- and the resu lt was as foll ows: When I began to talk with him, I cou ld not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was t hought wise by many, and still wiser by himself; and t hereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enm ity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I wen t away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautifu l and good , I am better off than he is- for he knows nothing, and t hinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particu lar, then, I seem to have slightly the advan tage of him.

Then I went to another who had still higher preten- sions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him. Then I went to one ma n af- ter another, being not unconscious of t he enmity w hich I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: Bu t necessity was laid upon me,-the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find ou t the meaning of t he oracle. And I swea r to you, Athen ians, by the dog I swear!- for I must tell you the truth- the result of my mission was just this: I found t hat the men most in re- pute were all but the most foolish; and that others less esteemed were really wiser and better. I will tell you the ta le of my wanderings and of t he "Herculean" labou rs,

as I m ay call them, which I endu red on ly to find at last t he oracle irrefutab le. After the poli ticians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyramb ic, and all sorts. And there, I sa id to myself, you will be ins tan tly detected ; now you will find out that you are more igno ran t than t hey are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them - thi nking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is ha rdly a person present who would not have talked bet ter about t heir poetry than they d id t hemselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; t hey are like diviners or sooth- sayers who also say m any fine things, bu t do not under- stand t he meaning of them . The poets appeared to me to be much in the same case; and I fu rther observed t hat upon the strength of their poetry they believed t hemselves to be the wisest of men in other t hings in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to t hem for t he same reason that I was superior to the politicians.

At last I went to the artisans, for I was conscious t hat I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure t hat they knew many fine things; and here I was not mis- ta ken, for they did know many things of which I was ig- norant, and in thi s they cer tain ly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good ar tisans fell in to the same error as t he poets;- because they were good workmen they th ought t hat they also knew all sorts of high mat ters, and this defect in them overshadowed t heir wisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was , nei- t her having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or li ke t hem in both; and I made answer to myself and to the oracle t hat I was better off as I was .

This inquisition has led to my having many enem ies of the worst and most da ngerous kind , and has given occasion also to m any ca lumnies. And I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the tru th is, 0 men of Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show that the wisdom of men is wor th little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is on ly using my name by way of illustrat ion , as if he said , He, 0 m en, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth wor th nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient to the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of any one, whether

The Tria l and Death of Socrates 49

citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him t hat he is not wise; and my occupa tion quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public m at- ter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter pover ty by reason of my devotion to the god.

There is anot he r th ing: Young m en of the richer cl asses, who have not m uch to do, come about m e of t heir own accord; they like to hear the pretenders exam- ined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to exam- ine others; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who thi nk that they know something, but really know little or nothi ng; and then those who are examined by them instead of bei ng angry with themselves are an - gry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say, t his vil- lainous misleader of youth!- and then if somebody asks t he m, Why, what evil does he practise or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell ; but in order th at they may not appear to be at a loss , they repeat the ready-made cha rges which are used against all phi losophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the ea rth, and having no gods, and ma king the worse appea r the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretence of knowledge has been detected- which is t he truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are d rawn up in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the crafts- men and poli ticians; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny all in a moment. And t his, Omen of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth; I have concealed noth ing, I have d issembled not hing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate me, and what is their hatred bu t a proof that I am speak- ing t he truth?- Hence has arisen the prejudice against me; and this is the reason ofit, as you w ill find out either in this or in any fu ture enq uiry.

I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my accusers; I turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus, that good man and true lover of his country, as he calls himself. ... He says that I am a doer of evil, and corrupt the youth; but I say, 0 m en of Athens, that Meletus is a doer of evi l, in that he pretends to be in earnest when he is only in j est, and is so eager to bring men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about

50 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

matters in which he really never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavour to prove to you.

Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a great deal about the improvemen t of youth?

Yes, I do. Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you

must know, as you have taken the pains to d iscover their corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their im- prove r is .- Obse rve, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgracefu l, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matte r? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their imp rover is.

The laws. But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to

know who the person is , who, in the first place, knows the laws.

The judges, Socrates, who are present in court. What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are

able to instruct and improve youth? Certainly they are. What, all of t hem , or some only and not others? All of them. By the goddess He re, that is good news ! There are

plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the aud ience- do they improve them?

Yes, they do. And the senators? Yes, the senators improve them. But perhaps t he members of t he assem bly corrupt

them?- or do they too improve them? They improve t hem. Then every Athenian im proves and elevates them;

all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm?

That is what I stoutly affirm. I am very unfortunate if you are right. Bu t suppose I

ask you a question: How about horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact op- posite the truth? One man is able to do them good, or at least not many- the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good , and others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? Most assured ly it is; whether you and Any- tus say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter on ly, and all the rest of the world were their improvers. But you, Meletus, have

sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young: you r carelessness is seen in your not caring about the very things which you bring against me.

And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question - by Ze us I will: Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not the good do their neigh bours good, and the bad do them evil?

Ce rtain ly. And is there any one who wou ld rather be injured

t ha n benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend, t he law requires you to answer- does any one like to be injured?

Ce rtain ly not. And w hen you accuse me of corrupting and dete-

rioratin g the youth, do you allege t hat I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionall y?

Intentionally, I say. But you have just admitted that t he good do their

neighbours good, and evil do t hem evil. Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized t hus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and ignora nce as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet I corrupt him, and in tention- ally, too- so you say, although neither I nor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. Bu t either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unin- tentionally; and on either view of t he case you lie. If my offence is uninten tional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I shou ld have left off doing what I only d id un intentiona lly- no doubt I shou ld; but you would have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in this court, which is a place not of in struction, but of punishment.

It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying, t hat Meletus has no care at all , great or small , about the matter. But still I shou ld like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your ind ictment, that I teach t hem not to acknowledge the gods which t he state acknowledges, but some other new divin ities or spiritual agencies in t heir stead. These are the lessons by w hich I corrupt the youth, as you say.

Yes, t hat I say emphatically. T hen, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speak-

ing, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms,

what you mean! for I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge some gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and am not an entire atheist- th is you do not lay to my charge- but on ly you say that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes- the charge is that they are different gods. O r, do you mean that I am an atheist sim ply, and a teacher of atheism?

I mea n the latter- that you are a complete atheist. What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think

so, Meletus? Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of t he sun or moon , like other men?

I assure you, judges , that he does not: for he says t hat the sun is stone, and the moon earth.

Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras: and you have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them illi terate to such a degree as not to know that these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras t he Clazomenia n, which are full of them. And so, forsooth, the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when there are not infrequently exh ib i- t ions of t hem at the theatre (price of adm ission one drachma at the most) ; and they might pay t hei r money, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father these ex- t raordinary views. And so, Meletus, you really t hink t hat I do not believe in any god?

I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.

Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty sure t hat you do not believe yourself. I cannot help t hinking, men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and impudent, and that he has wri tten this in dictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthfu l bravado. Has he not compounded a riddle, th inking to try me ? He said to hi mself: I sha ll see whether the wise Socrates will d iscover my facetious contradiction, or whet her I sha ll be ab le to deceive him and the rest of t hem. For he certain ly does appear to me to contrad ict him self in the ind ictment as much as if he said t hat Socrates is guilty of not be lieving in t he gods, and yet of be- lieving them - bu t this is not like a person who is in earnest.

I should li ke you, 0 men of Athens, to join me in ex- amining what I conceive to be his in consistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I must remind the audience of my req uest that they wou ld not make a disturbance if I speak in my accustomed manner:

Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human th ings, and not of human beings? ... I wish, men

The Tria l and Death of Socrates 51

of Athens, t hat he wou ld answer, and not be always try- ing to get up an interruption. Did ever any ma n believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and not flute-p layers? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for your- self. There is no man who ever did. But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritua l and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?

He cannot. How lucky I am to have extracted t hat answer, by

t he assistance of t he court! Bu t the n you swear in t he ind ictment that I teach and bel ieve in divine or spiri- t ual agencies (new or old, no matter for t hat) ; at any rate I bel ieve in sp iri tual agencies- so you say and swear in t he affidavit ; and yet if I believe in divine be- ings, how can I help believing in sp iri ts or demigods- m ust I not ? To be sure I must; and therefore I may assume that your silence gives consent. Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not either gods or t he sons of gods ?

Ce rtain ly they are. But this is what I call t he facetious riddle invented

by you: the dem igods or spirits are gods, and you say first t hat I do not believe in gods, and then again t hat I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in dem igods. For if t he demigods are t he ill egitim ate sons of gods, whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers, of whom they are said to be the sons- what human being will ever believe that there are no gods if t hey are the sons of gods? You migh t as well affirm the existence of m ules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such non - sense, Meletus, could only have been intended by you to make trial of me. You have put this into the indict- ment because you had nothing real of wh ich to accuse me. But no one who has a particl e of understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same men can believe in d ivine and superhuman things, and yet not believe that there are gods and dem igods and heroes.

I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary; but I know only too well how many are the enmities w hich I have incurred, and this is what wi ll be my destruction if I am destroyed - not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but t he envy and detraction of the world, which has been t he death of man y good men, and will probably be t he death of many more; there is no danger of my being t he last of them.

Some one will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of life wh ich is likely to bring you

52 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

to an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good for anything ought not to calcu late the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong- acting the part of a good man or of a bad .. . .

Strange, indeed , wou ld be my conduct, 0 men of Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by the genera ls whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amph ipoli s and Deli um , remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death - if now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfill the phi- losopher's mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I m ight just ly be arra igned in court for denying t he exis- tence of the gods , if I d isobeyed the oracl e because I was afraid of death, fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For the fear of death is indeed t he pretence of wisdom , and not rea l wisdom , being a pretence of knowing t he unknown; and no one knows whether death, which men in their fea r apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good . Is not th is ignorance of a d isgracefu l sort, t he ignorance which is the conceit that man kn ows what he does not know? And in this respect only I beli eve myself to differ from men in general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than they are- that whereas I know but li ttle of the world be- low, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a bette r, whether God or man , is evil and d ishonourable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. And therefore if you let me go now, and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that since I had been prosecuted I must be put to death ... - if you say to me, Socrates, th is time we will not mi nd Anytus, and you shall be let off, but upon one condition , that you are not to enquire and specu late in this way any more, and that if you are caught doing so again you shall d ie- if this was the cond ition on w hich you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honou r and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have li fe and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of ph i- losophy, exhorting any one whom I meet and saying to him after my manner: You , my friend - a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens- are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money and honour and reputation, and caring so li ttle about wisdom and truth and the greatest im provement of the

sou l, which you never rega rd or heed at all ? And if the person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; t hen I do not leave him or let him go at once; but I proceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine him , and if I th ink that he has no virtue in him, but on ly says that he has, I reproach him with undervalu- ing the greater, and overvaluing the less. And I sha ll re- peat the same words to every one whom I meet, young and o ld , citizen and alien, but especially to t he ci tizens, inasmuch as t hey are my brethren. For know that th is is the command of God; and I believe that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God . Fo r I do noth ing but go about persuad ing you all , old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvemen t of the sou l. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. Bu t if any one says that this is not my teach- ing, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, 0 men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Any- tus bids, and either acquit me or not; but wh ichever you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times . .. .

And now, Athen ians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may t hink, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a lud icrous figure of speech , am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly wh ich God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuad ing and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me ....

Now do you th in k that I cou ld have remained alive all these years if I had taken part in publi c affa irs, and had always maintained the cause of justice like an hon- est man, and had held it a paramount duty, as it is, to do so? Certainly not, Athen ians, nor cou ld any other man. But t hroughout my w hole life, bot h in private and in public, w henever I have had to ta ke part in pub- lic affairs, you will find I have always been the same and have never yielded unjustly to anyone; no, not to those whom my enem ies falsely assert to have been

my pupils. Bu t I was never anyone's teacher. I have never withheld myself from anyo ne, young or old, who was anxious to hear me disc uss while I was making my investiga tion ; neither do I discuss for pay ment, and refuse to discuss without payment. I am ready to ask questions of rich and poor alike, and if any man wishes to answer me, and t hen listen to what I have to say, he may . . ..

I believe in t he gods as no one of my accusers be- lieves in them: and to you and to God I commit my cause to be decided as is best for you and for me.

[The vote is taken and he is found guilty by 281 votes to 220.)

There are many reasons why I am not grieved, O men of Athens, at t he vote of condemnation. I ex- pected it, and am on ly surprised that the votes are so nearly equa l; for I had t hou ght that t he majority against me wou ld have been far larger; but now, had t hirty votes gone over to the other side, I should have been acquitted. And I may say, I think, that I have escaped Meletus. I may say more; for without t he assistance of Anytus and Lycon, any one may see that he would not have had a fi fth part of the votes, as t he law req uires, in which case he would have incurred a fine of a thousa nd drachmae.

And so he proposes death as t he penalty. And what shall I propose on my part, 0 men of Athens? Clearly t hat which is my due. And what is my due? What return shall be made to t he man who has never had the wit to be id le during his whole life; but has been careless of what the ma ny care for- wealth, and family interests, and m il itary offices, and speaking in t he assembly, and magistracies, and plots, and parties. Reflecting t hat I was really too honest a ma n to be a politician and live, I did not go where I could do no good to you or to myself; but where I could do t he greatest good pri- vately to every one of you, t hither I went, and sought to persuade every man among you that he must look to himself, and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to his private interests, and look to the state before he looks to t he interests of t he state; and that t his shou ld be t he order which he observes in all his actions . What shall be done to such an one? Doubtless some good t hing, 0 men of Athens, if he has his reward; and t he good shou ld be of a kind suitab le to him. What would be a reward suitable to a poor ma n who is your bene- factor, and w ho desires leisure that he may instruct you? There can be no reward so fitting as maintenance in the Prytaneum, 0 men of Athens, a reward which

The Tria l and Death of Socrates 53

he deserves far more than the ci tizen who has won t he prize at O lympia in the horse or chariot race, whether t he chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. For I am in want, and he has enough; and he on ly gives you t he appearance of happiness, and I give you the rea lity. And if I am to estimate t he pena lty fairly, I shou ld say t hat maintenance in the Prytaneum is the just return.

Perhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am saying now, as in what I said before about t he tears and prayers. But this is not so. I speak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one, although I cannot convince you- the time has been too short; if there were a law at Athens, as t here is in other cities , t hat a capital cause should not be decided in one day, then I believe that I should have convinced you. But I cannot in a moment refute great slanders; and, as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself t hat I deserve any evi l, or propose any penalty. Why shou ld I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of death which Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death is a good or an evil, why should I propose a penalty which wou ld certain ly be an evi l? Shall I say imprison - ment? And why shou ld I live in prison , and be t he slave of the magistrates of the year- of t he Eleven? Or sha ll t he penalty be a fi ne, and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is t he same objection. I shou ld have to lie in prison, for money I have none, and cannot pay. And if I say exi le (and this may possibly be t he penalty which you will affix) , I mus t indeed be blinded by the love of life, if I am so irrational as to expect that when you, who are my own citizens , cannot endure my di scourses and words, and have found them so grievous and odious t hat you will have no more of them, others are likely to endure me. No indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely. And what a life shou ld I lead, at my age, wander- ing from city to city, ever changing my place of exi le, and always being driven out! For I am qu ite sure that w herever I go, there, as here, t he young men will flock to me; and if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at their request ; and if I let them come, their fathers and friends will drive me out for t heir sakes.

Some one will say: Yes, Soc rates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and then you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere wi th you? Now I have great difficulty in maki ng you understand my answer to t his. For if I tell you t hat to do as you say would be a dis- obedience to the God, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am serious; and

54 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

if I say again that da ily to discourse about virtue, and of those other things about which you hear me exam ining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and that the unexam ined life is not worth living, you are still less likely to believe me. Yet I say what is true, although a th ing of which it is ha rd for me to persuade you. Also, I have never been accustomed to think t hat I deserve to suffer any harm. Had I money I might have estimated the offence at what I was able to pay, and not have been mu ch t he worse. But I have none, and t herefore I must ask you to proportion the fine to my means. Well, per- ha ps I could afford a m ina , and therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thir ty minae, and they will be the sureties. Let thirty minae be the penalty; for which sum they will be ample security to you .

{2nd vote: The jury decides for the death penalty by a vote of 360 to 141.J

Not much time will be gained, 0 Athen ians, in re- tu rn for t he evil name which you will get from the de- tractors of the city, who will say that you kill ed Socrates, a wise man; for they will call me wise, even although I am no t wise, when they want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while, your desire would have been fu lfill ed in the course of nature. For I am far advanced in years, as you may perceive, and not far from death . ...

The difficulty, my friends , is not to avoid death , but to avoid unrighteousness; for that runs faster than death. I am o ld and move slowly, and t he slower runner has overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, who is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer t he penalty of death- they too go their ways condemned by the truth to suffe r the penalty of villainy and wrong; and I mus t abide by my award - let them ab ide by theirs . I suppose that these things may be regarded as fated- and I t hink that they are well. . ..

Friends, who would have acquitted me, I would like also to talk with you about the thing which has come to pass, while t he magistrates are busy, and befo re I go to the place at which I must die. Stay then a little, for we may as well ta lk with one another while there is time. Yo u are my friends, and I should like to show you the mean ing of t his event which has ha ppened to me. O my judges- for you I may tru ly call judges- I shou ld li ke to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. H itherto the divine faculty of which t he in ternal oracle is the source has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about triAes, if I was going to make a slip or

error in any matter; and now as you see there has come upon me that which may be thou ght, and is generally believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of opposition, either when I was leaving my house in the morning, or when I was on my way to the court, o r while I was speaking, at anything which I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did touching t he matter in hand has t he oracle opposed me. What do I take to be t he explanation of this silence? I will tell you. It is an intimation that what has happened to me is a good , and t hat those of us who think that death is an evil are in error. For t he cus- toma ry sign wou ld surely have opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good.

Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good; for one of two thi ngs- either death is a state of noth ing- ness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no conscious- ness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is und isturbed even by dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his sleep was undistu rbed even by dreams, and were to compare with th is the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly than this one, I th ink that any ma n, I will not say a private man, but even the great ki ng will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if death be of such a nature, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead abide, what good, 0 my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world be low, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world , and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous in thei r own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he m ight converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hes iod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I myself, too, shall have a wonderful interest in there meeting and conversing w ith Pala medes, and Ajax the son ofTelamon, and any other ancient hero who has suffered death through an unjust judgment; and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my

own sufferings with t heirs. Above all , I shall then be a ble to continue my search into true and fa lse knowledge; as in this world, so also in the next ; and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, 0 judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan exped ition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too! What infi nite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! In another world they do not pu t a man to death for asking questions: assur- edly not. For besides being happier than we are, they will be im mortal, if what is said is true.

Wherefore, 0 jud ges, be of good cheer about dea th, and know of a certainty, that no evi l can happen to a good m an , either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by t he gods; nor has my own approach- ing end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly t hat t he t ime had arrived when it was bette r for me to

Probing Questions

For Further Reading 55

die and be released from trouble; wherefore t he oracle gave no sign. For which reason, also, I am not angry with my condemners, or with my accusers; t hey have done me no harm , although they did not mean to do me any good; and fo r this I may gently blame them.

Still I have a favour to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, 0 my fr iends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them , as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing,-then reprove them , as I have reproved you, for not caring abou t that fo r which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And if you do this, both I and my sons will have received justice at your hands.

The hou r of departure has arrived, and we go our ways- I to die, and you to live. Wh ich is better God only knows .

I. Whar d oes Socrates ,nean by "The unexamined life is nor worth living"? How does chis vie,v relate co Socrates' accivicy as rhe cicy's in rellecrual gadAy? Socrates see,ns ro chink chat many of his jurors lead unexam ined lives. Why does he chink chis?

2. Socrates ,vas executed because he deal t in offensive and dangerous ideas. Have there been o chers in h istory ,vho have also suffered because sociecy thought their ideas ,vere unaccept- able? Is a sociecy ever justified in punishing people for expressing such ideas?

3. Socrates d ied for his principles. Whar ideas in your life would you be ,villi ng ro d ie for?

For Further Read ing

S imo n Blackburn, Oxfo,d Dictionary of Phiwsophy (Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press, 1994, 2005). A concise guide to hundreds of philosophy t opics, w ith many of the ent ries being of substantial length.

N icholas Bunn in an d E. P. Tsui-James, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, I 969) . A one-volume student reference covering th e major divisions of philosophy.

Eliot D. Cohen, Phiwsophers at W0rk (Ne,v York: H olt, Rinehart, and W insto n, 1989). Repo rts of how people in d ifferent professions use philosophy.

Edward Craig, e.d., Routledge Encycwpedia of Phiwsophy, IO vols. (New York: Routledge, 1998) . A fi ne source of information o n a vast number of philosoph ical topics.

56 Chapter 1 Philosophy and You

Ted Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxfo rd: Oxfo rd Univer- sity Press, 1995). A good one-volume philosophy reference featuring many excellent ar ticles on ph ilosophical issues.

Brooke Moore and Richard Parker, Critical Thinking, 8th e.dition (New York: McGraw-Hill , 2007). A comprehensive and readable treatment of critical chinking skills.

Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn, e.ds., Classics of Philosophy, 3rd edition (Ne,v York: Oxfo rd University Press, 20 IO). The most comprehens ive anthology of Western philosophy available.

Bertrand Russell , The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). A very readable classic work by an emi nent philosopher. Focuses mostly on issues in epistemology.

Lewis Vaughn, Great Philosophical Arguments: An Introduction to Philosophy (Ne,v York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 20 12). A text with readings o rganized by topic and by th e standard a rguments chat have occupied thinkers throughout the centuries.

1 , ' ' I CHAPTER

GOD AND RELIGION

CHAPT ER OBJECTIV ES

2.1 OVERVIEW: GOD AND PHILOSOPHY

• Understand t he importance of relig ious be liefs in the world and how t hey can influence what people t hink, do, and value.

• Know how ph ilosophy tries to understand and evaluate

relig ious claims.

• Give an overview of t he trad itional arguments fo r the existence of God and object ions

to them.

• Define theism, atheism, agnosticism, monotheism, polytheism, deism , pantheism, and panentheism.

2.2 ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

• Exp lain and evaluate Aquinas's fi rst-cause argument and Craig's Kalam cosmological argument.

• Exp lain and evaluate Paley's

analogical design argument and the best-explanation design argument.

• Exp lain and evaluate Anselm 's

ontological argument .

2.3 GOD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

• Understand Rowe's a rgument from evil and some major critic isms of it.

• Critically examine the free will defense.

• Explain and evaluate Hick's sou l-making theodicy.

2.4 THEISM AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

• St ate and evaluate the argument from relig ious experience.

• Summarize Swinburne's

argument from relig ious experience and assess critic isms of it.

• Assess the claim that the

argument from relig ious experience fa il s because

religious experiences are incom patibl e.

58 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

2.5 BELI EF WITHOUT REASON

• Summarize and evaluate James's pragmatic argument for believing the religious hypothesis.

2.6 EASTERN RELIGIO N S

• Explain how Buddhism diffe rs from Western religious traditions.

• Explain the natu re and signifi cance of the Veda s, the Upanishads , and the Bhagavad-Gita.

• State and evaluate Pascal's wager.

• St ate and explain t he Buddha's Four Noble Truths.

• Know how t he Chuang Tzu cha racterizes t he Dao.

• Defi ne samsara, atman, brahmin, and Brahman.

• Id enti fy the pa rallels to t he Dao in Western philosophy.

2.1 OVERVIEW: GOD AND PHILOSOPHY

What does ph ilosophy have to do w ith religion? Th roughout h istory they have often been intertw ined. At t imes the two have bowed respectfully to each other (although sometimes from a distance), thrown stones at each other's conceptua l temples, \vo rked in each other's backyards, and chased w isdom along d ivergent

paths that often crossed. For Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, doing philosophy is not merely a sea rch for t ruth ; it is a spiritua l quest, a journey to h ighe r, invaluable things . From the Easte rn religious traditions of Buddhism, Hindu ism, Confu- cian ism, and Daoism come p h ilosoph ical insights t hat have influenced m ill ions and ea rned the respect of Western thinkers. To the great ph ilosophers of t he med ieva l period-Augustine, Boethius, Av icenna, Anselm, Maimon ides, Aqui- nas, and othe rs-reason is a g ift from God, and p h ilosophy can reveal h idden knowledge and sacred t ruths. In mode rn philosophy, f rom Descartes to the pres- ent, p h ilosophe rs (both religious and secu lar) examine cla ims about God, immor- tality, good and evil, and ultimate reality. Many contempora ry thinkers \vould insist that ph ilosophy, us ing irs own distinctive methods of inqu iry, seeks t ruth and, through t ruth, transcendence.

What some of the great ph ilosophers have to say about God and rel igion is t he subject of t his chapter. Of course, being p hilosophers, they do not simply declare

their views to be correct-they a rgue thei r cases. It is then up to us to evaluate their a rgumenrs to see if their claims are \VOrthy of our acceptance. To embrace a vie\v merely because it is comfortable, fam iliar, and emotionally satisfying is to violate the spir it of ph ilosophical inquiry, wh ich asks us to bel ieve for good reasons.

God is not what you imagine or what you

thin k you understand. If you understand, you have failed. -Augustine

1 Are reasons or arguments relevant to your current religious beliefs? If so, how? If not, do you t hink your beliefs are nonethe less rationa l? Expla in.

Overview: God and Phi losophy 59

Why Religion Matters

Belief in God o r in a spiritual reality has shape.cl civil izations and a ltered history. In che name of che divine, devotees have raised up and laid low m ighty empires. They have built temples, creace.d arc, produced sacred cexcs, and crafted ceremony and song. They have bequeathed co che world mora l and legal codes, explanations of how che universe works, and conceptual maps sho\ving \vhere ind ividuals belong in a d ivine plan. From such t hings, councless mi llions have dra\vn a sense of purpose, meaning, and courage in che face of loss.

Bue there is also a dark side of che religious realm. Faith has often engendered moral blindness, intolerance, narro\v-mindedness, and cr uelty. With unshakeable confidence in a transcendent po\ver, believers have burned places of \vorship, books, heretics, and unbelievers. In che name of their gods they have trampled on human rights, blocked sci- entific inquiry, oppressed \vomen, waged holy \vars, and infl icted terrorism on innocents.

le seems chat ho\vever we tally these lists of good and evil, we muse conclude chat che impact of religion on earth is incalculably large. This face alone is reason enough co examine che claims of religion critically and dispassionately-chat is, philosophically.

Religious belief or disbelief moves not just societies, but also individual lives. What- ever your ideas about God and religion, they will surely influence your chinking about some very important matters. Based on these beliefs, you may decide \vhac sore of entities exist in che universe, what claims a re true or false, and what things are good or bad. And from such views, your choices flow, and from your choices, your life is made.

Overview: The Philosopher's Quest

You may a lready have strong views about che existence of God and about che merics of a specific religious tradition. Where d id chose vie\vS come from? Chances are good chat you bel ieve what you do because you were ra ise.cl chat \vay, craine.d in a particular faith by your parencs or culcure. If so, you came by you r religious beliefs accidentally. Out of che many religions of che \vorld (and che thousands of fa ith groups), you found yourself in one of chem. And che mere face chat your pa rents o r your society hande.d chose beliefs co you does not mean they are true. The point is not chat che religious vie\vS \Ve inherit are false, but chat blindly accepting chem is a poor \vay co discover che t ruth about chem.

To judge che worth of any religious claims, co decide among che many compet- ing assertions, we need che objective sea nce and critical reasoning of philosophical inqu iry. The \vay of che ph ilosopher is not co ask how you came co have a belief, but iuhether the belief is supported by good reasons. She kno\vS chat co judge a religious view from che standpoint of che rel ig ious trad ition chat spa\vned it is co beg che question and co b ias her inqu iry from che scare. She strives instead for che ph ilosoph ical ideal of unbiased evaluation in che cour t of reason.

This cou rt has been in session for hundreds of years as philosophers and theolo- gians have debated religious issues, pa rticularly che existence or nonexistence of God. They have put fo rth a number of argumencs co cry co demonstrate che latter, several of wh ich are discussed in chis chapter and ics readings. The a rgumencs concern che

2 How has your belief o r non belief in God influenced t h e major choice s you 've made in your life? How has you r belie f or nonbelie f a ffected you r attitude toward science, mor- a lity, your educat ion, peop le who don't share you r b e lie fs, a t heist s, abort ion, and te rrorist acts?

I do no t feel o bliged to believe that ,he same God who has endowed us w ich sense, reason} and intdlccr

has intended us to forgo their USC . -Galileo Galilei

3 Suppose you, like many people, have come by your beliefs about religion acciden- t a lly (because you were born a t a part icula r p lace and t ime). How do you think you should re spon d t o t h is fact ? Should you (1) st ill assu me your be- lie fs are tru e, (2) re ject a ll your current beliefs, (3) suspend ju dgment about t he beliefs, o r (4) evalu ate your be- lie fs usin g reason and evidence?

60 Chapter 2 God and Religion

PH I LOSO PHY NOW

Who Believes in God? According ro many surveys, belief in God, or gods, is ,videspread on rhe p laner bur is neither universal nor unchang ing.

2007

20 14

% of American adults who say

Believe in God ; absolutely certain

7 1 o/o

63%

Believe in God ; fairly certain

17%

20%

Pew Research Center, 2014

Belief in God by Level of Education

D o not believe in God

Believe in God; absolutely certain

Believe in God; not t oo/ not at all certain

High school or less

43%

Some college

33%

College

38% 28% 19%

Pew Research Center, 2014

Percentage of people who do not identify with any religion

Pew Research Center, 2012

2007

15.3%

2009

16.8%

Certainty of God's existence vs. atheism

J apan

Percentage of people who said they 4 .3% were certain of God's existence

Atheist 8.7%

Live Science, 1991- 2008

Sweden France

10.2% 15.5%

19.3% 23.3%

2011

18.6%

20 12

19.6%

Great United Britain States

16.8% 60.6%

18.0% 3.0%

Why do you think "absolutely certain" belief in God in the United States declined slightly between 2007 and 2014? Does the fact that the vast major- ity of Americans believe in God provide evidence for God's existence? Why

or why not? Why do you think "absolutely certain" belief in God declines

the more education a person has? European countries have much lower rates of belief in God (and higher rates of atheism) than the United States

does. What conclusions can you draw from this?

Overview: God and Phi losophy 61

Figure 2.1 Most people probably acquire their religi ous beli efs in childhood. Did you come by your current relig ious beliefs that way? If so, do you think you should critically exam ine them in adulthood? Why or why not?

God of the th ree main Western religious traditions-Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. This being is thought to be the creator of the universe, a person (as opposed to an impersonal force or substance, as in some Eastern religions) \vho is a ll-powerful (omnipotent), a ll-kno\ving (omniscient), and a ll-good (omnibenevolent).

To try to prove the existence of this God, many th inkers have advanced cosmological arguments, which reason from the existence of the universe, or cos- mos (or some fundamenta l feature of it), to the conclusion that God exists. For ex- ample, St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) argues that some th ings in the universe are caused to exist, and that nothing can cause itself to exist or come into being through an infinite series of causes. So there must be a first uncaused cause of everyth ing- and this fi rst uncaused cause is God.

Ph ilosophers, of course, aren't the only ones \vho a rgue this way. Many people- perhaps you are one of them-have thought or said something along these lines: " If God doesn't exist, how d id the un iverse come into being? Ho\v did we come into being? To say that the \vorld \vasn't caused by anyone or that it was the result of an accident makes no sense. Only a supreme being cou ld have caused it to exist." Phi- losophers have simply given this k ind of argument more precision and coherence, as well as more critical scrutiny.

Many try to make their case for God through teleological arguments, which rea- son from apparent signs of design or purposeful creation in the \vorld to the existence of a supreme designer. William Paley (1743-1805), an English theologian and moral philosopher, presents a classic version of this approach. Arguing by analogy, he asserrs that a \Vatch is devise.cl by an intelligent designer; the un iverse resembles a \Vatch in

IClritic ism of religious belief., is often considered

im polite o r even uncon· stitutional (alth o ugh it isn't). Religion is treated

like a senile rdacivc whose b izarre statements arc not to be questio ned. -\X'alter Sinnott-Armstrong

Cosmological arguments arc arguments that cry m show thar fro m the fact that rhc universe exists}

God exists.

Teleological arguments arc argumen ts that try to show that God must exist because featu res of the

universe show signs of pur· pose o r design.

62 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

An ontological argument is an argume nt that tries to demonstrate God 's exis t·

ence by logical analysis of the concept of God.

I t h ink we must atrack- whcrcvcr we meet it- the no nsensical idea that mu -

tually exclusive pro posi-

t ions about God can bot h be true.

-C. S. lewis

An argum ent from relig ious experience is an argum ent of this fo rm: A p er.son seems m have ex-

perien ced God; the experi- e nce m us t have actually

been a genuine e n counter

with God; t herefore, God p robably exists.

that it too looks as if it were designed by some intelligent being; therefore, the universe \vas probably also created by an intelligent designer-in ocher words, by God.

Some p hilosophers have case the design argument as an inference co the best explanat ion. This version begins by pointing co some impressive features of the uni- verse such as the intricate workings of biological systems or the just-so calibration of physical properties chat allo\vS the un iverse co exist. le then claims chat t he best explanat ion of such amazing faces is chat God designed t he universe. God muse be the best explanation fo r these facts because it seems utterly improbable that they could have just happened without t he intervention of a deity. So if God is the best explanat ion, then God muse exist.

Ontolog ical arguments appeal not co empirical facts about the cosmos, but co the concept of God itself. From the definitio n of God, we prove \vith logic alone that a supreme deity is a reality. St. Anselm (1033- 1109) \vas t he first to articulate such an argument, and ever since, ocher philosophers have been offering their O\vn versions. He first posies a definition of God as the g reatest poss ible being. This asser- tion, Anselm says, implies chat God muse act ually exist, because ifhe did not exist in reality (and on ly existed in ou r minds), he would not be t he greatest possible being. (Ex ist ing in reality is thought co make something greater than if it ex ises merely in someone's mind.) Therefore, God exises.

Anselm's a rgument is not easy co grasp on a quick reading. To appreciate it, you may need co read it several times and spend some extra time \vich it. Just keep this in mind: There are good reasons why intrigued philosophers have been exami ning and reexamin ing Anselm's argument for the past nine hund re.d yea rs. (We \vill t ake a closer look at the argument lacer in chis chapter.)

For Anselm and ochers, the strongest ar- gumenes for God's existence spring from pure reason. But for many people, definitive evidence chat God ex ises comes from personal experience-from direct a\vareness of what seems co be God's divine presence. People ex- perience something chat t hey believe is God or is of God, and chis apparent encounter fo rms t he basis of an argument from relig ious ex- p erien ce. The a rgument says chat a person seems co have experienced God; the experience muse have actually been a genu ine encounter with God; t herefore, God probably exists. Th is way of a rguing is essentially an inference co the best expla natio n. The best explanation of the person's experience is chat God's presence \vas somehow sense.cl, and if so, God likely exists.

Figure 2.2 Some people think the world so wondrous that a d ivine designer must have brought it forth, but others have thought the world so thoroughly f lawed in its design that we might well con- clude that the designer was incompetent. Which view are you more sympathetic to?

Philosophers have subjected all the preced- ing arguments co critical examination, ques- tion ing both thei r conclusions and the truth of their premises. In the following sections, we

Overview: God and Phi losophy 6 3

wi ll review some of t hese criticisms as well as reasoned responses to them. For now, it is important to understand t hat even if the argu ments fa il t o p rove their case, t hat doesn't demonstrate t he nonexistence of God. If scientisrs have so far fa iled to fi nd evidence fo r life outside our sola r system, t hat doesn't prove t hat life doesn't exist

somewhere o ut there. The fail u re of t hese arguments wou ld sho\v on ly that they g ive

us no good reasons to believe in t he traditio nal God of West ern religion. But t here is a nother kind of argu ment that does purport to establish God's non-

ex istence: t he argu m ent from evil. You have p robably heard this a rgument, or t he compla int that insp ires it, before. When you have see n people confro nted \Vit h u n- bearable ev il- p ain, suffering , and injustice-you may have heard them say some- thing like this: "Why did t his trage.dy happen? W hy d id God allo\v my mother-a

WHAT DO YOU BELi EVE?

Hard-Wired for God?

An argument from evil is an argume nt purpo rting

to show that sin ce there is unnecessary evil, an all-powerful , all-knowing, and all-good God mus, no t c:xi ,;:t.

D o you bel ieve in God? If so, \vhy? So,n e scientists chink they know why. Here is a recent report o n rhe issue:

Humans are programmed to bel ieve in God because it gives t hem a bet- ter chance of surviva l, researchers cla im. A s tudy into the way ch ild ren's bra ins develop s uggests that du ring the process of evolution those with re ligious te ndencies began to benefit fro m their beliefs- possibly by wo rk· ing in groups to e ns ure the future of the ir community.

The fi ndings of Bruce Hood, professor of deve lopmental psycho logy at Bristol Un iversity, s uggest that magica l and su pernatural beliefs are hard - wired into our bra ins fro m birth, and that religions are therefore t appi ng into a powerful psychologica l fo rce. His work is supported by other researchers who have found evidence li nking religious fee lings and experience to par- ticu lar regions of the brain. They s uggest people are programmed to re- ce ive a fee ling of spirituali ty from electrical activity in these areas.

The fi ndings chall enge atheist s such as Richard Dawkins, t he author of The God Delusion, who has long argued t hat re ligious beliefs resu lt from poor education and ch ildhood "indoctrinatio n."- Oaily Mail, Septe m ber

7, 2009

Suppose it is true that we are all programmed to be lieve in God. Would t his fact support or undermine the proposition that God exists? If theism

has evolutionary advantages, would this fact constitute a good reason for

believing in God? Why or why not?

64 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

4 Th in k about t h e fou r types o f a rgume nt s for the e xiste n ce of God glo ssed here. At this po int in your readi ng of this chapter, which type do you thin k makes the strongest case for God? Why? Which d o you think makes the weakest ?

5 If you were to have a religious experience that seemed to be o f God, would you r experie nce be strong evidence fo r God's existence? Why or why not? Would you be able to d isting uish a genu - ine exp erien ce o f God from a fa lse one-say, inst ance s of w ishful thinking, hallucination, or fa ntasy? If so, how? If no t, would this fact change your degree o f confi dence that t he ex- perie nce was gen uine?

I don't want a God that would go arou n d ki lling people's little girls. Neither do I want a God w ho would kill his own son. -Bishop John Spong

A theodicy is a d efense of the traditional conceptio n

of God in light of the exis te nce of evil.

A theist L~ som eone w ho believes in God.

Theism is belief in , he

existence of God.

An atheist L\ som eone w ho denies God's existence.

devout and loving person-to suffer so horribly fo r so long and then die so young? If there is a God, \vhy does he permit such evils?" Believers in every age have struggled to reconcile the existence of ev il with their belief in an a ll-powerfu l, a ll-kno\ving, and all-good God. The argument from evil asserts that these two things cannot be reconciled, and we are therefore forced by reason to abandon our bel ief.

Stated more precisely, the a rgument from evil says t hat if an all-powerful, a ll- kno\ving, and all-good God ex isted, unnecessa ry evil \vould not exist. (Some ev il is deemed necessary, as \vhen a child is given a painfu l injec tion to save her life, or \vhen a farmer endures months of backbreaking wo rk to assure a good harvest to fee.cl his family. Unnecessary evil is t hought to h ave no s uch excuses fo r occurring.) An all-powerfu l and all-kno\ving God would kno\v about, and be able to p revent, evil, and an all-good God \vou ld want to prevent it. But there is in fact unnecessary evil in the world. Therefore, an all-powerfu l, a ll-knowing, and a ll-good God does not exist.

Philosophers have tried to answer the argument from evil in a variety of ways. Probably the most d ramatic response is that unnecessary evil exisrs because God cannot or \vi ll not prevent it; that is, he is a finite deity, lacking one or more of the trad itional divine attributes. This line, ho\vever, would seem to most people to make God u n\vOrthy of worship.

Other approaches t ry to defend against the argument from ev il while retain- ing all the attributes in the trad itional notion of God. These counterarguments are known as theodicies. They adm it that evil ex isrs but claim that it is necessary evil, required to achieve some greater good. So they d eny that unnecessary evil exists in the \vorld, \vhich is the crucial premise in the argument from evi l. The point of a theo- dicy is not to p rove that God ex isrs, but to show that the argument from evil does not succeed. It tries to demonstrate that there may be good reasons to think that the crucial premise is fa lse-that is, to think that all the ev il in the world is necessary. Among the possibilities a re that evil is necessary to effect the moral improvement of individuals, to better the human race, to punish humans for sin, or to help people understand the true nature of evil.

Perhaps the most promising theodicy is the free will defense. It maintains that evil is a necessa ry result of humans having free will. God created people with the free.dom to choose between good and evil, but he could not give people free wi ll and at the same time ensure that they \vou ld never do evil. That's impossible even for God. So the evil produced by humans is a necessary result of thei r enjoying God 's gift of free.dom.

Belief and Disbelief

A \vide spectrum of beliefs regard ing the existence of God is possible, and fortu- nately there is some standard terminology to help us sort them out. A person who bel ieves in the existen ce of God is a theist , and belief in the existence of God is theism . Someone who denies the existen ce of God is an atheist, and such denial is atheism . A person \vho neither bel ieves nor disbelieves in God is kno\vn as an agnostic. If you a re an agnostic, you may thi nk that the evidence for or against

Overview: God and Phi losophy 6 5

Bahai Buddh ist Buddhist

Christian Ch ristia n Confucia n Confucian/Daoist

Hindu Judaic Judaic Judaic

Islamic Sikh Shinto

Figure 2.3 There are thousands of religious g roups in the world, worshiping thousands of gods in countless ways. Do you believe that one of these g roups is the true one? Is one of these gods the right god?

theism is inconclusive, that you do not know what is the case. Or you may take the more radical agnostic view that knowledge of the existence or nonex istence of God is impossible. That is, the truth about God is unknowable.

Belief in God or the divine ca n take different forms, and there are terms to reflect that fact. The vie\v taken by many religions, including C h ristianity, Juda ism, and Islam, is monotheism, belief in one God. Belief in several gods is polytheism , also prevalent throughout the world. A doctrine that arose among prom inent thinkers in France and England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is d eis m , the notion that there is one God who is essentially an "absentee landlord." This God created the universe but put it on autopilot and now ignores it, taking no interest in human affairs. Prominent deists of the past include George Washington, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and Voltaire. Pantheism is the view that God and the universe a re one and the same, a divine Whole. God and the world are basically identical. The great philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) held this view, and other thinkers, including A lbert Einstein (1879-1955), were sympathetic to it. Pantheism is distinct from panentheism , the idea that God is in the universe and the universe is in God.

Some thinkers have questioned the basic approach to the God question that most ph ilosophers have taken. They reject the notion that has guided much of tradi- tional philosophical inqu iry-the vie\v that rational belief in God requires reasons o r evidence. They insist that we may rationally believe in the existence of God even though we have no good reasons for doing so. Others believe that faith and reason

Atheism is , he d enial of the existen ce of God.

An agnostic L~ som eone who neither accepts nor denies God's cxisrcncc.

A man can no more diminish God's glory by refusing m worship Him than a lunatic can put out the sun by scribbling the word, 'darkness' on rhc

walls of his cell. -C. S. Lewis

6 Do you think the argument from evi l is a strong argument fo r t he nonexist ence of God? Why or why not? If you believe in God, how do you reconcile t hat belief with the existence of evil? If you don't believe in God, is the a rgument from evil a factor in your nonbelief?

Mon o theism is a bel ief in o ne God.

Po lytheism is a belief in many gods.

D eis m is a belief in o ne God w ho c reated the world b u t lefr it unat- tended to run o n its own.

Panthe.ism is the view that

God and the universe arc o ne and the same ,hing, a divine \'(!hole.

Pane ntheis m is the view that although God and the world arc distinct, rhc world is part of God.

6 6 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

If God lived o n earth,

people would break his windows.

-Jewish Proverb

7 Rabbi Ha rold Kush - ner, a uthor of When Bad Things Happen to Good People, a rgues t hat u n necessary evil exist s in t he world beca use God is not able to prevent it. That is, God is fin ite, a less powerful deity t han t he traditio na l God. Do you think this is a good exp lanat ion of unn ecessary evil? Why or why not? Wou ld a fin ite God deserve your respect and devot ion?

A God that can be under- stood is no God. Who can explain the Infinite in word\? -\Y/. Somerset Maugham

Reason in man is rather

like God in the world. -1homas Aquinas

are incompatible, and that we can legitimately come to k no,v religious truths, in- cluding the existence of God, on ly th rough a leap of faith.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHI LOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 2 .1

I. Do you bel ieve in God? If so, can you state reasons for your belief? Do you think you r bel ief is rational? Would you bel ieve in God whether o r not you had good reasons? Expla in your position on these questions.

2. Wou ld you consider yourself an agnostic or atheist? If so, do you have reasons for your lack of bel ief in God? Is your lack of bel ief rational? Do you think that bel ievers are irrational? Explain.

3. What is Wi ll iam Paley's teleological argument? Do you think the analogy between a watch and the universe is strong enough to prove the existence of a designer?

4. What is the a rgument from evil? Do you think the existence of evil shows that God doesn't exist? Why or why not?

5. Some ph ilosophers and theologians believe that reason is a g ift from God and should be used in the search fo r truth about God. Do you agree?

2.2 ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

We ca n sort the a rgumenrs for God's ex istence into two categories: (1) those that appeal to the ev idence of experience (,vhat philosophers call a posteriori arguments) and (2) those that appeal to logical relations (called a priori argumenrs). A poste- riori arguments reason from empirical facts about the world to the conclusion that God exisrs . Cosmological, teleological, and religious-experience argumenrs are of this k ind. A priori argu ments logically derive the conclusion that God exisrs from conceprs of God. Ontological a rgumenrs take this form.

Cosmological Arguments

Cosmological arguments can boast a long lineage, h aving been set out by many theorisrs from A ristotle, Plato, Ghazali, Averroes, Aquinas, and Spinoza to contem- porary philosophers such as Richard Swinburne and William Lane C raig. They a ll begin ,vith the empi rical fact that the universe, or one of its essential properties, exisrs-and end with the conclusion that only God could be responsible for this fact. In his masterpiece Summa Theologica, the Roman Catholic schola r Thomas Aquinas

Arguments for the Existence of God 67

offers five "proofs" (his famous "Five Ways") of God 's existence, the first th ree of wh ich are cos mological arg uments. This is how Aqu inas lays out the first two:

Thomas Aquinas , Summa Theologica

The existence of God can be shown in five ways. The first and mo re manifes t way is the argument from motion. It is certa in, and

evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motio n is pu t in motio n by another, fo r nothi ng can be in motion except it is in po- tentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in actuali ty.

For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actu- ality. Bu t nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fi re, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing shou ld be at once in actuality and potentiali ty in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actuall y hot cannot simu ltaneously be potentially hot; but it is simu ltaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing shou ld be both mover and moved , i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infi nity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent mov- ers move only inasm uch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefo re it is necessary to arrive at a fi rst mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is fro m the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we fi nd there is an order of effici en t causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in wh ich a th ing is found to be the effi cient cause of itself; fo r so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all effi cient causes fo llowing in order, the first is the cause of the in- termed iate cause, and the intermed iate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the in termed iate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermed ia te cause. Bu t if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first effi cient cause, neither will the re be an ultimate effect, nor any intermed iate efficient causes; all of which is plainly fa lse. Therefo re it is necessary to adm it a first efficient cause, to wh ich everyone gives the name of God.'

Aquinas's argument from motion (his first way) goes like this: It is obvious that some things in the universe are moving (that is, changing), and if they a re mov- ing, something else must have cause.d them to move. And this "something else" must also have been moving, set in motion by yet another thing that \vas moving, and this thing set in motion by another moving th ing, and so on. But th is series of things-moving-other-things cannot go on fo rever, to infin ity, because then there

8 Why does Aqu inas t h ink t here cannot be an infin ite chain of movers? Do you accept his reasons fo r t h is? Can you conceive of a series o f movers st retching infin itely into t he past ? If so, can you detect any cont radictions inherent in your concept ion?

9 Why does Aqu inas insist t hat there must be a firs t cause? Does h is a rgument show t hat t he fi rst cause is in fact God? Does it show, fo r example, that the fi rst cause could not be an evil demon o r an impersonal fo rce?

68 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

Believe nothing, no matter w here you read it, or w ho

said it, no matter if I said it, unless it agrees with your own reason and your

own common sense. -The Buddha

PH I LOSO PH ERS AT WORK

St. Thomas Aquinas

Tho,n as Aq uin as (1225-1 274) was born in to a no- ble family in sourbern Italy ro even tually become che greatest philosopher of che medieval period and , co rbis day, che official rbeologian of che Ro,nan Catholic Church. Because his fa,nily had decided char he should be a Figure 2.4 Thomas Aqu inas great church leader, they packed him off before rbe (1225- 1274), the phi losopher who age of six co che Bened ictine rnonascery of Mon re fused Aristotle with Christian ity. Cassino for train ing. Ar fourteen, he was sent co rbe University of Naples for furrber study, an d there h is life rook ,vhar his fa,nily con- sidered a radical turn. Ar age nvency, he joined che scholarly Dominican order and pursued, not a leadership position in che church, but rbe rarefied life of rbe in tellect.

Becoming alarmed at Aquinas's change of plans, his fami ly had him k id - napped and locked in che fam ily castle for several ,nonths. When it became clear chat he was not goin g ro relinqu ish his scholarly a,nbit ions, they released h irn, and he contin ued h is s tud ies a n d h is writing at t he University of Paris and in Cologne, Ro,ne, Naples, Virerbo, and Orvieco.

Aqu inas's great concribucion co both p hilosophy and Chris tian ity ,vas h is fus ion of Aris totle's phi losophy with Chris tian doctrines. In theology he distin- guished between reason and faith, g iving each its o,vn domain of inqu iry. Reason ca n be used co prove che existence of God , he says, bu r only ch rough fa ith can we kno,v such rnysceries as che incarnation and the trin ity.

,vould not be something that scarce.cl all che movi ng. There muse therefore be an ini- tial mover (a " Fi rst Mover"), an extraordi nary being that sea reed che un iverse mov ing but is not icsel f move.cl by anything else-a nd chis being we call God .

Aquinas's second ,vay is h is famous first-cause argument. H e maintains chat ev- erything we can observe has a cause, and it is clear chat nothing can cause icsel f. For something co cause itself, it would have co ex ist prior to itself, which is imposs ible. N eit her can something be caused by a n infinite regress of causes-chat is, a series of causes screeching co infinity. In any series of causes, Aquinas says, there muse be a first cause, which causes che second, ,vh ich causes the thi rd, and so o n. Bue in a n infinite series of causes, there ,vould be no fi rst cause and t hus no subsequent causes, including causes existing now. So infinite regresses make no sense. Therefore, there muse be a first cause of everything, and chis first cause we call God. (H ere Aqu inas is not thinking of a first cause of a temporal series of causes, as in a sequence of fa ll ing domi noes, but of a fi rst cause chat sustains che whole series of causes, like t he bottom building block chat holds up a ll che others in a stack.)

Arguments for the Existence of God 69

Against these two arguments, philosophers have lodged several criticisms. One of the strongest takes a im at Aquinas's claim that an infinite regress is not possible. Aqu inas thinks that a chain of causes must have a first cause; othenvise there \vou ld be no subsequent causes in the \vorld. In an infin ite regress of causes, he contends, there would be no fi rst cause and therefore no subsequent causes. Critics reply that just because an infinite chain of causes has no first cause, that doesn't mean that the chain of causes has no cause at all: in an infinite chain of causes, every link has a cause. Many philosophers, includ ing David Hume (17 11-1776), see no logical con- t radiction in the idea of an infin ite regress. They hold that the universe need not have had a beginning; it may be eternal, without beginning, and without a first cause o r a fi rst mover. The universe may have s imply always been.

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Science and the Uncaused Universe

My religion consists of a h u mble admiration of the illimitable superior spirit who reveals himself (or

herself) in the slight derails we arc able to perceive

with our frail and feeble minds. -Albert Einstein

The notion chat so,ne events in che universe are entirely uncaused is now \Videly accepted a,nong quantum physicists, the scientists \Vho study the realm of subaco,nic particles (such as electrons, positrons, and quarks). According co quantum physics, subatomic particles fre- quently pop in and out of existence random ly-chat is, they appear and disappear uncaused out of a perfect vacuum. From these findings, some scientists have speculated chat che uni- verse itself ,nay have arisen uncaused. This is how two physicists describe che pheno,nenon:

[T]he idea of a First Cause sounds somewhat fishy in light of the modern

theory of quantum mechanics. According to the most commonly accepted interpretation of quantum mechanics, ind ividual subatom ic particles can behave in unpredictable ways and there are numerous random, uncaused

events.- Richard Morris, Achilles in the Quantum World, 1997

[Q]uantum electrodynam ics reveals that an electron, positron, and photon occasionall y emerge spontaneously in a perfect vacu um. When this hap- pens, t he three particles exist for a brief t ime, and then annih il ate each other, leaving no trace behind .... The spontaneous, temporary emergence of particles from a vacuum is called a vacuu m fluctuation, and it is utterly

commonplace in quantum fi eld t heory.- Edward Tryon, "Is t he Universe a Vacuum Fluctuation?" Nature, Vol. 246, Dec. 1973, pp. 396- 397.

Suppose some subatomic events are uncaused . Does this show that the universe is uncaused? What bearing does the phenomenon have on the cosmologica l arguments of Aquinas and Craig? How might Craig reply to the physicists quoted above?

70 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

10 Does t he Big Bang prove that the uni- verse must have had a beg inning? Some scientists have t hought that t he Big Bang was not the beg in- ning of t he universe, because t he un iverse is "oscillating"-that is, it expands and cont racts continua lly in an eternal cycle of a Big Bang fo l lowed by periods of expansion then contraction and another Big Bang. There is now reason to think t hat the universe is not oscillating, but if oscillation were a plau- sible possibility, wou Id this undermine t he claim t hat the universe began t o exist?

Some claim that the worst problem \Vith Aquinas's a rgumenrs is that at best they prove only that the universe had a first mover o r first cause-but not that the first mover or first cause is God. For a ll the arguments show, the first mover or first cause could be an impersonal substance o r energy, o r several minor deities, or a supreme but evil demon. Perhaps the universe is, as many scientisrs and philosophers allege,

simply an eter nal, uncaused brute fact. I nspired by recent findings in scientific cosmology (the study of the origin and

structure of the universe), some philosophers have been interested in another kind of cosmological argument. Scientifi c ev idence suggests that the universe sudden ly came into existence about fourteen billion years ago in an unimaginably massive explosion known as the "Big Bang." Until that moment, the universe that \Ve ex- perience today simply was not. Using th is fact as a starting po int, William Lane Cra ig defends the Ka/am cosmological argument (a name derived from medieval Islamic scholars):

William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith

In particular, I find the kalam cosmological argument for a temporal first cause of the universe to be one of the most plausible arguments for God 's existence ... . The argu- ment is basically t his: bot h philosophical reaso ning and scientific evidence show that the un iverse began to exist. Anyth ing that begins to exist must have a cause that brings it into being. So t he universe must have a cause. Philosophica l analysis reveals that such a cause must have severa l of t he principle theis tic attributes.

Figure 2.5 Was the Big Bang the beginni ng of the universe? Did the Big Bang have a cause?

Arguments for the Existence of God 71

The argument may be formulated in th ree s im ple steps.

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause. 2. The un iverse began to exist. 3. Therefore, the uni verse has a cause.

The logic of the argument is va lid and very simple; the argument has t he same logical structure as th e argument: "All men are morta l; Socrates is a man; the refore, Socrates is mortal. " So the questio n is, are there good reasons to beli eve t hat each of t he steps is true? I think there are.•

Cra ig chinks che first premise is obviously true: Nothing scares co exist w ithout a cause. Bue many d ispute chis, insisting chat t here is no logical reason why che

u n iverse could not be u ncaused. They as k why che notion of a n u ncaused origina- t ion of things makes no sense while che idea of a god creati ng things out of noth- ing does.

Some argue agai nst Premise 1 o n empi rical grounds, pointing co findings in quantum phys ics suggesting chat some events involving subatom ic pa rticles a re un- caused. This evidence has prompted theorises co speculate chat che universe itself may be uncaused. Ac che very lease, t hey say, it proves chat someching's com ing into ex istence uncaused is not impossible. (See che box " Philosophy Now: Science and che Uncaused Universe.")

Craig a rgues for Prem ise 2 ("The universe began co exist") in much che same way chat Aqui nas a rgues fo r a first cause: The universe m use have begun co exist because che alternative is a n infi nite regress of past events, wh ich is impossible. H e maintai ns chat che very idea of an actual infinit y of t h ings involves logical contradictions:

[W]hat is infinity minus infin ity? Well, mathematically, you get self-contradictory a n- swers . .. . [l]nfin ity minus infinity is infinity. But suppose instead you subtract all t he num bers grea ter than 2- how many are left? Three. So infinity minus infinity is 3! ... This implies that infinity is just an idea in your mind, not something th at exists in rea li ty.3

Many philosophers reject chis u nderstand ing of infinit y. They agree chat infinity can be perplexing, but t hey point out chat mathematicians k no\v how co work \vich infinit y without invit ing contrad ictio ns. More co che point, they hold chat there is no logical absurd icy in che notion of a series of even es screeching into an infin ite fut u re. We can easily conceive of ch is. Likewise, they say, there is no logical absurd icy in che idea of a series of events continuing into a n infin ite past. We can scraighcfo rwa rdly conceive of chis as \veil .

Craig says chat in fin it ies may ex ist in mat hematics (as in che series 0, l , 2, 3, . . . ), but chat t hey a re merely potential infinities, not actual infinities. Pot ential infinit ies "approach infinity as a limit, but they never actually gee there . . . . [E)xiscen ce in che mathematical realm does not imply ex istence in che real world.'" Ochers reply chat we may not be able co actually count co infinit y or measure a n infi n ite number of segments bet ween two poines, but chat does not mean chat che numbers or segmenes a re nonex 1scenc.

11 Is it obvious to you, as it is to Cra ig, t hat nothing starts to exist without a cause? Do you think that t he universe cou ld be uncaused? Why or why not?

12 Can you conceive of a series of event s stretching infin itely into the future? Can you conceive of a series of event s cont inuing infinitely int o the past? Do you think there is a contradiction lurking in the idea of an infi- nite series of causes? Does th e weirdness of infinity in mat hematics show that infin ities in t he empirica l world cannot exist?

What we need is no t the will m believe, b u t ,he w ill

to fin d out. -Bercrand Russell

72 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

Figure 2.6 In his book The Grand Design, world-renowned physicist Stephen Hawking declares, "Because there is a law such as gravity, the Universe can and will create itself from nothing. Spontaneous creati on is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the Universe exi sts, why we exist .... It is not necessary to invoke God to light the bl ue touch paper and set the Universe going." Is Hawking's view plausible? Why o r why not?

Design Arguments

Teleological, o r design, arguments for the ex istence of God are straightforward, the gist being chat since the world seems co show signs of purposeful des ign, it most likely was purposefully designed-chat is, intentionally made by an intelligent be- ing, wh ich we call God. A popular version takes che form of an argument from analogy and was famously laid down by che eighceench-cencury Anglican clergyman W illiam Paley:

William Paley, Natural Theology

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might poss ibly answer that, for anything I knew to the con- trary, it had lain there forever; nor wou ld it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurd ity of this answer. But suppose I found a watch upon the ground, and it shou ld be inqu ired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hard ly think of the answer which I had given- that, for anyth ing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why shou ld not this answer serve for the watch as well as for t he stone? W hy is it not as adm issible in the second case as in the first? For this reason and for no other; viz., that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we cou ld not discover in

Arguments for the Existence of God 73

the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together fo r a purpose, e.g., that they are so fo rmed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, if a diffe rent size from what they are, or placed after any other ma nner, or in any other order than that in which they are placed, e ither no motion at all would have been carried on in the mach ine, or none which would have answered the use t hat is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of t hese parts, and of their offices, all tending to one resu lt: We see a cylindrical box conta ining a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. We nex t ob- serve a fl exib le chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure) commun icating t he action of the spring from the box to the fuse. We t hen fi nd a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in, and apply to, each other, conducting t he motion from the fuse to the balance, and from the ba lance to the pointer, and, at t he same time, by t he size and shape of t hose wheels, so regulating t hat motion as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust; t he springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over t he face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but in the room of wh ich, if there had been any other t ha n a transpare nt substance, the hour cou ld not be seen without opening the case. This mechan ism being observed (it requ ires indeed an examination of the instru ment, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and under- stood), the infe rence, we think, is inevi tab le, that t he watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some t ime, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it fo r the purpose which we find it answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use ....

Every ind ication of contrivance, every manifesta tion of design, wh ich existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; wi th the d ifference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. I mean that the contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the comp lexity, subtlety, and curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if poss ible, do they go beyond them in number and variety; yet in a mu ltitude of cases, are not less evidently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less evidently accommodated to their end, or suited to their office, than are the most perfect productions of human ingenuity.1

It is obvious, Paley says, that the "several pares [of the watch] are framed and put together fo r a purpose," \vhich suggests that it h ad an intelligent designer. Likewise, t he un iverse manifescs countless parts, all seemingly formed and arranged to achieve various ends. From this he concludes that t he universe also probably has an intel-

ligent des igner, but one that surpasses immeasurably the po\ver and understanding of humans. This great designer must be God.

Before Paley made h is case in Natural Theology (1802), David Hume (17 11- 1776) had launched a famous critique of design arguments in his Dialogues Concern- ing Natural Religion (1779), and it has been echoed and amplified by thinkers ever since. In Dialogues, Hume presents a discussion of the issues among th ree fic tional characters-Demea, the orthodox believer ; C leanthes, the theologian; and Philo, the skeptic. Using Philo as h is mouthpiece, Hume assaults the design argument from analogy on nvo broad fronts. H e fi rst contends that the argument fails because the

As the poet said, "O nly God can make a tree• -

probably because it's so hard to fi gure ou t h ow to get the bark o n. -Woody Allen

74 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

13 Is Hume's argument about reasoning from parts to the whole cor- rect? We certainly can't reason that because the bricks of a house are light in weight, t he whole house is light in weight. But can't we legitimately argue that, say, because a bucket of water from a pond is polluted, the whole pond is poll ut ed?

14 Do you agree w ith Hu me that we can draw no conclusions about the cause of phenomena that are "sing le, individual. w ithout parallel or specific resemblance"? Wou ld contemporary scientists accept Hume's view?

15 Is Hume's sugges- tion t hat the universe is like a living th ing at least as plausible as the view t hat it is I ike a machine? Why o r why not? Suppose Hume is right. What would the implications be for Pa ley's argument?

analogy is \veak, hampered by too fe\v relevant s imilarities and too many d issimi-

larities. He then reasons that even if the argument demonstrates that the universe

has a designer, the designer may not be the trad it ional God of theism. Here is Philo

argu ing the first point:

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natu ral Religion

If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with t he greatest certainty, that it had an arch itect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect which we have expe- rienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house t hat we can with the same certa inty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking t hat the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presump- tion concern ing a similar cause; and how that precision will be received in the world, I leave you to consider ....

But can you think, Cleanthes, that your usual phlegm and ph ilosophy have been pre- served in so wide a step as you have taken when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines; and, from their similarity in some circumstances, in ferred a similarity in their causes? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we d iscover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hund red others which fa ll under daily o b- servation. It is an active cause by wh ich some particu lar parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion ba r a ll comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a ha ir, can we learn anyth ing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree? ...

When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, t he existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how th is argument can have place where the objects, as in t he present case, are single, individual, withou t parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficu lt to explain . And will any man tell me with serious counte- nance that an orderly universe must arise from some t hought and art like the human because we have experience of it? To ascerta in this reasoning it were requisite t hat we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from hu man art and contrivance ....

Now, if we survey the un iverse, so far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a great resemblance to an an im al or organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it produces no disorder; a continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired; the closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system; and each part or member, in perform ing its proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an anim al; and the Deity is the soul of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it.6

Philo asserts that trying to draw a conclusion about the cause of the un iverse based

on what \Ve know about the cause of, say, a house is pointless because the dissim ila rit ies

Arguments for the Existence of God 75

benveen the two phenomena are enormous. We cannot make any firm inferences about the a rchitect of the un iverse from \vhat we know about the a rchitects of houses. Further, he says, the intelligence that we observe in mankind is just one of the many forces that produce changes in the world. We therefore have no reason to presume that intelligence is the one th ing that is responsible for the universe as a whole. If we

contend that it is, \Ve commit the logical fallacy of arguing from the part to the \vhole: because a part of a syst em has a particular characteristic, the entire system must have that character istic too. As Ph ilo purs it, "From observing the growth of a hai r, can we learn anyth ing concerning the generation of a man?" In a sim ilar \vay, he says, we err if \Ve conclude that one event always causes another just because \Ve observe a single instance of such a pairing. We would need to encounter many instances of headaches p receded by a change in the \veather before we could plausibly infer that the latter caused the fo rmer. Likewise, we can establish no firm conclusions about the cause of the universe, because \Ve have only a single universe to examine. Finally, Philo tries to underm ine the machine-universe analogy by offering what he considers a better comparison. The universe, he argues, is more like a living thing than a machine. In the world, as in living things, there is a continual circulation of matter, damage and waste a re remedied, and each part operates to preserve itself and the \vhole. Living things cre- ate and regulate themselves, unlike mach ines, which requi re designers and technicians.

On the second point-that even if the un iverse h as a designer, he may not be God-Philo has th is to say:

Now, Cleanthes, said Philo, with an air of alacrity and triumph , mark the consequences. First, by this method of reasoning you renounce a ll cla im to infin ity in any of the at- tributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought o nly to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it fa ll s under our cognizance, is not in finite: What pretensions have we, upo n your suppositions, to ascribe that at tribute to the Divine Being? You will insist t hat, by removing him so m uch from all sim il arity to human creatures, we give in to the mos t arbitrary hypothesis, and at the same time weaken all proofs of his existence.

16 If there are many imperfections in nat ure, as Hume

suggests, woul d we necessarily be forced t o conclude t hat the designer was also imperfect?

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Secondly, you have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to the Deity, even in his fi. nite capacity; o r for supposing him free from every error, mis take, or incohere nce in his underta kings. The re are many inexplicab le difficulties in the works of Nature which if we all ow a perfect au thor to be proved a priori, are easily solved, and become on ly seem in g difficu lties from the narrow capacity of man, who can not trace infinite relations. But accord ing to your method of reason ing, these difficulties become all real; and, perhaps, will be insisted on as new in - stances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must acknowled ge that it is impossible fo r us to tell , from our limited views, whether this system contains any great fau lts or deserves any cons ider- able pra ise if compared to other poss ible and eve n

Figure 2. 7 Was the world designed by God w ith h umans in mind? If so, some have claimed, God must have erred, because the earth seems more hospitable to insects than to humans. The famous agnostic and tr ial l awyer Clarence Darrow once said, "There are some millions of different speci es of animals on th is earth, and one-half of these are insects .... If t he l and of the earth was made for life, it seems as if it was intended for insect life, whi ch can exist almost anywhere." Do you agree?

76 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

17 Hume suggests that, for a 11 we know, there cou ld have been many designers of the universe instead of one supreme deity. Is it reasonable to suppose that this is a genu ine possibility?

David H ume,

Dialogues Concern ing Natural Religion

real systems . Could a peasa nt, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely fau ltless, or even assign to it its proper rank among the productions of human wit, he who had never seen any other production?

But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remai n uncertain whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we for m of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautifu l a machine? And what surprise must we feel when we find him a stupid mechanic who imitated others, and copied an art which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many world s might have been botched and bungled, th roughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labor lost; many fr uitless trials made; and a s low but continued improvement carried on d uring infinite ages in the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine where the truth, nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great number of hy- potheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may be imagined?

And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce from your hypothesis to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rea ring a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several dei- ties combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affa irs. By sharing the work among severa l, we may so much further limit the attributes of each , and get rid of that extensive power and knowledge which must be supposed in one deity, and wh ich, according to you, can on ly serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such fool is h, such vicious creatures as man can yet often un ite in framing and exec uting one plan, how much more those deities or demons, whom we may suppose several degrees more perfect? . ..

And why not become a perfect anthropomorp hite? Why not assert the deity or dei- ties to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, etc.? Epicurus mai ntained that no man had ever seen reason bu t in a hum an fi gure; therefo re, the gods must have a hu man fi gure. And this argume nt, which is deserved ly so much ridicu led by Cicero, becomes, accord ing to you, solid and phi losoph ical.

In a word, C/eanthes , a man who fo llows your hypothes is is able, perhaps, to as- sert or conjecture the uni verse sometime arose from somethin g like design. Bu t be- yond that position he cannot ascertain one single ci rcumstance and is left afterwards to fi x every point of his theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothes is. This world , fo r aught he knows, is very fau lty and imperfect, compared to a superior stan- dard, and was on ly the fi rst rude essay of some infa nt deity who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance. It is the work on ly of some dependent, infer ior deity, and is the object of derision to his superiors. It is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever s ince his death has run on at ad ve n- tures, from the first impul se and active fo rce which it received from hi m ... .7

Philo declares that if we carefully and consistently apply the kind of reason ing used in the design argument (as Cleanthes would have us do), \Ve would have to accept some uncomfortable conclusio ns about the nature of the designer. Accord- ing to Cleanthes, \Ve are supposed to judge the natu re of the cause by the nature of the effect, and we a re to reason from the attributes of human designers to the at- tributes of God. By this logic, Philo says, \Ve \vould have to conclude that God (the cause) may not be infinite, because the universe (the effect) is not infin ite. We \vould be fo rced to adm it that God may not be perfect, because the universe is itself not

78 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

PH I LOSOPHY NOW

Do Scientists Reject Religion?

The answer is yes and no. A 2009 Pew Research Center survey showed that just over half of scientists (51 percent) believe in a deicy or higher po,ver, while belief in God or a higher po,ver among Americans is much higher- 80 ro 95 percent in some surveys. Bur scientists' spiritual and religious beliefs (and disbelief) are diverse and often illuminating. Here's a sampling of rhe views of so,ne of che more em inent and influential figures.

Science is not only compatible with spirituality; it is a profound source of spiri- tuality. When we recognize our place in an immensity of lig ht-years and in the passage of ages, when we grasp the intricacy, bea uty, and subtlety of life, then that soaring feel ing, that sense of elation and hu mility combined, is surely spiritual. So are our emotions in the presence of great art or m usic or litera- ture, or acts of exemplary selfless courage such as those of Mohandas Gandhi or Martin Luther King, Jr. The notion that science and spirituality are somehow

mutually exclusive does a disservice to both.- Carl Sagan (1934- 1996)

What I have done is to show that it is possible for the way the universe began to be determined by the laws of science. In that case, it would not be necessary to appeal to God to decide how the universe began. This doesn't prove that there

is no God, only that God is not necessary.- Stephen Hawking (1942- 2018)

Science is ... a powerfu l way, indeed to study the natural world. Science is not particu larly effective ... in making commentary about t he supernatu- ral world. Both worlds, for me, are quite real and qu ite important. They are investigated in different ways. They coexist. They illuminate each other.

- Francis Coll ins (1950- )

I am very astonished t hat the scientific picture of the real world around me is very deficient. It gives a lot of factua l in formation, puts a ll our experi- ences in a magnificently consistent order, but is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really near to our heart, that really matters to us. It cannot tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and sweet, physica l pain and physi- cal delight; it knows nothing of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, god and eternity.- Erwin Schrodinger (1887- 1961)

I find it as difficult to understand a scientist who does not acknowledge the presence of a superior rationality behind the existence of the universe as it is to comprehend a theologian who would deny the advances of science. - Wernher von Braun (1912- 1977)

Why do you chink chat only half of scientists believe in a deity or higher po,ver? Wh ich scientist's belief quoted above is closest co your own view of God and rel igion? Why?

Arguments for the Existence of God 79

Ontological Arguments

C-osmological and teleological appeals rest ultimately o n the evidence of experience. Ontological a rgumencs rest on logic alone. Logic tells us that some th ings can not possibly ex ist-round squares and married bachelors, for example. They ca nnot ex- ist because they involve logical contrad ictions. A nd logic tells us that it is (logically) possible that golden mounta ins and flying horses ex ist (tho ugh they are not actual), fo r they involve no logical contrad ictions. So isn't it at least plaus ible that \Vith logic alo ne we could someho\v prove the ex istence of God? Anselm thought so. H e was the fi rst to articulat e a precise statement of an ontological argument, and other thinkers s ince h im have offered thei r O\vn vers ions. H e reasons that since God by defin it ion is the greatest possible being, God must actually ex ist, because if he did not exist in reality (a nd merely ex isted in our m inds), he \vould not be the greatest possible be-

ing. Here is the argument in A nselm's own \vords:

Anselm , Proslogium

And so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understand ing to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand t hat t hou art as we believe; and that thou art t hat which we believe. And, indeed , we believe that thou art a being t han which noth- ing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, s ince the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiv.1). Bu t , at any rate, this very foo l, w hen he hea rs of t his being of which I speak- a being t ha n which nothing greater can be conceived - understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to under- stand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the paint- ing, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.

Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the under- standing, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understand ing. And assured ly that, than which nothing greater can be con- ceived, cannot exist in the understand ing alone. For, suppose it exists in the un- derstand ing alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

18 Does exist ence al- ways add greatness to an ent ity? That is, is it

always g reater to exi st t han not to exist? Why or why not ?

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understand ing alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived , is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understand ing and in reality.

And it assured ly exists so t ruly, t hat it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to ex- ist; and this is greater t han one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence,

Figure 2.8 St. Anselm (1033-1 109), medieval philosopher and theologian and the Archbishop of Canterbury. He held that reason was a friend of faith, not a source of religious skepticism.

80 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Evolution and Intelligent Design

Science maintains char che best explanation for the apparent design of biological life is rhe the- ory of evolution, which says char living things, in all their variery and co,nplexiry, arose ch rough

natural processes. Bur some dai,n char life on earth is best explained by the interven- t ion of a supreme intelligence. Michael Behe fainously argues char some biologi- cal systems are so profoundly incricace- so "irreducibly co,nplex"-rhac they could nor have been produced by gradual evo- lutionary changes. Only an intelligent de- signer can account for such complexiry.

The consensus among scientists is char evolution operates through ,vhat Danvin called "natura l selection." The basic idea is char offspring of organisms differ physically fro,n their parents in various ,vays, and these differences can be passed on generi- cally co their offspring. If an offspring has an inherited trait (such as sharper vision or a larger brain) char increases its chances of

Figure 2.9 Could the human eye- a very complex surviving long enough to reproduce, the in- system- have evolved through natural selection? dividual is more likely co survive and pass

Anselm,

Proslogium

rhe craic on co che next generation. After severa l generations, th is useful trait, or adaptation, spreads throughout a whole popu lation of individua ls, differentiating che population from its ancestors. Behe's claim is char it is i1npossible for irreducibly co,nplex systems to be produced through natural selection. He says chat an irreducibly complex system (for example, the eye) is co,nposed of several inter- connected, perfectly marched pares such char if even one part is 1nissing, the sysre,n will nor funct ion . An eye can i1nprove the surviva l prospects of organis,ns on ly if it functions, and

if that, than wh ich nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than wh ich noth ing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction . There is, then, so tru ly a being than which noth ing greater can be con- ceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord , our God.

So tru ly, therefore, dost thou exist, 0 Lord, my God , that thou canst not be con- ceived not to exist; and rightly. For, if a mind cou ld conceive of a being better than thee, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is most absu rd. And, indeed , whatever else there is, except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist. To thee alone, therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher

Arguments for the Existence of God 81

proper functioning requires char each of irs pares is rhere co do its job. Accord ing to evolu- tion, rhe eye ca,ne abour through slow, incre,nenca l changes. Bur, Behe asks, how can an unfin ished, nonfuncrioning eye improve survival? Th is shows, he argues, char the eye and all ocher irreducibly complex sysrems ,vere created ,vhole-nor ch rough evolution, bur by so,ne grear inrell igence.

But most biologists deny that rhe development of irreducibly complex systems ch rough natura l selection is physically impossible. Behe chinks natural selection requires that a coin- plex sysrem be fonned by gradua l addition of components until a functioning model is achieved. But critics point out char rhe components can be present all along or arise ar dif- ferent t imes, performing tasks that improve various processes. Then, because of a change in the genome, the pares may be put to new uses, fonning an irreducibly complex structure.

From the face that biologists generally do not kno,v precisely how each step of such a process happens, ir does nor follow chat the process is impossible or unknowable. Phi lip Kircher th inks that rhe remedy for our ignorance of these marrers is more and betrer re- search, not the presumption of an inrell igenr designer:

Even if intelligent designers were right in supposing that the phenomena they indicate cou ldn 't have evolved by natura l selection, only a more explicit identification of the causal mechan ism that was at work cou ld justify the conclusion that that mechanism is intelligent.- Philip Kitcher, Living With Darwin, 2007

Suppose evolution is t rue and intelligent design t heory is false. Would this mean that there is no supreme being w ho made biological life possible? Can someone consistently believe in both evolution and God?

degree than all others. For, whatever else ex ists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no God (Psalms xiv. ir), since it is so evident, to a rationa l mind , that thou dost exist in the highest degree of all ? Why, except that he is du ll and a fool?' 0

Here's che a rgument seated more fo rmally:

1. God, by definition, is the greatest being possible. 2. Suppose che greatest being possible exiscs only in the understanding (in the

mind, as a mental object).

82 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

19 What is t he most plausible me a n ing of "exist s in the u nd e r- standing a lone "? Cou ld it me a n t hat the concept of the greatest be ing possible is not a ctually exemplifie d, that it d o es not refer t o anyth in g exist in g in re- a lity? If so, how wou ld such an int e rpreta- tion affect Anselm's arg ument ?

If God did not exist, i, would be ncccs.sary ,o invent him. -Voltaire

I cannot conceive of a God wh o rcv.oards and p unishes his creatures, or has a w ill of ,he kind that we experi- ence in o urselves. Neither

can I nor would I want to con ceive of an ind ividual

tha, survives his physical death; let feeb le souls, from fca, o, absurd ego-

ism, cherish such th o ughrs. I am satisfied with the mys,cry of the eternity of life and with the aware- ness and a glimpse of the marvelous structure of the

existing world} together

with the devoted striving to comprehend a portion, be it ever so tiny, of th e Reason ,hat manifests itself in nature.

-Albert Einstein

3. Then a greater being than the g reatest being possible can be conceived, o ne existi ng not just in the understanding, but a lso in reality (for a being is greater if it ex ists in reality tha n if it exiscs on ly in the understa nding).

4. But this yields a contradiction, fo r a being g reater than the greatest being poss ible is impossible.

5. Therefore, God, the greatest being poss ible, must ex ist in reality, not just in the understanding.

Ma ny have fo und fa ult with th is li ne of reasoning. The fi rst major criticism came from an eleventh-cent ury monk named Gaunilo, who thought that A nselm ,vas try- ing to define God into existence. He maintained that if Ansel m's argument were a good piece of reasoning, we could use it to prove the existence of many thi ngs that obviously do not exist-for instance, the greatest island poss ible. We could argue that the g reatest isla nd possible must actually exist because if it existed only in the understanding, there could conceivably be an island that is greater, namely, one that exists in reality as ,vell as in the understand ing.

Anselm replied that h is reason ing does not pertain to things li ke Gaunilo's isla nd, but o nly to God, the greatest being possible. Others have suggested th at Gau n ilo's critique fails because h is island is not a possibility. To them it seems that for a ny island thought to be the greatest possible, ,ve ca n ahvays imagine how it can be greater by enhancing its properties. Such an island could therefore never be the g reatest. C ritics have rejected both of these suggestions, and some have countered that Ansel m's line could prove the existence of absurd things other tha n a perfect isla nd-like a supremely evil superbeing.

In putting forth his a rgu ment, Ansel m makes nvo assumptions: (I) ex istence makes someth ing greater (th at is, someth ing is greater if it exists in the ,vorld th an ifit exists only in the m ind as an idea) and (2) existence can be a defi ni ng property. C ritics have questioned both of these. On the firs t cou nt, they contend th at there is no good reason to thi nk that existence adds to the value of a n entity. After all, it is not obvious that it is better fo r, say, a thorough ly evil being to exist th an not to exist. On th e second count, they doubt that existence can be any k ind of defi ning property at all. Anselm assumes that one th ing can be greater th an another thing even though they h ave ex- actly the same properties, d iffe ring only in th at the fi rst th ing exists a nd the second does not. In his view, existence is another defi ni ng p roperty-the essential attribute that the one thi ng has a nd the other lacks. But is th is p lausible? Suppose you imagine an incred ibly beautifu l beach, detailing in your m ind its every property (,vhite sand,

Figure 2.10 Could t here be such a t hing as t he g re atest possible beach?

Arguments for the Existence of God 83

lovely palm trees, blue \Yater, etc.). Then you add one more attribute-actual exis- tence. Does this last step change the defining p roperties of you r beach-or does it simply indicate that the beach with al l irs defining properties is actual? Many philoso- phers, including Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), would choose the lat ter. As Kant says,

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

"Being'' is obvious ly not a rea l pred icate [term designating a property]; that is, it is not a concept of something wh ich cou ld be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely t he pos iting of a thing, or of certai n determi nations, as existi ng in themselves .... By whatever and by however many pred icates we may think a thing- even if we com pletely determ ine it- we do not make the least add ition to the t hing when we further declare t hat this th ing is."

I n any case, some detractors t h ink t he weakest link in Anselm's chain of reason- ing is Premise 2, the s upposition t hat t he greatest being possible exists on ly in t he understanding. Th is claim gives rise to the contrad iction t hat a g reater being t han the greatest being possible ca n be conceived (one existing in realit y) . But t hey argue that the contrad ic tion d issolves if we take Premise 2 to mean not that the greatest being possible exisrs in some sense in the m ind (the vie\v that Anselm seems to take), but simply that the concept of the g reatest being poss ible does not refer to any act u- ally existing thing. The latter, t hey insist, is the more reasonable reading of "exisrs only in the understanding," and it does not yield any contradictions about the nat ure of God. W ith th is reading of Prem ise 2, Anselm's argument does not go th rough .

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 2.2

1. What is Aquinas's first-cause argument? Does it prove the ex istence of the traditional God of theism? Does it prove that t he universe h ad a firs t cause?

2. What is Craig's cosmological argument? C ritique irs two premises. Are they t rue? Explain why you think they are true (or false). If the argu - ment is sound, what does it prove? Does it prove that God exists?

3. What a re the releva nt similarities and d ifferences benveen Paley's \Vatch and the universe? Is the \Vatch an alogy a good o ne?

4. A re Hume's criticisms of the design argument cogent? Does he suc- cessfully refute it?

5. Are the assumptions behind Anselm's argument justified? That is, are there good reason s for accepting them?

If trian gles made a god, th ey would give h im three sides.

- Charles de Montesq uieu

84 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

M oral evil is evil that comes fro m h uman c hoices and actions an d

the bad things t hat ar ise from them .

Natural evil is evil that

resuk s from t he workings of naru rc.

2.3 GOD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Some people doubt the existence of God because they bel ieve t hat the traditional ar- guments for theism fa ll short and that no other evidence in God's favor seems forth- coming. Others take a stronger stand against theism by setting forth the argument from evi l. They ask, in effect, "If God existS, how can there be so much unnecessa ry evil in the ,vorld? An a ll-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God might allo,v some evils because they a re necessary to bring about some g reater good. But much of the ,vorld 's ev ils seem to be entirely and blatantly g ratu itous. So ho,v can ,ve conclude anything other than that there must be no such God?"

Philosophers and theologians have genera lly concerned themselves with nvo types of evil. Moral evil comes from human choices and actions and the bad things that arise from them. Injustice, murder, deceit, theft, and torture are moral ev ils from wh ich flow pa in, suffering, inju ry, loss, and death. Natural evil results from the workings of natu re. From hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, fires, d isease, and drought come vast sums of ev il in the fo rm of human and animal suffering. To make thei r case, atheists have usually appealed to both k inds of evil, challenging theistS to explain why a perfectly good and powerful God would allow such horrors.

Rowe's Argument from Evil

One of the more influential versions of the a rgument from evil is provided by philo- sopher Wi lliam L. Rowe, ,vho focuses on evil as " intense human and an imal suffering":

W il li a m L. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion

Taking human and an ima l suffering as a clear instance of evil wh ich occurs with great frequency in our world, the ... problem of evil can be stated in terms of the following argument for atheism.

1. There exist instances of intense suffering wh ich an omn ipotent, omniscient being cou ld have prevented without thereby preventing the occurrence of any greater good.

2. An omn iscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any in- tense suffering it cou ld, unless it cou ld not do so without thereby preventing the occurrence of some greater good.

Therefore,

3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

What are we to say about th is argument for atheism, an argument based on the profusion of one sort of evil in the world? The argument is valid; therefore, if we have rationa l grounds for accepting its prem ises, to that extent we have rational grounds for accepting atheism. Do we, however, have rationa l grounds for accepting the premises of th is argument?

God and the Prob lem of Evi l 85

Figure 2.11 Does a fawn's suffering a lone in t he fo rest lead to a greater good? Could an omnipotent God obtain th is greater good some other way?

The second premise of the argument expresses a belief about what a morally good being would do under certain circumstances . Accord in g to this belief, if a morall y good being knew of some in tense suffering that was about to occur and he was in a position to prevent its occurrence, he would prevent it unless he cou ld not do so withou t thereby losing some greater good of which he was aware. This belief (or something very close to it) is, I thi nk, held in common by theists and nontheists. Of course, there may be disagreement about whether something is good, and whether, if it is good , one would be morally just ified in permitting some intense suffering to occur in order to obtain it. So meone might hold, for example, that no good is great enough to justify permitting an innocent ch ild to suffer terribly. To hold such a view, however, is not to deny premise 2 which claims on ly that if an omniscient, wholly good being permits intense suffering then there must be some greater good (a good which outweighs the sufferin g in ques- tion) which t he good being cou ld not obtain without permitting the intense suffering. So stated, 2 seems to express a belief that accords with our basic moral principles, principles shared by both theists and nonthe ists . If we are to fau lt th is argument, there- fore, we mus t find some fault with its first premise.

Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped , horri bly burned, and lies in terrible agony for severa l days before death relieves its sufferin g. So far as we can see, t he fawn's intense suffer- ing is pointless, leading to no greater good . Cou ld an omnipotent, omniscient being have prevented the fawn's apparently pointless suffering ? The answer is obvious, as even the theist will insist. An omn ipotent, omn iscient being cou ld easily have pre- vented the fawn from being horribly burned, or, given the burning, cou ld have spared the fawn t he intense suffering by quickly ending its li fe, rather than allowing the fawn to lie in terri ble agony for several days. Since no greater good, so far as we can see, would have been lost had the fawn's intense suffering been prevented, doesn't it appear that premise 1 of the argument is t rue, t hat there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient bein g could have prevented without thereby preventing the occurrence of any greater good? .. .

20 Do you agree wit h Rowe t hat it seems u n- likely that all instances of intense h uman and animal suffering lead t o g reat er goods? And do you thin k t hat if all that suffering does lead to greater goods, t hat "an omnipo tent, omniscient being could not have achieved at least some of t hose goods without perm it- t ing the instances of suffer ing that lead to t hem"?

8 6 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

William L. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion

The truth is that we are not in a position to prove that 1 is true. We cannot know with certainty that instances of suffering of the sort described in 1 do occur in our world. But it is one thing to know or prove that 1 is true and quite another thing to have rational grounds for believing 1 to be true. We are often in the position where in the light of our experience and knowledge it is rationa l to believe that a certain statement is true, even though we are not in a position to prove or to know with certainty that the statement is true. In the light of our past experience and knowledge it is, for example, very reason- able to believe that neither Goldwater nor McGovern will ever be elected president, but we are scarcely in the position of knowing with certainty that neither wil l be elected president. So, too, with , , a lthough we cannot know with certainty that it is true, it per- haps can be rationa lly supported, shown to be a rational belief.

Consider again the case of the fawn's suffering. There are two distinct questions we need to ra ise: "Does the fawn's suffering lead to some greater good?" and "Is the greater good to which it might lead such that an omnipotent, omniscient being cou ld not obtain it without perm itting the fawn's suffering?" It may strike us as unlikely that the answer to the first question is yes. And it may strike us as quite a bit more un likely that the answer to the second question is yes. But even if we shou ld think it is reason- able to beli eve that the fawn's suffering leads to a greater good unobtainable withou t that suffering, we must then ask whether it is reasonable to believe that all the instances of profound, seemingly pointless hu man and animal suffering lead to greater goods. And, if they shou ld somehow all lead to greater goods, is it reasonable to believe that an omnipotent, omn iscient being could not have brought about any of those goods without permitting the instances of suffering which supposed ly lead to them? When we consider these more general questions in the light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and profusion of human and animal suffering occurring daily in our world, it seems that the answer must be no. It seems quite unli kely that all the insta nces of intense human and animal suffering occurring daily in our world lead to greater goods, and even more unlikely that if they all do, an omnipotent, omniscient being could not have achieved at least some of those goods without permitting the instances of suffer- ing that lead to them. In the light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of those instances of suffering cou ld have been prevented by an omnipotent being without the loss of a greater good seems an extraord inary, absurd idea, qu ite beyond our belief. It seems then that a lthough we cannot prove that premise 1 is true, it is, nevertheless, altogether reasonable to believe that 1 is true, that it is a rational belief."

Some theisrs reject Premise 1 by appealing to human ignorance. They argue that there could be goods unkno\vn to us that justify the evil we see-goods compre- hended by God but beyond ou r ken. O r our concept of good may not be God's, for his morality is of a higher, purer kind than ours. In God's eyes, then, \vhat we believe is ev il might be good, or what \Ve think is good might be evil.

Defenders of Premise 1 reply that we may indeed be una\vare of goods that God discerns, but none of the goods we do know about could ever compensate for life's vast burden of seemingly g ratuitous evil. We need not know what God knows to be justified in believing Premise 1. As Rowe says,

That things appear to us to be a certain way is itself justificat ion for thinking things are this way. Of course, th is justificat ion may be de- feated. But apart from such defeat, the fact that th ings appear to us

God and the Prob lem of Evi l 87

to be a certa in way renders us rationally justifi ed in bel ieving that they are that way.'l

And co assert that God's morality is higher than ours, some argue, is co case doubt on a ll our moral judgments and co render meaningless our terms good and evil. J. L. Mackie observes chat on chis higher- morality vie\v, " When the theist says that God is wholly good he does not mean chat God has anything like the purposes and tendencies chat would count as good in a human being. But then why call him good? Is not chis d escription m isleading?"14

The Free Will Defense

To many theists, the best way co counter the argument from evil is co present a theo- dicy, an explanation of why God perm its evil. The point is co provide good reasons why evil may be a necessary part of God's creation, thereby showing that the argument from evil fails. Chief among such approaches is the free \viii defense, which is usually offered as an explanation of moral evi l. It says that human free will is an enormous good, so much so chat a universe \vhere humans have free will is better than one \vhere they don't, even if thei r exercise of freedom brings about much evil. Moral evil is the unavoidable byproduct of God's gift of free will. According co Richard S\vinburne,

Richard Swinburne, Is There a God?

The free-w ill defence cla ims that it is a great good that humans have a certain sort of free will wh ich I shall call free and responsible choice, but that, if they do, then neces- sarily there will be the natural possibility of moral evil. ... A God who gives humans such free will necessarily brings about the possibili ty, and puts outside his own control whether or not that evil occurs. It is not logical ly possible- that is, it wou ld be self. contrad ictory to suppose- that God cou ld give us such free will and yet ensure that we always use it in the right way.'s

H ere free w ill may sound like a serious restriction of God's po\ver (a denial of h is omn ipotence), but most philosophers, \vhether theist ic or not, have not taken that vie\v. They have interpreted God's omnipotence not as the power co do any- th ing whatsoever, but as the po\ver co do anything chat is logically possible. They h ave ackno\vledged that God cannot make a square circle or a married bachelo r, cause 2 + 2 co equal 5, o r create a triangle w ith four sides. But logical impossibili- t ies are fundamenta l faces about rea lity and are not thought co sec any restrictions on God's power.

Against the free will defense, two main objections have been raise.cl. The first is the contention chat there is no reason why an omnipotent God could not have created free agents \vho ahvays choose the good. As Mackie says, "If God has made men such that in their free choices they sometimes prefer \vhac is good and sometimes what is evil, why could he not have made men such chat they always freely choose the good?"16 Bue

What mean and crud things men do for ,he love

of God.

-Vl . Somerset Maugham

21 Is Mackie correct in saying that an omnipo- tent God could have created people with free will who always choose the good? Is such a state of affairs logically possible?

You can say rhat you trust God a nyway- that no

arguments can undermine your fai th. But th at is just a statemen t describing

how s tubborn you arc; it has no bearing w hatsoever o n the questio ns of God's

goodn ess. -B. C. Johnson

88 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

many theisrs assert that to ensu re people ahvays freely do what is right, God would have to farce them to do so-and forcing people to act freely is logically impossible.

The second objection is that even if God could not have made humans so they always freely choose the good, he could have at least made people such that they do less evil than they actually do. In this vie\v, God could have given people bet-

ter moral character so their desire to do good would be stronger and their desi re to do evil would be weaker. Such an a lteration in their character would not diminish their capacity to act freely, and even a slight change \vould reduce the amount of evil in the world. Many theists would object to this line, however, charging that such man ipulation of character by God would indeed curta il free wil l. God's t inkering with people's psychological makeup would be analogous to controlling a person's behavior t hrough hypnosis or d rugs.

The Soul-Making Defense

In any case, free wi ll is not the only good that has been offered as a justification fo r God's per m itting ev il. The philosopher John Hick says that t he greatest good is "soul-making." In h is theod icy, he argues that evil in t he fo rm of sufferi ng is necessary to provide humans w ith a world \vhere moral and spiritual progress is pos- sible. Personal growth-soul-mak ing-can take place only when people make free choices in response to the pain and anguish of living. Hick expla ins:

John Hick, Evil and the God of Love

Instead of regarding man as having been created by God in a fin ished state, as a finitely perfect being ful fi ll ing the divine intention for our hu man level of existence, and then fa lli ng disastrously away from t his, the [minority view) sees man as still in process of creation. lrenaeus himself expressed the point in terms of the (exegetically d ubious) distinction between the 'image' and the 'likeness' of God referred to in Genesis i. 26: 'Then God said, Let us make man in o ur image, after our likeness.' His view was that man as a personal and mora l being already exists in the image, but has not yet been formed into the fi nite likeness of God . By t his 'likeness' lrenaeus means something more than personal existence as s uch; he means a certain valuable quality of personal life which refl ects finitely the divine life. This represents the perfecting of man, t he ful- fi lment of God's purpose for hu man ity, the ' bringing of many sons to glory', t he creat- ing of 'children of God' who are 'fellow heirs with Christ' of his glory.

And so man , created as a personal being in the image of God , is on ly the raw mate- rial for a furt her and more difficult stage of God's creative work. This is the leading of men as relatively free and autonomous persons, through their own dealings with life in the world in which He has placed them, towards that quality of persona l existence that is the finite likeness of God . . . .

In the light of modern anthropological knowledge some form of two-stage concep- tion of the creation of man has become an almost unavoidable Christian tenet. At the very least we must acknowledge as two d istinguis hable stages the fas hioning of homo

God and the Prob lem of Evi l 89

sapiens as a product of the long evolutionary process, and his sudden or grad ual spiri- tua lization as a ch ild of God. But we may well extend the first stage to include the devel- opment of man as a rational and responsib le person capable of personal relationship with the personal Infinite who has created him. This first stage of the creative process was, to our anthropomorphic imaginations, easy for divine omn ipotence. By an exer- cise of creative power God caused t he physica l un iverse to exist, and in the course of countless ages to bring forth within it organic life, and fina lly to produce out of organic li fe personal li fe; and when man had thus emerged out of the evolution of t he forms of organic life, a creature had been made who has t he possibility of existing in conscious fell owship with God . But the second stage of t he creative process is of a different kind altogether. It cannot be performed by omnipotent power as such. For personal life is essentially free and self-directi ng. It cannot be perfected by divine fiat, but only th rou gh the uncompelled responses and will ing co-operation of hum an individuals in their ac- tions and reactions in t he world in which God has placed them . Men may eventually become t he perfected persons whom the New Testament ca ll s 'chi ldren of God ', but they cannot be created ready-made as th is.

The value-judgement that is im plici tly being invoked here is t hat one who has atta in ed to goodness by meeting and eventua lly mastering temptations, and thus by rightly making responsible choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuab le sense than would be one created ab initio in a state either of innocence or of virtue. In the former case, wh ich is that of the actual moral achievements of man - kind, the individua l's goodness has within it the strength of temptations overcome, a stability based upon an accumu lation of right choices, and a positive and responsible character that comes from the investment of costly personal effort. I suggest, then, that it is an ethically reasonable judgement, even though in the nature of t he case not one that is capable of demonstra tive proof, that human goodness slowly bu il t up t hrou gh personal histories of mora l effort has a value in the eyes of the Creator which justifies even the long travai l of t he sou l-making process ... .

If, then, God's aim in making the world is 'the bringing of many sons to glory', that aim will natu rally determine the kind of world t hat He has created. Antitheistic writers almost invariably assume a conception of t he divine purpose which is contrary to t he Christian conception. They assume that the purpose of a loving God must be to create a hedo nistic paradise; and therefore to the extent that the world is other than this, it proves to t hem that God is either not lovin g enough or not powerfu l enough to create such a world. They think of God's relation to the earth on t he model of a human being building a cage for a pet ani ma l to dwell in. If he is hu mane he will naturall y make his pet's quarters as pleasant and healthfu l as he can. Any respect in which the cage fall s short of the veterinarian's ideal, and contains possib ilities of accident or disease, is evidence of either li mi ted benevolence or limited means, or bot h. Those who use the problem of evil as an argument against belief in God almost invariab ly thin k of the world in this kind of way. David H ume, for example, speaks of an architect who is try- ing to plan a house that is to be as comfortable and convenient as poss ible. If we fi nd that 'the windows, doors, fi res, passages, stairs, and the whole economy of t he bu ild- ing were t he source of noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold' we shou ld have no hesitation in blami ng the arch itect. It wou ld be in vain for him to prove that if t his or that defect were corrected greater ill s wou ld resu lt: 'sti ll you would assert in general, that, if t he architect had had skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have remedied all or most of these inconveniences'.

22 According t o Hick, what is t he " soul - making process"? Is it, as he says, of such great va lue that it justifies all the human and animal suffering involved in it?

90 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

John Hick, Evil and the God of Love

Bu t if we are right in supposing that God's purpose for man is to lead him from hu man Bios, or the biological life of man, to that quality of Zoe, or the personal life of eternal worth, wh ich we see in Christ , t hen the question that we have to ask is not, Is this the kind of world that an all-powerfu l and in finitely loving being wou ld create as an environment for his human pets? or, Is the architecture of the world the most pleasant and convenient possible? The question that we have to ask is rather, Is this the kind of world that God m ight make as an environment in wh ich moral beings may be fash- ioned, through t he ir own free insights and responses, into 'children of God'?

Such critics as Hume are confusing what heaven ought to be, as an environment for perfected finite beings, with what this world ought to be, as an environment for be- ings who are in process of becoming perfected. For if our general conception of God's purpose is correct the world is not intended to be a paradise, but rather the scene of a history i n which hu man personality may be formed towards the pattern of Christ. Men are not to be t hought of on the ana logy of ani ma l pets, whose life is to be made as agreeable as possible, but rather on the analogy of human chi ldren, who are to grow to adu lthood in an environment whose primary and overriding purpose is not immedi- ate pleasure but the realizing of the most valuable potentia lities of hu man personality.

Need less to say, this characterization of God as the heavenly Father is not a merely random illustration but an analogy that lies at the heart of the Christian faith. Jesus treated the likeness between the attitude of God to ma n and the attitude of human parents at their best towards their children, as provid ing the most adequate way for us to thi nk about God. And so it is altogether relevant to a Christia n understanding of this world to ask, H ow does the best parental love express itself in its infl uence upon the environment in which chi ldren are to grow up? I think it is clear that a parent who loves his children, and wants them to become the best hu man beings that they are capable of becoming, does not treat pleasure as the sole and supreme value. Certainly we seek pleasure for our children, and take great delight in obtaining it for them; but we do not desire for them unalloyed pleasure at the expense of their growth in such even greater values as moral integrity, unselfishness, compassion, courage, humour, reverence for the truth, and per- haps above all the capacity for love. We do not act on the premise that pleasure is the su- preme end of life; and if the development of these other values sometimes clashes with the provision of pleasure, then we are willing to have our ch ildren miss a certain amount of this, rather than fail to come to possess and to be possessed by the finer and more precious qualities that are possible to the hu man personali ty. A child brought up on the principle that the on ly or the supreme va lue is pleasure would not be likely to become an ethically mature adu lt or an attractive or happy persona lity. And to most parents it seems more importa nt to try to foster quality and strength of character in their children than to fill their lives at all times with the utmost possible degree of pleasure. If, then, there is any true analogy between God's purpose for his hu ma n creatures, and the purpose of loving and wise parents for their children, we have to recognize that the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain cannot be the supreme and overriding end for which the world exists. Rather, this world must be a place of sou l-making. And its value is to be judged, not primarily by the quantity of pleasure and pain occurring in it at any particular mo- ment, bu t by its fitness for its prim ary purpose, the purpose of soul-making ....

If, then, the evi l in human life finally reveals its nature according as it becomes or fa ils to become a phase in t he fu lfilment of God's purpose, we must conclude, so far as the present life is concerned, that there are both good and evi l suffering, and that there are redeemed and unredeemed sinners. Any revision of the verdict m ust depend upon lengthening t he perspective out until it reaches a new and better conclusion.

God and the Prob lem of Evi l 91

If there is a ny eventual resolutio n of the interplay between good and evil, any deci sive bringing of good out of evil , it m ust lie beyond this world and beyond the enigm a of death. Therefore we can not hope to state a Christian theod icy witho ut taking seriously the doctrine of a life beyond the grave. This doctrine is not, of course, based upon a ny theory of natural immortality, but upon the hope th at beyond death God will resurrect or re-create or reconstitute the human personality in both its inne r a nd its outer as- pects. The Christian cla im is that the ultimate life of m an- after what further scenes of 'sou l-making' we do no t know- lies in that Kingdom of God which is depicted in the teachi ng of Jesus as a state of exultant and blissful happiness, symbolized as a joyous banquet in which all and sund ry, having accepted God's gracious invi tation, rejoice to- gether. And Ch ris tian theodi cy must point forward to th at final blessed ness, a nd claim that th is in fin ite future good will render worthwhile all the pain and t rava il a nd wicked- ness that has occurred on the way to it. Theod icy cannot be conte nt to look to the past, seeking an explanation of evil in its origin s, but must look toward s the future, expecting a triumphant resolution in the eventual perfect fu lfilment of God's good purpose.'7

Critics have assa iled Hick's view on several fronts, arguing t hat suffering can warp character as well as build it, that God's allo\ving people to suffer fo r t heir own good constitutes morally repugnant paternalism , a nd that H ick's t heodicy has the bizarre implication t hat our trying to erad icate evil would be \vrong. Rowe's main criticism is t hat far more evil afflicts people than is required for soul-mak ing:

The problem Hick's theodicy leaves us is that it is altogether rea- sonable to believe that some of the evil s that occur could have been prevented witho ut either d im inishing our mora l and s piritual devel- opment or undermi ning o ur confidence tha t the world operates ac- cording to natural laws .18

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 2.3

1. Do you th ink H ick's soul-making theodicy is an adequate response to the argu ment from evil? Explain.

2. Do you believe that Rowe's argument from ev il is sound? Do you accept his fi rs t prem ise? Why or w hy not?

3. Consider this view: The evil experienced on this earth is n il when compared to the infin ite and eternal happiness that Christians will ex- perience a fter death. If t his assertion is true, does it successfully rebut the argu ment from evil?

4. Some say that \vhat humans m ight consider ev il is actually good in the eyes of an omn iscient God with infinite wisdom. Evaluate this claim.

5. Do you believe that p hysical good is impossible without p hysical evil? That is, is evil necessar y for good to ex ist? Alter natively, is evil needed so we can understand and appreciat e the good?

Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil. - Isaiah 5:20 (King James Vers ion)

23 Do you thin k Rowe's criticism of t h e soul-making t heod icy is cogent? Ca n you conceive of a world t ha t has slight ly less suffer ing than o u r wo rld has, yet in which p le nty of soul-making t akes p la ce?

92 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

24 Can all relig ious ex- periences be expla ined in naturalistic t erms? Are t he naturalistic ex- planations better than the theistic one? What crit eria would you use to decide?

God is real since he pro· duces real effects. -William James

2.4 THEISM AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Many people affi rm that thei r belief in God does not rest on the k inds of appeals we have just examined. The cosmological, teleological, and ontological a rgumenrs carry no \veight with them. They believe in God because they have had a religious exper i- ence that they think gives them kno\vledge of God's existence. For them, it is this religious experience t hat justifies thei r theism.

Some mainta in that their encou nters with t he divine involve sensory content- they hear a voice, feel a touch, o r see a light or a face o r a form. Many biblical accounrs-such as St. Paul's encounter on the road to Damascus and Moses' hearing a voice from a burning bush-are like th is. Other people report hav ing no sensations

at a ll but nonetheless sensing a d ivine p resence. Here is one such description from St. Teresa of Av ila:

St. Teresa of Avila, The Life of Teresa of Jesus

I was at prayer on a fest ival of the glorious Saint Peter whe n I saw Christ at my side- or, to put it better, I was conscious of Him, for neither with the eyes of t he body nor with those of the soul did I see anything. I thought He was quite close to me a nd I saw that it was He Who, as I t ho ught, was speaking to me.'9

And here, from Wi lliam James, is another:

[A]II at once I experienced a feeling of being raised above myself, I fe lt the presence of God- I tell of the thing just as I was conscious of it- as if his goodness and his power were penetrating me altogether. The throb of emotion was so violent that I could barely tell the boys to pass on and not wait for me .... Then, slowly, the ecstasy left my heart; that is, I felt that God had withdrawn the comm union which he had granted, and I was able to walk on, but very slowly, so strongly was I still possessed by the interior emotion .... I thi nk it well to add that in thi s ecstasy of mine God had neither form, color, odor, nor taste; moreover, that the fee li ng of his presence was accom panied with no determinate loca lization. It was rather as if my personality had been tra nsformed by the presence of a spiritual spirit . ... At bottom the expression most apt to render what I fe lt is thi s: God was present, though invis ible; he fell under no one of my senses, yet my consciousness perceived him.'0

Since such occurrences a re thought to justify belief in God, we can dev ise an argument from religious experience that looks like this:

1. Religious experiences occur in \vhich God seems to be sensed. 2. The best explanation for these experiences is that God is indeed sensed (God

caused the experience). 3. Therefore, God probably ex ists.

Theism and Religious Experience 93

Premise I is true. Few deny that people have experiences that they take co be of God. Premise 2, however, is not obv iously true and is often concesce.d. Some critics reject it on che g rounds that natu ralistic explanations of religious experiences are as good as, o r better than, theistic explanations. J. L. Mack ie, for example, points out chat religious experiences are generally ind istinguishable from experiences \vich a kno\vn psychological or physical cause.

J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism

We are all fam iliar with dreams. Waking visions and hallucinations are relatively infre- quent, but still common enough . Many people have occasionally had the impression of hearing words spoken when there have been no such physical sounds in the neighbour- hood. Many religious experiences closely resemble, even in their sequences of contrast- ing phases, the almost universal human experience of being in love. Hysteria, delusions, cycles of man ia and depression are known and reasonably well understood psychopathic phenomena in innumerable cases where there is no religious component; but experi- ences which have such components, which count as religious par excellence, share many features with these pathological ones. Experiences of the mystical kind are often induced by certain drugs. Some of the experiences reported by mystics almost irresistibly invite in- terpretation as expressions of violent sexual passion. From a psychological point of view, as [William] James himself makes clear, the phenomena of conversion, 'mind-cure', sensory or motor automatisms (such as hearing voices) , in- spiration, mysticism, and so on lend themselves very readily to being un- derstood in terms of the operation of unconscious or subconscious parts of the mind .... Theologians themselves have long recognized that it is not easy to decide, about particular visions and messages, whether they come fro m God or from the devil. As James says ... 'No appearances whatever are infallible proofs of grace .... The good dispositions that a vi- sion, a voice, or other apparently heavenly favor leave beh ind them are the only marks by which we may be sure that they are not possible deceptions of the tempter'. Admittedly these alternatives, God and the devil, would both fall under the broad heading of 'some supernatural source'. But it will be fa irly read ily admitted today that the experiences initially ascribed to the devil are fully explicable in terms of purely human but su bconscious motives; since it is also admitted that those which the theologian would ascribe to God are not intrinsically distingu ishable from those which he would in itially ascribe to the devil, it follows that even what he classes as genuinely religious experiences do not intrinsically resist explanation in purely human terms. And this in itself seems fata l to any argument from religious experience to any supernatural conclusions whatever."

Seil!, some contend chat a rel igious experience can give us good reasons for believing chat God exists, just as ord inary sense experience can give us good reasons for believing chat a cat is on che mac. Richard S\vinbu rne takes chis line. He maintains that by applying a basic prin- ciple of rationality (\vhac he calls the "p rinciple of credulity"), we can

Figure 2.12 The Bible tells of Paul's con- version to Christianity after being struck bl ind during an encounter w ith God on the road to Damascus. Was it possible for Paul to know that he experienced God instead of, say, a very powerfu l Greek or Roman deity?

94 Chapter 2 God and Religion

PHILOSOPHY LAB - Read the rwo sets of statements below. On the left is a list of sensory or perceptual experiences char people have from rime ro rime. There is no question about the re- ality of these experiences; both common sense and science show char they do in face occur. On the right is a list of experiences char religious people often report. Noc everyone agrees char these experiences have a spiritual or religious cause.

They sometimes feel a "sense of presence," a psychological stare char engenders a fee ling char someone unseen is nearby, even though no one is really there.

They sometimes fee l certain about an idea or claim even when they are facrually ,vrong. This sense of certainty often arises from strong emotions.

They sometimes feel rhac something or someone unseen is touching rhem even when nothing is there- a known psychological or physiological reaction.

They sometimes feel che presence of God.

They sometimes have a strong feeling of certainty about religious matters.

They sometimes have seemingly physical sensations chat suggest chat God is touching chem.

Suppose you are religious and you have the experiences listed on the right. How do you distinguish these from the natural occur- rences on the left? Saying that you "just know" does not answer

the question. Do you have a special faculty unknown to science that helps you distinguish the two? What exactly allows you to separate the natural phenomena from the genuinely spiritual? Does faith en-

able you to tell the difference between the two kinds of events? Is it possible to misidentify your sensations?

be justified in believing chat o ur e xpe rie nce reveals God 's presence. The principle

is ro ug hly this: In the absence of reasons co the contra ry, if some t hi ng seems co be present, then it probably is present. Whe n applied co religious experiences, t he prin- ciple cells us that "in t he absence of s pecial considerations, a ll religious e xpe rie nces

o ught co be taken by thei r subjects as ge nuine, and hence as substantial grou nds for

bel ief in t he e xist ence of their appare nt object-G od, Mary, o r Ultimate R ealit y,

or Poseidon." 22 The special conside ra t ions include doubts abou t t he reliabil ity of t he

Theism and Religious Experience 95

perception (for example, when t he person involved is known to hallucinate or to be under the influence of alcohol o r d rugs) and strong evidence that the object of the perception does not exist.

Clearly, to make sense of ou r o rdinary experience and to acquire true beliefs, we must apply an epistemological rule like Swinburne's principle of credulity. But his

principle is fau lty, some say, inclin ing us to believe that an object is present when it isn't. Others doubt that any such p rincip le could ever justify us in bel ieving that a religious experience accu rately reveals reality. As W illiam L. Ro,ve says,

Will iam L. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion

[T]he Principle of Credulity presu pposes that we have some understand ing of what reasons there might be for questioning our experiences and some way of telling whe- ther or not these reasons are present. Consider aga in our example of your experience which you take to be a perception of a large, coiled snake. Like other physical objects that make up the world we perceive by our fi ve senses , snakes are publi c objects that are observable by others who satisfy certa in conditio ns. That is, we can pred ict t hat people with good eyesight will see a snake (if o ne is there) provided there is good li ght and t hey look in the right directio n. It is because physica l objects are subject to such predictions that we ca n understa nd what reasons t here might be for questio ning an experience which seems to be a perceptio n of a snake and ca n often tell whether such reasons are present . In the case of divine beings, however, matters are quite d iffere nt. Presumably, it is entirely up to God whether to revea l his presence to some hum an be- ing. If God does so, he may or may not d isclose him self to others who are in a similar situation. What this means is that it is quite difficu lt to discover reasons for t hinking that someone's ordinary religio us experience is delusive. But s ince t he Principle of Credu lity supposes that we understand what reasons t here might be to question an experience, some dou bt exists as to whether the principle can be fair ly applied to ex- periences whose subjects take them be perceptions of t he presence of a d ivine being.'3

By the lights of any adequate p rincip le of rationality, we generally have good reason to doubt the t ruth of an experience if those ,vho have it disagree about it. That is, we rightfu lly doubt experiences if they a re not rel iable. Many point to the apparent incompatibil ity of religious experiences as p roof that they a re indeed un- reliable. Generally, religious experiences in Western trad itions are of a God who is a divine person separate from the world. But experiences in Eastern trad itions a re often of a d ivine something that is entirely impersonal or identical with t he world. Believers may have an experience of God as one being, God as a trinity of persons, God as many, God as emptiness o r noth ingness, or God as an ultimate reality. If someone experiences God as a person and another experiences God as impersonal, how can both of these experiences be true? H o,v can both of them p rov ide a window on reality? Religious experiences tend to arise o ut of and support specific rel igious

t raditions-trad itions that differ drastically and disagree substantially in their views of spiritual reality. Conflicts among experiences o r t raditions that spa,vn experiences seem to cast doubt on the trustworthiness of all alleged encounters with the divine.

25 Why does Rowe doubt t hat Swinburne's principle of credulity can be successfully applied to religious ex- perience? Do you agree with him?

9 6 Chapter 2 God and Religion

PH I LOSO PHY NOW

Proof of the Power of Prayer?

Praying for ochers (intercessory prayer) is a com,non practice of millions world,vide, and its efficacy is an article of faith for nu,nerous religious groups. For ,nose, it isn't necessary co prove so,nehow that prayer works; they have faith that it does, and that's that. Bur a few have sought proof through science, hop- ing to uncover evidence that praying for sick people can make them well.

A fa,nous 1988 study by cardiologist Randolph Byrd looked at medical cornpl ica- rions in heart patients, some of,vho,n were prayed for and so,ne nor. Those who ,vere prayed for seemed to do bet- ter chan rhe ochers. In 1999, a larger, simi lar study of heart patients found that the prayed-for group had fewer medica l problems than a group nor prayed for. In a Figure 2.13 Can science prove that prayer works?

200 1 study of eight hundred heart patients, researchers found no significant effect of intercessory prayer on the patients' health. In 2006, researchers stud ied eighteen hundred people ,vho had undergone heart surgery and d iscovered char prayer had no effect on their recovery.

Unfortunately, most prayer studies have been too Aawed for their results to be taken seri- ously. The upshot is char so far, science has nor shown that intercessory prayer can improve people's health.

Many critics (both religious and nonrel ig ious) think th is kind of research is hopelessly misgu ided. To them, since intercessory prayer is neither well defined nor explained, studying it see,ns like chasing shadows. Son1e ask, Do the effects of prayer depend on the number or the faith of the people praying? If a deity can intervene in human affairs at any rime, how can researchers ever crust study results? How can scientists cake into account che inAuence of prayers fro,n people nor involved in the studies?

Do you believe that intercessory prayer works? What are your grounds for

believing or not be liev ing? Could science ever prove that prayer has rea l effects?

Theism and Religious Experience 97

Swinburne, ho\vever, thinks othenvise:

Richard Swin b urne, The Existence of God

Now, of course, devotees of different religions describe their religious experiences in t he religious vocabu lary with which they are fam iliar. Bu t in itself th is does not mean t hat their d ifferent descriptions are in confl ict- God may be known under different names to different cultures (as both Old and New Testaments acknowledge- see Exo- dus 6:2- 3 and Acts l]:23). Likewise a Greek's cla im to have talked to Poseidon is not necessaril y in conflict with a Jew's claim to have talked to t he angel who watches over t he sea; it is so only if to admit t he existence of Poseidon is to comm it one to a whole polytheistic theology, and there is no need to suppose t hat generally it is.

Adm itted ly, sometimes t he giving of one description to the object of religious ex- perience does carry comm itment to a doctrine regarded as fa lse by devotees of another religion. Claiming to have experienced the heavenly Christ commits one to a belief in an Incarnation that an orthodox Jew wou ld not adm it. Bu t in these cases, if t he oppo- nent of t he doctrine can produce good grounds for regard ing the doctrine as false, that is reason for the subject of the experience to withdraw his original claim. Among those grounds may be that others have had confl icting experiences and that their experiences are more numero us and better authenticated; but t here may be many grounds of other kinds as well. The subject of the religious experience need not in such a case withdraw his original cla im totally; he need only describe it in a less committed way- for ex- ample, claim to have been aware of some supernatura l being, not necessarily Dionysus (as originally claimed). The fact that sometimes ... descriptions of t he object of a religious experience are in conflict with descriptions of the object of another rel igious experience means on ly that we have a source of challenge to a particular deta iled claim, not a source of scepticism about a ll claims of rel igious experience.'"'

S uppose, then, that religious experiences did not clash in any important way. C-ould \Ve then conclude that such experiences sho\v that God ex isrs? Perhaps, but

agreement among experiences in itself cannot sho\v that they yield knowledge of the divine, for we know that people ca n have the same sensory experience that turns out to be illusory (s uch as seeing a mirage).

Skeptics give another reason for denying that harmony among religious experiences attests to d ivine presence: the d ifficulty of recognizing God. They ask, How can you ever be sure that you are perceiving or experiencing God? Can you recognize an all-po\verful, al l-knowing, and all-good being when you encounter it? How can you distinguish such a being from one that is incredibly powerful but finite, or one that is enormously power- ful and knowledgeable but demonic? In any case, ho\v can \Ve use our senses to detect God, since he presumably cannot be sensed? Some say their experiences come \vith a feeling of certainty that God is present. But ho\v can such fee lings give us knowledge? Feelings are not a reliable source of kno\vledge, for \Ve can feel certain about many things and still be wrong. Some think we can recognize God th rough a kind of spiritual sixth sense. But unlike our ord inary senses, which have been tested again and again fo r reliability, no extra sense has been shown to be trusnvorthy. So ho\v can we rely on it?

In man y areas of u nd e r ..

standing. none so much as in ou r understan d ing of

God, we bump u p against

a simp licity so profou nd tha t we must assign com-

plexities to it to comprc·

hcnd it at all. It is mindful of h ow we paste decals to a slid ing glas.s d oor ro keep

fro m b umping our nose agai ns t it. - Robert Brault

98 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

Theists have tried in various ,vays to answer these questions. O ne frequently heard defense is that the validity of religious experien ce does not depend o n agree- ment or disagreement among va rious descriptions of it, for the true religious experi- en ce can not be describe.cl at a ll. The experience is the same fo r everyone, but it gives rise to d ifferent descriptions because it is ineffable. It simply is not possible to put into word s an encounter ,vith the divi ne.

Perhaps an experience of God is indeed ineffable, but if so then nothing at a ll can be truthfully asserted about it, including the claim that religious experience can give us k nowledge of God 's existence. If nothi ng can be truthfully stated about something, then any statement about it would be false. So to affirm that ineffable religious experience gives us knowledge of God is to likewise assert something false.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 2.4

1. Some a rgue that the truth of rel igious experiences is corroborated by positive effects in the lives of those who have them-such as leading a morally better life. But consider: People can be inspired to be more virt uous by read ing compel ling works of fiction, but that doesn't show that the ,vorks a re true. If an alleged experience of God inspires some- o ne to lead a better li fe, is that reason enough to conclude that the experience is indeed of God?

2. W h at is the best explanation of religious experiences? Evaluate these nvo rival hypotheses: (1) religious experiences are caused by God; (2) religious experiences arise from people's o,vn m inds (due to hallucinations, wish- ful thi nk ing, drugs, etc.). Which explanation is better? W hy?

3. What is S,vi nburne's principle of credulity? W hat is Ro,ve's criticism of it? Do you agree ,vith Rowe?

4. Do disagreemenrs among religious experiences cast doubt on the trust- worthi ness of those experiences? Do you agree ,vith Swinburne's view that such disagreemen rs do not necessarily underm ine the truth of the experiences?

5. Is it possible for someone to d istinguish between an experience of an omnipotent God and an experience of a bei ng that is extremely power- fu l but fi n ite?

2.5 BELIEF WITHOUT REASON

The point of the arguments we've cons idered so far is to provide epistemic justification for believ ing (or not believing) in God-that is, reasons for believ ing that theism is tr ue (or false). But there are a lso argu ments intended to offer pragmatic justificatio n

Bel i et Without Reason 99

fo r belief.-reasons to think that believing in God offers practical advantages. Many who make pragmatic appeals d eny that there can be any rational grounds for theism. They are convince.cl that the best-made arguments for God's ex istence are doomed to fail, but that \Ve should believe anyway because belief brings \vith it certain invalu- able benefits. In this way they can maintain that even though the truth of theism is not backed by reasons, belief in God can nevertheless be rational.

The best examples of such arguments come from William James (1842-1910), the distinguished American philosopher and psychologist, and Blaise Pascal (1623- 1662), the French philosopher and mathematician who devise.cl what we no\v call " Pascal's wager."

James: Pragmatic Faith

C-ontrary to his scientifically m inde.d colleagues, James argues that sometimes \Ve may be justified in making a leap of faith to embrace a belief that is entirely unsup- ported by evidence. In the absence of any evidence t hat could help us decide an is- s ue, when we are p resented with a t rue choice between opposing beliefs (a "genuine option"), believing on faith may be the rational thing to do. To James, a genuine option is one that is live, forced, and momentous. A live option presents someone with alternatives that he believes could possibly be actualize.cl. A forced option is one that is unavoidable because the two poss ibilities are mutually exclusive, and not deciding is the same as choosing one of the alternatives. (An example from James is, "Eit her accept this truth or go \Vithout it.") A momentous option is one that really m at ters, because t he stakes are high, the decision is irrevers ible, or the choice offers a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. When we are confronted with a genuine option \Vit h no evidence to go by, James says, \Ve have the right to let our "passional natu re"-our feelings and d esires-decid e.

James thus repud iates eviden tialism , the vie\v that we a re justifi ed in believing someth ing only if it is supported by sufficient evidence. In James's day, the fo remost champion of evidentialism was W. K. C lifford, \vho d eclared, " It is \vrong ahvays, everywhere, and fo r anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."15 In other words, it is morally zurong to believe beyond the evidence. Aga inst th is position James asserts, "Our passional nature not only la\vfully may, but must, decide an op- tion between p ropositions, whenever it is a genu ine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds."26

To James, the decis ion to believe or not to believe in a d ivine reality (the "reli- gious hypothesis") is a genuine option that the intellect cannot help us decide. It is indeed momentous, for '\ve are supposed to gain, even no\v, by our belief, and to lose by ou r nonbelief, a certain vital good."17 The skeptic, out of fear of being wrong, would have us refra in from believing and wait until evidence tilts one way or the other. But James insists that the w iser choice-and the more advantageous-is to believe the religious hypothesis, to refuse to forfeit you r "sole chance in life of get- t ing upon the winning side." Moreover, to discover whether a divine being exists, we may fi rst have to have faith t hat it does. Unless we first believe, we may not be able to confirm t he truth through our O\vn experience. One who insists on evidence

Believe ,hat life is worth

living, and your belief will help c rca<c that fact. -William James

Evid entialism is th e view that we arc justified in bel ievi ng som ething o nly if

it is s up po rted by s ufficient evidence.

The way ro sec by fai th is to shut t he eye of reason . -Benjamin Franklin

100 Chapter 2 God and Religion

before bel ief " might cut himself off forever from his only opportunity of making the

gods' acquaintance."

This is how James makes his case:

W il li am Ja mes, " The W i ll t o Believe"

Let us give the na me of hypothesis to anyth ing that may be proposed to our belief; and just as the electricia ns speak of live and dead wires, let us speak of any hypothesis as either Jive or dead. A live hypothesis is one which appeals as a rea l possibil ity to him to whom it is proposed . If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no electric connection with your natu re- it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all. As an hy- pothesis it is comp letely dead. To an Arab, however (even ifhe be not one of the Mahdi's followers), the hypothesis is among the mind's possibilities: it is alive. This shows that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the individual th inker. They are measu red by his willi ngness to act. The maximum of liveness in an hypothesis mea ns willi ngness to act irrevocably. Practically, that means belief; but there is some believing tendency wherever there is will ingness to act at all.

Next, let us call the decision between two hypotheses an option. Options may be of several kinds. They may be-1, living or dead; 2, forced or avoidable; 3, momentous or trivial; and for our pu rposes we may call an option a genuine option when it is of the forced, li ving and momentous kind.

1. A living option is one in which both hypotheses are li ve ones. If I say to you: " Be a theosoph ist or be a Mohammedan," it is probably a dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is li kely to be alive. But if I say " Be an agnostic or be a Christian" it is otherwise: tra in ed as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal, however sma ll , to your belief.

2. Next, if I say to you: "Choose between going out with your umbrell a or with out it," I do not offer you a genuine option for it is not forced. You can easily avoid it by not going out at all. Si milarly, if I say "Either love me or hate me," " Either call my theory true or ca ll it false," your option is avoidable. You may remain ind ifferent to me, neither loving nor hating, and you may decl ine to offer any j udgment as to my theory. But if I say "Either accept this truth or go without it," I put on you a forced option for there is no stand in g place outside of t he alternative. Every dilemma based on a complete logical d isjunction, with no possibil ity of not choosing, is an option of this forced kind.

3. Fina lly, if I were Dr. Nansen and proposed to you to join my North Pole expedi- tion, your option wou ld be momentous; for this wou ld probably be your on ly similar opportun ity, and your choice now wou ld either exclude you from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether or put at least the chance of it in to your hands. He who refuses to embrace a unique opportunity loses the prize as surely as if he tried and failed. Per contra, the option is trivial when the opportunity is not un iq ue, when the stake is insignificant, or when the decision is reversible ifit later proves unwise. Such t rivial op- tions abound in the scientific life. A chemist finds an hypothesis live enough to spend a year in its verification: he believes in it to that extent. Bu t if his experiments prove inconclusive either way, he is qu it for his loss of time, no vital harm being done.

Belief Without Reason 10 1

It will facilitate ou r discussion if we keep all these distinctions well in m ind .

... It fortifies my sou l to know That, though I perish, Truth is so- sings Clough, whi lst H uxley excla ims: "My only consolation lies in the reflection

that, however bad our posterity may become, so long as they hold by the plain ru le of not pretend ing to believe what they have no reason to believe because it may be to their advantage so to pretend [the word 'pretend' is surely here red undan t), they will not have reached the lowest depths of immora li ty." And that delicious enfant terrible Clifford writes: "Beli ef is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements, for the solace and private pleasure of the believer .... Whoso would deserve well of his fell ows in th is matter will guard the purity of his belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it shou ld rest on an unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away .... If [a] belief has been accepted on ins ufficie nt evidence [even though the beli ef be true, as Clifford on the same page explains], the pleasure is a sto- len one .... It is sinfu l, because it is stolen in defiance of our duty to mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence, which may shortly master our own body and then spread to the rest of the town . . . . It is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."

111

All th is strikes one as healthy, even when expressed, as by Cl ifford, with somewhat too much of robustious pathos in the voice. Free-will and sim ple wish ing do seem, in the matter of our credences, to be only fifth wheels to the coach. Yet if anyone should thereupon assume that intellectual insight is what re mains after wish and will and sentimental preference have taken wing, or that pure reason is what then settles our opinions, he would fl y qu ite as directly in the teeth of the facts ....

Here in th is room, we all of us believe in molecu les and the conservation of energy, in democracy and necessary progress, in protestan t Christianity and the duty of fight- ing for "the doctrine of t he immorta l Monroe," all for no reasons worthy of the name. We see into these matters with no more inner clea rness, and probably with much less, than any disbeliever in t hem might possess .... Our reason is qu ite satisfied, in ni ne hundred and ninety-nine cases out of every thousand of us, if it can find a few argu- ments that will do to recite in case our credu lity is criticized by some one else. Our faith is faith in someone else's faith, and in the greatest matters this is most the case. Our belief in truth itself, for insta nce, that t he re is a t ru th, and that our minds and it are made for each other,- what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up? We want to have a truth; we want to believe that our experiments and stud ies and discussions must put us in a continua lly better and better position towards it; and on this line we agree to fight out our thinking lives. But if a pyr- rhonistic sceptic asks us how we know all this, can our logic find a reply? No! Certa inly it cannot. It is just one volition aga inst another,-we are willing to go in for life upon a trust or assumption which he, for his part, does not care to make .... As a rule we d isbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use ....

Evidently, then, our nonintellectual nature does infl uence our convictions. There are pass iona l tendencies and volitions which run before and others wh ich come after belief, and it is on ly the latter that are too late for the fair; and they are not too late when

"Faith" means not wanting

to know.

-Friedrich N ietzsche

26 Do you agree with Clifford t hat it is immora l t o believe any- t hing on insufficient evidence? Why or why not?

102 Chapter 2 God and Religion

William James, "The Will to Believe"

27 Is it ever rat ional to believe someth ing w ithout evidence? James says yes; Cl ifford says no. Who is right ?

the previous pass iona l work has been already in their own direction. Pasca l's argu- ment, instead of being powerless, then seems a regular clincher, and is t he last stroke needed to make our faith in masses and holy water complete. The state of th ings is evidently far from simple; and pure insight and logic, whatever they might do ideally, are not the on ly th ings that rea lly do produce our creeds.

Our next duty, having recognized this mixed up state of affairs, is to ask whether it be simply reprehensible and pathological, or whether, on the contrary, we must treat it as a normal element in making up our m inds. The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, th is: Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between proposi- tions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision just like deciding yes or no,-and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth . ...

VII

... There are two ways of looking at our duty in t he matter of opinion,-ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose d ifference the t heory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown very li ttle concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid error,- these are our first and great commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws. Although it may indeed happen that when we believe the truth A, we escape as an incidental consequence from believing the falsehood B, it hard ly ever happens that by merely disbelieving B we necessarily bel ieve A. We may in escaping B fall into believing other falsehoods, C or D, just as bad as B; or we may escape B by not believing anyth ing at all , not even A.

Believe truth ! Sh un error!- these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing between them we may end by colouring differently our whole intellectual li fe. We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as second- ary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance. Clifford, in the instructive passage which I have quoted, exhorts us to the latter course. Believe nothing, he tells us, keep your mind in suspense forever, rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence incur the awful risk of believing lies. You, on the other ha nd, may think that the risk of being in error is a very small matter when compared with the blessings of real knowledge, and be ready to be duped many times in your investigation rather than postpone indefinitely the chance of guessing true. I myself find it impossible to go with Clifford. We must remember that these feelings of our duty about either truth or error are in any case only expressions of our passional li fe. Biologi- cally considered, our m inds are as ready to grind out falsehood as veracity, and he who says "Better go without bel ief forever than believe a lie!" merely shows his own prepon- derant private horror of becoming a dupe. He may be critical of many of his desires and fears, bu t th is fear he slavishly obeys. He cannot imagine anyone questioning its bind ing force. For my own part, I have also a horror of being duped; but I can believe that worse things than being duped may happen to a ma n in this world: so Clifford's exhortation has to my ears a thoroughly fantastic sound. It is like a genera l informing his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a single wound . Not so are victories either over enemies or over nature gained. Our errors are surely not such awfu lly solemn things.

Belief Without Reason 103

In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain light- ness of heart seems hea lthier than thi s excessive nervousness on their behalf. At any rate, it seems the fittest thing for the empiricist philosopher.

VIII

... The question next arises: Are t here not somewhere forced options in our speculative questions, and can we (as men who may be interested at least as much in positively gaining truth as in merely escaping dupery) always wa it with impunity till the coercive evidence sha ll have arrived? It seems a priori improbable that t he truth should be so nicely adjusted to o ur needs and powers as that. In the great board inghouse of nature, the cakes and the butter and the syrup seldom come out so even and leave the plates so clean. Indeed, we should view t he m with scientific suspicion if they did.

Mora l questions immed iately present themselves as questio ns whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof. A mora l question is a question not of what sensib ly exists, but of w hat is good, or would be good if it did exist. Science can tell us what exists; but to compare the worths, both of what exists and of what does not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal call s our heart. Science herself consu lts her heart when she lays it down that the infinite ascertainment of fact and correctio n of false belief are the supreme goods for man. Challenge the statement and science can only repeat it oracularly, or else prove it by showing that such ascertainment and correction bring man all sorts of other goods which man's heart in turn declares. The question of having moral beliefs at all or not having t hem is decided by o ur will. Are o ur moral preferences true or fa lse, or are t hey only odd biologica l phenomena, making things good or bad for us, but in themselves indifferent? How can your pure intellect decide? If your heart does not wa nt a world of moral reali ty, your head will assured ly never make you believe in one. Mephistophelian scepticism, indeed, w ill satisfy the head 's play-instincts much better than any rigorous idealism can. Some men (even at the student age) are so nat urall y cool-hearted that the mora listic hypothesis never has for them any pungent life, and in their supercilious presence the hot young moralist always feels strangely ill at ease. The appearance of knowingness is on their side, of naivete and gullibili ty on his. Yet, in the ina rticulate hea rt of him, he clings to it that he is not a dupe, and that there is a realm in which (as Emerson says) all their wit and intellectual superiority is no better than the cunning of a fox. Moral scepticism can no more be refuted or proved by logic than intellectual scepticism can. When we stick to it t hat t here is truth (be it of either kind), we do so with o ur whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results. The sceptic with his whole nature adopts the doubting attitude; but which of us is t he wiser, Omniscience only knows.

Turn now from these wide questions of good to a certai n class of questio ns of fact, questio ns concern ing personal relations, states of mind between one man and another. Do you like me or not?- for example. Whether you do or not depends, in countless in- stances, o n whet he r I meet you half..vay, am wi lli ng to assume that you must li ke me, and show you trust and expectation. The previous fa ith o n my part in your liking's exis- tence is i n such cases what makes your liking come. But if I stand aloof, and refuse to budge an i nch until I have objective evidence, until you shall have done something apt, as the absolutists say, ad extorquendum assensum meum, ten to one your liking never comes. How many women's hearts are vanq uished by the mere sangu ine insistence

I respect fu ith, but doubt is what gets you an

education.

-\X'ilson MizJ\er

28 Are t he beliefs involved in James's do-you-like-me exam- ple really groundless? Or are they backed by basic principles of human psychology?

104 Chapter 2 God and Religion

of some man that they must love hi m! He wi ll not consent to the hypothes is that they cannot. The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about that specia l truth's existence; and so it is i n in- nu merable cases of other sorts. Who gains promotions, boons, appointments, but the man in whose life t hey are seen to play t he part of live hypotheses, who d iscounts them, sacrifices other t hings for their sake before they have come, and takes risks for t he m in advance? His faith acts on the powers above him as a cla im , and creates its own verification . ...

There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in it coming. And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which shou ld say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the " lowest kind of immorali ty" into which a t hinking being can fall. Yet such is t he logic by which our scientific absolutists pretend to regu late our lives!

Figure 2.14 Is it your faith that can change others' attitudes, or is it your behavior?

In truths dependent on our persona l action, then, faith based on desire is certainly a lawful and possibly an indispensab le th ing.

William Jam es, "The Will to Believe"

29 James assumes that we are better off in this life if we believe the relig ious hypot hesis than if we don't. Is this assumption correct? What evidence can you bring to bear on t his question?

But now, it will be said, these are all ch ildish hu man cases, and have noth ing to do with great cosm ical matters, like the ques-

tion of religious faith. Let us then pass on to that. Religions differ so much in their accidents t hat in discussing the religious question we must make it very generic and broad. What then do we now mea n by t he religious hypothesis? Science says things are; morality says some things are better than other things; and religion says essentially two t hings.

Fi rst, she says that the best t hings are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word. " Pe rfection is eternal"- this phrase of Charles Sec reta n seems a good way of putting this fi rst affirmation of reli gion, an affirmation wh ich obviously cannot yet be verified scientifically at all.

The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true.

Now let us consider what the logical elements of th is situation are in case the religious hypothesis in both its branches be really true. (Of course, we must admit that possibility at the outset. If we are to discuss the question at all, it must involve a livi ng option. If for any of you reli gion be a hypothesis that cannot, by any living possib ili ty be true, t hen you need go no farther. I speak to the 'saving remnant' alone.) So proceed- ing, we see, fi rst, that religion offers itself as a momentous option. We are supposed to ga in , even now, by our belief, and to lose by our non belief, a certain vital good. Sec- ond ly, religion is a forced option so far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by rema in in g sceptica l and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we posi- tively chose to dis believe. It is as if a man shou ld hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him because he was not perfectly sure that she would prove an angel after he brought her home. Wou ld he not cut himself off from that particu lar angel- possibility as decis ively as if he went and married someone else? Scepticism, t hen, is

Belief Without Reason 105

not avoidance of option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. Better risk loss of truth than chance of error,- that is your fa ith-vetoer's exact position. He is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing the field aga inst the religious hypothesis, j ust as the believer is backing the religious hypothes is aga inst the field. To preach scepticism to us as a duty until 's uffi cient evidence' for religion be found, is tantamount therefore to tell ing us, when in presence of the religious hypot hesis, that to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. It is not intell ect against all passions, then; it is only i ntellect with one passion laying down its law. And by what, forsooth, is the supreme wisdom of this pas- sion warranted ? Dupery for dupery, what proof is t he re that dupery t hrough hope is so much worse than dupery through fear? I, for one, can see no proof; and I simply refuse obedience to the scientist's command to im itate his kind of option, in a case where my own stake is importa nt enough to give me the right to choose my own form of risk. If religion be true and the evidence for it be still insufficient, I do not wish, by putting your extingu isher upon my nature (wh ich feels to me as if it had after all some business in th is matter) , to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side,-that chance depending, of course, on my will ingness to run t he risk of acting as if my pas- sional need of taking the world religiously might be prophetic and right.

All this is on the supposition that it rea lly may be prophetic and right, and that, even to us who are discussing the matter, religion is a live hypothesis which may be true. Now to most of us religion comes in a still farther way that makes a veto on our active faith even more illogical. The more perfect and more eterna l aspect of the un i- verse is represented in our religions as hav ing personal form. The universe is no longer a mere It to us, but a Thou, if we are religious; and any relation that may be possible from person to person m ight be possible he re. For instance, although in one sense we are passive portions of t he un iverse, in another we show a curious autonomy, as if we were sma ll active centers on our own account. We feel, too, as if the appeal of religion to us were made to our own active good-will as if evidence might be forever withheld from us unless we met t he hypot hesis ha lfway. To take a t rivial illustration: just as a man who in a company of gentlemen made no advances, asked a warrant for every concession, and believed no one's word without proof, wou ld cut himself off by such churlishness from all the socia l rewa rds t hat a more trusting spirit wou ld earn,-so he re, one who shou ld shut himself up in snarling logica lity and try to make the gods extort his recognition will y-nilly, or not get it at all , might cut himself off forever from his only opportunity of making t he gods' acquaintance. Th is feeling, forced on us we know not whe nce, that by obstinately believing that t here are gods (although not to do so wou ld be so easy both for our logic and our life) we are doing the u niverse the deep- est service we can, seems part of t he living essence of the religious hypothesis. If the hypothesis were true in all its parts, incl ud ing th is one, then pure i ntellectuali sm, with its veto on our making willi ng advances, wou ld be an absurd ity; and some participa- tion of our sympathetic nature would be logically required. I therefore, for one, cannot see my way to accepting t he agnostic rules for truth -seeking, or wi ll fully agree to keep my w ill ing nature out of the game. I cannot do so for th is plain reason, that a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule. That for me is t he long and short of the formal logic of the situation, no matter what the kinds of truth m ight materially be.'&

30 Is it reasonable to expect that by first having f ait h in God you can confirm his existence in your expe- rience? Would having fa ith before you get confirmation distort t his met hod of inqu iry and bias t he resu lts?

106 Chapter 2 God and Religion

Fai,h indeed ,ells whar the senses do not tell} but no t

t he conrrary of whar they sec. It is above them and no t contrary t o them.

-Blaise rascal

Despite the eloquence of James's argument, it has many detracto rs. For starters, they deny his assumption chat the cla ims of rel igion cannot be decided by a rgument and evidence. As ,ve have seen, many theists and atheists chink chat reason can in- deed decide che issue of God's existence, and che traditional a rgumenrs chat we've examined are attempts co do just chat.

Ochers doubt James's assertion chat it is better co believe the religious hypothesis than not co believe it because by bel ieving we acqu ire "even now ... a certain vital good." He doesn't say ,vhac chis vital good is, but if he means something like a better life, happiness, or spi ritual satisfaction in chis life, he seems co be on shaky ground. Jc is not obvious chat religious believers of any sore lead better, happier, or more sat- isfying lives than nonbelievers.

Some have also taken issue with James's notion of verifying t hrough our exper i- ences t he religious hypothesis by first bel ievi ng it. Faith is supposed co be the prereq- uisite for experiences chat will enable us co confirm some d ivine reality. Bue cr itics say chat having faith first is not likely co corroborate anything. Michael Marcin explains the point ch is way:

Michael Ma rt in , Atheism: A Philosophical Justification

James talks as if bel ieving in God and seeing whether the hypothesis that God exists is confi rmed in one's experience is like an experiment. But his procedure lacks an es- sential element of standard experimental procedure: he does not seem to allow for the disconfirmation of the hypothesis by the resu lts of the experiment. Suppose one believes in some god and yet no evidence of his existence is revealed in one's experi- ence. James does not entertain the possibility that th is fa ilure would count aga inst the hypothesis that this god exists.' 9

Pascal: Betting on God

Pascal chinks chat reason is impotent in helping us discern whether God ex isrs. "If there is a God," he declares, " he is in- finitely beyond our comprehension .... We are therefore incapable of knowing either what he is, or if he is."30 So Pas- cal insists chat ,ve can have only a prag- matic justification fo r believing in God. We should believe because believ ing is advantageous; it is our best bee. "Pascal's ,vager" then says chat if ,ve believe in God and he really does exist, we ,vin infinite happiness; if ,ve believe and he doesn't exist, we lose nothing. On the ocher hand, if we don't believe and he exisrs, Figure 2.15 Blaise Pascal (1623-1 662).

Belief Without Reason 1 07

WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE?

Do You Live by Faith? In urging others ro accept rhe existence of God on faith rather than evidence, ,nany contend char all of us-theisrs, atheists, and agnostics-live by faith every day. Here is a rypical state- ment of this view:

In this physical world that we live in, we all li ve by faith, whether we know it or not. For instance, we trust that our cars will start every morn ing to take

us to work. We trust that we will get paid on payday. Am I right? Well, you know what, on the spiritua l side of things, the Christian SHOULD live by

faith, too! ... [As the scripture says) "Behold, his soul [wh ich] is lifted up is not upright in him: but the just sha ll live by his faith."

Is it accurate to say t hat we have faith that these everyday events wi ll oc- cur? Or are we merely expecting them to occu r based on good evidence- our many previous expe riences w ith the events?

we lose the infinite happiness chat believing leads to; if we don't believe and he doesn't exist, we lose nothing. Thus, by believing in God, we have everything co gain and nothing co lose-a bet chat only an irrational person would turn do\vn.

But \vhat if you are an agnostic or atheist \vho wants co go along with chis bet? Can you believe in God simply by d eciding co? Not likely. Pascal's answer co chis problem is chat chose who want co believe can d evelop faith by behaving as if they believe, by caking holy \Yater, having masses said, and undertaking ocher religious practtces.

Here is Pascal laying out the \vagering options:

Bl aise Pascal , Pensees and Other Writings

Let us therefore examine this point, and say: God is, or is not. But towards which side will we lean? Reason cannot decide anything. There is an infinite chaos separating us. At the far end of this infi nite distance a game is being played and the coin will come down heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you choose one way or the other, reason cannot make you defend either of the two choices.

So do not accuse those who have made a choice of being wrong, for you know nothing about it! "No, but I will blam e them not for having made this choice, but for

31 Is it morally per- missible to believe in God just because it is t o your advantage to believe? Why or why not?

1 0 8 Chapter 2 God and Religion

32 Is it plausible that God would look kindly on atheists and agnos- tics because they refuse to believe w ithout evi- dence? After all, aren't they simply using God's gift of reason to arrive at t heir decision?

The reason Pascal's wager

docs nor work is the same reason why you should never plan your retire ment

o n w inning the lono. -Massimo Pigliucci

Bla ise Pascal,

Pense.es and Other Writings

having made any cho ice. For, though the one who chooses heads and the other one are equally wrong, they are both wrong. The right th ing is not to wager at all."

Yes, bu t you have to wager. It is not up to you, you are already comm itted. Which then wil l you choose? Let us see. Si nce you have to choose, let us see w hich interests you t he least. You have two things to lose: t he truth and the good , and two th ings to stake: your reason and wi ll, your knowledge and beat itude; and your nat ure has two th ings to avoid: error and wretched ness. Your reason is not hu rt more by choos ing one rather tha n t he other, since you do have to make t he choice. That is one po int d isposed of. But your beatit ude? Let us weigh up the gai n and the loss by cal ling heads t hat God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you wi n, you wi n everyth ing; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager that he exists then, without hesitati ng! "Th is is wonderful. Yes, I must wager. But perhaps I am betting too much." Let us see. Since there is an equa l chance of ga in and loss, if you wo n on ly two lives instead of one, you cou ld still put on a bet. But if there were three lives to win , you would have to play (s ince you must necessaril y play), and you would be unwise, once forced to play, not to chance your l ife to wi n t hree in a ga me where there is an equa l chance of los ing and win ning. But t here is an etern ity of l ife and happiness. And that being so, even t ho ugh there were an infi nite num ber of chances of which on ly one were in yo ur favour, you wou ld still be right to wager one in order to win two, and you wo uld be acti ng wrongly, since you are obliged to play, by refus ing to stake one life again st three in a game where out of an in fin ite nu mber of chances there is one in your favour, if there were an infin itely happy i nfinity of l ife to be won. But he re there is an in fin itely happy infi nity of l ife to be won , one chance of winn ing aga inst a finite nu mber of chances of losing, and what you are stak ing is fin ite. That removes all choice: wherever t here is infi nity and where t here is no infin ity of chances of losing again st one of wi nni ng, there is no scope for waveri ng, you have to chance every- th ing. And th us, as you are forced to gamble, you have to have d iscarded reason if you cl ing onto yo ur l ife, rather t ha n risk it for the infin i te prize wh ich is j ust as l ikely to happen as the loss of not hi ngness .3'

Would you ta ke this bet? Many ph ilosophers \vould not. They fault Pascal fo r as- sum ing only two alternatives (that his God exists and will besto\v eternal happiness on believers, o r that his God does not exist) and ignoring countless other possibili- ties. By his O\vn lighrs, Pascal should take these other possibilities seriously if we are as ignorant of God's nature as he says. Consider: (1) that God ignores o r pun ishes those who believe fo r self-serving reasons; (2) that God favors honest doubters who use their God-given po\ver of reason ing to bel ieve on ly according to the evidence; (3) that nothing people do o r believe matters because they a re predestine.cl by God to go to heaven o r hell; (4) that God hares people who gamble; (5) that people a re re- \varded for bel ieving not in Pascal's Christian God, but in Yah\veh, Apollo, Krishna, Ammon, Od in, or Sh iva; or (6) that God is malicious, withholding eternal happi- ness from both nonbelievers and believers alike. C ritics say that if we take such p ros- pecrs into account, Pascal's \vager loses its force and cultivating faith for pragmatic reasons seems un reasonable.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 2.5

I. Do you agree with James that faith in the religious hypothesis can bring about a "vital good" in one's life no\v? W hat evidence can you cite to back up your answer? For example, is there ev idence sho\ving that those \vho accept the rel igious hypothesis a re happier than those \vho don't?

2. Suppose it is true that sometimes, as James says, "faith in a fact can help create the fact." Is the existence of God one of the facts that \Ve can create by believing it?

3. Is evidentialism true? A re \Ve sometimes justified in bel ievi ng some- thing even if it is unsupported by evidence? If so, in what situations? If not, why not?

4. Suppose God is a vicio us deity who inflicts eternal p unishment on anyone \vho believes in him and g ra nts eternal bliss to anyone who refuses to believe in h im. H ow \vould Pascal's wager apply to belief regard ing such a deity?

5. Evaluate this quotation from A lan Dersho\vitz: "I have always con- sidered 'Pascal's Wager' as a q uest ionable bet to p lace, since a ny God \VOrth bel ieving in \vou ld prefer a n honest agnostic to a calculating hypocrite."

2.6 EASTERN RELIGIONS

Eastern rel igious traditions-including Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, D aoism, Jainism, and many others-diverge from Western religions in ways that both shock and intrigue those \vho trace their faith back to Moses, Muhammad, o r Christ. But both domains of relig ious bel ief are rich in philosophical thought. While the West has used reason to defend o r critique its religious doctrines, the East has built philosophical systems that try to plumb the depths of physical and spiritual reality. In the expanse of Eastern rel igious thought, Western philosophers see both d rastically different conceptions of the \vorld and many of their own ideas in new form staring back at them.

Buddhism

In its own fashion, Buddhism typifies the ways t hat most Eastern traditions differ from Western ones. Buddhism posits no creator God , no all-po\verful, all-knowing deity who rules t he universe, takes an interest in humans, or a nswers prayers. It

Eastern Religions 109

110 Chapter 2 God and Religion

' ' I

•

teaches that the Buddha himself was neither God nor the child of a god. H e was instead the ultimate teacher and an example for all Buddhists to follo\v. In accordance with the Buddha's wishes, Buddhism has no central religious autho rity. There is no Buddhist pope; there are only the Buddha's teachings. An individua l ach ieves salvation not through faith in God, but primarily through his or her own efforts, by self-discipline and sel f-transformation . Buddhists must \vork out thei r own salvation.

The term Buddhism disguises the religio n's complexi- ties. Although Buddhists everywhere may hold in com- mon some teachings of the Buddha, these core beliefs are few, allo\ving a great many meandering trails within a broad doctrinal highway. Buddhism therefore h as no sin- gle set of authorized p ractices or a com mon rulebook or a universal statement of the articles of faith. Instead there are many schools of thought and practice in Buddhism (some would say Buddhisms), Zen Buddhism and T ibetan Buddhism being only the most familiar.

Figure 2 .16 Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha (C. 563-483 8CE).

During a time of w rench ing social change and clash- ing religious viewpoints, Buddhism arose in northern India (no\v southern Nepal) in the sixth century BCE . The spi ritual landscape \vas dotted by religious and phi l- osoph ical \vorldviews of all so rts , with each one com- peting for recognition and the allegiance of devotees.

Karma is the u niversal

principle chat o ur actions

result in deserved pleasure

o r pain in this li fe or the next.

The practices advocated by va rious groups included meditation, celibacy, an imal sacrifices, vegeta rianism, nonviolen ce, wo rship of numerous gods, and asceticism (the denial of physical comfort or pleasures for religious ends). Some believed in rebirth and karma (the universal principle that our act ions result in deserved plea- sure or pain in this life or the next); some did not. Some accepted the notion of sp iritual progress through one's O\vn efforts; others denied it. Some thought that the actions of humans a re never done free ly but a re fated to occu r; some insisted that humans h ave free w il l. Into this ch aos came the man destined to become the Buddha (a title meaning "The Enlightened One"), born a prince in the t iny kingdom of Sakya in northern India and given the name Siddhartha Gautama (c. 563-483 BCE). After many years of reflection and searching fo r u ltimate wis- dom, he attained en lightenment-what he believed was a perfect understa nding of the t rue nature of the universe, of life and death, and of sufferi ng and liberation .

The teachings of the Buddha aston ished many of his day who \vere used to the doctrines and practices of Indian religions. In contrast to the orthodox ies of the time, the Buddha rejected the caste system, ext reme asceticism, the practice of animal sacrifice, the authority of the Vedas (Hindu scriptures), submiss io n to the Brahmins (members of the Hindu priestly caste), and the existence of the sou l (a permanent, unchanging identity). C-ontrad icting the Hindu social conventions, he taught that women should not be barred from the spiritual life he proposed-they

t oo cou ld attain enlightenment. Contrary to doctrines of the major Western reli- gious trad itions, he \vas nontheistic in t he sense that he had no use for t he idea of a personal creator God. H e believe.cl that gods, goddesses, and demons exist, bu t that t hey a re-like all other living t hings-fin it e, vulnerable, and mortal. They are trapped in the cycle of death and rebirth just as hu mans are. H e t herefore renou nced

rel igious devotion to a ny deity. O n some deep questions about t he nature of reality-questions that most reli-

gions try to address-the Buddha \vas s ilent. H e refused to conjecture about w hat h appens after death, \vhether t he universe is eternal, w hether it is infinite , whether body and soul are t he same thing, a nd w hat constit utes the d ivine. H e taught that s uch speculations are pointless, si nce t hey overlook \vhat is truly important in exis- t ence: the fact of su ffering a nd t he path of liberation from it. A person \vho spen ds his time trying to ans\ver t hese imponderable questio ns, he said, is like a man struck by a n a rro\v who will not pull it out until he has determ ined a ll t he m unda ne facts about t he a rro\v, bow, a nd a rcher-and d ies needlessly w hile gathering the information.

The Buddha meant h is teachings to be useful-a realistic, accurat e appraisal of our burdensome ex istence and how t o rise above it . To a n unusual extent, his ap- p roach \vas also rational and empi rical. He trie.d to provide a reasonable explanation fo r the problem of existence a nd offer a plausible solution. H e thought that people shou ld not accept his vie\vS o n faith but test them out through thei r own experience in everyday life.

The Buddha's system of t each ings abou t the true nature of reality and ho\v to live correctly to transcend it is k no\vn as the dharma, t he heart of \vhich is t he Four Noble Trut hs:

1. Life is suffer ing. 2. Suffering is cause.cl by desi res ("craving" or " t hirst ").

3. To banish su ffer ing, banish desires. 4. Ban ish desires a nd end suffering by fo llowing t he Noble Eightfold Path.

The First Noble Truth is that livi ng brings suffering, or dukkha. In the tradi- tional Buddhist way of putting it , "bi rth is pai n ful, old age is painful, sickness is pai nful, death is pai nfu l, sorrow, lamentation, dejection, and despair are painful. C -ont act \Vit h u npleasant things is painful, not getting w hat one \vishes is pa inful."32

Dukkha comes in small a nd large doses-from m ild stress a nd fr ustration to t he agonies of devastating d isease and t he heartbreak of over\vhelming loss a nd g rief. But in a ny dose, su ffer ing is in heren t to living: an inescapable cost of existence. An- other aspect of dukkha is impermanence (anicca)-t he fact that thi ngs do not last, that \vhatever pleasures we enjoy soon fade, t hat wh at ever we possess we even tually lose, that \vhatever \Ve do wi ll be u ndone by time. The very trans itory nature of life b rings suffering, d issatisfaction, a nd pain.

Dukkha a lso a rises because of anothe r fact of li fe: anatta, the impe rmane nce of t he self, or not-self, o r no -soul. A person-the "!" that we each refer to-is merely an eve r-changing, fl eeting assemblage of me nta l states or p rocesses. (The

West ern p hilosoph er Dav id Hume arg ued fo r the same view of the self.) And if there is no perma nent self, there is no \vay fo r a ny " !" to grope for happi ness,

Eastern Religions 111

Do not believe in anyth ing s imply because you have heard it. Do not believe in

traditions simply because they have been handed down for many genera~ tions . . . . Do not bdicvc in anything simply because it is found wrincn in your religious books . . .. Bur whe n, after observatio n and analysis, you fi nd anything that agrees wi th reason, and is cond ucive

to the good a nd benefit of o ne and all, th e n accept it and live up m it. -The Buddha's Kalama Sutra

The dharm a is , he Bud - dh a's system of teachings abou t rhc true nature of

reality an d how to live cor- rectly to transcend it.

You must be your own lamps, be your own refuges. Take refuge in nothing o utside yourselves. Hold firm to the t ruth as a lamp and a refuge, and do nor look fo , refuge ro a ny- thing besides yourselves. -The Buddha

112 Chapter 2 God and Religion

Do not dwell in t he past, do not dream of the fu. rurc, conccnttarc rhc mind o n the present mo me nt. -11,e Buddha

3 3 Contrast the Bud- dhist and Christ ian views of the cause of human suffering. Which seems to you more plausible ?

Nirvana, o r Enlighre n- mcnt} is rhc ultimate aim

of all Bud dhist practice an d rhe fi nal liberatio n to which all the Buddha's teachings po int.

sat isfaction, p leas ure, contentment, or anything else. The thought of not-sel f frightens people, but to most Buddhists, anatta is a very soothing doctrine. As one Buddhist monk says,

Ajahn Sumedho, Buddha-Nature

When you open the mind to the truth , then you realize there is noth ing to fear. What arises passes away, what is born d ies, and is not self- so that our sense of being caught in an identity with this human body fades out. We don't see ou rselves as some isolated, a lie nated entity lost in a mysterious and frighten ing universe. We don 't fee l overwhelmed by it, trying to find a little piece ofit that we can grasp and fee l safe with, because we fee l at peace with it. Then we have me rged with the Truth.ii

This focus on dukkha may seem like a dreary perspective on life, but it secs the stage for the Buddha's more optimistic views o n the ultimate conquest of s uffering. His message is not that we are doomed to unremitting sufferi ng, but that there is a ,vay to escap e ou r torment, to attain true and lasting happiness.

The Second Noble T ruth is that the cause of dukkha is selfish desire ("craving" or "thirst")-desire fo r th ings that we can never obtain, no matter how h ard we try. We des ire possessions, pleasu res, power, money, life, and more. We want things to be different from what they a re or to rema in the ,vay they are forever. But ,ve can never have any of these for long because everything is ephemeral, constantly changing. We have no distinct, p ermanent id entit y; the "self" is no more than a locus of shifting, Rowing energy. Such an insubstantial, transient thing ca n never acqui re anyth ing permanent, even if permanent objecrs exist. We d es ire this or that, but ou r desires are continually frustrated. The result is discontent, unhappiness, and pa in-dukkha.

The Third Noble Truth is that suffering ca n be extinguished if desire is extin- guished. Dukkha w ill end if desi re ends. To quench selfish d esires and therefore to end dukkha is to attain nirva na, the ultimate aim of a ll Buddhist practice a nd the fina l liberatio n to which all the Buddha's teachings point. It is the extinguishing of the Rames of attachment, delusion, and h at red; it is also the blossomi ng of content- ment and inner peace, the "quietude of the heart." The Buddhist scholar and monk Walpola Rahula describes it like this:

Walpola Rahu la , What the Buddha Tau ght

He who has realized t he Truth , Nirva na , is t he happiest being in the world. He is free from all 'comp lexes' and obsessions , the worries and troub les that torme nt others . His me nta l hea lth is perfect. He does not repent the past, nor does he brood over the future. He lives fu lly in t he presen t. The refo re he appreci ates and enjoys things in the purest sense without self-projections. He is joyful, exu ltant, e njoying the pure life, his

facu lties pleased , free from anxiety, serene and peacefu l. As he is free from selfish de- sire, hatred , ignorance, conceit, pride, and all such 'defi lements', he is pure and gentle, full of un iversal love, compassion, kindness, sympathy, understand ing and tolerance. His service to others is of the purest, for he has no thought of self. He gains nothing, accumu lates nothing, not even anything spiritual, because he is free from the illusion of Self, and the 'thirst' for becom ing.i •

Nirvana is manifested both in life and at d eath. In life, it is-as Rahula suggesrs-a psychological and moral transformation and, u ltimately, an enlightened way of living. At death, for an en lightened one, the continuing cycle, or wheel, of death and rebirth ends. Dukkha, the ever-recurring pain of existence, stops. And the controlling force behind the turning ,vheel-karma-ceases. So nirvana's quench- ing of" defilements" not only quenches dukkha in life, but also ter minates the repeat- ing pattern of death-rebirth. Beyond this profound release, what nirvana entails at one's death is uncertain. The Buddha insisted that n irvana is beyond description and impossible to imagine, for it is neither ann ihilation nor survival of a sou l. He said that people should devote themselves to attain ing it rather than trying to plumb its depths. Buddhist sources, ho,vever, refer to ni rvana ,vith words such as freedom, absolute truth, peace, and bliss.

In Buddhism, one's cycle of repeated deaths and rebirths-called samsara, o r "wandering"-is a painfu l process that can go on for mi llennia unless there is release from it through nirvana. The thing that wanders from one life to the next (,vhat we refer to as "I") is not an eternally existing, permanent soul, self, or atman, but an ever-changing mix of personality fragments that recombine in each ne,v life. The Buddha's classic illustration of th is point is a flame (the "I") that is transferred from one candle to another. Only one flame is passed among multiple candles, so there is some continuity from one candle to the next. But the flame itself is also different from moment to moment.

Karma is the universal principle that governs the character- istics and quality of each rebirth, or future life. In the sense used in Buddhism, karma is not a system of justice decreed by a God; nor is it a cosmic fo rce d riven to,vard some purpose or goal. It is essentially a la,v of nature, a universal fact about the effecrs of a be- ing's past actions. Karma dictates that people's deeds-their acrs of will or intentions-form thei r present cha racter and determine the general nature of their future lives. Good dee.ds (good karma) tend to lead to more pleasant rebirths; bad deeds (bad karma) are likely to yield less pleasant, even horrific, rebirths. D epending on ka rma, then, a rebirth may occu r at any one of several d ifferent levels- from life in va rious hells to existence as an animal, ghost, human, or god. Ka rma can also affect the quality of life at each level.

Eastern Religions 113

In the Buddha's vie,v of karma, through thei r o,vn moral choices and acts people a re free to try to change their karma and irs associated results, and no one is trapped in a given level of ex istence

Figure 2.17 Buddhist Temple o f the Dawn in Bangkok, Thailand.

114 Chapter 2 God and Religion

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Buddhism and Science

Does Buddhism conflict with science? For several reasons, ,nany Buddhists believe ir does nor. First, Buddhism is rhoughr ro be empirical, just as science is. The Buddha urged his fol- lowers ro rake nothing on lairh but to test it out in their own experience. The current Dalai Luna has echoed rh is sentiment: "If there's good , strong evidence from science that such and such is rhe case and rhis is contrary to Bud-

Fig. 2.18 A Budd hist monk meditating. dhis,n, then ,ve will change."

In addition, some elements of Buddhist cos,nology seem ro agree, at least superficially, with ideas in 1nodern science: every event has a cause, everything is connected or inrerdependenr in some fundamental way, no eternally immutable objects exist (the whole cosmos is in flux). And of course rhe principles of Buddhist morality do not collide ,virh science, because science is not in that line of work

Bur philosophers of science would say something like this: science's job is ro rest theo- ries, and ir judges the worth of theories accord ing ro certain criteria (includ ing how well the theory firs ,virh existing theories or evid ence, ho,v many assumptions ir ,nakes, and ,vherher

I've developed a new phi· losophy . . . . I o nly d read o ne day at a time. -Charles M. Schulz

34 Th e Buddha assumes t he doctrine o f reinca rnation (the transmigra t ion of the sou I a t death into a new body). Is this view plausible? Why or why not?

forever. There is a lways che hope of rising co a higher point through spi ritual effort or of halcing che cycle of rebirths alcogether through nirvana.

The notions of rebirth and karma lead naturally to che Buddhist attitude of compassion, tolerance, and kindness for all living things. After all, every being must follo,v che karmic cu rrent, being reborn as many different creatu res from che lo,vest

co the highest. Each human bei ng has an implied empathetic connection with a ll ocher beings (huma ns, an imals, and ochers) because he o r she is likely co have been such beings at one time or another and co have endure.cl che same kind of pain and grief they have.

The Fou rth Noble T rut h says chat che way co end dukkha and co attain n irvana is co fo llow che Noble Eightfold Path. The Pach cons ists of eight factors, o r modes of practice, whose pu rpose is che development, or perfection, of che three fundamenta l aspects of Buddhist li fe: wisdom, moral conduct, and mental discipline or focus. The eight facto rs have been d escribed as "seeps," as if t hey shou ld be done in order, but

Eastern Religions 115

it has successfully pred icted a ny novel phenon1ena). If a theory is nor need ed to explai n a phenomenon (because science explai ns it better), che theory is discredited. Scientists would reject rhe theory rhar Zeus causes lightn ing because rhey have n1uch better theories to ex- plain lightning. By chis measure, scie nt ists ,vould say, many Bud d hist theories would be rejected-for example, hungry ghosts, d emons, gods, spiritual realms, karma, and reincar- nation or rebirth . And rhe evidence for such theories provided by che Budd h ist's d irect expe- rience (,n ed itacion or mystica l practice) muse also be rejected . We can accept truths acqui red ch rough med itation or myscicis,n, says rhe scientist, only if t hey can be corrobora ted by our usual rests based on reason a nd evidence- a nd these truths fa il che rest.

How can a Buddhist respond ro such allegations? H ere a re three ,vays: (I) rhe Buddh ist can, on various grounds, deny rhe scientific view alrogerher (or large pa rts of it); (2) che Bud- dh ist can agree ,vich the scientists and reject Budd h isn1 entirely; o r (3) che Buddhist can e,n- brace his or her religio n bu r on ly after stripping our the scient ifi cally d ubious content. Some who ca ke ch is latter path ,nay e nd up ,vich a Bud d hism that firs better ,virh our scie nt ific age, and son1e n1ay a rrive at a pu rely secular Budd his,n , accept ing only ideas that are supported, o r a r lease not refuted, by science. The secular Buddhist, for example, may accept medication for its scient ifi cally proven physiological and psychological benefits ,vh ile embracing che ethical content for its ,noral guidance.

Do you believe that Buddhism is in serious conflict with modern science? Why or why not?

they are actually intended to be implemented in concert. Each one complements and en hances t he ochers, and a complete life cu ltivates them al l. Together t hey consti- t ut e a way of purposefu l living rhac che Buddha is said co have discovered t hrough his own experience-the "M iddle Way" o r "M iddle Path" bet ween che extremes of

b rutal asceticism and sensual sel f-i ndulgence. (A rist otle a lso taught chat the good life is a virtuous one balance.cl benveen having t oo much a nd not having enough .) H ere a re the eight fac tors sorted int o their three basic cat egories:

For the perfection of ,visdom :

1. Right understanding is a deep understanding of che true nature of reality as revealed in che Four Noble T rut hs. Th is kind of ,visdom refers not just co an

int ellect ual grasp of che faces, but, more importantly, co profound ins ig ht that penetrates co how things really are in t hemselves, insig ht gleaned experien- tially through a tra ined m ind free of spirit ual imped iments.

Life must be u nderst ood backward . But it must be lived forward.

-Soren Kierkegaard

116 Chapter 2 God and Religion

2. Right thought refers to the p roper motivations underlyi ng ou r thoughts and ac- tions. Right motivations a re selflessness, compassion, nonviolence, gentleness, and love. They are d irected not toward a fe,v, but to,vard a ll living things. Sel fishness, hatred, violence, and malice undermine spiritual progress and impede true wisdom.

For the perfection of moral conduct: 3. Right speech mea ns refrain ing from lying, sla nder, gossip, unk ind or rude

,vords, malicious or abus ive talk, and id le o r misleading assertions. Right speech, then, is truthful, kind, and constructive, fostering harmony, trust, and honesty.

4. Right action involves following the Buddha's Five Precepcs: refra ining from (1) harming living beings (a principle kno,vn as ahimsa, "non-harm" or "nonv iolence"), (2) taking ,vhat is not given (stealing), (3) engaging in miscon- duct regard ing sexual or sensual pleasures, (4) lying o r speaking fa lsely, and (5) impairing the mind with intoxicating substances. To the Buddhist, these precepcs are not moral la,vs o r commandments that demand strict ad herence as if they were laid down by d ivine authorit y. They are moral ideals to strive for, affirmations to oneself for living a more compassionate, mindful life.

5. Right livelihood means avoiding jobs or p rofessions that involve harm ing other living beings. These include occupations that traffic in weapons of ,var, intoxicants, and poisons; that entail the buying and selling of human beings; that cause harm or death to an imals; and that involve greed, dishonesty, o r deception.

For the perfection of mental discip li ne: 6. Right effort is cultivating wholesome states of mind and el iminating or

min imizing unwholesome ones. It means fostering compassion, sel fl essness, empathy, and understanding and ban ishing selfish desire, hatred, attachment, and self-delusion.

7. Right mindfulness refers to the development through meditation of an extraor- dinary awareness of the functioni ng of one's o,vn body and mind. It yields clear u ndersta nd ing of, and keen sensitivity to, one's bod ily p rocesses, emo- tional states, the attitudes and tendencies of the mind, and mental concepts that may help or hi nder spi ritual progress.

8. Right concentration is the development through meditation of a sublime inner peace and profou nd mental tra nquilit y. Such inner calm is thought to yield insight.

Hinduism

Hinduism can claim to be the ,vorld 's oldest livi ng religion (dati ng back th ree thousand years) and the third largest (with about one bill ion adherencs). Many observers are amazed that it boascs of no common creed, fo u nder, text, or deity. It comprises not one mode of devotion but a confounding diversity of them. Offerings to deity im- ages, the chanting of mantras, temple worship, sensual rites, mystical experiences,

ascetic privations, animal sacri fices-such practices may be embraced by some Hindus and ignored by others, but the broad tent of Hinduism ac- commodates them all. The sacred texts range from hymns to instructions fo r conducting rituals to philosophical treatises, and these are revered o r disregarded to varying degrees by thousands of discrete religious groups. A Hindu may bow to many gods (polytheism), one supreme God (monothe- ism), one god among a whole pantheon (henotheism), or no gods ,vhatso- ever (atheism). And H induism's gods are said to number over a mill ion.

Eastern Religions 117

The Western trad itions of Christian ity, Judaism, and Islam are generally faithful to a core of more or less coherent doctrines. Hindu ism is different. It's a large, unwieldy fam ily of beliefs and p ractices that seem reasonable and practical to Hindus but perplexing and contradictory to outsiders. Yet in the twenty-first centu ry this family thrives both in its mother country (India) and on foreign soil, has devotees in both the East and the West, and influences the worldviews of persons high and lo,v. And among this cacophony of vie,vs, systems of philosophical reflection and even scriptures contain ing p hilosophical speculation have thei r say.

Hinduism began in northwest India, emerging from a blend of native rel igions and the religious trad itions of an Indo-European people who mi-

Figure 2.19 Stone carving of one of India's more popular deities- Ganesha, the elephant-headed god.

grated there from central Asia. The ind igenous populace established an advanced civ- ilization that flou rished in the Indus River region and beyond as early as 2500 BCE. Th is Indus Valley civilization, as it is called, rivaled in many ways the Roman Em- pi re, which ,vas to come later. It dev ised a writing system, erected planned cities, and built impressive structures small and la rge-two-story houses, civic centers, porticos, baths, bath rooms, stainvays, drainage systems, and worship halls.

Around 1500 BCE, the migrating Indo-Europeans, called A ryans, moved into northwest India, carrying thei r distinctive cu ltu re with them. Most importantly, they b rought their speech, from ,vhich was derived the ancient language of Sanskrit, the medium of Hindu scripture. They were polytheistic, ,vorshiping gods that ,vere thought to embody powerful elements of nature such as the sun, moon, and fire. And they sacrificed animals (including horses) and p roffered animal byproducrs (such as butter and milk) as offerings to these gods.

Aryan culture was partitioned into four social classes called varnas. From these, the hered itary caste system was developed in Hindu society and sti ll holds sway in modern India, although it has been refined into thousands of subdivisions based on social and occupational criteria. Trad itionally the dominant class consisted of brah- mins, the priests and teachers who a lone could study and teach scripture. Brahmins still play a priestly role and are prevalent among India's professionals and civil servants.

For H induism, the most important result of the melding of the Aryan and Indus Valley cultures ,vas a set of sacred compositions known as the Vedas (" knowledge"), regarded by almost a ll Hindus as eter nal scriptu re and the essential reference point fo r all forms of Hinduism. They were p roduced by the Aryans between 1500 and 600 BCE (what has been called the Vedic era), ,vhich makes these compositions In- dia's oldest existing literatu re. For thousands of years the Vedas were transmitted orally from brahmin to brah min until they were finally put into ,vriting. They are

The great secret of true

success, of true happ iness,

is th is : the man o r woman

who asks for no re tu rn, th e

perfectly un.selfish person, is the most s uccessful.

-Swami V i\fe.kananda

In ,he mo rning I bathe my in,cllccr in the stupendous

and cosmogonal philoso- phy of the Bhngnvnd-Gitn, in comparL\on w ith w hich

ou r modern world and its literature seems p uny and

trivial. -Henry David 1horeau

35 What is the caste system? Why is its e xist- e nce in modern India controversial?

The *das arc early Hindu script ures, developed between 1500 and 600 s c.

118 Chapter 2 God and Religion

36 What is t he difference between sru ti and smriti? Does the difference ma tter much to Hindus?

The Upanishads arc Vedic literatu re con cerning the self, Brahman, samsara, a nd libcra, io n.

Samsara is o n e's cycle of re peated dca, hs a nd

rcbinhs.

Ab11a1t L~ one's soul o r self

I must confess to you that w h en d o ub t haunts me,

w h en d L~ap po intmcn ts s tare me in the face, and

w hen I sec not o ne ray of light on , he ho rizon, I m rn m the Bhagavad Gita and fin d a verse to comfort me;

a nd I immcdiardy begin to smile in t he midst of overwhelming sorrow.

-Mahatma Gandhi

said to be sruti ("that which was heard")-reveale.d directly to H indu seers (rishis) and presu med to be of neither h u man nor divine authorship. Later script ures are thought to be smriti ('\vhat is remembered")-of human authorship. These consist of commentaries and elaborations on the sruti. Hindus revere the Vedas, even though the majority of adherenrs a re ignorant of their content, and their meanings a re stud- ied mostly by the educated. In fact, most H indu devotional practices are derived not from the Vedas, but from the sacred texts that came later.

The Vedas consist of fo ur collectio ns, or books, of ,vritings, each made up of four sections. The fo ur books a re the Rig-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sama- Veda, a nd the Atharva-Veda . The sections are (1) samhitas: hymns, or chants, of pra ise or in- vocation to the gods (including many Aryan deities), mostly to be uttered p ublicly during sacrifices; (2) brahmanas: treatises on, and ho,v-to instructions for, rit uals; (3) Aranyakas: "forest treatises" for those who seek a reclusive relig ious life; a nd (4) the Upanishads: ph ilosophical and religious speculations.

The oldest book is the Rig-Veda, which contains a section of over one thousa nd ancient hym ns, each one invoking a particular god or goddess-for example, I nd ra (the ruler of heaven), Agn i (the god of fire), a nd Varuna (the god of moral order in the universe). Most of the hymns in the other books are taken from the Rig-Veda.

There a re 123 Upanishads, but only 13 or 14 (calle.d the principal Upanishads) are revere.cl by all H indus. The Upanishads were the latest additions to the Vedas, composed p rimarily from about 900 to 400 BCE d uring a time of intellect ual a nd relig io us unease. The ancient certainties-the authority of the brahmins, the stat us of the Vedas, the caste system, the sacrificial rites, and the nat ure of the deities-were bei ng called into questio n. The Upanishads put these issues in a different light a nd ,vorked out some philosophical doctrines that became fu ndamental to H induism right up to the twenty-fi rst cen tury.

In the early Vedas, there is an emphasis o n improving one's lot in life through religio us p ractice and faith in the gods. But in the Upanishads, the central aim is release from this world. Specifically, the goal is liberation from sanisara, o ne's re- peating cycle of deaths and rebirths. The essential H indu belief is that at death, o ne's soul o r self (abnan) d epa rts from the li feless bod y and is reborn into a new body, residi ng for a time until death, then being reborn in yet another physical form-a dreary sequence that may be repeated for thousands of lifeti mes. (Westerners call this the doctrine of reincarnation.) A nd with each ne,v incarnatio n comes the pain of living a nd reliving all the miseries of mortal existence.

The fo rce that regulates samsara is karma, the u niversal principle that governs the characteristics and quality of each rebirth, or future life. Karma is like a law of nature; it is simply the way the ,vorld works. It dictates that people's actions and intentions form their present character a nd d etermine the general nature of their future lives. Good deeds (good karma) lead to more pleasant rebirths; bad deeds (bad karma) beget less pleasant, even appalling, rebirths. Depending o n karma, the atman may be reborn into a human, an animal, a n insect, or some other lo,vly crea- ture. This repeating pattern of rebirth-death-rebirth continues because humans are igno ra nt of the true nature of reality, of what is real and what is merely appeara nce. They a re enslaved by illusion (maya) a nd act accordingly, ,vith predictable results.

According to the Upanishads, this ignorance and its pa infu l consequences can only be ended, and liberation (moksha) from samsara and karma can on ly be \VOn, th rough the freeing power of an ultimate, transcendent wisdom. This \visdom comes when an atman realizes that the soul is not sepa rate from the world or from other souls but is one \Vith the impersonal, all-pervading Spirit known as Brahman. Brahman is the universe, yet Brahman transcends all space and t ime.

Brahman is eternal and thus so is the atman. Brahman is Absolute Reality, and the atman is Brahman-a fact expressed in the famous adage "You are that [Brahman]," or "You are divine." The essential realization, then, is the oneness of Brahman and atman. Once an ind ividual fu lly understands this ultimate un ity, moksha occurs, samsara stops, and the atman attains full union \Vith Brahman.

Achiev ing moksha is difficult, requiring great effort and involving many lifetimes th rough long expanses of time. The Upanishads stress that Brahman is ineffable-it cannot be described in words and must therefore be experienced d irectly th rough several means: med itation, various forms of yoga (both mental and physical disci- plines), and asceticism. The aim of these p ractices is to look inward and discern the true nature of atman and irs unity with Brahman. The rituals and sacrifices of the early Vedas are deemed superfluous.

As noted earlier, the sruti scriptures of the Ve.die period (written roughly 1500 to 600 BCE) a re thought to be of divine o rigin, revealed to the rishis, who received them via an intuitive or mystical experience. Hindus regard the Vedas as authorita- tive, eternal, and fixed. Th is canon remains as it was w ritten, without further revela- tions or later emendations. But after the Vedic period, the human-authored smriti scriptures appeared. They too are venerated yet are considered less authoritative than the Vedas. They are also open-ended, a sacred work in progress. Over the centu ries revered figures have added to them and continue to do so. But these facts have not d imin ished the influence of the smriti scriptures, wh ich have probably had a greater impact on Hindu life than the Vedas have.

In Hindu scripture, newer w ritings generally do not supersede the old; they are added to the ever-expanding canon. Thus many ideas and p ractices found in both the Vedas and the post-Vedic scriptures are sti ll relevant to contemporary Hinduism. Likewise, the ancient Vedic gods and goddesses were never entirely replaced by dei- ties that a rose later in history. The pantheon was simply en larged. Today many of the old gods are ignored or deemphasized, while some of them a re still revered.

The smriti material is voluminous and wide- ranging. It cons ists mainly of (1) the epics (the Mahabharata and the Ramayana), (2) myths and legends (the Puranas), and legal and moral codes (the Laws of Manu) .

The great epics have served Ind ian and Hindu civil ization much as Homer's Iliad and Odyssey ser ved the ancient Greek and H ellenistic world: The stories express the culture's virtues, heroes, philosophy, and spirit ual lessons. With eighteen volumi- nous chapters (or books) and 100,000 verses, the Mahabharata is the longest poem in existence, many times more extensive than the Christian Bible. Composed be- nveen 400 BCE and 400 CE, the epic recounts the ancient conflict between two great fam il ies, both of which are descendanrs of the ruler of Bharata (northern India). Their struggle culm inates in a fateful battle at Kurukshet ra. Among the warriors

Eastern Religions 119

Brahman is the impe r·

sonal, all-pervading sp irir that is the u n iverse yet

transcends all space a nd

t ime. A brahmin is a p ricsr o r teach e r; a man of the

p riestly casrc.

37 What is the d if· ference between the ma in goal in life as p resented in the early Vedas and life's centra l aim as d iscussed in the Upanishads?

The apparent multiplica· tion of gods is bewildering

at rhc first g la nce, but you soon discover that they arc the sam e GOD. There is

always one uttermost God who defies personification. This makes H induism the

most m lcrant religion in

the world, because its o ne

transcendent God includes all possible gods. In fuct H induism is so elastic and so subtle that th e most profound Methodist, and

crudest idolater, arc equally at ho me with it. -George Bernard Shaw

38 What is t he re lation· ship between Brahman and atman? How are moksha and samsara related t o Brahman?

120 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

PHILOSOPHY NOW

The Caste System

Much of the social and religious landscape of 1nodern India has been shaped by rwo-thousand- year-old Hindu rreatises on religious, legal, and moral ducy (dhormo), the most fa,nous being the Lows of Monu. (According to legend, all hu,nans are d escended from Manu, the orig inal man.) Completed by around the first cenrury of the Com,non Era, the Laws provided the basic outli nes of India's caste system, laid d o,vn a code of cond uct for each social class, and

marked out the four stages of life for u pper-class Indian men. The Laws, in effect, de- fined the ideal Hind u sociecy, a framework that served as a reference point for modern laws and social rules in India today.

Figure 2.20 Sisters w ho belong to the da/it caste in India.

India's premodern Aryan culture ,vas d ivided into four hierarchica l classes called vornas, which beca,ne the basis of the four main casres of H induism. In later eras these d ivisions were refi ned into myriad subdivisions and

hardened to forb id social ,novement in one's lifeti1ne from one class ro anorher. In modern Ind ia borh rhe four classes and t he hund reds of subd ivisions are referred ro as castes; rhe sub- divisions are also sometimes called jotis. These subcasres are based on occupation, kinship, geography, and even secrarian affil iarion, a nd rhey are especially inAuential in rura l areas of Ind ia. In general, casre prorocol forbids ,nembers of one caste ro ,narry me,nbers of anorher, and inreracrions ,virh people fro,n a nother caste are ofren restricted.

The Bhagavad-Gita is the most highly venera,ed

and influential scripture in H induism.

,vho are to fig ht there is the war hero Arjuna, who has serious misgivings about a battle that ,vill pit brothers against brothers and cousins aga inst cousins. Before the fight begins, as Arjuna contemplates the blood y fratricide to come, he thro,vs do,vn his bo,v in anguish and despa ir. H e turns to his charioteer, Krishna-who in fact is God inca rnate-and asks whether it is right to fi ght against his o,vn ki n in such a massive bloodletting. The conversation that then takes place between Krishna a nd Arjuna const itutes the most famous part of the Mahabharata: the Bhagavad-Gita, the most high ly venerated and influent ial book in H ind uism.

The seven-hundred-verse Bhagavad- Gita (Song of the Lord) is no mere war story. I n d ramatic fas h ion, it confronrs the moral and p h ilosoph ical questions and

Eastern Religions 121

In ancient India the concepts of dharma and karma were central to the caste system, and the same is true today. Each caste is prescribed a dharma, a set of duties mandated for that caste. Theoretically no upward movement is possible during one's lifetime, but d iligently perforrn ing one's dharrna could lead to better karma and a h igher-level rebirth in the next life.

Eventually the caste system was ,nodified co include a fifth group-the "untouchables," or do/its ("oppressed ones"), who are thought to be "coo polluting" to be included in any of the higher castes. Th is group co,nprises those ,vho do "polluting" work such as sweeping streets; dean ing toilers; and handling leather, human waste, or dead bodies. The term "untouchables" comes from the traditional H indu idea char upper-class persons who roud1 so,neone from the lowest class will be polluted and must therefore perform rituals co cleanse themselves. For generations do/its have been subjected co violence and discrim ination-and they still are even in modern India, even though che untouchable class has been official ly outlawed. Mohand as Gandhi called the do/its the "children of God " and advocated for their rights and their equal status in society.

In recent years the caste sysce,n has drawn fire frmn ,nany critics. Th e main complaint is that the system is inherently unfair. The p light of che do/its is just on e example. The Laws of Mnnu mandate a lower status for the lowest class, and caste h ierarchy itself implies that some people are inherently less worchy than ochers, or char some deserve better rrearmenc under the la,v cha n others, or that che h ighest classes are privileged and therefore shou ld get special creaunenr. In practice, caste rules are n or as rig id, and adherence to caste ru les is not as w idespread, as their advocates ,n ight prefer. The influence of caste in people's dai ly lives is weak in urban areas and much s tronger in che cou ntryside.

What do you think the civil rights leader Martin Luther King would say about India's caste system and the treatment of the dalits? Do you think the caste system is morally wrong? If so, what are your reasons?

confl icrs that arise in Hindu conceprs and practice-in devotion co the gods, the caste system, obligations co family, duties in time of war, the nature of the soul, the concept of Brahman, and the correct paths cowa rd moksha.

In the Gita, we get a ne,v account of the natu re of God. In the Upanishads, Brah- man is the impersonal Ultimate Reality, or World -Soul, per vad ing and const ituting the universe but a loof from humans and thei r concerns. Bue Krishna turns out to be the Supreme Being incarnate, a personal deity ,vho loves and cares for humans and who often cakes human form co help chem.

Throughout h istory, many H indus have believed there is only one path co liberation-solely through meditation or only th rough asceticism, for example. Bue

In ,he great books of

In dia, an e mpire spoke to us, nothing small o r un~

worthy, but large, sere ne,

consiste nt, the voice of an

o ld intelligence, w hich in another age and climate

had pondered a nd thus d isposed of rhe questio ns that exercise us.

-Ralph Waldo Emerson

122 Chapter 2 God and Religion

Ind ia h as rwo m illion god s, an d worships t hem all. In religion all o ther countries

arc paupers; India is rhc

o nly mi llio n aire. -Mark Twail\

in che Gita, Krishna insists chat several paths (marga) can lead co moksha, a view chat fits well \Vith modern Hinduism. (Si nce these paths amount co spiritual disciplines, they are also referred co as fo rms of yoga.) Today there is a general awareness of mul- tiple paths co liberation, each appropriate for a particular kind of person.

The path co liberation chat Krishna speaks of most often is devotion co a personal god (bhakti-marga), che path chosen by most Hindus. Bhakti-marga entails over- \vhelming love and adoration of one's favored manifestation of God. The ca nd idates for adoration a re many-K rishna, Vishnu, Shiva, Varuna, Indra, Ganesha, Kali, and many other deities. The Hindu view of bhakti is chat co love o ne of these finite manifestations of God is co move closer co the infinite God of everythi ng. Brahman is supreme but impersonal. le is difficulc co adore the all-encompassing essence of all chat is; it is easier co love one of God's incarnations represented in countless ea rth ly images. Thus a H indu may bring an offering of flowers co a scone image of Krishna and pray for help o r healing, expecting that Krishna himself \viii be pleased and perhaps answer che plea. The devotee \viii feel that moksha is a little closer and that Brahman is a little nearer.

Hinduism contains complex systems, o r schools (darshana), of philosoph ical re- flection offered by ancient sages and commentators. To immerse oneself in o ne of these is co follo\v che path of kno\vledge (jnana-marga), a route taken by only a minority of Hindus. The schools include six major orthodox ones, some of which appea red as fa r back as 500 BC E: Samkhya (probably the oldest), Yoga, Nyaya, Vais- esika, Mimamsa, and Vedanta. They a ll differ in important \vays but presuppose che autho rity of che Vedas; accept the doctrines of reincarnation (the cycle of b irch and death) and moksha (liberation); and sec forth their doctrines in discourses, or books (sutras).

The Nyaya school focuses on d eveloping a theory of kno\vled ge (ep istemol- ogy) a nd a system of logical p roof chat can yield indubitable truths. Some early

Figure 2.21 Reading the Vedic texts.

Nyaya scholars were atheistic (as was Gautama), but later ones added che concept of a sup reme d ivinity. The Vedanta school maintains a thor- oughgoing monism (nondualism, advaita), claiming chat reality co n- sists not of t\VO kinds of essential stuff (as che dualistic Samkhya school holds), but of only one kind, a nd chis kind is Brahman, who alone is real. Brahman is all, and the self is identical co Brahman. The most influential proponent of chis vie\v was Shankara (788-820 C E). He ar- gued chat people persist in believing they are separate from Brahman because of maya-illusion. Only by s hatteri ng chis ignorance \vith knowledge of t rue reality can they escape che torturous cycle of death and rebirth. The Sam khya school, in contrast, sees t he world as dualiscic- chat is, co nsisti ng of two kinds of scuff or essences: spir it a nd matter. I n its earlie r forms, che school was atheist ic in that it rejected che notion of a pe rsonal god; the istic elemencs were introduced lacer. The central belief of th is vie\v is that my riad sou ls a re lodged in matter, and to be dis lodged is co atta in blissful liberation . The Yoga school accepts che philosophica l ouclook of Samkhya rega rd ing spirit, matter, and

liberation but goes furthe r in emphasizing med itative and physica l techniques fo r bind ing the sp irit to Brahman and thus achieving moksha. It also makes room fo r a qualified theism.

Dao ism

For nvo thousand years Daoism (or Taoism) has been molding C h inese culture and cha ng ing the character of rel igions in the East. It has both ph ilosoph ical and re- lig ious sid es, and each of these has many p ermutations. It gers its name from the impossible-to-define notion of D ao, \vhich has been translated as the "Way" or the "Way of Nature." D aoism is said to have been founded by Lao-Tzu, the supposed author of the classical Daoist text the Tao -te ching (Classic of the Way and Its Power), destined to become, along with C-onfucius's Analects, one of the t wo most respected books of Chinese w ritings. Scholars are unsure \vhether Lao-Tzu is a h istorical figure or a product of legend, but most agree that if Lao-Tzu was real, he probably lived in the s ixth centu ry BCE and may have been a contemporary of Confucius. The second most important text in ph ilosophical D aoism is the Chuang Tzu, named after irs p resumed author. Rega rdless of their autho rsh ip, these nvo books la id the ground- work fo r a Dao ism philosophy that influenced C h inese thinkers and nobles and has sh aped the \vorldviews of the Chi nese r ig ht up to the present.

The D ao (pronounce.cl dow) is the myster ious first principle of the universe: It is the eternal sou rce of all that is real and the inv isible process and underpinning of the world. It is the Way-the impersonal power that g ives o rder and stability to the cosmos. Like the fo rce of gravity, the Dao holds ever yth ing together, gives sh ape and st ruct ure to \vhat is, and deter mines the way that ever yth ing must go. The Chuang Tzu ch aracterizes the Dao as literally everythi ng-it is the \vhole of a ll that exists, and we a re of th is whole. The Chuang Tzu asser ts:

Chuang Tzu, All Things Are One

In the universe, all t hings are one. For him who can but rea lize his indissoluble unity with t he whole, the pa rts of his body mea n no more than so much dust and dirt, and death and life, end a nd beginning, are no more to him t ha n the succession of day and night. They a re powerless to d isturb his tranqu il ity.Ji

When it comes to the concept of the Dao, the West seems to parallel the East. The pre-Socrat ic Greek ph ilosopher H eraclitus declared that there is a source of all that exists, t he fount of rationality, a firs t p rincip le of the cosmos that he ca lled logos. And there are hints of sim ilar cosmic fo rces elsewhere in Western thought-in Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, fo r example, and in C hrist ianit y's om- n ipotent God.

Eastern Religions 123

Knowing othe rs is intd· ligence; knowing yourself is true wisdom . Mastering others is strength; m aster~

ing yourself is true power.

If you realize thar you have e n oug h, you a re t ruly ric h. -Lio Tiu

124 Chapter 2 God and Religion

If the descriptions of the Dao seem obscure or perplexing, it cannot be other- \vise, che Daoisc would say. For the Dao is beyond \vords; it is "nameless" (unname- able) and thus can on ly be hinted at. As che Tao -te ching says,

Lao-Tzu, Tao-te ching

The way that can be spoken of Is not the constant way; The name that can be named Is not the constant name. The nameless was the beginning of heaven and earth; The named was the mother of the myriad creatures .... There is a thing confusedly formed , Born before heaven and earth. Silent and void It stands alone and does not change, Goes round and does not weary. It is capable of being the mother of the world. I know not its name So I style it "the way." I give it the makeshift name of "the great."36

A fundamental notion in Daoism is chat since everything and everyone is subject co che power of che Dao, since nothing can withstand irs inexorable Ao\v, the best human life is one lived in harmony \vich it. To live well is co go \vich the current of che Dao; co struggle against che stream is co invite d iscord, strife, and \voe. The good Daoisc, then, discerns che way of natu re, the "grai n of the universe," and lers che cosmic order gu ide his or her life.

Living in harmony with che Dao means realizing che virtue of wu-wei-active inaction, or effortless action. This paradoxical attitude does not amount to passivity or apathy. According co some scholars it suggesrs acting effortlessly without strain ing or struggling and without feverish obsession with che objects of desire. To others it implies acting naturally, spontaneously, \vichouc predetermined ideas of how things should go. Thus che Daoisc does not try co cake charge of a problem, for that often just makes matters worse. She instead acrs instinctively and efficiently, letting the solution unfold naturally, \vaiting for the right moment, harnessing che Ao\v of the Dao by using che natural momentum in che situation, letting change happen by doing nothing. The Daoisc is wise like the figh ter who rolls \vich a punch, using its force co come round and retu rn the blow, expending a lmost no energy of her own . In eit her interpretation, the point is not co inter fere with nature but co let nature follo\v its O\vn path.

Daoiscs differ on exactly what practices wu-ivei implies. To many it suggests a rejection of world ly pleasures or a disregard for society and its conventions and

values (l ike those stressed in Confucianism). The Tao-te ching makes explicit this abhorrence of regimented life:

Exterm inate the sage, d iscard the wise, And the people will benefit a hundredfold; Exterm inate benevolence, d iscard rectitude, And the people will aga in be fi lial; Exterm in ate ingenu ity, d iscard profit, And there w ill be no more thieves and band its. These three, being fa lse adornments, are not enough

Lao-Tzu, Tao-te ching

And the people must have someth ing to which they can attach themselves: Exhib it the unadorned and embrace t he uncarved block, Have little thought of self and as few desires as poss ible.37

To some Daoisrs, zuu-wei implies t he opposite: a Daoism cons istent with the demands of everyday life and Confucian values.

Lao-Tzu says that even in matters of governance, struggle a nd strain are useless,

but wu-zvei accomplishes much:

Govern the state by being stra ightforward; Wage war by being crafty; But win the emp ire by not being meddlesome. How do I know t hat it is like that? By means of t his. The more taboos there are in the empire The poorer the people; The more sharpened tools the people have The more benighted the state; The more skill s t he people have The further novelties multip ly; The bette r known the laws and ed icts The more thieves and robbers t here are. Hence the sage says, I take no action and t he people are transformed of themselves; I prefer stillness and the people are rectified of themselves; I am not medd lesome and t he people prosper of themselves;

Lao-Tzu, Tao-te ching

I am free from desire and the people of themselves become simple like t he uncarved block.38

Eastern Religions 125

A man w ith o u tward

courage dares to d ie;

a man with inne r cou rage

dares to li ve.

-l..ao-Tzu

126 Chapter 2 God and Relig ion

In the T ao-te ching, ivu-wei seems to imply a nearly invisible, hands-off, small-scale government. The job of the wise ruler is to sh ield the people from excessive regulation, overbeari ng la\vS and decrees, and unsettling ideas. Such policies may bring people closer to the nat u ral o rder, but they have also been criticized as a recipe for despotism.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 2.6

1. The central aim of Budd hism is to quench a ll desire. What \vould be the moral implications of a life in wh ich that goal is successfully achieved ?

2. What is your opinion of the Buddhist doctrines of karma a nd rebirth? D o they seem plausible? What is your judgment based on-personal experience, faith, science, o r ph ilosophical or logical consideratio ns?

3. D o you agree with some critics of H indu ism that the caste sys tem is inherently u nj ust? W hy or why not?

4. What is the ultimate goal in life accord ing to D aoism?

5. What is the Buddhis t vie\v of the self? How does it differ from the C hristian view? What evidence or argument can be used to support each view?

Review Notes

2.1 OVERVIEW: GOD AND PHILOSOPHY

• The impact of religion on the world is reason enough to exami ne irs claims criti- cally and dispassionately-th at is, ph ilosophically. To judge th e worth of any reli- gious claims, we nee.cl the objective stance a nd critical reason ing of philosophical inqui ry-to ask whether the claims are suppo rted by good reasons.

2.2 ARGUMENTS FOR THE EX ISTENCE OF GOD

• Cosmological argu ments begin with th e empirical fact th at the u niverse, o r one of its essential properties, exists-and end with th e conclusion th at only God could be responsible for this fact. Fo r example, in his first-cause argument, Aquinas contends that some things in the universe are caused to exist, an d that noth ing can cause itself to exist o r come into being th rough an infinite series of causes. So there must be a first u ncaused cause of everything-and this first uncaused cause is God. Using the Big Bang as a starting point, C raig defen ds the Kalam cosmological a rgument.

• Teleological, or design, arguments for the existence of God reason that s ince the \vorld seems to sho\v s ig ns of purposeful design, it most likely was purposefully designed-th at is, intentionally made by an intell igen t being, which we call God. Paley articulates the classic desig n argument, and H ume conten ds, among oth er th ings, that such arguments fail because the an alogy is \veak and demonstrates o nly th at the universe has a designer, wh ich may not be the traditional God of th eism.

• O ntological argumenrs appeal not to the empirical facrs about th e cosmos, but to th e concept of God irself. From the defin itio n of God, we try to prove with logic alone that a supreme deity is a real ity. Anselm \vas the fi rst to a rticulate such an argument, and other versions have follo\ve.d, all of \vh ich have been subjected to critical scru ti ny.

2.3 GOD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVI L

• The argument from evil says th at if an all-po\verful, all-kno\ving, and all-good God existed, un necessary evil \vould not exist. An all-powerful an d all-knowing God \vould know about, and be able to prevent, evil, and an all-good God would wan t to prevent it. But there is in fact un necessary evil in the \vorld. Many have offered counterargumenrs, or th eodicies, to th e argument from evil, denying th at un neces- sary evil exists in th e \vorld.

2.4 THEISM AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

• Some p ut forth an argument from rel igious experience: Religious experiences occur in \vh ich God seems to be sensed; the best explanation fo r these experiences is that God is indeed sensed (God cause.cl the experience); therefore, God probably exists. Richard Swi nburne mai ntains that by applying a basic principle of rationality, we can be justified in believi ng that our experience reveals God's presence.

2.5 BELi EF WITHOUT REASON

• Some argumen rs are intended to offer pragmatic justi fication for belief-reasons to th ink th at believi ng in God offers practical advantages. Pascal's wager is such an argument, and James offers another one.

2.6 EASTERN RELIGIONS

• Buddhism pos its no creator God, no all-powerful, al l-kno\ving deity that rules th e u niverse, takes an interest in h umans, o r ans\vers p rayers. It teaches that the Buddh a h imself was neither God nor the child of a god. He \vas instead the ultimate teacher an d an example fo r all Buddh ists to follo\v.

Review Notes 1 27

128 Chapter 2 God and Religion

• The Buddha's teachings are known as the dharma, th e heart of which is the Four Noble Truths: 1. Life is suffering. 2. Suffering is caused by desires. 3. To ban ish suf- fe ring, banish des ires. 4. Banish des ires and end suffering by fo llowi ng the Noble Eightfold Path.

• The ultimate aim of all Buddh ist practice and th e liberation to ,vhich all the

Buddh a's teachi ngs point is known as ni rvana. It is th e extinguishing of the fl ames of desire and all that accompanies it-greed, hatred, p ride, delusion, and more.

• The vedar are regarded by almost all H indus as eternal script u re an d th e essential reference point for all fo rms of Hind u ism. They are India's oldest existing literature. H indus revere the vet&s, even th ough the majority of adherents are ignorant of their content, and thei r meani ngs are studied mostly by the educated.

• In the early vet&s, there is an emphasis o n improving one's lot in li fe th rough religious p ractice and faith in the gods. But in the Upanishads, the central aim is release from th is world. Specifically, th e goal is liberation from samsara. The essen- tial Hindu bel ief is that at death, o ne's soul or self (atman) depar ts from the lifeless body and is reborn into a new body, residi ng for a time u ntil death, then being reborn in yet another physical fo rm-a d reary sequence that may be repeated for thousan ds of lifetimes.

• The Upanishads say that release from samsara can only come through the freeing power of a transcen dent wisdom, which is achieved when an atman real izes th e soul is not separate from the world o r from other souls b ut is one with th e impersonal, al l-pervading Sp irit known as Brahman.

• The Bhagavad-Gita confronts the moral an d p hilosoph ical questions and co nfl icts that arise in Hindu concep ts and p ractice-in devotion to the gods, the cas te sys- tem, obligations to family, duties in time of ,var, th e nature of the soul, th e concept of Brahman, an d the correct paths toward moksha.

• Dao ism gets its name from the impossible-to-defi ne notio n of the Dao, which has been translate.cl as the "Way" o r the "Way of Nature." Daoism is said to have been fou nded by Lao-Tzu, the supposed auth or of th e classical Daoist text th e Tao -te ching ( Classic of the Way and Its Pozuer), d esti ne.cl to become, along with Co nfucius's Anal.ects, one of the two most respected books of Ch inese writings.

• A fundamen tal notion in Daoism is that since everyth ing and everyone is subject to the po,ver of the Dao, the best human life is one lived in h ar mony with it. To live well is to go ,vith the current of the D ao; to struggle agai nst the scream is to invite discord, strife, and ,voe.

WRITI NG TO UNDERSTAND:

ARG UING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 2

1. If you believe in God, why do you believe? Explain your view in detail. Is it based o n one or more of the trad it ional a rgumencs for God, you r personal experien ce, faith, o r something else? If your a nswer is per- sonal experience or faith, explain \vhy you think it is a good basis fo r bel ievi ng that God exiscs.

2. If you d o not believe in God (if you are either a n atheist or an agnos- tic), w hy not? Explain your view in detail. Is it based on the argument from evil, the fa ilure of theistic arguments, personal experience, or something else? If your answer is personal experience, explain why you think it is a good basis for not believi ng in God.

3. Crit ique Aquinas's first-cause argument. Expla in the a rgument, discuss the strengths a nd weak nesses of the reasoning a nd each premise, and render your own verdict as to the argu ment 's soundness.

4 . Crit ique Paley's d esign argument. Expla in the a rgument, discuss t he strengths a nd weaknesses of the reasoning and each premise, and render your own verdict as to the argu ment 's cogency. If you think h is argu ment fa ils, can you devise a better design argu ment ?

5. What a re some of the practical implication s of living according t o the Four Noble T ruths? In other words, w hat would your life be like if you based all your actions on these Truths? Would you prefer a life like this compared to you r li fe now? W hy or w hy not?

Key Terms

atma11 One's soul or self. (118)

Key Terms 129

agnostic Someone who neither accepts nor denies God's existence. (64)

argumen t from evil An a rgument purporti ng to show that since there is unnecessary evil, an al l- powerful, all-knowi ng, and all-good God must not exist . (63)

Bhagavad-Gita The most highly venerated and influen- tial scripture in H induism. ( 120)

argument from religious experien ce An argument of this form: A person seems t o have experienced God; the experience must have act ually been a genuine en- counter with God; therefore, God probably exists. (62)

atheism The denial of the exist ence of God. (64)

atheist Someone \vho denies God's existence. (64)

Brahman The impersonal, al l-pervading Spirit that is the universe yet t ranscends all space and time. (119)

brahmin A priest or t eacher; a man of the priestly caste. ( 11 9)

cosmological arguments Arguments that try to show that from th e fac t th at th e un iverse exists, God exists. (61)

130 Chapter 2 God and Religion

deism Belief in one God who created the \vorld but left it unattended to run on ics own. (65)

dharma The Buddha's system of teachings about the true nature of reality and how to live correctly to tran- scend it. (111)

evidentialism The view that we are justified in be- lieving something only if it is supported by sufficient evidence. (99)

karma The universal principle that our actions result in deserved pleasure or pain in this li fe or the next. (11 O)

monotheism Belief in one God. (65)

moral evil Evil that comes from human cho ices and actions and the bad things that a rise from them. (84)

natural evil Evil that resulcs from the \vorkings of na- ture. (84)

nitvana Enlightenment: the ultimate aim of all Bud- dhist practice and the final liberation to which all the Buddha's teachings point. (1 12)

ontological argument An argument that tries to dem- o nstrate God's existence by logical analysis of the con- cept of God. ( 62)

panentheism The vie\v that God is in the universe and the universe is in God. (65)

pantheism The vie\v that God and the universe are one and the same thing, a divine Whole. (65)

polytheism Belief in many gods. (65)

sa»isara One's cycle of repeated deaths and rebirths. (1 18)

teleological arguments Arguments that try to sho\v that God must exist because features of the universe sho\v signs of purpose or design. (61)

theism Belief in the existence of God. ( 64)

theist Someone \vho believes in God. (64)

theodicy A d efense of the traditional conception of God in light of the existen ce of evil. (64)

Upanishads Vedic literature concer ning the self, Brah- man, samsa,;i, and liberation. (118)

'41das Early Hindu scriptures, developed benveen 1500 an d 600 BCE. ( 117)

The Star 131

FICT ION

The Star Arthur C. C larke

Sir Arthur C. Clarke (1917- 2008) was one of the world's great masters of science fiction. H e is probably most famous for his novel Childhood's End and his screenp lay for the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey.

It is three thousand light-years to the Vatican. Once, I be- lieved that space could have no power over faith, just as I believed the heavens declared the glory of God's hand i- work. Now I have seen that hand iwork, and my faith is sorely troubled. I stare at the crucifix that hangs on the cabin wall above the Mark VI Computer, and for the first time in my life I wonder ifit is no more than an empty symbol.

I have told no one yet, but the truth cannot be con- cealed. The facts are there for all to read, recorded on the countless miles of magnetic tape and the thousa nds of photographs we are carrying back to Earth. O t her scien- tists can interpret them as easily as I can, and I am not one who would condone that ta mpering with the truth which often gave my order a bad name in the olden days.

The crew were already sufficiently depressed: I won- der how t hey will take t his ult imate irony. Few of them have any religious faith, yet they will not relish using this final weapon in their campaign against me- that private, good-natured , but fundamentall y serious war which lasted all t he way from Earth. It amused them to have a Jesuit as chief astrophysicist: Dr. Chand ler, for instance, could never get over it. (Why are medical men such notorious atheists?) Sometimes he would meet me on the observation deck, where t he lights are always low so that the stars sh ine with undi minished glory. He wou ld come up to me in the gloom and stand staring out of the great oval port, while t he heavens crawled slowly around us as the sh ip turned over and over wi th the residual spin we had never bothered to correct.

"Well, Father," he wou ld say at last, " it goes on for- ever and forever, and perhaps Something made it. But how you can believe that Something has a special inter- est in us and our miserable little world- that just beats me." Then the argument would start, while the stars and

From The Nine Billion Names of God: The Best Short Stories of Arthur C. Clarke (New York: Signet/NAL, 1974) , 235-240; full text from http://faculty.winthrop.edu/kosterj/engl510/star. htm. Reprinted by permission of the author and the author's agents, Scovil Galen Ghosh literary Agency, Inc.

nebulae wou ld swing around us in silent, endless arcs be- yond the flawlessly clear plastic of the observation port.

It was, I think, the apparent incongruity of my posi- t ion that caused mos t amusement among the crew. In va in I pointed to my three papers in the Astrophysical Journal, my five in the Monthly Notices of the Royal As- tronomical Society. I would remind them that my order has long been famous for its scientific works. We may be few now, but ever since the eighteenth century we have made contributions to astronomy and geophysics out of all proportion to our numbers. W ill my report on t he Phoen ix Nebula end our thousand years of history? It will end, I fear, much more t ha n that.

I do not know who gave the nebu la its name, which seems to me a very bad one. If it contains a proph- ecy, it is one t hat cannot be verified fo r several billion years. Even the word "nebu la" is m isleading; this is a far sma ller object t ha n those stupendous clouds of m ist- t he stuff of unborn stars- that are scattered through- out the length of the Mi lky Way. On the cosmic scale, indeed , the Phoen ix Nebula is a tiny thing- a tenuous shell of gas surrounding a single star.

Or what is left of a star .. . . The Rubens engraving of Loyola seems to mock me

as it ha ngs there above the spectrophotometer tracings. What wou ld you, Father, have made of this knowledge that has come into my keeping, so far from the little world that was all the Un iverse you knew? Would your faith have risen to the challenge, as mine has failed to do?

You gaze into the distance, Father, but I have traveled a distance beyond any that you cou ld have imagi ned when you founded our order a thousand years ago. No other survey ship has been so far from Earth: we are at the very frontiers of the explored Universe. We set out to reach the Phoenix Nebula, we succeeded, and we are homeward bound with our burden of knowledge. I wish I cou ld lift that burden from my shoulders, but I call to you in vain across the centuries and the light-years that lie between us.

On the book you are holding the words are plain to read. AD MAIOR EM DEi GLOR IAM, the message runs,

132 Chapter 2 God and Religion

but it is a message I can no longer believe. Wou ld you still bel ieve it, if you could see what we have found?

We knew, of course, what the Phoen ix Nebula was. Every year, in our Galaxy alone, more than a hundred stars explode, blazing for a few hours or days with hun- dreds of times their normal brilliance until they sink back into death and obscurity. Such are the ord inary novas- the commonplace d isasters of the Universe. I have re- corded the spectrograms and light curves of dozens since I started working at the Lunar Observatory.

But three or four times in every thousand years oc- curs something bes ide wh ich even a nova pales into total insign ificance.

When a star becomes a supernova, it may for a li ttle wh ile outshine all the massed suns of the Ga laxy. The Chinese astronomers watched this happen in A.O. 1054, not knowing what it was they saw. Five centuries later, in 1572, a supernova blazed in Cassiopeia so brill iantly that it was visible in the daylight sky. There have been three more in the thousand years that have passed since then.

Our mission was to visit the remnants of such a ca- tastrophe, to reconstruct the events that led up to it, and, if possible, to learn its cause. We came slowly in through the concentric shells of gas that had been blasted out six thousand years before, yet were expanding still. They were immensely hot, radiating even now with a fierce vio- let light, but were far too tenuous to do us any damage. When the star had exploded, its outer layers had been driven upward with such speed that they had escaped completely from its gravitational fie ld. Now they formed a hollow shell large enough to engulf a thousand solar systems, and at its center burned the tiny, fantast ic ob- ject which the star had now become- a Wh ite Dwarf, smaller than earth, yet weighing a mill ion times as much.

The glowing gas shell s were all around us, ban ish- ing the normal night of interstellar space. We were fly ing into the center of the cosm ic bomb that had detonated millenn ia ago and whose incandescent fragments were still hurtling apart. The immense sca le of the explosion, and the fact that the debris already covered a volume of space many millions of miles across, robbed the scene of any visible movement. It would take decades before the unaided eye could detect any motion in these tor- tured wisps and edd ies of gas, yet the sense of turbu- lent expansion was overwhelming.

We had checked our primary drive hours before, and were drifting s lowly toward the fierce little star ahead. Once it had been a sun li ke our own, but it had squandered in a few hours the energy that should have kept it shining for a mill ion years. Now it was a

shrunken miser, hoard ing its resources as if trying to make amends for its prod iga l youth.

No one seriously expected to find planets. If there had been any before the explos ion, they would have been boiled into puffs of vapor, and their substance lost in the greater wreckage of the star itse lf. But we made the automatic search , as we always do when approach- ing an unknown sun, and presently we found a s ingle small world circl ing the star at an immense distance. It must have been the Pluto of this vanished Solar Sys- tem, orbiting on the frontiers of the night. Too far from the central sun ever to have known life, its remoteness had saved it from the fate of all its lost compan ions.

The passing fires had seared its rocks and burned away the mantle of frozen gas that must have covered it in the days before the disaster. We landed , and we found the Vault.

Its bu ilders had made sure that we should. The monolithic marker that stood above the entrance was now a fused stump, but even the first long-range pho- tographs told us that here was the work of intelligence. A li ttle later we detected the continent-wide pattern of rad ioactivity that had been buried in the rock. Even if the pylon above the Vau lt had been destroyed, th is would have remained , an immovable and all-but eter- nal beacon calling to the stars. Our ship fe ll toward th is gigantic bu ll 's eye like an arrow into its target.

The pylon must have been a mile high when it was bu ilt, but now it looked like a candle that had melted down into a puddle of wax. It took us a week to drill through the fused rock, since we did not have the proper tools for a task like th is. We were astronomers, not archaeolo- gists, but we cou ld improvise. Our original purpose was forgotten: th is lonely monument, reared with such labor at the greatest possible distance from the doomed sun, could have only one meaning. A civilization that knew it was about to d ie had made its last bid for immortality.

It will take us generations to exam ine all the treasures that were placed in the Vault. They had plenty of time to prepare, for their sun must have given its first warnings many years before the fina l detonation. Everything that they wished to preserve, all the fruits of their genius, they brought here to th is distant world in the days before the end, hoping that some other race would find it and that they wou ld not be utterly forgo tten. Wou ld we have done as well , or wou ld we have been too lost in our own misery to give thought to a future we could never see or share?

If only they had had a little more time ! They cou ld travel free ly enough between the planets of their own sun , but they had not yet learned to cross the interstell ar

gu lfs, and the nea rest Solar System was a hundred light- years away. Yet even had they possessed the secret of the Transfinite Drive, no more than a few mill ions cou ld have been saved. Pe rhaps it was better thus.

Even if they had not been so disturbingly human as their sculpture shows, we could not have helped admir- ing them and grieving for their fate. They left thousands of visual records and the machines for projecting them, together with elaborate pictorial instructions from which it will not be difficult to learn their written language. We have examined many of these records, and brought to life for the first time in six thousand years the warmth and beauty of a civilization that in many ways must have been superior to our own. Perhaps they only showed us the best, and one can hardly blame them. But their worlds were very lovely, and their cities were built with a grace that matches any- thing of man's. We have watched them at work and play, and listened to their musical speech sounding across the centuries. One scene is still before my eyes- a group of children on a beach of strange blue sand, playing in the waves as children play on Earth. Curious whiplike trees line the shore, and some very large animal is wading in the shallows, yet attracting no attention at all.

And sinking into the sea, still warm and friend ly and life-giving, is the sun that will soon turn traitor and obliterate a ll th is innocent happiness.

Perhaps if we had not been so far from home and so vu lnerable to loneliness, we shou ld not have been so deeply moved . Many of us had seen the ruins of ancient civil izations on other worlds, but they had never affected us so profound ly. This tragedy was unique. It is one thing for a race to fai l and die, as nations and cultures have done on Earth. But to be destroyed so completely in the full flower of its achievement, leaving no survivors- how cou ld that be reconciled with the mercy of God?

My colleagues have asked me that, and I have given what answers I can. Perhaps you could have done bet- ter, Father Loyola, but I have found nothing in the Exer- citia Spiritualia that helps me here. They were not an evil

Probing Questions

The Star 133

people: I do not know what gods they worshiped, if indeed they worshiped any. But I have looked back at them across the centuries, and have watched while the loveliness they used their last strength to preserve was brought forth again into the light of their shrunken sun. They cou ld have taught us much: why were they destroyed?

I know the answers that my colleagues will give when they get back to Earth. They will say that the Universe has no purpose and no plan, that since a hundred suns explode every year in our Galaxy, at this very moment some race is dying in the depths of space. Whether that race has done good or evil during its lifetime will make no difference in the end: there is no divine justice, for there is no God.

Yet, of course, what we have seen proves nothing of the sort. Anyone who argues thus is being swayed by emotion, not logic. God has no need to justify His ac- tions to ma n. He who built the Universe can destroy it when He chooses. It is arrogance- it is perilously near blasphemy- for us to say what He may or may not do.

Th is I cou ld have accepted, hard though it is to look upon whole worlds and peop les thrown in to the fur- nace. Bu t there comes a poin t when even the deepest fa ith must fa lter, and now, as I look at the calculations lying before me, I have reached that point at last.

We could not tell, before we reached the nebula, how long ago the explosion took place. Now, from the astronomical evidence and the record in the rocks of that one surviving planet, I have been able to date it very exactly. I know in what year the light of this colossal conflagration reached the Earth. I know how brill iantly the supernova whose corpse now dwind les behind our speeding ship once shone in terrestrial skies. I know how it must have blazed low in the east before sunrise, li ke a beacon in that oriental dawn.

There can be no reasonable doubt: the ancient mys- tery is solved at last. Yet, oh God, there were so many stars you cou ld have used . What was the need to give these people to the fire, that the symbol of the ir passing might sh in e above Beth lehem?

I. What is che terrible irony revealed in che last sentence of chis story? Could chis irony arise in real life? That is, could che events recounted actually happen?

2. Why is che Jesuit astrophysicist's faith s haken? If you were in his position and kne,v what he did, ,vould your faith falter?

3. What does chis story suggest about the design of the universe? Do che events in che story imply chat there is a designer God-or chat there isn't? Explain.

134 Chapter 2 God and Religion

For Further Read ing

W illiam Lane C raig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, revised editio n (Wh eato n, IL: Crossway Books, 1994). A readable theistic defense of the existence of God.

W illiam Lane Craig and Walter Sin nott-Armstro ng, God? A Debate Between a Chris- tian and an Atheist (Ne\v Yo rk: Oxfo rd University Press, 2004). An informative give-and -take about the existence of God between a scholarly Christian and a knowl- edgeable atheist.

Richard M . Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge Un i- versity Press, 1991). A sophisticated but readable examination of arguments fo r the existence of God.

Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) .

B. C. Johnson, The Atheist Debater's Handbook (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1983) . A lucid, concise d ismantl ing of major argumenrs for God's existence.

W. J. Johnson, trans., The Bhagavad Gita (Oxford : Oxfo rd University Press, 1994) .

Ph ilip Kitcher, Living with Darwin (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2007) . A careful, even-handed examination of evolution and religion.

Kim Knott, Hinduism: A ve,y Short Introduction (Oxfo rd : Oxford Un iversity Press, 1998).

). L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, 3 rd e.dition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). An atheistic p hilosopher's classic, readable assessment of argumen ts fo r God's existence.

M ichael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Ph iladelphia: Temple Un iver- sity Press, 1990). A scho larly but accessible gu ide to majo r argumenrs for and against th eism .

W illard G. Oxtoby, ed., World Religiom: Eastern Traditions (Oxford: Oxford Un iver- sity Press, 2002).

M ichael Peterson, W illiam Hasker, Bruce Reichen bach, and David Basi nger, Reason and Religious Belief(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Theistic p hilosophers assess the case fo r and against God's existence.

Alvi n Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, Ml : Eerdmans, 1974) . A very accessible, th eistic rebuttal of the argument from evil.

Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1979).

W illiam L. Ro\ve, Philosophy of Religion (Belmont, CA: Wadswo rth, 2001) . A th or- ough, accessible survey of the main issues in the p hilosophy of religion.

Richard S\vinburne, The Existence of God, 2 nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). A comprehensive defense of th eism by a leading theistic p hilosopher.

MORALITY AND THE MORAL LIFE

CHAPT ER OBJECTIV ES

3.1 OVERVIEW: ETH ICS AND T HE MORAL DOMAIN

• Understand t he d istinction between eth ics and morality, and know the basic e lements that make morality a uniq ue normative enterprise.

• Understand t he nat ure of moral theories and expla in how t he moral criteria of adeq uacy are used to evaluate them.

• Define consequentialist, deontological, utilitarianism, ethical egoism, Kant's theory, virtue ethics, ethics of care, considered moral judgments, and divine command theory.

• State t he d ivine command theory and explain the arbitrariness argument aga inst it.

3.2 MORAL RELATIVISM

• Define moral objectivism, moral absolutism, moral relativism, subjective relativism, and cultural relativism.

• Exp la in the main o bjections to subject ive and cultural relat ivism , eva luate the standard argument for cultural relativism, and understand the relationship between cultural relativism and tolerance.

3.3 MORALITY BASED ON CONSEQUENCES

• St ate t he cent ral features of utilitarianism and describe Bentham' s and Mil l's different concept ions of happiness.

• Evaluate utilitarianism' s s t rengt hs and weaknesses.

• Expla in the d is t inct ion bet ween eth ical egoism and psychological egoism , and eva luate eth ical egoism's s t rengt hs and weaknesses.

3.4 MORALITY BASE D ON DUTY AND RIGHTS

• Describe t he differences bet ween t he t heories of Mi II and Kant.

• Articulate the main features of Kant 's t heory and of h is two versions of the categorical im perative.

• Evaluate the s trengths and weaknesses of Kant's theory.

136 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

3.5 MORA LITY BASED ON CHARACTER

• State the main features of virtue ethics and of Aristotle 's view o f the virtuous life.

• Describe t he d iffe rences between virtue ethics and most other moral theories .

• Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of virtue ethics.

3.6 FEMIN IST ETH ICS AND T HE ETHICS OF CAR E

• Explain how feminist ethics differs from both utilitari anism and Kant's theory.

• Describe t he nature of t he ethics of care, its most attractive features, and some of the criticisms that have been lodged against it.

• Articulate and defend your own moral theory-that is, your own view of the nature of right and wrong actions .

3.7 ALBERT CAMUS: AN EXISTENTIALIST VOICE

• Exp lain some of the main themes o f existential ism .

• Summarize the points that Camus makes in his

interpretation of the myth o f Sisyphus

3.8 CONFUC IANISM

• Understand the main a im o f Confuciu s 's teach ing.

• Know what Ji and ren mean and how Confucius thought they could be used to help someone become a "superior person."

• Define the obl igation o f fi lia l p iety and understand why Confucius thought it so important.

3.1 OVERVIEW: ETHICS AND THE MORAL DOMAIN

Ethics is part of philosophy; it is a lso par t of life-a very large, vital, inev itable part of life. You ca nnot avoid thinking about right and wrong, judging people to be good or bad, wondering what kind of life is ,vorrhwh ile, debating ,vith others about moral iss ues, accepting or rejecting the moral beliefs of your fam ily or culture, or com ing to some general understanding (a moral theory) about the nature of morality itself. When you do these things, you are in the realm of ethics and will need philosophy's resou rces to sort out good ans,vers from bad, justified beliefs from nonsense.

Ethics and Morality

Ethics, or moral philosophy, is the study of morality using the methods of philoso- phy, and morality consists of our beliefs about right and ,vrong actions and good and bad persons or character. Mora lity has to do ,vith our mora l judgments, prin- ciples, values, and theories; eth ics is the careful, philosophical exam ination of these.

Ethics (moral philosophy) is ,he study of morality using the methods of p hilosophy.

Morali ty consists of o ur beliefs about right and wrong actions and good and bad persons o r c haracter.

Overview : Ethics and the Moral Domain 137

Ethics applies critical reasoni ng to questio ns abou t what \Ve should do a nd \vhat is of value, questions that pervade our lives a nd demand reasonable answers.

In everyday la nguage, people often blur the disti nction between ethics and morality, using the terms as synonyms fo r moral beliefs or practices generally (as in "Moral it y is the fou ndation of civilization" or "Eth ics cannot be ignored"). Or they may use the

words to refer to the moral beliefs or p ractices of speci fic groups or persons ("Muslim morality," "Puritan eth ics," "the eth ics of Gandhi"). Those \vho maintain the disti nction that \Ve draw here \vill general ly apply the adjective forms moral and ethical accordingly. But it is also common (includi ng in th is text) to use these \vords as equivalent to right and good ("That was the eth ical th ing to do"), a nd to use immoral or unethical as syn- onyms for wrong or bad ("Abortion is immoral," "Cheating on an exam is u nethical").

Mora lity is a normative enterprise, \vh ich means that it provides us \Vit h norms, o r standards, for judging actions and persons-s tandards usually in the form of mora l principles or t heories. With moral standards in hand, \Ve decide whether an action is morally right or \vrong, \vhether a person is morally good or bad , and whether we are living a good o r bad life. The main business of mora lity is therefore not to d escribe ho\v things a re, but to prescribe how things should be. There are, of cou rse, other normative spheres (a rt and law, for example), bu t t hese are interested in applying nonmoral norms (aesthetic and legal norms, fo r instance) to judge the wort h or correctness of t h ings. W hen we pa rticipate in eth ics, we are t ypically either applying or evalu ating mora l norms and using the tools of ph ilosophy to d o it.

Mora lity sta nds out among other normative spheres because of its d istinctive set of properties . One of these is that moral norms have a much st ronger hold on us t han nonmoral ones do. The former a re thought to domi nate the latter, possessing a propert y that ph ilosophers call overridingness. For example, we would think that a mora l norm mandating t hat everyone be treated fai rly shou ld override a legal norm (a la\v) that enjoined one group to discriminate against a nother. If a la\v command ed us to comm it a seriously immoral act, we would p robably t h ink t he la\v illegitimate a nd might even fl out it in a n act of civil d isobedience. Moral no rms are gen erally stronger and more important t han nonmoral no rms.

In additio n, moral norms have impartiality: t hey apply to everyone equally. Morality demands t hat everyone be considered of equal moral \VOrth, a nd t hat each person's interests be given equal weight. Morality, in other \vords, says t hat equ als shou ld be treated equally u nless there is a mora lly relevant reason to t reat t hem dif- ferently. We would consider it u nj ust to apply a moral no rm to some people but not to others when t here is no morally relevant difference between them.

Moral norms, like non moral ones, also possess t he property of universality: they apply not just in a single case, but in a ll cases th at are relevantly sim ila r. Logic tells us th at we cannot reasonably regard an action performed by one person as morally \vrong while believing th at the same action performed in an al most identical sit uation by a nother person is morally right. Morality demands consistency among similar cases.

Finally, morality is reason based. To be fully involved in t he moral life and to make informed moral judgmen rs is to engage in moral reason ing. To do mora l rea- soning is to try to ensure that ou r moral judgments are not wrou ght out of t hin ai r o r concocted from prej ud ice or bli nd emotion-but are supported by good reasons.

Morality is not p roperly th e doctrine of how we

may make ourselves

happy, but how we may make ourselves worthy of

happin ess. - Immanuel Ka.m

1 How is d iscrimin a- t ion aga inst a g ro u p of people co ntrary t o mo ralit y's d ema nd for impa rtia lit y? Ca n th e re ever be re asons for t reat ing e quals unequ ally? If so, what kind o f re aso ns?

138 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

2 Can you think of examp les in history o r literature in whi ch peopl e l et their con - science be their guide and ended up comm it- ting immoral acts? Is it possibl e that Hit l er 's conscience told h im to murder si x m illion Jews?

Figure 3.1 Moral issues are forced upon us th roughout our lives. When th ey are, to what sys- tem of morality do you appeal- the one you were taug ht as a ch ild, a code derived from your preferred religion, or some other moral th eory?

We would th ink it preposterous for someone to assert that killing innocent children is morally permissible (or imperm iss ible)-and that he has no reasons whatsoever for bel ieving th is. In science, me.dicine, la\v, business, and every other area of intel- lectual life, \Ve want and expect cla ims to be backed by good reasons. Morality is no different. And ethics-the systematic search for mora l understanding-ca n be suc- cessful only through careful reflection and the sifting of reasons for belief. Crit ical reasoning is the main engine that drives ethical inquiry.

But \vhat about emotions-\vhat role do they play in ethics? Feelings a re an essential and inevitable part of the moral life. They can help us empathize with others and en la rge our understanding of the stakes involved in moral d ecisions. But they can also blind us. Our feelings a re too often the product of ou r psycho- logical needs, cu ltural conditioning, and selfish motivations. C ritical reasoning is the correct ive, giving us the power to examine and gu ide ou r feelings to achieve a more balanced view.

Some people believe that conscience, not ethics, is the best guide to plausible moral judgmenrs. At times, it seems to speak to us in an imaginary though authori- tative voice, telling us to do or not to do something. But conscience is no infallible indicator of mora l truth. It is cond itioned by our upbring ing, cultural background, and other factors and, like our feelings, it may be the result of irrelevant influences. Nevertheless, the voice of conscience shou ld not be ignored; it can often aler t us to

Overview : Ethics and the Moral Domain 139

something of moral impo rta nce. But we muse submit its promptings co critical ex- amination before we can have any confidence in chem.

The moral life, then, is about grappling with a distinctive class of no rms, wh ich can include moral principles, rules, theories, and judgmen cs. We apply these norms co nvo d istinct spheres of our moral experience-co both moral obligatiom and moral values. Moral obligations concer n our d uty, \vhat we are obligated co do. That is, obligations are about conduct, ho\v \Ve ought or ought not co behave. In chis sphere, we talk p rimarily about actions. We may look co moral principles or r ules co guide our actions, or study a moral theory that pu rports co explain right actions, or make judgments about right o r wrong actions. Moral values, on the ocher ha nd, generally concern chose things chat we judge co be morally good, bad, p raiseworthy, or blame- worthy. Normally we use such words co describe persons (as in "He is a good person" or "She is co blame fo r hu rting them"), t heir character ("He is virtuous"; "She is hon- est"), or their motives ("She d id \vrong bu t did not mean co"). Note chat we also attri- bute nonmoral value co things. If we say chat a book or bicycle or vacatio n is good, we mean good in a nonmoral sense. Such things in themselves cannot have moral value.

Strictly speaking, on ly actio ns a re morally right or wrong, but persons are mor- a lly good or bad (or some degree of goodness or badness). With chis d istinction we can ackno\vledge a s imple fact of the mora l life: a good person can d o something wrong, and a bad p erson can do something right.

Moral Theories

A la rge part of eth ics and t he moral life consists of devising a nd evaluating moral theories. That is, \Ve do moral theorizi ng. In science, theories help us understand the empirical world by explain ing the causes of even ts, \vhy things a re the way t hey a re. The germ t heory of disease exp la ins how p articular diseases a rise a nd spread in a human population. The hel iocentric (sun-centered) theory of planetary motion explains \vhy the p lanets in our sola r system behave the way t hey do. In ethics, moral t heories h ave a sim ilar expla natory role. A moral theory explains not \vhy one event causes a nother, but why a n action is right or \vrong or why a person or a person's character is good or bad. A moral theory cells us \vhac it is about an actio n chat makes it right, or what it is about a person t h at makes him or her good. The divine com- mand theory of morality, fo r example, says chat right actio ns are chose commanded o r willed by God. Traditional utilitarian ism says chat right actio ns a re chose chat produce t he best balance of happiness over unhappiness for all concerned . These and other moral t heories are attempts co define rightness o r good ness. I n chis way, t hey a re both more general and more bas ic t han moral p ri nciples or ocher general norms.

Moral t heorizing comes naturally co almost everyone. W henever we t ry co under- stand what a moral p roperty such as rightness or goodness means, o r justi fy a moral princip le or other norm, o r resolve a conflict benveen two cred ible principles, or ex- p lain why a particula r action o r p ractice is right or \vrong, or evaluate the p lausibility of specific moral intuitio ns or assumptions, we do moral theorizi ng. I n fact, we must t heorize if \Ve a re co make headway in such investigations. We muse stand back from t he situation at hand and try co grasp t he larger p attern chat only theory can reveal.

A moral theory is a , heory

thar explai ns w hy a n ac- tion L,;: right or wrong or why a person or a pe rson's character is good o r bad.

I say th at a man m ust be ccrrain of his morality fo r th e simple reason th at he

has to su ffe r for it. -G. K. Chestercon

140 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

A system of mo rality wh ich is based o n relative e motional values is a mere

illusio n, a t horou ghly vulgar conception w h ich h as nothing sound in it

an d n oth ing true. -Socr.ues

A con sequentialJst theory is a mo ral theory in wh ich the righ tness of actio ns depends solely o n their

consequences o r resul ts.

A deontological (o r n o n - con sequentialist ) theo ry is a mo ral theory in w hich

the righ tness of actio ns is dere rmined not solely by their consequences} b u t

partly o r e n tirely by the ir inu insic nature.

Utilitarianism is th e view chat right actions arc those chat result in the most

be neficial balan ce of good over bad consequen ces fo r everyone involved.

Ethi cal ego ism is che view that right actions a rc those

that further one's own best inrcrr:sts.

Figure 3.2 We all have a moral theory (even the i dea that moral theories don't exist is a t h eor- etical view about ethics). The important question is not whether you have a theory, but whether the theory you have is a good one.

T\vO types of theories have been of the greatest interest to philosophers. Consequentialist theories insist that the rightness of actions d epends solely o n their consequences or results. The key question is what o r ho\v much good the actio ns pro- duce, however good is defined. D eontological (or nonconsequentialist) theories say that the rightness of actions is d etermined not solely by their consequences, but pa rtly or entirely by their intrinsic nature. For some or all actions, rightness depends on the kind of actions they are, not on how much good they produce. A consequen- tialist theory, then, may say that stealing is wrong because it causes more harm than good. But a deontological theory may contend that stealing is inherently \vrong regardless of its consequences, good o r bad.

The most influential consequent ialist theory is utilitarianism , the vie\v that right actio ns are those that maximize the overall well-being of everyone involved. Or, to put it another way, \Ve should do \vhat results in the greatest balance of good over bad, everyone considered. Various forms of utilitarianism differ in how they define the good, \vith some equating it with happi ness or pleasure (the hedon istic view), others with satisfaction of preferences o r desires o r some other intrinsically valuable things o r states, such as kno\vledge or perfection.

Another consequentialist theory is ethical egoism , the view that right actions are those that further one's O\vn best interests. Your duty is to look out for yourself by doing what yields the most favo rable consequences fo r you, even if the interests of others are ignored or th\varted. Eth ical egoists may equate thei r interescs with pleasure, happiness, self-realization, or other valued states, but they all agree that promoting these things for oneself is the essence of morality. Selfishness and w ild abandon, however, are not entailed by ethical egoism, fo r ignoring the needs of oth- ers or acting without restraint may not be in one's best interescs.

Overview : Ethics and the Moral Domain 14 1

The most sophisticated and influential deontological theory comes from the German ph ilosopher Immanuel Kant (1724- 1804). Kant's theory is the very an- t ithesis of utilitarianism, holding that right actions do not depend in the least on consequences, the production of happiness, or the desires and needs of human be- ings. For Kant, the core of morality cons ists in fo llowing a rational and universally applicable moral rule and doing so solely out of a sense of duty. An action is right only if it conforms to such a rule, and we a re morally praise\vOrthy only if \Ye per- fo rm it for duty's sake a lone.

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Morality and the Law

Kant's theo ry is che cheory that right actions arc those that accord with the categorical imperative.

Some people confuse moralicy \Yirh rhe law, or identify the one \Yirh rhe other, bur rhe t\YO are distinct though rhey ,nay often coincide. Laws are norms enacted or enforced by rhe scare ro prorecr or promote rhe public good.They specify \Yhich actions are legally righr or \Vrong. Bur these sa,ne actions can also be judged morally righr or \vrong, and these rwo kinds of judgments \Viii nor necessarily agree. Lying ro a friend about a personal matter, deliberately crying ro destroy yourself rhrough reckless living, or fai ling ro save a drowning chi ld (when you easily could have) ,nay be irnmoral-but nor illegal. Racial bias, discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation, slavery, spousal rape, and unequal rrearmenr of minoriry groups are i1n1noral-bur, depending on rhe sociecy, rhey ,nay nor be illegal.

Much of rhe rime, ho\vever, ,norality and rhe la\Y overlap. Often whar is irnmoral a lso turns out ro be illegal. This is usually rhe case \Yhen irnmoral actions cause subsranria l harm ro ochers, whether physica l or economic. Thus rnurder and e1nbez2lemenr are both irnmoral and illega l, backed by socia l disapprova l and severe sanctions imposed by law. Controversy often arises \Yhen an action is nor obviously or seriously harmful bur is considered irnmoral by some \Yho \Vane rhe practice prohibited by law. The contentious notion ar work is char something may be ,nade illegal solely on rhe grounds char it is irnmoral, regardless of any physical or e.conomic harm involved. This view of rhe la\Y is known as legal moralism, and ir somerirnes underl ies debates about rhe legalization of abortion, euthanasia, reproductive technology, contraception, and ocher practices.

Many issues in ethics have borh a ,noral and legal dimension, and ir is irnportanr nor ro confuse rhe two. Somerirnes rhe question ar hand is a ,noral one (whether, for example, euthanasia is ever ,norally permissible); \Vherher a practice should be lega l or illega l rhen is beside rhe point. Sometimes the question is about lega lity. And sometimes rhe discussion concerns borh. A person may consider physician-assisted suicide morally acceptable bur ar- gue char ir shou ld nevertheless be illega l because allowing rhe practice ro beco,ne widespread wou ld harrn borh patients and rhe ,nedical profession.

Are you a legal moralist? Why or why not?

Copied from Lewis Vaughn, Bioethics, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

142 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

3 Do you gen e ra lly judge t he rig htness o r wron gness of a n action by it s consequences? By the nature of the action it self ? By so me other measure o f rig ht ness?

Virtue ethi cs is a moral theory th at focuses o n , he

development of virtuous

c harac te r.

Et hics of care is a moral p erspective ,h a t e mpha-

s izes the unique demands of s pecific s ituario ns and the virtues a nd feeli ngs

that arc central m close p ersonal relatio n ships.

The preceding theories are ,vhac philosophers call theories of obligatio n, ,vhich emph asize the rig htness o r ,vrongness of actio ns a nd che duties of persons. Their mai n concern is k nowing a nd doing ,vhac's right, a nd their chief guide co these aims is moral p rinciples. A n a ltogether different k ind of moral theory is virtue ethics, ,vhich foc uses not on ru les a nd right actions, but on che development of virtuous character. Accordi ng co vi rt ue eth ics, character is the key co the moral life, fo r it is from a vir- tuous ch aracter that moral conduce and values naturally arise. Virtues a re ing ra ined dispositio ns co ace by standards of excellence, so h av ing che proper vi rt ues leads as a matter of cou rse co right actions p roperly mocivace.d. The central cask in morality, then, is not k nowing a nd applyi ng principles, but being a nd becoming a good person, someone possess ing the vi rt ues chat defi ne moral excellence. In vi rt ue ethics, one deter mines right action not by consu lting rules, but by asking what a truly vi rt uous person ,vould do o r ,vhether an action would accord with che relevant virtues.

The ethics of care is a dist inctive mora l perspective that a rose out of femin ist concerns a nd g re,v co challenge core elemencs of most ocher moral theories. Gener- ally, chose theories emphas ize abst ract principles, general duties, ind ivid ual righ cs, impa rtial judgmen ts, a nd deliberative reasoning. Bue che ethics of care shifcs che fo- cus co che un ique demands of specific s it uations and co che virt ues and feelings that are cent ral co close personal relationships-empathy, compassion, love, sympathy, and fidelity. The heart of che moral life is feel ing for and caring for chose with whom you have a special, int imate con nection.

None of these theories is perfect. Each o ne is an attempt to iden tify che true determ inants of rightness o r goodness, and each has g rasped at lease a piece of the truth abou t morality. But no theory manages co f ully account fo r all ou r int uitions abou t che moral life.

That is not co say chat all moral theories are created equal. Some are better tha n ochers, and a vital cask in eth ics is co cry to cell wh ich is which. Mora l theories ca n be useful and valuable co us on ly if there are criteria fo r judging their worth-and fo rtunately there are such sta nda rds and st ra ightforward ways of applying chem.

Recall chat moral theories a re a nalogous to scientific theories. Scientists d evise theories co explain che causes of events. For each pheno menon co be explai ned, sci- en ciscs usually have several poss ible theories co cons id er, and che challenge is co de- termine which o ne is best (and is therefore most li kely co be correct). The superior theory is che o ne chat fares best ,vhen judged by generally accepted yardst icks k no,vn as che scientific criteria of adequacy. O ne criterio n often invoke.cl is fruitfulness- ,vhecher the theory makes s uccessful p redictions of previously un known phenom- en a. A ll things being equal, a theory chat makes successful pre.dictions of novel phenomena is more likely co be true than one chat does not . Another important criterion is conservatism-ho,v well a theory fies with esta blished faces, wit h wh at scientists already k now. All things being equal, a theory chat confliccs with wh at scientists alread y have good reasons co bel ieve is less likely co be true than a theory chat has no such conflicts. O f cou rse, a n unconser vat ive theory ca n turn out co be correct, and a conservative theory ,vrong, but che odds are against this outcome. Analogously, moral theories are mea nt co explain wh at makes an action righ t or a person good. And co cry co determi ne which moral theory is most likely correct, we

Overview : Ethics and the Moral Domain 14 3

apply conceptual yardsticks-the moral criteria of adequacy. Any plausible moral theory must measure up to these critical standa rds.

An important criterion of adequacy for moral theories is consistency with our consid- ered moral judgments. Any p lausible scientific theory must be consistent \vith the data that the theory is supposed to explain; there should be no conflicts between the theory and the relevant facts. Like\vise, a moral theory must also be consistent with the data it is supposed to explain: our considered moral judgments, \vhat some call our moral common sense. We arrive at them after careful deliberation that is as free of bias, self.. interest, and other distorting influences as possible. Moral p hilosophers grant them considerable respect and try to take them into account in their moral theorizing. These judgmentS are fall ible, and they are often revised under pressure from trusnvorthy principles or theories. But \Ve are entitled to t rust them un less we have good reason to doubt them. Therefore, any moral t heory t hat is seriously inconsistent with our most basic considered judgments must generally be regarded as fl a\ved, perhaps fatally so, and in need of revision. Ou r considered judgments, for example, tell us that slavery, murder, rape, and genocide are \vrong. A moral theory that imp lies otherwise fails to meet this criterion and is a candidate fo r rejection. That equals should be t reated equally, that there must be good reasons to deliberately cause harm to others, that justice is an essential p art of the moral life-these and other considered judgments are among t he many th at good moral theories must account for.

In applying this sta ndard, \Ve must keep in m ind that in both science and ethics, there is tension benveen theory and data. A good theory explains the data, which in turn influence the shape of t he theory. Particularly strong data can compel scientistS to alter a theory to account for the information, but a good theory can also give sci- entists reasons to question o r reject particular data. In the same way, there is a kind of give-and-take between a moral theory and the relevant data. Our considered moral

IMPORTANT MORAL THEORIES

All sects arc d iffere n t, bccau.,c they come fro m men; morality is every·

whe re the same. because it comes from God. -Voltaire

CONSEQUENTIALIST

ut ilitarianism The view that rig ht actions are those that result in t he most beneficia l ba lance o f good over bad consequ ences fo r everyone involved .

DEONTOLOGICAL VIRTUE ORIENTED

et h ical egoism The view that rig ht actions are t hose that f urther one's own best interests.

Kant's t heory The t heory that rig ht actions are those t hat accord with t he categorical imperative.

virtue ethics A moral theory t hat focuses o n the development of virtuous character.

et hics of care A moral perspective that em- phasizes t he u nique demands of specific sit uations and the virtues and f eelings that are centra l to clo se persona l relationships.

144 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

PHILOSOPHY NOW

The Morality of Human Cloning

Modern technology is conscancly presenting us with moral quandaries chat would have been unthinkable co previous generations. A prirne exa,nple is hu,nan reproductive cloning. Clon- ing is che asexual production of a genetically identical entity from an existing one. C loning an individual anirnal or hu,nan is a ,naccer of extracting che nucleus from an ordinary body cell, in-

serting che nucleus into a "blank" egg cell (one without a nucleus), and scirnulacing the reconfigured cell co scare cell division and devel- opment into an embryo. To dace, no human has been successfully cloned (though ,nany species of ani,nals have) , and for technical and ,noral reasons none is likely co be cloned any time soon. Bue the prospect of human clon ing in the future has jurnp-starced che moral debate over whether it should ever be done, even if feas ible.

Figure 3.3 If human reproductive cloning were feasible, should people be permitted to use this technology? Suppose the only way a child less couple could have a baby genetically related to them w as through cloning. Would cloning be a morally permis- sible opti on for them?

A typica l response co che pros- pect of hu,nan cloning is ,noral outrage, ,vhich coo often is based on rnisunderscandings. Chief among chese is the notion chat a human clone ,vould be identical co an existing person, che clone's "parent." This idea has led co a host of silly fan easies played out in movies, literature, and the popu- lar ,nind: an arn1y of Hitler clones spawned from one of che Fiihrer's

The most important human endeavor is the

striving for morality in our actions. Our inner balance and even our very existence

depend on it. Only moral- ity in our actions can give beauty and dignity to life . -Albert Einstein

judgments may g ive us good reasons fo r alcering o r even rejecting our moral theory. Bue if our moral theory is coherent and well supported, it may oblige us co rethink or reject our considered judgments. In both science and ethics, che goal is co ensure chat agreement between theory and data is as close as possible. The agreement is accept- ably close ,vhen no further changes in che theory o r che data are necessary-,vhen there is a kind of balance between che two chat moral philosophers call "reflective equil ibrium."

Overview : Ethics and the Moral Domain 145

cells, or a laborarory of Alben Einsreins discovering rhe secrers of rhe universe. The underly- ing fallacy is rhar genes ,nake rhe person, rhar generics ordains all of an ind ividual 's charac- rerisrics. This view is kno,vn as generic derermin ism, a nd iris a ,nych. Einsrein's clone would have Einstein's genes but wou ld not a nd cou ld not be Einsrein . The clone wou ld be unique and probably nor rnuch like his fa,nous progen iror at all.

Many ,vho favor che use of clon ing rest their case on its likely benefits. For some people, their only hope of having a child co whom rhey are generically refaced would be through clon ing. Some men have no sperrn; some wo,nen, no eggs; cloning could gee around these problems. For couples ,vho va lue chis genetic connection a nd also wa nr co avoid passing on a genetic d isease or health risk ro their ch ild, cloning ,vould be an arcraccive option-perhaps che only option. Parenrs whose on ly c hild d ies could have her cloned frorn a cell harvested from her body, ensuring rhar some pare of her would live on.

Some critics of cloni ng have charged char ir violates che rig hts of che resulting clone- specifically, rhe righr co a unique idenciry. A clone by definition is not genetically unique; his genome is iterated in his "parent." Aside from doubts about ,vhecher such a righr ex isrs, che srrongesc reply ro chis worry is rhac genetic uniqueness is neither necessary nor sufficie nt for personal uniqueness.

Many oppose che use of clon ing technology because it is unnatura l, a deviant way of bringing c hildren inro che ,vorld. Th is view is criticized as narro,vly dog,nacic, for some nar- ura l processes are bad (such as bacterial infection), and some unnarural ones are good (such as medica l creaunenc).

A kindred objection holds rhac cloning replaces natural procreation ,vich rhe artificial manufacture of children as produces- a demeaning process char erodes our respect for hu- rna n beings. C loning is thus profoundly dehu,nan izing. Bue son1e rejecr ch is cricicisrn, de- claring that che va lue and worth of a being does nor depend on how it is created, but on what chat being is like (its narure).

Is human reproductive clon ing morally permissible? Why or why not? Upon what moral principles do you base your view?

Another cesc of adequacy is consistency ivith the facts of the moral life. In science, good theories are consistent with scientific background knowledge, ,vich ,vhac sci-

entists already have good reasons co believe. Such theories are, as mentioned ear- lier, conservative. Th is background kno,vledge includes ocher ,veil-founded theories,

highly reliable findings, and scientific (natural) la,vs. Moral theories should also be

cons istent ,vich background kno,vledge-the moral background kno,vledge, the bas ic, inescapable exper iences of the moral life. These experiences include making

146 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

\Xlhcncvcr you arc to d o

a thing, t hough it can

never be known but to you rself, ask yourself how you would act were all t he

world looking at you, a nd ac t accordingly. -Thomas Jefferson

Divine command theory is the doctrine that God is the c reator of morality.

moral judgments, disagreeing with others on moral issues, being mistaken in our moral beliefs, and giving reasons for accepting moral beliefs. That we do in fact experience these things from time to t ime is a matter of moral common sense- seem ingly obvious facts of the moral life. Thus, any moral theory that is inconsistent ,vith these aspecrs of the moral life is deeply problematic. If a theory implies that disagreement on a moral issue is impossible, for example, ,ve must suspect that there is something seriously wrong with it. It is poss ible that we are deluded about the moral life-that we, for example, merely think we are disagreeing ,vith others o n moral issues but are actually just venting our feel ings. But our experience gives us good grounds for taking the commonsense view until we are given good reasons to bel ieve othenvise.

Finally, ,ve have this criterion: resourcefulness in moral problem-solving. If a scien- tific theory helps scientisrs answer questions, solve problems, and control events in the natural world, it demonstrates both its p lausibility and its usefulness. All things being equal, such a resou rceful theory is better than one that has none of these advantages. Much the same is true for moral theories. A resourceful moral theory helps us solve moral problems. It can help us identify morally relevant aspects of conduct, judge the rig htness of actions, resolve conflicts among moral principles and judgmenrs, test and correct our moral intuitio ns, and understa nd the underlying point of morality itself. Any moral theory that lacks problem-solving resourcefulness is neither useful no r cred ible.

Evaluating moral theories using these yardsticks is not a rote process. There is no standard p rocedure fo r applying the criteria to a theory and no set of instructions for assigning conceptual ,veight to each criterion as we judge a theory's worth. But the criteria do help us make broad judgmenrs o n rational grounds about a theory's strengths and weaknesses. We must use them as guides, relying on our best judg- ment in applying them, just as scientisrs must use their own educated judgment in ,vielding thei r kind of criteria of adequacy. In neither case is there a neat a lgorithm for theory assessment, but nonetheless, in both arenas the process is objective, rea- sonable, a nd essential.

Later in this chapter, ,ve will look at how ph ilosophers use these criteria to test major moral theories .

Religion and Morality

Morality and rel igion have always been closely intertwined. H isto rically, every re- ligion has offered its adherents mora l content in the fo rm of commandmenrs or preceprs. C hristianity, Judaism, Islam , Hinduism, and others all contain normative standards for right conduct. But many think that the connection between moral values and rel igious belief is even closer than these facts suggest: they bel ieve that religio n is the source of morality. The idea is that God makes morality; right and ,vrong are constituted by the will of God. R ight actions are those commanded by God; wrong actions are those proh ibited by God. Th is doctrine is kno,vn as the divine command theory, a view that has been taken to task in ethics by religious and no nreligious th inkers alike.

Overview : Ethics and the Moral Domain 147

The problem as most ph ilosophers see it is t h at t he doctrine forces a troubling d ilemma on us, o ne outlined by Socrates many cent uries ago. In Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, Socrates asks, in effect, Are actions right because God comma nds t hem, or does God comma nd them because they are right? To choose t he first option is to say t hat God makes mo- ra lity and to accept t he divi ne comma nd t heory. To choose t he second is to say that mora lity exisrs independently of God's ,vi ll a nd even he must obey it. For ma ny t heisrs, t he second option (the denial of t he divine command theory) is far more palatable t ha n t he fi rst, fo r the first one implies t hat morality is completely arbitra ry.

These critics argue that if a n actio n is morally r ight only because God says so, then any action at all could be mora lly right. If God so wi lled, t he torture a nd slaughter of innocents ,vould be mora lly right. As the d ivine command t heory wou ld have it, there cou ld be no reasons fo r God's will ing one ,vay o r the other. He just comma nds, and that m akes an action right (or ,vrong). But if God h as no reasons fo r his commands, no standard s other t ha n his say-so, h is commands a re a r- b it rary. This arbitra riness makes morality a cruel joke and reveals God as less than perfect.

A divine comma nd t heorist might reply that God would never com- mand something as evil as t he torture a nd slaughter of innocents be- cause God is a ll-good. But this response appea rs to make the idea of the goodness of God meaningless. Russ Shafer-Landau makes t he poi nt like this: Figure 3.4 Is morality constituted by

t he w ill of God?

Russ Shafer-Landau, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?

No, you say, s uch a t hing is impossible. A good God would never allow such a thing [wicked deed s]. Right enough. But what does it mean to be good ? If the Divine Com· mand Theory is co rrect, then something is good ju s t in case it is favor ed by God. Bu t t hen look what happen s: to say t hat God is good is just to say th at God is favor ed by God. Is that really what we mean whe n we say th at God is good?'

The arbitrariness p roblem h as led both theisrs a nd nontheists to reject the divine command t heory and accept t he second option of the dilemma, the view t hat moral- ity is not dependent on God 's wil l. Right and ,vrong must t hen ex ist independently of God and a re bind ing on everyone, including God himsel f. I n this way, t he notion of God 's goodness has real meaning, and t he religious can coherently claim t hat God is good , t hat he unerringly observes t he moral la,v, and t h at he urges h is chil- dren to strive to d o the same.

Some theisrs hold t hat even if God is not t he source of the mora l la,v, he provides the motivation to abide by it. The fea r of God's disfavor in t his life o r everlasting tor- ment in t he next makes people want to be good. A desi re for his blessings here a nd

Wh ile moral rules may be propounded by authority

th e fact rhat these were so propounded would not validate th e m.

-Sir Alfred Jules Ayer

148 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

4 If the divine com- mand theory were true, peop le wou ld need to ident ify a re liable source of p ro - nouncements about God's will (script ures or some re ligious aut hor- ity, fo r example). But there are many sources purport ing to be the true one. How can be- lievers d iscover which is t he right one? Is it possible to choose in a nonarbitrary way?

All moral obligation re.solves its d f into the

obligation of conform ity to rhe w ill of God .

- C harles Hodge

The will of God is the re fuge of ignorance. -Baruch Spinoza II I II 111111111111111 II 111 I II 111IIIIII1111111111

Moral objectivism is rhe view that there arc moral standards that arc uuc or

correct fo r everyone.

Moral absolutism is the

belief thar objective moral p rinciples allow no excep· tions or must be ap p lied the same way in all cases an d c ultu res.

now or eternal bliss in the hereafter has the same effect. Thus, believers have reason to be moral, and unbelievers do not.

This contention can be vie,ved as an empirical claim about the psychological tendencies of theists and nontheists. If it's true, ,ve ,vould expect theists generally to be more moral than nontheisrs. But no ev idence clea rly substantiates this.

Many believers and nonbelievers thi nk they have a deeper reason for rejecting the religious explanation of moral motivation. Suppose you do your best to always act morally-not because acting morally is your duty, but because you ,vant to avoid God's ,vrath and incur his bless ings. Your motives for being good then are self. ser ving and cyn ical, signs of poor moral character and disrespect for the moral law. People ,vith good moral character do good for the sake of the good; they do their duty for duty's sake. Thus it seems that if the expectation of reward o r punishment is ,vhat motivates people to act morally, moral character is undermined and morality irself becomes a hollo,v ideal.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 3.1

1. Where did your moral values come from? D id you arrive at them through critical reasoning-or d id you absorb them from your fam ily, peers, or cu lt u re?

2. Of the several moral theories mentioned in this ch apter, which one a re you most sympathetic to? Why?

3. H o,v do you th ink a utilitarian would view the morality of human cloning (discussed in the accompanying box)? A d ivine command theorist?

4. Do you accept or reject the divine command theory? W hy?

5. Is the hope for a heaven ly reward a good reason to obey the moral la,v? Why o r ,vhy not?

3.2 MORAL RELATIVISM

W ithout th ink ing much about it, most people accept a view of morality known as moral objectivism , the idea that at least some moral norms or principles a re objec- tively valid or true for everyone. In this view, moral standards are valid or t rue regard- less of whether people believe them, ig nore them, agree about them, or have never heard of them. Just as some statemen rs about physics or carpentry are objectively true regardless of people's beliefs on the subject, so some moral statemenrs are objectively true no matter what people think. Moral objectivism, ho,vever, is distinct from moral abso lutis m , the belief that objective moral principles allow no exceptions or must be applied the same ,vay in all cases and cultures. A moral objectivist can be absolutist

about moral princip les, or she can avoid absolutism by accepting chat moral princip les are prima facie-app licable un less exceptions a re warranted (as when nvo princip les conflict and one must be given more weight than the ocher). In any case, most people p robably assume some fo rm of moral objectivism and \vould not take seriously any claim implying that correct moral norms can be whatever we \vane chem co be.

But some (including many college undergraduates) reject mora l objeccivism in favor of a doctrine t hat they find much more appealing: moral relativism. Accord- ing co chis view, moral standards a re not objective, but a re relative co what individu- als or cultures believe. There simply are no objective mora l truths, on ly relative ones. An action is morally right if endorsed by a person or cultu re and morally w rong if condemned by a person or culture. Morality is not an objective fact; it's a human invention, dependent entirely on what people bel ieve. So an action is right fo r Person A if he approves of it but \vrong fo r Person B if she disapproves of it, and t he same would go fo r cult ures with sim ila rly diverging views. In chis way, moral norms are not d iscovered but made; the individual or culture makes right and wrong. Moral relativism pertain ing co individuals is known as subjective relativism, more pre- cisely stated as the view chat r ight actions are chose sanctioned by a person. Moral relativism rega rding cult ures is called cul tural relativism, t he view chat right ac- tions are t hose sanctioned by one's culture.

Subjective Relativism

In some \vays, subjective relativism is a com forting moral theory. It relieves individuals of the burden of serious critical reason ing about morality. After all, determining right and wrong is a matter of invento rying one's beliefs, and any sincerely held beliefs \vill do. Morality is essentially a matter of personal caste, which is an extremely easy thing co establish. Determ ining what one's moral vie\vS are may indeed involve deliberation

and analysis-but neither of these is a necessary requi rement for the job. Subjective relativism also helps people shore-ci rcuit the unpleasantness of moral debate. The sub- jective relativist's fam il iar refrain-"That may be your t ruth, but it's not my truth"- has a way of stopping conversations and putting an end co reasoned arguments.

But critics of the theory cha rge that in many ways it runs afoul of the moral criteria of adequacy, especially the one demanding consistency \vith the faces of the moral life. For starters, the doctrine implies chat each person is morally infallible. An action is morally right fo r someone if he approves of it-if he sincerely believes it co be right. His approval makes the action right, and-if his approval is genuine-he cannot be mistaken. His bel ieving it co be r ight makes it right, and chat's the end of it. If he endorses infanticide as a method of population control, then infanticide is morally perm issible. His sincere approval settles the issue, and he cannot be in error. But our commonsense moral experience suggests chat this relativist account must be mistaken. Our judgments about moral matters-actions, principles, and people- a re often w ide of the mark. We are morally fa llible, and \Ve are rightly suspicious of anyone who cla ims co be otherwise.

There is a more distu rb ing \vay co frame this point. Suppose H itler approved of kill ing mill ions of Je\vS during World War II. Suppose American serial k iller and

Mora l Relativism 149

What is morality in any

given time o r place? Ir L\

wh at the majority then and the re happen to like,

and immorality is whar they disli ke. -Alfred North Whirehead

Moral relativism is the view that moral standa rds

do no r have indepen dent status but arc rdarivc to wh at individuals o r cul -

tures believe.

Subjective relativism is the view that right actions

arc those e ndorsed by a n individual.

Cultural relativism is the view that right actions arc th ose endorsed by one's

cultu re .

5 When you discuss moral issues w ith others, what moral t heory do you assume-objectivism o r relativism? Why?

There is nothing e ither good or bad, But thin king makes it so. -William Shakespeare

6 Is moral d isagree- ment possible? When you seem to be d isag reeing w ith some- one on a moral issue, what are you really do- ing? Are you disag ree- ing about an objective moral fact, or are you merely expressing your likes and d islikes?

150 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

The fac t that a n opinion h as been widely held is no evidence that it is not u tterl y absurd. -BenraJ\d Russell

7 Do you beli eve that your culture has made mora l progress? Why or w hy not ?

Figure 3.5 Subjective rel ativism implies that Hitler's slaughter of millions of Jews was morally right. Is t his reason enough to reject the doctrine?

cann ibal Jeffrey Dahmer approve.cl of his mu rdering seventeen men and boys. Then by the lights of subjective relativism, a ll these mass ki ll ings were morally right be- cause their perpetrators sincerely deemed them so. But we \vou ld find this conclusion almost impossible to swallow. We \vould think these actions morally wrong whether the ki llers approved of their O\vn actions or not.

Subjective relativism also implies that all sincerely held mora l opinions are cre- ate.cl equal. If you sincerely approve of equal righrs for women, and someone else sincerely disapproves, your view of the matter is as good or as t rue as his. If Jeffrey Dahmer honestly thought his vicious murders \vere morally justified, and you sin- cerely bel ieve they were not, h is vie\v is no better or worse than yours. Th is equality of moral judgments seems incredible.

Something that seems an o bvious fact of the moral life is that sometimes people have moral disagreemenrs. But subjective relativism implies that moral disagreement is virtually impossible. Suppose a fr iend tells you that the terrorists \vho perpetrated the September 11 attacks on the United States were morally justified in doing so. And you respond that the terrorists \vere not morally justified. This \vou ld seem like an obvious example of t\VO people having a disagreement about an important moral matter. But no disagreement at all is tak ing p lace, accord ing to subjective relativ- ism. You and your fr iend a re merely expressing you r approval and disapproval, your

respective likes and dislikes. And because the two of you a re just expressing your personal tastes, you are not really dis- agreeing on an issue-just as you would not be disagreeing if you said you like chocolate ice cream and your friend sa id she likes van illa. The two of you a re litera lly discussing different subjects. The notion t hat we can never have a mora l disagree- ment with anyone is d ifficult to take seriously.

Cultural Relativism

These inconsistencies with t he facrs of t he moral life raise seri- ous doubts about subjective relativism . Many believe cultural relativism is a much more p laus ible view of morality. In fact, many think it obviously true, and they assume it \Vithout question. But the doctrine undermines irself in many of the same ways that subjective relativism does.

Mora l Relativism 151

Like subjective relativism, cultural relativism implies moral infallibil ity, a very hard implication to take seriously. As the doctrine would have it, if a culture genuinely approves of an action, then there can be no question about the action's moral rightness: it is right, and that's that. Cultures make moral right- ness, so they cannot be mistaken about it. But is it at al l plausi- ble that cultures cannot be \vrong about morality? Throughout history, cultures have approved of ethn ic cleansing, slavery, racism, holocausrs, massacres, mass rape, torture of innocenrs, burn ing of heretics, and much more. Is it reasonable to con- clude that the cultures that approved of such deeds could not have been m istaken? Is it p lausible that such repugnant acts could become moral duties if a cultu re sees them as such?

Relate.cl to the infallibility problem is th is difficulty: cul- tural relativism implies that we cannot legitimately crit icize

Figure 3.6 The fact that we no longer condone slavery seems like an obvious case of moral pro- gress. But cultural relativism cannot countenance any progress in our moral views. Does this show that the doctrine is false?

other c ultures . They a re a ll beyond criticism. If a cu ltu re approves of its actions, then those actions a re morally right-and it does not matter one bit whether another culture disapproves of them. Remember, there is no objective moral code to appeal to. Each society is its own maker of the moral law. It makes no sense for Society X to accuse Society Y of immora lity, fo r what Society Y approves of is moral. Some may be wi lling to accept this consequence of cultural relativism, but look at \vhat it would mean. What if the people of Germany approved of the extermination of mil- lions of Jews, Gypsies, and others during World Wa r II? Then the extermination was mora lly right. Suppose the people of Libya approved of the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, kill ing 270 people (a t ragedy fo r which the Libyan government eventually took responsibility). Then the bombing \vas morally right, and those who placed t he bomb on board did no \vrong. But all th is appears very much at odds with our moral experience. We think it makes perfect sense some- times to condem n other cultu res fo r morally \vrong actions.

Custom is ,he law of fook -Sir John Vanbrugh

152 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

WHAT DO YOU BELi EVE?

Cultural Relativism and Women's Rights

D ebates about cultural relativism are nor just acade,n ic exercises, for they have practical im- pl ications for wo,nen's rights throughout che world. Cultural relativists insist chat cultures should be preserved, and char che 1noral values of specific cultures cake precedence over uni- versal hu,nan rights, including che rights of wome n. Th is means respecting che moral bel iefs and practices of all cultures-even chose char sanction abusive creaunenc of ,vomen. Critics fi nd chis vie,v abhorrent because it, in effect, e ndorses such cultural practices as domestic

Figure 3.7 Are w omen's r ights object ive moral values?

Cult ural relativism also seems to r ule out the possibility of mora l progress . We sometimes compare our past mora l beliefs with those of the p resent a nd judge ou r views to be morally better than they used to be. We no lo nger counten ance such hor- rors as massacres of native peoples, slavery, lynch ings, racial discri mination, sex ism, and wa nton destruction of the environment, and we think these changes a re signs of moral progress. But cu lt ura l relativism implies that there can be no such thing. To legitimately claim th at there has been moral progress, there must be an objective, transcult ural standard fo r comparing cultures of the past and present. But accord- ing to cultural relativism, there are no objective moral standards, just norms relative to each cult ure. If over time a cu lt u re goes from condoning racial d iscrim ination to cond emning it, that d oes not represent moral progress. That is just a cha nge from one set of moral attit ud es to a nother, each one just as p lausible as the other. The nvo are different, but o ne is not superior to the other. On the other hand, if there is such a thing as mora l progress, then there must be objective moral standards.

Another p roblem for cult ural relativism is that it h as a d ifficult time explaining the moral stat us of social reformers. We tend to bel ieve they are at least sometimes right

Moral Relativism 153

abuse, rape, polygain y, honor killings (the slaying of daughters and ,vives to restore honor to a fainily), and "fe,nale circumcision" (fe ,nale genital cutting, the removal of all or pare of the female genitals) . They condemn these custo1n s on the grounds that they violate universal, objective moral principles. For example, rights activist and con1menrator Marya,n Namazie vigorously denounces the relativist doctrine:

Let us be clear about what cultural relativism is. It is a profou nd ly racis t phe- nomenon, wh ich values and respects all cultural and religious practices, irrespective of their co nseque nces for wom en. It asse rts that the rights of people, wo me n a nd girls a re re lat ive to where they are born, " their" cultures and re ligions. The re is no right o r wrong accord ing to cultural relativis ts . As a resu lt, cultural relativism supports and m aintains sex ual apar theid a nd violence against wo men in Islam-st ricke n societies like Iran beca use it is "their culture and religion " and it creates ghetto ized, regressive "m inority" commun ities in the West where wo men and girls continue to face apa rt- heid and Is lamic laws and customs .- Maryam Nam azie , speech at a pane l discussio n organ ized by the Action Co mmi ttee o n Women 's Rights in Iran and Amnesty lnternat ional's Wome n's Action Netwo rk, August 14 , 2001

Are there universal human rights, including women's rights? Is it import-

ant to preserve cultural values, including those that are abhorrent to most

people in the West? Do you agree with Namazie? Why or why not?

a nd societ y is ,vrong. When we contemplat e social reform, we think of such mora l exemplars as Martin Luther K ing, J r., Mahatma Gand hi, a nd Susan B. A nt hony, all of w hom agit at e.cl fo r just ice a nd moral p rogress. But one of the consequences of cult u ra l relativism is that social refo rmers can never be mo rally right. By defi nit ion, w hat society judges to be morally right is morally right , and s ince social refo rmers disagree with society, they cannot be right-ever. But surely o n occasion it 's t he

reformers ,vho are right a nd society t hat is ,vrong. Desp ite irs serious difficulties, cult ura l relativism is an attractive moral t heory to

m any, partly because it seems ,veil s upp orted by a common argument. The argument goes like this:

I. If people's moral judgments differ from cu lt u re to culture, mora l standa rds a re relative to c ult ure (there are no objective mora l stand a rds).

2 . Peop le's moral judgmen rs do d iffer from cult ure to culture. 3. Therefore, moral standards a re relative to culture (there a re no object ive mo ral

st andards).

154 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

Morality is largely a mancr of geography. -Elbert Hubbard

The argument is valid (the conclusion follows logically from the p remises), but are the p remises true? Look first at Premise 2. All sorts of empirical evidence-includ ing a t rove of anthropological and sociological data-show that the premise is in fact true. Clearly, the moral beliefs of people from diverse cultures often do differ drasti- cally on the same moral issue. Some societies condone infanticide; ochers condemn it. Some approve of t he k illing of wives and daughters co protect a family's honor; ochers chink chis tradition evil. Some bury thei r dead; ochers cremate chem. Some consider it a solemn duty co surgically remove the clito rises of young girls; ochers say chis is immoral and cruel. Some commend t he killing of people who practice a dif- ferent religion; ochers believe such intolerance is morally rep rehensible. We are forced co conclude chat d iversity of moral judgments among cultures is a reality.

But what of Premise I-is it also true? It says that because cultures have different moral beliefs, they must also have different moral standards, which means morality is relative co cultures. This prem ise, ho,vever, is false. First, from the fact ch at cultures have d ivergent moral beliefs on an issue, it does not logically follo,v chat there is no objec- tive moral truth co be sought, that there is no opinion chat is objectively correct. People may d isagree about the existence of biological life on Mars, but the d isagreement does not demonstrate that there is no fact of the matter, or chat no statement on the subject could be objectively tr ue. Disagreements on a moral question may simply indicate that there is an objective fact of the matter but chat someone (or everyone) is wrong about it.

Second, a conflict between moral bel iefs does not necessarily indicate a funda- mental conflict between basic moral norms. Moral d isagreements between cultures can arise not just because thei r basic moral p rinciples clash, but because they have dif- fering nonmoral beliefs chat put chose principles in very different lights. From the an- nals of anthropology, fo r example, we have the classic story of a culture chat sanctions the k illing of parents ,vhen they become elderly but not yet enfeebled. Our society ,vould condemn such a practice, no doubt appealing co moral p recepts urging respect for parents and fo r human life. But consider: This strange (to us) culture believes chat people enter heaven when they die and spend eternity in the same physical cond it ion they were in ,vhen they passed a,vay. Those who kill their parents are doing so because they do not ,vane their elders co spend eternity in a state of senility, but rather in good health. This culture's way is not ou r way; we a re unlikely co share these people's non- moral beliefs. But it is probable chat they embrace the same moral principles of respect for parents and life chat we do. According co some anthropologists, diverse cultures often share basic moral standards ,vhile seeming co have little or nothing in common. Thus the argument for cultural relativism founders because its key premise is false.

Many cultural relativists may not be bothered coo much by the fa ilure of this argument and by the doctrine's troubli ng implications mentioned earlier. That's be- cause they chink chat cultural relativ ism strongly supports their belief in the im- portant virtue of tolerance coward other cultures, and that moral objeccivism does not. The idea is chat if the values of one cultu re are no better or worse than chose of another, then there is no basis for hatred or hostility coward any culture any,vhere.

Tolerance is, of course, both morally praiseworthy and beneficial co our frac- tured p lanet of conflicting values. But cultural relativism has no advantage over moral objectivism in promoting tolerance-and may have a critical disadvantage.

Morality Based on Consequences 155

First, note that moral objectivism does not entail intolerance. It says on ly that some moral bel iefs are better t han oth ers; it does not imply anything about how objectivisrs should behave to,vard those they think are in moral error. Some objectivisrs are intol- erant; many are not. But cultural relativism can easily justify intolerance and cannot consistently advocate tolerance. If there are intolerant cultures (and t here su rely a re), then since cultures make right ness, intolerance in those cultures is morally right. For sincerely intolerant societies, t he persecution of mi norities a nd the k ill ing of dissidenrs may be t he height of moral rectit ude. In addition, cultural relativists who insist that ever yone should embrace tolerance are contradicti ng themselves. To say th at tolerant behavior is right for everyone is to asser t an objective moral norm-but cultural rela- tivism says there a re no objective moral norms. The moral objectivist, however, can plausibly claim that the moral requirement of tolerance is un iversal.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 3.2

1. What is the difference benveen moral objectivism a nd moral relativ- ism? Which vie,v makes t he mos t sense to you? Why?

2. Think about an argu ment t hat you have made o n a moral issue. From ,vhich perspective ,vere you a rguing-moral objectivism, moral rela- tivism, or some other t heory? W hy?

3. H ow is disagreement a problem for mora l relativism? Is the problem fatal to the theory? Why o r \vhy not?

4. H ow \vould you judge t he morality of the September 11 terror- ist attacks on the U nited States-as a moral objectivist or a moral relativist? Why?

5. Is the oppressio n of women objectively wrong? G ive reasons for your anS\ver.

3.3 MORALITY BASED ON CONSEQUENCES

In deontological theories, the r ightness or wrong ness of a n action is based on irs na- t ure, not o n the consequen ces t hat follow from it. But consequen tialist t heories say t he effects of an action are a ll t hat matter; our o nly duty is to ensure t hat t he effecrs a re a max imization of t he good. The good is whatever has intrins ic value-wh atever is valuable for irs own sake-which can include such things as pleasure, happiness, vi rtue, k nowledge, autonomy, and the satisfaction of desires. In consequentialist eth- ics, t hen , t he ends (the results) justify the means (the actions) .

For utilitarianism, t he foremos t consequentialist t heory, the only thing of intrin- s ic value is well-being. For ethical egoism, it's self-interest. In either case, the rig ht- ness or wrong ness of a n action is to be judged by its impact on t he people involved.

156 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

Act~utilitarianism is ch c idea , hat the righm ess of actions d epends solely o n the overall well-being p roduced by individual actions.

Rule-utilitarianism is ,he doctrine that a rig ht action

is one that confo rms m a rule thar, if followed consistcndy, would create

for everyone involved the most beneficial balance of well-being over suffering.

8 How might a deonto logica l theorist judge a case of eutha- nasia? Do you thin k this approach is bette r than the utilit a rian's? Why or why no t ?

Utilitarianism

Utilitarians judge the morality of conduct by a single standard, the principle of util- ity: R ig ht actions are those that result in greater overall ,vell-being (or utility) for the people involve.cl than a ny other possible actions. We are duty bound to maximize the utility of everyone affected, rega rdless of the cont ra ry urgings of moral rules or un- bending mora l p rinciples. In some moral theories, moral rules a re absolute, allow ing no exceptions even in exceptional cases. But in util itarianism, there are no absolute proh ibitio ns or mandates (except for the principle of utility itself). There is o nly the goal of maximizing ,vell-being. Thus, utilitarianism is not bothered by unusual cir- cumstances, nor is it hobbled by conflicting moral principles or rules that demand a uniform response to extraordinary situations.

In applying the utilitaria n moral standard, some moral ph ilosophers concentrate on specific acrs and some on rules covering kinds of acts. The former approach is calle.d act-uti lita rian ism , the idea that the rightness of actions depends solely on the overall ,veil-being p roduced by individual actions. An act is right if in a pa rticular situation it produces a greater balance of ,vell-being over suffering than any alterna- tive acts; determining rightness is a matter of weigh ing the effecrs of each possible act. The latter approach, known as rule-u tilita rian ism , avoids judging rightness by specific acts and focuses instead on rules governing categories of acts. It says a right action is o ne that conforms to a ru le that, if fo llowed consistently, would create for everyone involve.cl the most beneficial balance of ,veil-being over suffer ing. We are to adhere to the rules because, in the long run, they maximize well-being for everyone considered-even though a g iven act may produce bad effecrs in a particu- lar situatio n.

Consider how these nvo fo rms of utilitarianism cou ld apply to the moral issue of euthanasia, o r mercy killing, the taking of someone's life for his or her own sake. Suppose a woman is terminally ill and is suffering ho rrible, inescapable pain, and she asks to be put out of her misery. An act-utilitarian might conclude that euthanasia ,vou ld be the right course of action because it would result in the least amount of suffering for everyone concerned. Allowing the current situation to continue ,vould cause enormous pain and anguish-the woman's o,vn physical agony, the misery of her distraught family, and the distress and frustration of the physician and nurses ,vho can do little more than stand by as she withers away. Adm inistering a lethal injection to her, ho,vever, ,vould immed iately end her pain and prevent future suf- fering. Her fam ily ,vould grieve for her but ,vou ld at least find some rel ief-a nd per- haps peace-in knowing that her torture ,vas over. The me.dical s taff would probably also be relieved for the same reason. There ,vould, of course, also be possible negative consequences to take into account. In administering the lethal inj ection, her physi- cian would be risk ing both professional censure and criminal prosecution. If h is actions ,vere to become known publicly, people might begin to mistrust physicians ,vho t reat the terminally ill, undermin ing the whole medical p rofession. Perhaps the physician's action ,vould lead to a general devaluing of the lives of disabled or elderly people every,vhere. These dire consequences, however, ,vou ld p robably not be very likely if the physician acted d iscreetly. On balance, the act-utilitarian might

Morality Based on Consequences 157

Figure 3.8 Should the morality of euthanasi a depend on the act"s consequences?

say, greater net well-being (positive amounts of \veil-bei ng minus negative influences on well-being) \vould result from the mercy ki lli ng, which \vould therefore be the morally right course. On the other hand, a rule-utilitarian might ins ist that more net well-being would be produced by consistently fo llowing a rule that disallowed eu- thanasia. The argument would be that permitting mercy k illings \vould have terrible consequences overall-increases in involuntary euthanasia (mercy killing w ithout the patient's consent), erosion of respect for the med ical profession, and a \veaken ing of society's abhorrence of homicide.

Notice that in either kind of utilitarian ism, getting direct answers to a difficult moral p roblem is straightforward. The facrs of the case may be difficult to ascertain, but the procedure fo r discern ing the morally r ight course of action is theoretically s imple: Determine which action best maximizes \vell-being. Such simplicity makes utilitarianism an appealing theory, especially \vhen compared to others that require the use of abstract principles or elusive moral concepts.

The classic version of utilitarianism was devised by English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and given more detail and plausibility by another English philosopher, John Stua rt Mi ll (1806-1873) . Classic utilitarianism is hedonistic in that the utility to be maximized is pleasure, broadly termed happiness, the only intrinsic good. A right action p roduces more net happiness (amounts of happiness minus unhappiness) than any alternative action, everyone considered.

Bentham and M ill have d ifferent ideas about what happiness enta ils, as do many philosophers today. Bentham thinks that happiness is one-dimensional: It is plea- sure, pure and simple, something that va ries only in the amount that an agent can exper ience. In th is scheme, it seems that the moral ideal would be to experience

There arc in nature neither rewards no r punishme n ts. chcrc arc consequences. -Robert Ingersol

I have learned to seek my happiness by limiting my desires, rather than in at~

tempting m satisfy the m . -John Stuart Mill

9 W h ich view of the nature of happiness seems more plausib le t o you-Bent ham's or Mill's?

158 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

All actio n is fo r th e sake of some e nd; and rules of

action, it seems nacural ro suppose, musr take their

wh o le character a nd colo r from t he e nd to which they arc s ubservient. -John Stuart Mill

maximum amounts of pleasure, as does the glutton or t he debauchee. But Mi ll thinks that p leas ures can vary in quality as well as quantity. For him, there a re lower and h igher pleasures-the lo\ver and inferior ones indulged in by the glutton and h is ilk and the higher and more satisfying ones found in such experiences as the search for knowledge and t he appreciation of art and music. Mi ll famous ly sums up this contrast by saying, "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a p ig satisfied; better to be Socrates d issatisfied than a foo l satisfied ."2

Like all forms of utilitarianism, the class ic fo rmulation demands a strong sense of impartiality. When p romoting happiness, we must not only take into account the happiness of ever yone affected , but a lso give ever yone's needs or interesrs equal \veight. M ill explains:

[The] happiness which fo rms the utilita rian standard of what is right conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of a ll concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others , utilitarianism re- qu ires him to be as strictly impartial as a dis interested and benevo- lent spectator.1

This moral evenhandedness is an attractive featu re of util itarian ism. As \Ve have seen, impartiality is a fundamenta l characteristic of morality itself. D espite our d if- ferences in social status, race, gender, religion, and wealth , we are a ll equal before the moral law. Early utilitarians such as Bentham and Mill took moral equality ser i- ously, crusading for social changes that were shockingly radical for the times: the abolition of slaver y, humane treatment of p risoners, and women's r ights.

In class ic utilitarian ism , the emph asis is on max imizing the total quantity of net happ iness, not ensu ri ng that it is rationed in any particular amounts among the people involved. Th is means that an action resulting in one thousand un its of hap- piness for ten people is better than an action yield ing only nine hundred units of happiness for t hose same ten people-regardless of how the unirs of h app iness are distribute.cl among them. C lassic utilitarians do want to allocate t he total amount of happiness among as many people as possible (t hus thei r motto, "the greatest h appi- ness for the g reatest number"). But maxim izing total happiness is t he f undamental concern, whether everyone gets an eq ual portion o r one person gets the lion's share.

This is how Mi ll d efends his b rand of utilita rianism:

John Stuart Mill, "What Utilitarianism Is"

The creed wh ich accepts as the foundat ion of morals, Utili ty, or the Greatest Hap· piness Principle, holds t hat actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness , wrong as they tend to produce t he reverse of happiness. By happ iness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by un happiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more re· qu ires to be said; in particu lar, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent th is is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect t he theory of life on which t his t heory of morality is grounded - name ly,

Morality Based on Consequences 159

t hat pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the on ly th ings desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (wh ich are as numerous in the utili tari an as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasu re inherent in themselves, o r as a mea ns to the promo- t ion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

Now, such a theory of life excites in many m inds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate d islike. To suppose t hat life has (as t hey express it) no higher end than pleasure-no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit- they designate as utterly mean and groveling; as a doctrine worthy on ly of swine, to who m the followers of Epicu rus were, at a very early period, contemptu- ously likened ; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasiona lly made the subject of equally poli te comparisons by its German, Fre nch, and Engli sh assailants .

When thus attacked, the Epicu reans have always answered, that it is not they, but t he ir accusers, who represent human natu re in a degrad ing light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except t hose of wh ich swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge cou ld not be gainsaid, but wou ld t he n be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely t he same to human beings and to swine, the ru le of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasu res do not satisfy a human be- ing's conception of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the anima l appetites, and when once made conscious of t he m, do not regard anyth ing as happiness which does not include their gratification . I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of conse- quences from the utilitarian principle. To do th is in any sufficient man ner, many Stoic, as well as Ch ristian elements require to be included. But there is no known Ep icurean t heory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of t he feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to t hose of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, t hat utilita rian writers in gen- era l have placed the superio rity of mental over bod ily pleasu res chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of t he former- t hat is, in their ci rcumstantial advantages rathe r than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points uti litarians have fu lly proved their case; but t hey might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground , with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise t he fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirab le and more valu- able than others. It wou ld be absurd that while, in estim ating all other th in gs, qua lity is considered as well as quantity, t he estimation of pleasures shou ld be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespec- tive of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even thou gh knowing it to be attended with a great amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superi- ority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.

Now it is an unq uestionable fact that those who are equally acqua in ted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference

1 6 0 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Utilitarianism and the Death Penalty

Ucilirarianism is alive and well in conce,nporary debares about personal moraliry, institutional policy, and governmenr programs. Ir plays an especially big role in arguments over capital

punishmenc-officially sanctioned punishment by death for very grievous (capital) crimes. On one side of chis d ispute are che abolitionists, chose who ,vanr ro do a,vay with capital punishmenr, ,vho believe che death penalry is never justified. On the other side are the retentionists, those ,vho ,vane co retain the d eath penahy as part of asysce,n of legal punish- ment, ,vho believe that sometimes capiral punish- ment is ,varranced. Boch camps in the debare argue their cases o n utilitarian grounds (as ,veil as on the basis of deoncological principles).

Figure 3.9 In debates on capital punishment, w hich matters most: util ity or rights?

Many recencioniscs cake the utilitarian parh by arguing chat the death penalry has positive effects on sociery- specifically, char it either prevents crim- inals from harrning ochers again or deters ,vould-be offend ers from capital crirnes. Executing hardened murderers, say recencion is rs, is the best ,vay co pre- venr chem from killing ocher inmates or escapi ng and killing innocenr people. Abolitionists respond char life in prison ,vichout parole (a nd with appro- priare securiry ,neasures) is as effective as execution in preventing inmates from repeating t heir crimes. To make rheir arguments stick, both sides in this d ispute have co support their non moral dai,ns ,vich empirical evidence, but definitive evidence for the effectiveness of rhe nvo prevention s trategies is hard ro come by. Each side can challenge the ocher ro

John Stuart Mill, "What Utilitarian ism Is"

produce evidence co back their assertions.

to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures wou ld consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, fo r a promise of the full· est allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being wou ld consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of fee ling and conscience wou ld be selfish and base, even though they s hould be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher

Morality Based on Consequences 161

Recencion iscs often ma intain chat the most powerfu l d eterrent against n1urders is the ch rear of the ulri,nace pun ishment, death. Several socio logical stud ies seem co support ch is clain1, bur t hey have been the subject of a good deal of critical scrutiny and debate, a fac e chat abol it ionists are quick co point our. So,ne rerenrion ists argue chat com,non sense cells us chat the death pena lty is a better deterrent than life in prison. Ir seems obvious, they say, char the more severe the pun ishment, the more it deters potentia l offenders. Abol itionists reply chat there are reasons co chink rhe com,nonsense view is ,nistaken.

Some recention isrs cake the deoncological path through retributivism, che doctrine chat people should be punished si,nply because they deserve it, and char the punishment should be proportional co the crime. Many a bol itionists reject che rerriburivis t theory of pun ish- ment and thus reject the recencion ist argument char it supports. Bur some of chem accept it, argu ing char although offenders shou ld gee the punishment they deserve, no one deserves rhe death penalty.

Like rerencion isrs, abol itionists also try co ,nake their case on utilitarian ground s. They may contend char life in prison for 1nurderers results in greater overall happiness or good- ness for society than sentencing chem co death. For one th ing, if human life has great value, then preserving it by forgoing the death pena lty must maxin1ize the good. Abolition ists also insist char the death pena lty brings with it so,ne dra,vbacks char life sentences avoid. They may assert char the ,nonerary coses involved in capital punishment exceed the coses of life sentences without parole, char the chances of unintentionally executing the innocent are great, or chat the execution of offenders may actually provoke 1nurders or have an overall dehu,nan iz ing effect on society. Rerenrionists ,nay dispute these claims by questioning the evidence for chem, or they may rake a rerriburivist line by arguing char the consequences are beside rhe point.

Do you accept or reject the use of the death penalty? What are your

grounds for doing so? Are your grounds utilitarian, deontological, or both?

faculties requires more to make him ha ppy, is capa ble probably of more acute suffering, and certain ly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabil ities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwill ingness; we may at- tribute it to pride, a na me which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feeli ngs of which mankind are capable; we may refer it to the love of libe rty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Sto ics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appell ation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in o ne

10 Is the utilitarian view of mora lity based on the promot ion of happiness demean- ing? Is there more to life than the pursu it of happiness (as Mill defines it)?

162 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

John Stuart Mill, "What Utilitarian ism Is"

fo rm o r another, and in some, though by no mea ns in exact, proportion to their higher facu lties, and which is so essentia l a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which confl icts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them. Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happi ness- tha t the superior being, in anything like equa l circumstances, is not ha ppier than the inferior- confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputa ble that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fu lly satisfied; and a highly endowed being will a lways feel that any happiness which he can look fo r, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. Bu t he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all beara ble; and they wil l not ma ke him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he fee ls not at a ll the good which those imperfections qua li fy. It is better to be a hu man being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a foo l satis- fied. And if the foo l, or the pig, are of a different opin ion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides ....

Fro m this verd ict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no ap- peal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most gratefu l to the feelings, apart from its mora l attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qua li fied by knowledge of both, or, if they d iffer, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as fina l. And there needs to be the less hes itation to accept this judgment respecting the quali ty of pleasures, s ince there is no other tribuna l to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pa in s nor pleasures are homogeneo us, and pain is a lways heterogeneous wi th pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particu lar pleasure is worth purchasin g at the cost of a particu lar pa in , except the feelings and judgmen t of the experienced? When, therefore, those fee lings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the highe r faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.

I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Uti lity or Happiness, considered as the d irective rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; fo r that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, there- fore, could only attain its end by the general cu ltiva tion of nobleness of character, even if each ind ividual were on ly benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enuncia- tion of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutation superfluous.

According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirab le (whethe r we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and qua li ty; the test of quality, and the ru le for measu rin g it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added the ir hab its of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best fur nished with

Morality Based on Consequences 1 6 3

t he means of comparison. This, bein g, according to the uti litarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessa rily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precep ts fo r hu man conduct, by the observance of which an ex- istence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possib le, secured to a ll m ankin d; and not to them on ly, but, so fa r as the nature of t hings admits , to the whole sen ti en t creation .. . .

We have now, then, an answer to the question, of what sort of proof th e princi ple of utility is susceptible. If th e opinion wh ich I have now s tated is psychologically true- if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothi ng which is not either a part of hap- piness or a means of happi ness, we can have no other proof, and we require no other, t hat these are the on ly things desira ble. If so, happiness is the sole end of human ac- t ion , and the promotion of it t he test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily foll ows that it must be t he criterion of mora lity, since a part is included in the whole.

And now to decide whether this is really so; whether m ankin d does desire nothin g for itself but that which is a pleasure to them, or of which t he a bsence is a pain ; we have evidently arrived a t a question of fact and experience, dependen t, like all simi lar questions, upon evidence. It can only be determined by practised self-consciousness and self-observation, assisted by observa ti on of others. I believe t hat these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desi ring a thi ng and findin g it pleas- ant, aversion to it and t hinking of it as painfu l, are phenomena en tirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon ; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact: that to think of an object as desira ble (un less fo r t he sake of its consequences) , and to thin k ofit as pleasan t, are one and t he same thing; and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleas- ant, is a physical and meta physical possibility.•

So there is much to like about utilit arian ism. Its simplicity, its straightfon vard ap- plication to moral problems, and its insistence on moral impartiality have helped to make it one of the most influent ial moral theories in modern history. Still, it has d rawn many criticisms, the most serious one being that the theory Hies in the face of our con- sidered moral judgments, especial ly regarding issues of duty, rights, and justice.

S uppose you promise a friend that you will help her prepare for a b ig exam. You kno\v the subject inside and out, but she constantly struggles \Vith it. At t he last min-

ute, you decide that you \vou ld rather stay home and \Vatch a movie. You calculate that t he satisfaction you \vou ld get from \vatch ing the movie outweighs \vhatever dissatisfaction your friend \vould feel because you broke your promise. By utilitar- ian lights, you should stay home and watch t he movie, for your only obligation is to maximize utility. But this vie\v of the matter seems mistaken. When we make a promise, we impose a duty on ourselves, and such duties seem to ca rry weight in our moral deliberations that is independent of considerations of ut ilit y. Sometimes, when a large measure o f \vell-being hangs in the balance, breaking a prom ise o r for- saking some other duty seems justified. But our considered judgments suggest that duties can not be automatically overridden by calculations of utility.

No\v cons ider the case of a man arrested for mu rder \vho is in fact innocent of the crime. Angry cit izens demand t hat he be lynched immediately, a nd t hey t hreaten

11 Does the fact that people desire hap- p iness p ro ve that it should be desired, that achieving it should be t he u ltimate goal of t he moral life?

H appiness is a p ig's

p hi losophy. -Friedrich N iet1.sche

12 Is b re a king the p ro mise really w rong in t h is case? What wou Id you do? Why?

164 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

The despotism of custom is everywhe re the stand·

ing hindrance to h uman advancement. -John Stuart Mill

PHILOSOPHY LAB .. Imagine char rhe great ocean liner Titanic has sunk after smashing into an iceberg in the cold North Adanric. You are a member of rhe cre,v, no,v commanding a life- boat filled co capacicy ,virh rh ircy of rhe ship's passengers. You know char rhe boar is overloaded ,vich one passenger roo many, and char unless one passenger leaves rhe boar, it ,viii sink within an hour, killing al l aboard. To leave the boar is co die within rwency minures. To push someone into rhe ,varer is co kill her. No passenger will gee our of the boar volunrarily, nor rhe good pasror, rhe elderly women, rhe teenage girls, rhe gambler, the alcoholic, or the chief. So you muse make some decisions: Do you rhro,v one person overboard? Do you refuse co commie such an ace and thus allow everyone ro die? And if you do decide co ross a person into the sea, ,vho ,viii you choose? One of the social outcasts? An elderly person who has already lived a full life? Any random passenger?

This scenario is fiction, but it is based on an actual event. In both cases, the questions are: What is the mora lly right action? and How do you justify it?

riots and reprisal killings aga inst the man's fami ly. The local police chief kno,vs chat by lynch ing the man, the overall happiness of the people would be increased far more than if the man got a fa ir trial-the mob would be satisfi ed, lives would be saved, and p roperty ,vould be spared destruction. So the ch ief lees the town sering the man up. Does the chief do right? The utilitarian seems obliged co say yes. Bue ou r considered judgment ,vould likely be chat the chief did wrong by violating the man's rights and perpetrating an injustice. According co utilitarian ism's critics, th is sho,vs chat the theory is inadequate. The requirements of justice and individual rights muse be taken into account; utility is not the on ly thing chat matters.

Some utilitarians have replied co such criticisms by saying chat scenarios like the one just presented are unrealistic and misleading. In the real world, they say, actions chat seem co conflict with our moral intuitions almost ahvays produce such bad consequences chat the actions ca nnot be justified even o n util itarian grounds. Once all the possible consequences a re taken into account, it becomes clear that the propose.cl actions do not max imize h appiness, and chat commonsense morality and utilitarianism coincide.

C ritics reply chat many times the judgmenrs of commonsense morality and utili- tarianism do in face coincide when all the faces are kno,vn-but not ahvays. They insist that even the utilitarian must admit chat there could be cases in which actions chat maximize util ity do clash w ith our considered moral judgments, and this pos- sibility raises doubrs about the utilita rian standard.

Morality Based on Consequences 1 65

Ethical Egoism

Ethical egoism, though consequentialist, is a conceptual mile away from utilitari- anism. The utilitarian says ,ve have a duty to maximize the well-being of everyone within our reach, and that we must treat everyone (including ourselves) impartially and ,vith equal regard. Ethical egoism says that you have a moral obligation to maxi- mize the well-being of just one person-yourself-and that you act mora lly only

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

John Stuart Mill

John Scuarc Mill (I 806-187 3) was one of che ,nose in- fluential m inds of the n ineteenth century. He ,vas both an ernpiricist philosopher and a social reforn1er, dedi- cated co seeing char his liberal and ucilicarian ideals ,vere

H uma n history is th e sad

result of each o ne looking out for himself - Julio Corcaz.ar

used for che betterment of society. H e ,vas born in Figure 3.1 o John Stuart Mill London and g iven a rigorous education by his father, (1806-1873), philosopher, ethicist, James M ill, a philosopher in his own right. James was and reformer. a strong proponent of Jeremy Bentham's utilicarian- isrn, and he was decern1 ined co raise John Scuarc according co ucilicarian principles. John Stuart turned our co be an excre,nely precocious and bright student, beginning the study of Greek at age three and Plato and Larin ac eight. In his teens, he dutifully absorbed his father's philosophical and political views, ,vorked for che Ease India Co,npany, and went abroad co learn French and study chemistry and mathematics.

Ac age C\Vency, h is life cook an unexpected turn. He suffered a ,nencal break- down and fell into a dark depression, a condition char he lacer said was due co h is strict upbringing and exacting education. After a few months, he recovered, having gained a new perspective on his life and his previous ,vay of th inking. He remained a ucilicarian, but he left behind n1any of che less desirable features of Bentham's theory. He developed a deep fr iendship ,vich che feminist Mrs. H arrier Taylor, ,vho,n he ,narried years lacer, after her husband d ied. She had a profound effect on his v ie,v of the world and was a n1ajor influence on che ideas he expressed in 7he Subjection of Women (1869).

M ill went on co earn a prestigious place in che pantheon of respected ph iloso- phers for his work in epistemology (che study of knowledge), deductive and induc- tive logic, political choughc, and ethics. Among ocher works, he wrote System of Logic (1843), On Liberty (1860), and Utilitarianism (1861).

M ill is notable nor on ly for h is theory of ethics, bur for h is efforts co see it put into practice. He chus beca,ne one of the greatest social reforn1ers of h is day, advo- cating individual liberty, freedom of expression, social tolerance, aid co the poor, and wo,nen's rights.

1 66 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Torture and the Ticking Bomb Terrorist

In the fighr against global terrorism, some have argued for rhe use of a controversial and brutal ,veapon: rorrure. Their consequenrialisr argu,nenr goes something like chis: ir could happen char rhe only ,vay co prevent a thousand innocent people fro,n being killed by a rerrorisr- planred nuclear bo,nb is co torture rhe terrorise until he or she reveals the location of rhe bo,nb. Considering rhe many innocent lives char could be saved, ir would be morally pennissible- even morally obligarory-ro torture rhe terrorise. Thus rorrure is so,nerimes ,norally justified. And if rhar's so, legal izing or insrirurionalizing torture is also ,norally justified.

The crux of rhe argument is, of course, char a ricking-bomb scenario cou ld actually oc- cur char wou ld justify rorrure. Many accept chis pre,nise, bur some reject ir, insisting char in rhe real ,vorld such a scare of affairs simply would nor happen or char even if ir could, rorrure is an absolute (nonconsequenria lisr) moral ,vrong. Those who ch ink char a ricking-bomb siruarion cou ld actually happen cry co ,nake their case by providing possible scenarios char seem complerely rea listic.

Critics ,vho reject an absolute prohibition of rorrure may argue char if killing people is nor an absolute ,vrong (since killing someri,nes seems pennissible in, for exa,nple, self- defense and ,var), and if killing people is ,vorse than rorruring rhe,n, then ir ,nakes no sense co maintain char rorrure is an absolute ,noral wrong. If kill ing a person is nor absolurely i1npennissible, rhen neither is torture.

Ir seems dear char whether or nor rhe ricking bomb premise is rrue, rhe conclusion of rhe argument-char legalizing or insrirurionalizing rorrure is ,norally justified-does nor follow fro,n ir. Whether an instance of torture is ,norally justified is a separate question fro,n ,vherher our insrirurions shou ld adopt torture.

Thus ,nany ,vho agree char rorrure is so,nerimes ,norally permissible argue against mak- ing ir an official or unofficial pare of our law or insrirurions. They contend char legaliz- ing or insrirurional izing rorrure wou ld (I) create a "culture of torture" in wh ich torturing people ,vould beco,ne routine, ,norally corrupting, and eradicable; (2) conrradicr and un- derm ine democratic insrirurions (as one philosopher observes, " Ir would be equivalent co a liberal democracy legalizing and insrirurional izing slavery on rhe grou nds, say, of econo,nic

Psychological egoism is the theory that

people always act o u t of sdf.-inrc rcst.

,vhen you p lay favo rites and g ive spec ial treatment to number one. Whether you help or harm others, cooperate w ith them or oppose t hem , you must ahvays do what

produces the most favorable consequences fo r you. Doing what is in you r own best interest is the essence of the moral life.

Ethical egoists have argued that the theory is on solid g round because it reflects ,vhat they bel ieve is an obvious psychological fact about human nature: People always act out of self interest. A ltru ism-the unselfish concern fo r the well-bei ng of others- is never a motive for action. This claim about human motives is an empi rical theory called p sycholog ical egoism . It is the starting point for the ethical egoist's main argument, wh ich says that (1) we are obligated to act only if we can act; (2) we can act on ly when motivated by self- interest; (3) therefore, we are obligated to act only

Morality Based on Consequences 1 67

necessity"); and (3) permit che practice of torture co beco,ne more ,videspread and more brutal.

Alan Dershowirz cakes a different view. He believes chat torture is already being used by che Un iced Scares and ,vould almost certainly be used in any real-life ticking-bomb scenario. If chis is correct, he says,

then it is important to ask t he following question: if torture is being or will be practiced, is it worse to close our eyes to it and tolerate its use by low- level law enforcement officials without accountability, or instead to bring it to t he surface by requiring that a warra nt of some kind be req uired as a pre- condition to the infl iction of any type of torture under any circumsta nces? >>

Dershowirz therefore favors a fonn of legalization in which agents of che scare may tor- ture soineone if they first obtain judicial pennission in che form of"corture ,varrancs" simi lar co the judicial ,varrancs required for the police co legally rap someone's phone. Such a warrant system, he says, ,vould "decrease che amount of physical violence directed against suspects," and "che rights of che suspect would be beccer protected ,vich a warrant requiremenc."t

What is the nonconsequentialist argument against torture mentioned here?

Do you accept the first premise in the consequentialist argument? Do you

believe it could be morally permissible to torture the ticking bomb terrorist? Why or why not?

• Alan M. Dershowitz, "Tortured Reason ing," in Torture: A Collection , ed. Sanford Levison (Oxford: Oxford U n iversity Press, 2004), 257. t A lan M . Dershowirz, "The Case for Torturing the T icking Bomb Terrorist," in \W,y Terrorism \Vorks: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven: Yale Un iversity Press, 2002), 61 - 62.

when motivated by self-interest. The argument is based on a simple face about the moral life: We a re not morally obligated co do the impossible. We have no duty co

make our loved ones live nvo hund red years, because chat is beyond our power. We have no obligation co ensure chat everyone is healthy, because chat feat is not pos- s ible. L ike,vise, we are not capable of acting a ltruistically, so we have no obligation co do so. We a re duty bound co do on ly what we can do-,vhich is co ace purely out of self-interest.

Critics have rebutted ch is argument by rejecting psychological egoism (Prem- ise 2). They point out chat our experience suggests chat we don't a lways ace out of self-interest. We often look out for number one, but we a lso sometimes choose co inconvenience ou rselves, incu r ser ious disadvantages, or put ourselves at risk-co

13 Do people always act out of sel f-interest? Do you always act out of self- int erest?

1 68 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

The p ursuir of happiness is a most ridiculous phrase;

if you pursue happiness you'll never fin d it.

-C. r. Snow

He wh o lives o nly to

benefi t himself confers on the world a benefi t whe n h e d ies.

-Tertullian

14 If you devoted your life sole ly to the pursu it of happi ness, would you ever obtain it? If you have e xperienced moments of happiness, what was their cause? Were you trying to ach ieve happine ss, o r did you experience it because you were pur- su ing something e lse?

Self-interest is but the sur- vival of th e anim al in us.

Hum ani ty o nly begi ns fo r man w ith sclf~surrc ndcr.

-Henri Frederic Amyl

help someone else. People rush into burning buildings to save complete strangers. Mothers starve themselves so their child ren will have food. H usbands and wives sell everything they O\vn to pay for their spouse's urgent medical care.

Ethical egoists are likely to respond to this li ne by declaring that such experi- ences are deceptive, fo r actions that seem pu rely altruistic a re in fact done to achieve social advantage, to feel personal satisfaction, o r to p revent some future calamity. In fact, fo r every instance of apparent altru istic behavior, ethical egoists must say that we are seriously mistaken about the motivation behind it.

This reply may save psychological egoism from refutation, but it does so at a cost. It means that the theory is untestable. No ev idence could ever count against it; all possible ev idence is consistent w ith it. Psychological egoism is thus completely uninformative and conceptually \VOrthless, so it cannot be used as a premise in the argument fo r ethical egoism.

On the other hand, if we have no preconceptions about which way the evidence points, and we take it at face value, it seems to count against psychological egoism . The only evidence we have regard ing our motivations for acting is people's behavior and their introspective reports about \vhy they behave as they do. And this evi- dence, though not a lways reliable, suggests that \Ve sometimes do act selAessly and altruistically.

A common fo rm of psychological egoism says that people perform actions solely to obtain satisfaction, happiness, or pleasu re-even actions that appear to be altru is- tic or selAess. But this vie\v of the matter, philosophers ins ist, is muddled. It is much more likely that \Ve act to obtain particular th ings, not satisfaction itself, and that \Ve experience satisfaction as a byproduct of obta ining those things. We don't seek satisfaction; we seek certain things that g ive us satisfaction \vhen \Ve acquire them. If the th ings themselves were not the object of our desires, it \vould be difficult to see ho\v we cou ld get any satisfaction from our attaining them.

Of all the a rguments put forth against ethical egoism, the one that is probably most damaging boils down to this: The theory runs afoul of moral common sense. In judging a moral theory, we have good reason to doubt irs \VOrth ifit conAicts w ith \vhat we take to be our plausible mora l intu itions. As we have seen, ou r intuitions may be mistaken, but we are entitle.cl to accept them at face value unless \Ve have good reason to m istrust them. Critics maintain that ethical egoism clashes w ith moral common sense in two important ways.

First, the theory seems to be inconsistent \Vith ou r considered moral judgmenrs. Eth ical egoism implies that if secretly mu rdering and robbing a rich stranger \vould be in your best interests, then you should do so. The same could be said about your betraying you r best fr iend, or fa lsely accusing someone of a serious crime, or bu rn ing do\vn a facto ry owne.d by your business competitor. All these actions would be con- demned by our considered moral judgments, but eth ical egoism could countenance them. Commonsense morality says they are wrong; ethical egoism says they may be right. This objection to the theory is not undercut by the claim that morally \vrong actions are never in one's best interests, fo r we can easily imagine counterexamples in \vhich immoral acts are to a person's advantage.

Morality Based on Duty and Rights 1 6 9

Second, ethical egoism appears co conflict \vich an essential element of the moral life: impartiality. As \Ve saw earlier, morality entails that equals be created equally unless there is a morally relevant reason co treat chem differencly. Each person's inter- ests muse be given equal \veighc. But, by definition, ethical egoism insists chat some people's interests should be regarded as more worthy of consideratio n than chose of others-specifically, one's own interests are co be given h igher p riorit y t han chose of anyone else in t he \vorld. Discrimination aga inst ochers fo r no good reason is required by the t heory.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 3.3

1. H ow does Mill respond co the charge chat utilitarianism is a pig ph il- osoph y? W hat is meant by " Better co be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied"? D o you agree with this order ing of values?

2. W h at is Mi ll 's "proof" of the t rut h of u tilita rianism? Is it a good argu- men t? Explai n.

3. Suppose that by k illing one innocent person you could g reacly increase the health and \veil-being of a t housand . Wou ld it be morally perm is- sible co k ill chat person? How might a utilita rian decide chis question?

4. Evaluate chis statemen t: "Everyone is an egoist, for everyone ahvays tries co do wh at will bring h im or her satisfaction."

5. Suppose you are a n ethical egoist. Can you make you r view p ublic? Can you teach t he t heory co your child ren? Can you wish that every- one adopted t he t heory?

3.4 MORALITY BASED ON DUTY AND RIGHTS

The moral theory of Immanuel Ka nt is p rofoundly opposed co consequential ism on nu merous counts. Utilita ria ns ins ist chat the morality of a n action depends entirely on its effects-whether it maxim izes hu man \veil-being. No action whatsoever is inherently right or wrong; o nly irs costs a nd benefits make it so. Kant wi ll have none of chis. H e maintai ns chat right actions do not depend on their consequences, the p roductio n of h appiness, people's a ims, or t heir des ires and feelings. Right actions a re those chat a re right in themselves because they are cons istent with un iversal moral ru les derive.cl from reason, and the actions have moral worth only if we do chem out of a sen se of dut y, simply because they are our duty. For Kant, the moral law cannot be something contingent, cha ngeable, or relative. The moral law is absolute, un- cha ngeable, and universal, a rock-solid struc ture builc o n eternal reason.

Two rhings fill the m ind w ith ever new an d inc rcas ..

ing admiration and awe:

th e starry heavens above

and the mo ral law with in . -Immanuel Ka.m

1 70 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

15 What does Kant mean by his assertion that morality cannot have an empirical basis? Is he right about this?

16 What is Kant 's argu- ment for his view that nothing can be good w ithout qualification except a good will ? Is his argument sound?

Here is K ant on the subject:

Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals

As my concern here is with moral ph ilosophy, I li m it the question suggested to th is: W hether it is not of the utmost necessi ty to construct a pure moral ph ilosop hy, per- fectly cleared of everyth ing w hich is on ly empirical, and wh ich belongs to anthropol- ogy? For that such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral laws. Everyone must adm it that if a law is to have mora l force, i.e., to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the precept, " Thou shall not lie," is not va lid for men alone, as if other ratio- nal be ings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of ob ligation must not be sought in t he nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in w hich he is placed, but a priori simply in the con- ception of pure reason; and although any other precept which is founded on princi ples of mere experience may be in certa in respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even in t he least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive, such a precept, while it may be a practica l ru le, can never be called a moral law ....

Nothing can poss ibly be conceived in the world, or even out of i t, which can be called good, without quali fication, except a Good Will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, per- severance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubted ly good and des irable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the genera l well-being and contentment with one's cond itions which is ca lled happiness, inspire pride, and, often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the infl uence of these on t he m ind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will , enjoying un broken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the ind ispensable cond ition even of being worthy of happiness.

There are even some quali ties wh ich are of service to this good will itself, and may faci litate its action, yet which have no intrinsic uncond itional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qua lifies the esteem that we justly have for them, and does not perm it us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in t he affections and pass ions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not on ly good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called good without qua lification, although they have been so uncond itiona lly pra ised by the ancients. For without the princi ples of a good will , they may become extremely bad; and the coolness of a vill ain not on ly ma kes him far more dangerous, but also d irectly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he wou ld have been without it.

A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the atta inment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself, and cons idered by itself to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any incl ination, nay, even of the sum-total of

Morality Based on Duty and Rights 171

all inclinations. Even if it shou ld happen that, owing to specia l d isfavour of fortune, or t he niggard ly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will shou ld wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it shou ld yet ach ieve nothing, and there shou ld remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summon- ing of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it wou ld still shine by its own light, as a th ing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefu lness or fru itlessness can neither add to nor take away anythi ng from this value. It would be, as it were, on ly the setting to enable us to hand le it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs , or to determine its va lue . . .. s

In Kant's system, all our moral duties a re expressed in the form of categorical im- peratives. An imperative is a command to do something; it is categorical if it applies without exception and \Vithout rega rd for particular needs o r pu rposes. A categori- cal imperative says, "Do this-rega rdless." In contrast, a hypothetical imperative is a command to do something if \Ve want to achieve particular aims, as in "If you want good pay, work ha rd." The moral la\v, then, rests on absolute directives that do not depend on the contingencies of desire or utility.

Kant says that through reason and reflection \Ve can derive our duties from a s ingle moral p rinciple, \vhat he calls the c ategorical imperative. He formu lates it in different ways, the first one being: "I am never to act orher\vise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law."6 For Kant, our ac- tions have logical implications-they imply general rules, or max ims, of conduct. If you tell a lie for financial gain , you are in effect acting according to a max im like "Jr's okay to lie to someone when doing so benefits you financia lly." The question is whether the maxim corresponding to an action is a legitimate moral law. To find out, \Ve must ask if we could consistently w ill that the maxim become a universal law applicable to everyone-that is, if ev- eryone could cons istently act on the max im and we would be willing to have them do so. If we could do this, then the action described by the maxim is morally permissible; if not, it is pro- h ibited. Thus, moral laws embody t\VO characteristics thought to be essentia l to morality itself: universality and impartiality.

• •

> -

All that an y of us has ro do in this world is h is simple d u ty. -H. C. Trumbull

The categorical imperative is Kan t's fun damental

moral p rinciple, w hich he fo rm ulares as (I) " I am never m act otherwise than

so that I could also will that 11ty maxim should become a

universal law"; an d (2) "So act as to treat hu m ani ty, whe ther in th ine own

person o r in that of any o the r, in every case as an end with al, never as a means o nly."

Do not do unto others as you would rhey should do u n to you. Their tastes may not be the sam e. -George Bernard Shaw

i:::, • t,:j

' c::: - .... ---- ' '

To sho\v us how to apply this formu lation of the categori- cal imperative to a specific situation, Kant uses the example of a lying promise. Suppose you need to borrow money from a fr iend, but you kno\v you could never pay her back. So, to get the loan, you decide to lie, falsely prom ising to repay the money. To find out if such a lying promise is morally permissible, Kant would have you ask if you could consistently will the maxim of your action to become a un iversal la\v, to ask, in effect, "What would happen if everyone did this?" The maxim is "Whenever you need to borrow money you cannot pay back, make a lying promise to repay." So what would happen if everyone in need of a loan acted in accordance with this max im ? People \vould make

Figure 3.11 An old canceled German stamp w ith Kant's image.

1 72 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

17 In Kant's view, is lying to someone to spare her feelings morally permissible? Do you think it is permissible?

Imman uel Kant,

Groundwork of the Mela physic of Morals

18 In these passages, does Kant make clear how we are supposed to apply his principle of respect for persons? For example, how exactly do you show respect fo r a person who is ter- minally ill and in great pain who begs you to help him end his life?

lying promises to obt ain loans, but everyone would a lso know that such promises \vere worthless, a nd the custom of loaning money on p romises would disappear. So \villing the maxim to be a universal law involves a contradiction : If everyone made lying promises, prom ise-making itself would be no more; you ca nnot consistently \viii the maxim to become a un iversal la\v. Therefore, your duty is clear: Mak ing a

lying p romise to borro\v money is morally wrong. Kant's first formu lation of the categorical imperative yields several other impor-

tant duties. He a rgues that there is an absolute moral proh ibition against killing the innocent, lying, committing suicide, and fa iling to help others \vhen feas ible.

Perhaps the most reno\vned fo rmulation of the categorical imperative is the prin- cip le of respect for persons (a fo rmulation d istinct from the first one, though Kant thought them equivalent). As he expresses it, "So act as to t reat human ity, whether in thine O\vn person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." 7 People must never be treated as if they were mere instruments for ach ieving some further end, for people a re ends in themselves, possessors of ultimate inherent worth. People have ultimate value because they are the ultimate source of value fo r other things. They besto\v value; they do not have it bestowed upon them. So \Ve should treat both ourselves and other persons with the respect that all inherently valuable beings deser ve .

. . . Now I say: man and genera lly any rationa l being exists as an end in hi mself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, m ust be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the in clinations have on ly a cond itional worth; for if the incl inations and the wants founded on them d id not exist, then their object would be without value. But the inclinations themselves being sources of want are so far from having an absolute worth for which t hey should be desired, t hat, on the contrary, it must be t he universa l wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always cond itional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if t hey are non rational beings, on ly a relative value as mea ns, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points t hem out as ends in themselves, that is as someth ing wh ich must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect). These, t herefore , are not merely subjective ends whose ex istence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is things whose existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for which no other can be substituted , which t hey shou ld subserve merely as means, for otherwise noth ing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were cond itioned and therefore contingent, then t here wou ld be no supreme practical principle of reason w hatever.

If t hen there is a supreme practical princip le or, in respect of t he hu man will , a categorica l imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessari ly an end for everyone because it is an end in itself. constitutes an objective principle of will, and can t herefore serve as a universal practical Jaw. The fo undation of th is principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself Man necessa rily conceives his own existence as being so: so far then this is a subjective principle of hu- man actions. But every other rationa l being regards its existence s imilarly, just on the

Morality Based on Duty and Rights 1 7 3

same rational principle that holds for me: so that it is at t he same time a n objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of t he will must be capable of being deduced. Accord ingly the practica l im perative will be as fo llows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only . . .. a

According co Kane, the inherent worth of persons derives from thei r nature as autonomous, rational beings capable of directing their own lives, determin ing their own ends, and decreei ng their own rules by wh ich co live. Thus, the inherent value of persons does not depend in any ,vay on thei r social status, wealth, talent, race, o r culture. Moreover, inherent value is someth ing that all persons possess equally. Each person deserves t he same measure of respect as any ocher.

Kane explains chat ,ve treat people merely as a means instead of an end-in- chemselves if ,ve disregard these characteristics of person hood-if we thwart people's freely chosen actions by coercing chem, underm ine their rational decision-making by lying co them, or discount their equality by d iscrim inating against them .

Notice chat chis formu lation of the categorical imperative does not actually p ro- hibit creating a person as a means but fo rbids creating a person simply, or merely, as a means-as nothing but a means. Kane recogn izes chat in daily life we often muse use people co achieve our various ends. To buy milk we use the cashier; co find books we use the librarian; co gee well ,ve use the doctor. Bue because their actions are freely chosen and ,ve do not undermine their status as persons, we do not use chem solely as instru ments of our will.

Kane's principle of respect for persons captures what seems co most people an essential part of moralit y itself-the notion that some t h ings muse not be done co a person even if they increase the well-being of ochers. People have certa in rights, and these rig hts cannot be violate.cl merely for the sake of an overall increase in util ity. We tend co ch ink chat there is someth ing terribly wrong wit h jailing an innocent person just because her imprisonment ,vou ld make a lot of ocher people very happy, o r with seizing a person's possessions and giving them co the poor co max imize overall happiness, o r with enslaving a race of people so the rest of the ,vorld can have a higher standard of living. Over the principle of respect fo r persons, Kancians and util itarians part company. Utilitarians reject the concept of rights, o r they define rights in terms of utility. Kancians see respect fo r r ig hts as centra l co the moral life.

Kane's theory, however, does have its detracto rs. Many philosophers argue chat it is not consistent with our considered moral judgmenrs. A major cause of the problem, they say, is Kane's ins istence that ,ve have absolute (or "perfect'') d ucies- obligacions chat muse be honored ,vichouc exception. Thus, in Kantian ethics, we have an absolute duty not co lie o r co break a p romise or co k ill the innocent , come what may. Imagine chat a band of ki llers wanes co murder an innocent man who has taken refuge in your house, and t he k illers come co your door and ask you point- blank if he is in your house. To say no is co lie; co answer truthfully is co guarantee t he man's death. What should you do? In a case like chis, says Kane, you muse do your duty-you muse cell the truth, though murder ,vi ii be the resu lt and a lie would save a life. Bue in ch is case such devotion co moral absolutes seems completely askew,

H istory is a voice forever

sounding across the

centuries the laws of right and wrong. Opinions airer, manners change,

creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the

tablets of eternity.

-James A. Froude

19 Is Kant's view clearly su perior to utili- t arian ism? Or is ut ili- t arian ism the su perior o ne? Or does each th eory offer something o f value that should be part of any adeq uate system of morality?

Do not be too moral. You

may cheat yourself o ut of much life. Aim above mor ..

aliry. Be not simply good;

be good for something. -Henry David 1horeau

174 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

::, CD ANNE ~ FRANK CD

,---

Figure 3.12 Imagine that in 1944 you own the house where the young Anne Frank and her family are h id ing from the Nazis, and the Nazis ask you if anyone lives there. You can lie and save Anne and her family from death in a concentration camp, or you can tell the truth and doom them. Kant would have you tell the t ruth no matter what. Is he right? (In 1944 in t he Nether· lands, the authorities did in fact d iscover the hid ing place of Anne and the ot her members of her family. They were all shipped off to concentration camps; only Anne's father survived.)

for saving an innocent life seems fa r more important mora lly than blindly obeying a rule. Moral common sense suggests that sometimes the consequences of our actions do matter more than adherence to the letter of the law, even if the law is genera lly \VOrthy of our respect and obedience.

Some have thought that Kant's theory can yield implausible results for another reason. Recall that the first formulation of the categorical imperative says that an action is perm issible if persons could cons istently act on the relevant max im, and \Ve \vould be w illing to have them do so. This requirement seems to make sense if the maxim in question is someth ing like "Do not kill the innocent" or "Treat equals equally." But \vhat if the maxim is "Enslave all Christians" or "Kill all Eth iopians"? We could-without contradiction-will either one of these precepts to become a universal law. And if \Ve \vere so inclined, \Ve could be \vi lling for everyone to act accordingly, even if we ou rselves were Christians o r Eth iopians. So, by Kantian lights, these actions could very well be mora lly perm iss ible, and their permissibil- ity \vould depend on \vhether someone was willing to have them apply universally. Critics conclude that because the first formu lation of the categorical imperative seems to sanction such obv iously immoral acrs, the theory is deeply fla\ve.d. Defend- ers of Kant's theory, on the other hand, view the problems as reparable and have proposed revisions.

This apparent a rbitra riness in the first formu lation can significantly lessen the theory's usefulness. The categorical imperative is supposed to help us discern moral

Morality Based on Character 1 75

d irectives that a re rational, universal, a nd objective. But if it is subjective in t he way just described, irs helpfulness as a guide for living mora lly is du bious. There may be remedies for this difficulty, but Kant's theory in irs original form seems problematic.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 3.4

I. Is Kantian ethics too rigid because it fails to take consequences in to accou nt? Or is Kant correct t hat consequences a re irrelevant? Expla in.

2. Is it possible to un iversalize any of t he fo llowing max ims-and if so, does t hat fact raise d oubts about Kant's theory? (1) All senile peop le (i ncluding me, if I shou ld become sen ile) should be executed by t he state; (2) Anyone \vho is not a Ch r istian (including me) should be k illed; (3) Anyone (includ ing me) \vho da mages my ca r shou ld be shot.

3. Is Kant right not to make any exception s in applying categorical imperatives? A re there times when a n exception shou ld be made? For example, wou ld you lie to save an innocent person's life?

4. Suppose t wo people save a friend from dro\vn ing. The fi rst person acts on ly because she t h inks it is her dut y. The second person acts out of sincere compassio n for his friend. Is Kan t right t hat t he first person \vould be morally super ior to the second? W hy or why not?

5. Kant seems to assume that ou r moral duties can not confl ict. Is he right?

3.5 MORALITY BASED ON CHARACTER

The moral t heories just discussed are theories of obligation. They mai nly are con- cerned with p roviding an ans\ver to this question: What should we do?That is, what is our moral d uty? What actions are we mora lly obligated to p erform or not perform? These theories t herefore emphasize knowing and doi ng wh at's right, a nd their chief guide to these aims is moral p rinciples or directives.

Virtue ethics, ho\vever, is a d iffe rent ki nd of moral theory a ltoget her. It focuses not on dut y, but on the development of vir tuous character-not on what to do, but on what to be. Accordi ng to virtue et hics, character is the key to the moral life, for it is from a vir tuous character that moral conduct a nd values nat u ral ly arise. Virtues a re ingrai ned dispositio ns to act by standards of excellence, so havi ng the p roper vir tues leads as a matter of course to right actions properly motivated. The central task in mo- rality, then, is not knowing and applying principles, but being and becomi ng a good person, someone possessi ng the virtues that defi ne moral excellence. In vi rt ue ethics, someone determ ines right action not by consulting rules, but by asking what a t ruly virtuous person would do or whether an action would accord with the relevant virtues.

V irtue e thics is a moral

theory that focuses o n the dcvdopmc nt of v irtuo us character.

With virtue you can't be enti rely poor; w ithout virtue you can't really be rich. -Chinese Proverb

1 76 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

20 To Aristotle, is happiness subjective {something on ly in one's mind) or objec- tive (someth ing that has characteristics regard less of how one fee ls)?

Virtue ethicists have a ready answer to the age-old question, Why be moral? We should strive to be moral-to be virtuous persons-because developing virtues is the key to living a good life. Virtues help us fare better in life; they enable us to attain \vhat is truly valuable. Thus, virtues are both the traits that make us good persons and the dispositions that enable us to live good lives.

Aristotle (384-322 BCE) is the prima ry inspiration for contemporary versions of virtue ethics. For h im, as fo r many moder n virtue ethicists, the highest goal of humanity is the good life, o r "human flou rishing" (\vhat he calls eudaimonia, or hap- piness), and developing virtues is the way to ach ieve such a rich and satisfying life. The good life is the virtuous life.

Aristotle defends this vie\v in his masterpiece on morality, Nicomachean Ethics (named after h is son N icomachus):

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics

Every art and every inqu iry, and s imilarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason t he good has rightly been declared to be that at which all t hings aim .... If, then, there is some end of the t hings we do, which we desire for its own sake (everyth ing else be ing desired for the sake of this) , and if we do not choose everyth ing for the sake of something e lse (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our des ire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, t hen, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to a im at, be more likely to hit upon what we should? If so, we must try, in outli ne at least, to determine what it is . . ..

Now we call t hat which is in itself worthy of pursu it more com plete than that which is worthy of pu rsu it for the sake of som eth ing else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the thi ngs that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other th ing, and therefore we call complete without qua li ficat ion that which is always des irable in itself and never for the sake of someth ing else.

Now such a thing happiness, above a ll else, is held to be; for t his we choose a lways for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason , and every excellence we choose indeed for t he mselves (for if nothi ng resulted fro m them we shou ld still choose each of them) , but we choose t hem also for the sake of happi- ness, judging that t hrou gh them we sha ll be happy. Ha ppiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anyth ing other than itself . . ..

Happiness, then, is someth ing complete and self-sufficie nt, and is the end of action . .. .

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired . Th is might perh aps be given, if we could first ascerta in the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all thi ngs t hat have a funct ion or activity, the good and the "well" is thought to reside in the funct ion, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a funct ion . Have the carpenter, t hen, and the tanner certa in functions or activities, and has man none? Is he naturally function less? O r as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of t he parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man s imi larly has a

Morality Based on Character 1 77

function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is pecu liar to man . Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there wou ld be a li fe of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle .... Now if the function of man is an activity of sou l in accordance with, or not without, rational prin ciple, and if we say a so-and-so and a good so-and-so have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of excellence being added to the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the sou l implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be t he good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excell ence: if th is is t he case, huma n good turns out to be activity of sou l in conform ity with excell ence . . ..

In everything that is continuous and d ivisib le it is possible to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thin g itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. By the in termediate in t he object I mean that which is equ idistant from each of the extremes, wh ich is one and the same for all men; by the intermed iate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too li ttle-and th is is not one, nor the same for all. .. .

Thus a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the in termediate and chooses t his- the intermed iate not in the object but relatively to us.

If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well- by looking to the intermediate and judging its works by this standard (so that we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to ta ke away or to add anything, implyi ng that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, wh ile the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in thei r work), and if, further, excellence is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then it must have the quality of aim in g at the intermed i- ate. I mean moral excell ence; for it is this t hat is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in genera l pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at t he right times , with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is what is both in termediate and best, and this is character- istic of excellence. Simi larly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the in termediate. Now excell ence is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while t he in termediate is praised and is a form of success; and both these things are characteristics of excellence. Therefore excellence is a kind of mean, since it aims at what is intermediate ....

We must, however, not on ly make t his genera l statement, but also apply it to t he ind ividual facts .... With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name) , whi le the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short i n confidence is a coward. W ith regard to pleasures and pa in s- not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pa ins- the mean is tem- perance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence such persons also have received no name. But let us call them " insensible."9

21 What does Aristotle mean by "human good turns out to be activity of soul in conformity with excell ence"?

22 Is Aristotle's notion of virtue (the mean between two extremes) coherent? Can all virtues be considered a mean?

We arc nor concerned to

know whar goodness is, bu t how we arc to become good me n, fo r this alone gives the study (of ethics) its practical value. -Aristotle

178 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

It has been my experience t hat fo lks w ho have no vices have very few vi rtucs. -Abraham Lincoln

23 Do statements a bout virtu es really give u s adequate g uid- ance in d eciding what actions to perform ?

Figure 3.13 Raphael's renowned painting The School of Athens shows an array of g reat moral exemplars, including Ari stotle (center, in blue robe), Plato (conversing with Arist otle), Socrates, Epicurus, Hypatia, and Pythagoras. Who is your moral exemplar?

Aristotle argues chat che good life is one of happiness-a li fe not merely of plea- sure, but of optimal well-being. H appiness is the one thing chat is good in itself a nd not, like wealth o r power, just instrumen tally good (good as a means co something else). Happ iness is about doing what is inherently valuable, which means fulfi lling che funct ion un ique co human beings: acting through reason. To excel in the use of reason in all of life's e ndeavors is co possess che virtues in full, and the virtues are the key co a flouris h ing, happy life. For A ristotle, a virtue is che m idpoint (the "golden mean") between che extremes of excess and deficit, and the extremes are the vices. Courage, for example, is the virtue chat comes midway benveen the vices of CO\vard- ice (coo much fea r) and rashness (coo liccle fear).

Unlike theories of obligation, virtue ethics asks us co do much more than just observe minimal moral rules-it insists chat we aspire to moral excellence, chat we cu ltivate che virtues chat wi ll make us better persons. I n chis sense, virt ue ethics is goal-directed, not rule-guided. The moral virtues-benevolence, honesty, loyalty, compass ion, fairness, a nd the li ke-are ideals chat we muse ever strive co atta in. By the lighrs of both Aristotle and modern virt ue ethicists, cha racter is not static. We can become more virtuous by refl ect ing o n our lives and chose of ochers, p racticing virtuous behav ior, or imitating mo ra l exempla rs such as Gandhi, Buddha, Jesus, M uhammad, H ypacia, and Socrates. We can-and should-be better tha n we are.

To the virtue ethicist, possess ing the right virtues mea ns having the proper mo- tivations chat nat urally accompany chose virtues. To ace morally, we muse ace from virtue, and acting from virtue means acting w ith che appropriate motives. Jc is not

Morality Based on Character 179

enough to do right; we must do right fo r the right motivating reasons. If \Ve save a drowning friend, \Ve should do so out of genuine feel ings of compassion, kindness, or loyalty-not merely because of the prodding of moral rules o r social expectations. In contrast, some moral theories (notably Kant's) maintain that acti ng morally is solely a matter of acting for duty's sake-performing an action simply because duty requ ires it. Virtuous motives are irrelevant; we act mora lly if \Ve do ou r duty regard- less of our motivations. But this notion seems to many to offer a ba rren pictu re of the moral life. Surely, they say, motivations fo r acting are often relevant to ou r evalu- ations of people's character and actions. The friend we save from drown ing \vou ld p robably be appalled if \Ve declared that we save.cl her out of duty, even though \Ve did not really care whether she lived or d ied. Many moral ph ilosophers agree that motivations are indeed important considerations in moral judgments, and they have incorporated virtues into their theories of obligation.

Little \Yonder, then, that virtue ethics has been lauded for emphasizing what duty-based theories neglect. Many theorists say it deserves a great deal of cred it fo r contain ing a more plausible conception of motivation in moral conduct, for doing a better job of explain ing the role of virtue in the moral life, and for focusing on the goal of living a good life.

But philosophers have also accuse.cl virtue eth ics of harbori ng defects that lim it irs usefulness. For one th ing, some critics argue that the theory doesn't give us nearly enough help in deciding \vhat to do. They say, for example, that a woman may possess all the right virtues-and still not kno\v whether to t ry in vitro fert il ization, or help an illegal imm ig rant hide from the authorities, or be tested for a genetic defect.

On the contrary, virtue eth icists contend, the theory gives much more guidance to mora l decision-making than critics assume. Embedded in statemenrs about vir- tues and vices a re d irectives about performing o r refraining from certain actions. As the virtue eth icist Rosalind Hu rsthouse says, "[A) great deal of specific action guid- ance could be found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms ('v-rules') such as 'Do what is honest/charitable; do not do \vhat is dishonest /uncha ritable."' 10

A related d ifficulty is that virtue ethics seems to be hobbled by conflicts that arise among vi rtues. Suppose you see a coworker, a good friend, steal money from your com- pany. You know that he desperately needs money to pay for medicine for his daughter, and you are sure that if h is theft is discovered, he will be fired and likely p rosecuted. Your employer asks you point-blank if your fr iend is guilty of theft, and you r answer will determ ine his fate. Should you tell the t ruth or lie? To tell the truth is to be honest yet d isloyal (to your friend); to lie is to be dishonest yet loyal. Vi rtue ethics expects you to be both honest and loyal, but you cannot be both in th is situation-and the theory gives ver y little guidance in resolving the conflict.

But, the virtue ethicist says, every theory is confronted with such conflicts. Duty- based theories must deal \Vith confl icrs among rules o r principles, but the ex istence of such clashes does not show the theories to be defective beyond repair.

Another kind of confl ict appears when virtuous people-those moral exemplars after \vhom we a re to model ou rselves-disagree about the correct action in the same ci rcumstances. Virtue ethics says that right actions are those that virtuous people would do. But even moral exemplars sometimes differ on \vhat to do in the

Vices arc sometimes only

virtues carried to excess!

-Charles D ickens

180 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

same situation. When that happens, how are we to decide which model of virtue \Ve are to follo\v? Even more worrisome is that such a difference of opin ion among moral exemplars seems to reveal a logical contradiction \vith in the theory. If in the same situation one virtuous person would perform a particu lar action while an- other virtuous person \vould not perform it, then the same behav ior would seem to be simultaneously r ight and wrong. After all, right actions are by definition what moral exemplars do. But if virtuous people \vould do different things in the same ci rcumstances, the action would appea r to be both permissible and not permiss ible. Detractors say that the possibility of such contradictions casts serious doubt on the coherence of the theory. If so, it's open to virtue ethicists to somehow mod ify the theory to avoid the problem.

As critics see it, the most ser ious weakness in virtue ethics is that it cannot help us decide what to do because it focuses exclusively on virtues and leaves notions of duty out of account. We can see the difficulty by fi rst noting that the theory claims both that right actions a re those done by virtuous persons and that virtuous persons are those who do right actions. If we ask what is the right thing to do, the answer is that it is \vhatever the virtuous person does. And if \Ve ask who the virtuous person is, the answer is that she's the one who does right actions. But th is is circular reason- ing. If virtue is defined in terms of action, we cannot then define action in terms of virtue. The result, theorists say, is that virtue ethics cannot tell us which actions are r ight o r \vrong. To avoid such circular reasoning, \Ve have to introduce some inde- pendent moral standards of conduct.

Russ Shafer-Landau thinks this problem is sim ilar to the one faced by the divine command theory (Section 3.1):

Russ Shafer-Landau, The Fundamentals of Ethics

Virtue ethics and the divine command theory share a basic structure. And they share a basic weakness. We can see t his by posing a familiar dilemma. Virtuous people either have, or don't have, good reasons for their actions. (1) If they lack good reasons, then their actions are arbitrary, and can't possibly serve as the standard of mora lity. (2) If they do have good reasons to s upport their actions, then these reasons, and not the actions themselves, determine what is right and wrong.

The second option is the better one. We must suppose that virtuous people act on good reaso ns, or else they wou ldn't really be virtuous. Consider again the immorality of rape, and the many reasons why it is wrong. A virtuous person is one who is aware of these reaso ns and ta kes them to heart. Rape is not wrong beca use good people oppose it. They oppose it because it is wrong.

This approach preserves the integrity, the wisdom, and the goodness of the virtu- ous person. But there is naturall y a cost. And it is steep. The cost is that the virtue ethi- cist's account of right action is directly t hreatened . That account tell s us that acts are mora lly right just because all virtuo us people would perform them in t he circumstances, and wrong just because s uch people wou ld refra in. But as we have seen, the choices of virtuous people do not make actions right or wrong."

Feminist Ethics and the Ethics of Care 181

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 3.5

I. Aristotle a rgues that because every action aims at some end, there must be an end to which all actions aim. Is this a good argument? Why or why not?

2. Is virtue ethics sufficiently action g uid ing? Explain.

3. Do you think that morality is a matter of both d uty and vir tues? Why or why not?

4. What a re the advantages and disadvantages of virtue ethics? Cou ld virtue ethics be integrated into a duty-based theory like Kant's to produce a more plausible theory? If so, how \vould you merge the two?

5. Can virtue ethics be used to guide your actions? If so, how?

3.6 FEMINIST ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF CARE

In recent decades, an important development has challenged the traditional theo- ries and concepts of moral philosophy: the rise of fe mi n ist ethics. Feminist ethics is an approach to morality aimed at advancing \vomen's interesrs, underscoring their distinctive experiences and cha racteristics, and advancing the obvious truth that women and men are mora lly equal. It is defined by a d istinctive focus on these issues, rather than by a set of doctrines or common ideology among femi- n isrs, many of whom may disagree on the nature of feminist ethics o r on particula r moral issues.

Feminist ethics generally downplays the ro le of moral p rinciples and tradi- t ional ethical concepts, insisting instead that moral reflection must take into ac- count the social realities-the relevant social practices, relationships, institutions, and power arrangements. Many feminists think that the familiar principles of Western ethics-autonomy, utility, freedom, equality, and the like-a re too broad and abstract to help us make moral judgments about specific persons who are enmeshed in concrete social situations. It is not enough, for example, to respect a woman's decision to have an abortion if she is too poor to have one, or if her cultu re is so opp ress ive (or opp ressed) as to make abortion impossible to obtain, o r if social conditioning leads her to believe that she has no choice or her views don't count. Theoretical autonomy does not mean much if it is so t horoughly un- de rm ined in rea lity.

Many feminist \vriters maintain that the values and virtues inherent in most t raditional moral theories reflect a typically masculine perspective-and thus offer a one-s ided (or wrong-sided) view of the moral life. What's needed, they say, is a moral outlook that takes into account values and experiences that usually have been

Feminist ethics is an ap .. p roach to morality aimed at advanci ng wome n's

in tcrr:sts, un derscoring their dis tinctive experi- ences an d ch aracteristics,

and advancing the obvio us truth that women and men arc morally equal.

All virtue is s um med up in dealing justly. -Aristotle

24 Is t here such a t h ing as "the fema le perspec- t ive "? That is, do all women have t he same basic outlook or style of reason ing?

182 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

Ethics of care is a moral

p erspective cha t e mpha- s izes the unique demands of s pecific s ituario ns and

the virtues a nd feeli ngs that arc central m close p ersonal relatio n ships.

identified with women. According to Alison Jaggar, a feminist philosopher, femi- nists claim that trad itional ethics favors the

Alison Jaggar, " Femin ist Eth ics"

s upposed ly masculine or male-associated values of independence, autonomy, intellect, will , wariness, hiera rchy, dom ination, culture, transcendence, product, asceticis m, war and death over the supposedly fe minine or fema le-associated values of interdependence, community, connection, sharing, emotion, body, trust, absence of hierarchy, nature, im- manence, process, joy, peace and li fe.'2

Some proponents of feminist eth ics a lso reject the trad itional concept of the moral agent. Jan C rosthwaite says that the old notion is that of "abstract ind ividuals as fund amentally autonomous agents, a,vare of their own preferences and values, and motivated by rational self-interest (though not necessarily selfish) ."13 But, she says, many feminists

Jan Crost hwa ite, " Gender and Bioet hics "

present a richer conception of persons as historically and cu ltura lly located , socially related and esse ntially e mbodied. Ind ividuals are located in and fo rmed by specific relationsh ips (chosen and unchosen) and ties of affection and respons ibility .. . . Such a conception of socially embedded selves refocuses th inking about autonomy, shifting the e mphasis from independe nt self-determ ination towards ideals of integrity within relatedness .... Respecting au tonomy becomes less a matter of p rotecting individua ls from "coercive" infl uences than o ne of positive em powerment, recognizing people's interdependence and supporting individua ls' development of their own understand ing of their situation and options.'•

Many of these themes run th rough the et h ics of care, a moral perspective that a rose out of feminist co ncerns and grew to ch allenge co re elemenrs of most other moral theories. Generally, those theories emphasize abstract principles, gen- er al duties, ind ividual rights, justice, utility, impartial judgments, and delibera- tive reason ing. But the ethics of ca re shifrs the focus to the unique demands of specific situations and to the virtues and feeli ngs that are centra l to close personal

relationships-empathy, compassio n, love, sympathy, and fid elity. The heart of the moral life is fee ling for and cari ng for those ,vith whom you h ave a special, . . . 1nttmate connection.

Feminist Eth ics and the Ethics of Care 183

Ea rly on, the eth ics of care dre\v inspi ra- t ion from the notion that men and \vomen have d ramatically different styles of moral decision- making, with men seizing on principles, duties, and righrs, and women homing in on persona l relationships, caring, and empathy. This differ- ence was highlig hted in research done by psy- chologist Carol Gilligan and published in her 1982 book In a Different Voice. 15 Typically, men recognize an ethic of justice and rights, she says, and \vomen are guided by an ethic of compas- s ion and care. In her view, the latter is as legiti- mate as the former, and both have their place in ethics.

Other research has sugges ted that the d iffer- ences between men and women in styles of moral thinking may not be as g reat as G illigan suggesrs. But the credibility of the empi rical claim does not affect the larger insight that t he research seems to some w riters to suggest: Ca ring is an essential part of morality, and the most influential theories have not fu lly taken it into account.

These points get support along several lines. First, virtue ethics reminds us that virtues are part of the moral life. If caring is viewed as a

Figure 3.14 Virginia Held, feminist, author, and distinguished professor of philosophy at City University of New York Graduate School.

virtue-i n the form of compass ion, empathy, or kindness-then caring too must be an element of morality. A moral theory then would be deficient if it made no room fo r care.

Moreover, many argue that unlike the ethics of care, most mora l theories push the p rinciple of impartiality too far. Recall that impa rtiality in morality requires us to consider everyone as equa l, counting everyone's interesrs the same. The prin- ciple applies \videly, especially in matters of public justice, but less so in personal relationships of love, fam ily, friendship, and the like. We seem to have special obli- gations (partiality) to close friends, family members, and others we ca re for, duties that \Ve do not have to strangers o r to universal human ity.

Most moral theories emphasize duties and downplay the role of emotions, at- t itudes, and motivations. Ka nt, for example, \vould have us do our duty for duty's sake, \vhatever o u r feelings. For him, to be a morally good pa rent, we need only act from duty. But taking care of our children as a matter of moral obligation a lone seems an empty exercise. Surely, being a morally good parent also involves having feelings of love and attitudes of caring. The ethics of ca re eagerly takes these emo- tio nal elements into account.

The crhics of care confirms the prioriry that we nacur~

ally g ive to our family and friends , and so it seems a

more plausible conception.

- James Rachels

184 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

25 Does Held su ggest a way t o decide which emotions to heed a nd which to ignore? If the eth ics of ca re can- not help us sort out our emotions, should we consider it a bad theory?

A man's ethical behavior shou ld be based effccti vcly o n sympathy, education,

and social relatio nships; no religious basis is necessary. Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishmenr and h ope of reward after death. -Albert Einstein II I II I 11111111111111111 Ill II I II I II 111 Ill 1111111

The femin ist ph ilosopher Virgin ia Held offers this synopsis of the main elements of the ethics of care:

Vi rgin ia Held , The Ethics of Care

I think one can discern among various versions of the ethics of care a nu mber of major feat ures.

Fi rst, the central focus of the ethics of care is o n the compell ing moral salience of attend ing to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take respons i- bility. Caring for one's child, for in stance, may well and defensibly be at the forefront of a person's mora l concerns. The ethics of care recogn izes that hu man beings are depen- dent for many years of their lives, that the moral claim of those dependent on us for the care they need is pressing, and that there are highly important moral aspects in develop- ing the relations of caring that enable human beings to live and progress. All persons need care for at least their early years. Prospects for human progress and fl ourishing hinge fundamentally o n the care that those need ing it receive, and the eth ics of care stresses the moral force of the responsibili ty to respond to the needs of the dependent. Many persons will become ill and dependent for some periods of their later lives, incl ud- ing in frai l old age, and some who are permanently d isabled will need care the whole of their lives. Mora li ties bu ilt on the im age of the independent, autonomous, rational individual largely overlook the reali ty of human dependence and the morality for which it call s. The ethics of care attends to this central concern of human li fe and delineates the moral values involved. It refuses to relegate care to a realm "outside mora lity." ...

Second, in the epistemological process of trying to understand what morality wou ld recommend and what it wou ld be morally best for us to do and to be, the ethics of care va lues emotion rather than rejects it. Not a ll emotion is valued, of course, but in contrast with the dominant rationa list approaches, such emotions as sympathy, empa- thy, sensitivity, and responsiveness are seen as the kind of moral emotions that need to be cultivated not only to help in the im plementatio n of the dictates of reason but to bet- ter ascertain what morality recommends. Even anger may be a component of the moral ind ignati on that s hould be fe lt whe n people are treated unjustly or inhumanely, and it may contribute to (rather than interfere with) an appropriate interpretation of the moral wrong. This is not to say that raw emotion can be a guide to morality; fee lings need to be reflected on and educated. Bu t from the care perspective, moral inquiries that rely entire ly on reason and ratio na listic deductio ns or calcu lations are seen as deficient ....

Th ird, the eth ics of care rejects the view of the dominant moral theories that the more abstract the reasoning about a mora l problem the better because the more li kely to avoid bias and arbitrariness, the more nearly to ach ieve impartiality. The eth ics of care respects rather than removes itself from the clai ms of particu lar others with whom we s hare actual relatio nships. It ca ll s in to questio n the uni versalistic and a bstract rules of the dominan t theories. When the latter consider such actua l relatio ns as between a parent and child , if they say anythi ng about them at all , they may see them as permit- ted and cultivatin g them a preference that a person may have. Or they may recogn ize a uni versal obli gatio n for all parents to care for their ch il dren. But they do not perm it actua l relations ever to take priority over the requirements of impartiali ty . . ..

To most advocates of the eth ics of care, the compell ing moral claim of the par- ticular othe r may be valid even when it confl icts with the requirement usually made by

Feminist Eth ics and the Ethics of Care 185

moral theories that moral judgments be un iversalizeable, and this is of fundamental moral importance.

Dominant moral theories tend to interpret moral problems as if they were confl icts between egoistic ind ividua l interests on the one ha nd, and universa l moral principles on the other. The extremes of"selfish individual" and "huma nity" are recognized, but what lies between these is often overlooked . The ethics of care, in contrast, focuses especial ly on the area between these extremes. Those who conscientiously care for others are not seeki ng primarily to furt her their own individual interests; their interests are intertwined with the persons they care for. Neither are they acting for the sake of all others or hu- manity in general; they seek instead to preserve or promote an actual human relation between themselves and particular others. Persons in caring relations are acting for self- and-other together. Their characteristic stance is ne ither egoistic nor altruistic; these are the options in a confl ictual situation, but the well-being of a caring relation involves the cooperative well-being of those in the relation and the well-being of the relation itself. . . .

A fourt h characteristic of the ethics of care is that like much fem inist thought in many areas, it reconceptualizes traditiona l notions about the public and the private. The traditional view, built into the dom inant moral theories, is that the household is a priva te sphere beyond politics into which government, based on consent, shou ld not intrude ....

Dominant moral theories have seen "public" life as relevant to morality whi le miss- ing the moral significance of the "private" domains of fami ly and friends hip. Thus the dominant theories have assumed that morality should be sought for unrelated, inde- pendent, and mutuall y indifferent individua ls assumed to be equal. They have posited an abstract, fu lly rational "agent as such" fro m which to construct morali ty, while miss- ing the moral issues that arise between interconnected perso ns in the contexts of fami ly, fr iendship, and socia l groups. In the context of the fami ly, it is typica l for relations to be between persons with highly unequal power who did not choose the ties and obligations in which they find themselves enmeshed. For instance, no child can choose her parents yet she may well have obligations to care fo r them. Relations of this kind are standard ly noncontractual, and conceptualizing them as contractual wou ld often undermine or at least obscure the trust on which their worth depends. The ethics of care addresses rather than neglects moral issues aris ing in relations among the unequal and depen- dent, relations that are often laden with emotion and involuntary, and then notices how often these attributes apply not only in the household but in the wider society as well. . . .

A fift h characteristic of the ethics of care is the conception of persons with which it begins . . .. The ethics of care usually works with a conception of persons as rela- tiona l, rather than as the self-sufficient independent ind ivid uals of the dom inant moral theories. '6

Many philosophers, includ ing some who favor traditional theories, think the eth- ics of care is surely right about certain aspects of the moral life. Caring, they say, is indeed a vital part of morality. Sometimes the most important factor in moral decision-making is not justice, utility, or righrs, but compassionate consideration. Impartiality is a basic requ irement of morality, an ideal that guides us to fairness and justice and away from prejudice and inequality. But it often does not apply in ou r relationships ,vith friends and loved ones, for to those close to us we may have special obligations that we do not have to,vard others. And, contrary to Kant, feelings do matter. They can alert us to impo rtant moral issues and give us a deeper understand- ing of morality's point and purpose. T rue, reason must hold the reins of our emotions, but there can be no denying that emotions have a legitimate place in the moral life.

I reject t he notio n of universal caring- that is, caring for everyone-on th e grounds that it is impossib le to actualize and leads us to substitute

abstract problem solving and mere talk fo r genuine carmg. - Ne) Noddings

1 86 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

PH I LOSO PH ERS AT WORK

Mary Wollstonecraft

Mary Wollstonecraft ( 1759- 1797) ,vas a political radical, a social critic with a strong egalitarian bent, a distin- guished novelist, and one of the great fore bears of fem i- nise thought. What she wrote then about WOJnen's rights and ,vomen's situation in so- ciery is still relevant coday- and still considered radical by ,nany. By law and by cusco,n, 1niddle-dass English women in her day ,vere thought co be subordinate to 1nen in count- less ,vays. They lived under the ,veight of a damaging presumption: W0mm exist for the sake of mm. Wo,nen were denied properry o,vnership,

Fig. 3.15 Mary Wollstonecraft (1759- 1797). expected co defer to men in important ,naccers, barred from almost all professions,

excluded from voting and govern,nen c poses, deprived of higher education, and judged by different 1noral standards than those applied to men. Fe,v societies in che rest of che ,vorld created women any beccer.

Wollstonecraft studied the conditions chat women found themselves in, and she read ,vhat prominent 1nen had co say about the character, duties, and education of ,vOJnen. Thus much of her literary output ,vas in response co che views of che famous Edmund Burke, who ,vroce in support of aristocratic rights and privileges, and co Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who considered ,vo,nen inferior to men.

Her greatest works are A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790) and A Vindica- tion of the Rights of Woman (1792). In che laccer, she envisions a society of e.quals freed from the tyranny of unreason and spurious authority. Such a society requires che full develop1nent of the moral and rational facult ies of both 1nen and women. For coo long, she says, ,vomen have had their powers of reason obstructed by men

Feminist Eth ics and the Ethics of Care 187

,vho believe char reason is the do,nain of ,nales and ,vho define women in ,vays that serve men. Men have ensured chat women are uneducated, molded by male expectations, judged by appearances instead of incellecc, and obl iged to subm it to the preferences of men instead of the dictates of reason. As Wollsconecrafc puts it:

I have turned over various books written on t he subject of educa- t ion, and patiently observed the conduct of parents and t he man - agemen t of schools; but what has been the result?- a profound conviction that the neglected education of my fellow-creatures is t he grand source of t he misery I deplore; and that women, in par-

t icu lar, are rendered weak and wretched by a variety of concurring causes, originating from one hasty concl usion. The conduct and manners of women, in fact, evidently prove that t heir minds are not in a hea lthy state; for, like the flowers which are planted in too rich a soil , strength and usefu lness are sacrificed to beauty; and t he flaunting leaves, after having pleased a fastidious eye, fade, disregarded on t he sta lk, long before t he season when they ought to have arrived at maturity.- One cause of this barren blooming I attribute to a fa lse system of education, gathered from the books written on this subject by men who, considering females rather as women than human creatures, have been more anxious to make t hem alluring mistresses than affectionate wives and rationa l mothers; and the understanding of t he sex has been so bubbled [deluded] by this specious homage, t hat the civilized women of the present century, with a few exceptions, are only anxious to inspire love, when t hey ought to cherish a nobler ambition, and by their abilities and virtues exact respect.*

Wollsconecrafc argues that hu,nan icy's true happiness and ultimate perfection lie in the develop,nenc of reason, virtue, and knowledge. Yet in women, these hu- man capacities have been deliberately stunted, and che resu lt is a deform icy of che soul char society muse correct. If women have souls just as men do, they can- and should- aspire co possess these sa,ne qual ities and in the sa,ne measure.

• Mary Wollst onecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of \'(/0111011 , ed. Deidre Shauna Lynch ( New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), 8- 9.

' . •: ,,

188 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

To these concess ions many moral philosophers would add a cautiona ry note: The ethics of ca re is not the whole of morality, and to view it that ,vay is a mistake. To decide on the right action, we often ca nnot avoid applying the concepts of justice and rights. Sometimes impartiality is the best (or only) policy, ,vithout which our moral decisions would be m isguided, even tragic. And abstract principles or ru les, though un,vieldy in many cases, may be essential to reconciling confl icting obliga- . .

ttons or 1ntu1t1ons. So shou ld plausible moral theories try to accommodate both an ethic of obliga-

tion and an ethic of care? Many theorists, includ ing several writing from a femin ist perspective, th ink so. Annette Baier, fo r example, says:

Annette C. Baier, "The Need for More Than Justice"

The best moral theory has to be a cooperative product of women and me n, has to ha r- monize justice and care. The morality it theo rizes about is after all for all persons, fo r men and for women, and will need their combined insights. As Gill igan said , what we need now is a "marriage" of the old male and t he newly articulated female insights.'7

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND :

CRITIQU ING PHI LOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 3.6

1. Is it possible to combine Kant's theory with the ethics of care? If so, how?

2. Do you think there are innate differences benveen men and women in the ways they think about morality or moral issues? Are there cultur- ally ingrained differences in moral thinking?

3. Do you think it possible to arrive at plausible mora l judgments based entirely on emotion and personal experience? Expla in.

4. What features of the ethics of ca re do you find p lausible? Are t here any important elements missing? If so, what elements?

5. What role do you think emotions p lay in the moral li fe and moral think ing?

3.7 ALBERT CAMUS: AN EXISTENTIALIST VOICE

Lo ng before the ethics of care and feminist eth ics began to strongly challenge tradi- tional moral theories, an even more influential and revolutionary moral outlook arose in post-World War II Europe. This vie,v came to be known as existentialism, a per- spective that quickly spread throughout the intellectual world and is still compelling

Albert Camus: An Existentialist Voice 189

to ma ny thoughtful people in the nventy-first century. Several noted t hinkers have been ident ified as existentialist, includ ing Jean-Paul Sartre (1905- 1980), S0ren Ki- erkegaard (1813- 1855), Albert Camus (1913- 1960), Fried rich Nietzsche (1844- 1900), and Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986). These a nd other existen tialist writers differ dramatically o n some major issues (for example, some are atheists, like Sa rtre, Camus, and N ietzsche; and some, like Kierkegaard, are C hristians). But most of t hem also add ress common themes t h at are characteristic of ex istentialism, ,vhich itself is difficult to straightforwardly define.

U nlike deontological and consequentialist theories, existentialism does not offer ru les or p rincip les to g uide moral action. Instead it provides a broad analysis of the ind ividual's predicament in a n u ncaring u niverse and expla ins ho,v to fi nd meaning in such a forlor n world. Thus, a central existentialist t heme is t h at our existence is absurd: There is a n unbearable conflict between our need for meani ng and purpose in life and t he meaningless, indifferen t universe. Our sit uation is impossible, and t here is no hig her po,ver or govern ing principle to help us make sense of it. There is just us and the cold, silent universe, ,vhich cares nothing about our needs and de- s ires. Moreover, our conditio n is terminal; our death is g uaranteed. So ,ve must live a n absurd existence, and at the last we get no a nswers, just a n ending. W hat makes t h is predicament even more intolerable is brought out by a nother theme-existence precedes essence. The traditio nal view is that we come into existence with a n essence, a human nature, that is in a sense already set before ,ve come into t he world. A nd we

h ave no say in this; what we are as ind ividuals is p redetermined. But existentialists a rgue t hat reality is t he other ,vay arou nd. We first come into ex istence, and then ,ve define ourselves (establish our essence) through the choices ,ve make. It is we who a re totally responsible for what ,ve become. We a re totally respons ible because ,ve have absolute freedom to do as we ,viii. We are radically and painfully free to choose what we ,viii be and how ,ve will respond to the absurdity of living. As Sartre says, "We a re condem ned to be free." The responsibility of self-defi nition rests heavily upon us. To many, the weight is terrifying. But those who accept their responsibility a nd free- dom, who recognize that they alone are the ultimate designers of their lives, ,vho a re b rave enough to make the best of an absurd ex istence-they a re living authentically. Those ,vho allow society, religion, history, mass cult ure, or their own fea r to define t hem are living inau t hentically.

In h is famo us essay "The Myth of Sisyphus," Camus dramatizes t h e absurd ity of human existence by li ken ing it to that of the myth ica l Sisyphus, ,vho is fo rced by the gods to repeat a pointless task for all eternity: to push a boulder to t he top of a mountain only to have it tu mble do,vn agai n to the bottom. Yet Sisyphus fi nds meaning in th is seem ingly meaningless bu rden by courageously embraci ng it and refus ing to be over,vh elmed by despai r. The implicat io n fo r huma ns is that we too can live meaningfully a nd bravely by accepting o ur freedom and sh api ng ou r ow n lives through free cho ices. To Camus, Sisyphus is a h ero because he accepts h is fate and valia ntly p ush es o n anyway. Likewise, h u mans too ca n be h eroic by carryi ng on w ith life even though it has no inheren t mea ni ng a nd w ill soon be over.

1 90 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

26 Does Camus's perspective leave open the possibil ity of mora l relativism? If we have absolute freedom of choice, does that mean we ca n make any moral choice a t all? Does Camus set any limits on moral decisions?

Albert Ca mus, The Myth of Sisyphus

The gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly roll ing a rock to the top of a moun- tain, whence the stone would fall back of its own weight. They had thought with some reason that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labor.

If one believes Homer, Sisyphus was the wisest and most prudent of mortals. Ac- cording to another tradition, however, he was disposed to practice the profession of high- wayman. I see no contradiction in this. Opinions differ as to the reasons why he became the futile laborer of the underworld. To begin with, he is accused of a certain levity in re- gard to the gods. He stole their secrets. fEg in a, the daughter of )Esopus, was carried off by Jupiter. The father was shocked by that disappearance and complained to Sisyphus. He, who knew of the abduction, offered to tell about it on condition that )Esopus wou ld give water to the citadel of Corinth. To the celestial thu nderbolts he preferred the benediction of water. He was punished for this in the underworld . Homer tells us also that Sisyphus had put Death in chains. Pluto could not endure the sight of his deserted, silent empire. He dispatched the god of war, who liberated Death from the hands of her conqueror.

It is said also that Sisyphus, being near to death, rashly wanted to test his wife's love. He ordered her to cast his unburied body into the midd le of the public square. Sisyphus woke up in the underworld. And there, annoyed by an obedience so contrary to human love, he obtained from Pluto permission to return to earth in order to chastise his wife. Bu t when he had seen again the face of this world, enjoyed water and sun, warm stones and the sea, he no longer wanted to go back to the in fernal darkness. Recall s, signs of anger, warnings were of no avai l. Many years more he lived facing the curve of the gulf, the sparkling sea, and the smiles of earth. A decree of the gods was necessary. Mercury came and seized the impudent ma n by the collar and, snatching him from his joys, led him forcibly back to the underworld, where his rock was ready for him.

You have a lready grasped that Sisyphus is the absurd hero . He is, as much through his pass ions as through his torture. His scorn of the gods, his hatred of death, and his passion for life won him that unspeakable penalty in which the whole being is exerted toward accomplishing nothing. Th is is the price that must be paid for the pass ions of this earth. Nothing is told us about Sisyphus in the underwo rld. Myths are made for the imagination to breathe life into the m. As for th is myth, one sees merely the whole effort of a body strain in g to raise the huge stone, to roll it and push it up a s lope a hundred times over; one sees the face screwed up, the cheek tight agains t the stone, the shou lder braci ng the clay-covered mass, the foo t wedging it, the fresh start with arms outstretched, the wholly human security of two earth-clotted hands. At the very end of his long effort measu red by skyless space and tim e without depth, the purpose is achieved. Then Sisyphus watches the stone rush down in a few moments toward tha t lower world whence he wi ll have to push it up again towards the summit. He goes back down to the plain.

It is during that return, that pause, that Sisyphus interests me. A face that toils so close to stones is already stone itself! I see that man going back down with a heavy yet measured step toward tha t torment of which he will never know the end. That hour like a breathing-space which returns as surely as his suffering, that is the hour of conscious- ness. At each of those moments when he leaves the heights and gradually sinks towa rd the lairs of the gods, he is superior to his fate. He is stronger tha n his rock.

A lbert Camus: An Existentialist Voice 19 1

If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. Where wou ld his torture be, indeed , if at every step the hope of succeeding upheld him ? The workma n of today works every day in his life at the same tasks, and this fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious. Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory. There is no fate that cannot be su rmou nted by scorn.

If the descent is thus sometimes performed in sorrow, it can also take place in j oy. This word is not too much. Aga in I fancy Sisyphus returni ng toward his rock, and the sorrow was in the beginn ing. When the images of earth cl ing too tightly to memory, when the call of hap piness becomes too in sistent, it happens that melancholy rises in man 's hea rt: this is t he rock's victory, this is the rock itself. The bound less grief is too heavy to bear. These are ou r nights of Gethsemane. But crushing truths perish from being acknowledged. Thus, CEdipus at t he outset obeys fate without knowing it. But from the moment he knows, his tragedy begins. Yet at the same moment, blind and desperate, he realizes that the only bo nd linking hi m to t he world is the cool hand of a girl. Then a tremendous rema rk rings out: "Despite so many ordeals, my advanced age and the nobili ty of my sou l make me conclude that all is well." Sophocles' CEdipus, li ke Dostoevsky's Kirilov, thus gives the recipe for the absurd victory. Ancient wisdom confirms modern hero ism.

O ne does not d iscover the absurd without bein g tempted to write a man ual of hap- piness . "What! by such narrow ways- ?" There is but one world , however. Hap piness and the absurd are two sons of the same earth . They are insepa rable. It would be a mis- ta ke to say that happiness necessa rily sprin gs from t he absurd discovery. It happens as well t hat the feeli ng of the absurd springs from happiness. "I concl ude that all is well ," says CEdipus, and that remark is sacred. It echoes in the wild and li mited un iverse of man . It teaches that all is not, has not been, exhausted . It drives out of t his world a god who had come into it with dissatisfaction and a preference for futile sufferings. It makes of fate a hu man matter, which must be settled among men.

All Sisyphus' silent joy is conta ined therein. H is fate belongs to him. His rock is his thing. Likewise, the abs urd man when he contemplates his torment, silences all the idols. In the un iverse suddenly restored to its silence, the myriad wondering little voices of the earth rise up. Unconscious, secret calls, invitations from all the faces, they are the necessary reverse and price of victory. There is no sun without shadow, and it is essential to know the night. The absurd man says yes and his effort will henceforth be unceas ing. If there is a persona l fate, there is no higher destiny, or at least there is but one which he concludes is inevitable and despicable. For the rest, he knows himself to be the master of his days. At that subtle moment when ma n glances backward over his li fe, Sisyphus return ing toward his rock, in that slight pivoting he contemplates that series of unrelated actions which becomes his fate, created by him, combined under his memory's eye and soon sealed by his death. Thus, convinced of the wholly human origin of all that is human , a bli nd man eager to see who knows t hat the night has no end, he is still on the go. The rock is still rolli ng.

I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the moun tain! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity tha t negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. Th is universe he nceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each minera l flake of that night-fi lled mountain , in itself forms a world . The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fi ll

a man 's heart. One must imagi ne Sisyphus happy. '8

192 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 3.7

1. What are some of the main themes of existentialism? Are they an accurate d epiction of the human predicamen t? Why o r \vhy not?

2. Can li fe h ave mean ing even if there is no God ? Support your anS\ver.

3. Are we absolutely free to live ou r lives according to ou r ow n p refer- ences? Are we "condem ned to be free"? Exp la in.

4. H o\v does the myth of Sisyphus d ramatize the absurdity of the hu man condition? Do you agree \vith Camus's assessment of human existence?

5. According to Camus, how can life be lived meaningfully in a mean- ingless world? Can your life be lived mea ningfu lly? If so, how?

3.8 CONFUCIANISM

Con fucianism is a school of thought that arose out of ancient Chi na and, along \vith Daoism, has been a dom inant ph ilosophical system there for hu ndreds of years. Its effect on C hinese and East As ian life, cult ure, and government has been enormous- compa rable to the influence of Christianity, J udaism, and Islam in the West. Until the early nventieth cen tury, C-onfucian virtues and trai ning were requi red of anyone entering C h inese civil service, and even now under Communist rule C h ina holds to ics Confuc ian roocs in everyday life. Elsewhere in the East (especially in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam), C-onfucian ethics and ideals h ave remodeled society, provid ing moral underpi nning and g uidance to social relatio nships at all levels.

Figure 3.16 Confucius (551~ 79 ea).

Part of the appeal of Confucian ism is that in ti mes of ideological con- fusion it has offered plausible answers to essential philosophical questions: What kind of person shou ld I be? W h at k ind of society is best? W h at are my mora l obligations to my family, those who rule, and the rest of hu- manit y? In the twenty-fi rst cent ury, mi llio ns of people are attracted to the answers supplied by this two-thousand-year-old tradition .

Ma ny of the elemencs of Confucianism were part of Chinese cultu re long before Conf uc ius arrived on the scene. In fact, he cla imed merely to tra nsmit the wisdom of the anciencs to new gen erations, but what he transmitted plus wh at he added became the distinctive Confu cia n world- view. From early Chinese civilization came the C-o n fucian emphas is o n rituals and their correct performance; the veneration of ancesto rs; social and cosmic harmony; virtuous behavior and ideals; and the \viii of Heaven (or Tian), the u ltimate power and o rganizing p rinciple in the universe.

Into this m ix of cha racteristically Eastern ideas and practices there appeared in 551 BC E the renowned thinker \Ve call C-on fucius (the Western- ized spelling), othenvise k nown as K'u ng C h 'iu or as K'ung Fu-tzu (Master K'ung). According to legend a nd very sketchy in formatio n about h is life,

he \vas born to a poor family in the tiny C hinese state of Lu. He served briefly at age fifty in the Lu government as police comm issioner, and during the next thirteen years he visited oth er Ch inese states t rying to persuade their rulers to implement h is philosophy of \vise government. One leader after another turned him down. He spent the rest of h is life teaching his philosophy and contributing to the Confucian \vorks known as the Five Classics. He died in 479 BCE \Vithout his ideas having achieved wide acceptance. Only later did his vie\vS become a major influence.

C-onfucianism, especially later forms of it, has ahvays feature.cl some rel igious o r d ivine aspecrs. C-onfucius himself believed in t he supreme deity H eaven, assert- ing that we should align ourselves with its \vill. But in general he veered away from the supernatu ra l bel iefs of the past, for h is ma in interest was teaching a humanistic doctrine centered on social relationsh ips. H is aim was the creation of harmony and virtue in the world-specifically in individuals, in the \vay they interacted with one another, and in how they were treated by the state. He sa\v his teachings as a remedy for the social d isorder, corruption, and inhuman ity existing all a round him , from the lowest levels of societ y to the highest.

ln Confucianism, the ideal world is generated through the practice of Ii and ren. Li has several meanings, including ritual, etiquette, principle, and propriety, but its essence is conscientious behavior and right action. To follow Ii is to conduct yourself in your dealings with others according to moral and customary norms, and to act in this \vay is to contribute to social stability and harmony. Ren is about social vi rtues; it encompasses benevolence, sympathy, kindness, generosity, respect for others, and human-heartedness. At its core is the imperative to \vork fo r the common good and to recognize the essential worth of others regardless of their social Status. The expression of these virtues is governed by the notion of reciprocity (shu), what has been called Confucius's (negative) golden rule: "Never do to others what you \vould not like them to do to you." (The Ch ristian golden rule is stated positively: " Do unto others as you \vould have them do unto you.")

C-onfucius u rges people not merely to try to live according to Ii and ren but to excel at such a life, to become a "superior person" (a junzi), a noble. C-ontra ry to his- tory and custom, Confucius's idea of nobility has nothing to do with noble blood; t rue nobility, he says, comes from noble virtues and \visdom, and these anyone can acquire. He refers to a man who embodies th is kind of nobility as a gentleman. We get a glimpse of the gentleman in the Analects, the main Confucian text:

Confucius, Analects

Tzu -kung asked about t he true gentleman . The Master [Confucius] said , He does not preach what he practises till he has practised what he preaches . ...

The Master said, A gentleman can see a question from all s ides without bias. The small man is biased and can see a question on ly from one side.

The Master sa id , the Ways of the true gentleman are three. I myself have met with success in none of them. For he that is really Good is never un happy, he that is really wise is never perplexed , he that is really brave is never afraid. Tzu-kung sa id, That, Master, is your own Way!

Confucianism 193

By three methods we may learn w isdom: First, by rc.Acctio n, w h ich is no ..

blcst; second, by imitatio n, which is eas iest; and th ird ,

by experience, w hich is the b itterest.

-Confucius

27 Consid er the Confu cian emphasis on t h e noble or superior person. Do you t hink striving to become such a person is a la udable goa l? Wou ld it de- crease or increase the enjoyment of life?

Li In early Confucianism, ritual, etiquette, principle,

and p ropriety; conscicn ..

t ious behavior and right action.

Ren The essential Confu- cian virtues, including benevolence, sympat hy, kindn ess, generosity,

respect for o the rs, and h uman .. hcarrcdncss.

To be wealthy a nd h o no red in an unjust society L\ a d isgrace. -Confucius

194 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

Ar fifteen I scr my heart upon learning.

Ar rhirry, I had planted my feet firm upon the ground.

Ar forry, I no longer suf- fered fro m perplexit ies.

Ar fifty, I knew whar were the biddings of Heaven.

Ar sixry, I heard them with docile car.

Ar seventy, I could follow the dictates of my own heart; for what I desired no longer overstepped rhc boundaries of right. -Con(udus

28 Is the Confucian prescription for har- mony li kely to be fu lly implemented in West- ern countries? That is, could there ever be a democratic, capit a list, consumer society that was also strictly Confucian?

The noble-minded arc calm and steady. Lirtlc people arc foreve r fussing and frcrting. -Confucius

Confucius, Analects

Tzu-kung as ked about the qualities of a true gentleman. The Master said, He cultivates in himself t he capacity to be di ligent in his tasks .... The Master sa id, He cultivates in himself the capacity to ease the lot of other people .... The Master said, He cultivates in himself the capacity to ease the lot of the whole popu lace.•9

So living by Ii and ren requires self-cultivation and action-learning the moral norms, understa nding the vi rtues, and acting to apply these to the real world. Being a superio r person, then, demands kno\vledge and judgment as well as devotion to the noblest values and virtues.

I n Co nfucianism, individuals a re not like atoms: They are not discrete, iso- lated un its of stuff defined only by \vhat they're made of. Individua ls are part of a complex lattice of socia l relationsh ips that must be taken into account. So in Co nfuc ian ethics, ren tells us what virtues apply to social relationships gene rally, a nd the text ca lled the "Five Relat ionships" details the most important connec- tions and the specific duties a nd virtues associated w ith particular relationships. These relationships a re bet\veen parent and c hild , elder brother and younger brothe r, husband and wife, elder and junior, a nd ruler and subject. Harmony \viii pervade society, says Confucius, \vhen (1) parents provide fo r their c hildren, a nd ch ildren respect and obey their parents and care for them in their old age; (2) e lder brothers look afte r younger brothe rs, and the younge r s how deference to the elder; (3) husbands support a nd protect wives, a nd w ives obey husba nds a nd tend to children and the household; (4) elders sho\v cons ide ration for the younger, and the younger respect and heed elde rs; and (5) ru lers care for and protect s ubjects, and s ubj ects are loyal to rulers.

The relationship on \vhich all others are based is that of parent and child, or, as Confucius would have it, fathe r and son. The son O\ves the fat her respect, obedi- ence, and support-an obligation that Confucian ism calls "filial piety." The central feature of this relationship is that it is h ierarchical. Father and son are not equal part- ners; the son is subo rdinate. The other four relationsh ips are also hierarch ical, with the wife subordinate to the husband, the younger brother to the older, the junior to the elder, and the subject to the ruler. And as in fi lial p iety, the subordinates have a duty of obedience and respect, and the superiors a re obligated to treat the subor- dinates with kindness and autho rity, as a father would. C-onfucius believes that if everyone conscientiously assumes his o r her p roper role, harmony, happiness, and goodness wi ll reign in the land.

Confucius, Analects

On fi lial piety, Confucius had t his to say: Meng I Tzu asked about the treatment of parents. The Master sa id, Never dis-

obey! When Ch' ih was driving his carriage for hi m, the Master said, Meng asked m e about the treatment of parents and I said, Never disobey! Fa n Ch' ih said, In what sense did you mean it? The Master sa id, While t hey are alive, serve t hem according to ritual. When they die, bury them accord ing to ritua l and sacrifice to them accord ing to ritual. ...

Tzu-yu asked about the trea tment of parents. The Master said, "Filial sons" nowa- days are people who see to it that their parents get enough to eat. But even dogs and ho rses are cared for to that extent. If there is no feeling of respect, wherein lies the differe nce?•0

The virtue of filial p iet y is sti ll a strong force in China today, as this schola r explains:

John B. Noss, A History of the World's Religions

In China, loyalty to t he fam ily has been one's first loyalty. No lad in Ch ina eve r comes of age, in the Western sense. It is still true that his whole service is expected to be devoted to the family unti l death, and he is expected to obey his fa the r and, whe n his fat her d ies, his e ldest brother, wi th a perfect compli ance. This has meant in the past that ev- ery fat her has a great and grave responsibili ty to fu lfill toward his fam ily. He m ust seek to produce virtue in his sons by being himself the best example of it. The fact that the prese nt communist government speaks of making itself "father and elde r brother" and claims for itself the firs t loyalty of every citizen has not totally inva lidated the personal virtue of fi lial piety in t he context of fam il y life."

Today the influence of the Confucian virtue of fili al p iet y helps co explai n \vhy there is in much of Asia a g reater emphasis on meeting obligatio ns co family, com- munity, a nd state than on ensuring individual r ights and personal freedom.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 3.8

1. What a re Ii a nd ren? How would society change if everyone acted according co t hese two virtues?

2. If you a hvays strived co become a super ior person, would your life be better than it is now or worse?

3. Con fucia nism dow np lays ind ividual liberty a nd emphasizes t he im- portance of yielding co the group in many matters. Is chis an attractive aspect of Confucianism? W hy or why not?

4. Does Confucianism fi t easily \vich a Western society chat has a strong respect for individual righrs? Expla in .

5. Wou ld you prefer t o live in a strict Confucia n culture rather than the culcure you live in now? Why or why not?

Confucianism 195

196 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

Review Notes

3.1 OVERVIEW: ETHICS AND THE MORAL DOMAIN

• Eth ics, or moral philosophy, is the st udy of morality using the methods of p hiloso- phy, a nd morality consists of our beliefs about righ t an d wrong actions an d good and bad persons o r character. Morality has to do with our moral judgments, pri n- ciples, values, a nd th eo ries; eth ics is the careful, philosophical exam inatio n of th ese.

• Morality is a normative enterprise \vith a distinctive set of p roperties: overridi ng- ness, impartiality, universal ity, and reasonableness.

• A mo ral th eo ry explains not \vhy o ne event causes a nother, b ut why an action is right o r \vrong or why a person or a perso n's character is good o r bad. Some theories are co nsequentialist (like utilitarian ism an d ethical egoism), and some theories are deontological (like Kant's th eo ry) .

• We can evaluate th e worth of mo ral theories by applying th e moral criteria of adequacy-<:o nsistency \vith o ur considered moral judgments, co nsis tency \Vith the faces of the moral li fe, and resourceful ness in moral problem-solving.

• The doctrine th at r ight and wro ng are constituted by God's will is known as the divine command th eo ry. It raises the specter of the Euthyphro d ilemma and implies that the doctrine is guilty of arbitrariness.

3.2 MORAL RELAT IVISM

• Moral objectivism is the view th at at least some moral norms o r principles are objectively valid o r t rue fo r everyone. Moral relativism says that moral standards are not objective b ut a re relative to \vhat ind ividuals o r cultures believe. Moral rela- tivism pertai ning to individuals is known as subjective relativism, more precisely stated as the view th at right actio ns are those san ctioned by a person. Moral relativ- ism regarding cultures is called cultu ral relativism, the view that right actions are those sanctioned by one's cult ure. Both forms of relativism face serious difficulties.

3.3 MORAL ITY BASED ON CONSEQUENCES

• Utilitarian ism judges the morality of conduct by a single stan dard, the p rinciple of utility-right actions are those th at result in greater overall \veil-bei ng (o r util- ity) fo r the people involved th an any other poss ible actio ns. The theory has man y attractive feat u res but also some problems, the most serious being th at it seems to confl ict with o ur cons idered moral judgments.

• Eth ical ego ism says that right actio ns are those that maxim ize one's own well-being. It is thought to be supported by the empirical theory cal led psychological ego ism . Both theo ries have been subjected to intense criticism.

3.4 MORALITY BASED ON DUTY AND RIGHTS

• Kant's theory says that righ t actions are those that are right in themselves because th ey are consistent with universal moral r ules derived from reason, an d the actions have moral \vorth only if we do them o ut of a sense of d uty. Kant's cen tral mo ral tenet is th e categorical imperative. Like utilitarian ism, the th eo ry has been accused of fly ing in the face of our considered mo ral judgmenrs.

3.5 MORA LITY BASED ON CHARACTER

• Virtue ethics focuses not o n duty but o n the development of virtuous character-not on \vhat to do but on \vhat to be. According to virtue ethics, character is the key to the moral life, for it is from a virtuous character that moral conduct and values naturally arise.

3.6 FEM INIST ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF CARE

• The eth ics of care is a moral perspective that arose out of femin ist concerns an d g rew to challenge core elemen ts of most other moral theories. Th is approach shifts th e focus from abstract principles an d rules to the u nique deman ds of specific sit u- ations and to the virtues an d feeli ngs th at are central to close personal relationships. The heart of the moral life is feeli ng fo r and caring for those with whom you have a special, intimate con nection .

3.7 ALBERT CAMUS: AN EXISTENTIALIST VOICE

• Several themes are p romi nent in existential ism, including the absurdity of human existence, the idea that existen ce precedes essence, and the beliefs that we are to- tal ly responsible for how we live our lives and we are radically and painfully free to choose what we will be and how we will respond to the absu rd ity of living.

3.8 CONFUCIANISM

• Confuc ian ism is a school of thought that arose o ut of ancient C hina and, alo ng \vith Daoism, has been a dominant philosophical system there for h undreds of years. !rs effect on Chi nese and East Asian li fe, cultu re, and government has been enormous- comparable to the influe nce of C hristianity, J udaism, and Islam in the West.

• Confucius veered away from th e supernat u ral beliefs of th e past, for his mai n inter- est \vas teaching a humanistic doctri ne centered o n social relationships. His a im \vas th e creatio n of harmony a nd vi rtue in the world-speci fically in individuals, in the way they interact with o ne another, an d in how th ey are treated by the state.

Review Notes 197

198 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

Key Terms

• Li has several meanings, including ritual, etiquette, p rinciple, and propriety, but its essence is conscientious behavior and right action. To fo llow li is co conduce yourself in your deali ngs \vich ochers according co mo ral an d customary no rms. Ren is about social virtues; it en compasses benevolen ce, sympathy, kindness, generosity, respect for ochers, a nd human-heartedness. Ac its co re is che imperative co work for the commo n good an d co recognize ch e essential worth of ochers regardless of their social status.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

ARGU ING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 3

1. Accordi ng co Kane, right actions do not depend on consequences. H e says, fo r example, chat celling a lie is \vrong even if it will save some- o ne's life. Bue many people think that in this case not lying is w rong, because it's more importa nt co preserve life than co blindly follo\v a moral r ule. Do you agree with this assessment or \vich Kane? Give reasons for your a nswer.

2. Does it make sense co use utilitarian reasoni ng in decid ing how co fight a war? H o\v m ight a deoncologisc and a utilitarian differ in decid- ing on che morality of dropping t he A-bomb on Hiroshima during World War II? Which approach seems more plausible? Why?

3. Is Aristotle's eth ics su ffic iently action guiding? Does it help us make decisions? If \Ve ask \vhac we should do in situation X, Aristotle would seem co say, " Do what che virt uous person would do." Bue if I ask how I am co recognize the virtuous person, he would seem co say, "He is o ne who acts justly." Is there somethi ng circular about chis reasoning? Does virtue ethics need s upplementation from other ethical sys tems, o r can it solve chis problem?

4. Is it p lausible chat we have d uties o nly co chose we ca re about? Don't \Ve have d uties co some people we don't care about? Don't we have obliga- tions co deal justly with others and respect thei r rights, even if t hey are not pare of our family o r community? Give reasons fo r your answers.

5. What is your O\vn vie\v of what makes actions right or wrong? What reasons support chis position?

act-utilitarianism The idea chat the rightness of ac- tions depends solely o n che overall well-being pro- duced by individual actions. (156)

categorical imperative Kant's fu ndamental moral principle, wh ich he fo rmulates as (1) " I am never to ace och envise than so that I could also ivill that my maxim should become a universal law"; an d (2) "So ace as co treat humanity, \vhether in thine O\vn perso n or

Analects Confucian text co ntain ing the conversations of Co nfuci us and his fo llo\vers. (193)

in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." (17 1)

consequentialist theory A moral theory in \vh ich the rightness of actions depends solely on their co nse- quences or results. ( 140)

cultural relativism The view that right actions are those e ndorsed by one's culture. ( 149)

deontological (nonconseq uentialist) theory A moral theo ry in which the rightness of actions is d eterm ined not solely by their co nsequen ces, but partly or enti rely by their intrinsic nature. (140)

divine command theory The doctrine chat God is che creator of morality. ( 146)

ethical egoism The vie\v ch at right actions are chose that further one's O\vn best interests. (140)

ethics (moral philosophy) The study of morality us- ing the methods of philosophy. (136)

ethics of care A moral perspective that emphasizes che unique demands of specific situations and the virtues and feelings that are central co dose perso nal relation- ships. (142, 182)

feminist ethics An app roach co morality aimed at ad- vanci ng women's interests, undersco ring thei r distinc- tive experiences and characteristics, and advancing che obvious truth that women and men are mo rally equal . (181)

Kant's theory The theory that right actions are chose that accord with the categorical imperative. ( 14 1)

Ii In early Confucianism, rit ual, etiquette, princi- ple, and propriety; conscientio us behavio r and right action. ( 193)

Key Terms 199

moral abso lutism The belief that objective moral p rinciples al low no exceptions o r must be applied the same way in al l cases and cultures. ( 148)

moral objectivism The view that there are moral standards that are true or correct for everyone. (148)

moral relativism The view that moral standards do not have independent status but are relative to \vhat individuals or cultures believe. (149)

moral theory A theory chat explains why an action is right o r wrong or why a person o r a person's character is good or bad. (139)

morality Beliefs about right and wrong actions and good and bad persons or character. ( 136)

psychological egoism The theo ry that people always act out of self-interest. ( 166)

ren The essential Confucian virtues, including be- nevolence, sympathy, kindness, generosity, respect for oth ers, and human-heartedness. (193)

r ule- utilitarianism The doctrine that a right action is one th at confo rms to a rule that, if follo\ve.d con- siscencly, \vould create fo r ever yone involved che most beneficial balance of well-being over s uffering. (156)

s ubjective relativis m The view that right actions are those endorsed by an individual. (149)

utilitarianis m The view that right actions are those that result in che most beneficial balance of good over bad consequences for everyo ne involved. (140)

virtue ethics A moral theory chat focuses on the de- velopment of virtuous character. (142, 175)

200 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

FIC TIO N

The Ones Who Wa lk Away from Ornelas

Ursula K. Le Guin

Born in 1929, Ursula K. Le Guin is an award-winn ing author of several genres, most notably realistic fiction, science fiction, and fantasy. Her best-known works include the six Books of Earthsea, the science fiction masterpiece The Left Hand of Darkness, and the novels The Dispossessed and Always Coming Home.

With a clamor of bells that set the swa llows soaring, the Festival of Summer came to the city Ornelas, bright- towered by the sea. The rigging of the boats in harbor sparkled with Aags. In t he streets between houses with red roofs and painted wall s, between o ld moss-grown gardens and under avenues of trees, past great parks and public buildings, processions moved . Some were decorous: old people in long stiff robes of mauve and grey, grave master work-men, quiet, merry women car- rying their babies and chatting as they walked. In other streets the music beat faster, a shimmering of gong and tambourine, and the people went dancing, the pro- cession was a dance. Children dodged in and out, their high call s rising like the swallows' crossing Aights over the music and the singing. All the processions wound towards the north side of the city, where on the great water-meadow called t he Green Fields boys and girls, naked in the bright air, with mud-stained feet and an- kles and long, lithe arms, exercised their restive horses before the race. The horses wore no gear at all but a hal- ter without bit. Their manes were braided with stream- ers of silver, gold, and green. They Aared their nostrils and pranced and boasted to one another; they were vastly excited, the horse being the on ly anima l who has adopted our ceremon ies as his own. Far off to the north and west the mountains stood up ha lf encircl ing Ornelas on her bay. The air of morning was so clear that the snow still crowning the Eighteen Peaks burned with white-gold fire across the miles of sun lit air, under the dark blue of the sky. There was just enough wind to make the banners t hat marked the racecourse snap and Autter now and then. In the silence of the broad green meadows one cou ld hear the music winding through the city streets, farther and nearer and ever

Copyright© 1973 by U rsula K. le Guin Fi rst appeared in "New Dimension 3'' in 1973, and then in THE WIND'S TWELVE QUARTERS, published by HarperCollins in 1975. Reprinted by permission of Curtis Brown, Ltd.

approaching, a cheerful faint sweetness of the air that from time to time trembled and gathered together and broke out into the great joyous clanging of the bell s.

Joyous! How is one to tell about j oy? How describe the citizens of Ornelas?

They were not simple folk, you see, though they were happy. But we do not say the words of cheer much any more. All smi les have become archaic. Given a description such as this one tends to make certa in as- sumptions. Given a description such as this one tends to look next for the King, mounted on a splend id sta l- lion and surrounded by his nob le knights, or perhaps in a golden litter borne by great-muscled slaves. But there was no king. They d id not use swords, or keep slaves. They were not barbarians. I do not know the rules and laws of their society, but I suspect that they were singu- larly few. As t hey did without monarchy and slavery, so they also got on without the stock exchange, the adver- tisement, the secret police, and the bomb. Yet I repeat that these were not simple folk, not dulcet shepherds, noble savages, bland utopians. They were not less com- plex than us. The troub le is that we have a bad habit, encouraged by pedants and sophisticates, of consider- ing happiness as something rather stupid. Only pain is intellectual, on ly evil interesting. This is t he treason of t he artist: a refusal to admit the banality of evi l and the terrible boredom of pain. If you can't lick 'em, join 'em. lfit hurts, repeat it. But to praise despair is to con- demn delight, to embrace violence is to lose hold of everything else. We have almost lost hold; we can no longer describe a happy man, nor make any celebration of joy. How can I tell you about t he people of Ornelas? They were not naive and happy children- though their children were, in fact, happy. They were mature, intell i- gent, passionate adu lts whose lives were not wretched . O miracle! but I wish I could describe it better. I wish I cou ld convince you. Ornelas sounds in my words like a city in a fairy ta le, long ago and far away, once upon a time. Perhaps it would be best if you imagined it as your

own fancy bids, assuming it will rise to the occasion, for certainly I cannot su it you all. For instance, how about technology? I t hink that there wou ld be no cars or he- licopters in and above the streets; th is foll ows from t he fact that the peop le of O rnelas are happy people. Happiness is based on a just discrimin ation of what is necessary, what is neither necessary nor destruc- t ive, and what is destructive. In the middle category, however- that of the unnecessary but undestructive, t hat of comfort, luxury, exuberance, etc.- they cou ld perfectly well have central heating, subway trains, washing machines , and all kinds of marvelous devices not yet invented here, fl oating light-sources, fuelless power, a cure for t he common cold . Or they could have none of t hat: it doesn't matter. As you like it. I incline to think that people from towns up and down the coast have been coming in to Ornelas during the last days before the Festival on very fast little trains and double- decked trams, and that the train station of Ornelas is actually the handsomest bu ild ing in town, t hough plainer t ha n the magnificent Farmers' Market. Bu t even granted train s, I fear t hat Ornelas so far strikes some of you as goody-goody. Smiles, bell s, parades, horses, blah. If so, please add an orgy. If an orgy would help, don't hesitate. Let us not, however, have temples from which issue beautifu l nude priests and priestesses al- ready half in ecstasy and ready to copulate with any man or woman, lover or stra nger, who desires un ion with the deep god head of the blood, although that was my first idea. Bu t really it would be better not to have any temples in Ornelas- at least, not manned temples. Rel igion yes , clergy no. Surely the beautifu l nudes can just wander about, offering themselves like divine scuf- fl es to the hunger of t he need y and t he rapture of the fl esh. Let them join the processions. Let tambourines be struck above the copulations, and t he glory of desire be proclaim ed upon t he gongs, and (a not unimport- ant point) let the offspring of these delightful rituals be beloved and looked after by all. One th ing I know t here is none ofin Ornelas is guilt. But what else shou ld t here be? I thought at first there were no drugs, but that is pu- ritanical. For those who like it, the fa in t in sistent sweet- ness of drooz may perfume t he ways of the city, drooz which first brings a great lightness and bril liance to the mind and limbs, and then after some hours a dreamy languor, and wonderful visions at last of the very arcana and inmost secrets of the Universe, as well as exciting t he pleasure of sex beyond all belief; and it is not hab it- form ing. For more modest tastes I th ink there ought to be beer. What else, what else belongs in the joyous city?

The Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas 20 1

The sense of victory, surely, the celebration of courage. But as we did without clergy, let us do without soldiers. The joy built upon successfu l slaughter is not the right ki nd of joy; it will not do; it is fearful and it is trivial. A boundless and generous contentment, a magnani - mous trium ph felt not against some outer enemy but in commun ion with the finest and fairest in the souls of all men everywhere and the sp lendor of the world's summer: t his is what swells the hearts of the people of Ornelas, and the victory t hey celebrate is that of life. I really don't t hink many of them need to take drooz.

Most of the processions have reached t he Gree n Fields by now. A marvelous smell of cooking goes forth from the red and blue tents of the provisioners. The faces of small children are amiably sticky; in the benign grey beard of a man a couple of crumbs of rich pastry are entangled. The youths and girls have mounted their horses and are beginning to group around the starting lin e of the course. An old woman, small, fat, and laugh- ing, is passing out flowers from a basket, and tall young men wear her flowers in their sh in ing hair. A child of nine or ten sits at the edge of the crowd , alone, play- ing on a wooden flute. People pause to listen, and t hey smile, but t hey do not speak to him, for he never ceases playing and never sees them, his dark eyes wholly rapt in the sweet, thin magic of the tune.

He fin ishes, and slowly lowers his hands hold ing the wooden flute.

As if t hat little private silence were the signal, all at once a trumpet sounds from t he pavilion near t he start- ing li ne: imperious, melancholy, piercing. The horses rear on their slender legs , and some of t hem neigh in answer. Sober-faced , the you ng riders stroke t he horses' necks and soothe them, whispering, "Quiet, quiet, t here my beauty, my hope .. . . " They begin to form in rank along t he starting line. The crowds along the racecourse are like a field of grass and flowers in t he wind. The Festival of Summer has begun.

Do you believe? Do you accept t he festival, the city, the j oy? No? Then let me describe one more th ing.

In a basement under one of the beautifu l public bu ildings of Ornelas , or perhaps in t he cellar of one of its spacious private homes, there is a room. It has one locked door, and no window. A li ttle li ght seeps in dustily between cracks in the boards, secondhand from a cobwebbed w indow somewhere across the cellar. In one corner of the li ttle room a couple of mops, with stiff, clotted, foul-smell ing heads, stand nea r a rusty bucket. The floor is dirt, a li ttle damp to t he touch, as cell ar d irt usually is. The room is about t hree paces long

202 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

and two wide: a mere broom closet or disused tool room. In the room a child is sitting. It cou ld be a boy or a girl. It looks about six, but actually is nearly ten. It is feeble-minded. Perhaps it was born defective, or per- haps it has become imbecile through fear, malnutrition, and neglect. It picks its nose and occasionally fumbles vaguely with its toes or genitals, as it sits hunched in the corner farthest from the bucket and the two mops. It is afraid of the mops. It finds them horrible. It shuts its eyes, but it knows the mops are still standing there; and the door is locked; and nobody will come. The door is a lways locked; and nobody ever comes, except that sometimes- the child has no understand ing of time or interval- sometimes the door rattles terribly and opens, and a person, or several people, are there. O ne of them may come in and kick the child to make it stand up. The others never come close, but peer in at it with frightened, disgusted eyes. The food bowl and the wa- ter jug are hastily filled, the door is locked, the eyes dis- appear. The people at the door never say anything, but the child, who has not always lived in the tool room, and can remember sunlight and its mother's voice, sometimes speaks. "I will be good ," it says. "Please let me out. I will be good !" They never answer. The child used to scream for help at night, and cry a good deal, bu t now it only makes a kind of wh in ing, "eh-haa, eh- haa," and it speaks less and less often. It is so thin there are no calves to its legs; its belly protrudes; it lives on a ha lf-bowl of cornmeal and grease a day. It is naked. Its buttocks and thighs are a mass of festered sores, as it sits in its own excrement continually.

They all know it is there, all the people of Ornelas. Some of them have come to see it, others are content merely to know it is there. They all know tha t it has to be there. Some of them understand why, and some do not, but they a ll understand that their happ iness, the beauty of their city, the tenderness of their friend- ships, the health of their children, the wisdom of their scholars, the skil l of their makers, even the abundance of their harvest and the kind ly weathers of their skies, depend wholly on this child's abominable misery.

Th is is usually exp lained to children when they are between eight and twelve, whenever they seem capa- ble of understanding; and most of those who come to see the child are young peop le, though often enough an adu lt comes, or comes back, to see the child. No matte r how well the matte r has been explained to them, these young spectators are a lways shocked and sickened at the sight. They fee l d isgust, which they had thought themselves superior to. They fee l anger,

outrage, impotence, despite all the explanations. They wou ld like to do something for the child. Bu t there is nothing they can do. If the child were brought up into the sunlight out of tha t vile place, if it were clea ned and fed and comforted, that wou ld be a good thing, indeed; but if it were done, in that day and hour all the pros- perity and beauty and delight of Ornelas would wither and be destroyed. Those are the terms. To exchange all the goodness and grace of every life in O rnelas for that single, small im provement: to throw away the hap pi- ness of thousands for the chance of the happiness of one: that would be to let guilt within the walls indeed .

The terms are strict and absolute; there may not even be a kind word spoken to the child.

O ften the young people go home in tears, or in a tearless rage, when they have seen the child and faced this terrible paradox. They may brood over it fo r weeks or years. Bu t as time goes on they begin to rea lize that even if the chi ld cou ld be released, it wou ld not get much good of its freedom: a little vague pleasure of warmth and food, no doubt, but little more. It is too degraded and imbeci le to know any real joy. It has been afraid too long ever to be free of fear. Its habits are too uncouth for it to respond to humane treatment. Indeed, after so long it would probably be wretched without wall s about it to protect it, and darkness fo r its eyes, and its own excrement to sit in. Their tears at the bitter injustice dry when they begin to perceive the terrible justice of reality, and to accept it. Yet it is their tears and anger, the trying of their generosity and the accep- tance of their helplessness, which are perhaps the true source of the splendor of their lives. Theirs is no vapid, irrespo nsible ha ppi ness. They know that they, li ke the child, are not free. They know compassion. It is the exis- tence of the child, and their knowledge of its existence, that makes possible the nobi lity of their architecture, the poignancy of their music, the profund ity of their sci- ence. It is because of the child that they are so gentle with children. They know that if the wretched one were not there snivell ing in the dark, the other one, the Aute- player, could ma ke no joyful music as the young riders li ne up in their beauty for the race in the sunlight of the first morning of summer.

Now do you believe in them ? Are they not more credib le? But there is one more thing to tell , and this is quite incredible.

At times one of the adolescent girls or boys who go to see the child does not go home to weep or rage, does not, in fac t, go home at all. Sometimes also a man or woman much older fa ll s silent for a day or

For Further Reading 203

two, and then leaves home. These people go out into t he street, and walk down the street alone. They keep walking, and walk s traight out of the city of O rnelas, t hrough the beau tiful gates. They keep walking across t he farm lands of O rnelas. Each one goes alone, youth or girl, man o r woma n. Night fall s; t he traveler mus t pass down vill age streets, between the houses with yell ow-lit windows, and on out in to the darkness of the

fields. Each alone, they go west or north, towards t he mountains. They go on. They leave O rnelas , they walk ahead into the darkness, and they do not come back. The place they go toward s is a place even less imagin- ab le to most of us than the city of happiness. I cannot describe it at all. It is possible that it does not exist. But they seem to know where they are going, the ones who walk away from O rnelas.

Prob ing Questio ns

I . Ho,v does chis story apply ro utilitarian ,n oral theories? Does it put these theories in a good light or bad-or son1ething in benveen?

2. Does our happiness in a relatively prosperous nation depend on the suffering of the poorer people of the ,vorld who work for low wages co support our consu,n er society?

3. If you were a citizen of Ornelas, ,vould you walk away from ic as a few have done? Would you chink char che suffering of one child, though regreccable, was justified ro create a utopia for so many ro enjoy? Explain.

For Further Reading

Robert Audi, Moral Knoiuledge and Ethical Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) . A carefully argued defense of a mo ral theory that int egrates natural ist and rationalistic elemencs.

Steven M . Cilin and Joram G . Haber, 1iuentieth Century Ethical Theory (Upper Sad- dle River, NJ : Prentice-Hall, 1995) . A comprehensive an th ology of some of the most influential moral theorizing of th e twent ieth century.

William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd e.dit ion (Englewood Cliffi, NJ: Pren tice-H all, 1973). A h ighly regarded concise introduction to eth ics.

C. E. H arris, Applying Moral Theories (Belmont, CA: Wadswo rth, 1997). An intro- duction to ethics that covers moral theories and how they can be applied to real issues.

Kai Nielsen, Ethics Without God (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1973). A concise, read- able defense of the proposition that ethics does not require th eism.

Jennifer O ldstone-Moore, Confucianism: Origins, Beliefi, Practices, Holy Texts, and Sacred Places (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2002).

Ono ra O'Neill, "Kantian Eth ics," in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Pet er Si nger (Cambridge: Black,vell , 1993), 175-185. An informative perspective o n Kants ethical theory.

Lou is P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 4th edition (Belmo nt, CA: Wadsworth, 2002) . An introduction to ethics that lays out a case for objective morality.

204 Chapter 3 Morality and the Mora l life

James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 4th edition (Ne\v York: McGra\v- H ill , 2003). A co ncise guide co eth ics an d eth ical theories.

Russ Shafer-Landau, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (New York: Oxford Un i- versity Press, 2004). A readable, carefully crafted defense of objective ethics.

Peter Si nger, ed., A Companion to Ethics (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993). A topical an th ology covering man y issues, including mo ral th eo ry, theory applications, and challenges co commonsense ethics.

Lewis Vaughn, Contemporary Moral Arguments: Readings in Ethical Issues (New York: Oxford University Press, 20 10) . A moral- issues a nth ology organ ized by topic and by infl uential, classic arguments.

Lewis Vaughn, Doing Ethics: Moral Reasoning and Contemporary Issues, 4th editio n (Ne\v York: W. W Norto n, 20 10) . An introd uction co eth ical issues feat uring a wide range of readings a nd thorough coverage of moral reason ing and ethical th eo ry.

MIND AND BODY

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES

4.1 OVERV IEW: THE MIND- BODY PROBLEM

• Understand the nature and importance of the m ind-body problem .

• Deline substance dualism , Cartesian dualism , materialism, logical behaviorism, identity theory, multiple realizability, functionalism , epiphenomena/ism, and property dualism.

4.2 SUBSTANCE DUALISM

• Articu late Descartes' conceivability and d ivisibility arguments and the main o bjections to them .

• Explain why the issue of m ind- body interaction is a problem for Cartesian dualism.

• Understand why Descartes' theory seems to violate the principle o f the causal closure of

the physical and t he law of the conservation of mass-energy and be ab le to explain why such violatio n s would render the theory implausib le.

4.3 M IND-BODY IDENTITY

• Articulate the advantages of the identity theory over Cartesian dua lism .

• Understand Chalmers's zombie argument and why it seems to pose a threat to the identity theory.

• Underst and Nagel' s bat argument and how it seems to undermine materialist theories.

4.4 THE MIND AS SOFTWARE

• Explain functionalism and how the theory differs from substance dualism and the identity theory.

• Describe Ned Block' s absent qualia argument, explain how it is

supposed to show functiona lism to be false, and articulate possible responses to the argument from functionalists.

• Deline strong Al and explain how funct iona lism is supposed to make it possible.

• Underst and Searle's Chi nese room thought experiment, his d istinction bet ween syn tax and seman tics, and how h is argument is supposed to show that strong Al is not possib le.

4.5 THE MIND AS PROPERTIES

• Underst and how philosophers have reasoned from t he fa ilure of prom inent mind -body theories to the p lausibility of property dualism.

• Explain the main philosoph ica l chall enge to property d ualism.

206 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

T is true, tis certain; man t hough dead retains, Part of himself: the immortal mind remains . -Alexander rope

The mind- bod y p ro blem is the issue of what mental phenom ena arc and how they rdarc m the physical world .

Subst ance dualism is the no rio n that mind a nd body consist of rwo funda- mentally diffcrcnr kinds of stuff, o r s ubstances.

Cartesian d ualism is the view t har mind (or soul) an d body arc completely independent of o ne an~ o ther and inte ract causally.

M aterialism (or physical- ism ) is the doctrine that

every object and event in the world is p hysical.

4.1 OVERVIEW: THE MIND- BODY PROBLEM

Philosophy is notorious for intruding into facets of life that seem at fi rst glance to get along just fine without philosophical inqu iry. People may very well ,vonder, Why do we need philosophy to help us understand what a lready seems obvious? Why does philosophy see problems where nothing seems problematic? A prime example of a subject matter that may appear to many not to need any philosophical help (but gets it anyway) is mind and body. After a ll, if there is anything that ,ve seem directly and intimately acquainted with, it's our own m inds and our own bodies. And our commonplace theory about these things (usually derived from our culture or religion) seems to be perfectly consistent with our personal experience. So what's the p roblem?

Well, several hund red years of philosophical work have shown that many of our commonplace notions about mind and body are suspect or wrong, and that, for many reasons, we very much need to get them right. The commonplace view goes like this: You have a physical body, a thing that has shape, size, and ,veight, an entity ,vith a physical structure running physical processes subject to physical laws like any rock, tree, o r star. You also have a nonphysical m ind (or soul), a mental thing that cannot be ,veighed, measu red, or dissected, an entity that thinks, feels, and senses. Your body (brain) is nothing like your mind; you r mind is nothing like your body. Yet somehow you r physical body affects your nonphysical mind, as when your drop- ping a brick on your foot causes you to feel a sharp pain and to ask yourself how you could be so clumsy. And your mind affects you r body, as when you experience th irst and then decide to ,valk to the k itchen fo r a drink of water. Moreover, according to this view, your mind and body are independent of one another, so it's possible for your mind or soul to continue existing after your body dies.

But how are interactions between body and mind (or soul) possible? Ho,v ca n our phys ical b ra ins cause something to happen in our seemingly nonphysical minds and vice versa? Ho,v can somethi ng enti rely physical have anything to do with an entity without any physical characteristics? This is like asking how smoke could interact ,vith a rock-except that the problem is ,vorse than that, because, unlike smoke, the mind is supposed to have no physical properties at all. Has the nature of mind been entirely misconceived? A re the ,videly accepted ideas about the relation- ship benveen mind and body d rastically mistaken?

These are the central concerns in what is called the m ind- body problem- the issue of what mental phenomena really a re and how they relate to the physical ,vorld. The most important responses to it constitute the foremost theories of m ind in West- er n thought.

The commonplace theory-the one that you likely hold and may never have doubted-is known as substa n ce d ualism . It says that mind and body consist of two fundamentally different kinds of stuff, or substances-the mind being of non- physical stuff, and the body of physical stuff. The mind's mental states-desires, sensations, emotions, and thoughts-are states of nonphysical (or immaterial) stuff. The body's phys ical states-electrochem ical and b iomechanical-are states of physi- cal (material) stuff. Together these two substances-this dualism of stuff-make

Overview: The Mind- Body Problem 207

up a person. In fact, for substance dualiscs, the enti re universe is constituted by just these nvo substances.

Beginning ,vich Plato, many g reat thinkers have been substance dualiscs, but the most influential proponent of the theory in the mod ern period (begin ning in the seventeenth century) is Rene Descartes (1596-1650). H e argues not only chat the body and sou l a re composed of nvo distinct and independent substances (mental and physical) , but chat these two pares of a person interact causally. (Li ke many ocher s ubstance dualisrs, D esca rtes uses the ,vord soul instead of mind, but both terms refer roughly co the nonphysical, mental aspect of a person.) The mind, though immaterial, can in- flu ence the material body, and the body can affect the mind. Th is doctrine of distinct but interact ing s ubstances is known, for obvi- ous reasons, as Cartesian dualism o r inceractionism . It underp ins belief in an immortal soul chat lives on after death.

Among contemporary ph ilosophers, however, Descartes' dual- ism has very little credibility (for reasons discussed in the next sec- tio n). Mose of chem hold instead co va rious fo rms of materialism (or physicalism), the doctrine chat ever y object and event in the world is physical. So mental states must be physical states or some- how reducible co physical states.

Figure 4.1 Is th e mind identical to the brain? Or a re they two entirely diffe rent things, as Descartes th ought? If so, how do they inte ract?

One materialise theory is logical b ehaviorism, the idea chat mental states are dispositions co behave in particular ways in certain circumsta nces. To be in a mental state is just co be disposed co certa in kinds of behavior. So co h ave a headache is co be d isposed co wincing and caking an aspirin. To be afraid of thun- der is to be disposed co crying out and covering you r head with a blanket when the sky rumbles . The central cla im is not that we come co know about a person's mental states by caking note of her behavior, but chat her mental states are d ispos itions co behavior.

To its credit, logical beh av iorism avoids Cartesian dualism's problem of explain- ing mind-body interaction. But co critics, the theory seems co be in den ial about the nature of our mental states, for many of ou r mental states have a particular subjective feel or quality to chem (what philosophers call qualitative content or qualia). It feels a certain way co us co be in pain, to be thi rst y, co want a chocolate sundae, co see and smell a rose, or co experience happiness. Logical behaviorism, however, says chat mental states have nothing co do ,vich ou r interior feelings; dispositions co behave are all that matter. But chis seems co many people co d eny the obv ious.

Sim ilarly, logical behaviorism is at odds with our commonsense intuition chat mental states often cause behavior. We feel hungry, so we eat lunch. We fantasize about a d ream vacation in Aruba, so ,ve look up Aruba on a map. But because the logical behaviorist recogn izes o nly behavior and essentially discounts the ex istence of subjective mental states, he can not counten ance any cause-and-effect relationship between ou r inner life and our outer behavior.

A more widely accepted materialist approach co the mind-body problem is the identity theory, the view that mental states are id entical co physical brain states. The

Consciousness L\ the g lo ry

of creation.

- James Broughton

Logical behaviorism is the idea that mental s tates

arc d L\posicions m behave

in particular ways in ccr ..

rain circumstances.

Identity theory is , he view that mental s tates arc

identical to p hysical brain

stares.

1 At this point in you r read ing, does Carte- sian d u a lism strike you as a plausib le t heory of mind? Is it obvious t o you that people have both a physical body and a nonphysica l mind? What reasons do you have fo r your views?

208 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

Consciousness is what makes the m ind- body proble m really intractable. -11,omas Nagel

2 Do you t hink it is possible to know everything about a person's mental states just by knowing all the facts regarding his physical states? Do physical states and mental states amount to the same thi ng?

Brain: an apparatus w ith

w hich we think we t h ink. -Ambrose Bierce

central claim is not t hat t he meaning of mental terms ca n be expressed or defined in physical (bra in) terms, but rather that it is an empirical fact that mental states are nothing but brain states. The mind and body (bra in) are not distinct substances as substance dualism holds; the mind is t he brain.

Thus the identity t heory offers a better explanation of mind-body interaction than Cartesian dualism does because the m ind is the body. It prov ides a better ac- count of mental causation than logical behaviorism does, because mental states are brain states and brain states cause behavior. It also fits well with a massive amount of scientific evidence showing correlations benveen brain states and mental func- tion. Brain research h as sho,vn in countless ways that if a p erson's brain is damaged or physically stimulated, there are corresponding changes in psychological activit y. And ,vhen a person engages in some psycho logical activity (remembering or imagin- ing, for example), there are predictable a lterations in b ra in activity.

But several arguments have been lodged against the identity theory, most of them being attempts to show that mental states can not possibly be b ra in states. The common argument pattern is this: If the identity theory is true, then we ca n know or explain everything about a person's mental states by kno,ving or explaining everything about the person's brain states. But it is not poss ible to know or expla in mental states by knowing o r explaining brain states. Therefore, the identity theory is false.

Another kind of argument appeals to our intuitions about the possibility of non- humans having minds. The identity theory claims that since the mind is identical to

Figure 4.2 Cou ld a space alien have a mind without having a brain like ours?

Overview: The Mind- Body Problem 209

the brain, no being can have a mind unless it has a brain. Bue co some critics, chis conclusion is implausible. Jc seems possible, they argue, chat a being (an alien life- fo rm, for example) could possess a mind (have desires, ideas, emotions, sensations, etc.) without having a brain (the human organ). Cons ider che fi ctio nal alien E.T. o r Star Treks android Mr. Data. Jc is conceivable chat such creatures could have m inds but be made of an e ntirely different kind of scuff than \Ve are. If so, there muse be someth ing wrong \vich che identity theory.

The assumption behind chis argument is chat mental scares have what philoso- phers call multiple realizability, the capacity co be realized or instantiated in a va riety of fo rms and materials. In che theory of mind kno\vn as fu n ctionalism , mulciple realizability is a core doctrine. Logical behaviorism cla ims that che m ind is behav ioral dispositions, che identit y theory holds chat the mind is che bra in, but functionalism asserts chat che mind is che functions that the b ra in performs. The theory maintains chat a mental state is defined by its causal role-by che stimuli that initiate it, che resu lting interactions \vich ocher mental states, and che behav- ior chat is subsequently produced. A mental state, then, is just a d istinctive sec of inputs and outputs. Thus functionalism says chat che material or substa nce chat gives rise co a mind is unimportant; che scuff chat produces a mind ca n be al most anyth ing. What matters are the functiona l relations embodied in che scuff. So func- t ionalism can be case as a materialise view (and usually is) or given a nonmacerialisc . . 1ncerprecat1on.

Inspire.cl by the insight behind funct ionalism, some theorists have come co ch ink of che mind as a sophisticated computer chat's running some sore of soft- ware. Functiona lism holds chat che mind is the performance of functio ns, the processing of in- puts and oucpucs-\vhich is what any computer does. A computer runs software chat determines what and how che inputs and outputs are pro- cessed. So some functionalists claim that co have a mind is just co run che approp riate type of soft- ware. The bra in is hardware; the mind software. If so, it is possible for computers co have minds as long as they process inputs and outputs in che right way.

Multiple realizab ili ty is the capacity to be realized o r instantiated in a variety

of forms an d ma terials.

Functionalism is the view that the mi nd is the functio ns that t he brain

performs.

3 Is it concei vabl e that a space a lien coul d have a mind (feel pa in, percei ve colors, etc.) despite h i s being made out o f st uff t hat i s nothing like our brain stuff? Suppose, for exampl e, he is not a ca rbon-based life-form like us, but a silicon- based creatu re.

This vie\v has come co be known as strong ar- tificial intelligence, or strong AI. (Weak artificial intelligence refers not co che making of a m ind but co che use of computer simulations co study the mind.) Many assume that it is only a mat- ter of time before scientists develop a computer so sophisticated chat it will be able co think on its O\vn, co have \vhac \Ve would descr ibe as a mind. After all, don't we already have computers that can do astounding calculations, simulations, and problem solving? H asn't an IBM computer called

Figure 4.3 World chess champion Garry Kasparov playing Deep Blue. The computer beat him. Does this show that Deep Blue has a mind or that it could eventually become conscious?

210 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

C uriously enough m an's body a nd h is mind appear to d iffer in th e ir climatic

adaprations. -Ellsworth Humington

Property dualism is the view that mental pro per .. tics arc nonphysical p ropcrrics arising fro m,

bur not reducible to , p hysical p roperties.

Min ds arc simply what brains do. -Marvin Minsky

Epiphenomenalism is the no rio n that me n tal proper- ties do not cause anyth ing,

but merely accompa ny p hysical p rocesses.

Deep Blue already defeated the ,vorld 's best chess player, Ga rry Kasparov? And hasn't a computer calle.d Watson beaten nvo human opponents in a game of Jeopardy? But although such fears a re indeed impressive, many ph ilosophers remain unconvinced that a computer mind is possible.

These theorists take issue with funct ionalism on the grounds that it does not do justice to the subjective, qualitative nature of ou r experience-to what is called phenomenal consciousness. They argue that it is possible to be in a mental state that does not correspond at a ll with a specific funct ional state. For example, consider the mental state of being in pain. It has a certain qualitative feel to be su re, but it does not seem to be equivalent to any part icular functional situation. Many times pain doesn't seem to have a causal role at all; it just hurrs.

Some critics put forth what a re called absent qualia objections to functionalism . These arguments try to demonstrate that it is possible for a system to be in a par- ticular functional state and yet be in no mental, qualitative state at all. The system has the right inpurs and outpurs, but no mental state seems to be present. If such arguments are correct, then the notion that an appropriately programmed computer is a mind (the central claim of strong AI) is mistaken.

Many philosophers dra,v a similar conclusion about all materialist theo- ries: Materialism is fa lse. If that is the case, they contend, the ,vo rld must have both physical and nonphysical featu res, a nd the latter can not be reduced to the former.

But if the world contains both physical and nonphysical things, aren't we led back to Cartesian dualism, a reality consisting of two substances that may or may not interact? Not necessa rily. Some theorisrs defend a different kind of dualism- not Descartes' dualism but property dualism, the view that mental properties, or features, are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, phys ical properties. The idea is that there are properties of individuals-mental, experiential properties-that do not constitute an independent substance and that ca nnot be reduced to physical properties, even though they may somehow depend on phys ical properties. We may see the color red, feel a pain, or remember ou r first kiss, and none of these is the same thing as a physical process, although the latter may give rise to the former.

Property dualism, ho,vever, has been accused of having some of the same weak- nesses as substance dualism and raising some of the same questions. How can a physical property g ive rise to a mental property? How can mental events interact ,vith physical events? If mental events produce physical evenrs, doesn't this fl y in the face of the laws of physics? Modern physics says that physical matter/energy in the universe ca nnot be added to or subtracted from . But this seems to rule out any addi- tion of nonphys ical energy. If mental evenrs do not cause physical events, we are left ,vith epiphenomenalism, the notion that mental properties do not cause anything, but merely accompany physical processes. This theory suggesrs, fo r instance, that thinking about being late for an appointment is not what causes you to run. But epiphenomenalism seems to conflict with our commonsense intuitions about ho,v our minds and bod ies are related.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 4.1

I. Is Cartesian d ualism plausible? Can you chink of a \vay chat a non - physical mind and p hysical body could influen ce each ocher-chat is, interact causally?

2. H ow do you chin k scientists view che notion of m ind-bod y interac- tion? Are they likely co be skeptical of physical thin gs causally in teract- ing with nonp hysical en tities? If so, \vhy?

3. Is multiple realizabilit y a genuine proper ty of m inds? That is, do you chink it p lausible chat a m ind can be realized in a variety of physical systems?

4. Do you ch ink che mind is essen tially sofnvare running on a p hysical system like che human brain? W hy or why n ot?

5. Is epiphenomenalism a credible t heory of mi nd ? D oes it make sense, for exa mple, chat every time you d ecide co cross che screec, you r body \valks across che street-and yet you r d eciding co walk has nothing co do with your act ually walking?

4.2 SUBSTANCE DUALISM

For Descartes, che universe consists not merely of che kind of scuff chat science st udies, che physical, but also of che nonphysical. The chief characteristic of physical t hings, he says, is chat they have extemion-ch ey have length, width, a nd height and are located in physical space. They are things li ke pebbles, molecules, water, desks, and scars. Bue no np hysical entities have no molecules, no p hysical dimensions, and no lo- cation in space. Our bodies are p hysical chi n gs, matter extended in space. O ur mi nds are nonphysical, mental things-consciousness. O ur true selves consist enti rely of chis mental scuff; our bodies are adj uncts. Despite che profound difference between che mental a nd physical, t hey interact causally. The body collects sensory data, which cause che mind co experience sighcs, sounds, text ures, a nd odors; and che cho ices, be- liefs, a nd desires of che m ind cause che body co respond co che world. A human being, then, is a fusion of body a nd mi nd, but che essential person, che self, is pure mind, an immortal soul. You a re, in che famous ph rase, a "ghost in che machi ne."

Desca rtes fo rmulated his t ype of d ualism in che seven teenth century \vhen che find ings of science and che doctrines of traditional religion seeme.d co be in conflict. H is dualism helped co ease che tens io n benveen chem by placi ng science and rel ig ion in different, noncompeti ng realms. Science cou ld concern itself w it h che p hysical- wich biology, physics, astronomy, a nd che like. Religio n could focus on che men tal, on che domai n of immor tal sou ls and religious mora lity.

Substance Dualism 2 11

You d o n't h ave a soul.

You arc a Soul. You have a body. - C. S. Lewis

212 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

4 Is your existing w ith· out a body really con · ceivable? That is, can you conceive of your mind existing without any physical properties at al I, w ithout even a ghostlike quasi· physica l presence?

D escart es offers several a rg umenrs to support his theory of m ind, including \vh at philosophers call his conceivability argument. In it Descartes contends that \Ve cannot be just phys ical bod ies, as the materialists believe. We must be distinct from ou r bod ies-we must be nonphysical m inds. This is ho\v D escart es lays out the argument:

Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason

And then , examining attentively that wh ich I was, I saw that I cou ld conceive that I had no body, and that there was no world nor place where I m ight be; but yet that I could not for all that conceive that I was not. On the contrary, I saw from t he very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other th ings, it very evidently and certain ly followed that I was; on the other ha nd if I had only ceased from th inking, even if all the rest of wha t I had ever imagined had really existed, I should have no reason for th inking that I had existed. From that I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of wh ich is to th ink, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material th ing; so that this 'me,' that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the sou l would not cease to be what it is.'

Descartes reasons that it is conceivable that he could exist without his body, and that whatever is conceivable is logically possible. (For example, s ilver unicorns are conceivable and thus logically possible; square circles are inconceivable and therefore logically impossible.) So it is logically possible that he cou ld exist without h is body. If it is logically possible t hat he could exist \Vithout his body, then he is not identical to his body. His nonphysical mind and his physical body are distinct; he is therefore an immaterial, th inking thing. Dualism is true.

Philosophers have t aken issue w ith th is argument. Their main criticism is that Descartes' first prem ise (that it is conceivable that he could exist without h is body) is dubious. Theodore Schick, Jr., states the complaint like this:

Theodore Schick, Jr., Doing Philosophy

The crucial prem ise here is that d isembod ied existence is conceiva ble. Is it? Try the thought experiment yourself. Imagine you have no body- no arms, no legs, no hands, no eyes, no ears, and so on. Can you do it? If so, are you really imagining existing with- out a body, or are you im agining existing in a ghostlike quasi -physical body? Remem- ber, Cartesian m inds have no physica l attributes, not even a location in space. You wou ld n' t be able to do anyth ing (besides th ink) or fee l anything because you wou ldn't have a body. You wouldn't be able to commun icate with others unless you were given

Substance Dualism 213

some sort of telepathic ability. But, even then , it's unclear how you wou ld identify () . . . f h c h Id h · h b d I · · My m md 1s incapable o t em , ,or t ey, too, wou ave ne1t er a o y nor a ocat1on in space! . . h h.

If disembodied existence is not conceivable, then it is not logically possible and Descartes' argument fa ils.

Desca rtes also cries co prove his dualist theory us ing che divisibility argument. The crux of chis reasoning is chat bodies and minds muse be different things (and thus dualism is true) because bodies can be divided into pares but minds cannot. As Descartes says,

Rene Descartes, Meditations on Fir,t Philosophy

In order to begin th is exam ination, then , 1 here say, in the fi rst place, that there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by natu re a lways d i- vis ible, and the mind is entirely ind ivisible . For, as a matter of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a th inking th ing, 1 cannot distingu ish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clea rly one and entire; and a lthough the whole mind seems to be un ited to the whole body, yet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from my mind. And the facult ies of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc . cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind wh ich employs itself in wi lli ng and in feeling and understanding. But it is qu ite oth- erwise with corporeal or extended objects, for there is not one of these imaginable by me which my mind cannot eas ily divide into parts, and which consequently I do not recognise as being divisible; this wou ld be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already lea rned it from other sou rces.1

H ere Descartes uses che logical principle chat if two chin gs are one and che same, then they muse have exactly che same properties; conversely, if they have different properties, they muse not be one and che same. So he argues chat if minds are not divisible into pares, and if bod ies are divis ible into parts (since they a re spatially ex- t ended), then minds and bodies do not have che same properties. They are t herefore distinct, and dualism is true.

Bodies are divis ible, but is it really true chat minds are indivisible? Two faces give critics reason co chink chat minds are actually div isible. First, psychiatrists have idencifie.d a form of mental illness known as multiple personality disorder in \vhich a person has at lease one a lternate personality that can direct behavior. Those \vho have this disorder a re said to lack the normal unity of consciousness; their m inds appear co be divided. Second, a person's consciousness ca n apparently be divided through a kind of brain surgery known as cerebral comm issurocomy. The procedu re, often performed co treat epilepsy, severs che cord of nerves linking t he b ra in's two hemispheres . The result is a breakdown in communication between che hemispheres,

concc1vmg s ue a c mg as a soul. I may be in e rro r, and man may have a soul; bur I

simp ly do not believe ir. -Thomas A. Edison

Though t is a secretion of th e b rain.

-Pierre-Jean Georges

Caban is

5 Is Descartes cor- rect t hat the mind is ind ivisib le? Do the counterexamples of mu ltiple personalities and cerebral commis- surotomy show that t he min d can in fact be d ivided?

214 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE?

The Immortal Soul

Notions about che soul and its possible i1n1nortalicy have changed through che centuries and have been subject ro intense debate and philosophical inquiry. Many ancient Greeks thought chat the soul is a mate- rial thing char animates bodies and is dispersed (and thus destroyed) like s,noke after che body d ies. Plato taught chat che soul is an essential, nonphysical part of an organism and, unlike 1narerial things, is not subject co dissolution. The soul then is immortal, although it is fused with the body for awh ile. Bue souls are nor restricted co persons; living things of all kinds can also have souls.

Aristotle had very differen t ideas about souls. To him, che soul is the form of che body- that is, che abil it ies or capacit ies 1nanifesred through che living body. And since che sou l requires a body to ,nan ifest itself, rhe sou l perishes when che body dies. Aristotle therefore rejects che possibility of i,nmorcaliry, che trans,n igracion of sou ls, and disembodied existence.

The biblical account of che soul is ar odds with che sou l- body dual ism of 1nuch contemporary choughc. Biblica l scholars generally agree that che scriptural view of body and soul is monisric, not dual istic. The

Figure 4.4 A depiction of the soul leaving the body- a dualism at odds with the biblical account of the soul.

person is a sing le, undivided entity- a un ity of soul and body. Ir is nor che case chat che sou l takes up residence in the body then departs at death co live a separate, im,norca l existence. Body and sou l are one, both therefore being subject co d isintegration ,vhen a person d ies.

The prevai ling Christian view closely follows Plato's and Descartes' dual istic notion: The sou l is che essentia l component of a hu,nan being, a substance both im,nacerial and immor- tal, ,vhile che body is ,nacerial and inessential.

Most contemporary philosophers are materia lises regarding ,n ind and body and there- fore reject che substance dualism of Descartes and Western religion. They are also skeptica l of a ny claims of im,norcalicy.

Do you believe that you have an immortal soul? If so, on what grounds? If you do not, why not? Of the theories of soul just mentioned, which do you think is most p lausible? Why?

third ventric.:_:le>,r;:----

optic chiasm

hypophysis (pituitary gland)

cerebral cortex

pineal gland

hypothalamus

optic chiasm \ Ii,..,,;.~"'' hypothalamus

Figure 4.5 Descartes t hought that th e material and immaterial substances came together in the pineal g land . Does this notion remove the mystery of how interaction happens?

which in tu rn leaves the patient with nvo d istinct domains of consciousness. Th is seems to sho\v that the mind is indeed divisible.

In add ition to trying to underm ine Descartes' arguments for his theory of mind, philosophers have also launched some strong arguments against it. The primary at- tack of th is kind concerns the problem of mind-body interaction. In Cartesian du- alism, mind and body are thought to be two radically different kinds of substances that someho\v interact causally. But ho\v is s uch interactio n possible? H o\v can an object w ith physical properties affect somethi ng \vith no physical properties what- soever? H o\v can a mysterious, nonphysical reality influence any event involvi ng atoms, cells, blood, a nd bone? D escartes' theory doesn't expla in how m ind-body interaction occurs and is therefore regarded by many philosophers as inadequate. He does posit a weak explanation of the causal con nection benveen m ind and body by claim ing that the nvo substa nces intermingle in a small appendage of the brain kno\vn as the pineal gland. But many find this incredible. Whatever the gland's function (which was unknown in Descartes' day), it still is a physical thing, and p ro- posing it as the site of physical/nonphysical interaction does not banish the mystery of ho\v the material can affect the immaterial.

A nother common charge against Car tesian dualism (or any kind of dualism in which the physical and nonphys ical affect each other) is that it is incompatible with science. For example, the theory is said to violate the scientific pr inciple of the causal closure of the physical, \vhich affirms a phys ical cause for every physical

Substance Dualism 215

6 Is it possib le that nonphysi ca l (mental) causes do not exist, t hat the world conta ins on ly physical causes and physica l effects?

Causal closure of t he physical is the p rinciple that , he world is a closed

sysrem of physical cause., and effecLs.

216 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

Am ong the facts of the u niverse to be accoun ted for, it m ay be said, is Min d; and it is self evident that noth ing can h ave p ro· duced M ind but M ind . -John SLuart Mill

John R. Searle, Mind

effect. The world is a closed system of physical causes and effects; nonphysical (mental) causes are superfluous. It seems that \Ve can explain every event without reference to the immaterial. For any physical effect, scientists can in principle map out a detailed series of physical causes leadi ng up to that effect. If so, there seems to be no need for mental causes.

In addition, substance dualism, with its insistence on nonphysical causes of phys- ical even rs, seems to con flict with a basic law of science-the law of t he conser vation of mass-energy. John Searle explains the problem like this:

John R. Searle, Mind

All forms of substance dualism inherit Descartes' problem of how to give a coherent account of the causal relations between the soul and the body, but recent versions have an additiona l prob lem . It seems impossible to make substance duali sm consistent with modern physics. Physics says that the amount of matter/energy in the universe is constant; but substance dua lism seems to imply that there is another kind of energy, mental energy or sp iritual energy, that is not fi xed by physics. So if substance duali sm is true then it seems that one of the most fundamental laws of physics, the law of con- servation, must be fa lse.•

One way that dualists of any stripe can respond to criticisms concerning mind- body interaction and incompatibility \vith science is to embrace epiphenomenalism, the view that mental p roperties do not affect physical p roperties. If the body impacts the mind, but the mind does not impact the body, then there is no problem with ho\v the m ind and body interact, and the principle of the causal closu re of the physi- cal is not violated.

But epiphenomenalism seems to many theorisrs to be a denial of common sense.

Searle is one of them :

On this view [epiphenomena lism] consciousness exists alright, but it is like the froth on the wave or the flash of sunlight reflected off the surface of the water. It is there but it does not rea lly matter. It is an epiphenomenon. But th is seems too counter intuitive. Every time I decide to raise my arm, it goes up. I do not say, "Well , that's the th ing about the old arm. Some days she goes up and some days she doesn't." s

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 4 .2

I. What is Descartes' conceivability argument? Do you think it is successful in showing that some form of dualism must be true? Why or why not?

2. Evaluate Descartes' divisibility a rgument. Are its p remises true? Does it show that bodies are divisible but minds are not?

3. What is Descartes' explanation of ho\v m ind and body interact? Is it plausible?

4. Suppose Descartes is right that bodies are divisible and minds are not. Would this sho\v that minds can exist independently from bodies? Why or why not?

5. What is epiphenomenalism? Is it an adequate explanation of the rela- tionship between mind and body? Is it a better or \vorse explanation than Cartesian d ualism?

4.3 MIND- BODY IDENTITY

The favorite view among materialists is the identity theory, \vhich says that mind states are brain states. Our apparent sensations, thoughts, perceptions, and emotions (so-called phenomenal consciousness) are not immaterial phenomena d istinct from the material brain. These mental states are identical to physical brain states, just as lightning is identical to an electrical discharge. A pai n or a perception is nothing more than a certain process going on in the brain's neu rons. J. J.C. Smart, one of the first philosophers to articu late the identity theory, explai ns it like th is:

J. J. C. Sm art, "Sens ations a nd Bra in Proce sses"

Let me first try to state more accurately the thesis that sensations are brain processes. It is not the thesis that, for example, "after-image" or "ache" means the same as "brain process of sort X" (where "X" is replaced by a description of a certain sort of brain process). It is that, in so far as "afterimage" or "ache" is a report of a process, it is a report of a process that happens to be a bra in process. It follows that the thesis does not claim that sensation statements can be translated into statements about brain processes. Nor does it claim that the logic of a sensation statement is the same as that of a brain-process statement. All it claims is that in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are noth- ing over and above bra in processes. Nations are noth ing "over and above" citizens, but this does not prevent t he logic of nation statements being very different from t he

Mind- Body Identity 2 1 7

21 8 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

7 It seems that thought s and mental images are not located in physical space. Does this show that Smart is mistaken about thoughts and mental images being bra in processes?

logic of citizen statements, nor does it insure the translata bility of nation statements into citizen statemen ts. (I do not, however, wish to asser t that the relation of sensation statements to brain-process statements is very like that of nation sta temen ts to citizen statements. Nations do not just happen to be nothing over and above citizens, for ex- ample. I bring in the "nations" example merely to ma ke a negative point: that the fac t that t he logic of A-statements is different from that of B-statements does not insure that A's are anything over and a bove B's .)

When I say that a sensa tion is a brain process or that lightning is an e lectric dis- charge, I am using "is" in the sense of strict identity. Oust as in the- in this case necessary- proposition "7 is identical with the small est prime number greater than 5.") When I say that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an e lectric discharge I do not mean just t hat the sensation is somehow spatia lly or tem po rally continuous with the brain process or th at the lightn ing is just spa tiall y o r tem porall y continuous with the di scharge.6

The identity theory avoids some of t he cr iticisms directed at Cartesian dualism (that m ind-body interaction is mysterious and that the causal closure principle is violated) and at logical behav iorism (that mental causat ion is ignored or denied). And it explains how ment al states affect behavior, ho\v mental states can cause other

mental states, and \vhy many mental states are known to be correlat ed with b ra in processes.

But some philosophers reject the t heory using conceivability arguments (a la Des- cartes) to t ry to show that the theory is deeply fla\ved. A well-known vers ion of such an argument comes from David Chalmers, who wields it against all materialist views, not just the identity theory. His argument is based o n, strangely enough, the poss ibil ity of zombies:

David J. Cha lmers , The Conscious Mind

.. . [C]onsider the logical possibility of a zombie: someone or something physically identical to me (or to any other conscious being), but lacking conscious experiences altogether. At the global level, we can consider the logica l possib il ity of a zombie world: a world physically identical to ours, but in which there are no conscious experiences a t all. In such a world, everybody is a zombie.

So let us consider my zombie twin . This creature is molecule for molecule identical to m e, and identical in all the low-level properties postulated by a completed physics, but he lacks conscious experience en tirely. (Some might prefer to call a zombie "it," but I use the persona l pronoun; I have grown qui te fond of my zombie twin.) To fix ideas, we can imagi ne that right now I am gazing out the window, experiencing some nice green sensa tions from seeing the trees outside, hav ing pleasant taste experiences through munching on a chocolate bar, and fee ling a du ll ach in g sensa tion in my righ t shoulder.

What is going on in my zombie twin ? He is physica lly identical to me, and we may as well suppose th at he is embedded in an identical environment. He will certainly be identica l to me functionally: he will be processing the same sort of information, reacting

in a simi lar way to inputs, with his in ternal configurations being mod ified appropriately and with indistinguishable behavio r resulting. He will be psychologically identical to me .. .. He will be perceiving the trees o utside, in t he functio nal sense, and tasting the chocolate, in the psychological sense. All of this foll ows logica lly from th e fact that he is physically identical to me, by virtue of the functional analyses of psychologica l no- t io ns. He will even be "consci ous" in t he functio nal senses described earlier- he will be awake, able to report the contents of his internal states, able to focus attention in va rious places, and so on. It is just t hat none of this fun ctioni ng will be accompanied by any real conscious experience. There wil l be no phenomenal feel. There is no thing it is like to be a zombie.7

Chalmers asserts chat it is conceivable chat such a zombie cou ld exist. That is, it is conceivable chat there could be a creat ure physically identical co him in every \vay but lack ing the mental states that constitute conscious experience. If chis zombie is conceivable, he says, then it is logically possible that the zombie could exist. If it is logically possible chat the zombie could exist, then p hysical states muse not be es- sential co conscious experience. Materialism, therefore, must be false.

This is how Chalmers outlines the a rgument:

1. It is conceivable that t here be zombies . 2. If it is conceivable that t here be zombies, it is metap hysicall y possible that

t here be zombies . 3. If it is metap hysically possible that there be zombies, t hen consciousness is

nonphysical. 4 . Consciousness is no nphysical.8

How m ight a materialise respond co this a rgument? One way is co charge chat C halmers is mistaken, that h is zom- bies are actually inconceivable and therefore not logically possible. Many people, ho\vever, \vou ld probably disagree. Can you imagine an android like Star Trek's Mr. Data chat is phys ically identical co you but lacking any trace of inter- nal conscious experience?

Another kind of attack aga inst the identity theory (as \vell as ocher materialise vie\vs) comes in t he form of knowledge arguments. The bas ic line is chat bra ins have t he p roperty of being k nown t h rough empirical investi- gation, but mental states cannot be known chis way. The qualitative content of mental states has co be experienced subjectively, from the inside. And s ince bra in states and mental states have different properties in th is way, b rain states and mental states are not identical. So the identity theo ry is fa lse.

M ind- Body Identity 2 1 9

8 Can you conceive of your zombie twin? If so, w hat does that prove?

If the h uma n mind was simple e nough to u nder- stan d, we'd be too simple

to understand it. -Emerson Pugh

Thomas Nagel makes such an a rgument using a pro- vocat ive thought exper iment about bats . Presumably bats have expe rience (some level of consciousness), he says, al- though it is radically diffe rent from our own. To say chat bats have experience is co say chat "there is something

Figure 4.6 David Chalmers, d istinguished prof es- sor of philosophy and d irector of the Centre for Con- sciousness at the Australian National University.

220 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

Aristotle was fam ous fo r knowing everything. He taught ,hat the brain cxisL< merely to cool ,he blood and is not involved in the

process of thinking. This is ttuc o nly of certain per.sons. -Will Cuppy

Figure 4 .7 Ho llywood zombies like these a re a fa r cry f rom Chalmers's kind of zombies, which are physically ide nt ical to normal people. Does t he possib ility of such zombies show that mate· rialism is false?

that it is like t o be a bat." Th ro ugh scientific st udy, we could co me to know everything there is t o know about bat neurophysiology and all the othe r facts of bat biology. N evertheless, there would still be something that ,ve ,vou ld not

a nd could not know: what it feels like to be a bat. The bat's conscious experience ,vou ld be beyond our ken. We could say the same about humans. If we knew all the facts about thei r phys ical states we still would not know all there is to kno ,v about their m enta l states. The refore, it cannot be the case that physical states and mental st at es a re identical. Nagel decla res,

Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?"

Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being, o r a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that em body a particu lar point of view ....

Th is bears directly on the mi nd- body problem. For if the facts of experience-facts about what it is like for the expe riencing organ ism- are accessible only fro m one point of view, then it is a myste ry how the true cha racter of experiences cou ld be revea led in the physical operation of that organism. The latter is a domain of o bjective facts par excellence- the kind that can be observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals with diffe ring perceptual systems. There are no comparable imagi· native obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge about bat ne urophysiology by hu man

scientists, and inte lligent bats or Martians might learn more about the human brain t han we ever will. .. .

In the case of experience, on the other hand , the connexion with a particular point of view seem s m uch closer. It is difficu lt to understand what cou ld be m ea nt by the objective character of an experience, apart from the particular point of view fro m which its subject apprehends it. After all, what wou ld be left of what it was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat? But if experience does not have, in additio n to its subjective character, an objective nature that can be apprehended from many differ- ent points of view, then how can it be supposed that a Martian investigating my brain might be observing physical processes which were my mental processes (as he m ight observe physica l processes which were bolts of lightn ing) , only from a different point of view? How, fo r t hat matter, cou ld a human physiologist observe them fro m another point of view?9

Some mater ialises rebut this kind of argu ment by insisting chat, contrary co

Nagel and ochers, consciousness is not a k ind of experience (qualia) that is over and above the b ra in's cogn itive or behavioral funct ions. Consciousness just is che b ra in's cogn it ive or behavioral functions. Once we k now a ll about the brain's basic

functions-how it accesses information, d iscrim inates stimuli, controls behavior, monit ors its internal states, and the li ke-\ve k no\v all there is co know about con-

sciousness . And we can know about these things th rough object ive, third-person . . . 1nvest1gat1ons.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 4.3

1. If Nagel chi nks chat bats have m i nds (chat is, conscious experience), \vhac ocher creatures m use he admit have m inds? Do wrens have minds? G rasshoppers? Lobsters?

2. M use humans have immat erial m inds in o rde r co fa ll in love, \vrice

a song, o r remembe r smelli ng a rose? Smart chinks not. Do you agree?

3. Imagine a space alien coming co earth and scientists being able co

exam ine its internal organs. And suppose nothi ng resembli ng che huma n b ra in could be fo und. Accord ing co che identit y theory, \vou ld chis being have a mind? Imagine t h at its behavior was in most ways indistinguishable from human behavior. Wou ld you conclude chat it had a mind?

4. Brain phenomena have a location in space, but thoughts and percep- tions seem not co have a location in space. Does t h is show chat the ident it y theory is fa lse? W hy or w hy not?

5. When your body dies, w ill you r mind sti ll exist ? H ow would identity theorises answer chis? Is their answer plausible?

Mind- Body Identity 221

9 Do bats have con - sciou s experience? Why o r why n ot?

Figure 4.8 Is there so mething that it is like to be a bat ? If there is a nd w e nonbats could never know w hat it fe e ls like to be a bat despite our expert knowle dge of objective bat facts, what does that prove about t he plausibi lity of materialism?

222 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

The b rain may be regard ed as a kind of parasite of the

. . o rganism, a pensio ner, as

it were, w ho dwells w ith the body. -Arthur Schopenhauer

4.4 THE MIND AS SOFTWARE

Func tionalism says that mental states are neither b ra in states nor behavioral states. They are states that h ave causal functions, and it's possible for these functions to play out in just about any kind of stuff, physical or no nphysical (although contempora ry funct ionalists say the stuff is physical). That is, a mind is the functions that t he b ra in carries out, a system of causal relationships that is multip ly realizable. A mental state is therefore a causal sequence of inputs and outputs-initial stimuli that cause certain internal events or states (such as beliefs o r d es ires) that in turn cause exter nal behavior. For example, pain is what is caused by some kind of unpleasant stimu li (such as a burn to Rosa's h and), which causes other mental states (s uch as Rosa's be-

lieving that she should put ice on the burn), which causes external behavior (as when she reaches fo r ice in the freezer). Pain is whatever manifests such t ypical fun ctional roles in an organ ism, and anyth ing that exhibits these kinds of functions is a mind. H ere is Jerry Fodor explain ing the theory and the reasons why he thinks it is superior to both logical behaviorism and the identity theory:

Jerry A. Fodor, " T he M ind-Body Problem"

In the past fifteen years a philosophy of mind called functionalism that is nei ther du - alist nor materialist has emerged from philosophical reflection on developments in artifi cial intell igence, computational theory, linguistics, cybernetics and psychology. All these fields, which are collectively known as the cognitive sciences, have in common a certain level of abstraction and a concern with systems that process information. Functio nalism, which seeks to provide a philosophical acco unt of this level of abstrac- tion, recognizes the possibi lity that systems as diverse as hum an beings, calculating m achines and disembodied spiri ts co uld all have mental states. In the funct ionalist view the psychology of a system depends not on the stuff it is made of (living cells, m ental or spiritual energy) but on how t he stuff is put together ....

All of this emerged ten or fifteen years ago as a nasty d ilemma for the materialist progra m in the phi losophy of mind. O n t he one hand the identity theorist (and not the logical behaviorist) had got right t he causa l character of t he interactions of mind and body. On t he other the logical behaviorist (and not the identity t heo rist) had got right the relatio nal cha racte r of mental properties. Functionalism has appare ntly been able to resolve the d ilemma. By stressing the distinction compu ter science draws between hardware and software the functional ist can make sense of both the causa l and the relationa l character of the mental.

The in tu ition underl ying functionalism is that what determines the psychologi- cal type to which a menta l particular belongs is the causal role of t he particu lar in the m ental life of the organism. Functional individu ation is differentiation with respect to causal role. A headache, fo r exam ple, is iden tified with the type of m ental state that among other things causes a dispos ition for taking aspirin in people who believe aspi· rin relieves a headache, causes a desire to rid oneself of t he pain one is feeling, often causes someone who speaks English to say such things as " I have a headache" and is brought o n by overwork, eyestrai n, and tension . This list is presumably not complete.

The Mind as Software 223

More will be known about t he nature of a headache as psychologica l and physiological research discover more about its causal role.

Functionalism construes the concept of causal role in such a way that a mental state can be defined by its causa l relations to other mental states. In th is respect funct iona lism is comp letely d ifferent from logical behaviorism. Another major dif- ference is that funct iona lism is not a reductionist thesis . It does not foresee, even in principle, the elim ination of mental istic concepts from the explanatory apparatus of psycho logical theories.'0

Despite these advantages of functionalism, critics claim that it has a fatal flaw: It fa ils to account for the subjective, qualitative feel of consciousness. Thus, the most

common arguments against it (absent qualia a rgumenrs) try to show that the theory leaves out conscious experience, or qualia, the seemingly obvious, essential feature of mind. The gist of these arguments is that functionalism must be false because it is possible to introduce an appropriate functional organ ization into some system and yet, contrary to functionalist claims, no mental states are brought into existence. Consider Ned Block's absent qualia argument in the form of a famous thought experiment:

Ned Block, "Troubles with Functional ism"

Suppose we convert t he government of Ch ina to funct iona lism, and we convince its of- ficia ls that it wou ld enormously enhance their international prestige to realize a human mind for an hour. We provide each of the bill ion people in China (I chose Ch ina be- cause it has a bill ion inhabitants) with a specially designed two-way radio that connects t hem in the appropriate way to other persons and to [an] artificial body .... [W]e ... arrange to have letters displayed on a series of satellites placed so that they can be seen from anywhere in China. Surely such a system is not physically impossible. It could be funct ionally equivalent to you for a short time, say an hour ....

What makes the homuncu li-headed [many-headed] system ... just described a prima facie counter example to (machine) functional ism is that there is prima facie doubt whether it has any mental states at all-especially whether it has what philosophers have variously call ed "qualitative states," "raw feels," or "immediate phenomenological quali- ties." (You ask: What is it that ph ilosophers have called qua litative states? I answer, on ly half in jest. As Louis Armstrong said when asked what jazz is, "If you got to ask, you ain't never gonna get to know.") In Nagel's terms, there is a prima facie doubt whether there is anyth ing which it is like to be the homunculi-headed system."

If functiona lism is true, the proper arrangement of inputs and outputs among the billion people should produce a mind having qualitative mental states. That is, from the one billion Chinese people there shou ld arise one more person-the one b rought forth by the ,vhole system's funct ional organization. But, says Block, what

makes the Chinese brain a counterexample to functionalism is that it is logically

possible that th is "brain" has no qualitative mental states at a ll. If th is is the case, then m erely being in certain funct ional states does not guarantee being in any quali- tative mental states, and functionalism is false.

10 Is functiona lism really a better theory of mind than logical behaviorism and t he ident ity t heory, as Fodor says?

11 Does it seem to you t hat the Chinese brain lacks qualitative states? If not, why not?

I have a theory about the human mind . A brain is a lot like a compu te r. Ir will o nly take so man y facts, and the n it will go on overload and blow u p. -Erma Bombeck

224 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

WHAT DO YOU BELi EVE?

Al and Human Rights

Should machines with very advanced artificial intelligence be granted the same rights as hu- 1nan persons? Should conscious robots be created with the sa1ne respect char we ,vould give an adult human? In che Al ,vorld, such questions are being taken seriously right now-and the answers are, as you 1nighr expect, varied. Here's a story about a knowledgeable Oxford 1nache1nacician who has so,ne answers of his o,vn:

With huge leaps taking place in the world of artificia l intell igence (Al) , right

now, experts have started asking questions about the new forms of protec- tion we might need against t he formidable smarts and potential dangers of computers and robots of t he nea r future.

But do robots need protection from us too? As the "m in ds" of machines evolve ever closer to something t hat's ha rd to tell apart from human intel-

ligence, new generations of technology may need to be afforded the kinds of mora l and legal protections we usually thin k of as " hu man" rights, says mathematician Marcus du Sau toy from t he University of Oxford in t he UK.

Du Sautoy thinks that once the sophistication of computer th inking reaches a level basica lly akin to huma n consciousness, it's our duty to look after the welfare of machines, much as we do that of people.

Figure 4.9 The intell igent humanlike machine Sonny from the movie I, Robot.

The Mind as Software 225

"It's getting to a point where we might be able to say this thing has a sense of itself, and maybe there is a threshold moment where sudden ly this consciousness emerges," du Sautoy told media ... t his week. "And if we understand these things are having a leve l of consciousness, we might well have to in troduce rights. It's an exciting time."

Du Sautoy thinks the conversation about Al rights is now necessa ry due to recent advancements made in fields such as neuroscience. The mathema- tician, who appeared at t he literature festival to promote his new book, What We Cannot Know, says new techniq ues have given us a clearer understand - ing than ever before of t he nature of mental processes such as thought and consciousness- meaning t hey're no longer reserved solely for philosophers.

" The fascinating thing is that consciousness for a decade has been something that nobody has gone anywhere near because we didn't know how to measure it," he said. " But we're in a golden age. It's a bit like Ga lileo with a telescope. We now have a telescope into the brain and it's given us an opportunity to see things t hat we've never been able to see before."

That greater in sight in to what consciousness is means we shou ld re- spect it in all its forms, du Sautoy argues, regardless of whether its basis for being is organic or synthetic.

While the notion of a machine being protected by human rights sounds

like something out of science fiction, it's actually a fast-approach ing pos- sibil ity that scientists have specu lated about for decades. The big question remains, when will computer systems become so advanced that t heir artifi- cial consciousness ought to be recognised and respected?

Various commentators put t he timeframe from 2020 through to

some time in the next 50 years, although the rapid pace with which Al is progressing- be that playing games, learning to communicate, or operat- ing among us undetected- means that nobody really kn ows for sure.*

In the 2004 movie/, Robot, the robot called Sonny seems to be both con- scious and intelligent. lf that's so, is he a person with full moral rights, and should any human regard him as such? Can an intelligent machine be right·

fully regarded as a person even though it is made of metal and plastic, not biological tissue? If in the future, you meet a superintell igent, conscious ro- bot, would you regard her as a person-or treat her as you would a personal

computer or cell phone? If you owned such a robot, would it be morally

right for you to, say, dismantle her to use her parts for some other purpose?

*Peter Dockrill, "Artificial Intelligence Should Be Protected by Human Rights, Says Oxford Mathcmaticiant Science Alert, May 3 1, 2016, hnps://www.scicncc-alcrt.com/artificial· intdligcncc· should-be-protected-by-human· rights·says· oxford·mathematician.

226 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

John R. Searle, Mind

It is open to opponenrs of th is argument to show that it is somehow incoherent, harboring a crippling contradiction. They would need to establish that the condi- tions set forth in the Ch inese brain scenario (and similar thought experiments) are not possible. They can also allege bias: They can claim that the intuition behind Block's thought experiment seems strong only because we are prejudiced in favo r of

minds like ours that arise naturally from human brains. The doctrine of functiona lism has led many ph ilosophers and researchers to see

the mind as computer software. John Searle describes the early days of heady specu- lation about this ne,v perspective:

John R. Sea rle, Mind

It seemed that we knew the answer to the question that faced us: the way the system works is that the brain is a digital computer and what we call the "m ind" is a digital computer program or set of programs ... . [MJental states are computational states of the bra in . ... A principle that formed the foundat ion for any number of textbooks was this: the m ind is to the brain as the program is to the hardware."

Searle dubbed this vie,v of the mind strong artificial intelligence (strong AI). "On the strong AI vie,v," he says, "the appropriately programmed digit al computer does not just simu late having a mind; it literally has a mind."13 The appropriately pro- grammed computer can demonstrate genuine intelligence, achieving any cognitive capacity such as understanding and believ ing. It ,vas this astonishing possibility that

engendered the field of cognitive science. Many in the discipline also believed there was a way to test ,vhether a p rogrammed

computer had attained true intelligence. This test is derived from the work of Alan Turing (19 12-1954), the father of contemporary computer science and the genius be- hind today's computers. He invented the Turing mach ine, a theoretical model that became the blueprint for modern digital computers (,vhich are al l basically Turing machines), and then he devised the Turing test, a method that he thought could deter- mine ,vhether the machines are intelligent. Searle expla ins:

There are different versions of [the test], but the basic idea is this: we can side-step all the great debates about the other minds problem , about whether or not there really is any thinking going on in the machine, whether the machine is really intelligent, by simply asking ourselves , Can the mach ine perform in such a way that an expert cannot distingu ish its performance from a human performance? If the machine responds to questions put to it in Chinese as well as a native Chinese speaker, so that other native Chinese speakers could not tell the difference between the machine and a native Chi- nese speaker, then we wou ld have to say that the mach ine understood Chinese.'•

Those who took the strong AI pos ition bel ieved that eventually a digital com- puter would be able to pass t he Turing test and thus prove that it had a mind. Searle, ho,vever, rejects strong AI and tries to refute it with his classic thought experiment

The Mind as Software 227

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

Alan Turing

Alan Turing ( 1912-1954) was the father of che 1nod- ern con1pucer, inventor of che Turing ,nachine, and breaker of che "unbreakable" codes produced by che Gennan Enigma cipher machine in World \Xfar II. Long before his forn1al education at King's College, Cambridge, he ,vas chinking about difficult ques- t ions in philosophy, logic, machen1acics, and science.

Figure 4.10 Alan Turing (19 12- 1954).

Some say his greatest criu1nph was the invention of the Turing ,nachine, a theorized device (nor actually in existence ar che rime) char could compute the answers co any co1npucable problem. Today's computers are essentially Turing n1achines ,vith universal application.

In World War II, Turing ,vorked for che British government deciphering codes. Germany was using a code 1nechanism, che Enigma ,nachine, char could create advanced codes for ,vartime messages. The Enigma codes were thought co be unbreakable-bur Turing broke che,n anY'vay. By doing so, he ,nay have helped co shorten the war.

In 1950 Turing publ ished a groundbreaking paper in a major philosophy jour- nal. In it he details che Turing rest, a procedure for discovering ,vhecher machines can ,nake a believable simulation of rhe human 1nind. The Turing rest (also known as the imitation game) had a powerful influence on che field of AI and ,vas even featured in che 2014 1novie about Turing called (what else?) 1he Imitation Game.

Despite his genius and his contributions ro che ,var effort, Turing ,vas arrested and stripped of his security clearance by the British government for his homosexu- al icy (then a crime in che UK). He ,vas jai led and subjected co chemical castration through huge doses of estrogen. After che authorities released him from jail, he cook his own life. In 2013 he ,vas given a posthumous royal pardon.

kno,vn as che "Chinese room." The idea is chat if strong AI is true, then a person

should be able co attain a cognit ive capacity (chinking, understanding, believing,

ecc.) simply by implementing an appropriate computer p rogram. Searle chinks che

thought experiment shows chat no such capacities are achieved. C -onsider:

I do not, as a matter of fact, understand any Chinese at all. I cannot even tell Chi· nese writing from Japanese wri ting. But, we imagine that I am locked in a room with boxes fu ll of Ch inese symbols , and I have a ru le book, in effect, a computer program, that enab les me to answer questions put to me in Chinese. I receive symbols that, unknown to me, are questions; I look up in the rule book what I am supposed to do; I pick up symbols from the boxes , manipu late them according to the ru les in the pro· gram, and hand out the requ ired symbols, which are interpreted as answers. We can

John R. Searle, Mind

228 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

John R. Searle, Mind

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

John R. Searle

John Searle (b. 1932), an American philosopher, has had an extraordinary influence on che ph ilosophy of language, che philosophy of mind, and philosoph ical ideas about social reality. He was born in Denver, Colo- rado, but was educated moscly a t the Universicy of Oxford, where he obtained h is first teaching position

Figure 4.11 John Searle (b. 1932), professor of the philosophy of mind and language at the University of California, Berkeley.

at Christ Church. For over forty years he has been a philosophy professor at che University of Cal ifornia , Berkeley, ,vhile occasionally serving as a visiting pro- fessor at ,nany ocher universities both in che United Scares and abroad.

In che philosophy of mind, Searle has ,nade his mark by offering a widely read and debated criticism of strong AI and by developing innovative theories of consciousness and incencionalicy. Against strong Al , he launched h is most fa,nous salvo- the Chinese room argument. Through it, he argues chat an appropriately program,ned computer cannot acquire a cogn itive capacity such as understanding a nd believi ng. That is, stron g AI is fa lse. A progra,nmed co,npurer, he says, works by manipulating che syntax of formal symbols, but char is a far cry fro,n semantics, which concerns che ,neaning of che sy,nbols.

His vie,v of consciousness is chat it cannot be reduced co che physica l (brains or neurons). Ir is a pheno,nenon chat can only be observed fro,n a subjective, first- person perspective. Ir has a qualitative feel to it chat ,nay e,nerge fro,n che physical bur cannot be reduced to it.

Searle is the author of Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004); 7he Rediscovery of the Mind (1994); 7he Mystery of Consciousness (2002); Mind, language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World (1998); and Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983).

suppose t hat I pass the Turi ng test for understand ing Ch i nese, bu t, all t he same, I do not understand a word of Ch inese. And if I do not understand Ch inese on the bas is of imp lementing the right comp uter program, then neithe r does any other comp uter just on t he bas is of implementing t he program, beca use no computer has anyth ing tha t I do not have.

You can see t he d ifference between computation and real understa nd ing if you imagine what it is li ke for me also to answer question s in Engli sh. Imagine that in the same room I am given questions in En glish, which I then answer. From the outs ide my answers to the Engl ish and the Ch inese questions are equa lly good. I pass the Turing test for both. But from the ins ide, there is a tremendous difference. What is the d iffer- ence exactly? In Engli sh , I understand what the words mea n; in Ch inese, I understand nothing. In Ch inese, I am just a computer. •s

The Mind as Software 229

For Searle, the reason a computer cannot think or understa nd (and \vhy people can) is that a computer processes symbols by their physical properties (like shape, size, and order), and people process symbols by their meaning. That is, computers m anipulate symbols syntactically, according to what they look like or where they are positioned; people use symbols semantically, accord ing to \vhat they mean. "Having the symbols by themselves-j ust having the syntax-is not sufficient for havi ng the semantics," Searle says. "Merely manipulating symbols is not enough to guarantee kno\vledge of \vhat they mean." 16

Searle's influential thought experiment has drawn both praise and censure. The objections a re many, and he has responded to several of them. Some say that the man in the room doesn't understand Chinese, but he \vould if the sys tem \vere con nected appropriately to the rest of the \vorld. Many others argue that the pro- gram \vould understand C hi nese if it simulated the brain processes of a C hinese speaker. Probably the most common counterargument is this: In the scenario, the man doesn't understand Chinese, but the \vhole room (the entire computational system) does. In other words, the man is merely pa rt of the whole system made up of the man, the room, the boxes of Ch inese symbols, the ru le book, and everyth ing else. The man doesn't understand Chinese, but the iuhole system does understand. Searle replies that \vhether we consider just the man in the room or the \vhole sys- tem, the result is the same: The man doesn't have access to sema ntics (the meaning of symbols), just syntax (the physical form of symbols). And if the man doesn't have any semantics, neither does the whole room. Without semantics, the system doesn't understand anything.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 4.4

1. Does the Chinese brai n thought experiment sho\v that func tionalism is fa lse? If so, how? If not, \vhere does it go wrong?

2. Searle t hinks that even if a computer passed the Turing test, that \vouldn't prove that the machi ne had cognitive capacities. W hy does he think this? Do you agree with his reasoning?

3. Is it possible for a computer to process symbols semantically the way people do? Why or why not?

4. Does Searle claim that no machine of any kind can thi nk? Is it physically possible to build a machine that is so advanced that it has conscio us experience?

5. Suppose that i nstead of hand ling symbols, the man in the Chinese room somehow s imulated nerve firings like the kind i n the hu man brain. Would the ma n then understand C hinese?

12 If a computer passed t he Tu ring test, wou Id that demonstrate t hat the computer had genui ne intell igence? If not, would passing the t est be evidence that t he computer might have genuine intelligence?

13 Does this t hought experiment show t hat functionalism is fa lse?

230 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Al, Ethics, and War

Wherher strong AI (artificial intelligence) is true, and wherher advanced AI sysce,ns ,viii prove it true, is an open quesrion. But autorwmous AI sysrems- chose char can decide and act on their own-are already close at hand. They are expected co prolif- erare rapidly in rhe future, especially for milirary purposes. Patrick Lin, an expert on rhe milirary uses of aucono,nous robors, declares, "Robors are now replacing human soldiers in dull, d irry and dangerous missions, like searching runnels and caves for rerrorists, rescuing ,vounded soldiers, spy- ing on ene,nies and even killing hu,nans. In Iraq, ' •

robors have defused over 10,000 roadside bombs, Figure 4.12 An Explosive ordnance Disposal Robot ,vhich are responsible for 40% of U.S . casualties gripping a mortar round. there. In 2003, rhe U.S . had no ground robots in Iraq or Afghanisran; no,v we have over 12,000 robots on the ground and 7,000 in the air in chose conAicr areas. By all accounrs, the Robotic Revolution is here."

And ,vich the revolution, Lin says, comes a host of erhica l questions char were almost unrhinkable a few years ago17:

• Who should be blamed and punished for imprope r robotic conduct, such as illega l or accidental killings, if a robot can make its own attack decisions?

• Does the option of m ilitary robots make it easier for one nation to wage war, since t hey help reduce risk and friendly casualties , which both bear a heavy poli tica l cost? Just-war theory, wh ich dates back to Aristotle and

4.5 THE MIND AS PROPERTIES

After pondering the full range of mind-body theories (including chose covered in the p rece.ding sections), some philosophers reason like chis: Whatever che m ind is, it cannot be a Ca rtesian immaterial s ubstance that interacts causally w ith the physi- cal world. For it seems p rofoundly puzzling (not co mention highly improbable) that these two could affect one another. In addition, D escartes' dualism violates

the principle of che causal closure of the physical and the law of the conservation of

mass-energy. The main a lternative co D escartes' view is che identity theory, which

The Mind as Properties 2 31

other ancient philosophers, requ ires war to be the very last option, since it is so terrible.

• Should we allow robots to make some attack decisions by themselves- choices that would lead to human deaths?

• If we seek to gu ide robots in an ethica l framework, which ethical theory shou ld we use? The obvious choices have both advantages and serious li - abilities. Shou ld we let a robot decide that it is permissible to sacrifice one innocent person (for instance, a child) to save ten or a hundred others?

• If robots advance to t he point of having animal-level intelligence, or can m im ic human decision-making capabilities, or perhaps satisfy cond i- tions for personhood, wou ld we be morally requ ired to give rights to these th inking machines? After all, we already count as legal persons,

and give rights to, such things as corporations and ships. And some an imals, such as dolphins and chimpanzees, arguably deserve rights, especially since they may be more capable than some rights-endowed humans who are born with or suffer severe cognitive impairments.

Patrick Lin, "The Ethical War Machine, • Forbes.com, June 29, 2009, hrtp:!/1uww.forbes.

com/2009!06/J8/milirary-robors-ethics-opinio11s-contrib11tors-artificial-intellige11ce-09-patrick-li11.hrml.

Do you t hink autonomous robots should be trusted to make life-and-death decisions on the battlefield without human supervision? Is it possible to build good moral decision-making into them?

tells us that mental states are identical to phys ical brain states. But thought experi- ments featur ing Chalmers's zombie and Nagel's bat suggest that mind-brain iden- t ity is implausible. Likewise, arguments using scenarios like N ed Block's Chinese brain and John Searle's Chinese room show that functionalism is also dubious, fo r it seems poss ible to introduce an appropriate functiona l organ ization into a system and still not attain conscious experience or a cognitive capacity. According to these philosophers, the failure of these views suggests an a lternative theory of mind, one that posits no mysterious immaterial substance, den ies no scientific principles, and is neither materialist nor functiona list. We are driven, they say, to the hypothesis that

It seems impossib le to make s ubs tance dualism

consistent w ith modern

p h)"'iCS.

-John R. Searle

232 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

14 Do you agree that there is no room for a '"ghost in the machine' to do any extra causa l work"? Why or why not?

No explan atio n given wh o lly in physical te rms can ever account for the

e me rgence of conscious cxpcnc ncc. -David J. Chalmers

the mind is an arrangement of nonphysical properties arising from-yet dependent on-physical properties. We are led, in other words, to property dualism (or nonre- ductive materialism). As Chalmers says,

David J. Cha lmers, The Conscious Mind

The best evidence of contemporary science tells us that the physica l world is more or less causally closed: for every physical event, there is a physical sufficient cause. If so, there is no room for a mental "ghost in the mach ine" to do any extra causal work .... In any case ... it remains plausible that physical events can be explained in physical terms, so a move to a Cartesian dualism wou ld be a stronger reaction than is warranted.

The dualism implied here is instead a kind of property dual ism: conscious experi- ence involves properties of an ind ividual that are not entail ed by the phys ical properties of that individua l, although they may depend lawfu lly on those properties. Conscious- ness is a feature of the world over and above the physical features of the world. Th is is not to say it is a separate "substance"; the issue of what it would take to constitute a dualism of substances seems qu ite unclear to me. All we know is that there are proper- ties of individua ls in this world- the phenomenal properties- that are ontologically independent of physical properties.'8

The biggest challenge fac ing property dual ism is ho\v to explain the relationship benveen the mental and the physical. The main worry is that how mental properties could ever cause any changes in the physical \vorld is extremely puzzling. If the mind is entirely physical (that is, if the m ind is the brain), ho\v it causes physical move- ments of the body is no mystery: The phys ical brain causes effects in the phys ical body. But how are nerves, blood, and bone supposed to be altered by nonphys ical properties of the mind? (This p roblem is essentially the same one that Descartes faced in explain ing ho\v a nonphys ical, spiritual substance could affect a physical, extended substance.)

Some property dualisrs avoid these difficulties by accepting epiphenomenalism, the doctrine that the mental does not influence the physical. But others reject epi- phenomenali.sm because it conRicrs with com monsense intuitions about the nature of human actions. It seems obvious to them that the mind does indeed bring about changes in the body-that, for example, thinking about a friend causes you to call her on the phone, o r that having a headache leads you to reach for aspirin. So these theorisrs usually embrace \vhat is called downward causation, the vie\v that causal sequences can run from mind to body (from higher levels do\vn to lower ones) as \veil as from body to mind (from lower levels up to higher ones). Their task, then, is to explain ho\v do\vnward causation can occur without runn ing afoul of the causal closure of the physical or the conservation of mass-energy.

Much is riding on the outcome of the debate between materialists and property dualists. If the materialists are right, human beings are physical through and through; there is no immaterial essence or soul or self Survival after death is impossible. If

The Mind as Properties 233

PHILOSOPHY LAB - Imagine chat all che critics have been ,vrong, and Bigfoot lives! One specimen- which appears co be che only one on the planet- is locked away in a government laboratory. You, however, have fu ll access ro Bigfoot because you are che scientist who muse decide how the world is supposed co creac the creature. If he has roughly the same physical and mental makeup as an ape, you ,viii recommend chat we creac him accordingly- keep him in captivity, perhaps in a zoo, and maybe do some experiments on him. He would have the same righrs char an ape does. Bue if he is obviously inrelligenr (even able ro reason) , self-conscious, self-aware, and self- mocivaced, you ,viii recommend- what? He has all the high-level characcerisrics chat we see in humans, che same rraics chat oblige us ro crear humans ,vich respect, co grant chem fu ll moral righcs- ro call chem perJons. Bue Bigfoot is not a human, though he seems co be a person.

You are faced with deep philosophical questions: Can a nonhuman be a person? Do only humans have full moral rights? To answer no to the first question and yes to the second is to take the traditional

view embraced by many cultures and religions. To answer yes to the first question and no to the second is to say that personhood does not depend on what species a creature is. So what are you going to

do with Bigfoot?

epipheno menalism is true, then our mental states can cause nothing; ou r cho ughcs have no effect on our behavior. If pro perty dualism is true, then the world is more com- plicated than most scientists believe. In addition co physical objects, the universe con- t ains nonphysica l consciousness, a mysterious something chat we barely understand.

And how this immaterial reality relates co m aterial things such as human bodies and the external world is al most as baffling as D escartes' interacting substances.

234 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 4.5

1. Which is the better theory of mind-proper ty dualism or substance d ualism? Why?

2. Is property dualism a better theory than identity theory? Why or why not?

3. Is epiphenomen alism an adequate theory of mind? What consid era- tions count against it?

4. Is downwa rd causation possible? Can you think of a way that the m ind cou ld affect beh avior without violating the causal closure of the p hysical or the conservation of mass-energy?

5. What \vou ld be the religious or scientific implications of the identity theory?

Review Notes

4.1 OVERVIEW: THE MIND- BODY PROBLEM

• The mind-body problem is the iss ue of what mental phenomena really are and how they relate to the physical wo rld. The most important responses to it constitute the foremost theories of m ind in Western thought.

• Substance dualism is the doctrine that mind an d body co nsist of n vo fundamen- tally d ifferent kinds of stuff, o r substances. The most influential form of this view is Cartesian dualism, \vhich says that the separate substances interact. Most philoso- phers hold to various forms of materialism (or physical ism), the vie\v that every ob- ject and event in the \vorld is physical. Major materialistic theories include logical behaviorism (the idea that mental states are dispositions to behave in a particular way in certain circumstances) and identity theory (the view that mental states are identical to physical brain states). Functionalism (the doctrine that the mind is the functions that the brain performs) is usual ly interpreted as a materialist theory. Property dualism is the vie\v that mental properties, o r feat ures, are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, physical properties.

4.2 SUBSTANCE DUALISM

• To defend his brand of su bstance dualism, Descartes offers argumenrs based o n conceivab ility and divis ibility. Critics have found fault \Vith both of these and charge that Cartes ian dualism violates the principle of the causal closure of the physical and the law of co nservation of mass-energy.

4.3 M IND- BODY IDENTITY

• The identity th eo ry avoids some of th e p roblems th at beset Cartesian d ualism, bu t th eo rists have rejected it using conceivabil ity argumenrs (such as Chalmers's zombie th ought experiment) an d kno,vledge argumenrs (such as Nagel's bat scenario).

4.4 THE M IND AS SOFTWARE

• Functionalism has been accused of faili ng to account for th e subjective, qual itative feel of co nsciousness. Absent qualia argumenrs (such as Ned Block's C hinese brain th ought argument) try to demonst rate th is. Searle's Chi nese room argu ment tries to debunk th e funct ional ist view th at the mind is essentially software.

4.5 THE MIND AS PROPERTIES

• For some philosophers, property d ualism is th e most plausible th eo ry of mind, in ligh t of the fa ilures of substan ce dualism, id entity theory, and functionalism. !rs big- ges t challenge is expla ini ng the relationsh ip between th e mental and the ph ysical.

WRITI NG TO UNDERSTAND:

ARGUING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 4

1. Critique D escartes' substance dualism. Expla in t he t heory, discuss t he strengths a nd weaknesses of Descartes' conceivability and divisibil ity argu ments, and defen d your verdict regarding the theory's adequacy.

2. Examine C halmers's zombie a rgument against t he identity theory. Do you t hink t he a rgumen t is successfu l? Why o r ,vhy not?

3. Do you think the brai n is a computer r unni ng some so rt of sofnvare? Defend your view by evaluating the standard argumenrs for and against function alism.

4. Do you think epiphenomenalism is t rue? Evaluate what you take to be the strongest argu ments for and agai nst it and then render your verdict.

5. Do you believe t h at you have a n immortal soul? Explain a nd d efend your view, tak ing into account t he principle of the causal closure of the physical, the la,v of conservation of mass-energy, and the brain research sho,vi ng countless correlations between mental properties (bel iefs, perceptio ns, etc.) and physiological activity.

Review Notes 235

236 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

Key Terms

Cartesian dualism The view that m ind (or soul) and body are completely in- dependent of one a nother and interact causally. (206)

causal closure of the physical The prin- ciple that the ,vorld is a closed system of physical causes and effeccs. (215)

epiphenomenalism The notion that mental properties do not cause anything, but merely accompany physical pro- cesses. (21 O)

functionalism The view that the m ind is the functions that the brain performs. (209)

identity theory The view that men- tal states are identical to physical brain states. (207)

logical behaviorism The idea that men- tal states are dispositions to behave in

particular ways in certain ci rcumstances. (207)

materialism (o r physicalism) The doc- trine that every object and event in the ,vorld is phys ical . (206)

mind- body problem The issue of what mental phenomena are and how they re- late to the physical world. (206)

multiple realizability The capacity to be realized or instantiat e.cl in a variety of forms and materials. (209)

property dualism The view that men- tal properties are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, phys i- cal properties. (210)

substance dualism The notion that m ind and body consist of two funda- mentally different kinds of stuff, o r sub- stances. (206)

They're Made out of Meat 237

FICT ION

They're Made out of Meat Terry Bisson

Terry Bisson is a much-lauded science fiction writer, author of seven novels (includ- ing Talking Man, Fire on the Mountain, and Voyage to the Red Planet) and numerous short stories (includ ing "Bears Discover Fire" and the following selection).

"They're made out of meat." 0 Meat?" "Meat. They're made out of meat." 0 Meat?" "There's no doubt about it. We picked up severa l

from different parts of the planet, took them aboard our recon vessels, and probed them all the way through. They're completely meat."

"That's impossible. What about the radio signa ls? The messages to the stars?"

"They use the radio waves to talk, but the sig- nals don't come from them. The signals come from machines."

"So who made the machines? That's who we want to contact."

"They made the machines. That's what I'm trying to tell you. Meat made the machines."

"That's ridiculous. How can meat make a machine? You're asking me to beli eve in sentient meat."

"I'm not asking you, I'm telling you. These creatures are the only sentient race in that sector and they're made out of meat."

"Maybe they're like the orfolei. You know, a carbon- based intell igence that goes through a meat stage."

"Nope. They're born meat and they die meat. We studied them for several of their life spans, which didn't ta ke long. Do you have any idea what's the life span of meat?"

"Spa re me. Okay, maybe they're on ly part meat. You know, like the weddilei. A meat head with an electron plasma brain inside."

"Nope. We thought of that, s ince they do have meat heads, like the weddilei. But I told you, we probed them. They're meat all the way through."

Terry Bisson, Omni, 1990. From http://www.terrybisson .com/page6/page6.html.

"No bra in? " "O h, there's a brain all right. It's just that the bra in

is made out of meat! That's what I've been trying to tell you."

"So ... what does the thinking?" "You're not understanding, are you? You're refusing

to deal with what I'm tell ing you. The brain does the thinking. The meat."

"Thinking meat! You're asking me to believe in thinking meat!"

"Yes, thinking meat! Conscious meat! Loving meat. Drea ming meat. The meat is the whole dea l! Are you beginn ing to get the picture or do I have to start a ll over?"

"Om igod. You're serious then. They're made out of meat."

"Thank you. Finally. Yes. They are indeed made out of meat. And they've been trying to get in touch with us for almost a hundred of their years."

"Om igod. So what does this meat have in mind?" "First it wants to talk to us. Then I imagine it wants

to explore the Un iverse, contact other sentiences, swap ideas and information. The usual."

"We're supposed to talk to meat." "That's the idea. That 's the message they're send -

ing out by rad io. 'Hello. Anyone out there. Anybody home.' That sort of thing."

"They actual ly do talk, then. They use words, ideas, concepts?"

"O h, yes. Except they do it with meat." "I thou ght you just told me they used radio." "They do, but what do you think is o n the rad io?

Meat sounds. You know how when you slap or flap meat, it makes a noise? They talk by flapp ing their meat at each other. They can even sing by squ irting air through their meat."

"Om igod. Singing meat. Th is is altogether too much . So what do you advise?"

"Officially or unofficially?"

238 Chapter 4 Mind and Body

"Both." "Officially, we are required to contact, welcome and

log in any and all sentient races o r multibeings in th is quadrant of t he Universe, without prejud ice, fear or fa. vor. Unofficially, I advise that we erase t he records and forget the whole thing."

"I was hoping you wou ld say that." "It seems harsh, but there is a limit. Do we really

want to make contact with meat?" "I agree one hund red percent. What's there to say?

'Hello, meat. How's it going?' But will th is work? How many planets are we deali ng with here?"

"Just one. They can travel to other planets in special meat containers, but they can't live on them. And being meat, they can only t ravel through C space. Which lim· its them to the speed of light and makes the possibility of their ever making contact pretty sli m. Infinitesima l, in fact."

"So we just pretend t here's no one home in the Universe."

"T hat's it."

Probing Questions

"Crue l. But you said it yourself, who wants to meet meat? And the ones who have been aboard ou r ves- sels, the ones you probed? You're sure they won't remember?"

" They'll be considered crackpots if they do. We went into their heads and smoothed out their meat so that we're just a dream to them ."

"A dream to meat! How strangely appropriate, that we should be meat's dream."

"And we marked the entire sector unoccupied ." "Good. Agreed, officially and unofficially. Case

closed. Any others? Anyone interesting on that side of the galaxy?"

"Yes, a rather shy but sweet hydrogen core cluster intelligence in a class nine star in G445 zone. Was in contact two galactic rotations ago, wants to be friendly again."

" They always come around." "And why not? Imagine how unbearably, how un-

utterably cold the Universe wou ld be if one were all I .. a one . ..

I. Why is chis srory cold from rhe perspective of inrelligenr bur alien (co us) beings? Whar can you learn about minds from ch is way of looking ar realiry?

2. What point does chis srory make about the relationship between menral scuff and physical scuff?

3. Are alien bur inrelligenr beings ,virhour brains conceivable? Thar is, is ir logically possible char such creatures exist?

For Further Reading

David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Ne,v York: Oxford University Press, 1996). A clear introduction to issues regarding consciousness by one of the leading thinkers in the field. Offers a sustained critique of physicalism.

David J. C halmers, ed., Phiwsophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Ne,v Yo rk: Oxford University Press, 2002). A comp rehensive collection of readings covering all the key issues.

James Cornman and Keith Lehrer, "The Mind-Body Problem," in Philosophical Problems and Arguments (New Yo rk: Macm illan, 1982). A straightfo rward examina- tion of many of the main arguments in philosophy of mind.

Dan iel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Bro,vn, and Company, 1991) . A plainspoken discussion of consciousness as a physicalist phenomenon.

Brian P. McLaughlin, with Ansgar Beckermann and Sven Walter, The Oxford Hand- book of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2009). A large, com- prehensive set of readings.

Ian Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind· A Beginner's Guide (Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2005). A clear and concise introduction to the central theo ries in th e philoso- p hy of mind.

John R. Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction (Ne,v Yo rk: Oxford University Press, 2004). A fine int roduction fo r beginners to al l the lead ing theo ries of mind.

For Further Reading 239

CHAPTER

FREE WILLAND DETERMINISM

CHAPT ER OBJ ECTIVES

5.1 OVERVIEW: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM

• Understand the nature and im portance of the free will problem.

• Define determinism , hard determinism , incompatibilism, indeterminism, compatibilism, and libertarianism.

• Give an overview of the t hree majo r philosophical responses to t he free wil l problem.

• Understand the main reasons why peop le think t he issue of free wil l matters.

5.2 DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM

• Understand d'Holbach' s position on free will and the main reason he takes it.

• Explain how scie n ce is used to argue for determin ism .

• Understand how quantum physics seems to p rovide a counterexample to determinism.

• Summa rize James's indeterminist view and why some philosophers have rejected it.

5.3 COMPATIB ILISM

• Exp lain the com patibil ist position on free w il l.

• Understand how compatibilists define "could do otherwise."

• Summa rize Rowe' s object ion to compatibilism.

• Critically examine Stace' s compatibilism.

5.4 LIBERTARIAN ISM

• Understand t he three types of arguments that libertarians have put forth to support their view.

• Understand the Consequence Argument .

• State and evaluate the libertarian's a rgument from experience.

• Explain agent causation and know the main arguments for and against it.

5.5 SARTRE'S PROFOUND FREEDOM

• Understand Sartre's existentia list freedom.

• Explain his notion of "existence precedes essence."

• Evaluate h is idea of radical freedom.

Overview: The Free Will Problem 241

5.1 OVERVIEW: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM

Few th ings in life are more valuable co us than freedom. We ,vane it, we demand it, we say we cannot live without it. We yearn for and expect social or political freedom, the freedom co go where we wane, say what we please, and do as we may w ith in broad legal and social limits. Bue we a lso want-and usually assume ,ve have-a more profound kind of freedom, ,vhac ph ilosophers call free wil l. This type of freedom is the power of self- decerminacion : If we possess it, then at lease some of ou r choices are not decided fo r us o r forced upon us but are up to us. If we don't possess it, our social and political freedoms would seem co be considerably less valuable. If ou r actions are not our own because, say, someone h as brain,vashed o r d rugged us co control how ,ve vote, then being free co vote would seem co be an empty liberty. So the central question in free w ill debates is whether we in face have chis more fundam ental fo rm of freedom.

The question arises because, as in many ocher issues in ph ilosophy, nvo of our basic beliefs about ourselves and the ,vorld seem co con fli ct. On one hand, ,ve tend co chink we have free wi ll

in the sense just described. On the ocher, we also usually assume chat ever y event has a cause. Or, as ph ilosophers would say, we accept determinis m ,

Figure 5.1 Are all of our actions produced by a chain of events that stretches back into t he indefinite past?

the doctrine chat ever y event is determ ined or necessitated by preced ing events and the laws of nature. D eterminism says chat all events-including ou r choices and actions-are produced inexorably by previous events, ,vhich are cause.cl by sti ll ea r- lier events, wh ich are caused by still ochers, the chain of causes leading back into the indefinite past. Since every cause always results in the same effect, the futu re can unfold in on ly one ,vay. Everyth ing chat h appens must happen in an unalterable, preset fashion. Bue if determ inism is true, ho,v can any choices we m ake or any ac- tions we perform be up co us? How can we do anything "of ou r own free w ill"? If determinism is true, your read ing chis book right now was caused by p rior events such as certain states in your brain, body, and e nvironment, and these events were in turn caused by sti ll ochers , and the causal sequence muse screech back councless years co a time before you ex isted. You had no say in the movement or d irection of chis causal t ra in, no control over how it went. Your reading ch is book rig ht no,v could not have tu rned out any ocher way. You could not have done otherwise. How, then, cou ld your actions be free?

D eterminism is the doctrine that every cvcnr is de,ermined by p receding even rs an d , he laws of nature .

242 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

You must believe in free

w ill~ the re is no choice. -Isaac Bashevis Singer

The p r oblem of free will is the challenge of reconcil· ing d etermi nism w ith o ur

intuitions o r ideas abou t

personal freedo m .

1 Are yo u bothe re d by the tho ug ht of a rig idly dete rmine d exist e n ce? Do e s the id ea t hat a ll yo ur actio ns are dete r- mine d d isturb yo u - o r re assu re you?

Men arc deceived if rhcy think themselves free, an opinion which consists o nly in this, that they arc conscious of their ac~ tions and ignorant of the cau.<cs by which they arc determined.

-Baruch Spinoza

From chis conflict comes che problem of free will- the challenge of reconcil- ing determinism \vich our intu itions o r ideas about personal freedom. The p roblem seems all the sha rper because both horns of chis apparent d ilemma a re endorsed by common sense. In our lives we recognize che work of deterministic forces: Every cause does seem co regularly and lawfu lly produce an effect, and every effect seems co have a cause. Baseballs obey gravit y, b read nou rishes, fire burns, electronics \vork, huma n bodies a re shaped by genetics, and human personalities a re molded by expe- rience. All this is reinforced by science, \vhich tirelessly traces che universe's myriad links benveen cause a nd effect. Our everyday experience a lso suggests that some- times it is indeed up co us how we choose a nd ace, and that we could have chosen and acted ochen vise than we d id .

Bue \vho cares \vhecher a ll our actions a re determined by forces beyond our con- trol? Well, we do. Mose of us are unseeded by the thought chat our choices and ac- tions may not be our own, chat everything we do is inev itable, p reset, or necessary. This fear of a predeterm ined existence is reflected in movies, books, a nd popu lar culcure. In the fi lms Gatta.ca, A Clockwork Orange, and The Truman Show, determin- istic fo rces in various guises are part of what makes these mov ies so disturbing. The novel Brave New World by Aldous H uxley shows us a fut uristic society of contented citizens who a re happy with their lot in life-but on ly because social engineers ma- nipulate and dampen che people's des ires with a mind-numbing d rug called soma. B. F. Sk inner's novel Walden II depicts a nother community of happy folk who wa nt on ly what they can readily acqui re or achieve. They are perfeccly satisfied \vich thei r lives because they h ave been p rogrammed through lifelong behav io ra l condition ing (the k ind chat Sk inner h imself advocat e.cl) co desire only what is attai nable. Skin ner portrays his vision as a utopia, but many think it is a dystopia in \vhich social free- dom is a reality but free will is no nexistent.

People also ca re about che issue of free will because upon it hang momentous questions about moral responsibilit y, legal pun ishment, praise a nd blame, and social and political control. If our actions are not free in any important sense, it is d ifficu lc co see how \Ve could be held morally responsible fo r what we do. If our actions are fu lly determined, how could we be legiti mately subjected co p unishment, praise, or blame for our actions? Punishi ng us for someth ing \Ve did would be like penalizing us for havi ng red ha ir o r brown eyes. As you m ight expect, many who reject che notion of free wi ll think that punish ing people for crimes makes no sense. Instead of pun ishing crimi nals, they say, \Ve should try co modify their beh av ior. Instead of imprisoning or executing chem, we shou ld train them ch rough behavioral cond ition- ing a nd other techniq ues co be la\v-abid ing.

The issues of determinism and free wi ll often come up in court \vhen someone is bei ng cried for a serious crime such as rape or murder. The defense atto rney argues chat che defendant is not responsible for his actio ns, fo r h is character \vas wa rped by abusive parents, an impoverished or brutal envi ronment, or bad gen es. His life was programmed-determined-co turn out a certain \vay, a nd he had no say in any of it. The prosecutor insists that despite che influence of these factors, che defenda nt deserves most of che blame fo r his crime because u ltimately he acted freely. The ju ry then must decide where determinism ends and free \vi ii begins.

Overview: The Free Will Problem 243

Philosophers both ancient and modern have p roposed three solutions co the free wi ll p roblem . The first is known as hard d eterminism , the vie\v that no one h as free will . H ard decermin ists ac- cept these three propositio ns: (1) D eterminism is true, (2) determin ism and free will are incompat- ible, and (3) we never ace freely. Proposition 2 is a statement of che doctrine of incompati bilism : Determin ism a nd free will are incompatible d oc- trines; they both cannot be true. That is, if every event is determ ined, there can be no free w ill; if free \vill exists, d eterminism can not be actual. H ard d ecerminiscs argue chat given che truth of determin ism a nd che truth of incompacibil ism, the assertion of free will muse be fa lse.

To support Proposition l, d ecerminiscs typ i- cally appeal co che deliverances of science. They point out that scien tific research in many field s, from astrophysics co zoology, is forever uncover- ing causal con nections, seem ing co confirm a de- terministic picture of che world . Scien ciscs no\v k no\v chat hu man behav io r is sh aped co a remark- able degree by hered ity, che brain's biochem is- try, beh avioral conditioning, a nd evolution. A ll

Fig u re 5.2 A t eenager on death row, 1986. To m any, if d eter- minism is true, criminals should not be pu nished, just tra ined. Does t his w ay of d ealing with crim inals make sense to y ou?

these faces reinforce the notion chat human choices and actions a re brought about determin istically.

Strangely enough, science-specifically quantu m p hysics-h as also provided evid ence chat determin ism is false. Or, co p ut it another \vay, some scientific evid ence s upports i n d eterminism , the vie\v chat not every event is determi ned by preceding events and the laws of nature. The standard view among quantum physiciscs is chat m any events on the quantum level (the domain of subatom ic pa rticles) are uncaused. A mo ng ph ilosophers, ho\vever, debate still continues over \vhac chis qua ntum inde- terminacy means fo r che problem of free w ill.

The second p roposed solution co che free will problem is compat ibilism , o r soft determin ism . Compacibil iscs bel ieve that (I) determi nism is tr ue, (2) determ inism a nd free will a re compatible, a nd (3) we sometimes ace freely. So compacibilism cla ims chat although deter m inism is true, ou r actio ns can sti ll be free because d eter- minism and free \vill are not in con fli ct (incompatibil ism is false). le is possible fo r every event co be caused by preceding events plus the laws of nature-and for us co still ace freely. Bue how is s uch a thing poss ible?

Traditional compacibilism holds chat you r action is free if (I) it is caused by your own cho ices o r d esires and (2) it is not imped ed or constra ined by anyth ing. You ace in complete freed om when you give money co a cha rity-if you really do wane co give you r money a nd if noth ing p revents you from doing so (for example, no phys ical o bstacles sta nd in your way, no one is coercing you, and no inner

H ard determinism is , he view thar free will docs not exist, t hat no o n e acts freely.

Incompatibilism is the view that if dctcrminL~m is t rue, no one can act freely.

Indet erminism is the view th at n ot every even t is

dc,crmincd by preceding events and , he laws of nature.

Compatibilism is the view that although de,crminism is tr ue} o u r actions can st ill

be free .

244 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

Life is like a game of card s. The hand you arc d ealt is determinism; the way you play it is free will. -Jawaharlal Nehru

2 How wou ld a personal belief in det er m ini sm affect yo ur vi ew of crime and p unishme nt ? Do yo u thin k that p eop l e are generally resp onsible f o r their crimes, o r are they n ot respo n sib le due t o d et e r min i stic f o rces beyo nd their co ntro l?

O ne of the annoying things abo u t believing in free will and individ ual re· sponsibility is the d iffic ulty of fi nding somebody to blame your proble ms on. And when you do find somebody, it's re markable how often his p icture turns

up on your driver's license. -P. J. O ' Rourke

L ibe rtarianism (not polir- ical) is the view that som e actions arc free, fo r they arc caused or controlled by the p erson or agen t.

3 At th is point in yo ur reading, which d oct r in e are you mo r e sym pat hetic t o -hard d et er min- i sm, compatibilism, o r li berta ri an ism?

Figure 5.3 Physicist s th ink t hat so me events on t he quantum l evel are uncaused. Do es t his mean t hat some events on the macro l evel (t he level inhabit ed by rocks, stars, and peopl e) are also uncaused? If so, would th is indeterminism g ive us free w ill?

compulsion restrains you) . You act freely when you are able to do what you desire to do; you d o not act freely \vhen you are not able to do \vh at you des ire to do. This \vould be t rue, accord ing to traditional compatibil ism, even if your d esires \vere themselves determined by fo rces beyo nd you r co ntrol. Your \viii irself may be de- te rm ined by preceding events and the laws of nature, b ut if you are able to do \vh at you w ill, you act fre ely. I n th is way, says the compatibilist, free w ill is compat ible \vith determi nism.

But some critics reject the compatibilist's notion of freedom. They maintain that merely being able to act accord ing to your desires \vithout constraints is not real free.dom if your desires are determined far you in the first place.

The third answer to the problem of free \vill is libertarianism (not to be con- fused with the political doctrine of the same name). It asserts that some actions are free, for they are ultimately caused, or controlled, by the person, o r agent. So liber- tarians believe that (1) determ inism is false (i ndeter minism is true), (2) deter m inism and free wi ll a re incompatible, and (3) we someti mes act freely. They hold that inde- termin ism is necessary for free \vill, that free actions can occur only in a \vorld where not all evenrs a re determ ined by prio r events and natural laws. Note how liberta ri- anism differs from the other two positions on free wil l. Both liber tarians a nd h ard deter m inists accept incompatibilism, but they take opposing views on deter m inism and free actio n. And, contrary to compatibilisrs, liber tarians reject determ inism a nd embrace incompatibilism.

Overview: The Free Wi ll Problem 245

WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE?

Fate

Are you a fatal ist? Do you believe chat face rules your life so that your future will unfold in a certain ,vay regardless of what you do? Soldiers in baccle so1neci1nes cake a fatal istic attitude. They say, "If a bullet is meant co kill you, you ,vill die, and there's nothing you can do about it. If a bullet is meant co spare you, you ,vill live no matter ,vhac you do. Eicher ,vay, whatever happens, face will decide, and there's no point in worrying about it or crying co avoid your destiny." Have you ever had sim ilar choughcs about death, failure, love relationships, or- heaven forbid-final exams?

Fatal ism is che v ie,v chat ,vhac ,viii be, ,viii be, and no human actions can change it. le says chat any actions you ,night cake co a leer your face are futi le. Determin ism is d ifferent. le says chat events happen because of preced ing events, but these preced ing events can include things that we do.

So is fatalism true? Apparently not. le seems obvious chat 1nany events happen because our actions help bring the,n about. Sometimes events occur because of what we do, not re- gardless of ,vhat we do. Whether che soldier is killed by the bullet 1nay d epend on ,vhecher he cries co avoid getting h ie.

Do you believe in fate? If so, why? What evidence supports your belief? W hy do you t hink some peop le take a fatalistic view of life?

Like the other free wi ll theories, libertarianism has its detracto rs. For example, some have objected that it is incoherent, mysterious, or both. They ask, Ho,v can an agent cause event A ,vhen there is no previous event B in the agent that causes event A, and no p rior event C that causes event B, and so on? Because libertarians accep t indeterminism, they are committed to denying such a causal sequence. But explain- ing ho,v free will is possible while rejecting determinist ic causal chains has been a challenge fo r libertarians, and some of their solutions have provoked cons iderable skepticism.

246 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 5.1

1. Does science really show that determ inism is true? Why o r \vhy not?

2. Does quantu m indeterminacy prove that determinism is false (that indeterm inism is t rue)? Some philosophers say that the breakdown of d eterminism on the quantum level isn' t relevant to the free \vill iss ue,

because the indeterminacy is confi ned mostly to s ubatomic particles and generally doesn't affect human actions. Do you agree? Explain.

3. Do you believe that the compatibilist 's concept of free will is plausible? If you were free to act on any of you r desi res but your d es ires \vere controlled by God, would you h ave free will?

4 . Suppose hard determinism \vere true. Would that mean \Ve are not responsible fo r our actions? If hard d eterminism did make responsibil- ity impossible, would that fact sho\v that the theory is false?

5. Which theory of free \viii seems to agree best with your own experi- ence of m aking choices and taking action?

5.2 DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM

The hard determinist bel ieves that determinism is a fact abo ut the universe a nd that

incompatibilism is true (t h at no o ne can act freely if d eterminism is true). From these nvo claims it is a short step to the conclusion that no o ne acts freely (that liber tarian ism is false). This line of reasoning (or someth ing close to it) has been around since ancient times, but since t he r ise of modern science in the sevent eenth century it has seemed to some to be much more credible because d et erminism itself has seeme.d more credible. Baron d'Holbach (1723-1789), a p rominent philosopher of the French E nlightenment, has given us one of the clearest and boldest statemenrs of the hard determ inist position:

Baron d'Holbach, "Of the System of Man's Free Agency"

It has been already sufficiently proved that the soul is noth ing more tha n the body con· s idered relatively to some of its functions more concea led than others: it has been shown that th is soul, even when it shall be supposed immaterial, is continually mod ifi ed con- jointly with the body, is submitted to all its motion, and that without this it would rema in inert and dead; that, conseq ue ntly, it is subjected to the influen ce of those mate rial and physical causes which give impulse to the body; of wh ich the mode of exis tence, whether habitual or transitory, depends upon the material elements by which it is surrounded,

Determinism and Indeterminism 247

that form its texture, constitute its temperament, enter into it by means of the alime nts, and penetrate it by their subtility. The facu lties which are call ed intellectual, and those qualities which are styled moral, have been explained in a manner purely physical and natural. In the last place it has been demo nstrated that all the ideas, all the systems, all the affections, all the opinions, whether true or false, which man for ms to hi mself, are to be attributed to his physical and material senses. Thus man is a being purely physical; in whatever manner he is considered, he is connected to universal nature, and submitted to the necessary and immutable laws t hat she imposes on all the beings she contains, according to their peculiar essences or to the respective properties with which, without consulting them, she endows each particular species. Man's life is a line that nature commands hi m to describe upon the surface of the earth, without his ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant. He is born without his own consent; hi s organization does in nowise depend upon himself; his ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those who cause him to contract the m; he is unceasingly mod ified by causes, whether visible or concealed, over which he has no control, which necessarily regu late his mode of existence, give the hue to his way of thi nking, and determine his manner of acting. He is good or bad, happy or miserable, wise or foolis h, reasonable or irrational, witho ut his will being for any thing in these various states. Nevertheless, in despite of the shackles by which he is bound, it is pretended he is a free agent, or that independent of the causes by which he is moved, he determines his own will, and regu- lates his own condition.'

To d'Holbach and other En lightenment thinkers, the theories and

discoveries of science were robust proof that every event ,vas determined by preced ing events and natural laws. They saw the u niverse as a grand, intricate, physical machine, ,vith every part-including human beings- predeter m ined to operate in foreordained fashion. In such a u niverse, t hey insisted, free actions a re imposs ible. Free wi ll is an illusion. We t hink ,ve are free only because we are ignorant of the forces that bind us.

A man is the o rigin of his action.

-Aristotle

Since d'Holbach's day, many others have taken the fi nd ings of sci-

ence to be undeniable evidence for un iversal determinism. After a ll, sci- ence has had-and continues to have-remarkable success in explaining and p red icting all sorrs of natural phenomena, including t he choices and

actions of hu man beings. In light of this success, many people believe t hat the trut h of determinism is s imply obvious. Nowadays, most who accept determinism are compatibilisrs, but a few of them see no reason to th ink free ,vill is compatible with determinism, so t hey take the hard determinist vie,v.

Figure 5.4 Baron d' Ho lbach (1723-1 789).

Yet in an ironic turn of scientific histo ry, reasons to doubt determinism have come from science itself. Quantum physics provides a surprising counterexample to t he notio n that every event has a cause. The most widely accepted vie,v among quantum physicists is t hat at the subatomic level, some events (such as the decay of radioactive pa rticles) a re random and therefore uncaused. If so, it is not the case that every event is determine.cl by p reced ing events and t he la,vs of nature, and t he central prem ise in the argument fo r hard determin ism is unfounded.

Some hard determin ists maintain that these u ncaused evenrs are mostly con- fined to the subatomic realm and do not sign ificantly affect t he larger ,vorld of

4 Do you believe bot h t hat every event has a cause a nd t hat free a ct ions are p ossible? If so, a re these beliefs comp atible?

248 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

A man can do wh at h e wants. but not want what he wanes. -Arthur Schopenhauer

PH I LOSO PH ERS AT WORK

William James

Willian1 James ( 1842-19 10) is one of A,nerica's most influential ph ilosophers, leaving a lasting impression on debates in epistemology, philosophy of religion, eth- ics, and free ,viii. He ,vas born in New York City and gre,v

up in an incelleccually scimulacing fa,nily. His father Figure 5.5 William James (1842- was a philosopher of religion, and his brother Henry 1910), philosophe r, psychologist, was the fan1ous novelise. He s tudied abroad, earned pragmatist. a nd believer in free will. a H arvard degree in medicine, and spent most of h is career lecturing and writing in psychology and philosophy.

His reputation as the greatest psychologist of A,nerica and Europe was assured by che publ ication of h is voluminous work The Principles of Psychology (1890). After chat came nu,nerous philosophical essays and books, includ ing The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897); The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902); Pragmatism: A New Name far Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907); and The Meaning ofTn1th (1909).

James is one of che foun d ers of che phi losophy of prag,nacism, a doctrine about ,neaning and cruch . James is famous for articulating a pragmatic theory of truth, which says chat che cruch of a s cacemenc is a matter of its util ity. For James, ucilicy ,nay mean e ither success in predicting events or pro,nocion of beneficial feel ings and actions. Through pragmacis,n, James can1e co che conclusion chat religion is a legicimace and i1nportanc aspect of life because we can plausibly accept rel igious clai,ns on grounds of their utility, regard less of their lack of evidence.

Ironically, James, the famous psychologist, was g iven co psychosomatic illness and cl inica l depression . Once while ,vrescl ing ,vich che problem of free ,viii, he fell into a devastatingly dark n1ood and d id not recover until he had foun d a solu- tion. He conclud ed chat despite determin isn1, ,ve can have free ,viii because chance events make room for free actions.

human actions. This sugges ts, they say, chat for a ll practical purposes , determinism is true. Bue ochers reject this view, contending that quantum indeterminism isn't as restricted co the quantum level as some assume, a nd that therefore causal indeter- minism could a rise anywhere.

Mose indecermin isrs do not deny that many, perhaps most, of our actions are cause.cl by prior events; t hey concede that much of human behavior may be causally determined. Bue they reject the notion that previous events cause all our actions; they think that cla im is a sweeping generalization chat science has yet co demonstrate.

Long before the advent of qua ntum physics, there were thinkers who posited indeterminism in the ,vorld a nd argue.cl that it opened the ,vay fo r humans co have

Determinism and Indeterminism 249

free ,viii. The "atomist" philosophers of ancient Greece t heorized that the world was

composed of bits of matter called atoms moving in rigidly determ ined fashion- except that these objects sometimes "s,verved" randomly to allow for undetermi ned,

free actions in humans. Centuries later the distinguished American philosopher Wil- liam James (1842-1910) argued that indeterm inism is a featu re of the universe that

permits "alternative futures" and the possibility of freedom. It allows some th ings to happen by chance. Most importantly, James says, it allows free actions, for free actions are chance happenings. He explains his view like this:

William James, "The Di lemma of Determin i sm"

What does determ inism profess? ... It professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous poss ibilities hidden in its womb: the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible. The whole is in each and every part, and welds it with the rest into an absolute un ity, an iron block, in wh ich there can be no equ ivocation or s hadow of turning . . ..

Indeterminism, on the contrary, says that the parts have a certa in amount of loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does not necessarily de- termine what the others shall be. It adm its that poss ibilities may be in excess of actu- alities, and that things not yet revea led to our knowledge may really in themselves be ambiguous. Of two alternative futures which we conceive, both may now be rea lly pos- s ible; and the one become impossible on ly at the very moment when the other excludes it by becoming real itself. Indeterm inism thus denies the world to be one unbend ing unit of fact. It says there is a certain ultimate plural ism in it; and, so saying, it cor- roborates our ordinary unsophisticated view of things. To that view, actualities seem to fl oat in a wider sea of poss ibili ties from out of which they are chosen; and, somewhere, indeterminism says , such possibili ties exist, and form a part of truth ....

Do not all the motives that assail us, all the futures that offer themselves to our cho ice, spring equa lly from the so il of the past; and would not e ither one of them, w hether realized through chance or through necessity, the moment it was rea lized, seem to us to fi t that past, and in the completest and most continuous manner to in terdigitate with the phenomena already there?•

James holds that a free choice is not deter mined by prev ious evenrs; it is un- caused. There is more than one way that the choice can go, and how it goes is a matter of chance. But even t hough the choice comes about by chance, it ,viii seem to follow from previous events just as a deter m ined choice ,vou ld.

Many have rejected this kind of argument, including those w ho believe that in- determin ism is a prerequisite for free w ill. The difficulty, they say, is that indetermin- ism alone does not make fo r free and respons ible actions. Liber tarians, fo r example, agree that indetermin ism is necessary for free w ill, that free actions can occur only in a world where not all actions are deter mined by p rior events and natural laws. But they also point out that if ,vhat an agent does happens by chance (that is, randomly),

5 How does James's indetermin ist view fit wit h our commonsense notions about pun ish· ment and reward?

My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will. -William James

250 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

You say: I am n ot free. Bu t I h ave raised and lowered

my arm. Everyone under~ stand s that this illogical

answer is an irrefutable proof of freedom .

-Leo Tolscoy

then she is not free to act o r not act . W h at she does just happens, a nd she has noth- ing to do with it . H er actions a re not u nder her control and t herefore a re not really her actio ns. In fact, t hey would not be actions at all . An actio n is an event intended to happen by the agent, but if her intentions h ave nothing to do w it h it (because it is random), it is not really a n action and is definitely not free. So for libertarians,

indetermin ism by itself is not enou gh for free wi ll, w hich is w hy they take pains to explain the role of t he agent in free actions.

The conclusion liberta rians draw from all this is t hat both deter m inism and indetermin ism can be enemies of free wi ll. Determi nism coup led with incompati- bilism yields hard d et er minism-no free wil l. And indeter m inism that amounts t o randomness does not give us free will ei t her.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 5.2

1. S uppose hard determinism is true. Would punish ment for offen ses ever be justified ? Wou ld praise fo r m a king good choices be app ropri- ate? If t he answer is no, would that constit ute a n a rg umen t against hard deter m inism?

2. If hard determi nism \vere \videly recognized as true, how \vould t hat consensus li kely affect our judicial system ?

3. D o you agree with the criticism of Jam es's indeterm inism ? A re chance actions really free actio ns? Exp lain .

4 . M ust at leas t some indeterm in ism exist in the universe to ma ke free w ill possible? W hy or w hy not ?

5. S uppose James's indeterminist view of free will is correct. W h at \vould

be the implications for our social practice of rewarding and pun ish ing beh avior?

5.3 COMPATIBILISM

The great appeal of t raditional compat ibilism is t hat it provides a plausible way to reconcile free \vill and determi nism . It says t hat determ inism is true a nd so is t he commonsense belief that we h ave free \viii. Science is squ ared with our presu mption

of freedom, and incompatibilism is unfou nded. This reconciliatio n project has been-a nd sti ll is-attractive to many serious

thin kers, including t he a ncient Greek Sto ics, some English-speak ing ph ilosophers of prev ious cen t uries, a nd nu merous contempora ry p roponents. Among t he great est of t hese a re Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), David H ume

(1711- 1776), and John Stuart Mill (1806- 1873). Locke s ums up trad itional com- pacibilism like this:

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

But though the prefere nce of the Mind be a lways determ ined . . . yet the Pe rson who has the power, in which alone consists the liberty to act, o r not to act, accord ing to such preference, is nevertheless free; such determination abridges not that Power.1

Compacibilises do not deny chat all our \vanes o r d es ires are caused by preceding events. In face, they hold chat determ inism is necessary for free wi ll; an undeter- mined choice, they say, would be random and uncont rolled by the agent. They insist that even though our d esires a re determined, \Ve ca n sti ll ace freely as long as (1) we h ave the power co do \vhac we wane, and (2) nothing is preventing us from doing it (for example, no one is restrain ing o r coercing us).

Boch compacibiliscs and most of thei r critics agree chat free actions (and moral responsibility) requi re alternative poss ibil ities, or a "could do ochenvise" sort of free- dom. If we are free-if ou r actions are truly up co us-\ve muse be able co ace in one of several different \vays, co have more than one option co choose from. We muse h ave the wherew ithal co do otherwise than what \Ve actually do. Bue if we have only one cho ice open co us, if all ocher possibilities are closed, then ou r actions are not up co us. l ncompatibil ises say chat chis is precisely what would happen if determin ism were true. Bue compacibiliscs assert chat \Ve can still do otherwise even if determ in- ism reig ns in the \vorld.

Bue ho\v? C-ompacibiliscs ca n make chis claim by assign ing a cond itional, o r hypothetical, meaning co the notion of "could do otherw ise." To chem, "could do otherwise" means chat you \vou ld have been able co do something different if you had zuanted to. You are free in the sense chat if you had desired co do something dif- ferent than what you act ually did, nothing would have p revented you from doing it. If you had wanted a piece of cake instead of the slice of pie chat you actually got, and nothing would have prevence.d you from getting cake, then your action was free. Whatever you finally choose is, of course, determined by p revious events. Bue you would have been able co choose differently if history had been different.

H ere is Walter Scace (1886-1967), a nvencieth-cencu ry compacibilisc, a rguing the compacibilisc's case by t rying co ascertain \vhac we o rdina rily mean by "free aces":

W. T. Stace, Religion and the Modern Mind

The only reasonable view is that all hu man actions, both t hose wh ich are free ly done and those which are not, are ei ther wholly dete rmined by causes, or at least as much determined as other events in nature. It may be true, as the physicists tell us, that

Compatibilism 251

6 Is the compatibilist's definit ion of "could do otherwise" plau- sible? Or is it, as James called it, a "wretch ed subterfuge"?

7 Does it mat ter to you whether you have free will? Would you r behavio r change if you believed (or didn't be - lieve) t hat a ll your ac- t ions were determined by forces beyond you r control?

252 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

W. T. Stace, Religion and the Modern Mind

nature is not as deterministic as was once thought. But whatever degree of determin- ism preva ils in the world, human actions appear to be as much determined as anyth ing else. And if t his is so, it cannot be the case that what distinguishes actions freely cho- sen from those wh ich are not free is that the lat ter are determ ined by causes wh il e the former are not. Therefore, be ing uncaused or being undetermined by causes, must be an incorrect defin it ion of free will.

What, then, is t he difference between acts wh ich are freely done and those wh ich are not? What is the characteristic wh ich is present [in all free actions] and absent from [all unfree actions]? Is it not obvious that, although both sets of actions have causes, the causes of [free actions] are of a different kind from the causes of [unfree acts]? The free acts are all caused by des ires, or motives, or by some sort of i nternal psychologi- cal states of the agent's m i nd. The unfree acts, on the other hand , are all caused by

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Does Belief in Free Will Matter?

Your belief or non belief in free ,viii doesn't affect your behavior; your acceptance or rejection of che doctrine doesn't maccer co how you live your life. Is chis true? Is it true chat your belief in free ,viii is inconsequential? Some philosophers, as well as many non philosophers, chink so. But so,ne scientific research suggests ochenvise.

In studies conducted by Kath leen D. Vohs and Jonathan W. Schooler, college students who were encouraged co doubt free will were more likely to cheat than students ,vho were not g iven chat encourage,nenc. Th is is ho,v the researchers su,n up the results:

In Experiment 1, participants read either text that encouraged a belief in determ inism (i.e., that portrayed behavior as the consequence of environ- mental and genetic factors) or neutra l text. Exposure to the determ inistic

Figure 5.6 Are those who don't believe in free will more li kely to cheat? If so, why?

message increased cheating on a task in which participants cou ld passively all ow a flawed

computer program to reveal answers to mathematica l prob- lems that they had been in- structed to solve themselves. Moreover, increased cheat-

ing behavior was med iated by decreased belief in free will. In Experiment 2 , participants who read determ inistic state-

ments cheated by overpaying

phys ical forces or physical cond itions, outs ide the agent. Police arrest means physical force exerted from the outside; the absence of food in the desert is a physical condition of t he o utside world. We m ay therefore frame the following rough defi ni tions . Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent. Acts not freely done are those whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent.

It is plain that if we defi ne free will in this way, then free wi ll certainly exists, and t he philosopher's denial of its existence is seen to be what it is- nonsense. For it is obvi- ous that all those actions of men which we shou ld ordi narily attribute to the exercise of their free will , or of which we should say that they freely chose to do them, are in fact actions which have been caused by their own desires, wishes, tho ughts, emotions, impulses, or other psychological states.•

Compatibilism 253

8 Are free a cts, as St ace says, "those whose immed iate cause s a re psycho- log ical states in the agent"? Would such a cts st ill be free if t he "psychologica l states" were secretly controll e d by someone else through hypnosis?

them selves for performance on a cognitive task; participants who read statements endorsing free will did not.

Kathleen D. Vohs and Jonathan W'. Schooler, "The Value of Believing in Free \'(!;//, •Psychologica l

Science 19, 110. 1 (2008) 49- 54.

Stud ies cond ucted by Roy F. Bau,neiscer and h is colleagues reseed the hypothesis char a lack of bel ief in free ,viii is linked co greater selfishness and increased aggression. The resu lts:

In Experiment , , in duced belief in free will red uced willingness to help o th- ers. Experiment 2 showed that chronic disbelief in free will was associated

with reduced helping behavior. In Experiment 3, par ticipants' ind uced dis- belief in free will caused par ticipants to act more aggressively t han others.

Baumeister, Roy F., E.J. Masicampo, and C. Nathan DeWall. 2009. " Prosocial benefits of feel ing

free: Disbel ief in free will increases aggression a nd reduces helpfulness." Personality and Social

Psychology Bulletin 35(2):260- 268.

Some researchers have hinted that if belief in determinism leads to antiso- cial behavior, perhaps any research findings supporting determinism shou ld be hidden from the pub lic. Do you think that such a policy would be mor- ally permissible? Would you want to be to ld the truth about free will and

determinism, come what may?

254 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

Man is a being w ith free w ill; the refore, each man

is pote ntially good o r evil, and it's up to him a nd only h im (through his reasoning mind) to d ecide wh ich h e

wants to be.

-Ayn Rand

For Stace and other compatibil ists, all our actions a re caused, but free ones are caused by internal psychological facto rs, and unfree ones are caused by external fac- tors. When your internal states cause you r actions and external forces do not impede or constra in you, you are free to do otherwise.

l ncompatibilists, however, insist that this compatibilist freedom is not real free- dom at all. They argue that the compatibilist conception of freedom must be mis- taken because an agent can do what she wants without external constraints and still not act freely. Real freedom, they contend, is not just the power to act if we will to act, but power over the wi ll itself. This is how William L. Ro,ve makes this argu- ment, d irecting it specifically against Locke's compatibilism:

Will iam L. Rowe, "Two Conce pts o f Freedom"

Locke d istingu ished between a free action and a voluntary action. For your action to be voluntary all t hat is required is that you wil l to do that action and perform it , presumab ly as a resu lt of your willing to do it. Suppose you are sitting in your chair and someone invites you to go for a wa lk. You reject the idea, choosing instead to remain just where you. Your so remaini ng, Locke wou ld say, is a voluntary act. But was it a free act? Th is is a further question for Locke, and it depends on whether you cou ld have done otherwise had you so wil led. If I had i njected you with a powerfu l drug, so that at the t ime- perhaps without your being aware of it- your legs were paralyzed, then your act of rema ining in the chair was vol untary but not free , for you cou ld not have got up and walked had you willed to do so. A free act, says Locke , is not just a voluntary act. An act is free if it is vol untary and i t is true that had you w il led to do otherw ise you wou ld have been able to do otherwise. For Locke, then, we can say that you are free with respect to a certain action provided it is in your power to do it if you w ill to do it and in your power to refrain from do ing it if you should wi ll to refrain. Locke tel ls us that a man who is chained in pr ison does not stay in prison freely- even if that is what he wants to do- because it is not in his power to leave if he should will to leave. But if the prison doors are thrown open , and his chains are removed, he is free to leave and free to stay- for he can do either, depend ing on his will ... .

Lockean freedom ... exists solely at the level of action: you are free with respect to some action provided that you have the power to do the act if you will to do it, and have the power not to do it if you wil l not to do it. But what about the will? What if you don 't have the power to wi ll the action , or don't have the power not to will it? To see the difficu lty here, let's return to our example where you are sitting down, someone asks you to get up and wal k over to the window to see what is happen ing outside, but you are qu ite satisfied where you are and choose to remain sitting. We earlier supposed that I had injected you with a powerfu l drug so that you can't move your legs. Here Locke would say that you don 't sit freely, since it was not in your power to do otherwise if you had wil led otherwise-say, to get up and walk to the window. But let's now suppose that instead of paralyzing your legs I had hooked up a mach ine to your brain so that I can and do cause you to will to sit, thus depriving you of the capacity to wil l to do otherwise. It's still true that you have the power to get up and wa lk if you shou ld will to do so- I haven't ta ken away your physica l capacity to wa lk,

as I did when I paralyzed your legs . Here the prob lem is that you can't wil l to do any- t hing other than sit. In this case, it seems clear that you sit of necessity, not freely. You can't do otherwise t han sit, not because you lack the power to get up and walk if you shou ld manage to choose to do that, but because you lack the power to choose to get up and walk. On Locke's account of freedom , however, it remains t rue that you s it free ly and not of necessity. And th is being so, we must conclude that Locke's account of freedom is simply ina dequate. It is not sufficient that you have the power to do otherwise if you so will; it must a lso be true that you have the power to will to do otherwise. Freedom that is worth the name, therefore, must incl ude power to will, not simply power to do if we will.I

In response t o criticism, t raditional compatibilisrs sometimes say that how- ever one feels about the compatibilist conception of freedom, it is at least clear and coherent. The alternat ive is libertarianism, \vhich they claim is obscure and unintelligible.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 5.3

1. Suppose traditional compatibilism is true. Would pun ishment, re\vard, blame, or praise ever be justified?

2. Assuming a dog has desires and often behaves accordingly, \vou ld he

have free wi ll, according to compatibilism? Why or why not?

3. Does Stace's d istinction between free acts and unfree acts make sense? Do you think that an agent's actions can be unimpeded and caused by her psychological states yet still not be free?

4. Does Stace's vie\v of free actions coincide \vith \vhat most people or- dinarily think about such matters? Explain.

5. Which do you think is a more plausible theory of free will-hard determinism o r compatibilism? Why?

5.4 LIBERTARIANISM

To be taken seriously by the free wi ll skeptic, libertarians must argue t heir case on three fronts. Against the compatibilist, they must show that determinism and free wi ll are incompatible (t hat incompat ibilism is true). Agains t the determinist , they must show that there is good reason to bel ieve that we sometimes act fre ely. And

against all free \viii skept ics, t hey must demonstrate that the libertarian concept of free wi ll is coherent and plausible.

Libertarianism 255

9 What is Rowe's a rgument against tra- d itiona l compat ib ilism? Is it sound? Why or why not?

H e sat a lo ng ti me and he thought about h is life a nd

how lin le of it he could ever have fo reseen and he

wondered fo r all h is will

and all his intent h ow much of it was h is doing. -Cormac McCarthy

10 Is our experience good evidence that we have li bertarian free will ?

11 Do you think t he hypot het ical int e rp re- t ation of "could do otherwise" capt ures o u r commonsense experience better t han the libertarian interpretat ion? Why or why not?

256 Chapter 5 Free Wi ll and Determinism

PH I LOSO PHY NOW

Science and Free Will

Is ir possible rhar your actions are predetermined unconsciously before you are consciously a,vare of intend ing ro perform those actions? To che consternation of many libertarians, sOJne scientific research seems co suggest just thar- and thus ro raise doubts about the existence of free ,viii.

The experi,nencs that caused all rhe fuss (and inspired many related scientific studies) were conducted by che University of Cal iforn ia researcher Benjamin Libet. He recorded che brain activity of subjects as they rando,n ly flexed their index fingers , and he ,nonicored the accompanying muscle movements. H e found chat che subjects became aware of their inten- tion ro move their fingers about 200 1nill ise.conds before che actua l move,nenc occurred- an unsurprising resu lt.. The astonishing finding ,vas rhar che subjects became a,vare of their in- tention 350 co 400 milliseconds after che brain activity chat initiates muscle move,nenc had already happened. Th is see,ns co suggest chat rhe decision ro move ,vas an unconscious event, chat consciousness ca,ne along after che unconscious decision ,vas already made. If so, ,vhere does free ,viii enter che picture?

Liber thought his research showed chat there cou ld be at least a li,niced kind of free will in human actions. The conscious m ind may nor be involved in initiating actions, but ir ,night be able co veto actions before they happen.

Liber's studies and simi lar ones by ocher invescigacors have been criticized on severa l counts. For one, che results of the experi,nencs may apply only to simple movements (such as finger flexing). As one critic says, "Will ing a srereoryped, well-rehearsed finger movement is coo si,nple co have 1nuch bearing on such conscious processes as che decisions made ch rough plann ing a course of action rhar spans past and future , or analysis of co,nplex events." Also, some invesrigacors seem ro assu,ne char decisions are insrancaneous, but chis may nor be che case. "Why do we ch ink char a decision is instantaneous?" ch is critic observes. "What we consciously chink could ,veil be spread out over time. The process can be on-going bur our rea lization captures rhe process only as a snap shoe in time that suffices co label che decision bur not the process." (W. R. Kle,nm, "Free Will Debates: Simple Experiments Are Nor So Simple," Advances in Cognitive Psychology 6 (20 10): 47-65.) Finally, some detractors accuse Libec and ochers of failing ro distinguish between conscious awareness (the intention co do son1ech ing) and ",neca-conscious a,vareness" (the awareness that you are intending co do someth ing). The charge is rhar Libec's subjects are reporting chat rhey are aware chat they are consciously intending someth ing (,neca-conscious awareness), and chis kind of awareness naturally comes after che conscious intention itself is fonned (after conscious awareness). So Libec's findings may nor be che threat ro free will chat some researchers assu,ne.

Suppose all our decisions are made for us on an unconscious level so that we do not have conscious control of our actions. How would this fact

change your thinking about your actions and about moral responsibility?

Often libertarians try to establish incompatibilism by p utti ng fo rt h \vhat is kno\vn as the Consequence Argu ment. Peter van lnwagen crafted the most inAuen- tial fo rm of it, wh ich he sum marizes like t his:

Peter van lnwagen, An Essay on Free Will

If dete rminis m is true, the n our acts a re the co nseque nces of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on befo re we were born, and ne ither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefo re the co nseque nces of these things (in cluding our prese nt acts) are not up to us.6

Van l n\vagen contends t hat if determ inism is t r ue, t hen every event-including ou r every action-is t he res ult of (1) evenrs in the distant past a nd (2) t he laws of nature t hat rule those even rs . But we have no po\ver over p ast events and the laws of nature; we ca n ch ange neither the evenrs nor the laws. These things are not up to us, a nd if t hey are not up to us, t heir consequences (including our current actions) a re not up to us either. We are left \Vith no a lternative poss ibilities. So if deter m inism is true, we cannot do otherw ise: There are no free actions. Therefore, compatibilism is false; incompatibil ism is true.

C,ompatibilists often reject the Consequence Argu ment o n the grou nds that it ass umes a faulty interpretatio n of "could do otherwise." They say that the Conse- quence Argument works only if "cou ld do othen vise" is given a n incompatibilist meaning, \vh ich is that you have the p ower to wi ll to d o otherwise (that your wi ll is

Libertarianism 257

12 What a re the prem- ises of van lnwagen's argument ? Are t hey plausible?

Man was predestined ro have free will. -Hal lee luyah

up to you). But if you give "could do otherwise" a hypothetical mean- ing (\vh ich compatibilists prefer), the C,onsequence A rgument d oes n't go through. Recall that the hyp othetical meaning is that you \vould have been able to do somethi ng if you had desi red to (i f you desired to a nd nothing p reven ted you from doing it). This "cou ld d o other wise" iss ue, then, is at the heart of the d ebate benveen compatibilists a nd incompatibilists.

CHAPTER 5 PHILOSOPHERS

But show ing incompatibilism to be tr ue is not t he on ly hurd le fac- ing liber taria ns, for they must a lso prov ide good reasons to think that libertarian free \vi ii actually exisrs . On this score t hey often contend t hat the best evid ence for t he ex istence of free w ill comes from ou r own experience. W hen making a cho ice, we often sense that we have genu ine options, that \Ve h ave the power to choose (or not choose) among alter native courses of actio n, and that what we fin ally choose and do is genuinely a nd u lt imately up to us. Proponen ts of free w ill say t h at this experience is as persiste nt a nd reliable as a ny \Ve cou ld have, and it prov ides stro ng evid ence fo r libertaria n freedo m. Judg- ing from ou r perceptions, fo r example, we thi n k we h ave good ev i- d ence for t he existe nce of physical o bjects. Like\vise, ou r experien ce of choosing and acting seems to g ive us evidence for free w ill t hat is at least as strong as t hat for physical objecrs .

Baron d'Holbach (1723- 1789)

Willi am James (1842- 1910)

Thomas Hobbes (1588- 1679)

John Locke (1632- 1704)

David Hume (1711 - 1776)

John Stuart Mill (1806- 1873)

Walter Stace (1886 - 1967)

Willi am L. Rowe (b. 1931)

Peter van lnwagen (b. 1942)

Roderick Ch isholm (19 16 - 1999)

Randolph Clarke (b. 1953)

Richard Taylor (1919 - 2003)

Timot hy O'Connor (b. 1965)

Robert Kane (b. 1938)

Jean-Pau l Sartre (1905- 1980)

258 Chapter 5 Free Wi ll and Determinism

Agent causation is the view that a free actio n is

caused by an agent (per- son) and is n ot wholly determined by p revious

even rs.

13 Does Taylor's con- cept of agent causat ion accurately reflect what people take themselves to be doing when they perform actions? Why or why not?

PHILOSOPHY LAB - Imagine char your fr iend says he knows you so well rhar he can predict everything you ,viii do in any given rime period. So you tesr him . For an hour you cry co ace normally, and he observes you . Afrer the hour is up, he hands you his notes char he ,vrore an hour ago, before rhe experiment began. You are shocked co see char he has accurarely predicted your every action.

Then you begin to worry. Does the fact that everything you did

was predictable mean that your whole life is determined by forces beyond your control? In other words, is your life predictable because it is determined?

H a rd determin ists and compatibilisrs t ypically reply t h at this experiential sense of freedom is illusory. Our experience is not good evidence for free will, a nd we believe in free will on ly because we a re igno ra nt of all the factors (genes a nd envi- ronment, for example) t hat determ ine us. Libertaria ns reply that we can indeed be mistaken about ,vhether our actions are free, for our experience could mislead us. But we are entitled to trust our experience u n less evidence gives us good reasons to doubt it. And so far, they say, t here are no good reasons to do so.

Can libertarians provide an intelligible and cred ible explanation of how free ,vi ii is possible? If not, libertarian ism will be regarded as a problematic theory-even if incompatibilism a nd the existence of free ,vi ii are assu med. The main difficulty is explaining ho,v actions ca n be free if indeterm inism is true-that is, if actions are not caused by p rior events. How can an actio n be uncaused? A nd if it is u ncaused by previous events, wouldn't it be simply random? A ra ndom action is not a free action .

Several p hilosophers have responded to these ,vorries, most notably Thomas Reid in t he eig hteenth cent ury and in recent years Roderick Ch isholm, Randolph C la rke, Richard Taylor, T imothy O 'C,onnor, a nd Robert Kane. O ne proposed solution fa- vored by most of these is agent causation, t he vie,v that a free action is caused by an agent (person) a nd is not wholly determi ned by previous events. H ere is Taylor making a case fo r one version of this theory:

Richard Taylor, Metaphysics

The o nly conception of action that accords with our d ata is o ne according to which people- and perhaps some othe r things too- are sometimes, bu t of course not

always, self-determining bei ngs; that is, beings t hat are sometimes t he causes of their own behavior. In the case of an action t hat is free, it must not on ly be such t hat it is caused by the agent who performs it, but also such t hat no antecedent cond itions were sufficient for his performing just t hat action. In the case of an action that is both free and rational, it must be such that the agent who performed it d id so for some reason, but th is reason cannot have been the cause of it.

Now this conception fits what people take themselves to be; namely, beings who act, or who are agents, rather t han thi ngs t hat are merely acted upon, and whose behavior is simply the causa l consequence of conditions that they have not wrought. When I believe that I have done something, I do bel ieve that it was I who caused it to be done, I who made something happen, and not merely something within me, such as one of my own subjective states, wh ich is not identical with myself. If I be- li eve t hat something not identical with myself was the cause of my behavior- some event who lly external to myself, for insta nce, or even one interna l to myself, such as a nerve impu lse, volition, or whatnot- then I cannot regard that behavior as being an act of m ine, un less I further believe that I was the cause of t hat externa l o r interna l event. My pulse, for example, is caused and regulated by certain conditions existing with in me, and not by myself. I do not, accordingly, regard this activity of my body as my action, and would be no more tempted to do so if I became sudden ly conscious with in myself of t hose conditions or impu lses that produce it. This is behavior with which I have noth ing to do, behav ior that is not on ly not free activity, but not even the activity of an agent to begin with; it is nothing bu t a mechan ica l reflex. Had I never learned t hat my very life depends on t his pulse beat, I wou ld rega rd it with complete in difference, as something foreign to me, like t he osci ll ations of a clock pendu lum that I id ly contemp late.

Now t his conception of activity, and of an agent who is t he cause of it, involves two rather strange metaphysical notions that are never app lied elsewhere in nature. The first is that of a self or person- for example, a ma n- who is not merely a collec- tion of t hings or events, but a self-moving being. For on this view it is a person, and not merely some part of hi m or something with in him, that is t he cause of his own activity. Now, we certa inly do not know that a hu ma n being is anything more t han an assemblage of phys ica l t hings and processes that act in accordance with those laws that describe t he behavior of al l other phys ica l things and processes. Even t hough he is a living being, of enormous complexity, there is nothing, apart from t he req uire- men ts of t his theory, to suggest that his behavior is so radically different in its origin from that of other phys ica l objects, or that an understandi ng of it must be sought in some metaphysica l realm wholl y different from t hat appropriate to the understa nd - in g of no nliving t hings.

Second , th is conception of activity involves an extraord inary conception of cau- sation according to which an agent, wh ich is a substance and not an event, can nev- ertheless be the cause of an event. Indeed, if he is a free agent then he can , on this conception, cause an event to occur- namely, some act of his own- withou t anything else causing him to do so. This means that an agen t is sometim es a cause, without being an antecedent sufficient condition; for if I affirm that I am t he cause of some act of mine, then I am plain ly not saying t hat my very existence is sufficient for its occur- rence, wh ich would be absurd. If I say that my hand causes my penci l to move, then I am saying that the motion of my hand is, under the other cond itions then preva ilin g, suffici ent for the motion of the pencil. But if I then say t hat I cause my hand to move, I am not saying anything remotely like this, and su rely not that the motion of my self

Libertarianism 259

14 How might a determinist o r inde- terminist respond to Taylor's notion of agent causat ion?

Free will is an illusio n . People alv.,ays choose che perceived path of greatest pleasure.

-Scott Adams

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Free Will and Determ inism

is sufficient for t he motion of my arm and hand, since these are the only th ings about me that are moving.

This conception of the causation of events by things that are not events is, in fact, so d ifferent from the usua l phi losop hica l conception of a cause that it shou ld not even bear t he same name, for "being a cause" ordinari ly just means " being an antecedent sufficient condition or set of cond itions." Instead, then, of spea king of agents as causing their own acts , it wou ld perhaps be better to use another word entirely, and say, for instance, that they originate them, initiate them, or simply that they perform them.

Now this is, on the face of it, a dubious conception of what a person is. Yet it is consistent with our data , reflecting the presuppos itions of deliberation, and appears to be the on ly conception that is cons istent with them, as determ inism and simple indeterm inism are not. The theory of agency avoids the absurdities of simple indeter- minism by conceding that human behavior is caused , while at the same time avoiding the difficulties of determ inism by denying that every chain of causes and effects is infi nite. Some such causa l chains, on this view, have beginnings, and they begin with agents themselves. Moreover, if we are to suppose that it is sometimes up to me what I do, and understand this in a sense that is not consistent with determinism , we must suppose that I am an agent or a being who initiates his own actions, sometimes under conditions that do not determine what action I shall perform. Deliberation becomes, on this view, something that is not on ly possible but qu ite rationa l, for it does ma ke sense to deliberate about activity t hat is tru ly my own and that depends in its outcome upon me as its author, and not merely upon someth ing more or less esoteric that is supposed to be intimately associated with me, such as my thoughts, volitions, choices or whatnot.7

Taylor ackno\vledges chat chis cake on free will may at first glance seem implau- sible, but he thinks che theory is che only one that fies \vich our common experience of actions and choices.

O'Connor also subscribes co agent causation, and like everyone \vho cakes this view he holds that free actions a re caused by the agent. Bue in expla ining ch is, he suggests chat all events in the un iverse a re p roduced in virtue of the properties that objects possess. Ord inary events are produced chis \vay; likewise, an agent may pro- duce an event in virtue of the unique properties chat she possesses. When she makes a free choice, she does so via \vhac O 'Connor calls "volition-enabling properties."

Thus her choice is not deter m ined by prev ious evencs; it is produced by her. Specifi- cally, she makes her choice base.cl on the reasons she has, and che reasons influence che production of che decision without causally determining it. The choice is not random because it is p roduced by her; she is the author and cause of it.

As you m ight expect, agent causation perspectives a re d isputed at many poincs,

\vich opponents contending chat che theories are incoherent o r otherwise inadequate and p roponents denying che cha rge. Bue as such debates unfold, libertarians insist chat, despite cla ims co the contra ry, p lausible theories of libertarian free will a re on che cable.

Sartre's Profound Freedom 2 61

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 5.4

I. What is the libertarian argument for the ex istence of free will? Is the argument convinci ng? Is t he argument's premise true?

2 . Is t he hypothetical interpretation of "could do otherwise" plausible? Is it what we usually mean when we say \Ve could have done otherwise? Explain.

3. Is our experience of choosing and acting good ev idence for free will? Is it at least as strong as t he ev idence for physical objects? Explain.

4. What is Taylor's a rgument for agent causation? Is it cogent? Why or \vhy not?

5. What a re the three claims that libertarians must advance to make thei r theory believable? Do you accept each of these? Explain why you do o r do not accept them.

5.5 SARTRE'S PROFOUND FREEDOM

The forego ing doctrines-hard determin ism, compatibilism, and libertarianism- are the major ph ilosophical stances on free \vill and d eterminism, each with a long history and articulate proponents. But they a re not the only views on the subject. Other thinkers, both contemporary and influential, have advanced unique perspec- t ives on human freedom or have taken issue with the standard viewpoints. Among the most interesting and influential of these voices is that of t he existentialist philosopher and novelist Jean- Paul Sartre (1905-1980).

Sartre is one of the modern founders of the philosoph ical per- spective known as existentialism, a central tenet of \vhich is t h at humans are profoundly free to create their O\vn lives and thus are entirely responsible for defin ing t he mean ing and moral relevance of thei r existence. From reflectio ns o n his own lived experience, Sa rtre arrives at what he takes to be some basic truths about hu- man beings and their ex istential predicament. Unlike almost every philosopher before him, he not only believes that we a re free, but also insists t h at \Ve a re radically free. We may be influenced by the factors of natu re and nu rtu re (heredit y and environment), but ultimately we are not determined by them. We a re totally free- free to define ourselves by our own lights and capable of resisting the physical, psychological, and social forces that will thoroughly sh ape us if we let them. We a re determ ined only if \Ve allow our- selves to be determ ined. Figure 5.7 Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980).

2 62 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

Mankind has a free will; but it is free to m ilk cows an d m build h ouses, noth-

ing more.

-Martin Luther

Man is condemned m be free . -Jean-Paul Sartre

15 Sartre reasons from his lived experience to his theory of free w ill. Does h is experience provide a d equate sup- port for his assertions?

One of Sartre's core ideas is that "ex istence precedes essence." Most people as- sume, he says, that "essence precedes existence"-that befo re we come into ex is- tence, our fundamental characteristics (our essence) as humans are al ready set. They think that our psychological makeup, choices, desires, and ideas a re in a sense locked in befo re we can say ou r fi rst words. Our d estiny is mapped out beforehand through the workings of a creator God or a universal human nature o r some unalterable social structure. But, according to Sartre, this kind of "essence precedes existence" thinking is tragically mistaken. It prevenrs us from seeing a future of open possi- bilities, saps our creativity, lim its our freedom, and weakens our sense of ou r moral responsibility. The truth, says Sartre, is the opposite of the received view: "Existence precedes essence"-we fi rst come into being and then ,ve define ourselves. H e d e- clares, "Man is nothing else but ,vhat he makes of himself."

And what is this radical freedom that we all possess? It is both a blessing and a curse. As Sartre says, "We are condemned to be free." The bless ing is that as free persons, we have the power to set our own goals, live our own lives, and create our- selves as we go. The curse is that as free beings, we can look to no one but ourselves to decide ho,v we should live. We carry this burden alone. We must bear the awesome moral respons ibility of deciding how ,ve should live, ho,v we should t reat others, and ,vhat values we should p rescribe for the rest of the world through our actions. We can celebrate our capacity to create ou r essence and live by our own rules, but because we are utterly a lone in bearing this monumental burden, we are also con- demned to experience g reat anguish, despair, and a sense of abandonment.

This is how Sartre explained th is ex istentialist freedom in a famous lectu re titled "Existentialism Is a Humanism":

Jean -Pau l Sartre, " Existentialism Is a Human ism"

What [existentialists] have in common is that they think that existence precedes es- se nce, or, if you prefer, t hat subjectivity m ust be the starting point.

Just what does that mean ? Let us consider some object that is manufactured, for example, a book or a paper-cutter: here is an object which has been made by an artisa n whose inspira tion came from a concept. He referred to the concept of what a paper-cutter is and li kewise to a known method of production , which is part of the concept, someth ing which is, by and large, a routine. Thus, the paper-cutter is at once an object produced in a certain way and , on the other hand, o ne having a specific use; and one cannot postu late a man who produces a paper-cutter but does not know what it is used fo r. The refo re, let us say that, for the paper-cutter, essence-that is, the e n- semble of both t he prod uction routi nes and the properties which enable it to be both produced and defined- precedes existe nce. Thus, the presence of the paper-cutte r o r book in front of m e is determ ined. Therefore, we have here a technica l view of the world whereby it can be said that production precedes existence.

When we conceive God as the Creator, He is genera lly thought of as a superior sort of artisan . Whatever doctrine we may be considering, whether one like that of

Sartre's Profound Freedom 263

Descartes or that of Leibnitz, we always grant that will more or less follows understand- ing o r, at t he very least, accompanies it, and that when God creates He knows exactly what He is creating. Thus, the concept of man in the m ind of God is comparable to t he concept of paper-cutter in the m ind of the manufacturer, and, following certain tech- niques and a conception, God produces man , just as the artisan , following a definition and a technique, makes a paper-cutter. Thus, the ind ividual man is the realization of a certain concept in the divine in tell igence.

In the eighteenth century, the atheism of the phi/osophes discarded the idea of God , but not so much for the notion that essence precedes existence. To a certain extent, this idea is found everywhere; we find it in Diderot, in Voltaire, and even in Kant. Man has a human nature; this hum an natu re, wh ich is the concept of the hum an, is found in all men, wh ich means that each man is a particu lar example of a universa l concept, man. In Kant, the result of this universa lity is that the wild-man, t he natura l man, as well as t he bourgeois, are circumscribed by t he same defin ition and have the same basic qua l- ities. Thus, here too the essence of man precedes the historica l existence that we find in nature.

Atheistic existentialism, which I represent, is more coherent. It states that if God does not exist, there is at least one be ing in whom existence precedes essence, a being who exists before he can be defined by any concept, and t hat this being is man, or, as Heidegger says, human reality. What is meant here by saying that existence precedes essence? It means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwa rds, defines himself. If man, as the existentialist conceives him , is indefi n- able, it is because at first he is nothing. On ly afterwa rd wi ll he be someth ing, and he himself will have made what he will be. Thus, there is no human nature, since there is no God to conceive it. Not only is man what he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what he will s himself to be after th is t hrust toward existence.

Man is noth ing else but what he makes of himself. Such is t he first principle of existentialism. It is also what is ca lled subjectivity, the name we are labeled with when charges are brought against us. But what do we mea n by this, if not that man has a greater dign ity than a stone or table? For we mea n that man fi rst exists, t hat is , that man first of all is the be ing in the future. Man is at t he start a plan which is aware of itself, rather than a patch of moss, a piece of garbage, or a cau liflower; nothing exists prior to this plan; t here is nothi ng in heaven; man will be what he will have planned to be. Not what he wi ll want to be. Because by the word "wi ll" we genera lly mean a con- scious decision, which is subsequent to what we have already made of ou rselves. I may want to belong to a politica l party, write a book, get married; but all that is only a mani- festation of an earlier, more spontaneous cho ice that is ca lled "will." But if existence rea lly does precede essence, man is responsible for what he is . Thus, existentialis m 's first move is to make every man aware of what he is and to make the fu ll responsibility of his existence rest on him. And w hen we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not on ly mean that he is responsible for his own ind ividuality, but that he is re- sponsible for all men ....

When we say t hat man chooses his own self, we mean that every one of us does likewise; but we also mean by t hat that in making this choice he also chooses all men. In fact, in creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts w hich does not at the same time create an im age of man as we think he ought to be. To choose to be th is or that is to affirm at t he same time the value of what we choose, because we can never choose evil. We always choose the good, and nothing can be good for us withou t being good for all.

16 Is Sartre exaggerat· ing t he extent to which people can define t hemselves when he says "existence p re- cedes essence"?

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If, on the other hand, existence precedes essence, and if we grant that we exist and fashion our image at one and the same time, the im age is valid for everybody and for our whole age. Thus, ou r respons ibi lity is much greater than we m ight have supposed, because it involves all man kind . . .. Therefore, I am responsible for myself and for everyone else. I am creating a certa in image of man of my own choosing. In choosing myself, I choose man.

This helps us understand what the actual content is of such rather grandiloquent words as anguish , forlornness, despair. As you will see, it's all qu ite simple.

Fi rst, what is meant by anguish ? The existentialists say at once that man is anguish . What that means is this : the man who involves himself and who realizes that he is not only the person he chooses to be, but also a law-maker who is, at the same time, choos- ing all mankind as well as hi mself, cannot help escape the feeli ng of his total and deep responsibility. Of course, there are many people who are not anxious; but we claim that they are hidi ng their anxiety, that they are fleeing from it. Certainly, many people believe that when t hey do something, t hey themselves are the on ly ones involved , and when someone says to them, "What if everyone acted that way?" they shrug their shoulders and answer, " Everyone doesn't act that way." But rea lly, one shou ld always ask himself, "What would happen if everybody looked at things that way?" There is no escaping t his distu rbing thou ght except by a kind of doub le-dea li ng . . ..

There is no question here of the kind of angu ish which would lead to qu ietism, to inaction . It is a matter of a simple sort of angu ish that anybody who has had respon- sibi lities is familiar with. For example, when a m ilitary officer takes the respons ibility for an attack and sends a certain number of men to death, he chooses to do so, and in the main he alone makes t he choice. Doubtless, orders come from above, but they are too broad; he interprets them, and on this interpretation depend the lives often or fourteen or twenty men . In makin g a decision he cannot help having a certain anguish . All lead- ers know this anguish. That doesn't keep them from acting; on t he contrary, it is the very condition of their action. For it implies that they envisage a num be r of possibili- ties , and when t hey choose one, they realize t hat it has value on ly because it is chosen . We shall see that this kind of angu ish, which is the kind that existentialism describes, is explained , in addition , by a di rect responsibility to the other men whom it involves. It is not a curtain separating us from action , but is part of action itself.

When we spea k of forlornness, a term Heidegger was fond of, we mean only that God does not exist and t hat we have to face all the consequences of this . The existen- tialist is strongly opposed to a certa in kind of secu lar eth ics which would like to aboli sh God with the least possib le expense .. . .

The existentiali st, on the contrary, thinks it very distressing that God does not exist, because all possibili ty of finding values in a heaven of ideas disappea rs along with Him; there can be no longer an a priori Good, since there is no infi nite and perfect consciousness to th in k it. Nowhere is it written that the Good exists, that we must be honest, t hat we must not lie; because the fact is we are on a plane where there are only men. Dostoievsky said, " If God didn't exist, everything wou ld be possib le." That is the very starting point of existentialism. Indeed, everything is permissible if God does not exist, and as a resu lt man is forlorn, because neither within him nor without does he find anything to clin g to. He can't start making excuses for himself.

If existence really does precede essence, there is no explaining t hings away by reference to a fixed and given hu man nature. In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom. On the other hand, if God does not exist, we find no val- ues or commands to turn to which legitimize our conduct. So, in the bright realm of

Sartre's Profound Freedom 2 6 5

values, we have no excuse behind us, no justification before us. We are alone, with no excuses.

That is the idea I shall try to convey when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he d id not create himself, yet, in other respects is free; because, once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does ....

As for despair, the term has a very simple meaning. It means that we shall confine ourselves to reckon ing only with what depends upon our wi ll , or on the ensemble of probab ilities which make our action possible. When we want something, we always have to reckon with proba bili ties. I may be counting on the arriva l of a friend. The fr iend is coming by ra il or street-car; th is supposes that the tra in will arrive on schedule, or that the street-car will not jump the track. I am left in the realm of possibility; but possibilities are to be reckoned with on ly to the point where my action comports with the ensemble of these possibilities, and no further. The moment the possibilities I am considering are not rigorously involved by my action, I ought to d isengage myself from them, because no God, no scheme, can adapt the world and its possibilities to my will. When Descartes said, "Conquer yourself rather than the world," he meant essentially the same thing ... .

Actually, th ings will be as man wil l have decided they are to be. Does that mean that I should abandon myself to quietism? No. First, I should involve myself; then, act on the old saw, "Noth ing ventu red , nothing gained." Nor does it mean that I shou ldn't belong to a party, but rather that I s hall have no ill usions and shall do what I can. For example, suppose I ask myself, "Will socia lization, as such, ever come about?" I know nothing about it. All I know is that I'm going to do everything in my power to bring it about. Beyond that, I can't count on anyth ing. Quietism is the attitude of people who say, "Let others do what I can't do." The doctrine I am presenting is the very opposite of qu ietism, s ince it declares, "There is no reality except in action." Moreover, it goes further, s ince it adds, "Man is noth ing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent that he fulfi ll s himself; he is, therefore, nothing e lse than the ensemble of his acts, nothing else than his life."&

The hard determinisrs would, of course, reject Sartre's brand of free wil l. For them , everyth ing \Ve know about science suggesrs that such unfettered freedom is impossible. For much the same reason, compatibil isrs would find Sartre's vie\v d iffi- cult to accept, for they too believe in determin ism . Even the libertarians would insist that our experience shows that at least some of ou r actions are determined, and they would likely agree that not all of science's evidence for determinism can be as easily d ismissed as Sartre assumes.

17 Are people wholly responsible for the ki nd of persons t hey become?

18 Is it t rue that if God does not exist, t here a re no objective moral standards? What would utilitaria ns and others who p refer secular t heories of morality have to say about t his claim?

You may fetter my leg, bur Zeus himself cannor get

rhe better of my free will. -Epictetus

266 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 5.5

1. Which seems most likely co you: chat your path in life is deter mined befo re you a re born, or chat you are born and then you determin e how you r life wi ll go? W hy? Is there a midd le grou nd o n chis issue?

2 . Is Sar tre r ight about free w ill bei ng che main facto r chat deter m ines who you are-or do such t hings as genet ics and societ y have t he great- est impact on how you turn out?

3 . What is your reaction co Sartre's perspective on freedom? Do you fi nd his vie\v liberating and inspiring, or do you chi nk it is d isheartening and fo rlorn?

4. In ocher \vricings, Sart re says chat it is impossible for self-conscious beings like us not co have free \viii. Why do you chin k Sartre \vou ld believe chis? Is he r ight?

5. H o\v wou ld a compacibil isc respond co Sart re's ideas? How would a libertarian respond?

Rev iew Notes

5.1 OVERVIEW: THE FREE W ILL PROBLEM

• The p roblem of free will is the challenge of reco ncili ng determ inism \vich our int u- itions or ideas about personal freedom.

• The mai n ideas concerning free will are determin ism , hard determ inism, incom- pacibilism, indeter mi nism, compacibilism, and libertarian ism.

• The th ree major responses co the free will problem are hard determinism, compati- bilism, and libertarianism. H ard determin ism is the view chat no one has free will. Compatibilism claims chat although determin ism is tr ue, ou r actions can still be free because determ inism and free will are not in conflict. Libertarian ism says chat some actions are free, for they are ultimately caused, or cont rolled, by the person, o r agent.

• For many people, free will matters because it relates co crucial questions about mo ral respo nsibili ty, legal p unish ment, p raise and blame, and social and political control.

5.2 DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM

• D ' Holbach asserts ch at no one has free will , and chat the theories and discoveries of science are robust proof chat every event is determined by preceding events an d natural laws .

• Many poi nt to science as proof of determ inism, for it has had remarkable success in explaini ng a nd predicting all sorts of natu ral phenomena.

• Q uantu m p hysics seems to u ndermi ne belief in determi nism because the standard view among quantum p hysicists is that at the subatomic level, some events are u ncaused.

• James argu es that ind etermi nism is a feat u re of th e u n iverse that permits "alterna- tive futures" an d th e possibility of freedom. It allows free actions because free ac- tio ns are ch ance h appeni ngs.

5.3 COM PAT I Bl LISM

• Compatib ilism says that determi nism is true (incompatibil ism is false), and so is th e commonsense belief th at we have free \viii.

• To compatibilists, "could do othenvise" means that you would have been able to do somethi ng d ifferent if you had wanted to. You are free in the sense that if you had desi red to do someth ing different th an \vhat you actually d id, noth ing wou ld h ave p revented you from doing it.

• Rowe's objection to compatibil ism is that th e compatibilist conception of freedom must be m istaken because an agent can do what she \van es \vithout external con- straints and still not act freely.

• Stace argues that "acts freely do ne are those whose immediate causes are psycho- logical states in th e agent. Acts not freely d one are th ose whose immediate causes are states of affai rs external to th e agent." H is view seems to be vulnerable to th e kind of an ti-compatibilist argu ment that Rowe pu ts fo rth .

5.4 LIBERTARIAN ISM

• Against th e compatibilist, libertarians must show that determinism a nd free will are incompatible (that incompatibilism is true) . Agai nst the determin ist, they must sho\v that there is good reason to bel ieve th at we sometimes act freely. And against all free will skeptics, they must d emonstrate that th e libertarian concept of free will is coh eren t and plausible.

• The Consequence Argument says that if determ inism is true, then every even t is th e result of (1) even ts in the distan t past an d (2) th e laws of nature that rule th ose even ts. Bu t we have no power over past events and the la\vS of nature. They are not up to us, an d neither are their consequences, incl ud ing ou r curren t actio ns. So if determin ism is true, there a re no free actio ns, an d compatibilism is false.

• Libertarians say th at when making a cho ice, \Ve often sense th at we h ave genu- ine optio ns, that we have the power to choose (or not ch oose) among alterna- tive cou rses of action, an d that wh at we fi nally choose an d d o is genuinely an d ultimately up to us. Libertar ians contend th at th is experience constitutes strong eviden ce fo r libertarian freedom.

Review Notes 2 67

268 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

• Agent causation is the view that a free action is caused by an agent (perso n) and is not \vholly determ ined by previous evencs. Taylor argues that the theory is the only one that fits with our co mmon experience of actions and cho ices. O'Connor makes a case for it by trying to show that the notion of agent causation is coherent and plausible.

5.5 SARTRE'S PROFOUND FREEDOM

• Sartre says that \Ve are radically free; \Ve may be influenced by the fac to rs of nature and nurture, but ultimately we are not determ ined by them .

• "Existence precedes essen ce" refers to the idea that we first come into being and then \Ve define ourselves; we are only what we make of ourselves.

• Sartre paints a compelling picture of radical freedom, but g iven ou r experien ce and the evidence of science, many find it implausible.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

ARGUING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 5

1. Evaluate the case for h ard d eterminism, including in you r evaluation an assessment of both determinism and incompatibilism.

2. Expla in why chance does (or does not) m ake room for free will.

3. Assess the compatibilist's interpretation of "cou ld do othen vise." Devise an argu ment showing \vhy the interp retation should be accepted (or rejected).

4. Evaluate the C-onsequence A rgument. Examine itS premises, determine if they are true, and assess whether the conclusion fo llows from them .

5. Does science show that free wi ll does not exist? Examine both pro and con arguments and back your verdict with reasons.

Key Terms

agent causation The view that a free ac- tion is caused by an agent (person) and is not wholly determined by previous events. (258)

compatibilism The view that although determinism is true, our actions can still be free. (243)

determinism The doctrine that every event is determ ined by preceding evencs and the laws of natu re. (241)

hard determinism The view that free \viii does not exist, that no one aces free ly. (243)

incompatibilism The view that if de- termin ism is true, no one can act freely. (243)

indeterminism The view th at not every event is d etermine.cl by preceding events and the laws of nature. (243)

libertarianism (metaphysical) The view that some actio ns are free, fo r they are

caused, or co ntrolled, by the person, o r agent. (244)

problem of free will The chal lenge of reconciling determ inism with our intu- itions or ideas about personal free.dam. (242)

Key Terms 269

2 70 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

FIC TION

A Little Omniscience Goes a Long Way Thomas D. Davis

Thomas D. Davis is a philosopher, textbook writer, and author of three novels- Suffer Little Children, Murdered Sleep, and Consuming Fire.

Satan, with a flutter of his mighty wings, descends upon a cloud where God is reclining.

SATAN: How's it going? GOD: (He yawns.) Perfectly, as usua l. SATAN: And your new creatures on earth- how are

they? GOD: Just fine. Eve's asleep under the apple tree,

curled up on her right side, dreaming of flowers. Adam is sitting up, squinting at the sun, scratching his nose with his left index finger, trying to decide what he wants to do this morning. What he wants to do is take a walk in the garden. In a moment he will.

SATAN: And you know all that without looking. GOD: Of course. I arranged it all to happen that

way. SATAN: Isn't it boring to know everything that will

ever happen? Th is morn ing I saw two solar systems collide and explode in a tremendous cataclysm. The ex- plosion must have lasted, oh , ten minutes. It was lovely and, for me, quite unexpected. I can't imagine life with- out surprises. It's surprises that keep me going. In a manner of speaking, of course.

GOD: Foreknowledge is the price you pay for cre- ation and control. You can't have everything.

SATAN: Boredom is the secret sadness of God. An interesting thought.

GOD: To you , maybe. SATAN: Your only sadness, I hope. GOD: Not the on ly one. For instance, I've often

thought it would be fun to make a rock so big I cou ldn't lift it. But that wou ld be a contradiction . And having procla imed all contradictions impossible, I have to make do without them. The laws of logic are for the best, of course. There wou ld be chaos without them.

Thomas D. Davi s, "A little Omniscience Goes a Long Way," in Philosophy: An Introduction Through Original Fiction, Dis- cussion, and a Multi-Media CD-ROM (New York: McGraw- Hill , 2004), 11-17.

Still , a few round squares now and t hen wou ld help break the monotony.

SATAN: I could tell you about some of my adven- tures today. But you know about them already.

GOD: Of course. I know what you did because I de- creed that you wou ld do it.

SATAN: That is exactly what I want to talk with you about.

GOD: I know. SATAN: You don't mind? GOD: If I minded, I wou ldn't have decided to make

you initiate th is conversation. SATAN: That's reasonab le.

GOD: Of course it's reasonable. Everything I do or say is reasonable. Which is to say that I have a reason for doing or saying it.

SATAN: To get to the point: A few of the angels and I have been discussing this whole matter of your control- li ng everything we do.

GOD: I know. SATAN: I wish you wou ldn't keep saying that. GOD: As you wish. SATAN: Look here. If you have decreed this who le

conversation and know how it is going to turn out, why don't you just give me your answer and save us both a lot of talk?

GOD: Don't be absurd. I know what's going to hap- pen because I decreed that it would happen. If it weren't going to happen, I wouldn't know how it was going to turn out. If I told you now how it will turn out, then it wouldn't happen and so it wouldn't turn out that way.

SATAN: Come again? GOD: Just trust me. SATAN: Then we have to go through this whole con-

versation to get the answer, though you know all the while what the answer will be?

GOD: It's not qu ite that cut and dried.

SATAN: You mean you don't know exactly what your answer will be?

GOD: Not with absolute certainty. SATAN : Oh , I see. You're saying t hat your actions

are not inevitab le. GOD: No. Probably what I do is inevitable. The un-

certainty is rather a matter of my knowing what inevitable thing I am going to do. You see, when I create a world , I know what will inevitably happen in that world because I created it so that such things would be inevitable. But of course, I d id not create myself, being eternal, and I don't have qu ite the same vantage point on myself.

SATAN : You mean to say that you don't know what you are going to do before you do it?

GOD: Oh , I generally have a pretty good idea. At fi rst, so to speak, I had no idea at all. Bu t I have lived an infin ite length of time, I have come to know myself pretty well, and I have found that I have a relatively unchanging character. It was when I rea lized how un- changing I am that I began to get bored. Still, I do sur- prise myself occasionally.

SATAN : Just a minute. You are perfectly good - yes? GOD: Perfectly. SATAN : And everything you do is for the best ? GOD: Yes. SATAN : Then it follows that you must know what

you are going to do. GOD: No. I mean superficially your logic is sound ,

but you are read ing too much in to it. I don't do things because they're best. Rather, they're best because I do t hem. Therefore, knowing that I'll do what's for the best amounts to nothing more t han knowing that I'll do what I do. Not a very helpfu l bit of information , you must admit.

SATAN : I suppose not. But, in any case, as to t his conversation, you don't know for certa in what answer you're going to give me.

GOD: Not for certain. There's a bit of gray area here. Possibly I am in for a bit of a change.

SATAN : Ah, you don't know how encou raged that makes me feel.

GOD: Of course I know how encouraged that makes you feel. I made it make you feel encouraged.

SATAN: Can we get on w ith it? GOD: Go ahead. SATAN: We do everyth ing we do because you make

us do it. That makes us feel li ke puppets. It's undigni- fi ed. We're not responsible for anything we do. We do good things all the time, but we don't get any cred it because it's really you doing t hem .

A Little Omn iscience Goes a Long Way 271

GOD: Surely you don't want me to make you do evil ?

SATAN : No. GOD: That wou ldn't make any sense. I can't make

you do evil. Whatever I made you do wou ld be good , because I made you do it.

SATAN : What I am ta lking about is control. Right now you have complete control over everyth ing we do. We would like to have some control over our lives.

GOD: Bu t you do have control. No one is shoving you around or chaining you down. You do whatever you want to do. How could anyone be more in control than t hat? As a matte r of fact, that is exactly as much control as I have over my li fe.

SATAN : But what we want, you make us want. No one makes you want what you want. We don't want you to control everyth ing we want and t hink. We don't want everything to be inevita ble.

GOD: In other words, you want a privilege that probably not even God enjoys.

SATAN : I d idn't think of it that way. I suppose I've made you angry.

GOD: No. I'm directing this conversation. So you don't want your thoughts and emotions ru led by my decrees? Nor any other decrees or laws, I suppose?

SATAN : No. GOD: Then aren't you saying t hat you want your

lives to be ru led by chance? SATAN: No. We don't want them to be ruled by

anything- except ourselves. We want control over our lives. GOD: I'm afraid you'll have to give me a bette r idea

of what it is you're after. SATAN : Look here. You're omniscient. Can't you at

least help us see what it is we're after, even if you de- cide not to grant it?

GOD: Even omn iscience can't see clarity in a vague idea. The opposite of inevitability is chance. It seems to me that you have to pick one or the other.

SATAN: Chance, then. GOD: If I grant you this chance you want, t hen that

means I'll have to be watching all the tim e to see what happens, constantly guard ing again st t he unexpected. T hat is qu ite a bit to ask of me, don't you t hink?

SATAN: You mean you can't foresee what happens by chance?

GOD: Of course not. SATAN: Bu t you're omniscient. You can see the

future.

2 72 Chapter 5 Free Will and Determ inism

GOD: Not the future proper. The future is what is not yet. If I could see it, it would be now, and hence not the future. As things stand, I know what will happen because I have made th ings so t hat they must happen that way.

SATAN : Well, suppose you did have to keep on guard . You're omnipotent. It wouldn't cost you much effort.

GOD: It is more a question of elegance than of effort.

SATAN : I'm only maki ng t he suggestion you made me make.

GOD: Fair enough. So you say you want chance. Or at least that you prefer it to inevitabili ty. I don't believe you have thought it out, but let's discuss it. You want a world in which nothing is predictable, solar systems spinning wil dly all over t he place, that sort of thing?

SATAN : No, not at all. Let t he planets and the plants and the animals rema in under your control. Just give independence- chance, if you will- to the thinking creatures.

GOD: Let's experiment a bit , shall we ? Come over here. You see Adam and Eve down there in the ga rden. I'll toss some chance into them. There. Watch and tell me what you see.

SATAN : Adam's stroll ing through the garden. He's looking to his right towa rd a berry bush. Uh-oh. Now his arms are fl aili ng about. Now he's rolling on t he ground, drooling. It looks as if he's having a fit.

GOD: A chance event. SATAN : But Eve looks qu ite normal. She's just

awakened, and she's yawning. GOD: Anyth ing can happen by chance, even the

normal things. SATAN: Obviously t he re's a prob lem with Adam,

and I think I see what it is. You have all owed chance to affect his mi nd and body. Bu t the body is not t he real Adam, it is merely an appendage. So whe n chance operates in his body, it does indeed control Adam. Confi ne the chance to h is m ind, and then Adam will be tru ly independen t . Would you do so? And w it h Eve as we ll.

GOD: As you say. Let's watch again . SATAN : Adam's getting up now. He's walking over

to a bush and picking some berries. You're not making him do that?

GOD: No. SATAN : This looks like it then. Adam in control . ..

oops! Now his arms are flailing. He's having tha t fit again. What happened?

GOD: First, by chance, he wanted to eat the berries. Now, by chance, he wants to roll on the grou nd and drool. The desires are happening by chance instead of my causing them. I can't tell what he's going to want next. Neither can he.

SATAN : And look at Eve. Good grief, she's talking to a snake. Weird.

GOD: Apparently she just got the urge. Are you ready?

SATAN : For what? GOD: You sa id you wanted me to give you chance. SATAN : No! Please don't! GOD: Why not? SATAN : That's horrible, having things happen to

you li ke that. There's no dignity there. I want to stay as I am.

GOD: Tha t's wise, I think. You may not have t he kind of control you want. Bu t then that kind of control is im poss ible. Inevitability or chance- those are the on ly options. And neither constitutes ultimate control over one's life. Bu t at least this way what happens to you will be orderly.

SATAN : I feel bette r now t hat we've talked this out. GOD: Actually, I'm sorry nothing came of our talk-

sorry the way I am about square circles. I cou ld use a little excitement.

SATAN : I won't take any more of your time to- day. Oh, but there is one other thing. Please take that chance out of Adam and Eve. I wou ldn't want that on my conscience.

Satan exits with a flutter of his mighty wings. GOD: As you say ... I suppose. On the other hand,

it wou ld be nice to have a part of the un iverse where there are surprises. It could prove interesting.

Prob ing Questio ns

I. Whar theory of free will (hard d eterminism, co1npacibilis1n, or libertarianism) best de- scribes how the world is for Saran? Do you accept ch is theory? Why or why noc?

2. In ch is s rory does God have free ,viii? Explain.

3. If you had ro d ecid e between inevicabil iry and chance, as Saran does, wh ich would you choose? Is there a th ird alcernacive? Whar ,vould a libertarian say about Saran's either/or h . ) c 0 1ce.

For Further Reading

Roderick C hisholm, Person and Object (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1976) . Ch isholms defense of a libertarian free will.

Randolph C larke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) . A lucid exam ination of various libertarian app roaches co free will.

Daniel Den nett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984). A clear and lively defense of compatibilism .

Ted H o nderich, How Free Are You?: The Determinism Problem (Oxfo rd : Oxford University Press, 2003) . An introduction to, a nd a novel view of, th e deter min ism problem.

Robert Kane, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Ne,v York: Oxford University Press, 2002). An an th ology covering more recent wo rk on free will , focus ing on ne,v ap- proaches to the traditional th eories.

Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2000) . An innovative defense of libertarianism and an ex- ceptionally clear critique of the most p romi nent versions of the theory.

Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 4th edition (Engle,vood C liffs, NJ : Prentice H all, 1992) . Contai ns a very straightfonvard defense of libertar ian ism.

Peter van In,vagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). An infl uential argu ment for incompatibili.sm.

Gary Watso n, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2003). A collectio n of some of the most influential discussions of free will from the last fi fty years.

For Further Reading 273

CH AP TER

KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM

CHAPT ER OBJ ECTIVES

6.1 OVERVIEW: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

• Understand t he nature of epis temology and t he ne cessary and s ufficie nt co nd ition s for proposit io na l kn owledge.

• Defi ne skepticism, cognitive relativism, subjective relativism, cultural relativism , a priori, a posteriori, rationalism, empiricism , skepticism, a n d subjective idealism.

6.2 THE RATIONALIST ROAD

• Understand t he nature of Plato's rationalism, h is not io n o f the Forms, and h is be lie f a bo ut in nate knowledge.

• Expla in t he point t hat Socrates wanted to prove by his conversation with t he slave boy.

• Expla in how Descartes arrived at his skepticism and how he

later came to the conclu s io n that he did possess knowled ge.

• Show how Descartes a rgues for his principle o f clear and d istinct ideas.

6.3 THE EMPIRICIST TURN

• Summa riz e Locke's critiq ue of innate ideas.

• Define primary and secondary q ualities.

• Summarize Locke's attempt to show that sense data a re p roof of the existence of an extern al world .

• Exp lain what Berkeley means by "to be is to be perceived."

• Understand how Berkeley argues fo r his t heory t hat material o bjects d o not exis t.

• St ate t he main d ifferences between Locke's and Hu me's emp1nc1sm.

• Explain why H ume believes t hat a ll theologica l and met aphysica l propositions are worth less.

• State Hume' s argument against the principle of ind uc tion.

6.4 THE KANTIAN COMPROM ISE

• Und erstand why Kant believes that h is t heory o f knowledge is like the Copern ican revolut io n .

• Define analytic statement, synthetic statement, a nd synthetic a priori knowledge.

• Explain how Kant 's t heory has both em piric is t a nd rationa list e lements .

• Summa rize Kant's explanation o f how synthetic a priori knowle dge is possible.

Overview: The Problem of Knowledge 2 75

6.5 A FEMI NIST PERSPECTIVE ON KNOWLEDGE

• List some ways that, accord ing to fem inis t s, "dom inant knowledge p ractices" di sadvantage women.

s tandpoint theory, and fem inist postmodernism.

• State t he cent ra l a im of fem in is t philosophy and of fem inist epis temology. • Summa rize the principa l claims

of fem inist empiric ism, femin ist

• Understand some of the c ritic isms that fem in is t s have lodged against fem inist postmodernism.

6.1 OVERVIEW: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

Th is is a serious question: Do you know anything? In other words, do you possess any knowledge? And here are some equally serious questions: If you do have kno,vl- edge, how did you attain it? And if you possess it, how much do you possess-that is, what is the extent of you r kno,vledge? Do you kno,v on ly the contents of your own m ind or only mathematical or logical truths? Do you know that there is a God, that o rdina ry physical objects exist, that there is an external world (one existing indepen- dently of your mind), that unobservable entities such as electrons a re real, that other m inds besides you r own exist, that events have occu rred before the present moment?

These questions probably seem odd to you, perhaps even absu rd. But among serious thinkers, they are neither. Trying to find good answers to these is the main business of epistemology, the ph ilosoph ical st udy of knowledge. It is the branch of philosophy that systematically investigates whether, how, and to what extent we kno,v things. For well over nvo thousand yea rs, philosophers have been searching for answers to these questions because, contrary to what most people believe, the answers are not obvious, and both the ask ing and the answering have theoretical and practical value. We value knowledge for its own sake, regardless of what we can do ,vith it. When we are at our best, we crave the light simply because it is the light. But we a lso value knowledge because it can guide us to ou r goals, steer us away from error, and help us succeed in life, however we define success. Knowledge is po,ver. Whatever our reply to the epistemological questions, if ,ve take them seriously, they surely will affect how ,ve see the ,vorld and ,vhat we do in it.

Kno,vledge co mes in different forms, and ph ilosophy is usually concerned w ith only one of them. Know ing what something feels like (for example, ,vhat influ- enza feels li ke) const itutes one form of knowledge. Knowing how to do someth ing

The o nly good is know- led ge and the only evi l is ignorance. -Socrates

Epistem ol ogy is the study of knowledge.

276 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

Propositional knowledge is knowled ge of a propos1no n.

\Vhcn you know a th ing, to hold that you kn ow it; and w he n you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it- this is knowledge. -Confucius

1 Do questions-such as "Is it raining?"- count as proposit ions?

SkepticJSm is the view that we lack knowledge in some funda me n tal way.

(for example, ho\v to throw a ba ll) constitutes another. Know ing that something is the case (such as knowing that an elm t ree gro\vS in the quad) is propositional knowled ge- kno\vledge of a proposition. A proposition is a statement that is ei- ther true or fals e, an assertion that something is or is not a fact. This kind of kno\vledge has been the main focus of ph ilosophers and is our primary concern in this chapter.

Philosophers going back as far as Plato have said that propositional kno\vledge has three necessary and sufficient cond itions: to know a propos ition, (I) you must believe it, (2) it must be true, and (3) you must have good reasons for-be justified in-believing it true. On this traditional account, merely believing something is not enough; \vhat you believe must be true. A belief does not count as knowledge un- less it is true. But a mere true bel ief is not knowledge either, because you can have a true belief and yet not genuinely know. Let's say you believe for no reason that th ree ducks are now S\vimming on Walden Pond, and suppose you r belief is true-there really are three ducks S\vimming on Walden Pond. Does you r true belief count as knowle.dge? Accord ing to the traditional view, no-because you have no reason to think that three ducks are now swimm ing on Walden Pond. You have only a true bel ief by accident, a lucky guess, and that's not kno\vledge. To have kno\vledge, your bel ief must be t rue, and you must have good reasons to believe it true. Knowledge, then, is true belief that is justified. Philosophers disagree about the exact natu re of the required justification, but most accept that knowledge is true belief that is in some sense backed by good reasons.

Much of the work in epistemology centers around the questions of \vhether we have kno\vledge and, if so, how much we have. Most ph ilosophers believe we have some knowledge but differ on its extent. They may ins ist that we possess kno\vledge of the ex istence of an external world, other minds, physical objecrs, the past and

future, or self-evident truths. But some philosophers embrace skepticism , the view that \Ve lack knowledge in some fun- damental \vay. Skeptics may deny that we have kno\vledge in all of the areas just mentioned or maintain that \Ve lack kno\vledge in only some of them. In any case, they hold that many or all of our beliefs are false or unfounded.

Some skeptics a rgue that we lack knowledge because we have no \vay of d istinguish ing benveen beliefs that we take to be instances of kno\vledge from beliefs that are clearly not instances of knowledge. For a ll we know, we could be halluci- nating, dreaming, in the grips of an illusion, o r mistaken for some other reason . How do we kno\v that we are not hallu- cinating o r dreaming right now? Hallucinations and dreams can seem as real as ou r "normal" experience. If we ca nnot distinguish these nvo, the skeptic says, then we ca nnot have kno\vledge.

Figure 6.1 Are you d reaming now? How can you tell?

Other skeptics raise doubts about the reliability of what we take to be our normal sou rces of knowledge-perception, memory, introspection, and reasoning. We realize that a ll

Overview: The Problem of Knowledge 2 77

WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE?

Cognitive Relativism Undone

Are you a cognitive rela tivist? Do you bel ieve chat truth is relative co persons or cul cu res- char the truth about something d epe nds o n ,vhat persons or cultures believe? If so, consider chis common-and pote nt-cricicis,n of che doctrine:

The most se rious flaw of relativism in all its fo rms is a purel y logica l o ne: It's se lf-re fu t ing because its truth implies its fa ls ity.

Accord ing to the relativist . .. everyth ing is relative . To s ay that every- th ing is relative is to say that no unre stricted universal generalizations are true (an unrestricted unive rsal gene ralizatio n is a statement to the effect that s omething holds for all individuals, societies, o r conce ptual schemes) . But the state me nt "No unrestricted un iversal generalizations a re true" is itse lf an unrestricted univers al generalization. So if relativism in a ny of its fo rms is true, it's false . As a resu lt, it canno t possibly be true.

Theodore Schick, Jr .• and Lewis Vaughn, How t o Th ink Abou t \Vcird Things (2011), 3 11.

Are you sti ll a cogn itive relativist?

these sources are fallible, that t hey sometimes lead us into error. Bue skeptics ask how we kno,v chat these sources a re not always in error. If a ll these sources are suspect, ,ve cannot use one co check a nother. We ca nnot, fo r example, use our sense of sight co check t he reliability of ou r sense of couch. And if ,ve chin k one mode of percep tion is more trusnvorchy than t he ochers, how do ,ve k now that? We seem forced once again into skepticism.

A nother view ch at challenges ou r commonplace id eas about k no,vledge is cognitive relativism, the doctrine chat the truth about so meth ing d epends on what perso ns o r cu ltures believe. The notion that truth depends o n what a person believes is k nown as subjective relativism, and t he id ea ch at truth depends on what a culture bel ieves is called cultural relativism. We no rmally assume that truth is object ive-chat it depend s o n the way t he world is. W hen ,ve assert a prop osition, ,ve generally believe chat the proposition is true if and only if it says the ,vay things are in realit y. Bue t he relativ ist rejects ch is vie,v, believing instead chat truth is relative co ,vh ac a person o r culcure accepts as true. Truth is a mat- te r of wh at a person or culcure believes-not a matter of ho,v the wo rld is. This mea ns chat a p roposition ca n be tr ue fo r o ne person, but not fo r a nother. I f you believe chat sheep can fl y, then it is true (for you) chat sheep can fl y. If someone else

Cognitive relativism is the doctrine that , he rruth abour somcrhing depends o n what persons o r cul ~ turcs: believe.

Subjective relativism is the view that right actions arc , hose e n dorsed by an individual.

Cultural r elativism is , he view that right actions arc those endorsed by one's cul tu re.

278 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

The recipe fo r perpetual ignorance is: be saris ..

fi ed wi th your opinions and content w ith your knowledge. -Elbert Hubbard

2 Are you a cultural relat ivist? Is the point about personal fa llib il - ity a va lid crit icism of the doctrine?

A p riori knowledge is knowledge gained in- dependend y of or prio r to se nse cxpcnc ncc.

A poste.riori know ~ ledge is knowledge thar depends entirely on sense cxpcncncc.

T rue knowledge exists in

knowing that you know not hing. -Socr.ues

Rationalism is the view thar through unaided rea- so n we can come to know

what the world is like.

Empiricism L~ the view t har our knowledge of the empirical world comes solely fro m sense cxpcncncc.

believes that sheep cannot Hy, then it is true (fo r him) that sheep can not Hy. You thereby can make something true by believing it to be true. Likewise, if a culture believes that the earth is Hat and that adu lterers should be beheaded, then it is true (for irs people) that the earth is Hat and that adulterers shou ld be beheaded.

If relativism in either form is correct, then kno,vledge would be easy to attain- perhaps a great deal easier than acquiring objective truth, which demands that our bel iefs somehow link up to the objective ,vorld. But for a variety of reasons, most philosophers have rejected relativism. For one thing, they say, the doctrine implies several absurdities that render it implausible. They point out, for example, that if we could make a statement true just by believing it to be true, we ,vould be infall ible. We could not possibly be in error about anything that we sincerely believed. We could never be mistaken about what time it is o r when the French Revolution took place or whether breaki ng a promise is morally per missible. Personal infallibility is, of course, absu rd, and this possibil ity seems to count heavily against subj ective rela- tivism. The same point ca n be made about cultural relativism.

Philosophers distinguish two ways to acquire knowledge: through reason and through sense experience. The former is called a priori; it yields knowledge gained independently of or prior to sense experience. The latter is known as a p osteriori; it gives us knowledge that depends e ntirely on sense experience. We can come to kno,v many propositions a priori-for example, that a ll bachelors are unmarried, that a ll triangles have three sides, that 2 + 3 = 5, and that something is either a cat or not a cat. We need not do a survey of bachelors to see if they really a re a ll unmarried; we can kno,v this just by thinking about it. And we know that "Something is either a cat or not a cat" is true; it is a simple logical truth-and we know it ,vithout hav ing to observe any cars. It seems that we can also come to kno,v many propositions a posteriori-for instance, that John the bachelor has red hair, that he just d re,v a tri- angle on paper, that he is holding five pencils, and that Tabby the cat is on the mat. To know these things, we must rely on our senses.

Through the centuries, philosophers h ave debate.cl whether ou r kno,vledge of the world is fundame ntally a priori o r a posteriori (if indeed we h ave kno,vledge), and these argumenrs continue today in many fo rms in both philosophy and science. On one side of this d ivide are the rationalis ts , ,vho bel ieve that through unaided reason we can come to know what the ,vorld is like. They maintain that some or all knowledge of the empi rical ,vorld is a priori, discoverable simply through the ,vorkings of our minds. O n the other side are the empiricis ts , who contend that our knowledge of the empirical world comes solely from sense experience. We acquire knowledge entirely a posteriori. We may come to know logical and mathematical truths throug h reason, but ,ve can kno,v nothing of empirical reality except through our senses.

At this point, you may find yourself being more sympathetic to the empiricists than to the rationalisrs. After all, you seem to acquire an enormous amount of information via your five senses. Through them, you grasp that the grass is g reen, the stove is hot, the music is loud, the lime is tart, and the rose is sweet. But what can you know through reason alo ne? Rationalists would say that you ca n know a g reat deal. Without making any empirical observations, mathematicians can not

Overview: The Problem of Knowledge 2 79

o nly discover ne\v mathematical truths, but a lso develop mathematical models chat can accurately describe the empirical \vorld. They can, fo r example, accurately p re- d ict the existence of astronomical objecrs and their movements without o nce look ing through a telescope. Likewise, we k now the fundame ntal truths of logic, \vichouc which reasoning itself wou ld be impossible. We k now, for example, chat nothi ng can both h ave a property a nd lack it at the same time, a nd chat for any particula r property, everything either has it or lacks it. Thus we k now withou t looking chat nothing can both be a dog a nd not be a dog at the same time, there are no squa re circles, a nd married bachelors don't ex ist. Some rationalises have gone further and asserted that reason alo ne can reveal the most important, basic truths about the world-such as "Every event has a cause" a nd "The shortest d istance between two poi nts is a stra ig ht line."

Many of the greatest thinke rs in h istory have taken the rationalist app roach co k no\vledge. Among these \Ve ca n count Plato (c. 427-347 BCE), Rene D escartes (1596-1650), Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), a nd Gottfried Leibn iz (1646-1716). The most influential rationalise theory comes from Descartes, the invento r of ana- lytic geometry and fou nder of modern ph ilosophy. He chinks sense experience is a n unreliable source of k no\vledge, so he looks co reason co give all o ur k no\vl- edge a fo undation as fir m as chat \vh ich supports unshakeable mathematical truths. Th rough reason he hopes co defeat skepticism. H is method is first co dou bt ev- erything th at he cannot be cer tain of, a p rocess chat leaves hi m kno\ving ha rdly a nything. Bue through reason alo ne he soon uncovers wh at he considers co be self- ev idenc, certa in truths from which he derives ocher indubitable p ropos itions. In chis way he tries co build an edifice of knowledge that, like an inverted pyramid, rests on o ne or nvo rock-solid fo undation scones chat support a ll the others.

The empiricist view of k nowledge has been advanced most famo usly by the British empiricists John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), and David H ume (1711-1776). They want co t urn D escartes' pyramid righcside up, rest- ing all k nowledge on a vase foundation of sense data (the content of our experience) chat supports the upper stones. Among these th inkers, H ume probably has been the most influential, arguing fo r a n uncompromising empiricism chat leads to a far-reaching skepticism chat not a ll empiricists have sha red. H e holds chat all our kno\vledge (aside from pu rely logical truths) is derived from sense perceptio ns o r ideas about chose perceptions. Like other empi ricisrs, he believes chat the mind is empty-a blank slate-until experience gives it content. We ca n have kno\vledge of something only if it can be sensed, and any proposition chat does not refer co what can be sensed is mean ingless. G uided by chis latter empiricist principle, H ume is d riven to skepticism about many things chat ochers have taken for granted, including the existence of the external world, causation, a conti nuing self, rel igious doctrines, a nd inductive reasoni ng. H is skepticism arises because he th in ks that even though a ll our knowledge is based on sense experience, \Ve cannot k now how the objecrs of our sense experience are related. We cannot k now, fo r example, chat there is a cause-a nd-effect relationship between associated objects. To infer such a con nection is co go beyond what ou r senses tell us. Our notions of causal connectio ns are merely matters of custom and habit.

To be conscious that you

arc ignorant is a great s tep to knowledge. -Benjamin Disraeli

3 What fac t s a bo ut the world ca n we kn ow based sole ly o n our re aso ning?

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I t h ink we ought always to entertain our o pinions with some measure of dou bt. I shouldn't wish

people dogm at ically ro believe any philosophy, nor even mmc. -Bertrand Russe ll

Subjective idealism is the doctrine that all that exist arc m inds and their ideas.

Applying his own theory of knowledge, John Locke rejeccs skepticism about external objects. Like a good empiricist, he believes chat all \Ve are di reccly a\vare of is sense data. Our sense experience is caused by external objects, and we can have knowledge of chose objects because our sense data resemble or represent chem.

Berkeley, like Locke, also thinks his brand of empi ricism can defeat che skeptic, but he differs \vich Locke and ocher empiricists o n how sense data rel ace co the ex- ternal \vorld. H e accepts che empiricist notion of our being a\vare o nly of sense data but rejeccs Locke's belief in che existen ce of material objects. H e argues chat not on ly do we know just our own ideas, but there is no reason co suppose that they resemble or are cause.cl by material objects. Locke, like most people, presumes chat material objects exist independencly of our sense experience, chat they are, even when we do not perceive chem. Bue Berkeley d enies this, insisting that it is logically impossible for physical objects co exist, for we ca nnot "conceive chem existing unconceived." A ll chat exist, he says, are minds and their ideas, a vie\v kno\vn as subjective idealism .

Immanuel Kane (1724- 1804) was shocked by the skepticism that seeme.d co be lurk ing in empiricism in genera l and in che thoroughgoing empiricism of Hume in pa rticular. Hume's view is chat we conscancly experience councless sensations associ- ace.d in various ways, but \Ve cannot know about any necessary con nections between chem, che kind of connections that a re che central focus of science. Kane agrees that all our kno\vledge begins \vich che ra\v data of sen se experience, but he argues that our minds impose order o n it. Like a cookie cutter scamping out shapes in dough, ou r minds mold ou r sensations into conceptual patterns chat determine how we see che \vorld. Thus our minds impress che concepcs of cause and effect, space, and time onto our experience. Therefore \Ve can know-a p riori-chat there a re necessary connections benveen causes and effeccs and chat space and time have definite char- acteristics, because our mental po\vers impose chis structure on our perceptions. In chis way, Kant cries co save science and our everyday experience from Hume's rad ical skepticism. In che p rocess he initiates two hundred yea rs of critical scrutiny of his ideas by generations of philosophers.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQ UING PHI LOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 6.1

I. Consider che skeptic's charge chat we can never be confident about che reliability of our normal sources of knowledge (perception, memory, introspection, and reasoning). Does it fo llow from t he face that we are sometimes mistaken when we rely o n t hese sou rces chat \Ve are always m istaken? How \vould you respond co che skeptic?

2. Does cognitive relativism really imply that persons or cult u res are infallible? If so, \vhy \vould chis be a problem for che cogn itive relativist? Do you agree with the doctrine's critics o n chis point? Why o r \vhy not? (c,int.)

The Rationa I ist Road 281

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS cont. SECTION 6.1

3. Suppose a rationalist declares that scientists can know (\vit hout once look ing through a telescope) about the physical characteristics of planets in our solar system. Would this be a plausible claim? Why or \vhy not?

4 . Suppose Locke is r ight that all we are ever d irectly aware of is sense data. Would th is fact make it impossible to know about external objects? How could \Ve ever know th at there is someth ing on the other side of our sense data? Explain how Locke's view can lead to skepticism.

5. Berkeley den ies the existence of material objects. H ow would you argue t hat he is mistaken about t his? Hi nt: Why do you normally assu me t hat material objects exist and are not merely creations of you r mind? Why do you assume that the \vorld exists \vh ile you are sleeping?

6.2 THE RATIONALIST ROAD

So rationalists hold t hat \Ve have kno\vledge, that skepticism is false, and that t hrough reason we can come to know the most important t ruths of reality. They differ, ho\vever, on ho\v such knowledge is pos- s ible and how t hey a rrive at their rationalist conclusions. Historically, two giants stand on the long road of rationalist thought: Plato at t he beginning in ancient Greece and Desca rtes in Europe at the intersec- tion of modern philosophy and science.

Plato's Rationalism

Plato maintained that sense experience alone could not be the source of kno\vledge, although many of his contemporaries claimed other\vise. Some of them assumed that since knowledge must be based on sense experience, and since sense experience can vary from person to person

Figure 6.2 Plato (c. 429-347 see).

or culture to culture, cognitive relativism must be true. If one person says a grape is sour and another says it's sweet, there must be no objective fact of the matter, just t ruth relative to different persons. Other thinkers thought that si nce our perceptions are often illusory, distorted, or otherwise m istaken, sense experience is not a reliable source of kno\vledge. And since our perceptions are the only possible route to kno\vledge, we must not kno\v anything. Thus skepticism, they said, is the p roper epistemological attitude. Plato thought that our perceptions \Vere just as unreliable a guide to genuine kno\vledge as the relativists and skeptics assumed. But he argued that since we clearly do have kno\vledge, we must derive it from a reliable source-and that source has to be reason.

Every great advan ce in

natural knowledge has involved the absolute rejec- tion of a uth o riry. -Thomas H . Huxley

282 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

4 Is the number five an object ive entity? Is the p reposition over ob - jectively real? Exp la in your reasons. Do your answers to these q ues- tions g ive a ny support to Plato's notion of the Forms?

All men by nature desire kn owledge. -Aristotle

Plato deduced that ,ve must be able to acqui re k nowled ge because we ca n identify false beliefs, and ,ve obviously possess kno,vledge because we can grasp, through reason, mathematical, concept ual, and logica l truths. We kno,v that 2 + 5 = 7; that a triangle has three sides; and that if A is la rger than B and B is larger than C, then A is la rger than C. Plato pointed out that these truths a re objective: They are true regardless of what ,ve think. We do not invent them o ut of our imaginations; we discover them . No matter ho,v hard we try, ,ve cannot make 2 + 5 equal 9. Plato reasoned that if such truths a re object ive, they must also be about real th ings. They must refer to an independently existing, immaterial reality that is beyond sense experience. I n addition, he insisted, these truths must a lso be immutable and eterna l, ex isting in the immaterial realm unchanged fo r all ti me. On ly through o ur powers of reason can we reach beyond the physical world to take hold of real knowledge of fundamental truths. Sense experience, in contrast, can yield only trans ito ry, ever-changing information-mere opinion that is vastly inferior to everlasting truths.

So for Plato, reality comprises two worlds: the fleeting world of the physical ac- cessed through sense experience and the eternal, nonphysical, changeless world of genuine knowledge accessed o nly th rough reason. In spelling out the contencs of t he latter, Plato articulates the central notion of his philosophy: the Forms. The Forms (also called Ideas) are perfect conceptual models for every existing thing, residing on ly in the eternal world penetrated by reason a lone. They a re the ideals, or stan- dards, that ,ve can first come to know and then use to assess the notions and objects ,ve encounter in our lives. Through reason, we can access the Form of "table" and thus know the ideal template of"table." W ith this kno,vledge ,ve can understand the essence of a table and use th is understanding to make judgments about a ll phys ical tables . Like,vise, when ,ve access the Form "courage," we know ,vhat the ideal of courage is and can use this knowledge to appraise a particu lar instance of courage. As Plato sees it, the truly real ,vorld is the world of the Forms-the domain of the perfect and everlasting. W ith knowledge of the really real, we can understand the "less real" realm of the imperfect and t ransitory.

In Plato's account, the Forms a re universals-properties that ca n be had by sev- eral particular things. Every blue thing is a pa rticular instance of the universal prop- erty of blueness . Every triangular thing is a pa rticular example of the universal of triangularity. Particulars reside in the tempora ry, imperfect world of the material; universals are found in the eternal, perfect world of the really real. We can rise above mere opinion and attain knowledge o nly by reasoning our way to the Forms. To do this is to travel down the rationalist road marked by Plato, the greatest rationalist of all time.

Ho,v is it that we seem to have kno,vledge of the Forms, however dimly, even though ou r senses can tell us nothing about them? Our sense experience can ac- quaint us only ,vith m aterial objeccs, but the Forms a re not material. It's as if these universals were already in our minds ,vaiting to be uncovered. Plato's answer- and the ans,ver of most other rationalises-is the doctrine of innate knowledge. He thinks that knowledge of these immaterial ideals is already present at birth, in- scribed in our minds (our immortal souls) in a previous ex istence. We are born w ith

The Rationa I ist Road 283

this knowledge, and we somehow acquired it before our present lives. Accessing this kno\vledge, then, is a matter of using reason to recall what we prev iously knew in another life.

To many ears, this recall theory may sound preposterous. But in Meno, Plato attempts a brilliant demonstration of it. In the dialogue, he depicrs the character of

Socrat es discussing innate kno\vledge with Meno. To prove his point, Socrates calls over an unschooled slave boy and asks him a series of questions about a geometry problem. Socrates dra\vS a nvo-foot-by-two-foot square (four square feet) and then t ells the boy to dra\v another one that is twice the size of the first. Initially the boy thinks that doubling the length of each side of the square \viii produce a square twice as large as the first. So he draws a four-foot-by-four-foot square (sixteen square feet) but sees right away that that ans\ver cannot be correct. As Socrates asks fur- ther questions, the boy comes to the right answer on his own . Socrates says that he merely helped the boy recollect knowledge that he already possessed, bringing innate kno\vledge to consciousness.

Plato, Meno

Soc. What do you say of him [the s lave boy], Meno? Were not all these answers given out of his own head?

Men. Yes, they were all his own. Soc. And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know? Men. True. Soc. And yet he had those notions in him? Men. Yes. Soc. Then he who does not know still has true notions of that which he does not

know? Men. He has. Soc. And at present these notions are just waken ing up in him , as in a dream; but

if he were frequent ly asked the same questions, in different forms, he wou ld know as well as any one at last?

Men. I dare say. Soc. Without any one teach ing him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he

is only asked questions? Men. Yes. Soc. And this spontaneous recovery in him is recollection? Men. True. Soc. And this knowledge which he now has m ust he not either have acqu ired or

always possessed? Men. Yes. Soc. Bu t if he always possessed this knowledge he wou ld always have known; or if

he has acquired the knowledge, he could not have acquired it in this life, un less he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the same with a ll geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has any one ever taught him? You must know that, if, as you say, he was born and bred in your house.

5 Socrates explains the boy's understanding of geometry by insisting that the boy was recol- lecting knowledge ga ined in another life. What is a p lausible a lternative exp lanat ion for the phenomenon? Which explanation seems closer to the truth?

284 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

Men. And I am certain that no one ever did teach him. Plato, Meno Soc. And yet has he not the knowledge?

Men. That, Socrates, is most certa in . Soc. But if he did not acqu ire this knowledge in t his life, then clearly he must have

had and learned it at some other time? Men. That is evident. Soc. And that must have been the time when he was not

a man? Men. Yes. Soc. And if there have been always true thoughts in him ,

both at the t ime when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him , his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he a lways either was or was not a man?

Men. That is clear. Soc. And if the truth of a ll things a lways existed in the sou l,

then the sou l is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what you do not know, or rather do not remem ber.

Men. I fee l, somehow, that I like what you are saying. Soc. And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some th ings I have

said of which I am not altogether confi dent. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we th ink that we ought to inquire, than we s hould have been if we indulged in the id le fancy that there was no knowing and no use in searching after what we know not; - that is a theme upon wh ich I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.'

Figure 6.3 Roman fresco painting of Socrates.

Opinio n is t he medium between knowledge and ignorance.

-Plato

The re comes a time when the mind takes a h ighe r plane of knowledge but can never prove how it got there. -Albert Einstein

Many thinkers reject Plato's notion of a preexisting state in which we acqu ire knowledge, and they are skeptical of che claim chat we are born ,vich knowledge. Bue che idea of innate knowledge in some form is still attractive co rationalise philosophers, for it would expla in ho,v we could possess knowledge ,vich- ouc relying on sense experience. In any case, both rationalists and empiricists muse provide an explanation of ho,v ,ve seem co know logical and mathematical truths (and perhaps scientific truths) chat we do not arrive at through our senses.

Descartes' Doubt

In Desca rtes' time, che ,vorld muse have seemed co many co be tu rn ing upside down.

Time-honored ideas, established religious doctrines, and t raditional attitudes were being called into question by both new discoveries in science and radically different religious outlooks on che Continent. Th is ,vas che era of Galileo, C-opernicus, Kepler, Bacon, Newton, and Marcin Luther-thinkers ,vho ,vere dismantling che old ideo-

logical structures piece by piece. Into chis ,vorld of upheaval and change came che brilliant Descartes, determined co see if there could be any epistemological certain- ties in an age of doubt. He hoped chat kno,vledge could be given a foundat ion as sturdy as chat ,vhich buttressed mathematics. If only kno,vledge of che ,vorld could

be as certain as knowledge of geometry!

Oddly enough, Descartes begins his quest for kno\vledge by first plunging into skepticism. He sees that a great many things he thought he knew appear now to be false. So he decides to "raze everything to the g round and begin again" from a firm foundat ion, doubting all beliefs except those that are "certain and indubitable," be-

liefs that cannot possibly be false. Only bel iefs t hat are certain can count as kno\vl-

edge, he says. If he has reason to doubt any of them, they are not knowledge. Here he is at the st art of his quest:

Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy

The Rationa I ist Road 285

It is now some years s ince I detected how many were the fa lse beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as t rue, and how doubtful was everything I had since con- structed on this basis; and from that t ime I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had former ly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundat ion , if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences . But as th is enterprise appeared to be a very great one, I waited until I had attained an age so mature that I cou ld not hope that at any later date I should be better fitted to execute my design. Th is reason caused me to delay so long that I should fee l that I was doing wrong were I to occupy in deliberation the time that yet remains to me fo r action. To-day, then, since very opportunely for the plan I have in view I have delivered my mind from every care [and am happily agitated by no passions] and since I have procured for myself an assu red leisure in a peaceable retirement, I shall at last seriously and free ly add ress myself to the general upheaval of all my former opinions.

Now for th is object it is not necessary that I shou ld show that all of these are fa lse-I shall perhaps never arrive at this end. But inasmuch as reason already per- suades me that I ought no less carefu ll y to withhold my assent from matters wh ich are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly to be false, if I am able to find in each one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the whole . And for that end it will not be requ isite that I shou ld examine each in particu lar, wh ich would be an endless undertaking; for owing to the fact that the destruction of the foundations of necessity brings with it the downfall of the rest of the edifice, I shall on ly in the first place attack those principles upon which all my former opinions rested.•

Desca rtes soon finds reason to doubt all beliefs base.cl on sense experience, arriv- ing at th is conclusion via h is famous dream argument. He notes that " there are no certain indications by which \Ve may clearly distinguish \vakefulness from asleep."3

Our d reams can seem like reality, and in d reams we often don't know we are dream-

ing. So it is possible that we are dreaming now, he says, and that what we take to be the real world is in fact not real at al l. More to the point, it is possible that our sense exper ience-by \vhich \Ve presume to know material reality-is just a dream. If so, we can't be certain about anything we think \Ve know through our senses. Therefore, sense experience can yield no knowledge.

286 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy

6 Is there any way you can tell whether you are awake or dream- ing? Is Descart es right that he cannot tell the difference? Explain.

7 Is there any way you can determ ine whether you are living in the Mat rix? Can you tell whether an evil gen ius is syst ematica lly deceiv- ing you? Why or why not ?

Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy

All that up to the presen t time I have accepted as most true and certain I have learned either from the senses or thro ugh the senses; but it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive, and it is wiser not to trust entirely to any thing by which we have once been deceived.

Bu t it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things which a re hardly perceptible, or very far away, there are yet many others to be met with as to which we cannot reasona bly have any doubt, although we recognise them by their means. For exam ple, there is the fact that I am here, seated by the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and other simi lar matters . ...

At the same t ime I mus t remember that I am a man, and tha t consequently I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams represen ting to myself the same things or sometimes even less proba ble things, than do those who are insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to me t hat in the night I dreamt that I fo und my- self in t his particular place, t hat I was dressed and seated nea r t he fire, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed! At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is deli berately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; wha t happens in sleep does not appea r so clear nor so distinct as does all t his. Bu t in think- ing over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by simi lar ill usions, and in dwelling carefu lly on this reflection I see so manifes tly that there are no certain ind ications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from s leep t hat I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuad ing me t hat I now dream .•

After chis insight, Descartes d iscovers chat his skepticism goes even deeper. Sup- pose, he says, chat an ev il genius o r god has sec out co systematically deceive me. This bei ng could delude me about every k ind of thought I could possibly have. I can't be sure chat ch is is not che case. I can't be certain chat a ll my thoughts are not che work of an evil entity chat in fuses my mind with false sensations and ideas, mak ing an external reality appear co ex ist. And if I am not certa in of chis, I can't k now a nything chat I previously choughc I kne\v, including such seemingly o bvious th ings as che truths of mathematics.

Nevertheless I have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an all-powerful God ex- isted by whom I have been crea ted such as I am. Bu t how do I know tha t He has not brought it to pass t hat there is no earth, no heaven , no extended body, no magni tude, no place, and that nevertheless [I possess the perceptions of all these things and tha t] they seem to me to exist jus t exac tly as I now see them? And , besides, as I sometimes imagine t hat others deceive themselves in the t hings which they t hink they know best, how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I add two and three, or count the sides of a squa re, or judge of things yet simple r can be imagined ?I

As we have seen, D escartes' assumpt ion is chat knowle.dge requires certa int y.

He holds chat for beliefs co count as kno\vledge, we muse be certain of chem-they muse be so \vell supported as co be beyond all possible doubt. Bue some philoso- phers claim chat chis requ irement fo r knowle.dge secs che bar coo h ig h. They reject Descartes' skeptical a rgumencs because they are convinced chat knowledge demands not beyond-all-doubt certainty, but on ly reasonable g rounds for believ ing. After all,

The Rationa I ist Road 2 87

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Living in the Matrix

Descartes' evil genius scenario is the forerunner of some similar what-if tales cold by philoso- phers and ochers in our o,vn rimes. In one of chem, you are not ac che ,nercy of a ,nalicious demon; you are instead a brain in a var of chemicals in a laboratory. Your brain is hard-,vired co a computer, which a brilliant (hue probably crazy) scientist is using co give you experiences char are indistinguishable from chose you ,night have if you ,vere not a ,vired-up marinating brain. The question is, H ow could you ever be certain d1ac you are not such a brain in a var?

The same sort of question arises about che predicament of humans in che movie The Matrix. Intelligent computers have enslaved che human race, encasing everyone in pods and eleccronically feed ing simulations of the rea l world into their brains. As Christopher Grau says,

These creatures have fed Neo [the movie's protag- onist] a s imu lation t hat he couldn't possibly help but take as t he real thing. What's worse, it isn't clear how any of us can know with certainty that we are not in a position similar to Neo before his "rebirth." ... A viewer of The Matrix is naturally led to wonder: how do I know I am not in the Matrix?

Christopher Grau, "Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience

Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix," in Ph ilosophers Explore the Matrix, ed. Christopher Grau (New York: Oxford University Press,

2005), /0- 23.

Figure 6.4 The Matrix, like a lot of other movies, raises philosophical questions- specifically, epistemological questions.

Some philosophers think the skeptical implications of Matrix-type scenar- ios can be countered through an argument based on inference to the best explanation. What would such an argument look like? Do you agree that it can successfully counter the skeptica l scenarios?

they say, ,ve often claim co kno,v many p ropositions that are not certain. We insist that ,ve kno,v chat grass grows, chat some dogs have fleas, that Africa exists, and

that Abraham Lincoln lived and died in America-yet none of these statements is beyond a ll possible doubt.

Information L\ not

knowledge. -Albert Einscein

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PHILOSOPHY LAB - Imagine char you and a friend are looking ar an especially bright light in rhe night sky. You chink rhe light is an aircraft; your friend believes it is a twinkl ing star. To you, rhe light seems to move; to your friend, it seems srationary. When you view it from rhe ground, it looks ell iptical, bur from your second-story windo,v, it looks c ircular. You judge ir robe close, perhaps only a couple of miles away. You can make our the craft's nose and rail, the outl ine of rhe ,vings, and tiny dors char must be the windows. You may even hear rhe drone of its engines. After a half hour, the light has remained in exactly the same position in the sky. On your radio, you hear a newscast about ho,v bright and beautiful the planer Venus is ronighr- posirioned as it is in rhe very same portion of the sky char you have been observing. You have been ,vrong about everything, your m ind has shaped your perceptions, your perceptions of rhe same objecr have been differenr from different angles, and your friend's observations and your o,vn have differed dramatically.

If your senses can be this fraught with inconsistencies, discrepancies,

and errors (and they often are), how can you ever be sure that the

world is as it appears to be? Can you rea lly know anything? How

would you answer these skeptical concerns?

Descartes' Certainty

Ad ri ft in doubt, Descartes ,vonders whether there is anything at all he can know. Bue just ,vhen it seems that he can kno,v nothing, he comes upon a truth that he cannot possibly doubt: H e exisrs:

Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy

The Med itatio n of yesterday fi lled my mind wi th so m any doubts that it is no longe r in my power to fo rget them. And yet I do not see in what m anner I ca n resolve them; and, just as if I had all of a sudde n fa lle n into very deep wate r, I a m so disco ncerted that I ca n neithe r make certa in of set ting m y feet o n t he bot tom, nor can I swim and so support myself on t he surface. I shall nevertheless make an effort a nd follow anew the sam e path as that on which I yesterday e nte red , i.e. I shall proceed by setting aside all that in wh ich the least doubt could be supposed to exist , just as if I had discove red

290 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy

PH I LOSO PH ERS AT WORK

Rene Descartes

Descartes (I 59~ J 650) d id h is philosophical ,vork in a time of incelleccual, scientific, and religious chan ge, an era of revolutionary new chinking char would eventu- ally transform the Western world. He ,vas a conce,nporary

of Gal ileo and Kepler, con1ing along afi:er Copernicus Figure 6.5 Rene Descartes (1596- d id his work and before Ne,vcon did h is. While trying 1650), philosopher, mathematician, co reconcile che o ld ideas with che new, he sparked a and e minent rational ist. quiet revolution of his own and became che father of ,nodern philosophy.

He ,vas born in La H aye, France, educated in phi losophy and mathe,nacics ar che Jesuit College of La Fleche in Anjou, and trained in che law ar Poiciers. He served for a whi le in che Dutch army, where he d id much of h is early phi losoph ical chinking, supposed ly inspired by drea,ns he had wh ile sleeping in a "srove-heared room."

He ,vas such a bright s tudent char he easily advanced beyond h is teachers, and he qu ickly realized chat their arguments and reasoning were defective. Knowl- edge in general, he thought, is on very shaky ground, and char scare of affairs is

But after I have recognised that there is a God- because at the same time I have also recognised that all things depend upon Hi m, and that He is not a deceiver, and from that have inferred that what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fa il to be true- although I no longer pay attention to the reasons for which I have judged this to be true, provided that I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it no contrary reaso n can be brought forward which could ever cause me to doubt of its truth; and thus I have a true and cer- tain knowledge of it. And this same knowledge extends likewise to all other things which I recollect having formerly demonstrated, s uch as the truths of geometry and the like; for what can be alleged against them to cause me to place them in dou bt? Will it be said that my nature is such as to cause me to be frequently deceived? Bu t I already know that I cannot be deceived in the judgment whose grounds I know clearly. Will it be said that I formerly held many things to be true and certain which I have afterwards recognised to be false? But I had not had any clear and distinct knowledge of these things, and not as yet knowing the ru le whe reby I assure myself of the truth, I had been impelled to give my assent from reasons which I have since recognised to be less strong tha n I had at the time imagined them to be. What furthe r objection can then be raised ? That possibly I am dreaming (an objection I myself made a little while ago), or that all the thoughts which I now have are no more true than the phantasies of my dreams? But even though I slept the case would be the same, for all that is clearly present to my mind is absolutely true.8

Being a thoroughgoing rationalist, Descartes believes that he apprehends substan- tial truths about the ,vorld through reason. He would admit that th rough perception

The Rationa list Road 291

intolerable. So he sec our on his long quest for knowledge char ,vas as logical and certain as a marhemarical proof. Along rhe ,vay, he reshaped n1arhe1narics by in- venting coord inate geometry. (Re,nember "Carresian coordinates"?)

H e developed a rarional isric theory of knowledge ,vhose scarring point was a recognition of personal existence ("I ch ink therefore I a,n"). Reason is rhe source of subscanrial kno,vledge, and sense experience has on ly a subord inate role. H is episten1ology ,vould be influentia l and controversia l for centuries co come. H is metaphysics has also affected succeeding generations. H e posited a stark division bet\veen ,nind and marrer, wirh rhe £\VO somehow inreracring (an inreracrion char he could nor adequately explain). His Discourse on the Method was published in 1637, Meditations on First Philosophy in 1641, Principles of Philosophy in 1644, and The Passions of the Sou/in 1649.

In 1649 he agreed co ruror rhe phi losoph ically minded Queen Kristina of S,veden. Bur rhe work de,nanded an unpleasant departure fro,n his usua l routine of sleeping in: H e was asked co begin lessons ar 5:00 a.m.! The change allegedly caused his de,nise; he conrracred pneun1onia and d ied. (Another notable ph iloso- pher, Grotius, had visited Kristina in 1644 and suffered an identical fare. Kristina seems co have been very rough on famous phi losophers.)

he learns simple facts such as the color of a Ro,ver and the position of the sun in the sky. But in many other cases, he says, kno,vledge of the external world is obtained through an " intuition of the mind," not sense data. H ere is Descartes explaining this point:

Let us begin by considering the commonest m atters, those which we believe to be the most distinctly comprehended, to wit, the bod ies which we touch and see; not indeed bod ies in general, for these general ideas are usually a little more confused, but let us consider one body in particular. Let us take, for exam ple, this piece of wax: it has been taken quite freshly from the hive, and it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey which it contains; it still retains somewhat of the odour of the flowers from which it has been culled; its colour, its figure, its size are apparent; it is hard, cold, easily handled, and if you strike it with the finger, it will emit a sound. Finally all the things which are requisite to cause us distinctly to recognise a body, are met with in it. Bu t notice t hat while I speak and approach the fire what remained of the taste is exhaled, the smell evaporates, the co- lou r alters, the figure is destroyed, the size increases, it becomes liq uid, it heats, scarcely can one handle it, and when one strikes it, no sound is emitted. Does the same wax remain after this change? We m ust confess that it rem ains; none would judge otherwise. What then did I know so distinctly in this piece of wax? It could certainly be nothing of all that the senses brought to my notice, since all these things which fall under taste, smell, sight , touch, and hearing, are found to be changed, and yet the same wax remains ....

We must then gra nt t hat . . . it is my mind alone which perceives . . . this piece of wax .. .. But what is thi s piece of wax which ca nn ot be understood excepti ng by the

Rene De scarte s, Meditations on First Philosophy

9 Does Descartes succeed in showing that knowledge of the external world is ga ined by a n int uitio n of the mind? Does his a rgume nt show that e mpiricism is fa lse? Why o r why not?

6.3 THE EMPIRICIST TURN

Mose empiricists have rejected skepticism while denyi ng ra- tio nalise claims (such as the doctrine of innate ideas), building their theories of kno\vledge on the supposed firmer g round of sense experience. Bue the differences among the greatest empiricists a re stark. Locke argues chat we ca n know much about things external co ou r minds; Berkeley agrees chat we can have knowledge but den ies the reality of material objects; and Hume insists chat the scope of our knowledge is much narro\ver than most people realize, ra ising skeptical doubts about the ex istence of the external world and the inductive methodology of science.

Locke

The Emp iricist Turn 293

In Locke's philosophical masterwork, An Essay Concern- ing Human Understanding (1689), he builds a case aga inst rationalism and for a thoroughgoing empiricism. First, he contends chat the rationalise notion chat \Ve a re bo rn with kno\vledge ("innate p rincip les," as he says) already imprinted on ou r m inds is unfounded. The rationalise argues, says Locke, chat since all people seem co possess knowledge of cer- Figure 6.7 John Locke (1632-1704).

cain universal p rinciples (s uch as truths of logic), chis knowl- edge muse be inborn. Ho\v else cou ld everyone have come by chis kno\vledge? Locke replies chat there are no such universal princip les, and even if there \vere, they could h ave easily arisen through sense experience. They need not be present at birch. H ere is Locke's critique of innate ideas:

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

1. The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate. It is an established opinion amongst some m en, t hat there are in the unders tanding certain innate principles; some prim ary notions, characters , as it were, stamped upo n t he mind of man, which t he soul receives in its very first being; and brings into t he world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the fa lseness of this supposition, if I should only shew (as I hope I shall in the fol lowing parts of t his discou rse) how men, barely by the use of their natura l faculties, may attain to all t he knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such origin al notions o r p rincip les. For I im agine any one will eas ily grant, that it would be impe rtinen t to suppose, the ideas of colours inn ate in a creature, to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive t hem by the eyes, from external o bjects: And no less unreasonable wou ld it be to attribute several t ruths to t he imp ress io ns of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in o urselves

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10 Locke says that universal agreement on principles does not prove that they are in- nate. Why does he say this? Is he right?

11 In response to Locke's point about ch ildren, suppose a rationalist insists that ch ildren's minds are not fully developed and so cannot yet have knowledge of innate principles-therefore, their lack of innate knowledge does not prove anything. Is th is a good argument?

faculties, fit to attain as easy and cer tain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind .

Bu t because a man is not permitted withou t censure to foll ow his own thoughts in the search of truth , when they lead him ever so li ttle out of the common road ; I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opin ion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be considered by t hose who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth , wherever t hey fi nd it.

2. General assent, the great argument. There is nothing more common ly taken for granted, t han that there are certa in principles , both speculative and practica l, (for they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind: Wh ich t herefore, they argue, must needs be the constant im pressions, which the sou ls of men receive in their fi rst bein gs, and which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily and rea lly as t hey do any of their inherent faculties.

3. Universal consent proves nothing. This argument, drawn from universal con- sent, has this misfo rtune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it wou ld not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shewn how men may come to that un iversal agreement, in the th ings they do consent in, which I presume may be done.

4. What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; not universally assented to. But, wh ich is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove inn ate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such; because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the specu lative, and insta nce in those magnified principles of dem- onstration; "Whatsoever is, is;" and "It is impossible for the same thi ng to be and not to be;" which, of all others, I thin k have the most all owed title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxim s universally received, that it wi ll , no dou bt , be thought strange, if any one shou ld seem to question it. Bu t yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an un iversal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom t hey are not so m uch as known.

5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, etc. For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: It seem ing to me near a contradiction, to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not; im printing if it signify any thing, being nothing else, but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to im print any th ing on the m ind, without the mind's perceiving it seems to me hardly intell igible. If therefore children and idiots have sou ls, have minds, with those im pressions upon them, they must unavoida bly perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths: Which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such im pressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be inn ate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown ? To say a notio n is im printed on the mind , and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this im pression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind wh ich it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind , and to be im printed: Since, if any one can be said to be in the mind , which it never yet knew, it must be only, because it is capable of knowing it, and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever

shall know: For a man may live long, and d ie at last in ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of know- ing, be the natural impress ion contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point wil l amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; wh ich , whil st it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing d ifferent from those, who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever den ied that the mind was capable of knowing severa l truths. The capac- ity, they say, is innate, the knowledge acqu ired . But then to what end such contest for certa in innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understa nding without being perceived, I can see no d ifference there ca n be, between any truths the mind is capable of knowing in respect of their original: They m ust all be innate, or all adventitious: In vain shall a man go about to distingu ish them . He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (ifhe intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mea n such truths to be in the understa nding as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words (to be in the understand ing) have any propriety, they signify to be understood: So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind, and never to be perceived; is all one, as to say any thing is, and is not in the mind or understand- ing. If therefore these two propositions, "Whatsoever is, is," and "I t is impossible fo r the same thing to be and not to be," are by nature imprinted , ch ildren cannot be ignorant of them; infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understand - ings, know the truth of them , and assent to it.'0

For Locke, t he mind does not come into the world already inscr ibed \Vit h ideas or knowledge. O n the contrary, he says, the mind is unmarked "white paper" void of any ideas until sense experience gives it content. From where does t he mind obtain "all t he materials of reason a nd kno\vled ge"? he asks. "To this I answer, in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded." 11

Rationalists like D escartes would say that our most important items ofknowle.dge must be innate because they could not possibly have come from sense experience. They \vou ld maint ain, for example, that our kno\vledge of the concept " infinity" and of the proposition "Ever y event h as a cause" must be prenatally imprinted o n ou r minds because we ca n never obser ve instances of t hese in reality. Through sense ex- perience \Ve can become acquainted o nly with finite things, not an infinity of t hings; and we can observe only a limited number of evenrs, not a ll events. Locke, ho\vever,

holds that we can grasp such ideas by first havi ng sense experience related to t hem and then extrapolating the ideas from the sense data. We can, for example, h ave the concept of infinity by experiencing finite things and multiplying a nd extend ing them in our imagination until we approach the idea of the infinite.

Locke t ries to d efeat the skeptic by showing how our sense experience can reveal the ex istence of an external world. H e says we must d isting uish between the objecrs of our experience (external objecrs) and the experience of those objects (sensations, or sense data). Physical objecrs cause sensations in us, and we are directly aware on ly of those sensations (or ideas, as Locke calls them). So we have di rect kno\vledge not of ext ernal objects, but of the sense data related to those objecrs . But if all \Ve ever really kno\v a re sense data, ho\v ca n we be su re they give us an accurate picture of the external \vorld?

The Emp iricist Turn 295

No man's knowledge

here can go beyond h is cxpcncncc. -John Locke

12 Eva luate Locke's point about extrapolat- ing ideas from se nse data. Is it p lausib le? Is it a good response to the rationalist?

296 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

All our knowledge has its . .

o ngms m our pcrccpnons. -Leonardo da Vinci

John Locke, An Essay Conuming Human Understanding

Locke's ans\ver is chat sensations caused by external objeccs somehow represent chose objects and thereby g ive us knowle.dge of chem. Sensations a re, Locke says, "resemblances" of external things. Bue he poincs out chat not all of our sensations fa ithfully reflect reality. He d istinguishes between two kinds of properties that ex- ternal objects can have. Primary qualities are objective properties such as size, solid-

ity, and mobil ity. They a re in material objects, independent of our senses, and \vould be possessed by che objeccs even if no one was around co sense anything. Secondary qualities a re subjective p roperties such as che color re.cl or che smell of roses. They are in the mind, in chat they depend on che operation of che senses. They exist only when someone experiences them. For Locke, \Ve can have objective knowle.dge of mate- rial objects because some of our sense data represent the objects' primary qualities, \vhich are objective characteristics of chem.

Locke's theory of knowle.dge, however, has been sharply criticized by both ratio- nalises and empi riciscs. The main crit icism is that Locke has not given us any good reason co think chat our sense data are proof of the existence of an external reality. After all, according co Locke, \Ve directly experience only our sensations, or ideas; \Ve only indirectly perceive external objects. We have no \vay of jumping out of our subjective point of view to compare our sense exper ience \vich che objective \vorld . For all we know, our sense data present a radically distorted or thoroughly false picture of reality.

Here is Locke's answer co chis charge:

1. Is to be had on ly by sensation. The knowledge of our own being we have by intu ition. The existence of a God reason cl early makes known to us, as has been shown.

The knowledge of the existence of any other thing, we can have only by sensation: For there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory, nor of any other existence but that of God, with the existence of any par- ticu lar man; no particu lar man can know the existence of any other being, but only when by actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him.

For the having the idea of any th ing in our mind, no more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history.

2 . Instance, whiteness of t his paper. It is therefore the actua l receiving of ideas from without [outside), that gives us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us, wh ich causes that idea in us, though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it. For it takes not from the certa inty of our senses, the ideas we receive by them, that we know not the man- ner wherein they are produced: V. g. whilst I write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced in my m ind, which whatever object causes, I call wh ite; by which I know that that quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea) doth reall y exist, and hath a being without me. And of th is, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my facu lties can attain, is the testi- mony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing, whose testimony I have reason to rely on as so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I see wh ite and black, and that something really exists, that causes that sensation in me, than that I write or move my hand; which is a certainty as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of any thing, but a man's self alone, and of God.

3. This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves t he existence of t hings without us. The notice we have by our senses, of t he existing of things without us, though it be not altogether so certain as our in tu itive knowledge, or the ded uctions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves, that our facu lt ies act and inform us right, concerning the existence of those objects that affect them , it cannot pass for an ill -grounded confidence: For I th ink nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical, as to be uncertain of the existence of t hose th ings which he sees and feels . At least, he t hat can doubt so far (whatever he may have with his own t houghts) will never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say any th ing contrary to his own opinion. As to myself, I th ink God has given me assurance enough of the existence of th ings without me; since by their dif· ferent application I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my present state. This is certain; the confidence that our facu lties do not he rein deceive us is t he greatest assurance we are capable of, concern ing the ex- istence of material beings. For we cannot act any thing but by our facu lties; nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help of those faculties, which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is. Bu t besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, t hat they do not err in the information they give us, of the existence of things without us, when they are affected by them, we are farther confirmed in th is assurance by other concurrent reaso ns.

4. Because we cannot have t hem but by t he i nlets of the senses. First, it is plain t hose perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses; because t hose t hat wan t [l ack] the organs of any sense, never can have the ideas belonging to t hat sense produced in their minds. Th is is too evident to be doubted: And therefore we cannot but be assured, that they come in by the organs of t hat sense, and no other way. The organs themselves, it is plain , do not produce them, for t he n the eyes of a man in t he da rk wou ld produce colors, and his nose smell roses in the winter: But we see no· body gets the relish of a pine-apple, ti ll he goes to the Ind ies, where it is, and tastes it.

5. Because an idea from actual sensation, and another from memory, are very dis- tinct perceptions. Second ly, because sometimes I find, that I cannot avoid the havin g t hose ideas produced in my m ind . For though when my eyes are shut, or wi ndows fast, I can at pleasure recall to my m ind t he ideas of light, or the sun, which former sensa- t ions had lodged in my memory; so I can at pleasure lay by that idea, and take into my view that of the smell of a rose, or taste of sugar. But, if I turn my eyes at noon towards t he sun, I cannot avoid the ideas, which t he light, or sun, then produces in me. So that t he re is a manifest difference between t he ideas laid up in my memory, (over which, if they were there only, I shou ld have constantly t he same power to d ispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure) and t hose which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And t herefore it must needs be some exterior cause, and the brisk actin g of some objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot resis t, that produces t hose ideas in my mind, whet her I will or no. Besides, there is nobod y who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun, as he hath the idea of it in his memory, and actua lly looking upon it: Of which two, his perception is so distinct, that few of his ideas are more distingu ishable one from another. And therefore he hath cer- tai n knowledge that they are not both memory, or the actions of his mi nd, and fancies only within hi m; but t hat actual seeing hath a cause without.

6. Pleasure and Pain, w hich accompanies actual sensation, accompanies not the return ing of those ideas, without the external objects. Third ly, add to this, that many of

The Emp iricist Turn 297

13 Has Locke p rovided good reasons t o t h ink t hat our sense da t a p rove the existence of an external world? Evaluate h is attempt t o answer his critics o n t h is point.

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those ideas are produced in us with pain , which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus the pain of heat or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us no disturbance; wh ich, when felt, was very t roublesome, and is again, when actually repeated; wh ich is occasioned by the disorder t he external object causes in our bodies when applied to it. And we remember the pains of hunger, thi rst, o r the head- ache, withou t any pain at all ; which would either never d isturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds, and appearances entertain ing our fancies, without the real exis tence of things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of pleasu re, accompanying several actual sensations: And though mathematical demonstra tion depends not upon sense, yet the exam in ing them by diagrams gives great credit to the evidence of ou r sight, and seems to give it a certainty approach ing to that of demonstration itself. For it wou ld be very strange, t hat a man shou ld all ow it for an undeniable truth, that two angles of a figure, which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram, shou ld be bigger one than the other; and yet doubt of the existence of those lines and angles, wh ich by looki ng on he makes use ofto meas ure that by.

7. Our senses assist one another's test imony of the existence of outward things. Fourthly, our senses in many cases bear witness to t he truth of each other's report, concerning the existence of sensible things without us. He t hat sees a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be any th ing more than a ba re fancy, feel it too; and be convinced by putting his hand in it. Which certa inly cou ld never be put into such exqu isite pain, by a bare idea or phantom , un less that the pa in be a fancy too: Wh ich yet he cannot, when the burn is well, by raisi ng the idea of it, bring upon himself again.

Thus I see, whil st I write this, I can change the appearance of the paper: And by de- signing the letters tell before-hand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment, by barely drawin g my pen over it: Which will neither appea r (let me fancy as much as I will) if my hands stand sti ll; or though I move my pen, if my eyes be shut: Nor when those characters are once made on the paper, can I choose afterwards but see them as they are; that is, have the ideas of such letters as I have made. Whence it is man ifest, that t hey are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination, when I fi nd that the characters, that were made at the pleasure of my own thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy it; but continue to affect my senses constantly and regu larly, accord ing to the figures I made them. To which if we will add, that the sight of those shall, from another man , draw such sounds, as I beforehand design they shall stand for; there will be little reason left to doubt, that those words I write do really exist without me, when they cause a Jong series of regular sounds to affect my ears, which cou ld not be t he effect of my imagination, nor cou ld my memory retain them in that order.

8. Th is certainty is as great as our condition needs. But yet, if after all t his any one will be so sceptica l, as to d istrust his senses , and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, thin k and do, durin g our whole being, is but the series and deluding appear- ances of a Jong dream, whereof there is rea lity; and t herefore will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any thing; I must desire him to consider, that if all be a dream, t hen he doth but dream, that he makes the question ; and so it is not much matter, that a waking man shou ld answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I ma ke him this answer, that t he certainty of things existin g in rerum natura, when we have the testi mony of our senses fo r it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our cond ition needs. For our faculties being su ited not to the fu ll extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt

and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are; and accommodated to t he use of life; they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those th ings, which are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a cand le burning, and hath experimented the force of its fl ame, by putting his finger in it, will li ttle doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain: Which is assurance enough, when no man requires greater certa inty to govern his actions by, than what is as certa in as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleases to try, whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy; by putting his hand into it, he may perhaps be wakened into a certa inty greater than he cou ld wish, that it is something more than bare imagination. So that th is ev idence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i.e. happiness or misery; beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an assurance of the existence of things without us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good, and avoiding t he evi l, which is caused by them; which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them.

9. But reaches no fart her than actual sensat ion. In fine then, when our senses do actually convey in to our understandings any idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something at that time rea lly exist without us, wh ich doth affect our senses, and by them give notice of itself to our apprehens ive facu lties , and actuall y produce that idea which we then perce ive: And we cannot so far distrust their testim ony, as to doubt, t hat such collections of simple ideas, as we have observed by our senses to be united together, do really exist together."

Locke asks, in effect, what could possibly cause our sense experience if not ex- ternal objects? His answer is that \Ve kno\v that external objects a re real (and not a dream or delus ion) because the theory that they exist is the best explanation for the sensations we have. External objects cause our sensations, and this is a much better explanation for our exper ience than that an evil genius o r ou r own minds create a fantasy world that we take to be real.

Berkeley

Like Locke, George Berkeley is an empiricist who rejects skepticism. He be- lieves that we can indeed acqu ire knowledge, and that the only path to it is through sense experience. But beyond these points of agreement, Berkeley veers sharply a\vay from Locke's view and from the theories of most other empiricists. (Caution: At fi rst glance, you may th ink Berkeley's theory of knowledge is both b izarre and wrong. But he p rovides plausible, and unsettling, arguments for his

view, and generations of philosophers-whether they have agreed with Berkeley or not-have been fo rced to take his theory seriously.)

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14 Is Locke's argu- ment (an infe rence to t he best explanation) successful? Evaluat e its strengths and weaknesses.

We arc drowning in in~

fo rmation a nd starved for

knowledge. -Unknown

For Berkeley, there are no material objects, no things that exist in the exter nal world. There are objects to be su re, but they exist only as sensations (what Berkeley calls ideas) in some mind. They are real only because they are perceived by some- one. Thus he declares in his famous phrase, esse est percipi, "to be is to be perceived." What we usually call physical objects, then, are simply compilations of sense data,

Figure 6.8 George Berkeley (1685-1753).

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and reality consists only of ideas and the minds that perceive them. Our sense experi- ence does not represent an external reality as Locke t hought; our sense experience is real ity. Locke's view is vulnerable to skeptical criticism because he admits that there is a gap between our sensations and reality. Berkeley, ho\vever, tries to defeat skepticism by doing away with the gap entirely. He contends t hat there is no gap because material objects do not exist; only ideas exist along with the minds that perceive them.

Let's a llow Berkeley to make h is case:

Geo rge Berkeley, Of the Principles of Human Knowledge

I. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attend ing to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compound ing, divid ing, o r barely representing those originall y perceived in the aforesaid ways . By sight I have the ideas of light and colours with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive, for example, hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smell ing furn ishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition . And as severa l of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one th ing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple. Other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things; which, as they are pleasing or dis- agreeab le, excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.

II. But bes ides all that end less variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise someth ing wh ich knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willi ng, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call m ind, spirit, sou l, or myself. By wh ich words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely d istinct from them, wherein they exist, or, wh ich is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.

Ill. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the m ind, is what every body will allow. And (to me) it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or comb ined together (that is, whatever objects they compose) , cannot exist otherwise than in a m ind perceiving them. I think an intu itive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that sha ll attend to what is meant by the term exist, when applied to sens- ible things. The table I write on, I say, exists , that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I shou ld say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actua lly does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the li ke expressions. For as to what is sa id of the absolute existence of unthinking things with- out any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly un intelli gible. Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or th inking things which perceive them.

IV. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevai ling amongst men, that houses, moun · tai ns, rivers, and in a word sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how grea t an assurance and acqu iescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world; yet whoever sha ll find in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifes t contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations; and is it not plain ly rep ugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived? .. .

VI. Some truths there are so nea r and obvious to the mi nd , that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take th is important one to be, to wit, that all the choir of heaven and furn iture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence wi thout a mi nd , that their being (esse) is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actua lly perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all , or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit: it being perfectly uni ntelligible and invol vi ng all the absurdity of abstraction, to attri· bute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect and try to separate in his own thoughts the be ing of a sensible thing from its being perceived .. . .

VIII. But say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist withou t the mi nd, yet the re may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind , in an un thinki ng substance. I answer, an idea can be like noth · ing but an idea; a colour or fi gure can be li ke noth ing but another colour or figure. If we look but ever so little in to our thoughts, we sha ll find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be them · selves perceivable or no? if they are, then they are ideas, and we have ga ined our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense, to assert a colour is like someth ing wh ich is invis ible; hard or soft, like something which is inta ngible; and so of the rest.'l

To provide further support fo r his theory, Berkeley takes aim at Locke's distinc- tion between primary and seconda ry qualities. He claims that primary qualities are just as mind-dependent as secondary qualities are, fo r primary qualities ca n a lso va ry accord ing to the state of our senses, and primary qualities are inseparable from secondary qualities.

IX. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities: by the fo rmer, they mean extension, fi gure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number: by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes , and so fo rth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resem· blances of any thing existing without the mind or unperceived ; but they will have our ideas of the primary quali ties to be patterns or images of th ings which exist without the mind , in an unthinking substance which they ca ll matter. By matter therefore we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure and motion, do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, fi gure, and motion, are on ly ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can

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15 Is Berkeley rig ht t hat belief in mate- rial objects involves a log ical contrad iction? Explain.

George Berkeley, OJ the Principles of Human Knowledge

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George Berlceley, OJ the Principles of Human Knowledge

16 Do you think there is no substantial diffe r- ence between p ri mary and secondary quali- ties? Why o r why not ?

exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence it is plain, that the very notion of what is called matte r, or corporeal substance, involves a contrad iction in it.

X. They who assert that fi gure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qua li ties, do exist without the mind , in un thinkin g substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and such like secondary qualities, do not, which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind a lone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different s ize, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth , wh ich they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now if it be certain, that those origin al qualities are in separably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of bein g abstracted from them, it plainly fo ll ows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try, whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and mo- tion of a body, without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved , but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible qua lity wh ich is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qua lities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else .. . .

XIV. I shall further add, that after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensib le qua lities to have no existence in matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of a ll other sensible qua lities whatsoever. Thus, for in- stance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at a ll pat- terns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite the m, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand, seems warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qua li ties existing in matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of any thing settled and determ inate without the mind ? Aga in , it is proved that sweetness is not rea lly in the said th ing, beca use, the thing remain ing unaltered , the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say, that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear s lower without any alteration in any externa l object.

XV. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind, and he s hall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion . Though it must be confessed, this method of argu ing doth not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object. But the arguments forego in g plainly show it to be imposs ible that any colour or extension at all or other sensible quality whatsoever, shou ld exist in an un thinkin g subject without the mind, or in truth, that there shou ld be any such thing as an outward object.••

Berkeley's most interesting a rgument against the existence of material objecrs is a purely logical one: He contends that they cannot exist because their existence would be logically absurd. The commonsense vie\v is that material objects continue to be even when no one has them in mind. But, says Berkeley, this would mean that they can be conceived of as ex isting unconceived, that we can th ink about things that no

one is thinking about-a logical contradiction. Therefo re, Berkeley concludes, the cla im that material objects ex ist is false.

Crit ics h ave taken issue with this argument. They agree that in one sense it is impossible to conceive of someth ing unconceived: It is impossible to contemplate a thing that is at the same time not being contemplated. But they m aintain that there is no incoherence in believ ing the assertion that an entity exists unconceived. No contradiction lurks here. If so, the concept of a material object is not, as Berkeley cha rges, "a manifest repugnancy."

Some h ave faulted Berkeley's theory in another way. They ask, Why do pat- terns of sensations present themselves to us as if they \vere e ntirely independent of our minds? That is, \vhy do the configurations of sense data behave like material objects, seemi ngly ex isting unperceived and beyond our control? Berkeley's ans\ver is that things are never unperceived, for God continually perceives them and thus causes them to be as they are. God inserts a grand, intricate panoply of ideas into our minds-sensations that constitute fo r us a real world of God 's making. What we think of as material objects are instead repeating patterns of sense experience caused by God.

Like the rationalist D escartes, Berkeley the empiricist ultimately b rings in God to explain ho\v knowled ge is possible. But to many, his explanation of the peculia r nature of ou r sense experience is not as good by far as the commonsense exp lanation: Material objects exist independently of us and cause the patterns of our sensations. They think the God theory leaves too much unexpla ined; to them, the m aterial- object theory seems simpler and more consistent \Vith scientific understanding of perception. As Bertrand Russell says,

Hume

[E]every principle of s implicity urges us to adopt the natural view, that there really are objects other than ourselves a nd our sense-data which have an existence not dependent upon our perceiving them. •s

So, in thei r own ways, Desca rtes, Locke, a nd Berkeley wrestled with the g reat epistemologica l questions: Do \Ve have knowledge? And if so, \vhat exactly do we know? I n the end they all concluded that we do indeed h ave kno\vledge, but they d iffered on its extent. I n contrast, David Hume-the renowned Enlightenment th inker and preeminent British philosopher-argued fo r a thoroughly consistent empi ricism that led him to a skept icism so extensive that few others dared fo llo\v h is lead.

Hume ins ists that whatever knowledge we have is of two k inds: "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact." The forme r include truths of mathematics and truths of logic (such as "Either it's ra ining or it's not raining" and "No bachelors are marr ied "); they are derived f rom reason. The latter cons ist of information about t he world and are based entirely on sense experience. We can come to kno\v relations of ideas w ith certainty, but they are not informative about reality. We know that "Either it's rain ing or it's not raining" is true, but the proposition tells

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The posscs..'iion of kn ow· ledge docs not kill the sense of wonder and mys ..

tcry. There is always more mystery. -Ana'is Nin

17 How does Hu me's empiricism d iffe r from Locke's and Berkeley's?

304 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

\Y/e h ave lim ited know· ledge, or else scie nce and p h ilosophy would not be necessary.

-h-a.n Urlaub

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

David Hume

D uri ng his lifetime, David H un1e (171 1- 1776) earned a reputation as one of Britain's pre,nier ,nen of letters and garnered fa,ne as che aut hor of the six- volu,ne H istory of England. In ou r o,vn rime, he is regard ed

as a key figu re in the Enl ighte nment, the most inAu- Figure 6.9 David Hume (17 11- ential of the British e1npiriciscs, a nd possibly Britain's 1776), philosopher, historia n, a nd, greatest ph ilosopher. reportedly, "a perfectly wise and

He was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, ,vas edu- virtuous man."

caced at its un iversity, and s pent most of his literary career in t he c ity of h is birth. By age sixteen he ,vas a lready well versed in classical literature, logic, metaphysics, p hilosophy, and eth ics. Lacer, in a three-year period , he read, in h is words, ",n ose of che celebrated Books in Latin, French & English."

He wrote essays on politics, eth ics, and econom ics, as well as ,najor philosophical treatises. The first (and some say the greatest) o f the latter ,vas A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), followed by An Enquiry Concerning H uman Understanding (1748) a nd An Enquiry Concerning rhe Principles of Morals (175 1). In An Enquiry Concern· ing Human Understanding, h is ,nasterpiece in episte1n o logy, he argued for a s tronger a nd ,nore e ncompassin g skepticis,n t ha n a ny o cher major philosopher d ared e,n- brace. H is skepticis,n extended co induction, causation, the external world, che self, 1niracles, and che existence of God. (His Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ,vas such a scorching attack on rel igious bel ief t hat he delayed its publication u nti l after

us not h ing about whether it is actually rai ning. It simply states a n o bvious logi· cal t r uth . Matters of fact , on the other h a nd, are in format ive abou t the world, bu t they cannot be know n with certa inty. So contra ry to the ratio na lists, Hu me mai ntains t hat reaso n is not a source of knowledge about the world . In li ne ,vit h the empiricists, he ho lds that k no,vledge a bout the wo rld ca n be acqui red only th ro ugh experience.

But how much can we really know through experience alone? That is, wh at ca n ,ve k now about matters of fac t? H ume's answer: very little. He says that the infor- mation derived from experience-wh at he calls perceptions-consists of sense data (such as sighrs, odors, a nd sounds) a nd inner psychological states (such as hate, fea r, love, and desire) . Percep tions are of two typ es: impressions and ideas. Imp ressions are ,vhat ,ve d irectly and vividly experience, the raw sense data and psychological states. Ideas a re our less vivid thoughrs and reflections about impressions. The experience of a b right red color ,vhen you look at a rose is a n impression . You r thoughrs or imag· inings about the original rose experience is a n idea. Hume uses this terminology

his death.) H is doubts about all these ideas sprang naturally from his consistent and thoroughgoing e1npiricis1n, in which assertions can count as knowledge only if they can be traced back co experience. He boldly declared, "When we run over libraries, persuaded of these [e,npiricist] principles, ,vhat havoc must we ,nake? If we cake in our hand any volume; of divinicy or school metaphysics, for instance, lee us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experim~ntal reasoning concerning matter of focr and existence? No. Commie it then co the Rames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

Despite his cough-,nind ed phi losophy, H urne ,vas blessed with a cheerful d isposition, ,vhich probably helped him cope with the gloomy skepticism of his studies. H e said chat reason cou ld not cure his ,nelancholy, but d istraction and rec- reation could. As he put it, "I d ine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am ,nerry,vich ,ny fr iends; and ,vhen after three or four hours' amusement, I ,vould return co these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and rid iculous, that I cannot find in my heart co enter into chem any farther." Bue he d id enter into the,n again many times- and so laid down a challenge co future ch inkers co cry co answer his philosophica l doubts.

By all accounts, Hume ,vas a decent, generous, and honorable person, ad,nired and liked by everyone who knew hi,n. A contemporary of Hume's, Ada,n S,nith, the renowned philosopher and econom ise, said of Hume chat "upon che ,vhole, I have always considered him, boch in his life-c i,ne and since his d eath, as approach- ing as nearly co the idea of a perfeccly ,vise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty ,viii ad mit."

to make his central point: For something to cou nt as knowledge, it must be based on impress ions or on ideas derived from impressions. And fo r a statement to be meaningfu l, it must ultimately refer to impressions. Here is H ume outl ining these distinctions:

David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Every one will readily allow, that there is a considerable d ifference between t he per- ceptions of t he mind, w hen a man feels the pa in of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate wa rmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memo ry this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may m im ic or copy the perceptions of t he senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of t he original senti- ment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigor, is, that

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David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

18 Hume thinks that all knowledge must be traced back to percep- tions; otherwise, asser- tions of knowledge are mean ingless. From t his he concludes that all theolog ical and meta- physical specu lat ions are worthless. Do you agree with him? Why or why not?

they represent their object in so lively a manner, that we cou ld almost say we feel or see it: Bu t, except the mind be d isordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishab le. All the colours of poetry, howeve r splendid, can never paint natu ral objects in such a man- ner as to make the description be taken for a rea l landscape. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dull est sensation.

We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very d ifferent manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the rea l disorders and agitations of the passion. When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithfu l mi rror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and du ll , in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed. It req uires no nice discernment or meta- physica l head to mark the distinction between t hem.

Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mi nd into two classes or species, which are distingu ished by their d ifferent degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and li vely are common ly denominated Thoughts or Ideas. The other spe- cies want a name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite fo r any, but ph ilosophica l pu rposes, to rank them under a genera l term or ap- pell ation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them Impress ions; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mea n all our more lively perceptions, when we hea r, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And im pressions are distin guished from ideas, wh ich are t he less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, whe n we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned . ...

All t he objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either in- tuitively or demonstratively certa in . That the square of the hypothenuse is equa l to the squares of t he two sides, is a proposition, wh ich expresses a relation between these figures. Th at t hree times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of th is kin d are discoverab le by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is any whe re existent in t he un iverse. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths, demonstrated by Eucl id, wou ld for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is sti ll possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the m ind with the same faci lity and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun wi ll not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contrad iction, than the affir- mation, that it will rise. We shou ld in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its false- hood. Were it demonstratively false, it wou ld im ply a contradiction, and cou ld never be distinctly conceived by the mind.'6

Hume argues not on ly that whatever we know about the world must be grounded

in our perceptions, but also that we can be sure only of t hose p erceptions. We kno,v just our exper ience and can on ly guess what lies beyond it. It's as if ,ve are locke.d in

a windo\vless room and must specu late about \vhat it's like outside based on a video we can \Vatch indoors. The video may o r may not resemble the ourside world, but it's the only information \Ve have.

Hume's strict empiricism leads naturally to skepticism about a notion that \Ve usually assume without question: causality. We believe the world is filled \vith causes

and effects; \Ve th ink one thing causes another, and the two are somehow physically linked. Ever y day of our lives we d raw countless conclusions based on our assump- tions about cause-and-effect relationships. But Hume argues that we have no good grounds for believing that causes and effects are related the \vay we think they are.

To be fully acquainted, therefore, with t he idea of power or necessary conn exio n, let us examine its impression; and in order to find t he impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived .

When we look a bout us towards external objects, a nd consider the operation of ca uses, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary con- nexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infa ll ible conseq uence of the other. We only fi nd , that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impu lse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second . This is t he who le that appears to the outward senses. The m in d feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: Conseq uently, there is not, in any s ingle, particular instance of cause and effect, a ny thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary conn exion.

Figure 6.10 The movement of one billiard ball may accompany that of another- but where is the evidence of a causal connection?

The Emp iricist Turn 307

Knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers. -Alfred lord Tenn yson

David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

19 Why does Hume conclude t hat we have no evidence fo r causa l relationships between events? Do you a gree with h im? Why o r why not?

308 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

David H u me, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

The principle o f induction is the presumption that even rs , hat followed one an o , her in the pas, will

do the same in the future, thar the future will be like the past.

David H u me, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Fro m the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will resu lt fro m it. Bu t were the power or energy of any cause d iscoverable by the m ind , we could foresee the effect, even without experience; and m ight, at fi rst, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by t he mere dint of thought and reasoning . . ..

Bu t to hasten to a conclus ion of this argu m ent, whi ch is already drawn out to too great a length: We have sought in va in for an idea of power or necessary connexion, in all the sources from which we cou ld suppose it to be derived. It appears, that, in single instances of the operation of bod ies , we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any t hing but one event foll owing another; without being able to comprehend any force or power, by which the cause operates, o r any connexion between it and its supposed effect. The same difficu lty occurs in contemplating the operations of m ind on body; where we obse rve the motion of the latter to follow upon the voli tion of the former; but are not able to observe or conceive the tie wh ich binds togethe r the motion and volition , or the energy by which the mind produces th is effect. The authority of the will over its own facu lties and ideas is not a wh it more comprehensible: So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughou t all nature, any one instance of connexion, wh ich is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One eve nt follows another; but we never can observe any t ie between them. They seem conjoined, bu t neve r connected . And as we can have no idea of any th ing, wh ich never appeared to our ou tward sense or inward sentiment, the necessa ry conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any m ean ing, when employed eithe r in philosoph ical reasonings, o r common life.•7

Hume asserts chat neither reason nor experience can p rovide us w ith evidence chat causal relationships ex ist. We can observe no power or fo rce chat enables causes co produce events. Our perceptions d o not give us any reason co bel ieve chat o ne thing makes another thing happen. All ,ve obser ve, says Hume, is one event as- sociated with another, and when ,ve repeatedly see s uch a pa iring, we jump co che conclusion chat the events are causally connected. We make these inferences out of habit, not logic o r empirical evidence.

In making judgmencs about causes and effects, we reason inductively. That is, we assume chat events that follo,ved one another in che past ,vill do the same in che future, chat che future will be like the past. We p resuppose, in ocher words, the principle of induction. Because of previous experience, ,ve expect night co follo,v day, fire co burn, bread co nourish, a nd dogs co bark. Like,vise, the ,vhole scientific enterprise runs on ch is principle, with scientists making in ferences from empirical regularities co predic- tions about evencs co come. At first glance, it m ight seem that no one ,vould seriously question the legitimacy of inductive reasoning. But Hume does:

As to past Experience, it can be all owed to give d irect and certain info rmation of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: Bu t why this experience shou ld be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be on ly in appearance sim il ar; t his is the main question on which I wou ld insist. The bread , which I formerly ate, nourished me; that is, a body of such se nsible qua lities, was , at t hat time, endued with such secret powers: But does it foll ow, that other bread mus t also nourish m e at another time, and t hat like sensible qua lities must always be attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least , it must be acknowledged , that there is here a consequence

drawn by t he mind; that the re is a certain step take n; a process of thought, and an infe rence, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from bei ng the same, I have found that such an object has a lways been attended with such an effect, and I fo resee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with sim ilar effects. I shall allow, if you please, t hat the one proposition may justly be infe rred from the other: I know in fac t, t hat it always is inferred. But if you insist, that t he infere nce is m ade by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce t hat reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. The re is req uired a m e- dium, which may enable the mind to d raw such an infe rence, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that med ium is, I mus t confess, passes my comprehen- s ion; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert, that it reall y exists, and is t he origin of all our conclus ions concerning m at ter of fact ....

For all inferences from expe rience suppose, as t he ir fo undation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined wi th s im il ar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion, that the course of nature m ay change, and that t he past m ay be no ru le for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no infere nce or conclus ion. It is im poss ible, therefore, that any arguments from experi- e nce can prove this resemblance of t he past to the future; since all these arguments are fou nded on the supposition of that resem blance. Let t he course of things be a llowed hithe rto ever so regular; t hat alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do you pretend to have learned t he nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently, all t he ir effects and influe nce, m ay change, without any change in t he ir sensible quali ties. This happe ns sometim es, and with rega rd to some objects: Why may it not happe n always , and with rega rd to a ll objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you against t his supposition?'8

Hume asks, Do we have any grounds \vhatsoever for believing the principle of induction? What justifies our assumption that the future \vill be like the past? H e a rgues that the principle ca nnot be an a p riori truth, and it cannot be an a posteriori fact. It can not be the forme r because the denial of an a priori truth (s uch as "All

bachelors are unmarried") is self-contradicto ry, and the den ial of the principle of induction is not like that. It cannot be the latter because no amount of empi rical evidence can show it to be true. Why? As Hume observes, to maint ain that the prin- ciple of induction is an a posteriori fact is to say that it can be established by experi- ence (that is, inductively). That is equiva lent to saying that the p rincip le of induction can be proved by the principle of induction-which is to beg the questio n. A rguing in a circle like this offers no support to the principle at a ll.

This difficulty of justifying the assumption that the future will be like the past is known as the problem of induction, a nd it has incite.cl generations of thinkers to try to solve it. They have explo red w hether there are grounds fo r believing that the inductive princip le-so indispensible in science and daily life-is true. All the \vhile \Ve use the

princip le to make all k inds of inferences and predictio ns, which usually serve us \vell. Hume, for his part, holds that \Ve rely on the principle of inductio n not because it

is a n established truth, but because it is a habit of mind. Because of our lo ng experi- ence of seeing one event repeatedly follo\v another, we develop a feeling of expecta- tio n that t hey \viii ahvays follo\v o ne a nother.

The Emp iricist Turn 309

20 What is Hume's argument against the principle of induction? Does his view imply t hat we must discard all inductive reasoning or scientific research? Why or why not?

Science L'i organized knowledge. Wisdom is organized life. -Immanuel Kant

310 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

David Hu me, An Enquiry Conuming Human Understanding

By no\v you probably know that Hume's skepticism extends beyond causality and induction to the existence of the external world. He reasons that because all we can d irectly know is our experience, \Ve can never be sure that an external world ex- ists beyond ou r internal perceptions:

By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely d ifferent from them, though resembli ng them (if that be possible) and cou ld not arise either from the energy of the mind itself. or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown sp irit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from any thing external, as in dreams, madness, and other d iseases. And noth ing can be more inexplicab le than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.

It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by ex- terna l objects, resembling them: how shall th is question be determ ined? By experience surely; as a ll other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be en- tirely s ilent. The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.'9

Provoked by Hume's radical skepticism, philosophers have expended a great deal of energy trying to show that h is vie\vS on causality, induction, and the external \vorld a re partly or wholly unfounded. But the bri lliant Hume has put forward some compelling arguments, and they have proven hard to counter.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHI LOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 6.3

I. Summarize a nd evaluate Locke's case against in nate ideas. Does he

successfully sho\v that in nate ideas do not ex ist?

2. Assess Locke's a rgumen t that \Ve ca n have k nowledge of a n external

world desp ite our bei ng d irectly aware only of sense dat a. Do you agree \vith him, o r do you side \vit h his critics who say that \Ve can know only the contents of ou r minds?

3. Evaluate a rguments for a nd against Berkeley's subjective idealism. Do you accept or reject his t heory? Why or why not ?

4 . Suppose someone claims that he can easily refut e Berkeley's idealism by simply k icking a rock or eating an apple. Does this demonstration show t h at Berkeley's vie\v is false? Explain.

5. Do you agree with H u me t h at any belief not based on perceptions (\vhich includes all theological and metaphysical bel iefs) cannot be knowledge and is complet ely meaningless? Give reasons for you r vie\v.

The Kantian Compromise 311

6.4 THE KANTIAN COMPROMISE

Immanuel Kant \vas sure that kno\vledge was possible, that we can know many things about the \vorld, most notably countless propositions in mathematics and sci- ence. But Hume had raised serious doubts about the possibility of this knowledge, and h is extreme skepticism shocked Kant into trying to show that Hume \vas \vrong. Kant declares,

I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very th ing, which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic s lumber, and gave my investigations in the fie ld of speculative ph ilosophy a quite new direction. I was far from fo ll owing him in the conclusions at which he arrived.'0

Hume had maintained that knowledge of the world comes entirely from ex- perience; we know nothing unless our kno\vledge can be traced back to perceptions (sense data and internal states). Moreover, he had insisted that \Ve have access only to

these inner experiences. We have direct awa reness of our own perceptions, but not of the world beyond them. This means that the empirical la\vS and principles of science, wh ich scientists regard as un iversal and changeless, cannot be known. They cannot be known because they assert more than experience is capable of establishing. This skeptical conclusion, Hume had a rgued, applies even to the principle at the heart of the scientific enterprise-the law of cause and effect. He had maintained that ou r experience cannot reveal to us any causal connections, for all we can actually per- ceive is some events following other events. And even if we could repeated ly observe a particular sequence of cause and effect, \Ve still could not conclude that the se- quence would happen the same way in the future. We may drop a baseball from the roof of a house and \Vatch it fall do\vn\vard, and we may repeat this little experiment a hund red times with the same resu lt. But according to Hume, \Ve have no basis fo r inferring-and therefore do not kno\v-that exactly the same thing \vi ii happen on the hundred-first try. So Hume's view meant that scientists could never legitimately conclude that they had discovered a un iversal, changeless law of natu re. They could not know \vhat they thought they kne\v. This was the conclusion that so exasperated Kant-and that set h im on his quest to disprove it.

To map out the epistemological differences between Hume and Kant, \Ve can apply some terms that Kant himself used.Two of these terms \Ve have already met: a p riori statements (statements known independently of or prior to experience) and a posteriori statements (statements that depend entirely on sense experience). Two ne\v terms are analytic and synthetic. An analyt ic statement is a logical truth whose den ial resu lts in a contradiction. For example, "All brothers are male" is analytic. To deny it-to say that " it is not the case that all brothers a re male"-is to say that some males are not males, which is a contradiction. Or consider, "A ll bodies a re extended (occupying space)." To deny this is to say that something ex- tended is not extended-another contradiction. Analytic statements are necessar- ily true (cannot be fa lse), but trivially so. They are true but tell us nothing about the world. The statement about brothers is obviously t rue but does not tell us \vhether

And seeing ignorance is th e curse of God, Kn ow· ledge th e w ing wherewith we Ay to heaven. -William Shakespeare

An analytic statement is a logical truth whose denial rcsulrs in a contradiction.

312 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

A synthetic s tatement is a s catcmc nt chat is not an alytic.

21 Contemporary scientists assert t hat in the realm of su batomic particles, some events are not caused. Does this fact prove false Kant's claim that the law of cause and effect is a synt het ic a priori trut h?

any b rothers exist. A syn t hetic statemen t is one that is not analytic. It does tell us something about the world, and d en ying it does not yield a contradiction . Science specializes in synthet ic statements, and so do \Ve in ou r everyday lives. Examples include "Every event h as a cause," "The planets o rbit around the sun," " From noth- ing comes noth ing," " Water boils at 100 d egrees C at sea level," and "Abraham Lincoln \Vas born in the United States."

Both Hume and Kant agree that we can know ana lyt ic statements \Vithout appea ling to exp erien ce (that is, a prio ri). (Re me mber, Hume refers to such state- ments as " relations of ideas.") Th ro ugh reason alone we ca n come to kno\v such a nalytic a priori propositions as "All brothers are male" and "All bodies are ex- tended." But Hume a lso holds t hat we can kno\v synthet ic propositions (t hose that are informative about the \vorld) only a posteriori (on ly through exper i- ence) . And this synthet ic a posterior i knowledge (" matters of fact") is limited: We cannot kno\v what ou r percept ions cannot detect. Acco rding to Hume, we a re not able to directly o bserve cau sality at \vo rk, and \Ve ca nnot infer universal p roposit ions or la\vS base.cl on limited , loca l observations. The emp iricist path to knowledge, then, is detoured by skept icism . Kant, on t he o ther hand, ins ists that sy nthetic a prio ri knowledge is possible. We ca n indeed kno\v things about the world, and \Ve can kno\v t hem independently or p rior to experience. Because th is kno\vledge is a prior i, it is both necessarily t rue and universally applicable, a far cry from Hume's extensive skepticism . Kant says we can kno\v th at every event has a cause (a sy nthet ic truth), and \Ve can acqui re this knowledge a priori, th ro ugh o ur powe rs of reason :

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

... if we seek an example from the understand ing in its quite ordinary e mployment, the proposition , "eve ry a lteratio n must have a cause," will se rve our purpose. In the lat ter case, indeed , the very concept of a cause so ma nifest ly contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and of the strict universality of the rule , that the concept would be altoget her lost if we attem pted to derive it, as Hume has done, from a repeated association of that which happens with t hat which precedes, and from a custom of con nec ting rep resentations, a custo m originating in this repeated associa- tion, and constituting therefore a merely s ubjective necess ity."

So Kant's epistemology is neither enti rely empiricist nor fu lly rat ionalist. He depar ts radically from trad ition by find ing a t hi rd \vay-one that sees merit and error in both t heories of knowledge. In line with the empir icists, he holds that a ll knowledge h as its o rigins in experience, but that doesn't mean experience a lone is the source of a ll ou r knowledge. With a nod to the rationalisrs, he ma intains that experience by itself is blind, but that doesn't mean \Ve ca n acquire knowledge of the \vorld through reason alo ne. Kant says that Plato took this latter route and, like a

The Kantian Compromise 313

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

Immanuel Kant

l1n1nanuel Kane ( 1724- 1804), a s,nall-co,vn n1an of conventional living, started a revolution in philosophy and earned the cicle of che greacesc philosopher of che lase three hundred years. A superficial look ac his life would lead ,nany co chink he ,vas about as dull and as uni,nagi- nacive as one could gee. He was born, lived all his life, and

Figure 6.11 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), quiet

d ied in Konigsberg, Ease Prussia (now Kal iningrad). His revolutionary. habits ,vere so regi,nented chat che good folk of his to,vn could set their watches to his punctual daily stroll.

Bue appearances can be deceiving. Kant had ,nany friends, ,vas charrning and interesting in conversation, participated in n1any of che scholarly debates of his time, and ,nade exciting d iscoveries in both science and philosophy. Early in his career he ,vrote about physics and ascrono,ny and pred icted the existence of che planet Uranus, which was found three-quarters of a century after his d eath.

Kane studied ac che University of Konigsberg for six years, lacer served as a pri- vate cucor, and then in 1755 began lecturing at the un iversity, an appointment that lasted over forty years. He caught physics, mathematics, geography, philosophy (all che main areas of study), and ,nore. Mose of his ,vritings reflected his relentless search for the proper philosophical foun d ations or ,nechods in science, metaphys- ics, and eth ics. In epistemology, he effected his Copern ican revolution by turn ing the conventiona l assurnptions about knowledge upside down. To acquire knowl- edge, he said, che m ind does not conforrn to real ity- rather, rea lity conforms to the mind. Thus, he found what he thought was a chi rd path co knowledge benveen e1npiricisn1 and rational ism, excraccing fro,n each their grains of cruch and chang- ing episternology forever.

H e published his greatest work, The Critique of Pure Reason, in 1781. After that came an extraordinary procession of other influential writings, including Pro- legomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785), Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786), Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793).

dove crying co fl y in empty space ,vich no air resistance, found himsel f trying co rea-

son about reality with no raw material (experience) co reason about:

There can be no doub t that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how sho uld our facu lty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecti ng our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of

Imm anuel Kant,

Critique of Pure Reason

314 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

Imman uel Kant,

Critique of Pure Reason

The wish to ralk to God is absurd. We canno t talk to o ne we canno t comprehend - and we can - no t compre hend God; we can o n ly believe in H im.

-Immanuel Kant

22 What is the point Kant is making wit h t he example of a dove flying in empty space? Who do you think is closer t o the t ruth regard ing the nat ure of a priori trut h-Plato or Kant?

\Vhcrc is the Life we have lost in living' W h ere is rhc w isdom we have lost in

knowledge' Where is rhc

kn owledge we have lost in info rmatio n? -T. S. Eliot

our understand ing to compare these representations, and, by combining or separat- ing them, work up the raw material of the sensib le impressions into that knowledge of o bjects which is entitled experience? In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins.

But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not fo ll ow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impress ions and of what our own facu lty of knowledge (sensible im pressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. If our fac- ulty of knowledge makes any such add ition, it may be that we are not in a position to d istinguish it from the raw material, unti l with long practice of attention we have become skill ed in sepa rating it.

Th is, then, is a question wh ich at least ca ll s for closer exam ination, and does not al- low of any off-hand answer:- whether there is any knowledge that is thus independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is entitled a priori, and distingu ished from the empirical, which has its sou rces a posteriori, that is, in experience .. . . Mathematics gives us a shining example of how far, independently of experience, we can progress in a priori knowledge . .. . Misled by such a proof of the power of reason , the demand for the extens ion of knowledge recogn ises no limits. The light dove, cleaving the a ir in her free fl ight, and fee ling its resistance, might imagine that its fl ight wou ld be still easier in em pty space. It was thus t hat Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow lim its to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty s pace of the pure understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance-meeting no resistance that might , as it were, serve as a support upon which he cou ld ta ke a stand; to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understand ing in motion."

Bue Kane cannot simply assert chat synthetic a p riori knowledge is poss ible and leave it at chat. He muse show how it's possible. His starting point is che prem- ise (which he thought o bvious) chat science and mathematics do give us necessary, universal k nowledge about che world. From there he argues chat somethi ng muse therefore be fundamentally wrong with both empiricism and rationalism, because these theories fail co explain ho\v chis kind of kno\vledge is possible. In H ume's em- piricism, he says, sense experience can shine no light on che outer world, leaving in

profound doubt che existence of external objeccs, causality, and scientific laws. And rationalism promises access co synthetic knowledge wh ile ignoring sense experience, \vhere such knowledge begins . To Kane, only a drastically different approach could demonstrate ho\v synthetic a p riori kno\vledge could be juscifie.d.

Actually, co call Kane's approach drastically different is an underscacemenc, for \vhac he proposed was a full-Hedged revolution in epist emology chat he thought \vas comparable co che Copern ican revolution in science. Ac a time when che prevail- ing (and Chu rch-sanctioned) belief was chat che sun orbited che earth, Nicolaus Copern icus (1473-1543) thought che better theory was chat che earth orbited che sun. Copern icus curne.d out co be right, and he arrived at h is answer through a stunn ing reversal of che received view. In sim ilar fashion, Kane thought he had in- scigaced his own revolution by turning che traditional perspective on kno\vledge upside down. For centuries che conventional view was chat knowledge is acqu ired \vhen che mind conforms to objects-chat is, when che mind cracks che external \vorld.

The Kantian Compromise 315

Figure 6.12 Copernican sun-centered (heliocentric) system of planetary motion. Copernicus proposed a reversal of t he old earth-centered theory. How was Kant's epistemological system just as revoluti onary?

But Kant proposed the opposit e: objects conform to the mind. He argued that sense experience can match reality because the mind stamps a structure and organization on sense experience. Synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, he said, because the

mind's conceprs force an (a priori) order onto (synthetic) experience. The idea is not that ou r minds literally creat e the world, but that ou r m inds organize our experience so ,ve perceive it as recogn izable objects. The empiricisrs see the m ind as a passive absorber of sense information, but Kant says the mind is an active shaper of experi- ence into objecrs that ,ve can know a priori. As he says,

Hitherto it has been assumed that al l our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to t hem a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in fa il ure. We must therefo re make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of meta- physics , if we suppose t hat objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired , namely, that it shou ld be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to t hem prior to their being given .. .. If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as o bject of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our facu lty of intu ition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possib il ity.'!

23 W hat is Kant's Copernican revol ution? Is his theory of know-

ledge more plausibl e t han rat ionalism or empiri cism? Expla in.

Immanuel Kant,

Critique of Pure Reason

31 6 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

The learning and kn ow- ledge that we have, is, at the most, but little com~ pared with that of which we arc ignorant.

-Plato

According co Kane, the mind shapes ra,v experience by organizing it in accord- ance with certain fundamental concepts such as time, space, and causality. All our experience is sifted and sorted through the mind's "conceptual processor," without ,vhich we could make no sense of the be,vildering flow of sighcs, sounds, smells, and other perceptions. Our raw sense data may consist of a blur of red, for example, but by interpreting chis information in light of basic concepcs (round ness, space, time, past experience, etc.), our minds perceive a red rose. We therefore kno,v th e ,vorld only as

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Conceptualizing the World

Kan r's view of rhe 1nind as an actively consrrucrive faculry is echoed in conremporary psychological research, which shows rhar our minds consranrly consrrucr and inrerprer our perceptions. Thar is, our senses are nor ,nere recorders

Figure 6.13 What do you see here-a duck or a rabbit? Although the image does not change, your interpretation can vary so you see either a duck or a rabbit (but not bot h at the same time). If you change your interpretation of the image, you see somet hing different.

Figure 6.14 Depending on how you conceptualize this figure, you w ill see a young woman or an old woman.

The Kantian Compromise 31 7

conceptualize.cl sense dat a, a world chat Ka ne calls phenomena. What t he world is in itself outside our experience Kane cal ls noumena, a reality foreve r beyond o ur ken.

Ka ne's insight about conceptualized exper ien ce m ight sou nd odd, but he \Vas o n t he r ight crack, a nticipating fi ndings in modern science by two cen t u ries . R e- sea rch in developmental and cognitive psychology shows chat ou r perceptions are

not t he res ult of the mind's passive reco rd ing of sensations. O u r perceptions a re, co a la rge degree, constructed; they o riginate with our un fi lte red sense experience a nd

of perceptual information; instead, our minds cake the ra\V daca of experience and rework them in light of the concepts and beliefs already in our heads. Our minds 1nust "conceptualize" the ta\V sen- sory input so \Ve can understand it. We do this so often and so extensively that we are hardly a\vare of the process. Con- sider these three exainples of "ambiguous figures." In each case, it's possible co see the figure in rwo \vays-even though the visual input is the saine in both.

None of chis is controversial. It be- con1es so \Vhen \Ve clai m chat our im- med iate, ra\v sense data are determ ined entirely by our concepts or t heories. This wou ld mea n that we experience on ly whar our concepts allow us co see and chat we never see the world objectively. Many philosophers reject chis view be- cause, among ocher thi ngs, it i1npl ies chat \Ve \Vould never be able co experi- ence anything ne\v or surprising. But chis result see,ns highly i1n plausible. Figure 6.15 Do you see a w oman's face here-or the silhouette

of a saxophone player?

Do these examples prove Kant's constructivist theory of knowledge? Or do they just show that much of our sensory input is conceptualized? Do they show that our conceptua lized experience is nothing like what is actually "out there"?

31 8 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

24 What does Kant mean by "Thoughts wit hout content are empty, intuitions wit hout concepts are blind" ? Do you agree that at least some of your percept ions are conceptualized?

Imman uel Kant,

Critique of Pure Reason

It is the refore correct to say rhat the senses do not e rr- not because they always jud ge rig htly, b ut because they d o no t judge at all. -Immanuel Kant

then are interpreted by the mind accordi ng to our preexisting ideas. For example, our experie nce may consist o nly of red sensat ions in d im light, b ut because \Ve have reason to bel ieve we are look ing at a red rose a nd a lready have in m ind the relevant concepts, we pe rceive a red rose. We hea r o nly a muffled sound in the next room, but because of o ur expectations, \Ve perceive t he sou nd as a telephone r ing. W hen \Ve look at a car in t he far dista nce, t he image we see is tiny. But because of prev i- ous experience a nd ou r u nderstandi ng of how the size of objects stays constant , \Ve perce ive the car as having normal dimensions and being act ually much larger than we are.

This is how Kant explains the role of sense experience and concepts in our per- ception of reality:

Ou r knowledge springs fro m two fundamental sources of the mi nd; the first is the ca- pacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object th rough these representations (spontaneity [in the prod uction] of concepts) . Through the firs t an object is given to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of the mind). Intuition [raw sense data] and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way correspond ing to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge . . . . Ou r nature is so consti- tuted that our intuition can never be other t han sensible; that is, it contains only t he mode in which we are affected by objects. The fac ulty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding. To neither of these powers may a preference be given over the other. Without sensibi lity no objec t would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the o bject to them in intuition, as to make our intu- itions intell igible, that is, to bring them unde r concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their func tions. The unders tanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise.'•

Kant thought h is theory of k nowledge corrected t he errors of rationalism a nd emp iricism and expelled t he skepticism t hat t hese views engendered. In t heir theo- r ies t he rationalists had bet heavily o n reason as the key to knowledge; t he empiri- cists had bet everyth ing on exp erience. Ka nt tried to show that genuine k nowledge is a synthesis of both reason a nd experience. H e a rgued that we can k now many things abou t the world-cause-and-effect relationships, the trut hs of mathematics, t he laws of science-and we can k no\v they are necessarily, u niversally, and a priori true. We can, in other \vords, t ake hold of synthetic a priori k nowledge. We ca n obtain it because our t hinking is framed by fundament al concepts t hat g uarantee ou r exper i- ence \vi ll take a p red etermine.cl fo rm. A nd we can be sure the truths we discover are universal because all our minds possess t he same cogn itive struct ure determined by the same set of innate concepts. In short, Ka nt's a nswer to t he rationalists, empiri- cists, a nd skeptics is t hat we kno\v t he \vorld because we, in effect, constitute it.

After Kant, epistemology was never the same. Anyone who has seriously tried to fathom the nat ure and extent of o ur k no\vledge has had t o contend \vith his insights and a rguments. That is not to say that everyone \vho has delved deeply into Kant has

A Feminist Perspective on Knowledge 31 9

agree.cl with hi m. Some philosophers doubt that everyone uses the same set of basic concepts to make sense of the empirical world. They point to anthropological and psychological resea rch sho,ving that not every cu lt ure uses t he same set of conceprs (the same conceptual scheme) to interpret and orga nize their experience. Other crit- ics have argued that Kant's theory does not adequately explai n our certainty that facts about t he world must be consistent w ith logic and mathematics. We think that truths of logic and mathematics a re true necessa rily and universally regardless of the stntcture of our minds. But Ka nt wants us to believe that logical a nd mathematical concepts do depend o n the innate structure of ou r minds. Th is implies that the structure of our m inds could possibly change to make 5 + 12 = 13, or make the statement "All b rothers are male" false.

These a nd many other criticisms of Ka nt's work ,viii be debate.cl for generations to come-,vhich is p roof of his lasting influence.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 6 .4

1. H ow is Ka nt's theory of knowledge di ffere nt from rationalism, empiri- cism, a nd skepticism?

2. In what ,vay is Kant's vie,v a "Copernican revolution"?

3. Explain ho,v H ume and Kant differ on knowledge of the law of cause and effect. Which view seems more plausible to you? W hy?

4. Explain Kant's distinction between phenomen a and nou mena. W h at ,vou ld a skeptic say about this distinc tion? W hat would H u me say? W h ich of these three views is most plausible?

5. Kant assu mes that our experience wi ll a hvays be sh aped by a fi xed set of fundamental concepts. But it seems possible that human nat ure a nd irs innate conceprs (if there a re any) could change radically over time th roug h evolution. What are the implicatio ns of this fo r Kant's notion of concept ualized experience?

6.5 A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON KNOWLEDGE

Feminism, as both a movement and an approach to social and intellectual issues, is concerned with identifying a nd remedying harm and disadva ntage a ris ing from biases aga inst women. Fem inists a rgue that such prejud ices are common throughout society a nd academia, and that they lead to the ,videspread d iscrediting of women's ideas a nd experien ces and the relegating of women to subordinate roles. Fem inist philosophy is an attempt to add ress the disparagemen t o r subord ination of women in philosophy and related fields, and feminist epistemology tries to do the same in theories of k nowledge.

Doubt is not a very agree·

able state} but certainty is a ridiculo us one. -Voltaire

320 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

25 Does t he fact t hat some famous phi- losophers held nega- tive views of women impugn the nat ure of the phil osophical ent er- prise? Why or why not?

In p hilosophy, there is no single outlook that can be called fem in ist; rather, there are several different viewpoints and approaches that deserve the name. The common thread is an emphasis on gender and on ho\v it shapes the issues at hand. Alison Ainley, a feminist ph ilosopher, notes the diversity of the philosophical projects:

Alison Ain ley, " Feminist Philosophy"

Feminist a pproaches to ph ilosophy can take place at a number of levels and from different perspectives, and indeed th is has been identified as a notab le strength . For example, fem inists have presented ph ilosoph ical critiques of philosophers' images of women, poli tica l critiques of the organization of the discipline of phi losophy, critiques of philosop hy as mascu line , historical research into the work of past women ph iloso- phers whose work may have been unjustly disregarded , and positive contributions to philosophy from a femin ist perspective. Fem in ist philosophers may take some or all of these approaches to be important, but, genera lly speaking, fem inist phi losophy will assume the question of sexual difference to be a phi losoph ical issue at some level and , depend ing on the point of departure, produce very different ways of theorizing about this question. Although women tend to work in this area, not all women ph ilosophers are necessarily fem in ist phi losophers (although t here may be fem inist implications in their work).'S

Fem inist thinkers have had good reason to suspect bias in the ph ilosophical en-

terprise. It is easy in philosophy's history to find eminent male ph ilosophers dismiss- ing, devalu ing, or ignoring the female intellect-even though women philosophers have been p resent in every age, from the classical period to modern t imes. (Som e im- portant male philosophers have afforded \vomen more respect-for example, Plato and John Stuart Mill-and some have developed ideas that have been put to use in fem inist \vritings-for example, David Hume and John Dewey.) Louise M. Antony points out some of the more notorious exa mples of b ias:

Lou ise M. Antony, "Embodiment and Epistemology"

Although women were largely ignored by the major ph ilosophers, whenever we were discussed, we were denigrated. Strikingly, the insult often involved a philosop her's ex- plicitly denying to women some characteristic that that ph ilosopher had elsewhere held to be essential to full personhood , making us, by defin ition, less than human. Thus Aristotle, who defined "man" as a rational animal, claimed t hat women's reason was defective in that it was "without the power to be effective." Locke, who thought that "man" cou ld transcend natural power relations by means of civ il agreement, still found it obvious that in case of confl ict between husband and wife, "the ru le .. . natu- ra lly falls to the man's share, as the a bler and the stronger." Rousseau, who took free- dom to be the distinguishing mark of human ity, held that it fo llowed from the different

A Fem inist Perspective on Knowledge 321

natures of men ("active and strong") and women ("passive and weak") that "woman is made to please and be dom inated" by man. Pe rhaps most notoriously of all, Kant, who made acting from apprehens ion of the categorical imperative the essence of moral agency, averred that " I hard ly bel ieve that the fa ir sex is capable of princi ples."26

Fem inist epistemology focuses most of its attention on the "situated knower" and "situated knowle.dge"-that is, on ho\v knowledge a rises from t he unique p erspec- t ives and practices of those involved in knowing. The basic claim is that gender has skewed trad itional epistemology tO\vard the dominant male p erspective and has thus adversely affected women and other disadvantage.cl groups. Feminist philosophers say the remedy is to develop theories of knowledge based on a lternative conceptions of gender and power, banish ing the ill effecrs of the traditional view in the process. According to Elizabeth Anderson,

Eliza beth Ande rson , "Fem inist Epistemology and Ph ilosophy of Science"

Various practitioners of fem in ist epistemology and philosop hy of science argue that dom inant knowledge practices disadvantage women by (1) exclud ing them from in- quiry, (2) denying t hem epistem ic authority, (3) denigrating their "feminine" cogn itive s tyles and modes of knowledge, (4) producing theories of women that represent them as inferior, dev iant, or significant only in the ways they serve male interests, (5) pro- ducing theories of social phenomena that render women's activities and interests, or gendered power relations, invisible, and (6) producing knowledge (science and tech- nology) that is not useful for people in subordinate positions, or t hat rein forces gender and other social hierarchies. 2 1

Eve Bro\vn ing C -ole, another feminist philosopher, characterizes t raditional epis- t emology like this:

Eve Browning Cole , Philosophy and Feminist Criticism

[T]here is widespread agreement that the dom in ant theories of knowledge provided by t he Western ph ilosophical trad ition have focused on a specific kind of knowledge which is, as Lorra ine Code has described it, "a commod ity of privilege." Askin g such ques- t ions as "How do I know that there is a cat on the mat?" assumes that any "I" might be substituted for any other, that cond it ions of knowing are homogeneous and can be generally specifi ed. All potentia l knowers have a presumed equal access to the view of t he cat, and the epistemologist's job is to explain what is going on in their viewing and whether it amounts to knowledge or something else. But the fact of t he matter is that ideal viewing cond itions simply do not obta in for all potential viewers; in our society, knowledge cond itions are vastly d ifferent for members of groups d ifferent iated by gen- der, race, cl ass, age, economic status, and so fort h. An aged woman who cannot get

If women be educated fo r dependence; that is, to ac t accord ing to the will of another fal lible being, and submit, rig ht o r w ro ng, to power, w he re arc we to

stop? -Mary \Xfollstonecraft

322 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

Eve Browning Cole, Philosophy and Feminist Criticism

26 What is Cole's ma in point in the preceding passage? Do you agree with her?

Eve Browning Cole, Philosophy and Feminist Criticism

Nothing can be mo re ab-

surd th an th e practice rhat prevails in our country of men and women not fo( .. lowing the same pursui ts w ith all their strengths and with one mind, for thus,

the state instead of being wh ole is reduced to half -Plato

out to see her social worker, or who fea rs going downtown on the bus alone, will be ignorant of important benefits to which she may be entitled; in this sense, s he will not be in a position to view that particu lar cat on its mat. Trad itional epistemologies have not regarded such situations as problematic or interesting; they have not regarded them at all. Yet su rely these are situations in which the social and situational differ- ences among knowers are crucial for determining the kind of knowing that can take place. Epistemologies that do not have room for these differences doom themselves to irrelevance at best, and at worst they perpetuate in justice- for, as we have already stressed, knowledge is power.'8

To develop alternatives co trad itional theories of knowledge, feminise philoso- phers have explored three epistemological paths: feminist empiricism, feminist stand- point theory, and feminist postmodernism. Feminise empiricism is probably che lease controversial. Jc doesn't wane co abolish established theories; instead, it calls for a deeper, more rigorous application of empiricism, a t heory \vich a long history. As Cole says:

One way to react to all this is that prescribed by the femin ist empiricist, who suggests that philosophy's s hortcomings with regard to wh ite women , to women and men of color, to lesbians, and to all the nonprivileged, can be remed ied by a more ca reful adherence to what is after all philosophy's stated mission: the pursuit of wisdom, the search for truth. What has produced the lamentably Aawed history of philosophy has been a pattern of fai lures to live up to the basic scenario of empiricist knowing: the unbiased observation of the face of the universe. Prejudice and bias have been all too clearly present, clouding the judgment of the philosopher and skewing the resultant description.

To give just one famous example: Aristotle, whose allegiance to carefu l empirical observation is stated and evinced everywhere in his work, is incorrect about the num- ber of teeth women have. He asserts that the adult man has thirty-two teeth but the adu lt woman on ly twenty-eight. Now, this cannot have been a function of the difficu lty of observation, as women with countable teeth existed in plenty then as now. Rather, scholars have hypothes ized that Aristotle counted the teeth in the male jaw and , in the grip of a powerful prejudice, subtracted four to arrive at the numbe r in a woman's (sma ller} jaw. Another possibility is that he o bserved the dentition of a woman who had no wisdom teeth. In either case, Aristotle's mistake is a result of fai ling to be a good enough empiricist rather than something endemic to the method of o bservation itself.

The feminist empiricist ma intains that phi losophers and scientists need to be told to "Look again !" rather than to fi nd a wholly new way of looking. The prospects for a better philosophical understanding of human existence and its surround ings will im- prove as larger nu mbe rs of women enter the domains in which "received knowledge" is processed : universities, laboratories, publishi ng houses, journal editoria l boards, and fund ing agenci es. These women will be placed well to po int out mistakes in the observations of their colleagues and to set up research agendas that prom ise to avoid the mistakes of the past.'9

Fem inise standpoint theory says chat different social g roups have distinctive kinds of kno\vledge acquired through unique experiences, and chat some of these groups may enjoy epistemological advantages over ochers. In particular, che type of knowledge derived from women's experiences may be just as good as or better than

A Fem inist Perspective on Knowledge 3 23

kno\vledge acqui red by the dominant kno\vledge-producing group-that is, wh ite, middle-class men of science. Cole explai ns:

We noted ... t hat ph ilosophy's history has issued predom inantly from the minds of privileged wh ite males. It was suggested that their position, their standpoint, has had a decisive infl uence on the shape history has taken. Though many philosophers have presumed to speak for all "mankind ," for " Reason itself," or even for "Absolute Spirit," and to be discussing the general "Nature of Mind," "conditions for knowledge," and "the human good," fem inist critics have shown and continue to show the limitations of such spuriously universa l discourse, and to point out large portions of human experi- ence as yet undreamt of in their philosophy.

This specificity of the traditional standpoint has led some feminist ph ilosophers to explore the potential of basing an epistemology in a femin ist (sometimes in a women's) standpoint. The basic assumption, originating in a Hegelian or Marxian view that t he human self is essentially shaped by its material activities and situation, is that women's lives have d iffered from men's lives in ways that wou ld construct clear differences in their respective world views and self-concepts. Since the making and tra ns mitting of knowledge are crucially importa nt human activities, women's "ways of knowing" may be expected to be no less rea l t ha n men's, but t hey are also qu ite likely to be very d iffer- ent from what traditional epistemology has supplied from the white men's standpoint.

Feminist-standpoint epistemologies seek to uncover and describe women's knowledge-making activities as t hese have originated in and been shaped by women's daily work and women's values ....

Now, standpoint theorists in feminist epistemology look at how these different work s ituations (women's dual-sphere work responsibilities, men's s ingle-sphere work responsibili ties) shape personali ty and character a long gender-specific li nes. Women, to be proficient workers in both their doma ins, must become conversant with two d if- ferent sets of behavior prescriptions: those appropriate to the domestic, personal situ- ations in which they are caregivers and maintainers of li fe , and t hose appropriate to the more public and male-dom inated locations in which they a lso labor. Behaviorally, then, and epistem ically, t hey must be able to speak two languages, avail themselves of two different repertoires of ru les dictating appropriate activity ....

This brings out an importa nt point concerning standpoint theories. Those who ad- vocate the construction of a feminist-standpoint epistemology do not merely maintain t hat "adding in" t his standpoint, derived from women's experiences and practices tra- ditiona lly excluded from philosophy's purview, will produce better philosophy, science, politics, etc.; they go further and argue that the fem inist standpoint has certain inherent epistemic advantages over androcentric [male-centered] epistemologies which make it a better place to stand, so to speak, when engaged in the making ofknowledge.3°

Critics, ho\vever, have argued that standpoint theory undermines itself. The theory says chat the feminise perspective is privileged (for example, better than tradi- tional theories), and that every perspective is both limice.d and validated by a g roup's exper iences. Bue there a re many different groups and perspectives-ho\v then can the feminise view be better or less lim ited than any ocher ?

In philosophy, poscmodernism is a distrust or rejection of some of the most influential epistemological ideas of modernity: objective or scientific truth, objec- t ive reality o r face, universal propositions, fo undational knowle.dge, u ltimate jus- t ification, and tradit ional conceptions of rationality. Femin ist poscmodernism is

Eve Browning Cole, Philosophy and Feminist Criticism

I myself have never been able m fin d o u t p recisely what fe minis m is: I o nly know t hat people call me a fem inist whenever

I express sentiments that differe ntiate me from a doormat.

-Rebecca \'qes,

2 7 Which view strikes you as more plausib le- femin ist empiricism or feminist standpoint t heory? Explain .

324 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

Eve Browning Cole, Philosophy and Feminist Criticism

28 Do you think fem- inist postmodernism undermines itself in the ways that Cole suggests?

sim ilarly skeptical of these notions and sets about systematically "deconstructing" them (critically analyzing and debunking them). Feminist postmodernists refuse to accept a bas ic tenet of fem inist standpoint theory: that there can be a s ingle privileged perspective from \vhich to acquire knowledge. Instead they insist on the existence of countless perspectives, a plurality of vie\vpoints, with none able to claim any epistemological advantage over the others. None can be called objectively true, because there is no perspective-neutral standard by \vhich to judge objective truth. Cole characterizes feminist postmodernism like this:

Feminist postmodern epistemologies are thus essentially critica l. On ly through a thor- oughgoing deconstruction of "our intellectua l heritage" (every word of which phrase should be questioned) , an abjuring of privi leged standpoints and claims to o bjective truth, and a relentless critique of the relation between knowledge-making and power- guard ing can a liberatory feminist thinking and practice proceed.

In the absence of objective truth, epistemically privileged standpoints, method- ologies legitimated by experts, and all the other apparatus of trad itional knowledge- seeking, what will make any knowledge cl aim more reliab le than any other? Is this epistem ic anarchism, a situation in which a ll claims, no matter how bizarre or contra- dictory, are equally va lid? Postmodern femin ist epistemologies ma intain that know- ledge claims will find all the legitimation they need in "loca lized practices," in the application they find in contexts socially and historicall y specific, for which they were designed. Thus what will emerge is a kind of epistemic pluralism, similar to that seen in [lesbian epistemologies]; the knowledge I need will be made by me, and those im- mediately su rrounding me, in the work we do; it will be circu lated to the extent that others' practices encourage such interaction , and will grow o r change in this interactive process. What I must not do is dictate in advance the shape this knowledge must take (rational, empirical, justifi able under counterfactual test, etc.) or impose th is know- ledge on anyone else in some kind of intellectual imperiali st frenzy.3'

Cole also notes the criticisms that have been lodged against the theory by fem- inists themselves:

Some feminist ph ilosophers express serious concerns about postmodernism as a viable basis for epistemology or for fem inist politics in general. If a rad ical deconstruction of gender categories is carried out, where is the basis for the cla im that women as such have anything in common? If gender identity is revealed to be an entirely social con- struct, a myth told to serve the interests of the lords of cu lture, where is the basis for feminist thinking? Sisterhood is not powerfu l ifit is merely a bad dream caused by some foul cognitive substance we ingested last millennium.

Sandra Harding has expressed concern that the willingness to resign objectivity and individual autonomy to the dustbin of outmoded obsessions is perhaps a luxury many fem inists wou ld not afford. Western academic women have "had access to the benefits of the En lightenment" and thus might give them up more easi ly than other women, especially th ird-world women, who have yet to achieve the political autonomy, suffrage and legal rights, and degree of access to the benefits of science their Western s isters enjoy. Thus it is all too easy for Western fem inists to criticize the philosophical foundat ions on which liberalism and modern science rest; such critical latitude is born of privilege.

There are also good reasons for caution a bo ut the reli nqu ishing of the concep t of objectivi ty as un derstood by Western s cie nce. Ma ny of the most s ignifi ca nt advances in wom en's politica l history have been achieved through successful ly putting across t he a rgument that barriers to wom en's freedom are based only on prejudi ce, a mi s- ta ken a nd s ubjective attitude. Appeals to fair ness, justice, and d ispassiona te objec- t ivity have been powerful e le m ents in t his argument. Most of us believe t hat sexism, raci s m , heterosexism, a nd othe r pern icious attitudes are not objectively defens ible, are based in part on false beliefs and bad faith or m ora l incons istency. If we no lo nger have a sta ndpoi nt from which to make these cl aims, with what justifi cation ca n we contin ue to decry t he attitudes ? We ought rather to seek to reco nceive the notions of o bjectivi ty, justice, and truth t han to discard them a nd leave ourselves rhetorically hel pless.1•

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PHI LOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 6.5

1. Some notable male ph ilosophers have assumed t hat women's reason ing abilit y is inferior to men's. What conclusion about the ph ilosoph ical ent erprise do you d ra\v from this? S hould t he t heories of t hese ph iloso- phers be rejected out of hand?

2. Is t here such a t hing as a female nature (a nature w hose essence is female)? O r (aside from basic biological fact ors) is female or woman defined variously by society o r culture?

3. Kant said t hat women are not capable of grasping p rinciples, t hus ex- cluding \vomen from mora l reason ing. Should his theory of knowledge then be d iscount e.d, d iscard ed, or ig no red? Why o r \vhy not?

4 . Are all universal stat ements in scien ce and ethics s uspect, as fem inist postmodernists believe? Explain .

5. Fem inist postmod ernism has been accused of being a fo rm of cogni- tive relativism . Is t h is cha rge valid? W hy o r \vhy not?

Review Notes

6.1 OVERVIEW: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

• Epistemology is the ph ilosophical study of knowledge. Proposit ional knowledge is

kno\vledge of a p roposition; a proposition is a statement that is eith er t rue or false, an assertion that something is or is not a fact.

• Skepticism is the vie\v that we lack kno\vledge in some fundamen tal \vay; cognitive relativism is the doctrine th at the truth about something depends on w hat a person or cultu re bel ieves; subjective relativism is the notion that truth depends on what a

Review Notes 325

326 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

person believes; cultural relativism is the idea that tr uth depends on \vhat a culture believes; a priori knowledge is gained independently of or p rior to sense experience; a posteriori kno\vledge depends entirely on sense experience; rationalism is the vie\v that through unaided reason we can come to know what the world is like; empiri- cism says knowledge of the empirical world comes solely from sense experience; and subjective idealism is the vie\v that all that exist are m inds and their ideas.

6.2 THE RATIONALIST ROAD

• Plato believes that the source of our knowledge is reason. He says that we must be able to acquire knowledge because \Ve can identify false beliefs, and \Ve obviously possess kno\vledge because we can grasp, through reason, math ematical, concep- tual, and logical truths. Fo r Plato, real ity comprises two worlds: the fleeting \vorld of the physical accessed through sense experience, and the eternal, nonphysical, changeless world of genuine knowledge accessed only through reason. This non- phys ical world contains the Fo rms, which are perfect conceptual models for every existing th ing, res id ing only in the eternal \vorld penetrated by reason alone. Plato believes in innate knowledge-the idea that knowledge of the Forms is already present at birth, inscribed in our minds in a p revious existence.

• In Meno, Socrates attempts to give a p roof of the existence of innate ideas by asking an unschooled boy about a geometry problem. As Socrates asks questions, the boy comes to the right ans\ver on his own. Socrates claims to have merely helped the boy recollect knowledge that he already possessed, b ringing innate knowledge to consciousness.

• Descartes initial ly finds reason to doubt all beliefs based on sense expe rience, a rriving at th is conclusion via h is d ream and evil gen ius argumenrs. Then he pulls h imself out of skepticism by realizing that he cannot possibly doubt that he ex ists-for ifhe can have thoughts, he must exist (" I think, therefore I am"). From this basic idea, he goes on to di.scover another p rinciple of knowledge acqu isition: If he perceives something clearly and distinctly, he must know it with certainty. He must know it with certainty because a perfect God would not allow him to be deceived.

6.3 THE EMPIR ICIST TURN

• Locke argues that there is no such thing as innate ideas; universal principles arise from sense experience.

• Locke says that physical objecrs cause sensations in us, and \Ve are di rectly aware only of those sensations. But the sensations caused by external objects somehow represent those objects and thereby give us kno\vledge of them.

• For Locke, primary qualities are objective properties such as size, solidity, and mob ility; they are in material objecrs, independent of our senses. Secondary

qual ities a re subjective properties such as th e color red or th e smell of a rose; they are in th e m ind.

• For Berkeley, no material thi ngs exist in the external wo rld. There are objects, but th ey exist o nly as sensations in some mi nd . They are real only because they are per- ceived by someone. H e rejeccs the notio n of material objeccs because, he says, belief in ch em involves a logical cont radiction.

• Locke and Hume are both empiriciscs. Locke says that we can have kno\vledge of external objects; H ume asserts ch at s ince all we are directly aware of is sense experi- ence, we have no eviden ce that external objects exis t.

• H ume argues chat since all claims about the world muse be t raced back co sense experience, and si nce theological and metaphysical p ropos itio ns are not li nked co sense experience, such propositions are mean ingless.

• H ume contends ch at \Ve are not justi fied in believi ng th e principle of induction, because co be just ified it has co be either an a p riori t ruth or an a posteriori facc- an d it is neither.

6.4 THE KAN TIAN COMPROMISE

• Kane brought about a Copernican revolutio n in epistemology. Just as Copernicus revolutionize.cl astro nomy by revers ing the t raditional theory, so Kane brought forth a radically d ifferen t th eo ry of knowledge by arguing fo r an analogous reversal. In- stead of accepting the conventio nal view that knowledge is acqu ired \vhen the mind co nforms co objects, he argues that objects confo rm co the mi nd .

• An analytic statement is a logical truth \vhose denial resulcs in a contradiction. A syn- thetic statement is one chat is not analytic. A synthetic a prio ri tru th assercs something about the \vorld that we can know independently of or p rio r co experience.

• Kane argues that sense experience can match reality because the mi nd stamps a struc- ture and o rgan ization on sense experience. Synthetic a priori knowledge is poss ible because the m ind's concepts force an (a priori) order onto (synthetic) experience.

6.5 A FEMINIST PERS PECTIVE ON KNOWLEDGE

• Femin ise philosophy is an attempt co address the disparagemen t or subordi nation of \vomen in ph ilosophy and related fi elds, an d femin ise epistemology cries co do th e same in theories of kno\vledge.

• According co Eve Brown ing Cole, femi nises believe ch at domi nan t knowledge prac- tices disadvantage women by (1) exclud ing them from inqu iry; (2) denyi ng chem epistem ic authority; (3) denigrating th eir "fem inine" cognitive styles; ( 4) p roduc- ing theories of women ch at represent chem as inferior, deviant, or sig nificant o nly in the ways they serve male interests; (5) producing theories of social phenomena ch at render \vomen's activities and incerescs invis ible; a nd (6) produci ng knowledge

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328 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

(science and tech nology) chat is not useful for people in subordi nate positions, or chat rei nforces gender and ocher social hierarchies.

• Femi nise emp iricism cal ls fo r a deeper, more rigorous application of empi ricism . Femi nise stan dpoint theory says ch at different social groups have distinctive kinds of kno,vledge acqu ired th rough unique experiences and some of chese groups may enjoy epistemological advantages over ochers. Fem inise poscmodern ism is skepti- cal of such notions as objective o r scien tific t ruth , objective reality or face, un i- versal p ropos itio ns, fou ndational kno,vledge, ultimate justification, and traditional conceptions of rationality. Fem inise poscmoderniscs a re devoted co deconscruccing these ideas.

• Some femi nises ,vorry chat a deco nstruction of traditio nal assumptions about kno,vledge a nd truth could u ndermine femin ise philosophy itself and cake a,vay an importan t cool for disman tling barriers co women's freedom.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

ARGU ING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 6

1. This ch apter covers t he theories of kno,vledge p roduced by Plato, D escartes, Locke, Berkeley, H u me, and Kane. W hich one of these do you chink is most plausible, and ,vhy?

2 . Which t heory do you chink is lease p lausible? W hy?

3 . Evaluate Locke's empiricist t heory. What is the strongest argument in its favor? W h at is che ,veakesc?

4. Evaluate Berkeley's main reason fo r rejecting t he existen ce of material objects. D oes he successfully p rove his case? Do you believe chat ma- ter ial objeccs exist? Why or ,vhy not?

5. Expla in H u me's a rgumen t against t he principal of inductio n. Is his argument sou nd? In light of che argu ment, what attitud e co,vard sci- ence d o you chink is most reasonable?

Key Terms

analytic statement A logical truth whose denial resulcs in a contradiction. (3 11)

a pos teriori knowledge Knowledge that depends entirely on sense experience. (278)

a priori knowledge Kno\vledge gained independently of or p rior to sense expe- rience. (278)

cognitive relativism The doctrine that the truth about something depends on what persons or cultures believe. (277)

cultural relativism The view that right actions are those endorse.cl by one's cul- ture. (277)

empiricism The view that our kno\vl- edge of the empirical wo rld comes solely from sense experience. (278)

epistemology The study of kno\vledge. (275)

principle of induction The presumption that evencs that followed one another in the past will do the same in the future, that the future \viii be like the past. (308)

propositional knowledge Knowledge of a proposition. (276)

rationalism The view that through un- aided reason we can come to kno\v what the wo rld is like. (278)

skepticism The vie\v that we lack knowl- edge in some fundamental way. (276)

subj ective idealism The doctrine that all that exist are minds and thei r ideas. (280)

subjective relativism The view that right actions are those endorsed by an individ- ual . (277)

synthetic s tatement A statement that is not analytic. (312)

Key Terms 329

330 Chapter 6 Knowledge and Skepticism

FIC T ION

Throug h t he Looking-G lass Lewis Carroll

Lewis Carroll (1832- 1898), born Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, is most famous for au- thoring Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass, two literary classics. But his in terests and talents sp read far beyond these books. He also wrote poems and articles, was an innovative photographer, lectured in mathematics at Oxford University, and invented an impressive assortment of games and puzzles.

After a pause, Alice began, "Well - they were both very unpleasant characters- "

Here she checked herself in some alarm, at hear- ing someth ing th at sounded to her li ke the puffing of a large steam-engine in the wood near them, though she feared it was more likely to be a wild beast. "Are there any lions or tigers about here?" she asked t im id ly.

"It's on ly the Red King snoring," said Tweed ledee. "Come and look at him!" the brothers cried, and

they each took one of Alice's hands, and led her up to where the King was sleeping.

"Isn't he a lovely sigh t?" sa id Tweed ledum. Alice cou ldn't say honestly t hat he was. He had a tall

red night-cap on, with a tassel, and he was lying crum- pled up into a sort of untidy heap, and snoring loud- "fit to snore his head off!" as Tweed ledum remarked.

"I'm afraid he'll ca tch cold with lying on the damp grass," said Alice, who was a very th oughtfu l li ttle girl.

"He's dream ing now;" said Tweed ledee: "and what do you th ink he's dream ing about?"

Alice said "Nobody can guess that." "Why, abou t you!" Tweedledee excla imed, clapping

his hands triumphantly. "And if he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you'd be?"

Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass (New York: Oxford University Press , 2009).

Probing Questions

"Where I am now of course," said Alice. "Not you !" Tweedledee retorted contemptuously.

"You'd be nowhere. W hy, you're only a sort of th ing in his dream !"

"If that there King was to wake" added Tweedle- dum, "You'd go out- bang!- just like a cand le!"

"I shouldn't!" Alice exclaimed indignantly. "Be- sides , if I'm only a sort of thing in his dream, what are you, I shou ld like to know?"

"Dit to," sa id Tweed ledum. "Ditto, d itto!" cried Tweed ledee. He shouted this so loud that Alice couldn't help

saying " Hush! You'll be waking him, I'm afra id, if you make so much no ise."

"Well, it's no use your talking about waking him," said Tweed ledum, "when you're only one of the t hings in his dream. You know very well you're not real."

"I am rea l!" said Alice, and began to cry. "You won't make yourse lf a b it realer by cry-

ing," Tweed ledee remarked: " there's noth ing to cry about."

"If I wasn't rea l," Alice sa id- half- laugh ing through her tears , it all seemed so ridiculous- "! shouldn't be ab le to cry."

"I hope you don't suppose those are real tears?" Tweedledum i nterrupted i n a tone of great con- tempt.

I. This exchan ge berween Alice and Tweedledu,n and T,veedledee can seem unnerving ro

some readers. Why do you rhin k rhar is?

2. Whar is rhe relarionship berween rh is lirrle srory an d Descarres' dream argumenr?

3 . Suppose Descarres p lays rhe parr of Al ice in rhis srory. Whar , vould he be likely ro say abour rhe dain1 rhar he is part o f the Red Ki ng's drean1?

For Further Reading

Robert Audi, Belief, Justification, and Krwwledge (Belmont, CA: Wadswo rth, 1988). A student-friendly introduction co ep istemology.

Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxfo rd University Press, 2006). Con- cise and po,verful critique of relativism and conscruccio nism.

Eve Brown ing Cole, Philosophy and Feminist Criticism: An Introduction (New York: Paragon House, 1993). A readable introduction co feminise criticism of traditional philosophy.

Christopher Grau, ed., Philosophers Explore the Matrix (Ne,v York: Oxford Univer- s ity Press, 2005). An anthology of philosophical exami nations of The Matrix. Of special interest is C hristopher Grau's a rticle chat dra,vs interesting paral lels beC\veen Descartes' dream and evil genius scenarios and che story chat unfolds in The Matrix.

Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO : Wescview Press, 2000). A useful introduction co che traditional and contemporary app roaches co knowledge. Includes discussion of the autho r's own coherence theory of undefeated justification.

Paul K. Moser, Kno1uledge and Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). A robust defense of a foundacional isc account of knowledge and justification.

Paul K. Moser, Dwayne H. Mulder, and J. D. Trout, The Theory of Knowledge: A The- matic Introduction (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1998). A clear and accessible discussion of the main p roblems and concepcs in contemporary epistemology.

Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1912, 1959). A very readable classic work by an eminent philosopher. Focuses moscly on issues in epistemology.

Roger Trigg, Reason and Commitment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). A defense of che possibil ity of knowledge and justification, and a strong cri- tique of various forms of cognitive relativism.

For Further Reading 331

CHAPTER

AESTHETICS

C H APT ER OBJ ECTIV ES

7.1 OVERVIEW: PHILOSOPHY OF BEAUTY

• Define aesthetics.

• Un derstand the d ifference between moral and aesthetic values.

• Know the questions that aesthetics tries to answer.

7.2 WHAT IS ART?

• Expla in the formalist view of art.

• Understand the four ways of characterizing art.

• Explain the d ifference between art as representation and art as

expression.

• Understand Clive Bell's notion

of significant form.

7.3 AESTHETIC VALUE

• Define subjectivism and objectivism.

• Distinguish between a functiona l view and a forma l view of aesthetic value.

7.4 PLATO, ARISTOTLE, ANO HUME

• Contrast Hume's view of art with Aristotle' s.

• Explain Plato' s concept of beauty as a Platonic Form .

• Explain Aristotle's concept of catharsis.

7.1 OVERVIEW: PHILOSOPHY OF BEAUTY

Let's review. Philosophy concerns itself with \vhat is t rue, what is real, and what is good. The latter area is t he domain of values (also called axiology), which includes both moral values and aesthetic values. As we've seen, moral values and t he concepts and experiences that accompany them are the subject matter of ethics. Aesthetic values are exam ined in the field of philosophy known as aesthetics, t he study of the feelings, judgments, and vie\vS involved in our appreciation and experience of the arts or other objects deemed beautiful. So one part of aesthetics focuses on the aesthetic value and experience of t he arts (the philosophy of art), while the other part investigates aesthetic value in beautiful things outside that category (the philosophy of the aesthetic).

Aesthetics d eals w it h works of art: objects that are important to almost everyone, that give us pleasu re, that sometimes favor us \Vith a glimpse of the transcendent, but that are neither useful nor essential to our existence. Instead we value them fo r what they are in themselves, or fo r thei r O\vn sake. As the Roman poet Ovid once said, "Nothing is more useful than the arts, which have no utility."

Aesthetics add resses questions that interest not on ly philosophers but a lso plenty of nonphilosophers who are affected by what they call beauty in the arts as well as in the natural \vorld. What, if anything, g ives an object aesthetic value? Is there such a thing as an aesthetic experience, and if so, how does it d iffer from other kinds of ex- periences? Ca n art be a source of truth o r kno\vledge? Does the perception of beauty have anything to do \vith moral concerns? Can an art object be beautiful yet express a moral perspective that is despicable? Can some art objects be reasonably judged to be better than others-or are there no standards at all fo r judging one object supe- rior to another? That is, ca n anything be objectively beautifu l?

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 7.1

1. How are works of art valued in today's society? How do you know if a \vork of art is " beautiful"?

7.2 WHAT IS ART?

Sometimes the simplest terms are the hardest to define. That is the case with art, even though it may seem t hat any fifth grader would know exactly what the word means. But \vhy do we want a definition of art in the first place? For o ne thing, we would like to be able to tell "art" from " non-ar t." We may readily call the Mona Lisa, the Sistine C hapel, Hamlet, o r the Ei ffel Tower art, but would we a lso \Vant to give the label of art to cars, tools, clothes, store \vindows, rustic barns, interior decoration, how-to books about d iesel engines, sculptu res formed out of excrement, or paintings

W hat Is Art? 3 33

The true work of art is but a shadow of the d ivine perfectio n. -Michelangelo

Aesthetics is the study of the feel ings and judgmen Ls involved in experiencing the arts o r o ther o bjects

deemed bcauriful .

The purpose of an is washing the dust of daily li fe off our souls. -Pablo Picasso

334 Chapter 7 Aesthetics

PH I LOSO PHY NOW

Is It Art? New ,vays of viewing and creati ng art (and new technology for transm itting ic to che world) have raised the ph ilosophical q uestion chat never seems co go away: What is and is not art? Consider, for exa,nple, chese Instagram images.

The aim of arr is m represent nor the outward appearance of ,hings, bu, their inward significance. -Aristotle

#instaarl

•

Figure 7 .1 lnstagram, a photo-sharing applicat ion that allows users to share pictures and videos either publ icly or privat ely, amasses search· able posts that users label with hashtags, such as #inst art. In t he age of social media, filte rs, and limitless pot ential followers, has lnstagram made "maki ng art" more accessible? Have mill io ns of post s tagged as "art" worked to reshape the ve ry defin itio n of t he word?

created ,vich t he paint-soaked tail of a dog? H o,v d o we d istinguish artifacts chat we

consider a rc from objects chat we ch ink a re definitely not a rc? T raditionally art h as been cha racterized in four ways. The fi rst is the easiest co

g rasp : Arc is representation. In this theory, co create a rc objects is co depict o r imi- tat e objects in t he ,vorld-in paint, clay, scone, poetry, or ocher media. Represen- tatio nal arc has been with us for a very long time, from the earliest cave drawings co Plato's notio n of art as im itation co t he p resent day. Modern theorises point out

that representation in a rt does not mean making an exact copy of an object. Every attempt to depict reality is necessa rily shaped by the artist's own perspective. D a Vinci's Mona Lisa, Michelangelo's David, Rodin's The Thinker, Vermeer's Girl with a

Pearl Earring, the Venus de Milo, Van Gogh's Irises-these and councless other works are representational yet reflective of the artist's interpretation.

Anot her d efinition says chat art is expression. This view holds that ar c is a ,vay of communicating t he anise's feelings and prompt ing ochers co experience chose same feelings. The great Russian novelise Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) d eclared, "Arc is a human activity consisting in t his, chat one man consciously, by means of certain external signs, h ands on co ochers feelings he has lived through, and chat ochers are infec ted by these feelings and a lso experience chem."'

By the twent ieth century, arcisrs and critics were defining arc by its farm-by the structure or organization of its parrs and such qualities as the unity or h armony of the whole. The content ,vas inessential. This form alist view came along as the

abstract movement in arc ,vas blossoming, and the two seemed made for each ocher. The arc theorise C live Bell exp lained arc form alism like chis:

Clive Bell , Art

What quali ty is shared by all objects that provoke our aesthetic emotions? On ly one answer seems possible- s ignificant fo rm. In each , lines and colors combined in a par- t icular way; certain fo rms and relations of forms , stir our aesthetic emotions. These relations and combinations oflines and colors , these aestheticall y moving forms , I call "Significant Form"; and "Significant Form" is the one quality common to all works of visual art.2

The fourth ,vay co characterize arc is (p aradoxica lly) chat it cannot be charac- t erized. In the lacer half of the twent ieth century, the very possibility of devising a plausible definition of art was calle.d into question. To some art theorises, there is no

good reason (aside from tradition and convenience) co lump novels, films, dance, operas, songs, and ocher such things into a single category called art.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PHI LOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 7.2

1. Arc has been d efined as representation, expression, and form alis m. Is it a plausible theory chat arc is correccly characterized by just one of these three? Why or why not?

What Is Art? 3 35

1 Do you agree wit h t he exp ression t heory of art? Is art simply an e xpression of fee lings? Is abstract art an e x- pression of fee li ngs?

Formalism is chc view chat art is defined by its form , th e structure o r o rganiza ..

tion of ics pan s.

If art is to n ourish , he roots of our culture, society m us t set chc artist free to follow his visio n

wherever it takes h im.

- John F. Kennedy I II I II I II I II 111 Ill 11111111111111111111111 I II I II

336 Chapter 7 Aesthetics

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Controversial Art

Ir see,ns chat there is always a quarrel bre,ving somewhere about the aesthetic value or social relevance of a piece of art. The disputes often concern the medium used, the objects depicted or suggested, the ideas evoked, or the supposed 1nessages conveyed-any of which are liable to offend or dis,nay.

Figure 7 .2 A diamond-encrusted skull by Damien Hirst titled For the Love of God. Price: $1.8 million.

Figure 7 .3 Fearless Girl, a bronze sculpture by Kris· ten Visbal, was installed in March of 2017 at Bowling Green in the Financial District of Manhattan, New York City. The statue was erected as an advertisement for an index fund with companies that have a higher percentage of women among their senior leadership and has been both praised and criticized by feminists across the country and around the world as a symbol of both resistance and corporate g reed .

Figure 7 .4 This bronze sculpture, Homeless Jesus, sits outside the Catholic Charities building in Washington, D.C. While some have criticized the statue as an insu lting depiction of Jesus, others praise it for its commentary on how society treats its most vulnerable.

What Is Art? 3 3 7

Do you think any of these works has aesthetic value? If so, which one(s) and why?

If not, why not? They each have a political or philosophical message. Does the

message add to, detract from, or have no effect on the piece's aesthetic value?

338 Chapter 7 Aesthetics

2 Does an art object have to serve a f unc- tion to be art? Would art that serves a racist or crim inal f unction cou nt as art ?

O bjectivism (in a rr) is chc view that works of a rt

have o bjective properties

by which we can judge chcir aesthetic goodn ess or

badn ess.

Su bjectivism (in arr) cs tho view that aesthetic criteria

arc purely subjective; the goodn ess o r badness of a work of arr d epends o n how rhc audience responds to it.

I like ro prorond thar my art has nothing to do with me. -Roy Lichtenstein

7_3AESTHETIC VALUE

Assum ing that art, however defined, is a genuine constituent of hu man experience, ,ve can ask ,vhat gives it aesthetic value. Over t he centuries, two broad categories of ans,vers have arisen among philosophers and other art t heorists. First, there is the notion that art has aesthetic value if it Mes something, that is, if it serves some im- portant fu nction-if it inspi res exalted o r ed ifying emotions, serves a moral or social purpose, conveys social truths or values, effecrs change in social o r political systems, or rouses sensations of pleasure in the aud ience. The second category is the idea that art has aesthetic value if it has particular formal characteristics. The candidates for these cha racteristics include u n ity, coherence, intensity, radiance, and complexity. Bell 's "significant fo rm" is a well-known example.

If such criteria exist, then we must be able to distinguish good a rt from bad art, bet ween War and Peace and yesterday's ne,vspaper. But there is considerable debate about whether we can actually do this. Some critics, the objectivists, insist that works of a rt have objective p roperties by ,vh ich we can judge thei r aesthetic goodness or bad- ness. The propert ies, objectivists argue, exist in the art object. The Mona Lisa is good art because its objective p roperties-its unity and coherence, fo r example-make it so. Other t heorists, the subject ivists, deny this and argue instead t hat ,vhatever aesthetic criteria we have a re purely subjective; th e apparent aesthetic properties of the art object are in the eye of t he beholder. The goodness o r badness of a work of art depends on the response of its audience. One person can hold that the Mona Lisa is bad art, while another can maintain that it is good a rt-and t hey both would be right.

Here is t he author and critic Martin Gardner advocating the objectivist view:

I believe there are standards of excell ence in all the arts, fine or not fine, t hat transcend both individ ual tastes a nd cultural norms .... In spite of the many ways tastes can vary, I rema in convinced that there are some universal standards in art even though we can specify them o nly in misty ways. Cons ider again the chair. There may be wide variations in personal taste about how comforta ble it is, but beca use human bodies have roughly the same s ize a nd shape, we can say dogmatically that it is a poor chair in any country if it coll apses under a weight of twenty po unds, or if its seat is covered with s harp spikes. It is in this trivial sense that we can speak of universal standards con- cerning the chair's valu e as a seat.

The aesthetic values of a painting are more difficu lt to evaluate, but the situation is similar. Those who view the picture do indeed d if- fer more in their tastes than in t he sizes and shapes of t heir bodies. But if t hey share a common human nature, with common needs, and if they ca n be ranked (a lbeit crudely) in their capacity for respondi ng to art, we have a basis for beli eving in some un iversal standards even though we may not agree on exactly what they are .

. . . We ca n, for example, say dogmatically that the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel is greater, in a sense that transcends individual or group tastes, than an oil painting produced in ten minu tes by a street-corner lightni ng artist who sells it with the paint still wet.3

And here is the philosopher Curr John Ducasse expounding on the subjectiv- . . 1st view:

There is, then, no such thing as authoritative opinion concerning the beauty of a given object. There is only the opinion of th is person or that; or the opinion of persons of some specified sort. When one has stated the

opinion and mentioned the person or class of persons who hold it, one has gone as far as it is possible to go in the direction of a scien-

tifically objective statement relating to the beauty of the object. When some matter (as that of beauty) is not of the sort which "is so" or "not so," in an absolute sense, the nearest approach that one can make to the wished-for absoluteness lies in furnishing, as fully as possible, the data to which the matter in question is relative; and this is what one does in the case of beauty when one indicates just who happens to be that judges the given object beautiful or the reverse.•

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

Arthur C. Danto

Arthur Danco ( 1924-2013) was a philosopher of arc and one of the most ,videly read arc crit- ics of che rwenciech century. He ,vas a professor of philosophy ac Columbia Universicy, an arc critic for

24 GIANT SIZE Pfi

The Nati.on ,nagazine, and a promoter of Pop artists Figure 7 .S such as Andy Warhol.

He is probably best known in aeschecics for h is concept of che "artworld." He argues chat ,vhac distinguishes art fron1 non-art is not something chat can be perceived in che arnvork itself. Objects are identified as ,vorks of art if they are situated in a particular arcworld-a social-historical context that includes such things as che ,vorks of artists, che conventions of art, che history of arc, and che practices of arciscs and critics. Arc, in ocher ,vords, exists in "an atmosphere of arc theory."

In 1964 Danco saw Andy Warhol's sculpture citied Brillo Box, a sirnple imita- tion of a lowly consu,ner item, a box of Brillo soap-pads. Danco asked what che dif- ference was between che Brillo Box object and the score-bought item. What made the forrner arc and che laccer not arc? His answer ,vas chat Brillo Box was recognized and understood in an arnvorld.

Danco is che author of Nietzsche as Philosopher (1965), The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981), Beyond the Brillo Box (1992), After the End of Arr (1997), The Abuse of Beauty (2003), and What Arr Is (2013).

Aesthetic Value 339

340 Chapter 7 Aesthetics

Abstract art: a product of the u ntalented sold by the u nprincipled ro the u rterly bewildered. -Al Capp

Catharsis is rhe purging of the e mo tions of pity and fear by experiencing them vicariously in a theatrical context.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 7.3

1. Does an object have aesthetic value only if it serves some function? Are art objects valuable in themselves, without any functions? Explain.

7.4 PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND HUME

Plato a nd Aristotle have had enormous influence on aesthetics, shaping thought and debate about beauty general ly (not just in art), representation in a rt creation, and aes- thetic vi rtues. Plato is an objectivist, but in a unique way. His view is that true beauty is not of th is world. Beauty is a Platonic Form, an ideal entity existi ng in a perfect, non- physical, unchanging realm apart from the ephemeral, physical \vorld we inhabit. The sphere of the Forms is the really real \vorld, the place where the perfect models of reality reside. The world we live in is less real. Someth ing is beautiful in th is less real world if it participates in, or imitates, the Form of Beauty, and through reason we can sometimes gli mpse t rue Beauty if \Ve manage to look beyond the d im, ear thly objects th at \Ve deem beautiful. So there is an objective standard by which \Ve can judge beaut y in nat u re and in works of art. The challenge is to access this standard-the ideal of Beauty-so \Ve can see more clearly where beauty resides (or does not reside) in the objecrs of this world.

Aristotle is also an objectivist, but not in the sense that Plato is. For A ristotle, beauty is a p roperty of objects in the everyday world, and through knowledge and skill we can create beautiful th ings. The arcs need not fulfill a function to be valuable-they a re to be cherished fo r thei r own sakes; that is, art fo r art's sake. To have aesthetic value, a sculpture needs only to be beautiful.

Aristotle, like many theorists of modern times, cha racterizes art as expression . In The Poetics, his treatise on tragedies, he emphasizes the concept of cat harsis, the purging of the emotions of pity and fea r by experiencing them vicariously in a the- atrical context.

As an objectivist, he believes there are objective standards by wh ich we may judge art and beauty generally. In the Poetics he first d istinguishes t ragedy from other a rt fo rms and then explores the features that make for good and bad traged ies. H ere is an excerpt:

Aristotle, The Poetics

CHAPTER 7

Now, we have settled t hat a tragedy is a mimesis [im itation, representation] of a com- plete, that is, of a whole action, "whole" here implying some amp litude (there can be a whole w ithout ampl itude).

Plato, Aristotle, and Hume 341

By "whole" I mean "with a beginning, a middle, and an end." By "beginning" (in th is context[ I mean "that which is not necessarily the consequent of something else, but has some state or happening naturally consequent on it," by "end" "a state that is the necessary or usua l consequent of something else, but has itself no such consequent," by "middle"" that which is consequent and has consequents." Well-ordered plots, then, will exhibit these characteristics, and will not begin or end just anywhere.

It is not enough for beauty that a thi ng, whether an anima l or anything else com- posed of parts, should have those parts well ordered; s in ce beauty consists in amplitude as well as in order, the thing must also have amplitude-and not just any amplitude. Though a very small creature cou ld not be beautifu l, since our view loses a ll distinct- ness when it comes near to taking no perceptib le time, an enormously ample one cou ld not be beautifu l either, since our view of it is not simu ltaneous, so that we lose t he sense of its unity and wholeness as we look it over; imagine, for instance, an animal a thousa nd miles long. Animate and inani mate bod ies, then , must have ampli tude, but no more than can be taken in at one view; and simi larly a plot must have extension, but no more than can be easily remembered . What is, for the poetic art, the lim it of th is extension? Certainly not that imposed by the contests and by perception .. . . As the lim it imposed by the actual nature of the thing, one may suggest "the ampler the bet- ter, provided it remains clear as a whole," or, to give a rough specification , "sufficient amplitude to allow a probable or necessary succession of particu lar actions to produce a change from bad to good or from good to bad fortune."

CHAPTER 9

What I have said also makes plain that the poet's job is saying not what did happen but the sort of thing that would happen, that is, what can happen in a strictly probable or necessary sequence. The difference between the historian and the poet is not merely t hat one writes verse and the other prose- one could turn Herodotus' work into verse

PHILOSOPHY LAB - Suppose you are the curator of a world-class arr museum, and you have the job of selecting new pieces for the summer exhibition. You must now justify your decision to exhibit or not exhibit two pieces chat have received ,vide international acclaim. One is an eight-foot-high marble sculpture depicting a nude man and woman in a passionate embrace, and the other is a five-foot-diameter black metal sphere resting on a sheet of glass.

On what grounds can you justify showing these sculptures? How can

you justify not showing them? You may appeal to the definition of art, aesthetic values, the reaction of the local community, and the apparent aesthetic function of each piece.

3 What is Arist otle's idea of amplit ude? How does he define p roper amplit ude?

342 Chapter 7 Aesthetics

and it would be just as much history as before; the essential difference is that the one Aristotle, The Poetics tells us what happened and the other the sort of th ing that wou ld happen . That is why

poetry is at once more li ke ph ilosophy and more worth wh ile t ha n history, since poetry tends to make genera l statements, while those of history are particu lar. A "general statement" means [in th is context] one that tells us what sort of man would , probably or necessarily, say or do what sort of things, and this is what poetry aims at, thou gh it attaches proper names; a particular statement on the other ha nd tell s us what Alcibi- ades, for instance, did or what happened to him .. . .

4 According t o Aristotle, what emo· tions should a tragedy evoke? What is the point of evoking them?

The artist belongs to h is

work. not rhc work m the arr Lu. -No\-a.lis

It is obvious from all th is t hat the poet shou ld be considered a maker of plots, not of verses, since he is a poet qua maker of mimesis and t he objects of his mimesis are actions. Even if it is incidentally true that t he plot he makes actuall y happened, that does not mean he is not its maker; for there is no reason why some things that actually happen shou ld not be the sort of t hing that wou ld probab ly happen, and it is in virtue of that aspect of them that he is their maker.

Of defective plots or actions the worst are the episod ic, those, I mean, in which the suc- cession of the episodes is neither probable nor necessary; bad poets make these on their own account, good ones because of the judges; for in aiming at success in the competition and stretching the plot more than it can bea r they often have to distort the natural order.

Tragedy is a mimesis not on ly of a complete action , but also of t hings arousing pity and fear, emotions most likely to be stirred when thi ngs happen unexpected ly but because of each other (th is arouses more surprise than mere chance events, since even chance events seem more marvell ous when t hey look as if they were meant to happen- take the case of t he statue ofMitys in Argos ki ll ing M itys' murderer by falling on him as he looked at it; for we do not th ink that things li ke t his are merely ra ndom) ; so such plots will necessarily be the best. . . .

CHAPTER 13

What ought one to aim at and beware of in composing plots? And what is t he source of the tragic effect? These are the questions that naturally follow from what I have now dealt with.

Well, the arrangement of tragedy at its best shou ld be complex, not simple, and it shou ld also present a mimesis of things that arouse fear and pity, as this is what is peculiar to the tragic mimesis.

So it is clear that one should not show virtuous men passing from good to bad fortune, since this does not arouse fear or pity, but only a sense of outrage. Nor should one show bad men passing from bad to good fortune, as this is less tragic than any- thing, since it has none of the necessary requ irements; it neither satisfies our hu man feeling nor arouses pity and fear. Nor shou ld one show a qu ite wicked man passing from good to bad fortune; it is true that such an arrangement would satisfy our hu- man feeli ng , but it wou ld not arouse pity or fear, since t he one is felt for someone who comes to grief withou t deserving it, and the other for someone like us (pity, that is, for the man who does not deserve his fate, and fear for someone like us); so th is event will not arouse pity or fear. So we have left the man between these. He is one who is not pre-eminent in mora l virtue, who passes to bad fortune not t hrough vice or wick- edness, but because of some piece of ignora nce, and who is of high repute and great good fortune, like Oedipus and Thyestes and the splendid men of such fam ili es.

So the good plot must have a single line of development, not a double one as some people say; that li ne should go from good fortune to bad and not the other way round ; the change shou ld be produced not through wickedness, but through some

Plato, Aristotle, and Hume 343

large-sca le piece of ignorance; the person ignorant shou ld be the sort of man I have described-certainly not a worse man, though perhaps a better one . . ..

Well then, the best tragedy, judged from the standpoint of t he tragic art, comes from this sort of arrangement. That is why those who censure Euripides for doing this in his traged ies and making many of them end with disaster are making ju st the same mistake. For this is correct in the way I sa id. The greatest proof of this is that on the stage and in the contests such plays are felt to be the most properly tragic, if they are well managed , and Euripides, even if he is a bad manager in the other points, is at any rate the most tragic of the poets.

Second comes the sort of arrangement that some people say is the best: this is t he one that has a double arrangement of the action like the Odyssey, and ends with opposite fortunes for the good and bad people . It is thought to be the best because of t he weakness of the audiences; for the poets fo llow the lead of the spectators and make plays to their specifications. But this is not the pleasure proper to tragedy, but rather belongs to comedy; for in comedy those who a re most bitter enemies throughout the plot, as it might be Orestes and Aegisthus, are reconci led at the end and go off and nobody is killed by anybody.s

David Hume's vie,v of aesthetic judgment and value diverges radically from Aris- totle's. Hume contends that aesthetic judgments (,vhat he calls "judgments of taste") are ultimately based on the sensibilit ies of the individual. The standard of aesthetic taste is to be found not in the art object irselfbut in subjective experience. "Beauty," he says, "is no qua lity in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which con- templates them; and each mind perceives a different beaut y." But for Hume, this subjectivism need not lead to wholesale relativism, in which any aesthetic judg- ment is as good as any other. He a rgues that there are st able relationships bet ween objects in the world and the particular responses they elicit in us. "Some par ticu lar forms or qualities [in objects]." he says, "are calculated to please [aesthetically), and others to displease [aesthetically]." Some ind ividuals are more keen ly attuned to these relationship s than others; their aesthetic sensibil ities are more " delicate."

With practice in cultivating aesthetic t aste, these people become superior judges of aesthetic value. They, in other words, become critics.

Hume's aesthetic theory thus explains the commonsense vie,v that a rt objects can vary radically in aesthetic value: C lea rly a Mona Lisa is aesthetically superior to a stick figure on a cave wall. The theory also explains why some observers are better judges of the aesthetic quality of art than others.

David Hume , Of the Standard of Taste

It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a ru le, by which the various sentimen ts of men may be reconci led; at least, a decision afforded , confirming one sentiment, and condemning another.

There is a species of phi losophy, which cuts off all hopes of success in such an attempt, and represents the impossibi lity of ever attain ing any standard of taste.

344 Chapter 7 Aesthetics

PH I LOSO PHY NOW

Feminist Art

Aesrherics, rhe arr world, and arc itself in their many forms are nor ,vhar they used to be-and much of rhe credit for the changes muse go ro the feminist art movement. Consider chis bit of history:

The Feminist art movement emerged in the late 1960s amidst the fervor of anti-war demonstrations and civil and queer rights movements. Hear- ken ing back to the utopian idea ls of early twentieth-century modernist movements, Fem inist artists sought to rewrite a falsely male-dominated art history as well as change the contemporary world around them through their art, focus ing on intervening in the estab li shed art world and the art canon's legacy, as well as in everyday socia l interactions. As artist Suzanne Lacy declared, the goal of Femin ist art was to " infl u- ence cu ltural attitudes and transform stereotypes." Feminist art created opportunities and spaces that previously did not exist for women and m inority artists, as well as paved the path for the Identity art and Activist

art of the 1980s.

Figure 7 .6 In Judy Chicago's art installation The Dinner Party, there are thirty-nine place set- tings for thirty-nine famous women. Each place setting, except Sojourner Truth's, evokes an image of a vulva.

Plato, Aristotle, and Hume 345

Figure 7 .7 Femini st art asks the viewer to question the norms of his or her social or political spheres in hopes of provoking action or i nspi ring change. Nan Goldi n's The Ballad of Sexual De- pendency is a series of photographs taken in New York d uring the 1970s and 1980s. They address AIDS, drug addiction, and abuse.

Key Ideas

• Feminist artists sought to create a dialogue between the viewer and the artwork through the inclusion of women's perspective. Art was not merely an object for aesthetic admiration, but cou ld also incite the viewer to question the social and political landscape, and t hrough t his

questioning, possibly affect the world and bring change toward equality. • Before feminism, the majority of women artists were invisible to the

public eye. They were oftentimes denied exh ibitions and gallery rep· resentation based on t he sole fact of their gender. The art world was largely known, or promoted as, a boys' club, of which sects like the hard

drinking, womanizing members of Abstract Expressionism were glam· orized. To combat this, Feminist artists created alternative ven ues as well as worked to change established institutions' policies to promote women artists' visibi lity with in the market.

346 Chapter 7 Aesthetics

PHILOSOPHY NOW (continued)

Figure 7 .8 Feminist art such as Faith Ringgold's The American People Series #18: The Flag Is Bleeding can act as a vehicle to create awareness around different social or po· litical issues. What probl ems might Ringgold be addressing with this painting?

• Fem inist artists often embraced alternative materials that were con· nected to the female gender to create their work, such as textiles, or other med ia previously little used by men such as performance and video, wh ich did not have the same historically ma le-dominated precedent that

painting and scu lpture carried. By expressing t hemselves through these non-traditional means, women sought to expand the definition of fine

art, and to incorporate a wider va riety of artistic perspectives.*

Which example of feminist art shown here impresses you the most? Why?

• "Fem inist Art;" 17u A rt Story, http://www.thc-artstory.org/movcmcnt .. fcmin ist .. art.htm, accessed October 26, 2017.

Plato, Aristotle, and Hume 347

The d ifference, it is said, is very wide between judgment and sentiment. All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it. But all determ in ations of the understanding are not right; because they have a reference to someth ing beyond themselves , to wit, real matter of fact; and are not always conformable to that standa rd. Among a thousand different opinions which differen t men may entertain of the same subject, there is one, and but one, that is just and true; and the only difficu lty is to fix and ascertain it. O n t he contrary, a thousa nd different sentiments, exci ted by the same object, are all right: Because no sentiment represents wha t is rea lly in t he o bject. It on ly marks a certain conformity or relation between the object and the organs or faculties of the mind; and if that conformity did not rea lly exist, the sentiment cou ld never possibly have being. Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the m ind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beau ty; and every individua l ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretend ing to regu late those of others. To seek t he rea l beau ty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an enqu iry, as to pretend to ascertain t he real sweet or real bitter. According to t he disposition of the o rgans, the same object may be both sweet and bitter; and t he proverb has justly determined it to be fruitless to dispute concerning tastes. It is very natural, and even qu ite necessa ry, to extend this axiom to menta l, as well as bodily taste; and thus common sense, which is so often at va riance with philosophy, especially with the sceptical kind, is found, in one instance at least, to agree in pronouncing the same decision.

But thou gh this axiom , by passing into a proverb, seems to have attained t he sanc- t ion of common sense; there is certainly a species of common sense which opposes it, at least serves to modify and restra in it. Whoever wou ld assert an equa li ty of genius and elegance between OG ILBY and MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be t hought to defend no less an extravagance, t han if he had maintai ned a mole-h ill to be as high as TENER IFFE, o r a pond as extensive as the ocean. Though there may be found persons, who give the preference to the former authors; no one pays attention to such a taste; and we pronounce without scruple the sentiment of these pretended critics to be absurd and ridicu lous. The principle of the natural equality of tastes is t hen totally forgot, and while we admit it on some occasions, where the objects seem near an equa li ty, it appears an extravagan t pa radox, or rather a palpable absurdity, where objects so d isproportioned are compared together.

It is evident that none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings a priori, or can be esteemed abstract conclusions of the understanding, from comparing those habitudes and relations of ideas, which are eternal and immutable. Their foundation is t he same with that of all the practical sciences, experience; nor are they any thing but general observations, concerning what has been universally found to please in all coun- t ries and in all ages. Many of the beauties of poetry and even of eloquence are founded on falsehood and fiction, on hyperboles, metaphors, and an abuse or perversion of terms from their natural meaning. To check the sall ies of the imagination , and to re- duce every expression to geometrical truth and exactness , wou ld be the most contrary to t he laws of criticism; because it would produce a work, which, by universa l experi- ence, has bee n found the most insipid and d isagreeab le. But t hough poetry can never subm it to exact truth, it must be confined by ru les of art, d iscovered to the author either by genius or observa tion. If some negligent or irregu lar writers have pleased, they have not pleased by their transgressions of rule o r order, but in spite of t hese tra nsgressions: They have possessed other beauties, which were conformab le to just criticism; and the

David H um e, Of the Standard of Toste

5 Hume says that t he a ttributes o f a p iece of art a re not in the object it self but in the mind . What does he mean by th is?

Art for art's sake L\ a

philosophy of the well-fed. -Fr,nk Lloyd \'qrigh1

348 Chapter 7 Aesthetics

force of these beauties has been able to overpower censure, and give the mind a satis- faction superior to the disgust arising from t he blemis hes . ...

But t hou gh a ll the genera l ru les of art are founded on ly on experience and on the observation of t he common sentiments of hu ma n nature, we must not imag- ine, that, on every occasion, t he feel ings of men will be conformable to these ru les. Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tende r and delicate nat ure, and re- quire the concurrence of ma ny favourab le circumstances to make t hem play with fa- ci lity and exactness, according to t heir general and establ is hed principles. The least exterior hi nd rance to such sma ll springs , or the least interna l d isorder, d isturbs their motion, and confounds the operation of the whole mach ine. When we would ma ke an experiment of th is nature, and would try the force of any beauty or deform ity, we must choose with care a proper time and place, and bring the fancy to a suitable situation and disposition. A perfect serenity of m ind, a recollection of tho ught, a due attention to t he object; if any of t hese circumstances be wanting, our experiment will be fal lacious, and we sha ll be u nable to judge of the catholic and universal beauty. The relation, which nat ure has placed between the form and the sentiment, wil l at least be more obscure; and it wi ll req uire greater accuracy to t race and discern it. We sha ll be ab le to ascertain its influe nce not so m uch from the operation of each particu lar beauty, as from the durable adm iration, which attends t hose works , t ha t have survived a ll the caprices of mode and fash ion, all t he m ista kes of ignorance and envy ....

It appears then, that, am idst all the variety and caprice of taste, there are certain genera l principles of approbation or blame, whose influence a carefu l eye may trace in a ll operations of the mi nd . Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they fail of their effect in any particular insta nce, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the organ. A man in a fever wou ld not ins ist on his palate as able to decide concerning flavours; nor wou ld one, affected with the jaundice, pretend to give a verdict with regard to colours. In each creature, there is a sound and a defective state; and the former alone can be supposed to afford us a true standard of taste and sentiment. If, in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or a considerable uni- formity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of t he perfect beauty; in like manner as the appearance of objects in day-light, to the eye of a man in health, is denominated their true and rea l colour, even wh ile colour is allowed to be merely a phantasm of the senses.6

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 7.4

1. What is David Hume's view of art? Is h is subjectivist view of art plausible? Can it really be the case that p ieces of art have no objective qualities that make them good?

2. Which theory of art makes the mos t sense to you-Plato's o r Aristotle's? Why?

Review Not es

7.1 OVERVIEW: PH ILOSOPHY OF BEAUTY

• Aesthetics is the study of the feelings and judgmencs involved in experienci ng the ar cs or ocher objects deemed beautiful.

• Moral values have co do with right and \vrong acts and good and bad persons. Aeschecic values have co do \vith good and bad \vorks of art and ocher objects chat could be judged beautiful.

• Aesthetics asks: What, if anything, gives an object aesthetic value? Can art be a source of cruch or kno\vledge? Does the perception of beauty have an ything co do \vich moral concerns? Can some art objeccs be reasonably judged co be better chan ochers-or are there no standards at all fo r judging one object superior co another? That is, can anything be objectively beautiful?

7.2 WHAT IS ART?

• Formalism is the vie\v chat a rt is defined by its form, the structure o r organization of ics parts. Representation is the notion chat creati ng art objects is depicting or imitat- ing objects in the world. Expression assercs chat art is a way of communicating the artist's feelings and prompting ochers co experience chose same fee lings.

7.3 AESTHETIC VALUE

• Objectivism is the vie\v chat \Yorks of arc have objective properties by \vh ich we can judge their aesthetic goodness o r badness. Subjectivism says chat aeschecic criteria are purely subj ective; the goodness or badness of a work of art depends on how the audience responds co it.

• Functionalism is che idea chat art muse serve some important function-engendering exalted o r edifying emotio ns, serving a moral or social purpose, conveying social truchs or values, effecti ng change in social or political systems, or arous ing sensa- tions of pleasure in the audience.

7.4 PLATO, ARISTOT LE, AND HUME

• Plato is an objeccivisc. His vie\v is chat Beauty is a Platonic Form, an ideal entity existing in a perfect, nonphysical, unchanging realm apart from the ephemeral, physical wo rld we inhabit.

• Ariscocle is also an objeccivisc. For him, beauty is a property of objects in che ev- eryday world. The a rts need not fulfill a funct ion co be valuable-chey a re co be cherished for their O\vn sakes. Fo r him, an essential part of tragedy is catharsis,

Review Notes 349

350 Chapter 7 Aesthetics

the purging of the emotions of pity and fear by experiencing them vicariously in a theatrical context.

• H ume contends that aesthetic judgments are ultimately based on th e sensibilities of the individual. The standard of aesthetic taste is to be fo und not in th e art object itself b ut in subjective experience. But th is subjectivism need not lead to wholesale relativism in which an y aesthetic judgment is as good as any oth er.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

ARGU ING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 7

1. Are you an objectivist or subjectivist about art? Why?

2. C ritique A rthur Danto's institutional theory of art. One criticism of it is that if people in the arnvorld define what is and is not ar t, then there seems to be no way for the decision-makers to decide among themselves wh at a rt is. Is this a fair criticism? W hy or why not?

3. Is the Mona Lisa art? W hy o r \vhy not?

4. What \vould Ma rtin Gardner th ink of the sculpture Brillo Box? Would he consider it a rt? W hy or why not?

5. D o you agree with Da nco that an object is art o nly if museums and art shows exh ibit it? Explain.

Key Terms

aesthetics The st udy of the fee Ii ngs and judgmen rs involved in experiencing the arts or other objeccs deeme.d beautiful. (333)

cath arsis The p urging of the emotio ns of pity an d fear by experienci ng them vicariously in a theatrical co ntext. (340)

fo rmalism The view that art is defi ned by its form, the structu re or organ izatio n of its parts. (335)

objectivism (in art) The view that wo rks of art have objective properties by \vhich \Ve can judge th eir aesthetic goodness or badness. (338)

subjectivism (in art) The view that aes- th etic criteria are p urely subjective; the goodness or badness of a \vork of art depends o n h ow the audience responds to it. (338)

The Oval Portra it 351

FI CT ION

The Oval Portrait Edgar Allan Poe

While Edga r Allan Poe (1809 - 1849) is perhaps best known to modern readers for his horror stories, he was also an accomplished poet and critic. "The Oval Portrait," first pub lished in 1842, includes a theme that recurs in several stories as well as in his later critical essay "The Philosophy of Composition": that "the mos t poetical topic in the world" is "the death . .. of a beautiful woman."

The chateau into which my va let had ventured to make forcib le entrance, rather than permit me, in my desper- ately wounded condition, to pass a nigh t in the open air, was one of those pi les of commingled gloom and grandeur wh ich have so long frowned among the Apen- nines, not less in fac t tha n in the fancy of Mrs. Rad- cliffe. To a ll appearance it had been temporarily and very lately abandoned. We establi shed ourselves in one of the smallest and least sumptuously furnished apart- men ts. It lay in a remote turret of the building. Its dec- orations were rich, yet tattered and antique. Its walls were hung with tapestry and bedecked with manifo ld and multiform armorial trophies, together with an un- usually great number of very spirited modern paintings in frames of rich golden arabesque. In these pa in tings, which depended from the walls not only in their main surfaces, but in very many nooks which the bizarre ar- ch itecture of the chateau rendered necessa ry- in these paintings my incipient delirium, perhaps, had caused me to take deep interest; so that I bade Pedro to close the heavy shutters of the room- since it was already night- to light the tongues of a tall candelabrum which stood by the head of my bed - and to throw open far and wide the fr inged curtains of black velvet which en- veloped the bed itself. I wished all this done that I might resign myself, if not to sleep, at least alternately to the contemplation of these pictures, and the perusal of a small volume which had been fou nd upon the pillow, and wh ich purported to criticise and describe them.

Long- long I read- and devoutly, devoted ly I gazed . Rapidly and gloriously the hours fl ew by and the deep midnight. The position of the candelabrum displeased me, and outreaching my hand with difficulty, rather than

Edgar Alan Poe, "The Oval Portrait," 1842, Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenbe rg.o rg/fi les/2147 /2147-h/2147-h. ht m#li nk 2H_4_0014 (31 December 2014) .

disturb my slumbering valet, I placed it so as to throw its rays more fu lly upon the book.

But the action produced an effect altogether unan- ticipated. The rays of the numerous candles (for there were many) now fe ll within a niche of the room which had hitherto been thrown into deep shade by one of the bed-posts. I thus saw in vivid light a picture all unno- ticed before. It was the portrait of a young girl jus t ripen- ing into womanhood. I glanced at the painting hurriedly, and then closed my eyes. Why I did this was not at first apparent even to my own perception. But while my lids remained thus shut, I ran over in my mind my reason for so shutting them. It was an impu lsive movement to gain time for thought- to make sure that my vision had not deceived me- to calm and subdue my fancy fo r a more sober and more certain gaze. In a very few mo- ments I again looked fixed ly at the painting.

That I now saw aright I cou ld not and wou ld not doubt; for the first fl ash ing of the cand les upon that canvas had seemed to dissipate the dreamy stupor which was stea ling over my senses, and to startle me at once into waking life.

The portrait, I have already said, was that of a young girl. It was a mere head and shoulders, done in what is technically termed a vignette manner; much in the style of the favorite heads of Sully. The arms, the bosom, and even the ends of the radiant ha ir melted imperceptibly into the vague yet deep shadow wh ich formed the back- ground of the whole. The frame was oval, richly gilded and filigreed in Moresque. As a thing of art nothing could be more admirable than the painting itse lf. But it could have been neither the execution of the work, nor the immorta l beauty of the countenance, which had so suddenly and so vehemently moved me. Least of all, could it have been that my fancy, shaken from its half slumber, had mistaken the head for that of a living per- son. I saw at once that the peculiarities of the design,

352 Chapter 7 Aesthetics

of the vignetting, and of the frame, must have instantly dispelled such idea- must have prevented even its mo- mentary entertainment. Thin king earnestly upon these points, I remained, for an hour perhaps, half sitting, half recl ining, with my vision riveted upon the portrait. At length, satisfied with the true secret of its effect, I fell back within the bed. I had found the spell of t he picture in an absolute li fe-likeliness of expression, which, at first startling, finally confounded, subdued, and appalled me. With deep and reverent awe I rep laced the candelabrum in its fo rmer position. The cause of my deep agitation being thus shut from view, I sought eagerly the volume wh ich discussed the paintings and their histories. Turn- ing to the nu mber which designated the oval portrait, I there read the vague and qua int words which fo ll ow:

"She was a maiden of rarest beauty, and not more lovely than fu ll of glee. And evil was the hou r when she saw, and loved, and wedded the painter. He, passion- ate, stud ious, austere, and having already a bride in his Art; she a maiden of rarest beauty, and not more lovely than fu ll of glee; a ll light and smiles, and fro licsome as the young fawn; loving and cherishing all things; hating on ly the Art wh ich was her rival; dread ing on ly the pal- let and brushes and other untoward instruments which deprived her oft he countenance of her lover. It was thus a terrible thing for th is lady to hea r the painter speak of his desire to portray even his young bride. But s he was humble and obedient, and sat meekly for many weeks in the dark, high turret-chamber where the light dripped upon the pale canvas only from overhead. But he, the painter, took glory in his work, which went on from hou r

Probing Questions

to hour, and from day to day. And he was a passionate, and wild, and moody man, who became lost in rever- ies; so that he would not see that the light which fe ll so ghastly in that lone t urret withered the health and the spirits of his bride, who pined visibly to all but him. Yet she smiled on and still on, uncomp lainingly, because she saw that the painter (who had high renown) took a fervid and burn ing pleasure in his task, and wrought day and night to depict her who so loved him, yet who grew daily more dispirited and wea k. And in sooth some who beheld the portrait spoke of its resemblance in low words, as of a migh ty marvel, and a proof not less of t he power of the painter than of his deep love for he r whom he depicted so surpassingly well. But at length, as the labor drew nearer to its conclusion, there were admitted none into the turret; for the painter had grown wild with the ardor of his work, and turned his eyes from canvas merely, even to regard the countenance of his wife. And he would not see that the tints which he spread upon the canvas were drawn from the cheeks of her who sat beside him. And when many weeks had passed, and but little remained to do, save one brush upon the mouth and one tint upon the eye, the spirit of t he lady again flickered up as the flame with in the socket of the lamp. And then the brush was given, and then the tint was placed; and, for one moment, the painter stood entranced before the work which he had wrought; but in the next, wh ile he yet gazed, he grew tremulous and very pall id, and aghast, and crying with a loud voice, 'This is indeed Life itself!' turned suddenly to regard his beloved:- She was dead!"

I. The central contrast here is between the lifeless bur beautiful painting and the living and beautiful ,von1an. What does chis contrast suggest about arr and life?

2. The painrer is so passionate about his painting char he fails co notice char his wife is dying. What does this suggesr about the fervent pursuir of beaury in arr?

3. Why did rhe painrer's ,vife dread sining for the porrrair? Why did rhe painter fail co notice char his wife was fading a,vay even as his arr ,vas becoming ,nore lifelike?

For Further Read ing

Aristotle, Poetics, trans. M. E. Hubbard, in Classical Literary Criticism, ed. D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972, 2008).

Clive Bell, Art (London: Chacco and Windus, 1914).

A rthur Danco, Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambrid ge, MA: H arva rd Uni- versity Press, 1981).

Susa n L. Feagin and Patr ick Maynard, Aesthetics (Lo ndon : Oxford U niversity Press, 1998).

Cynthia Freela nd, But ls It Art? (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Marcin Ga rdner, The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener (N ew Yo rk: Sc. Mart in's G riffin, 1999).

G. G ra ham, Philosophy of the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics (London : Routledge, 1997).

Kathleen M. Higgins, Aesthetics in Perspective (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1996).

Dav id Hu me, "Of che Standard of Taste," from Four Dissertations (Lo ndon : A . Miller, 1777).

M. Kelly, ed ., Encyclopedia of Ethics (Ox fo rd: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Leo Tolstoy, What ls Art? (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960).

For Further Reading 353

CHAPTER

THE JUST SOCIETY

CHAPTER OBJECTIV ES

8.1 OVERVIEW: JUSTICE AND POLITICAL PH ILOSOPHY

• Understand t he nature of polit ical p hilosophy and why the issues it deals with a re important.

• Define distributive justice and explain t he purpose o f devis ing theories of justice.

8.2 PLATO' S THEORY: JUSTICE AS MERIT

• Explain the main elements of Plato' s theory of justice.

• Be a bl e to assess the strengths and weaknesses o f Plato's theory.

• Define democracy, meritocracy, and aristocracy.

8.3 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES

• Compare and evaluate the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke.

• Explain Hobbes's notions of "t he state o f n ature" and Leviathan.

• Explain Rawls's t heory o f justice.

• Define liberalism, classical liberalism, libertarianism , and welfare liberalism.

8.4 SOCIALIST THEORIES

• Understand t he ma in features of Marx' s pol itical theory.

• Critically evaluate the strengths and weaknesses o f socialism.

8.5 FEMINISM AND SOCIAL

JUSTICE

• Understand Okin 's critiq ue o f traditiona l theories of justice.

• Explain Mi ller's view of fem in ist critiques of traditional theories.

Overview: Justice and Politica l Philosophy 355

8.1 OVERVIEW: JUSTICE AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Political philosophy is the study of political societies usi ng the methods of philosophy-namely, critical reasoning a nd careful analysis. It is essentially moral philosophy applied to government and polit ical life. Like moral ph ilosophy, it is a no rmative endeavor, concerned with standards or p rinciples fo r determining how polit ical systems ought to be structured. To d o irs work properly, polit ical philosophy must also take into account ho\v political systems are in fact structured, bu t this is a descriptive task that is secondary to the no rmative o ne. Political science, o n the other h and, is mostly a descriptive enterprise ded icated to uncovering the empirical facrs of political systems past or p resent.

The issues of political ph ilosophy are large, important, a nd personal. They ra ise questions about the moral and no n moral goodness of whole societies, which largely determine the moral and nonmoral goodness of o ur lives. We can, of course, try to ignore these issues, but that is like a fish tryi ng to igno re the water. The q uestions p ress us from all sides. W hat is justice, and \vhat constitutes just a nd unjust treat- ment of the members of society? How should the political a nd material goods of society (\vealth, p roperty, liberties, righrs) be d istributed among its citizens? Should these goods be allotted accord ing to need, utility, merit, desert, equality, or some other p rinciple? What theory of political society should rule the distributio n? Is d e- mocracy really the best form of governmen t? Is socialism? Libertarian ism? Do \vell- off citizens have a duty to provide goods to the less well- off? W h at is the morally right (just) bala nce between the state's control of its people and the people's liberty a nd rights? W h at is the moral justification for the state's exercise of po\ver and au- tho rity over ind ividuals? Is the state necessary at all-or is it better to live in small communities without state authorit y?

Suppose someone fails to see the need to study political p hilosophy or even to th ink much about the governmen t under wh ich she lives. Political ph ilosophers can make several replies to this attit ude, but let us focus on just two. First, whether you a re just begin ning to form your ideas about politics and government or you are al- ready a veteran of many political discussions (and proud ly call yourself a Democrat, Republican, socialist, libertarian, o r something else), political ph ilosophy can help you more tha n you may realize. A good dose of political p hilosophy ca n clarify your thinking, introduce you to ne\v perspectives, acquaint you \vith argumen ts for a nd against political theories (including your O\vn), and help you a rrive at informed opinions. The result is greater understanding acqui red th rough critical thi nking and reflection-not through prejudice o r unsupported p resu mption .

Cons ider, fo r example, this issue: the pervasiveness of government. The state's fingers a re every\vhere, revealed through levie.d taxes, a welfare system, the con- struction of roads a nd dams, the treatment of p risoners and patients, vast a rm ies of government employees, decla rations of peace and war, subsidies for homeo\vners a nd corporations, and the regulation of everything from hambu rger to baby cribs. How do you feel about such om nipresent governance? Would you like to see more of the same, much less, or some other political system a ltogether? Such questions a re flas hpoints in contempora ry debates about the p roper role of government in our

Political philosophy is the study of political soci- eties using che mechods of p hilosophy.

l nj ustice an ywhere is a threat to j ustice

everywhere.

-Martin Luther Klng. J r.

356 Chapter 8 The Just Society

In the absence of justice,

what is sovereignty but o rganiu:d robbery? -Saint Augustine

Figure 8.1 Signing o f the Declarati on of Independence: ·we hold these t ruths to be self- evi dent, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.• What philosopher inspired these words?

lives. How would you go about getting some answers? An offhand, party-line reac- tion to these questions may provide some temporary satisfaction or assurance. But if you ,vant better understanding and well-supported vie,vs, your best bet is to take the philosophical approach.

Second, political philosophy may not bake b read o r sell widgets, but it does sometimes change the world. You ,viii see several examples in this ch apter of po- litical theories that affected histo ry, but for no,v let's ponder this one. John Locke (1632-1704) argued that through a social contract between government and the governed, the authority of the state could be justifie.d. The state ex isrs by the consent of the governed and is the guarantor of the people's inalienable rights of" life, liberty, and estate." The state serves the people, and the people have the right to challenge it through revolution if it violates the terms of the contract. Locke's ideas (shockingly rad ical when first introduced) ,vere familiar to American colonisrs, and they heavily influenced the framers of the Declaration of Independence, the Const itution, a nd the Bill of Rights. (Other natio ns took notice of Locke's thinking as ,veil.) Even the language in these documenrs reflects Locke's thinking. This famous sentence in the Declaration, for example, is almost pure Locke: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equ al, that they are e ndowed by their Creator ,vith certain unalien able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." Political theory in the seventeenth century thus affects twenty-first- century Americans (and the rest of the ,vorld).

Overview: Justice and Pol itica l Phi losophy 357

The topic that gets most attentio n in political ph ilosophy is justice. In its broad- est sense,justice refers to people getting what is fa ir or \vhat is their due, a nd the core p rinciple that defines a person's due is equals should be treated equally. The idea is that people should be treated the same unless there is a morally relevant reason fo r t reating them differently. Justice by this defi nition comes in two forms, and each is p rofoundly important in a society. Retributive justice has to do with the fair meting out of pun ishment to cit izens for wrongdoing. D istributi ve justice , o r social jus- tice, is about the fa ir distribut io n of society's benefi ts a nd burdens (its material and no n material goods)-such things as jobs, income, property, liberties, rights, welfare a id, taxes, and p ublic service. H o\v these goods are distributed among the citizens of a state is a functio n of ho\v the state is struct ured, how its social and political instit u- tio ns are arra nged. It's this kind of justice that is the foc us of polit ical ph ilosophers a nd their theories of justice.

Theories of justice embody principles that defi ne fa ir distributions, that explain what people a re due and why. A utilitarian theory of justice, fo r example, says that the distribution of goods shou ld be base.cl o n the principle of utility. Society's insti- tut ions must be arra nged so that its benefits a nd burdens a re allocated to max imize some measure of society's welfare (total happiness, fo r example). This is a popula r scheme of distribut io n, a lthough some think it is inconsistent with our common- sense notions of justice a nd equality. As you m ight guess, the utilita rian ph ilosopher John Stuart Mi ll favors the vie\v.

Some theories of justice insist on distribut io ns according to merit, or desert (what people deserve). Plato (c. 427-347 BCE) took this tack, arguing that because people differ in their talencs and achievements, they shou ld be given a station in li fe that reflects this difference. Some people have superior capacities and therefore should receive a superior share of society's goods; some possess few capacit ies and should get a smaller share. As you ca n see, Plato's vie\v is strong ly a ntidemocratic.

I n other theories, merit and utility mean little, while equality means (almost) everything. The thoroughgoing egalitarian maintains that, contrary to Plato, there a re no morally relevant d ifferences among persons, so everyone should be appo r- t io ned an equal sha re of society's benefits. After all, don't we believe that all persons a re created equal? John Rawls (1921-2002) argues for this k ind of rigorous equality in his theory of justice. H e contends that si nce people's character and behavior are accidents of nature, no one really deserves any particular allotment of benefics or burdens-and so equality is the most reasonable bas is fo r distribut io n of goods. A staunch egalitaria nism demands that the supposedly deservi ng, undeservi ng, needy, a nd self-sufficient receive the same size slice of society's pie a nd the portions cannot be adjusted o n grounds of utility.

An importa nt theme of some theories is that society's wealth should be allocated accord ing to need. Allotmencs of goods based on people's hardship or indigence are common elements in ma ny societ ies, often combined with other d istribution prin- ciples. Welfare programs, lo\ver tax rates fo r people with low incomes, disaster re- lief, low-interest loa ns to the disadvantaged-such programs are strictly need-base.cl. Some thi nkers hold that meeting the needs of society's worst off should be a major concern of the state. But others a rgue that assisting the needy is not a requirement of

Justice is the idea that people sho uld get what is lair or whar is their d ue.

D ist ributive j ustice (or social just ice) is the lair distributio n of society's

benefirs and b urdens- such chings as jobs, incom e, prope rty, libcrrics,

rig hts, welfare aid, taxc.'i, a nd p ub lic service.

1 Wou ld a socie t y structured ent ire ly o n the p rincip le of utility b e j ust?

The vin u c of justice consists in moderatio n, as

rcgulaccd by wisdom. -Aristotle

2 Are the p rincip les of dese rt and equa lity in confl ict? That is, is it p ossible t o h ave a society that treats everyo n e w ith strict equa lity while ensur- ing t hat e ve ryo n e get s w hat th ey deserve?

35 8 Chapter 8 The Just Society

WHAT DO YOU BELi EVE?

Figure 8.2 More Americans are shunning political parties and mi grating to the polit- ical center.

Mostly Rep 11bUcan

Staunch Conservatives

Political Views in Flux

The Pe,v Research Center, which conduces opinion surveys co gauge political attitudes, reports chat, "With the econ omy still struggl ing and the nation involved in multiple 1nil icary operations overseas, che public's political 1nood is fractious. In chis environ,nent, many political attitudes have beco,ne ,nore doctrinaire at both ends of che ideological spectrum, a polarization chat reAecrs the current atmosphere in Washing- ton. Yee ac the sa,ne time, a gro,ving number of Americans are choosing not co identify with either political party, and the center of the political spectrum is increasingly d iverse." H ere are che results fro,n a recent Pew survey of Americans.

Percentage of ...

General PtlbUc Registered Voters

9 I I (Highly engaged Tea Party supporters}

Main Strecr Republicans I I 14 (Con1ervative 011 most issues)

Mostly Independent

Libertarians (Free market, small government seculars)

D isaffccreds (Downscale and cynical}

Post-Moderns (Moderates but liberal 011 social issues)

Mostly Democratic

New Coalition Dcmocrars (Upbeat, 111ajority-mi11oriry)

Hard-Pressed Democrats (Religious, fi11a11cially struggling)

Solid Liberals (Across-rJ1e-board liberal positions)

Bystanders

Young, politically d isengaged

Total

9 JO

I I I I

13 14

JO 9

13 15

14 16

JO 0

JOO JOO

·Beyond Red vs. Blue: 71,e Political Typology'" Pew Research Center, Washington, DC (May, 2011) http:!/

www.people-press.org/20J J/05!04/beyo11d-red-vs-blue-rhe-polirical-typologyl.

Do yo u see yourself in these numbers? If not, how wou ld you characterize your political views?

Overview: Justice and Politica l Philosophy 359

justice; helpi ng unfortunates is a job best left to volunta ry cha rity, not govern ment.

Many who resist the idea of distribu tions based o n equality or desert do so by appealing to a p rinciple of entitlement. They argue that even if people don't deserve the goods they have, they nevertheless may be entitled to them. We are entitled, for example, to self-owners hip of ou r O\vn bodies even though \Ve have d one nothing to de- serve hav ing them. Perhaps the most famous entitlement theory of just ice is that of Robert Nozick (1938-2002). He argues that if \Ve rightfully possess any good s, they a re o urs on ly because we are entitled to them-en titled because we acqu ired them legitimately, not because we got them through appeals to equa lity o r desert.

The most influential theories of justice h ave incorpo- rated some o r a ll of these principles, emphas izing some of them, downplaying others, and arriving at distinc- tive sociopolitica l mod els that we ca n use to judge the worth i ness of real-\vorld systems. It is difficult-perhaps impossible-to fully fat hom our own political system without know ing something about the theories of justice that preceded it . The following sections should help you understa nd what those predecessors a re li ke.

Figure 8.3 Is the state o bli gated to help t he poor? Is it morally permissible for the g overnment t o t ax the rich to g uarantee the poor a basic minimum of w elfare assistance?

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 8.1

1. I magine you are conv inced that the way you r own society is str uctured is better than that of other societies. H o\v cou ld you argue for such a position?

2. Suppose you think you r country's form of distributive justice is ser- iously Aa\ved. H o\v could you a rgue fo r you r view? What p rincip le of justice is at fault?

3. D o you think a society based entirely on equality would be just? W hy or why not?

4. D o you think, as Ra\vls does, that no one really deserves any particu- lar distribution of benefi ts or burdens? Exp la in.

5. In your view, \vhat would be some of the beneficial or harm fu l effects of a society based solely on merit, as Plato proposed?

Where justice is denied,

where poverty is enforced,

where ignorance prevails,

and where any one class is

made to fed that society is an organized conspiracy to

oppress, rob and degrade them, neither persons nor

property will be safe. -Frederick Douglass

3 6 0 Chapter 8 The Just Society

Meritocracy is a system of rule by rh osc m osr q ualifi ed to govern .

Democracy is ru le by the people as a w ho le.

3 How w o u l d yo u defen d democ- racy ag ainst Pl ato 's criticism s?

\Vh at do I care abou t

Jupite r> Justice is a human issue, and I do not need a

god to teach it to me. -Jean-Paul Sartre

8.2 PLATO'S THEORY: JUSTICE AS MERIT

About nven ty-five centuries ago, Plato proposed in his masterwork The Republic a theory of justice t hat has challenged t hinkers and stimulated debate ever since. H e argues that the on ly kind of society t hat can ensure people get their due is a meritocracy, a system of r ule by those most q ualified to govern. H e cont rascs meri- tocracy with a form of governmen t he strongly opposes: democracy, r ule by t he people as a whole. I n his view, democratic r ule is mob rule, t he reign of a rabble too easily swayed by emotional appeals and bad argu ments. Plato had plen ty of experience with democratic rule, for in his day Athens was a democracy in which governmen tal decisions were made by d irect vote of adult male Athen ians. (Greek democracy was fa r from rule by all t he people, for only free men \vere fu ll citizens, and \vomen and slaves were excluded.) H e never fo rgot t hat it \vas a democratic vote of his fello\v citizens that comm itted the u lti mate injustice by condemn ing to death his teacher and role model, the venerable Socrates.

Plato's theory of justice dovetails with his th eory of mind, as \vell as with his epis- temology a nd eth ics . H e argues that the makeup and functioni ng of society is directly analogous to the makeup and functioni ng of the person (or soul). I n his philosophy of mi nd, every person is composed of three fu ndamental componencs: (1) appetite, or desires; (2) spir it, or d rives (i nclud ing motivations and emotio ns); a nd (3) reason (the intellect). The just, or vi rtuous, person will be a \vell-balance.d composite of t hese, each

•

. '

perfo rm ing its own distinctive function in harmony \Vith t he others, \vith the appetites and spirit ruled and coordinated by reason. In s imila r fas hion, Plato says, a societ y consiscs of three t ypes of people, each one identified according to \vhich of the soul 's componencs predominates:

1. Those who are moved by their appetites (producers- laborers, carpenters, a rtisa ns, farme rs)

2. Those who are moved by spirit (auxiliaries-soldiers, \varriors, police)

3 . Those who are moved by reason (guardians-leaders, rul- e rs, p hilosopher-kings)

I n a just society, these t hree perform their proper func- tions \vhile the producers and aux iliaries are led and controlled by t he g ua rdians. The just state is a ha rmonious community gover ned by reason, just as a virtuous person is a tripartite be- ing presided over by the rational faculty of t he soul.

Figure 8.4 Plato's Academy at Athens. In Plato's r epu blic, all people are not created equal. Does th is f act invalidate his t heory of justice?

Plato says citizens a re assigned to one of the three func- tions base.cl on t heir aptit ude and performance, a nd o nce ap- pointed, t hey are expected to remain in that class and not try to cross over to another. This scheme reflects his theory of ethics. To be virtuous and happy, he says, we must act ac- cord ing to our talencs and aptitude, striving fo r excellence in the endeavors nat ure has chosen for us.

Plato's Theory: Justice as Merit 3 6 1

Plato, then, envisions an aristocracy (a society ruled by the best cit izens)- not an a ristocracy of the rich, landed, or well-born, but of the intellectual. The guardians a re true philosopher-kings. They wield all the political power by virtue of their greater talents a nd intellige nce. In the ideal republic, the g ua rd ians- contrary to the usual custom-cannot own property, for O\vning p roperty might tempt them to govern for persona l gain rathe r than for the good of societ y. This po\verful elite can include women and anyone from the lower classes , because the only qualification for becoming a ru ler is simply to be of superior intelligence and character.

To modern minds, some of the elements of Plato's society may sound both wrong and alien. H is ideal state rests on massive inequality among citizens who are sorted into three classes marked by unequal sha res of power and privilege. Granted, people a re assigned to different classes according to merit, but inequality is still the rule. Plato maintains that equals should be treated equally, but to him the classes d eserve different treatment because they are different. All men a re not created equal . Then there is the autho ritarianism of Plato's republic, in which no one gets to choose his o r her own role in life. In general, once assigned to a social role, citizens ca nnot jump to another. There is no social mobility, except within a class and in the case of guardians being chosen from lower classes.

In the follo\ving selection from The Republic, Plato (through the character of Socrates) is expla ining his concept of j ustice to companions. The discuss ion is nar- rated by Socrates .

Plato, The Republic

Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You rem ember the original prin- ciple which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man shou ld practise one th ing o nly, the th ing to which his nature was best adapted;- now justice is this principle or a pa r t of it.

Yes, we often said that one man shou ld do one thing on ly. Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a

busybody; we sa id so aga in and aga in, and m any others have sa id the sa me to u s. Yes, we said so. Then to do one's own bus iness in a certa in way may be assumed to be justice. Ca n

you tell me whence I derive th is inference? I can not, but I should like to be told. Because I thi nk that t his is the only virtue wh ich remains in the State when t he

other virtues of tempera nce and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that th is is t he ultimate cause and cond ition of the existence of all of them, and whil e remaining in t he m is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or rema ining one.

That foll ows of necess ity.

Aristocracy is a socicry ruled by the best citizens.

4 To determine cit- izens' aptitudes and t alents (and thus their place in society), Plato favored testing t hem whil e they are young. Is it possible t o discover t he best career for someone t his way? What about people who d iscover or de- velop their true talents lat e in lif e-those, for example, who are poo r st udent s but turn out t o be gen iuses in adult- hood like Einst ein? Is Plat o t oo optimist ic about t he ease of discovering a person's t rue ca lli ng?

Justice in t he li fe an d con- d uc t of th e State is pos.sible

o nly as firs t it resides in th e hearts and souls of rhe citizens. -Pla,o

5 Don't we reward ath- let es, doctors, lawyers, and business executives according to their merit and not by democratic vote? Should ou r lead- ers be chosen the same way, as Plat o suggests? Why or why not?

362 Chapter 8 The Just Society

6 Do you th ink Plato exaggerat es t he conse- quences of allowing a person to abandon his own career path and do another person's job? Explain.

If we are asked to determ ine which of these four qualities by its presence contrib- utes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreem ent of rulers and subjects or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about t he true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness i n t he ru lers, or whether this o ther which I am mentioni ng, and which is found in ch ildren and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject,- the qua li ty, I mean, of every one doing his own work and not being a busybody, wou ld claim the palm- t he question is not so easily answered.

Certa inly, he replied, there wou ld be a difficu lty in saying which . Then the power of each individua l in t he State to do his own work appears to com-

pete with t he other politica l virtues, wisdo m, temperance, courage. Yes, he sa id . And the virtue which enters into this com petition is justice? Exactly. Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not t he rulers in a State

those to whom you wou ld entrust the office of determ ining suits at law? Certa inly. And are su its decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what

is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own? Yes; that is their principle. Which is a just princi ple? Yes. Then on t his view also justice will be adm itted to be t he having and doi ng what is

a man's own, and belongs to him ? Very true. Think, now, and say whether you agree wi th me or not. Suppose a cobbler to be

doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a ca rpenter; and su ppose them to ex- change their implements or t heir duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you t hink that any great harm wou ld result to the State?

Not much. Bu t when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, hav-

ing his heart lifted up by wea lth or strength or the num ber of his foll owers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrio r into that of legislators and guard ians, for wh ich he is unfi tted, and either to take the im plements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this medd li ng of one with another is the ruin of t he State.

Most true. Seeing then, I said, t hat there are t hree distinct classes, any medd ling of one with

another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doi ng?

Precisely. And the grea test degree of evil-doing to one's own city wou ld be termed by you

injustice ? Certainly. This t hen is injustice; and on the o ther hand when the trader, t he auxiliary, and the

guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make t he ci ty just. I agree with you.•

Plato's Theory: Justice as Merit 363

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Merit or Equality: Who Gets to Live?

Organ transplant operations are incredibly expensive, organs are in very short supply, and transplants are d esperately needed by far ,nore people than can be acco1n1nodared. The ,vaic- ing list for transplants is long, and thousands die every year for their lack. Screeni ng commit- tees a t transplan t centers decide whether someone should be placed on the ,vairing list and ,vhac ranking he or she should receive. They use various criteria to make these decisions, some explicit, so,ne inforrnal or unspoken, some plausible (such as che patient's need and likel i- hood of benefit), and so,ne controversial (such as abil ity co pay, social ,vorthiness, and health habits).

A,nong these, social or ,noral ,vorth iness-,nerit-is probably rhe ,nose contentious. Here the questions are: Which potential recipients-if g iven che chance co live-are expected co contribute most co the good of society? Or ,vhich possible recipients do nor deserve transplants, because they have indu lged in habits (like excessive alcohol use or dangerous activities) char contributed to their irnpend ing organ fai lure? To scare che is- sue concretely: All th ings being equal, should rhe medical student or priest gee che transpla nt instead of che prostitute or alcohol ic?

Figure 8.5 Who should get the only available liver or heart- t he person chosen by lottery, the upright citizen, the man who donates thousands of dollars to the hospital, the priest, or the homeless child ?

Many reject such appeals co merit and insist char the proper criteria are egalitarian- a matter of justice and che moral equality of persons. They argue char all persons have equal ,vorth. Morally, che medica l student is nor worth ,nore than the prostitute or alcohol ic, and vice versa. Education, achievement, occupation, and the like are nor ,norally relevant.

Nevertheless, ,vh ile generally taking the egalitarian approach, son1e ph ilosophers ,nain- rain char in very rare cases, social worth can outweigh egalitarian concerns. It seems reason- able that in a natural d isaster involving ,nass casualties, injured physicians or nurses should be created first if they can aid the o cher survivors.

Should socia l or moral worth ever be taken into account in deciding who should get a transplant? Suppose the question is whether to give a transp lant to a Nobel laureate or to a hard-working, honest truck driver. Assuming that all other factors are equal, which one should get the transp lant? Why?

364 Chapter 8 The Just Society

Social contract t heory

is the view that justice is

secured, and the stare is made legi, imate, through

an agreeme nt amo ng

citizens of the state or

between rhc cirizcns and

the rulers o f ,he sratc.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPH ICAL VIEWS SECTION 8.2

1. Plato thinks d emocracy is no better than mob rule. D o you agree? What are you r reasons?

2. Plato believes that it's possible for a society to be just w itho ut equality among irs citizens. D o you agree? W hy or why not?

3. Plato believes h is just society to be well ord ered, rational, and ha rmo- nious. But are these trairs su ffic ient to ensure justice in a society? Can we plausibly call such a society just \vhen the state decides wh at kinds of lives its citizens must live? Give reasons fo r your view.

4. In Plato's republic, the guardians d eserve to be r ulers because they are the most intelligent a nd intellectually g ifted. But do such attributes g uarantee \visdom? Are intellectually superior people a hvays good leaders?

5. Would you want to live in a state patterned after Plato's just society? Why or why not?

8.3 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES

In the seventeenth centu ry, ph ilosop hers defied tradition by d efending a new k ind of theory of justice and a novel way of justify ing the existence of the state: social contract theory. This vie\v says that justice is secured , and the state is made legiti- mate, through an agreement among citizens of the state or between the citizens a nd the rulers of the state. The people consent explicitly or implicitly to be governed-to be subject to the d ictates and the power of the state-in exchange fo r the state's providing security, righrs, a nd liberties. The state's exi.sten ce is justifi ed by the bind- ing contract that a ll pa rties accept. This understa nd ing of the role and justification of the state was incorporated into the Constitut ion of the Un ited States, a nd in the twenty-fi rst century, th is idea of a social contract is now taken for granted by much of the world.

Nevertheless, when fully formed social contract theories were fi rst introduced, they \Vere thought by many to be radical, scand alous, and wrong. In medieval Europe, the prevailing vie\v had been that states a re supposed to be d om inated by monarchs \vho r ule by the" divine right of k ings ." God sanctions the monarch's authority a nd

ordains that society be ranked in a hierarchy of positions, from the k ing or queen do\vn to the poorest serfs, with each perform ing his o r her p reordained function . As in Plato's republic, people h ave their p roper place in society, and no one is perm itted or expected to deviate from it. The governed cannot consent to anything, and monarchs have absolute power over a ll their subjects.

Social Contract Theories 365

Among the most influential social contract t heorists are Thomas H obbes (1588- 1679), Joh n Locke (1632-1704), a nd John R awls (192 1-2002). We take up thei r views in t he fo llowing pages.

Hobbes

Hobbes \vas the fi rst p h ilosopher in mod ern t imes to systematically articulate a social contract t heory. It was a major d eparture from received vie\vS about society, and t hat fact alo ne \vas enough to infuriate many. It a lso conta ined a rejection of both the divine right of k ings a nd the notion of a divinely est ablished moral la\v-points that gave his critics even more reasons to attack him .

I n his famo us Leviathan, H obbes cont ends that a social cont ract is necessary

in hu ma n affa irs because living w ithout one wou ld be a horrific nightmare of ex- istence. H e begins by assuming a pessimistic view of hu ma n beings: At their co re, he says, t hey a re sel fis h , t reacherous, dishonest , a nd violent . H e argues that when

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

Thomas Hobbes

Charity begins at h ome, and justice begins next

door. - C harles Dickens

7 Hobbes is a pessimist abo ut h u man nature; h e thinks people are basica lly greedy and treachero us. Do you thin k he's right abo ut t h is? Or are peop le f undame ntally sociable, coope rative, and benign? Exp lain your reasonrng .

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) ,vas more than an em- inent English philosopher whose cheories in Auenced future generations. He ,vas also a li nguist, poet, classical scholar, cranslacor, logician, critic, and 1nache1nacical cucor co Charles II. Figure 8.6 Thomas

(1588-1 679), polit ical a nd polymath.

Hobbes H e ,vas born into a poor rel igious fa,n ily and

liked co say char when his ,nocher was pregnant ,vich hi,n, she went into labor on hearing char che Span-

theorist

ish Armada was chreacen ing England. He joked char "fear and I ,vere born nvins cogecher." He was educated at Oxford and spent most of his years as secretary and tutor co che fami ly of che ch i rd earl of Devonshire. D uring chis employment, he mer che fore,nosc European thi nkers (Gal ileo and Francis Bacon a,nong chem) and ,vroce on a wide range of issues, both scientific and philosophical. Many of these ,vorks were extremely controversia l. H is pol itica l phi losophy ,vas offensive co boch sides in che English Civil War; che Ron1an Catholic C hurch and Oxford Un iver- sity forbade che reading of his books; and he went against che gra in of his era by advancing macerialis,n, egoism, and (\vhac some considered) heresy.

H is most fa,nous creation is leviathan (1651), ,vhich has had an enorn1ous in- Auence on English ,noral and pol itica l chi nking. His ocher ,vricings include Philo- sophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (1651), On the Body (1655), and On Man (1658).

366 Chapter 8 The Just Society

8 Do you t h ink Hobbes is rig ht about humans being ro u gh ly equal p hysica lly a nd men - tally? W hy o r why n ot?

Ir is better to lose every ..

thing you have to keep the balance of justice level, than to live a life of petty privi lege devoid of true freedo m . -Bryant H. McGill

these tendencies a re left u nchecked by enforced laws o r agreements, humans sink into a "state of nature"-a "war of every man aga inst every man." In the state of nature, there is no code, culture, or comfort. There is no justice. There is o nly "continual fea r, and danger of violent death; and the life of man [is) solita ry, poor, nasty, brutish, and shor t."2

But, Hobbes says, humankind also has a st rong instinct for self-interest and self-preservatio n, and fortunately th is impulse is coupled with the power of reason. Through reason, he says, people see that the on ly ,vay to escape this "war of a ll against a ll " is to enter into a social contract ,vith o ne another. In the name of self- interest, they agree to turn over much of their autonomy, freedom, and power to an absolute sovereign that will forcib ly keep the peace, restrain antisocial actions, and compel people to keep their agreements. H obbes calls this sovereign the Leviathan (the name of a sea monster mentioned in the Bible), wh ich symbolizes great power and evil. Its authority over those bound by the social contract is absolute, its po,ver is fearsome (enough to deter any tendency to disorder), and irs contractual agreement ,vith irs s ubj ects is irrevocable. Once po,ver is g iven up to th is despot, there is no going back, and there is ahvays the chance that the sovereign will create an environ- ment worse than the state of nature. But that is the chance people must take.

So the state's authority is justified by a social contract, and justice comes into be- ing as the Leviathan assumes power. For H obbes, justice is a matter of the keeping of covena nrs (contracrs), and the only ,vay to e nsure that covenants are kept is to let the Leviathan reign. Without the Leviathan to enforce covenants, there is no justice. As H obbes says, "Where there is no common power, there is no la,v; where no law no injustice." 3

H ere is Hobbes arguing for his theory in Leviathan:

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan

CHAPTER 13. OF THE NATU RAL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS CONC ERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND M ISERY

Nature hath made me n so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes man ifes tly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the d ifference between man, and man , is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not p retend , as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.

And as to the facu lties of the mind (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceed ing upon general, and infa ll ible rules, called sci- ence; which very few have, and but in fe w thi ngs; as being not a native facu lty, born with us; nor attained, [as prudence], while we look after so mewhat else), I find yet a greater equality amongst me n, than that of strength. For prudence, is but experience;

Social Contract Theories 367

which equa l t ime, equally bestows on all men, in t hose th ings they equally apply t hem - selves unto. Tha t which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain con- ceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men t hink t hey have in a grea ter degree, t han t he vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men , that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned ; yet t hey wil l hard ly beli eve t here be many so wise as themselves: For t hey see their own wit at hand , and other men 's at a distance. But this proves rather t hat men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equa l d istribution of any th ing, than that every man is contented with his share.

From this equa li ty of ability, arises equa lity of hope in the atta in ing of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire t he same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enem ies; and in the way to their end (which is principally t he ir own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only), endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an invader hath no more to fear, than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not on ly of t he fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from t his diffidence of one another, there is no way fo r any man to secure himself, so reasonab le, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to mas ter the persons of all men he can, so Jong, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requi res, and is generall y all owed. Also because there be some, that taki ng plea- sure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, t hat otherwise wou ld be glad to be at ease within modest bo unds, shou ld not by invas ion increase their power, they wou ld not be able, long t ime, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmen tation of dominion over men, be- ing necessa ry to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Aga in , men have no pleasure (but on t he contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looks that his companion shou ld va lue him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavors, as far as he dares (which amongst t hem that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other) , to extort a greater value from his condemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.

So t hat in the nature of man, we find three principa l causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, d iffidence; third ly, glory.

9 Does the existence of st able democracies in the twenty-fi rst centu ry show that Hobbes is wrong about human nature?

The fi rst, ma keth men in vade for gain ; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make them- selves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; t he second to defend them; the t hird, for t rifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, t he ir nation, their profession, or t heir name.

Figure 8. 7 Frontispiece to Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiastical/ and Civil, 165 1, by Thomas Hobbes.

368 Chapter 8 The Just Society

Thomas Hobbe s, Leviathan

10 Suppose the world is suddenly left w ith no government al au- thority anywhere; no formal restraints on human behavior exist. Speculate on how you think people would act. Wou ld chaos and sav- agery ensue, or would people more or less live in peace and harmony?

Hereby it is manifest, t hat during the ti me men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man , aga inst every man . For WAR, consists not in battle only, or the act of fight- ing; but i n a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known : and therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the natu re of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the natu re of fou l weather, lies not in a shower or two of rain; but in an incli nation thereto of many days together: so the nature of war, consists not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other ti me is PEACE.

W hatsoever t herefore is consequent to a t ime of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time; wherein men live withou t other security, t han what thei r own strength, and t heir own i nvention shall furnis h them withal. In such cond ition , there is no place for industry; because the fru it t hereof is uncertain: and consequently no cu lture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities t ha t may be imported by sea; no commodious bu ild ing; no instruments of moving, and removing such thi ngs as requi re much force; no knowledge of the face of t he earth; no account of t ime; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of vio lent death; and the l ife of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish , and short . .. .

To th is war of every man against every man , th is also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injust ice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war t he two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the fac- ulties neither of the body, nor mi nd . If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in t he world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in soli tude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no domin ion, no mi ne and th ine d istinct; but on ly t hat to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill cond ition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the pass ions, partly in his reason.

The pass ions that incli ne men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious l ivi ng; and a hope by t heir ind ustry to obta in them. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called t he Laws of Nature ... .

CHAPTER 14. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS, AND OF CONTRACTS

The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus natura/e, is the li berty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; t hat is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any th ing, which in his own judgment, and reason , he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereu nto.

By LIBERTY, is understood, accord in g to the proper sign ification of the word, the absence of external impediments: which i mped iments, may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he wou ld; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, accord ing as his judgment, and reason shall dictate to him.

A LAW OF NATURE (lex naturalis), is a precept, or genera l ru le, found out by rea- son, by which a man is forbidden to do t hat , wh ich is destructive of his life, or taketh

Social Contract Theories 369

away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he th inks it may be best preserved . For t hough they t hat speak of this subject, use to confound jus , and lex, right and law; yet they ought to be distingu ished; because RIGHT, consists in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW, determines, and binds to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation , and liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chap- ter) is a condition of war of every one aga inst every one; in which case every one is governed by his own reason ; and there is nothing he can ma ke use of that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it foll oweth , that in such a cond ition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one another's body. And t here- fore, as long as this natura l right of every man to every thing endu res, there can be no security to any man (how strong or wise soever he be) of living out t he time, which nature o rdinarily allows men to live. And consequen tly it is a precept, or genera l ru le of reason, that every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, t hat he may seek, and use, all helps, and advan tages of war. The first branch of which ru le, containeth the first, and fundamental law of nature; which is, to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature; which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves.

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor peace, is derived this second law; that a man be will ing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall t hink it necessa ry, to lay down t his right to all things; and be contented with so much li berty agains t o ther men, as he would allow other men aga inst himself. For as long as every man holds this right, of doing any thing he likes; so long are all men in the cond ition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then there is no reason for any one, to divest himself of his : for that were to expose himself to prey (which no man is bo und to) rather t ha n to d ispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel; wha tsoever you requi re that others shou ld do to you, t hat do ye to them . And that law of all men, [what you would not have done to you , do not do to others) . . ..

CHAPTER 15. O F OTH ER LAWS OF NATURE

From t hat law of nature, by which we are ob liged to transfer to another, such rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of man kind, t here followeth a third; which is this, t hat men per form their covenan ts made: without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all th ings rema ining, we are still in the cond i- t ion of war.

And in this law of nature, consists the fountain and origina l of JU STICE. For where no covenant hath proceeded , there hath no right been tra nsferred , and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just.

But because covenants of m utua l trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either part (as hath been said in t he former chapter), are invalid; though the ori- ginal of j ustice be the maki ng of covenants; yet injustice actually there can be none, ti ll t he cause of such fear be taken away; which wh ile men are in the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place, t he re must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their

11 Is ceding a ll power t o a leviathan the on ly way for people t o achieve peace, security, and cooperation in a society? Expla in.

370 Chapter 8 The Just Society

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan

\Vhy has government been instituted a t all? Because

the passions of m an will no t conform to the die~ tares of reason and j ustice

w ithou t constraint.

-Alexander Hamilton

covenants, by the terror of some pun ishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of t heir covenant; and to make good that propriety, which by mutual con- tract men acquire, in recompense of the un iversal right t hey abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth . And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary defi nition of justice in the Schools: for they say, t hat justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own . And therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no inju stice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety; all men having right to all things: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of ju stice, consists in keeping of valid covenants: but t he va lid ity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that propriety begins.•

Locke

Locke's social contract theory has some points in common \Vith Hobbes's-but also much that Hobbes would have rejected outright. Both Hobbes and Locke assert that ( I) reason enables people to see the w isdom of forming a state th rough a social con- tract, (2) people must freely consent to be bound by the contract (not be coerce.cl into accepting it), and (3) the state's authority is justified by this consent of the governed. Beyond these matters, Hobbes and Locke part company.

For one thing, they have very d ifferent ideas about the "state of nature," the \vorld in \vhich no civil society exisrs . For Hobbes, to be in the state of nature is to be in a "war of all against all," where morality is nonexistent, and the only la\vS are commonsense rules fo r survival and self-interest. For Locke, on the other hand, the state of nature is considerably less nasty and brutish, for even there, natu ral mora l la\vS apply and help to regulate people's behav ior. Those living in the state of nature are free, sociable, equal, and (mostly) at peace.

Hobbes contends that, generally, justice and rights do not come into being until the state is esta blished. People surrender thei r lives and liberties to the Leviathan in exchange for security and peace, and he can do \vhat he wants \Vith his subjects. But Locke a rgues that humans have inherent, God-given rights \vhether or not a govern- ment is around to guarantee them. Ch ief among these is the right to property-not just land but your own body and any object that you change th rough work (\vith \vhich you "mix you r labor"). These rights are inalienable: They cannot be trans- ferred to the government or any other entity. Humans create the government and cede some power to it; in return it p rotects thei r righrs and liberties. The state serves the people (not the other way round), di recting all its power "to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people."

But \vhat exactly does the state do to p reserve liberties and p romote the com- mon good? Locke identifies three functions that people need the state to perform. First, citizens need the natural moral la\v to be set out in clearly expressed laws of the land. Un\vritten natural laws are clear to humans, but people are apt to mis- construe them in line with their biases. Second, there need to be impartial judges \vho can settle disputes concerning the app lication of the laws. Third, there nee.ds

Social Contract Theories 371

to be po,ver in the st ate to enforce the laws. Otherw ise, people will be able to t ake justice into their o,vn h ands.

Suppose, however, that the state abuses its power by repeat- edly and arbitrarily trampling on the people's rights and liberties. Hobbes says that once you cede po,ver to the Leviathan, he is free

to treat you as he wil l. But Locke says if the government violates the righrs of cit izens, it is no longer legitimate, obligations to it are voided, and the people have a right to dissolve it-to initiate rebellion. Locke's ins istence on the right to rebel aga inst a govern- ment t hat misuses its po,ver is echoed clearly in the Declaration of Independence:

We hold t hese truths to be self-evident, that all men are cre- ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with cer- tain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.- That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed ,- That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new Government. .. . s

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The following passages are from Locke's landmark Second Trea- tise of Government:

Figure 8.8 Title page of Two Treatises of Government by John Locke, second edition, 1694.

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government

CHAPT ER VIII

Of the Beginning of Political Societies

95. Men being, as has been said , by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to t he political power of another, without his own consent. The only way, whereby any one divests himself of his natura l liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to jo in and unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe , and peaceable living one amongst an- other, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, a nd a greater security against any, that are not ofit. This a ny number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of t he rest; they are left as t hey were in t he liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby pres- ently incorporated , and make one body politic, wherein t he majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.

96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every indi vidual, m ade a community, t hey have thereby made t hat community one body, with a power to act as

372 Chapter 8 The Just Society

John Locke,

Second Treatise of Government

12 Locke believes in an objective mora l law. Do you a lso believe in it? Do you believe t hat there a re objective moral p rinciples that are b inding on every- one? Why or why not?

one body, wh ich is only by the will and determ ination of the majority. For that which acts any community, being on ly the consent of the individuals of it, and it being neces- sary to th at which grea ter force carries it, wh ich is the consent of the majority: or else it is imposs ible it should act or con tinue one body, one community, which the consent of every in dividual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consen t to be concluded by t he majority. And therefore we see, that in assemb lies, impowered to act by pos itive laws, where no nu mber is set by t hat pos itive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determ ines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.

97. And thu s every man, by consenting with o thers to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obliga tion, to every one of th at society, to su b- mit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporate into one society, wou ld signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would th ere be of any compact ? What new engagemen t if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actua lly consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of nature hath, who may su bmit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.

98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individua l; nothing but the consent of every individua l can make any thing to be the act of the whole: But such a consen t is next to im possible ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of business, wh ich in a number, though much less th an that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep ma ny away from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety of opinions , and contrari- ety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the com ing into so- ciety upon such terms would be on ly like Cato's com ing into the thea tre, only to go out again. Such a constitution as thi s would make the m ighty leviathan of a shorter duration than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in : which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational creatures should desire and constitute so- cieties only to be dissolved. For where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.

99. Whosoever therefore ou t of a sta te of natu re unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to t he end s for which they unite into society, to t he majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And t hus th at, which begins and actuall y constitutes any political society, is nothing, but the consent of any number of freemen capab le of a majority, to uni te and incorporate in to such a society. And th is is th at, and that only, which d id , or cou ld give beginning to any lawful government in the world ... .

CHAPTER IX

Of the Ends of Polit ical Society and Government

123. If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equa l to t he grea test, and subjec t to no body, why will he par t with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the

Social Contract Theories 373

dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, t hat though in the state of nat ure he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncerta in , and constantly exposed to the invasion of others. For all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoy- men t of the prope rty he has in th is state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him will ing to quit this condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continua l dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is will ing to join in society with others, who are already un ited, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of t heir lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name, property.

1 24 . The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themsel ves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in t he state of nature there are ma ny t hings wanting.

First, There wants an establis hed, settled , known law, received and allowed by common consent to be t he standard of right and wrong, and t he common measure to decide all controversies between t he m. For though the law of nature be plain and in tell igible to all ra tional creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of studying it, are not apt to allow ofit as a law binding to them in the application of it to t heir particular cases.

1 25. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all d ifferences according to t he established law. For every one in t hat state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to t he mselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.

1 26. Thirdly, In the state of nature, there often wan ts power to back and support t he sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice of- fended , will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injust ice; such resistance many times makes the pun ishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.

1 27. Thus man kind , notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition , while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. He nce it comes to pass that we seldom find any number of men li ve any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are t he rein exposed to, by the irregu lar and un- certain exercise of the power every man has of pun ishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and t he rein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willi ngly give up every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such ru les as the commun ity, or those authorized by them to t hat purpose, shall agree on. And i n this we have the original right and rise of both the leg- islative and executive power, as well as of the governments and societies themselves ....

CHAPTER XIX

Of the Dissolution of Government

222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of t heir property, and t he end why they choose and authorize a legislative, is , t hat there may be laws made, and ru les set, as guards and fences to t he properties of all t he members of t he society: to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of t he soci- ety. For since it can neve r be supposed to be the will of t he society, that the legislative

13 Do you agree wit h Locke that the main reason for people to establish a government is to p rotect property? Explain.

374 Chapter 8 The Just Society

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government

14 Do citizens of a state ever have the right to overthrow their government? How would a ut il itarian answer this question? How does Locke an- swer it? Wh ich view is closer to your beliefs? Why?

Governme nt docs not solve proble ms; it s ubsi ..

dizcs th e m . -Ronald Reagan

L iberalism is the political doctrine thar p u ts primary emphasis on ,he libcny

and rights of individuals against encroachment.~ by the state.

shou ld have a power to destroy that, which every one designs to secure, by enteri ng into soci ety, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of the ir own making, whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people, o r to reduce the m to slavery under arbitrary power, they pu t themselves into a state of wa r with the people, who a re thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God ha th provided for a ll men, agains t force and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative sha ll transgress this fundamen tal ru le of society; and e ither by a mb ition, fear, folly or corruption , endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other an absolute power over the lives, li berties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power, the people had put into their hands, for quite contrary ends , and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall thin k fi t) provide for the ir own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said he re, concern in g the legislative in genera l, holds true also concerning the su preme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both, when he goes a bout to set up his own arbitrary will, as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he e ither employs the force, treasure, and offices of the soci ety to corru pt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly pre-engages the electors, and prescribes to the ir choice, such, whom he has by solici tations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs: and employs them to bring in such, who have promised before-hand, what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regu late candidates and electors, and new mode l the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of pub lic security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives, as the fence to their properties, cou ld do it for no other end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, free ly act, and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth , and the publi c good should, upon exam ination and mature debate, be judged to req uire. This, those who give their votes before they hea r the de bate, and have weighed the reasons on a ll sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an assem bly as this, and endeavour to set up the decl ared abettors of his own will , fo r the true representatives of the people, and the law-make rs of the society, is cer tainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government, as is possib le to be met with. To which if one s hall add rewards and punishmen ts visibly employed to the same end, and a ll the arts of perver ted Jaw made use of, to take off and d estroy a ll tha t stand in the way of such a design, and will not comp ly and consent to betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in the soci ety, who thus emp loy it contrary to the trust that went along with it in its first institution, is easy to determine; and one cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted.6

Liberalism is the political doctrine chat purs p ri mary emphas is on the liberty and rights of individuals against encroachments by che scace. le is at the heart of po- litical outlooks chat today are given the vague labels of liberalism and conservatism, for both ideologies cake fo r granted chat bas ic ind ividual liber ties and rights should be p rotected against unacceptable government intrusion. They d iffer in ho,v they de- fine unacceptable involvement of the government. Locke's theory of justice is a form

Social Contract Theories 375

of liberalism-classical liberalism, che view chat che scace should protect personal

freedoms as well as che r ig ht co pursue one's O\vn social and econom ic \veil-being in

a free ma rket \vicho uc interfe re nce from ochers. I n cont empora ry polit ics, classical

liberalism most resembles what is known as (polit ical) libertarianism . Libertarians

insist chat government should be small and limited co night-watchma n funccions-

t he protectio n of society and free econom ic systems from coercion a nd fraud. All

ocher social or economic benefits a re che respo nsibil ity of individu als.

Rawls

Dav id H ume, \vhom \Ve met in earl ier chapters, \vas a severe critic of social con-

t ract t heory as offered up by H obbes a nd Locke. H e declared chat social contracts

a re h istorical fictions-no such concraccs have ex ist ed in realit y. Govern ments have

been established by conquest and force, not by agreements among equals in a state

of natu re. This criticism did no t matter m uch t o many lacer theorises because t hey

viewed che t heories of Locke, H obbes, a nd ochers not as historical faces, but moscly

PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK

John Locke

The philosopher John Locke (1632- 1704) is the senior theorise among the British empiricists and per- haps, as so,ne say, the grearesr English philosopher in rhe early modern period (rhe firs t decades after Descartes) .

Classical liberalism is , he view th ar , he srare should pm,ec, personal freedo ms

as wdl as the right m pursue o ne's own social and econo m ic wdJ.bci ng in a free market w ithout inte rfe re nce fro m o thers.

Libertarianism (political) is the view that govern· men, should be small a nd

limited to nig ht -watchman functio ns.

Eventually he became the ,nose renowned inrellecrual Figure 8.9 John Locke (i 632- in England and possibly throughout the Conrinenr. 1704), empiricist philoso pher and

H e ,vas born into a Puritan fam ily, stud ied political theorist. moral phi losophy and logic ar Oxford, and rhen sec his sighrs on a career in med i- cine. Like his fellow empiricist Thomas Hobbes, he rubbed elbo,vs with many of rhe great ch inkers of rhe day. He knew rhe famous chemise Robert Boyle as well as rhe physicist Isaac Newton and encountered ocher notables ar rhe Royal Society.

For a ,vh ile he was secretary ro rhe earl of Shaftesbury, ,vho beca,ne his patron . Th is relationship involved hi,n in Protesranr policies and in ta lk of resistance ro Charles II, rhe Catholic king. Conseq uenrly, Shaftesbury had ro Aee ro H olland, and Locke followed him in 1683, returning ro E ngland in 1689.

Locke ,vas nor an academic who directed his ,vrirings ar ocher philosophers. He preferred instead ro address imporcanr issues in conre,nporaty society, aim ing his ,vriring ar an ed ucated public. H is besr-kno,vn works include the Essay Concerning Hu.man Understanding, Second Treatise of Government, and Leuer on Toleration, all published in t 689.

376 Chapter 8 The Just Society

John Rawls, A Theo,y of Justice

as exp lanations of how states could be fo rmed and just ified. Nevertheless, Hume's attack dampened interest in social contract theories of justice fo r two centuries- until the \vork of John Ra\vls (1921-2002).

Ra\vls also thinks of social contracrs as fictions-but very useful fi ctions. H e believes they give us a way to explore the requirements of distributive justice. He asks, in effect, What kind of social contract would best ensure a fair distribution of rights, duties, and the advantages of social cooperation? To ans\ver th is question, he proposes an ingenious thought experiment. Imagi ne we are living in a state of nature and want to devise a social contract that ensures that everyone is treated fa irly. What k ind of state \vould we all agree to? Sp eci fically, by what principles should our just society structure itself? His response is that the required principles are those that people \vould agree to under hypothetical conditions that ensure fair and unbiased choices. H e holds that if the starting point for the social contract is fa ir-if the initial conditions and bargain- ing process fo r producing the p rinciples are fair-then the p rinciples themselves will be just and will define the essential makeup of a just society. As Rawls says,

John Rawls, A Theory of justice

[The] gu iding idea is that the p rincip les of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the origina l agreem ent. They are the p rincip les that free and ratio nal pe rso ns concerned to further their own interests wou ld accept in an initial position of equa lity as defi ning the fu ndam ental terms of t heir association. These principles are to regu late all further agreements; t hey specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be establi shed .7

At the hypothetical starting point-what Rawls calls the "original position"-a group of normal, self-interested, rational individuals come toget her to choose the principles that will determine their basic rights and duties and their share of society's benefits and burdens. But to ensure that their decisions are as fa ir and impartial as possible, they must meet behind a metaphorical "veil of ignorance." Behind the vei l, no one knows his or her own social or economic status, class, race, sex, abil ities, talents, level of intelligence, o r psychological makeup. Rawls thinks that since the pa rticipanrs are rational and sel f-interes ted but ig norant of their situation in societ y, they \vi ll not agree to principles that w ill put any particular group at a disadvantage, because they might very \veil be members of that group. They wi ll choose principles that are unbiased and nondiscriminatory. The assumption is that since the negotiat- ing cond itions in the o riginal position are fai r, the agreements reached will a lso be fa ir-the principles wi ll be just.

Rawls contends that given the original positio n, the participants would agree to arra nge thei r social relatio nships according to these fundamenta l principles:

FIRST PRINCIPLE

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Social Contract Theories 377

SECOND PRINCIPLE

Socia l and economic inequa lities are to be arranged so that they are both : (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, ... and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under cond itions of fair equa lity

of opportuni ty.a

The first principle-the equal liberty principle-says that ever yone is entitle.cl to the most political freedom possible in exercising basic rights and duties (for example, the right to vote and hold office and freedom of speech, assembly, and thought). Each person should get a maximum degree of basic liberties, but no more than anyone else. This p rincip le takes precedence over all other considerations (including the second principle), so that basic political liberties cannot be reduced or ca ncelled just to improve economic well-being. This stipulation, of course, di rectly contradicts utilitarian views of the matter.

The second principle concerns social and economic goods such as income, wealth, opportun ities, and positions of authority. Ra,vls recogn izes t hat some social and econom ic inequalities in society are unavoidable as well as beneficial. Those who ,vork harder or devise a better mousetrap deserve to reap greater benefirs fo r their efforts. Such inequality p rovides incentives fo r extraordinary p roductivity, ,vhich in turn w ill be to the good of society as a whole. (Th is k ind of unequal social arrangement contrasrs ,vith systems that aim at a much greater d egree of equality, as in socialist societies.) So Rawls asserrs in part (a) that social and economic inequalities are not unjust if they work to everyone's benefit, especially to the benefit of the least well-off in society. "[There) is no injustice," he says, " in the greater benefirs ea rne.d by a few provided that the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved." 9 For Rawls, such a policy is far more just t han one in which some people a re made to suffer fo r the greater good of others: " It is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper."

But Ra,vls also maintains that although eco- nomic inequalities are allowed, and not everyone wi ll obtain the greater rewards, ever yone should at least have an equal opportunity to acqu ire them. Th is is the message of part (b). Every person is en- t itled to an equal chance to t ry to acquire basic goods. No one is guaranteed an equal share of them, but opportunities to obtain these benefits must be open to a ll, regardless of social standing.

Givi ng mo ney a n d power to governme nt is like

giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys. -P. J. 0 . Rourke

15 A re you more sympathetic to liber- t arian ism or welfare liberalism? Why?

In Rawls's program, the demands of the first principle must be satisfied before satisfying the Figure 8.10 John Raw ls (1921-2002).

378 Chapter 8 The Just Society

Wdfare liberalism is a form ofliberalism, ,h e

aim of which is m preserve ind ivid ual libcnies w hile

e nsuring the gene ral wel- fare of ,he ci,iu:nry.

second, and the requi rements of part (b) must be met before those of part (a). In any just d istribution of benefits and burdens, then, the first priority is to ensure equal basic politi· cal liberties fo r all concerned, then equality of social and econom ic opportu nity, then the ar rangement of any inequalities to the benefit of the least advantaged.

Rawls's t heory of justice has significant implications fo r the allocatio n of society's resources. C,onsider, fo r example, t he hotly debated resou rce of health ca re. O ne prom inent line of argu ment goes li ke this: As Rawls cla ims, ever yone is entitled to fa ir equality of opportunit y, and adequate (bas ic) health ca re enables fair equality of opportunity (by ensu ri ng "normal species f unctioning"). Therefore, everyone is ent itled to adequate health care, \vh ich includes a ll appropriate measures fo r elim· inating or compensating fo r the disadvantages of disease and impairmen t. 10 In such a system, t here would be universal access to a basic level of health care, wh ile more elaborate or elective ser vices wou ld be available to a nyone who cou ld afford t hem.

Rawls's proposal is a fo rm of liberalism, \vhat h as been called welfare liberalis m . Its a im is to p reserve individual liberties wh ile e nsuring the general welfare of t he citizenry. It requires the redistribution of resources (for example, taxing the better off to p rovide benefits to the less well-off)-a scheme that liberta rians \vould never countenance. The libertarian says t hat government shou ld not be in t he business of helping t he socially or economically d isadvantaged, for t hat wou ld require violating people's liberty by taking resources from t he haves to give to t he have-noes.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 8.3

1. H obbes says t h at once people cede power to a strong governmental authority, the aut ho rity w ields total authority over t hem; t he govern· ment's power is unalte rable and absolute. Do you t h in k such a govern· ment is necessary for people to live in peace? W hy or why not? What states in t he world today fi t H obbes's description of the Lev iath an?

2. H obbes believes that t here is no such t hing as justice until the Lev ia- t ha n is established . Th is means that justice does not exist independ- ently of an aut ho rity to d efine a nd enforce it. Explain \vhy you agree o r disagree \vit h t his vie\v.

3 . Locke thinks that people have a r ig ht to rebel against a government t hat abuses ics po\ver. D o you agree? If so, u nder what conditions would you thin k rebellion is justified ?

4. Was t he United States fou nded according to the p rinciples of classi- cal liberalism, \velfare liberalism, or something else? Has t he country stayed true to its origins? Explain.

5. Is classical libera lism a better theor y of justice tha n welfare libera lism? Support your a nswer with reasons.

8.4 SOCIALIST THEORIES

The prevailing theories of justice throughout the ,vorld are liberalism and social- ism. Socialism is the political and economic doctrine that the means of production (property, factor ies, bus inesses) should be owned or controlled by the people, either communally or through the state. Socialism can accommodate liberal democratic forms of government and can even retain some elements of market cap italism. C ommunism usually implies socialism within a totalitarian system.

The gu iding p rinciple of the socialist vie,v is equality: The ,vealth of society should be shared by all. The ideal distribution of goods usually follows the classic formu la laid do,vn by Karl Marx (1818-1883), the father of modern socialism: "From each ac-

cording to h is ability, to each according to his needs." People should do work that fits their abilities, and they should reap rewards that match their nee.ds. Generally, liberal societies let t he means of p roduction accru e to fewe r people through th e ,vork ings of a free market-that is, t hrough capitalism . In such a system, wealth goes to anyone who can acqui re it in the marketplace, but in a socialist system, ,vealth is controlled by the state, ,vhich allocates it for the good of the people generally.

Few philosophers have had as much influence on the world as Marx has-,vho, ironically, did not consider hi mself a philosopher and d id not believe t hat ideas a lone could have much of an impact on history. He thinks that ,vhat d rives philosophy, history, society, law, government, and morality is econom ics. It is the dominant system of econom ics in every age, he says, that determines how society is structured and ho,v history w ill go. A society's system of economics is defined by its means of p roduction-by irs economic and technological ways of meeting people's physical and social needs. The means of production, Marx says, shape social relationships, class structure, technological tools, and political and philosophical ideas. Those ,vho o,vn and control t he means of production make up t he dominant class, possess most of t he ,vealt h, wield most of t he political power, and exploit t he lower class. Their ideas-political, philosophical, o r social-are the ruling ideas. The rest of the people own no property and occupy the lowest ru ngs of society, selling their labor to the ru ling class, the property o,vners. The nvo camps, t hen, are fo rever at odds.

Marx maintains that this pattern of opposition-this class struggle-repeats irself th roughout history. It is inevitable and unalter- able. In it he sees a dialectic process unfold again and again in society:

Socialist Theories 379

I am convinced that the

path to a new, better

and pos.<ible world is no t capitalism, the path is socialis m .

-Hugo C havez

Socialism is the doctrine that t he m eans of produc·

tion (proper[)', facto ries, b usinesses) sho uld Ix: owned o r controlled by the

people, e ither communally o r through the state.

Communism usually imp lies socialism w ithin a totalitarian system .

Capitalism is a polit ical econo m ic system that lets

th e means of productio n accrue m fewe r people th ro ugh the workings of a

free marke t . In such a sys· rem, wealth goes to anyone who can acquire it in rhc marketplace.

Fi rst there is a historical starting point (the thesis), ,vh ich eventually p roduces a state of affai rs di rectly opposed to it (the antithesis), the con- fl ict being resolved by a ne,v situation (the synthesis). Marx thinks the dialectic struggle in modern times is between those who o,vn the means of production (the bourgeoisie, or capitalists) and th ose who do not (the proletariat). The bourgeoisie are few but own all the facto ries and other means of p roduction (thesis); the p roletariat are many but o,vn noth - ing, serving only as workers in the capitalist system (antithesis). To in- crease thei r profits, the bourgeoisie hire more and more workers but pay them less and less, replacing workers ,vith machines ,vhenever possible. Figure 8.11 Karl Marx (1818-1883).

380 Chapter 8 The Just Society

16 Is Marx correct in saying t hat a society's means of production shape its political and phil osophical ideas? What about relig ion, cu lture, social reformers-<an any of these influence a society's t hinking?

Capitalism is war; social-

ism ts peace.

-Karl liebknecht

17 Do ideas affect his- tory? Marx says no. But his socialist ideas seem to have affected h istory profound ly. Does th is fact d isprove Marx's claim?

PHILOSOPHY LAB - Imagine char rhe United Scares has evolved into a liberrarian paradise. The govern- menr is small, charged only ,virh the limited functions of protecting society and economic systems from coercion and fraud. All other social and economic benefits are the responsibility of individuals. People have maximum freedom ro pursue their economic goals without interference from the government. Taxes are extremely lo,v, raised only to fund the military and whatever forces are needed ro secure people's social and economic rights. There are no entitlement programs-no Social Secur- ity, no Medicare, no health care programs, no studenr loans, no welfure systems of any kind. Government regulation of business is minimal, as is consumer prorec- tion. There are no minimum-wage la,vs and no government attempts ro redistribute wealth or to help rhe poor, disabled, disadvantaged, or elderly.

Would you want to live in such a society? Would your life be better or worse in it? What would you like or d islike most about this social

system? Overal l, wou ld people be better or worse off in a thor- oughly libertarian America?

The workers' ,vages decline, more become unemployed, and their exploitation by the capitalists continues. As their situation worsens, Marx observes, they have an increased sense of alienation: They are no longer valued as persons, for they have become mere cogs in the capitalist machinery, and they can no longer take pride in their work, for it has been downgraded into mindless assembly-line motions. But ultimately the success of the bourgeoisie proves to be their undoing. They produce, as Marx says, their o,vn gravediggers. They un,vittingly create a large, poor, angr y proletarian class that has had enough of capitalism and the woes that come ,vith it. A proletarian revolution sweeps the old order a,vay and eventually ushers in a classless society (synthesis) in which the means of production belong to everyone and ,vealth is shared equally among equals.

A frequent criticism of socialism is that a distribution of goods according to needs and abilities would require coercion by the state. For socialism to ,vork, people must be forced to do the jobs that match their skills, not the jobs they prefer. And they must be compelled to accept the benefits (monetary or otherwise) that match their needs, not the benefits they most desire.

Critics also accuse socialist systems of providing no incentive for p eople to excel at their jobs. Under socialism, people are rewarded according to their needs, not by ho,v well or how hard they work. So what inducement is there to be more ambitious or efficient?

Socialist Theo ries 381

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Is the United States a Socialist Country?

To 1nany Americans, socialism is a d irry,vord. Former President Obama ,vas accused of crying co rurn rhe United Scares into a socialise country like chose in Europe. To score points ,virh rhe e lecrorare, politicians label their opponents socialises. So,ne political rheorisrs say char a lirrle socialism won't hurr and mighr help, and a few declare char rhe debate is s illy because rhe United Scares is already a socialise country. ls ir?

Ir depends on your definition of socialism. So,ne people (including a few television co,n- menrarors) say char a govern,nenr is socialise if ir runs social progra,ns char orhenvise could be left co rhe markerplace-progra,ns like publ ic education, prisons, aid co rhe poor, and Medicare. By chis standard, rhe Un ited Scares is indeed socia lise. Bur rhe rradirional defini- tion is ,nore like rhe one given ar rhe beginning of chis section: Social ism is rhe doctrine char rhe means ofprod11ction (property, factories , businesses) should be owned or controlled by rhe people, either communally or through rhe scare. The programs just mentioned are generally nor considered means of production. Neither are such th ings as police and fire prorecrion, national defense, and income redisrriburion. Welfare progra,ns are examples nor of socialism bur of ,velfare liberalis1n. So even though rhe Un ired Scares may have some socialise e lements (such as partial ownersh ip and control of rhe banking industry), ir's nor predo,ninanrly socia lise-and calling ir char would be an exaggeration.

Suppose the government owns and runs al l technology companies, ha lf the farms, and the entire steel industry. Wo uld t he Un ited States then be properly ca lled socialist? What would be the advantages or d isadvantages of such a scheme?

Marx conveyed his views over many years and in several ,vritings, the most well kno,vn being the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848), which he coauthored with his colleague Friedrich Engels:

Ka rl Ma rx and Fri ed rich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party

A specter is haunting Europe- the specter of communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered i nto a holy alli ance to exorcise th is specter: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French radicals and German police spies.

382 Chapter 8 The Just Society

Karl Marx a nd Friedric h Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party

Democracy an d socialism

h ave nothing in common

but one word , equality.

Bur notice t he diffe r·

c ncc: w h ile democracy

seeks equality in liberty, socia)ism seeks equality in

restrai nt and servitude.

-Alexis de Tocquev ille

As w ith th e C hristian religion, th e worst advcr ..

tiscmcnt for Socialism L'i

i ts adherents.

- George Orwell

18 Many count ries have developed a large middle class t hat doesn't seem to fi t int o Ma rx's two-class scheme. Is t h is fact a counterexample to his t h eory?

Where is the party in oppos itio n that has not been dec ried as communistic by its o pponents in power? Whe re the oppos ition that has not hurled back t he brand ing rep roach o f communi sm against the more advanced opposition pa rties, as well as aga in st its reactionary adversa ries?

Two things resu lt fro m th is fact: I. Com m unism is already acknowledged by all Eu ropean powers to be itself a power. II. It is high time that co mmun ists shou ld openly, in the face of the whole wo rld,

publish their views, t he ir aims, their tendencies, and m eet th is nursery tale of the spec- ter of com m unism with a Manifesto of the party itself.

To thi s end, com mun ists of various natio nalities have assem bled in London and sketched the foll owing Manifesto, to be published in the English , French, Germ an, Ita l- ian, Flemish , and Danish languages.

The histo ry of all hitherto exist ing society is the histo ry of class st ruggles . Free m an and slave, patrician and plebe ian, lo rd and serf, gu ild m aster and jour-

neyman , in a wo rd, oppresso r and oppressed , stood in constant oppos ition to one an- other, carried o n an uni nterrupted , now hidden , now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the co mmo n ruin of the contend ing classes.

In the earlier epochs of history we fi nd alm ost eve rywhere a com plicated arrange- m ent of society into various orde rs, a manifold g radation of socia l rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knigh ts, plebeians, slaves; in t he M idd le Ages, feuda l lords, vassals, guild masters, jou rneymen, app rentices, serfs; in almost all of t hese classes, aga in , subord inate g radations .

The modern bou rgeois [capitalist] society t hat has sp rou ted fro m the ruins of feudal society has not do ne away with cl ass antagonisms. It has but establi shed new classes, new co nd itions of oppress io n, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, howeve r, this distinctive fea - ture: it has sim plified the cl ass an tago nism s. Society as a whole is more and m ore split- ting u p into two great hostile camps, into two great classes d irectly facing each other: bou rgeoisie and proletariat . . . .

The bou rgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revo lution izing the instruments of produ ctio n, and thereby the relations of product ion, and wi th them the who le rela- tio ns of society. Co nservation of the old modes of productio n in una ltered form was, on the contrary, the fi rst condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Con- stant revo lution izing of production, un interrupted distu rbance of all social cond itio ns, everlasting uncertainty and agitation d istinguish the bou rgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relat ions, with their train of ancient and ve nerable prejud ices and op inio ns, are swept away, all newformed ones becom e antiquated befo re they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profa ned , and m an is at last com pelled to face with sober senses his real cond it ions of li fe and his relations with his kind.

The need of a const antly expand ing m arket fo r its prod ucts chases the bou rgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle eve rywhere, es - tablish con nectio ns everywhere.

The bo urgeoisie has thro ugh its exp lo itat ion of the wo rld market give n a cos mo - poli tan character to product ion and cons umption in eve ry coun try. To t he grea t ch a- grin of reactio nist s, it has d rawn from under the feet of industry the nationa l grou nd on which it stood. All old-establ ished nat ional industries have been destroyed o r are da ily being destroyed. They are d islodged by new industries , whose introduction

becomes a life and death question for all civil ized nations, by industries that no longer work up ind igenous raw material , but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed not on ly at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the o ld wants, satisfi ed by the productions of the country, we find new wants , requ iring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and nationa l seclusion and self-sufficiency we have intercourse in every direction, universa l interdependence of nations. And as in materia l, so also in intell ectual production. The intell ectual creations of individua l nations become com- mon property. National one-sidedness and narrow-m indedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local l iteratures there arises a world literature.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instru ments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of commun ication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to cap itu late. It compels all nations, on pain of extinc- t ion, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production: it compels them to introduce what it ca ll s civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the ru le of the towns. It has created enormous cities , has greatly increased the urban popu lation as compared with the ru- ral, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the popu lation from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.

The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the popu lation, of the means of production , and of property. It has agglomerated popu lation , centra lized means of production, and has concentrated property i n a few hands. The necessary consequence of th is was pol it ica l central ization. Inde- pendent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate i nterests, laws, gov- ernments and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation , w ith one government, one code of laws, one nationa l cl ass i nterest, one frontier, and one customs ta riff.

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations to- gether. Subjection of nature's forces to man , machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam navigation, ra ilways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cu ltivation, cana lization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground- what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor? ...

But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also call ed into existence the men who are to wield those weapons- the modern working class- the proletarians.

In proportion as the bourgeois ie, i.e. , capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class developed- a class of laborers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work on ly so long as their labor increases capital. These laborers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the Auctuations of the market.

Socialist Theories 383

19 Marx lists the many technological and civic innovations brought about by capitalism, t hings that seem bene- f icial to society. Do they count erbalance t he many bad t hings about capitalism t hat Marx detail s?

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20 For capitalist societies, Marx predicts worker alienation, oppression and exploit- ation of workers, and general misery among those who do not cont rol the means of production. Many so- cieties today, including the United States, are capitalist, but t hey do not seem to be following Ma rx's pattern. Does t h is show t hat Marx's views are w rong?

Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to divis io n of labor, the work of the proletarians has lost all individua l character and , consequently, all charm for the work- man. He becomes an appendage of the mach ine, and it is only the simplest, most monotonous, and most easily acqu ired knack that is requ ired of him. Hence the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost enti rely, to the m eans of subsistence that he requires for his mai ntenance and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and therefore also of labor, is equal to its cost of production. In pro- portion , therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases , the wage decreases. Nay, more, in proportion as the use of m achinery and divis ion of labor increases, in the same proportion the burden of toi l also increases, whether by prolongation of the working hours, by increase of the work exacted in a given time, or by increased speed of the m achinery, etc.

Modern industry has converted t he little workshop of the patriarchal m aster into the great factory of the indust rial capita list. Masses of laborers, crowded into the fac- tory, are organ ized like soldiers. As p rivates of the industrial army they are placed under the com mand of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not on ly are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois state; they are da ily and hourly enslaved by the m achine, by t he overlooker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois man ufac- turer himself. The more openly this despotis m procl aims gain to be its end and aim , the more petty, the more hatefu l, and the more embittering it is .. . .

The proletariat goes th rough various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bou rgeoisie. At first the contest is ca rried on by ind ividual laborers, then by the workpeople of a factory, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, aga inst the individua l bou rgeois who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but aga inst the in struments of pro- duction themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labor, t hey smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the van ished status of the workman of the M idd le Ages . . ..

Bu t with the development of industry the proletariat not on ly increases i n num- ber; it becomes conce ntrated in greater m asses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ra nks of the proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labor and nea rly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition among the bourgeois and the resu lting commercial crises ma ke the wages of the workers eve r more Auctuatin g. The unceasing im provem ent of ma- ch inery, ever more rapid ly developing, ma kes their livelihood more and more precari- ous ; the coll isions between individua l workmen and individual bourgeois ta ke more and more the character of collis ions between two classes . Thereupon the workers begin to form combi nations (trade unions) aga inst the bou rgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts . Here and there t he contest breaks out in to riots.

Now and then the workers are victorious, bu t only for a time. The real fru it of their battles lies not in the immediate resu lt, but in the ever expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved m eans of commun ication that are created by modern indu stry and that place the workers of different locali ties in contact with one another .. . .

This o rgan ization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a pol- itica l party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers

t he mselves. Bu t it ever rises up aga in, stronger, firmer, mightier. It com pels legislative recognition of particu lar interests of the workers by ta king advantage of the divisions amo ng the bou rgeoisie itself . . ..

H itherto every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of o ppressing and oppressed classes. Bu t in o rder to oppress a class cer- tai n conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavis h existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, ra ised himself to membe rship in the commune just as the petty bourgeois, under t he yoke of feud al absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern laborer, on the contrary, instead of rising with t he progress of indus try, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapid ly than popu- lation and wea lth. And here it becomes evident t hat the bourgeois ie is unfit any longer to be the ru ling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an overriding law. It is unfit to ru le because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letti ng him sin k into such a state t hat it has to feed him instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie: in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.

The essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage labor. Wage labor res ts exclusively on com petition between the laborers. The advance of in - dustry, whose in voluntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the laborers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foun - dation on which the bourgeoisie produces and ap propriates products. What the bour- geoisie, therefore, prod uces, above all , is its own gravediggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable . . ..

All property relations in the past have continuall y been subject to historical change consequen t upon the change in historica l conditions.

The French Revolution, for example, abolished feuda l property in favor of bour- geois property.

The distinguishing feature of communism is not the abol ition of property genera lly, but the abol ition of bourgeoisie property. Bu t modern bou rgeois private property is the final and most com plete exp ression of t he system of prod ucing and appropriating products that is based on antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

In this sense the theory of the communists may be summed up in the single sen- tence: Abolition of private property ... .

We have seen above that the first step in t he revolution by the working class is to raise t he proletaria t to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.

The proletariat will use i ts political sup remacy to w rest, by degrees, all capita l from t he bourgeoisie, to centralize all in struments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ru ling class, and to increase the total of produc- t ive forces as rapidly as possi ble.

O f course, in the beginning this cannot be effected except by means of despotic in roads on t he rights of property and on t he conditions of bo urgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insuffi cient and un tena ble, but wh ich, in the course of the movemen t, outstrip themselves, necessitate further in roads upon the old social order, and are unavoida ble as a means of entirely revolu- t ion izing the mode of production.

Socialist Theories 385

21 Many Western countries have been strongly committed t o private property for decades, yet no proletarian revolution has erupted or is likely t o erupt. Why is this? Does it show t hat Ma rx's socialist ideol- ogy is mistaken?

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These measures will of course be d ifferent in different countries. Nevertheless, in the most advanced countries t he followin g will be pretty generally

applicable:

1. Abolition of property in land and appli cation of all rents of land to public purposes.

2 . A heavy progressive or graduated income tax. 3. Abolition of all right of inheritance. 4. Confi scation of t he property of all em igrants and rebels. 5. Ce ntralization of credit in the hands of the state, by mea ns of a nat ional bank

with state capital and an exclusive monopoly. 6. Ce ntralization of the means of commun ication and tra nsport in the ha nds of

the state. 7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by t he state; the

bringing into cu ltivation of wastelands, and t he im provement of the soil gener- ally in accordance with a common plan.

8. Equal liabi lity of all labor. Establishment of in dustrial armies, especially for agriculture.

9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradua l aboli tion of the distin ction between town and country, by a more equable d istribution of the popu lation over the country.

10. Free education for all children in public schools. Aboli tion of children's factory labor in its present form . Com bination of education with industrial produc- tion, etc.

When , in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared and all pro- duction has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its con- test with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its cl asses and class antagon isms, we shall have an association in which t he free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. ...

The communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by t he forcible overthrow of all existing socia l condi- tions. Let the ru ling classes tremble at a commun istic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but t he ir chains. They have a world to win.

WORKING MEN OF ALL CO UNTRIES UNITE!"

Femin ism and Socia l Justice 387

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQUING PH ILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 8 .4

I. A classical liberal might say to a M arxist that liberty and rig hts are the most i mportant values in a society, and Marxist societies have fe\v, if any, liberties. The Marxist m ight reply that liberties and righcs don't mean much if people a re too poor a nd oppressed to enjoy them . W h ich view seems more reasonable to you? W hich society would you be \villing to live in-classical liberal or Marxist? W hy?

2. D oes alienation as described by Marx exist today in modern cap italist societies? Explain.

3. Suppose all resou rces in the United States were distribu ted accord ing to Marx's dict um : from each according to his abil ity, to each according to his need. What \vou ld such a society look li ke? Wou ld it be better than the system that exists now? W hy or why not?

4. Suppose the state compelled you to \vork in a factory for the rest of your life, and it arran ged fo r you r salary to be based solely on \vh at the state thinks you need . Would these actions be a violation of you r autonomy? If they \vould imp rove the general welfare, would they be morally justified ?

5. Assess socialism: Is it a good theory of justice? Is it better tha n liberal- ism? Expla in your answer.

8.5 FEMINISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Many femin ists assert that the t raditional theories of justice (as developed by their theorists) have a fatal weak ness: They are blind to injustice. Specifically, the theories a re blind to the injustice th at befa lls \vomen. The problem arises, these critics say, because the theories are based on a fa lse assumption about societ y, o ne that most of us simply take fo r granted. Most people-includ ing Locke, H obbes, a nd other tra- ditio nal theorists-have assu med there is a strong \vall of separatio n benveen private a nd public life, and that on ly public life is the p roper concern of political theory. Private li fe is about personal and family life, about ra ising child ren and shouldering other d omestic respons ibil ities. Public life is the realm of politics, careers, econom- ics, a nd law. Throughout history, women have largely been relegated to the private sphere, where issues of righcs and equality are not supposed to apply. C,onsequently, femi n ist ph ilosophers contend, women have been left out of trad itional theories of justice, an omission that ensured women wou ld not be treated as the moral equals of men. The result h as been unjust treatment of h alf the population-mill ions of women \vho have h istorically been d en ied the polit ical, econom ic, a nd social power th at men have enjoyed.

Of all the nasty outcomes predicted for women's lib-

eration . . . none was more

alarming. from a fem inist point of view, than the

suggestion that women would eventually become jusr like men. -Barbara Ehrenreic:h

388 Chapter 8 The Just Society

22 Why does t he unequal treatment of women seem to contra- dict principles laid out in t he U.S. Constit u- tion? Is the problem w ith t he principles or w ith society?

This vie\v has been argued vigorously by che philosopher and femin ise Susan

Moller Oki n (1946-2004) in her book justice, Gende,; and the Family:

Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family

We as a society pride ourselves on our democratic values . We don't believe people shou ld be constrained by innate differences from bei ng able to achieve desired posi- tio ns of influence or to im prove their well -being; equali ty of opportunity is our pro- fessed aim. The Preamble to our Constitution stresses t he importance of justice, as well as the general welfare and the blessings ofl iberty. The Pledge of Allegiance asserts that our republic preserves " liberty and justice for all."

Yet substantial inequalities between the sexes still exist in o ur society. In economic terms, fu ll -time working women (after some very recent im provement) earn on average 71 percent of the earnings of full-time working men . One-half of poor and three-fifths of chronically poor households with dependent children are main tained by a single fe. ma le parent. The poverty rate for elderly women is nea rly twice that for elderly men. On the political front, two out of a hundred U.S. senators are women , one out of nine j us- tices seems to be considered sufficient female representation on the Supreme Cou rt, and the number of men chosen in each congressional election far exceeds t he number of women elected in the entire history of the country. Underlying and intertwined with all these inequalities is the unequal d istribution of the unpaid labor of the family.

An equa l sharing between the sexes of family responsibilities, especially child care, is "the great revolution that has not happened." Women, in cluding mothers of young children, are, of course, worki ng outside the household far more than their mothers d id. And the small proportion of women who reach high-level positions in politics, business, and the professions command a vastly disproportionate amount of space in the media , compared with the mi llio ns of women who work at low-paying, dead-end jobs, the mill ions who do part-time work with its lack of benefits, and t he mi ll ions of others who stay home perform in g for no pay what is freq uently not even acknowledged as work. Certa in ly, the fact t hat women are doing more paid work does not imply t hat they are more equa l. It is often sa id that we are living in a postfem inist era. This claim, due in part to the distorted emphasis on women who have "made it," is false, no mat- ter which of its meani ngs is i ntended. It is certa inly not true that femi nis m has been vanq uished, and equa lly untrue that it is no longer needed because its aims have been fulfi lled. Until there is justice within the fam ily, women will not be able to gain equa lity in poli tics, at work, or in any other sphere ....

[T]he typical current practices of family life, structured to a large extent by gender, are not just. Both the expectatio n and the experience of the division of labor by sex make women vulnerable. As I shall show, a cycle of power relations and decisions per- vades both fam ily and workplace, each rei nfo rcing the inequalities between t he sexes that already exist within t he other. Not on ly women, but children of both sexes, too, are often made vu lnerable by gender-structured marriage. One-q ua rter of chi ldren in the United States now li ve in families w ith only one parent- in almost 90 percent of cases, the mother. Contrary to common perceptions- in which the situation of never-married mothers looms largest- 65 percent of single-parent families are a resu lt of marita l separation or divorce. Recent research in a number of states has shown that, in the

Femin ism and Socia l Justice 3 89

average case, the standard of li ving of divorced women and the children who live with them plummets after divorce, whereas t he economic situation of d ivorced men tends to be better than when they were married.

A central source of injustice for women these days is that the law, most notice- ably in the event of divorce, treats more or less as equa ls those whom custom, workplace discrim ination, and the still conventional divis ion of labor within the family have made very uneq ual. Central to this socially created inequality are two commonly made but inconsistent presumptions : that women are primari ly responsib le for the rearing of children; and t hat serious and committed members of the work force (regard less of class) do not have primary responsibility, or even shared responsibility, for the rearing of children. The old assumption of the workplace, still implicit, is that work· ers have wives at home. It is bui lt not on ly into the structure and expectations of the workplace but into other crucia l SO· cial in stitutions, such as schools, which make no attempt to take account, in their scheduled hours or vacations, of the fact that parents are likely to hold jobs.

Now, of course, many wage workers do not have wives at home. Often, t hey are wives and mothers, or single, sep· arated, or divorced mothers of sma ll ch il dren. But neither the fam ily nor the workplace has taken much account of this fact. Employed wives sti ll do by far the greatest proportion of unpaid fam ily work, such as child care and housework. Women are far more likely to take time out of the workplace or to work part-time because of family responsibil ities than are their husba nds or male partners. And they are much more l ikely to move because of t heir husbands' employ· ment needs or opportun ities than their own . All these ten· dencies, wh ich are due to a number of factors, incl uding the

Figure 8.12 Susan Moller Okin (1946-2004).

sex segregation and discrim in ation of t he workplace itself, tend to be cyclica l in their effects: wives advance more slowly than their husba nds at work and t hus gain less seniority, and t he discrepancy between t heir wages inc reases over time. Then, because bot h the power structure of the fami ly and what is regarded as consensual "rational" fami ly decision making refl ect the fact that the husba nd usua lly earns more, it will be- come even less likely as time goes on that the unpaid work of the fam ily will be shared between the spouses. Thu s the cycle of ineq uality is perpetuated. Often hidden from view within a marriage, it is in the increas in gly likely event of marital breakdown that the sociall y constructed inequal ity of married women is at its most visible.

This is what I mea n when I say that gender-structured marriage makes women vu lnerable. These are not matters of natural necessity, as some peop le wou ld believe. Surely nothing in our natures dictates that men shou ld not be equa l participants in t he rearing of their chi ldren. Noth in g in the nature of work makes it impossible to adjust it to the fact that people are parents as well as workers. That these t hings have not hap- pened is part of the historically, socially constructed d ifferentiation between the sexes that feminists have come to ca ll gender. We live i n a society that has over the years regarded the innate characteristic of sex as one of the clearest legitim izers of different rights and restrictions, both formal and in formal. While the legal sanctions that uphold

23 Do you agree t hat typica l family practices are largely structured according to gender? If so, are these practices unjust? Why?

390 Chapter 8 The Just Society

Susan Moller Okin,

Justice, Gender, and the Family

male dominance have begun to be eroded in the past century, and more rapid ly in the last twenty years, t he heavy weight of tradition, comb ined with the effects of socializa- tion, still works powerfu lly to reinforce sex roles that are common ly regarded as of un- equal prestige and worth. The sexual division of labor has not only been a fundamental part of the marriage contract, but so deeply infl uences us in our formative years that fem inists of both sexes who try to reject it can find themselves struggli ng against it with varyi ng degrees of ambivalence. Based on this linchpi n, "gender"- by which I mean the deeply entrenched institutionalization of sexual difference-still permeates our society.

" The personal is poli tical" is t he central message of feminist critiques of the publi c/ domestic d ichotomy. It is the core idea of most contemporary fem inism. Though many of those who fough t in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for suffrage and for the abolition of the oppressive legal status of wives were well aware of the connec- tions between women's political and personal dominations by men, few pre-196os fem inists questioned women's special role in the family. While arguing for equa l rights, such as the vote or access to education, most accepted the prevailing assumption that women's close association with and responsibili ty for the care of the family was natural and inevitab le ....

Thus feminists have turned their attention to the politics of what had previously been regarded- and, as I have shown, still is seen by most political theorists- as para- digmatically nonpolitical. That the personal sphere of sexuality, of housework, of child care and fami ly li fe is political became the underpinning of most feminist t hought. Feminists of d ifferent political lean ings and in a variety of academic disciplines have revea led and analyzed t he multiple interconnections between women's domestic roles and their ineq ua lity and segregation in the workplace, and between t he ir socialization in gendered families and the psychological aspects of their oppression. We have strongly

Figure 8.13 Are the power relationships and decisions w ithin typical families political?

Femin ism and Socia l Justice 391

and persistently chall enged the long-sta nd ing underlying assumption of almost a ll po- litical theories: that the sphere of fam ily and personal life is so separate a nd distinct fro m the rest of socia l life t hat such theories can justifiab ly ass ume but ignore it. . . .

The interconnections between the domestic a nd the nondomestic aspects of o ur lives are deep and pervasive. G iven the power structures of both, wome n's lives are far more detrimentally affected by these interconnections than are me n's. Consider two recent front-page stories that appeared on s ubsequent days in the New York Times. The first was a bout a tiny elite among women: those who work as lawyers for the country's top law fir m s. If these women have children with whom they wa nt to spend any time, t hey find themselves off t he partnership track and instead, with no prospects of ad- va ncement, o n the "mom my track." "Nine-to-five" is considered part-time work in t he ethos of s uch fi rms, and one mother reports that, in spite of her twelve-hour workdays and freq uent work on weekends, she has "no chance" of making partner. The article fai ls to mentio n that these women's children have fathers, o r that most of the men who work fo r the sa me prestigio us law fi rms also have children, except to report that ma le lawyers who take parental leave are seen as "wimp-like." The sexual d ivision of labor in t he family, even in these cases where t he women a re extremely well qualified, success- fu l, and potentia lly inAuential, is simply assumed .

The next day's Times reported on a case of major significance for abortio n rights, decided by a Federal Ap peals Court in Minnesota. The all -male panel of judges ru led 7 to 3 t hat the state may require a wom an un der eighteen years who wishes to ob- tai n an abortion to notify both her pa rents- even in cases of divorce, separation, or desertion-or to get special approval from a s tate judge. The significa nce of this article is amplifi ed when it is juxtaposed with the previous o ne. For it s hows us how it is that t hose who rise to the top in the highly politicall y inAuential profession of law are among t hose who have had t he least experience of all in raisi ng children. There is a high inci - dence of recruitment of judges from those who have risen to partnership in the most prestigious law firms. Other judges are often d rawn fro m the equall y highly com peti· t ive fi eld of academ ic law, which also places its greatest demands (those of the tenure hurd le) on lawyers d uring the child-rea ring years, and therefore discrim inates agai nst t hose who participate in pa renting. Those who a re chosen, therefore, would seem to be those least well informed to m ake deci sions about abortion, especia lly in cases in- volving relations between teenage girls and their parents. Here we find a systematica lly built-in absence of mothers (and presumably of "wimp-like" participating fathers, too) fro m high-level po litical decisions concerning some of the most vu lnerable persons in society- women, d isproportionately poor and black, who become pregnant in their teens, and their future children. It is no t hard to see here the t ies between the suppos- edly distinct public and domestic s pheres."

Few thoughtful people would argue that \vomen have achieved equality in every aspect of their lives. In fact, it seems clear that in politics, the \vorkp lace, and the household, women do not have equal free.dom, r ights, a nd oppor tunities. On t his score, O kin is su rely right. But some philosophers have d rawn d ifferent conclusions from these facts. They insist that t he femin ist critique of these inequalities does not show that t he "personal is political" o r t hat the t raditional theories of justice a re seriously defective. The crit ique suggests that the p rinciples embodied in these theories-liberty, equality, a nd righrs-are as relevant as ever but have yet to be fully applied to private life. This is how David M iller expla ins t he poi nt:

[T] he Rule . . . naturally fal ls m the man's sh are, as

abler and stronger r than the \Vomanl. -John Locke

392 Chapter 8 The Just Society

24 Do you agree w ith Mill er's assessment of the fem inist view of the tradit ional t heories of justice? Why or why not?

David Miller, Political Philosophy

[W]e live in societies that are founded on commitments to freedom and equality but that have fai led so far to live up to these commitments in the case of women and people from minority cultures. It is one of our deepest bel iefs that each person shou ld be able to live life in the way t hat he or she chooses, subject to certain lim its . ... [l]t is another deep bel ief that each person is entitled to be treated as an equal, either by being given equal rights, or by be ing given equa l opportun ities. Given these bel iefs, it becomes a matter of great political concern if one section of society enjoys only a smaller area of persona l freedom, or receives less than equal treatment at t he ha nds of existing social and political in stitutions. So, for instance, when women are denied the option available to men of ha rmoniously combin ing a career with fami ly life, or when members of ethnic minorities have fewe r opportunities in the job market than others, this mea ns that they are not being treated as fully free and equal members of their society .. ..

What feminists are pointing out about relationships between men and women is not so much their inherently political nature as the failure of politics to address them. Political authority, in the form which it has been constituted up to now, has not set adequate par- ameters for the pecu liarly intim ate relations that exist between t he sexes. It has fai led in a number of ways: it has not given women adequate physical security, especially protection against domestic violence, it has not ensured that women enjoy equal rights with men in a number of important areas of li fe, and it has not provided women with sufficient per- sonal freedom ... . It is these pol itical fa ilures that have allowed men to exercise power over women in their personal lives, and one obvious reason is that women have for cen- turies been almost entirely excluded fro m politics in the conventiona l sense.•1

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

CRITIQU ING PHILOSOPHICAL V IEWS SECTION 8.5

I. D oes Okin's claim about the injustice of current practices offumily life coincide \vith your own observations of fam ily life in our culture? Explain.

2. Oki n says t hat the gender roles of America n men and women are not the way they are by n ecessity but are "socially constructed" (based on variable social conventions). Do you agree? Are gender roles established by n atural or divine la\v?

3 . Shou ld t he laws of a society reinforce currently accepted fam ily practices-or should la\vS set the sta ndard for just fam ily practices?

4. Are the tradit ional theories of justice (social contract t heories, for example) irredeem ably fl awed because they \vere devised by white men who t houg ht of women as second-class citizens?

5. Mi ller says t hat what fem inists are pointing out about relationships be- nveen men a nd women is not so much their in heren tly political nature as the fa ilure of politics to address them. Do you agree? Why?

Review Not es

8.1 OVERVIEW: JUSTICE AND POLITICAL PH ILOSOPHY

• Political ph ilosophy is the study of political societies using the methods of philosophy-critical reaso ning and careful analysis.

• The issues of political ph ilosoph y raise q uestio ns about the mo ral and no nmo ral goodness of whole societies, which largely determ ine the moral and no nmo ral goodness of ou r lives.

• D istributive justice is about the fair d istribu tion of society's benefits a nd bu rdens (its material and nonmaterial goods). H o\v these goods are d istributed among the citizens of a state is a fu nction of how the state is structured, ho\v its social a nd political institutio ns are arranged.

8.2 PLATO'S THEORY: JUSTICE AS MERIT

• In The Republic, Plato argues that the o nly kind of society that can ensure that people get thei r d ue is a meritocracy. In a just society, the prod ucers and auxiliaries perform their proper fu nctions while being led and controlled by the guardians. The just state is a ha rmon ious co mmunity governed by reason, just as a virtuous person is a tripartite being p resided over by the rational fac ul ty of the soul.

• Plato's ideal state rests on inequality among citizens \vho are sorte.d into three classes marke.d by u neq ual shares of powe r and privilege. Peop le are assigned to d ifferent classes according to merit, bu t ineq uality is still the rule. Plato maintains that equals should be treated equally, bu t to him the classes deserve different treat- ment because they are differen t. In Plato's republic, no one gets to choose his or her own role in life.

• Meritocracy is a system of rule by those most q ual ified to govern, democracy is rule by the people as a whole, and a ristocracy is a society ruled by the best citizens.

8.3 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES

• In Leviathan, H obbes contends that a social contract is necessary in human affairs because living without one wo uld be a ho rrific nightmare of existence. Through reaso n, people see that the on ly way to escape this "war of all against all" is to e nter into a social co ntract \vith one a nother. In the name of self- inte rest, they agree to tu rn ove r m uch of their au tonomy, freed o m, and po\ver to an absol ute sovereign-the Leviatha n. Locke argues that humans have inherent, God-given rights whether or not a government is aro und to g ua ra ntee them . These rights are inalien able : They cannot be transferred to the government o r a ny other ent ity. Humans create the gove rnmen t and ced e some po\ver to it; in return, it protects their rights and li berties. The state serves the peop le ( not the other \vay round),

Review Notes 393

394 Chapter 8 The Just Society

directing all its po,ver "to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of che people."

• For Hobbes, in the state of nature, there is no code, culcure, or comfort. There is only "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man [is) solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." The Leviathan is an absolute ruler ,vhose authority

over chose bo und by the social contract is absolute. Its po,ver is fearsome (enough co deter an y tendency co disorder), and ics contractual agreement with its subjeccs is irrevocable.

• Ra,vls says the just state is based on principles chat people would agree co under hypothetical conditions chat ensure fai r and unbiased choices. H e holds chat if the starting point fo r the social contract is fair-if the initial conditions and bargaining process for producing the principles are fair-then the p rinciples themselves ,viii be just and will define the essential makeup of a just society.

• Liberalism is the political doctrine chat puts primary emphasis on the liberty and rights of individuals against encroachments by the state. Classical liberalism is the view chat the State should protect personal freedoms as well as the right co pursue one's o,vn social and eco nomic ,veil-being in a free market without interference from ochers. Libertarianism and classical liberal ism are essential ly the same. Welfare liberal ism is the vie,v chat a just society aims co p reserve individual liberties ,vhile ensuring the general welfare of the citizenry.

8.4 SOCIAL IST T HEORIES

• Marx's political theory is a form of socialism, the political and economic doctrine chat the means of production (property, factories, businesses) should be owned or concrolle.d by the people, either communally or through the state. The guiding principle is equality: The ,veal ch of society should be share.cl by all. The ideal distri- bution of goods follo,vs the classic fo rmula: " From each according co his ability, co each according co his needs."

• Social ism emphas izes equality and the distribution of goods according co need and ability. A frequent criticism of socialism is chat such a distribution would require coercion by the state. Critics also accuse socialise systems of providing no incentive for people co excel at their jobs.

8.5 FEMINISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

• Susan Moller Okin says traditional theories are based on the assumption chat there is a wall of separation between private and public life and chat only public life is the proper co ncern of political theory. Bue women have largely been relegace.d co the private sphere, ,vhere issues of righcs and equality are not supposed co apply. Con- sequently, women have been left out of traditional theories of justice, an omission chat ensured women would not be created as the moral equals of men.

• David M iller argues that the femi nist critique of inequalities in privat e life does not sho\v th at th e "personal is political" or that the t raditional theories of justice are seriously defective. The critique suggests that the pri nciples embodied in these th eo ries a re relevant but have yet t o be fully app lied to private li fe.

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

ARG UING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 8

1. Which theory of justice do you t hink is more plausible-Ra\vls's \vel- fa re liberalism or Nozick's classical liberalism (l ibertarian ism)? G ive

reasons for your choice.

2. Would you prefer to live in a state like Plato's meritocracy o r in a democratic capit alist society li ke t he United St ates? Why?

3. What a re the \veaknesses and strengths of Hobbes's social contract theory? Would H obbes's state protect your rights? Under w hat cir- cumstances would you consent t o live in h is state and be ruled by t he Lev iat han?

4 . Compare Locke's social contract st ate \vit h a moder n socialis t society. Which one does a better job of protecting individual rig hts? Ensuring equality amon g citizens? Providing for the needs of ever y citizen? In your opin ion, \vhich theor y of justice is better? Why?

5. Have women in this country been systematically t reat ed unfairly or unequ ally? Are t hey currently being t reated unfairly o r unequally? If so, how? W hat do you think are the chief causes of such treatment?

Key Terms

aristocracy A society ruled by th e best citizens. (361)

capitalism A political economic system that lets the means of production accru e to fewer people th rough the \vorkings of a free market. In s uch a system, \vealth goes t o anyo ne \vho can acquire it in th e

marketplace. (379)

classical liberalism . The view that th e stat e should protect perso nal freedoms as well as the right to pursue one's own social and economic \veil-being in a free

market without int erference from others. (375)

communism Commonly, social ism w ith in a totalitarian system. (379)

democracy Rule by the people as a whole. (360)

distributive just i ce (or social justice) The fair distr ibution of society's ben efi ts

and burdens-such thi ngs as jobs, in- come, p roperty, li berties, rights, welfare aid, taices, an d public service. (357)

Key Terms 3 95

396 Chapter 8 The Just Society

justice The idea that people should get \vhat is fair o r \vhat is thei r due. (357)

liberalism The political theory that pucs p rimary emphasis on the liberty and rights of individuals against encroach- ments by the state. (374)

libertarianism (political) The doctrine that emphas izes personal freedoms and the right to pursue one's own social and economic \veil-being in a free market \vithout interference from others. (375)

meritocracy A system of rule by those most qualified to govern. (360)

political philosophy The study of po- litical societies using the methods of phi- losophy. (355)

social contract theory The view that justice is secured, and the state is made legitimate, through an agreement among citizens of the state o r between the citi- zens and the rulers of the state. (364)

socialism The doctrine that the means of production (property, factories, busi- nesses) should be owned or controlled by the people, either communally or th rough the state. (379)

welfare liberalism A form of liberalism, the aim of which is to preserve individual liberties while ensuring the general wel- fare of the citizenry. (378)

Lord of the Flies 397

FI CT ION

Lord of th e Flies

William Golding

Sir Will iam Golding (1911 - 1993) was a Nobel Prize- winning writer of over a doze n novels and nume rous s ho rt stories and essays.

In rhis famo 11J novel, William Golding describes a situati.on in which rhe orderliness and moral stability of civilization dissolves and human savagery emerges- a state of affeirs that resembles Hobbes's "state of nature." Several boys, ages six to twelve, are strand£d on a d£serted island in the Pa- cific. At the outset, they institute a rudimentary social sys- tem. Rules and procedures are agreed on, and Ralph is voted leamr and is therefore allowed to carry rhe white conch, the symbol of authority. Only a boy holding the conch is permit- ted to speak at an assembly. 7he bo)~ erect she/rm and build a fire atop a mountain to a/err passing ships of their presence.

For a while rhe aura of civilization deters anarchy and moral chaos, but as days go by, the boys' little soci- ety begins to deteriorate. 1hey are soon living in squalor, comperiti.on for power sets in, marry neglect their duties, and violence escalates. Ralph and jack become fierce rivals as rhey compete for leadership. 7he bespectacled Piggy p lays rhe role of the voice of reason, and Simon is thought to possess a kind of spiritual imight. But rhe boys'predicamenr strains their rationality and spiritual- ity to the limit. As we enter the story, the fire has been ne- glected, causing it ro go out. j ack and his band of hunters are returning from killing a pig, and Ralph scolds them for not seeing ro rhe fire.

The hun ters were more s ile nt now, but at this they buzzed again . Ra lph Aung back his hair. O ne arm poin ted at the empty horizon. His voice was loud and savage, a nd s truck the m in to silence.

"There was a sh ip." Jack, faced at once with too many awfu l im plica-

tio ns, d ucked away from the m. He laid a hand o n the pig and drew his knife. Ralph brought his arm down, fi st clenched, and his vo ice shook.

From LO RD OF THE FLIES by William Golding, copyright 1954, renewed © 1982 by W illiam Gerald Goldin g. Used by perm ission o f G. P. Putnam' s Sons, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a d ivision of Penguin Random House LLC.

"There was a s hip. Out the re. Yo u said you 'd keep the fi re go ing and you let it out!" He took a step to- wards Jack who turned and faced him.

"They might have seen us. We might have gone home- "

This was too bitter for Piggy, who fo rgot his timidity in the agony of his loss. He began to cry out, shrilly:

"You a nd your blood, Jack Merridew! you a nd you r hun ting! We might have gone home"-

Ra lph pushed Piggy on one s ide. "I was ch ief; a nd you were going to do what I sa id.

You talk. But you can 't eve n bu ild hu ts- the n you go off hun ting a nd let ou t the fi re- "

He turned away, silent for a mo me nt. The n his vo ice ca me again on a peak of fee ling.

"There was a ship- " One of the sma lle r hu nters bega n to wa il. The d is -

mal truth was fi ltering throu gh to eve rybody. Jack we nt ve ry red as he hacked a nd pu lled at the pig.

"The job was too much . We needed everyone." Ra lph turned . "You cou ld have had everyone whe n the shelte rs

we re fi nished . But you had to hu nt- " "We needed meat." Jack stood up as he said th is, the blood ied knife in

his hand . The two boys faced each other. There was the brilliant wo rld of hunting, tactics, fi e rce exh ilara- tion, skill; and there was the world of longing and baf- Aed common-sense . Jack tra nsferred the knife to his left hand and smudged blood over his forehead as he pushed down the plastered hair.

Piggy began aga in . "You didn't ought to have let that fi re out. You s aid

you 'd keep the smoke go ing- " This fro m Piggy, and the wails of agree me nt fro m

so me of the hunte rs d rove Jack to violence. The bolting look came in to his blue eyes . He took a step, and able at last to hit someone, stuck his fist into Piggy's stom - ach. Piggy s at down with a grunt. Jack stood ove r him. His vo ice was vicious with humiliation.

398 Chapter 8 The Just Society

"You would, wou ld you? Fatty!" Ralph made a step forward and Jack smacked Pig-

gy's head . Piggy's glasses flew off and tinkled on the rocks. Piggy cried out in terror:

"My specs!" He went crouch ing and fee ling over the rocks but Si-

mon, who got there first, found them for him. Pass ions beat about Simon on the mountain-top with awfu l wings.

"One side's broken." Piggy grabbed and put on the glasses. He looked

ma levolently at Jack. "I got to have them specs. Now I on ly got one eye.

Jus' you wait- " Jack made a move towards Piggy who scrambled

away till a great rock lay between them. He thrust his head over the top and glared at Jack through his one flas hing glass.

"Now I on ly got one eye. Just you wait- " Jack mimicked the whine and scramble. "Jus' you wait- yah !" Piggy and the parody were so funny that the hu nt-

ers began to laugh. Jack fe lt encouraged. He went on scrambling and the laughter rose to a ga le of hysteria. Unwillingly Ralph felt his lips twitch; he was angry with himself for giving way.

He muttered . "That was a dirty trick." Jack broke out of his gyration and stood facing

Ralph. His words came in a s hout. "All right, all right!" He looked at Piggy, at the hunters, at Ralph. "I'm sorry. About the fire, I mean. There. 1- " He drew himself up. "- I apologize." The buzz from the hunters was one of admiration

at this ha ndsome behaviour. Clearly they were of the op inion that Jack had done the decent thing, had put himself in the right by his generous apology and Ralph, obscurely, in the wrong. They waited for an appropri- ately decent answer.

Yet Ralph's throat refused to pass one. He resented, as an addition to Jack's misbehaviour, this verbal trick. The fi re was dead, the ship was gone. Cou ld they not see? Anger instead of decency passed his throat.

"That was a dirty trick." They were silent on the moun tain-top while the

opaque look appeared in Jack's eyes and passed away. Ralph's final word was an ungracious mu tter. "All right. Light the fi re."

With some positive action before them, a little of the tension died. Ralph said no more, did nothing, stood looking down at the ashes round his feet. Jack was loud and active. He gave orders, sang, wh istled, threw remarks at the silent Ralph - remarks that did not need an answer, and therefore cou ld not invite a snub; and still Ralph was si lent. No one, not even Jack, would ask him to move and in the end they had to bui ld the fire three yards away and in a place not really as con- venient. So Ralph asserted his chieftainship and cou ld not have chosen a better way if he had thought for days. Against this weapon, so in definable and so effective, Jack was powerless and raged without knowing why. By the time the pile was bui lt, they were on different sides of a high barrier.

When they had dealt with the fire another crisis arose. Jack had no means of lighting it. Then to his sur- prise, Ralph went to Piggy and took the glasses from him. Not even Ralph knew how a link between him and Jack had been snapped and fastened elsewhere.

"I'll bring 'em back." "I'll come too." Piggy stood behind him, is landed in a sea of mean -

ingless colour, while Ralph knelt and focused the glossy spot. Instantly the fire was a light. Piggy held out his hands and grabbed the glasses back.

Before these fantastically attractive fl owers of vio- let and red and yell ow, unkin dness melted away. They became a circle of boys round a camp fire and even Piggy and Ra lph were half-drawn in. Soon some of the boys were rush ing down the slope fo r more wood wh ile Jack hacked the pig. They tried holding the whole car- cass on a stake over the fire, but the stake burnt more quickly than the pig roasted. In the end they skewered bits of meat on bra nches and held them in the flames: and even then almost as much boy was roasted as meat.

Ra lph drib bled. He meant to refuse meat but his past diet of fruit and nu ts, with an odd crab or fish, gave him too little resistance. He accepted a piece of half-raw meat and gnawed it like a wolf.

Piggy spoke, also dribbling. "Aren't I having none?" Jack had meant to leave him in doubt, as an asser-

tion of power; but Piggy by advertising his omission made more cruelty necessa ry.

"You didn't hunt." "No more did Ralph," said Piggy wetly, "nor Si-

mon." He amplified. "There isn't more tha n a ha'porth of meat in a crab."

Ralph stirred uneasily. Si mon, sitting between the twins and Piggy, wiped his mouth and shoved his piece of meat over the rocks to Piggy, who grabbed it. The twins giggled and Simo n lowered his face in shame.

Then Jack leapt to his feet, slashed off a great hunk of meat, and flung it down at Simon's feet.

"Eat! Damn You!" He glared at Simon. "Take it!" He spun o n his heel, centre of a bewildered circle

of boys. "I got you meat!" Numberless and inexpress ible frustrations com-

bined to make his rage elemental and awe-in spiring. "I painted my face- I stole up. Now you eat- all of

you- and 1- " Slowly the s ile nce on the mountain -top deepened

till the cl ick of the fire and the soft hiss of roasting meat could be heard clearly. Jack looked round for under- standing but fo und only respect. Ralph stood among the ashes of the signal fire, his hands fu ll of meat, say- ing nothing.

Then at last Ma urice broke the silence. He cha nged the subject to the only one that could bring the majority of them together.

"Where did you find the pig?" Roge r pointed down the unfrie nd ly s ide. "They were there- by the sea." Jack, recovering, cou ld not bear to have his story

told. He broke in quickly. "We spread round . I crept, on hands a nd knees.

The spears fell out because they hadn' t ba rbs on . The pig ra n away and made an awfu l noise- "

"It turned back and ra n into the circle, bleed ing- " All the boys were talking at once, relieved and ex-

ci ted. "We closed in - " "The first blow had para lysed its hind quarters, so

then the circle could close in and beat and beat- " "I cut the pig's throat- " The twins, still sharing the ir identica l grin , jumped

up and ra n round each othe r. Then the rest joined in , making pig-dying noises and s houting.

"One fo r his nob!" "Give him a fourpenny one!" Then Ma urice prete nded to be the pig and ran

squealing into the centre, and the hunters, circling still, pretended to beat him. As they da nced , they sang.

"Kill the pig. Cut her throat. Bash her in."

Lord of the Files 399

Ralph wa tched the m, envious and rese nt fu l. Not ti ll they fl agged and the chant d ied away, d id he speak .

"I'm calling an assembly." One by o ne, they halted, and stood watching him. "With the conch . I'm calling a meeting even if we

have to go on into the dark. Down on the platform. When I blow it. Now."

He turned away and walked off, down the moun - tain .. . .

Soon jack wins nil but five of the boys to his side. Simon, Piggy, and the twins, Sam and Eric ( "Samneric"), stick with Ralph to support the rule of law. To light a fire for the pig roast, jack's hunters need n magnifying glass, so jack and two of his band attack Ralph and Piggy and take Piggy's glasses by force. We mter the scene where Ralph and his friends are smarting over the loss of the glasses and the ability to make a fire. Piggy addresses them:

"I got the conch. I'm going to that Jack Merridew an' tel l him , I am."

"You'll get hurt." "What can he do mo re tha n he has? I'll tell him

what's what. You let me carry the conch, Ra lph. I'll show him the one thing he has n't got."

Piggy paused fo r a moment and peered round at the dim figures. The s hape of the old assembly, trodde n in the grass, listened to him .

"I'm going to him with this conch in my hands. I'm going to hold it out. Look, I'm goin' to say, you're stronger than I am and you haven't got asthma. You can see, I'm goin' to say, and with both eyes. Bu t I don't ask for my glasses back, not as a favo ur. I don't as k you to be a sport, I'll say, not because you're strong, but because what's right's right. Give me my glasses, I'm going to say- you got to! "

Piggy ended, flushed and trembling. He pushed the conch quickly into Ralph's hands as though in a hurry to be rid of it and wiped the tears fro m his eyes. The green light was gentle about the m and the conch lay at Ra lph's feet, fragile and white. A single drop of water that had escaped Piggy's fingers now flas hed on the delicate curve like a star.

At last Ralph sat up straight and drew back his hair. "All right. I mean- you can try if you like. We'll go

with you." "H e'll be painted," sa id Sam, timid ly. "You know

how he'll be- "

4 0 0 Chapter 8 The Just Society

"- he won't think much of us- " "- if he gets waxy we've had it- " Ralph scowled at Sam. Dimly he remembered

something that Si mon had said to him once, by the rocks.

"Don't be silly," he said. And then he added quickly, "Let's go."

He held out the conch to Piggy who flushed, this time with pride.

"You must carry it- " "When we're read y I'll carry it- " Piggy sought in his mind for words to convey his

passionate willingness to carry the conch against all odds. "- 1 don't mind . I'll be glad, Ralph, only I'll have to

be led." Ralph put the conch back on the shining log. "We better eat and then get ready." They made their way to the devastated fruit trees.

Piggy was helped to his food and found some by touch. While they ate, Ralph thought of the afternoon.

"We'll be like we were. We'll wash- " Sam gulped down a mouthfu l and protested. "Bu t we bathe every day!" Ralph looked at the fi lthy objects before him and

sighed . "We ought to comb our hair. O nly it's too long." "I've got both socks left in the shelter," said Eric,

"so we cou ld pull them over our heads like caps, sort of." "We cou ld find some stuff," said Piggy, "and tie

your hair back." "Li ke a girl!" "No. 'Course not." "Then we must go as we are," said Ralph, "and they

won't be any better." Eric made a detaining gesture . " Bu t they'll be painted! You know how it is- " The others nodded . They understood only too well

the liberation into savagery that the concea ling paint brou ght.

"Well, we won't be pa inted," said Ralph, "because we aren't savages."

Samneric looked at each other. "All the same- " Ralph shouted. "No paint" ... They set off along the beach in format ion. Ra lph

went first, limping a little, his spear carried over one shou lder. He saw things partiall y through the tremb le of the heat haze over the flashing sands, and his own

long hair and injuries. Behind him came the twins, wor- ried now for a whi le but fu ll of unquenchable vitality. They said li ttle but tra iled the butts of their wooden spears; for Piggy had found, that looking down, shield- ing his tired sight from the sun, he cou ld just see these moving along the sand. He walked between the trailing butts, therefore, the conch held carefu lly between his two hands. The boys made a compact little group that moved over the beach, four plate- like shadows dancing and mingling beneath them. There was no sign left of the storm, and the beach was swept clean like a blade that has been scoured. The s ky and the mountain were at an immense distance, shimmering in the heat; and the reef was lifted by mirage, float ing in a kind of silver pool half-way up the sky.

They passed the place where the tribe had danced . The charred sticks still lay on the rocks where the rain had quenched them but the sand by the water was smooth again. They passed th is in silence. No one doubted that the tribe would be fo und at the Castle Rock and when they came in sight of it they stopped with one accord. The densest tangle on the island , a mass of twisted stems, black and green and impenetra- ble, lay on their left and tall grass swayed before them . Now Ralph went forward.

Here was the crushed grass where they had a ll lain when he had gone to prospect. There was the neck of land, the ledge skirting the rock, up there were the red pinnacl es.

Sam touched his arm. 0 Smoke." There was a tiny smudge of smoke wavering into

the air on the other side of the rock. "Some fire- I don't think." Ralph turned . "What are we hiding for?" He stepped through the screen of grass on to the

little open space that led to the narrow neck. "You two follow beh ind. I'll go first, then Piggy a

pace behind me. Keep your spears ready." Piggy peered anxiously into the luminous veil that

hung between him and the world. "Is it safe? Ain't there a cl iff? I can hear the sea." "You keep right close to me." Ralph moved forward on to the neck. He kicked

a stone and it bounded into the water. Then the sea sucked down, revealing a red, weedy square forty feet beneath Ralph's left arm.

"Am I safe?" quavered Piggy. "I fee l awful- "

High above them from the pinnacl es came a sud- den shout and then an imitation war-cry that was an- swered by a dozen voices from behind the rock.

"Give me the conch and s tay still." "Halt! Who goes there?" Ralph bent back his head and glimpsed Roger's

dark face at the top. "You can see who I am !" he shouted. "Sto p bei ng

s illy!" He put the conch to his lips and began to blow.

Savages a ppea red, painted out of recogn ition, edging round the ledge towards the neck. They carried s pears and disposed themselves to defend the entrance. Ralph went on blowing and ignored Piggy's terrors.

Roger was shouting. "You mind out- see?" At length Ra lph took his lips away and paused to get

his breath back. His first words were a gasp, but audibl e. "- call ing an assembly." The savages gua rding the neck muttered among

themselves but made no motion. Ra lph walked for- wards a couple of steps . A voice whispered urgently behind him.

"Don't leave me, Ralph." "You kneel down," said Ra lph sideways , "and wait

till I come back." He stood half-way along the neck and gazed at the

savages intently. Freed by the paint, they had tied their hair back and were more comfortable than he was. Ra lph made a resolution to tie his own back afterwards. Indeed he felt like telling them to wait and doing it the re and then; but that was imposs ible. The savages sniggered a bit and one gestured at Ralph with his spear. High above, Roger took his ha nds off the lever and leaned out to see what was going on. The boys on the neck stood in a pool of their own shadow, d iminished to shaggy heads. Piggy crouched, his back shapeless as a sack.

"I'm call ing an assem bly." Silence. Roger took up a small stone and fl ung it between

the twins, aiming to miss . They started and Sam only just kept his foo ting. So me source of power began to pulse in Roger's bod y.

Ralph spoke again, loudly. "I'm call ing an assem bly." He ran his eye over them . "Where's Jack?" The group of boys stirred and consu lted. A pain ted

face s poke with the voice of Robert.

Lord of the Files 40 1

"He's hunting. And he said we weren't to le t you in." "I've come to see about the fire," said Ra lph , "a nd

about Piggy's specs." The group in front of him shifted and laughter sh iv-

ered ou twards from among them, light, excited laugh- ter that went echoing among the ta ll rocks.

A voice spoke fro m behind Ra lph. "What do you want?" The twins made a bolt past Ra lph and got between

him and the entry. He turned quickly. Jack, iden tifiable by personality and red ha ir, was advancing from the for- es t. A hunter crouched on either s ide. All three were masked in black and green. Behind them on the grass the headless and paunched body of a sow lay where they had drop ped it.

Piggy wailed. "Ralph! Do n't leave me!" With ludicrous care he embraced the rock, pressing

himself to it above the sucking sea . The sniggering of the savages became a loud derisive jeer.

Jack shouted above the noise. "You go away, Ralph. You keep to your end. This is

my end and my tribe. You leave me a lone." The jeering died away. "You pinched Piggy's specs," sa id Ralph, breath-

lessly. "You've got to give them back." "Got to? Who says?" Ralph's temper blazed out. "I say! You voted fo r me for Ch ie f. Didn't you hear

the conch? You played a dirty trick- we'd have given you fire if you'd asked for it- "

The blood was flowing in his cheeks and the bunged-up eye throbbed .

"You cou ld have had fire whenever you wanted. But you didn't. You came sneaking up like a thief and stole Piggy's glasses!"

"Say that aga in!" "Thief! Thief!" Piggy screamed. "Ralph! Mind me !" Jack made a rush and stabbed at Ralph's chest wi th

his spear. Ralph sensed the position of the weapon from the glimpse he caught of Jack's arm and put the thrust aside with his own butt. Then he brought the end round and caught Jack a s tinger across the ear. They were chest to chest, brea thing fierce ly, pushing and glaring.

"Who's a thief?" uvou are!"

402 Chapter 8 The Just Society

Jack wrenched free and swung at Ralph with his spear. By common consent they were using the spears as sabres now, no longer daring the lethal points. The blow struck Ralph's spear and slid down, to fall agoniz- ingly on his fi ngers. Then they were apart once more, their positions reversed, Jack towards the Castle Rock and Ralph on the outside towards the island.

Both boys were breathing very heavil y. "Come on then- " "Come on - " Trucu lently they squared up to each other but kept

just out of fi ghting distance. "You come on and see what you get!" "You come on - " Piggy clutching the ground was trying to attract

Ralph's attention. Ralph moved , bent down , kept a wary eye on Jack.

"Ralph- remember what we came fo r. The fi re. My specs."

Ralph nodded. He relaxed his fig hting muscles, stood easily and grounded the butt of his spear. Jack watched him inscrutably through his paint. Ralph glanced up at the pinnacles, then towards the group of savages.

"Listen. We've come to say this . First you've got to give back Piggy's specs. If he hasn 't got them he can't see. You aren't playing the game- "

The tribe of painted savages giggled and Ralph's mind fa ltered . He pushed his hair up and gazed at the green and black mask befo re him, trying to remember what Jack looked like.

Piggy whispered. "And the fire." "O h yes. Then about the fire. I say this again. I've

been saying it ever since we dropped in." He held out his spear and pointed at the savages. "Your only hope is keeping a signal fire going as long

as there's light to see. Then maybe a ship'II notice the smoke and come and rescue us and take us home. Bu t without that smoke we've got to wait till some ship comes by accident. We might wait years; till we were old- "

The sh ivering, silvery, unreal laughter of the sav- ages sprayed out and echoed away. A gust of rage shook Ralph. His voice cracked.

"Don't you understand, you painted foo ls? Sam, Eric, Piggy and me- we aren't enough. We tried to keep the fire going, but we cou ldn't. And then you, play- ing at hunting .... "

He pointed past them to where the trickle of smoke dispersed in the pearly air.

"Look at that! Call that a signa l fire? That's a cook- ing fire. Now you'll eat and there' ll be no smoke. Don't you understand? There may be a sh ip out there- "

He paused, defeated by the silence and the painted anonym ity of the group guarding the entry. The ch ief opened a pink mouth and addressed Samneric who were between him and his tribe.

"You two. Get back." No one answered him. The twins, puzzled, looked

at each other; wh il e Piggy, reassured by the cessation of vio lence, stood up carefully. Jack glanced back at Ra lph and then at the twins.

"Gra b them!" No one moved. Jack s houted angrily. "I said 'grab them '!" The pain ted group moved round Samneric ner-

vously and unhand ily. Once more the s ilvery laughter scattered.

Samneric protested out of the heart of civilization. "Oh, I say!" "- honestly!" Their spears were taken from them. "Tie them up !" Ra lph cried out hopelessly against the black and

green mask. "Jack!" "Go on. Tie them." Now the painted group felt the otherness of Sam -

neric, felt the power in their own hands. They fe lled the twins clumsily and excitedly. Jack was inspired. He knew that Ralph wou ld attempt a rescue. He struck in a hu mming ci rcle beh ind him and Ra lph only ju st parried the blow. Beyond them the tribe and the twins were a loud and writhing heap. Piggy crouched again . Then the twins lay, astonished, and the tribe stood round them. Jack turned to Ralph and spoke between his teeth.

"See ? They do what I want." There was silence again. The twins lay, inexpertly

tied up, and the tribe watched Ralph to see what he would do. He numbered them th rough his fringe, glimpsed the ineffectual smoke.

His temper broke. He screamed at Jack. "You're a beast and a swine and a bloody, bloody

thief!" He charged. Jack, knowing this was the crisis, charged too. They

met with a jolt and bounced apart, Jack swung with his fist at Ra lph and caught him on the ear. Ralph hit Jack in the stomach and made him grunt. Then they were

facing each other again , panting and furious, but un - nerved by each other's ferocity. They became aware of the noise that was the background to this fig ht, the steady s hrill cheering of the tribe beh ind them.

Piggy's voice penetrated to Ralph. "Let me speak." He was standing in the dust of the fi ght, and as the

tribe saw his intention the shrill cheer changed to a steady booing.

Piggy held up the conch and the booing sagged a li ttle, then came up again to strength.

"I got the conch!" He shouted. "I tell you, I got the conch!" Surp risingly, there was silence now; the tribe were

curious to hea r what amusing thing he might have to say.

Si lence and pause; but in the silence a curious air-noise, close by Ralph's head. He gave it half his attention - and there it was again ; a faint "Zup !" Some- one was throwing stones: Roger was dropping them, his one hand still on the lever. Below him, Ralph was a shock of hair and Piggy a bag of fat.

"I got this to say. You're acting li ke a crowd of kids." The booing rose and d ied again as Piggy lifted the

white, magic shell. "Which is better- to be a pack of pain ted niggers

like you are, or to be sensib le like Ralph is?" A great clamour rose among the savages. Piggy

shouted again . "Which is better- to have rules and agree, or to

hunt and kill?" Again the clamour and again- "Zup! " Ralph shouted against the noise. "Which is better, law and rescue, or hunting and

breaking things up? " Now Jack was yell ing too and Ralph could no longer

make himself heard. Jack had backed right against the tribe and they were a solid mass of menace that bris- tled with spears. The intention of a charge was forming among them; they were working up to it and the neck would be swept clear. Ra lph stood fac ing them , a little to one side, his spear ready. By hi m stood Piggy still hold- ing out the talisman, the frag ile, shin ing beauty of the shell. The storm of sound beat at them, an incantation of hatred. High overhead, Roger, with a sense of delirious abandonment, leaned all his weight on the lever.

Ralph hea rd the great rock long before he saw it. He was awa re of a jolt in the earth that came to him

Lord of the Files 403

through the soles of his feet, and the breaking sound of stones at the top of the cliff. Then the monstrous red thing bounded across the neck and he flung himself fl at while the trib e shrieked .

The rock struck Piggy a glanci ng blow from chin to knee: the conch exploded in to a thousand white frag- ments and ceased to exist. Piggy, saying nothing, with no tim e for even a grunt, travell ed through the air side- ways from the rock, turning over as he went. The rock bounded twice and was lost in the forest. Piggy fell forty feet and landed on his back across that square, red rock in the sea. His head opened and stuff came out and turned red . Piggy's arms and legs twitched a bit, like a pig's after it has been killed. Then the sea breathed again in a long, slow sigh, the water boiled white and pink over the rock; and when it went, sucking back aga in , the body of Piggy was gone.

This time the silence was complete. Ralph's lips formed a word but no sound came.

Suddenly Jack bounded out from the tribe and be- gan screaming wildly.

"See? See? That's what you'll get! I mea nt that! There isn't a tribe for you any more! The conch is gone- "

He ran forward , stooping. "I'm Chief! " Viciously, with fu ll in tention, he hurled his spear at

Ralph. The point tore the s kin and flesh over Ralph's ribs , then sheared off and fe ll in the water. Ra lph stum- bled, fee ling not pain bu t panic, and the tribe, scream- ing now like the Chief, began to advance. Another spear, a bent one that would not fly straight, went past his face and one fell from on high where Roger was . The twins lay hidden beh ind the tribe and the anonymous devils' faces swa rmed across the neck. Ra lph turned and ran . A great noise as of sea-gu ll s rose beh ind him. He obeyed an instinct that he did not know he pos- sessed and swerved over the open space so that the spears went wide. He saw the head less body of the sow and jumped in time. Then he was crashing through foli- age and small boughs and was hidden by the fo rest ....

Ralph runs into the forest to hide, and Jack begins a vicious search for him. Soon Ralph realizes that jack has started a forest fire to force him out into the open. The trick works, for Ralph soon stumbles onto the beach, terrified- and is stunned to find a naval officer greeting him. The turvy had seen the smoke risingfrom the island and had come to investigate.

404 Chapter 8 The Just Society

[Ralph] staggered to his feet, tensed for more terrors , and looked up at a huge peaked cap. It was a wh ite- topped cap, and above the green shade of the peak was a crown, an anchor, gold fo li age. He saw white drill , ep- au lettes, a revolver, a row of gilt buttons down the front of a uniform.

A naval officer stood on the sand, looking down at Ralph in wary astonishment. On the beach beh ind him was a cutter, her bows hauled up and held by two ratings. In the stern-sheets another rating held a sub- mach ine gun.

The ululation faltered and died away. The officer looked at Ralph doubtfully fo r a moment,

then took his hand away from the butt of the revolver. "Hullo." Squ irm ing a little, conscious of his filthy appear-

ance, Ralph answered shyly. "Hullo." The officer nodded, as if a question had been an-

swered . "Are there any adu lts- any grown-ups with you?" Dumbly, Ralph shook his head. He turned a ha lf.

pace on the sand. A semicircle of little boys, their bod- ies streaked with coloured clay, sharp sticks in their hands , were standing on the beach making no noise at all.

"Fun and games," said the officer. The fire reached the coco-nut pa lms by the beach

and swallowed them noisily. A flame, seemingly de- tached, swung like an acrobat and licked up the palm heads on the platform. The sky was black.

The officer grinned cheerfu lly at Ralph. "We saw your smoke. What have you been doing?

Having a war or someth ing?" Ralph nodded. The officer inspected the li ttle scarecrow in front of

him. The kid needed a bath, a hair-cut, a nose-wipe and a good deal of ointment.

"Nobody killed , I hope? Any dead bodies?" "Only two. And they've gone." The officer leaned down and looked closely at Ralph. "Two? Killed?" Ralph nodded again. Behind him, the whole island

was shuddering with fl ame. The officer knew, as a ru le, when people were tell ing the truth. He whistled softly.

Other boys were appearing now, tiny tots some of them, brown, with the d istended bellies of small savages. One of them came close to the officer and looked up.

11 l'm I'm- " • But there was no more to come. Percival Wemys

Mad ison sought in his head for an incantation that had faded clean away.

The officer turned back to Ralph. "We'll take you off. How many of you are there?" Ralph shook his head. The officer looked past him

to the group of painted boys. "Who's boss here?" "I am," said Ra lph loud ly. A little boy who wore the remains of an extraor-

dinary black cap on his red hair and who carried the remains of a pair of spectacles at his waist, started for- ward, then changed his mind and stood still.

"We saw your smoke. And you don't know how many of you there are?"

0 No, sir." "I shou ld have thought," said the officer as he visu-

alized the search before him, "I should have thought that a pack of British boys- you're all British aren't you?- would have been able to put up a better show than that- I mean- "

"It was like that at first," said Ralph, "before things- "

He stopped. "We were together then- " The officer nodded helpfu ll y. "I know. Jolly good show. Like the Coral Island." Ra lph looked at him dumbly. For a moment he

had a fleeting picture of the strange glamour that had once invested the beaches. But the island was scorched up like dead wood - Simon was dead - and Jack had .. . . The tears began to flow and sobs shook him. He gave himse lf up to them now for the first time on the island ; great, shuddering spasms of grief that seemed to wrench his whole body. His voice rose under the blac k smoke before the burn ing wreckage of the island ; and infected by that emo- tion , the other little boys began to shake and sob too. And in the midd le of them, with fi lthy body, matted ha ir, and unwiped nose, Ra lph wept for the end of innocence , the darkness of man's heart, and the fa ll through the air of the true, wise friend ca ll ed Piggy.

The officer, surrounded by these noises, was moved and a little embarrassed. He turned away to give them time to pu ll themse lves together; and waited , a llowing his eyes to rest on the trim cruiser in the d istance.

Prob ing Questio ns

I. Whar does 7he Lord of the Flies say about ,noralicy? Does ir suggest rhar hun1ans don't need moral icy? Thar ,noralicy has no hold on hu,nans? Whar is Piggy's notion of moralicy? What is Jack's?

2. Whar does che story say about hu,nan nature? Are humans inherendy savage and bloodchirscy?

3. Imagine char Tho,nas Hobbes reads 7he Lord of the Flies. If he interprets che story in light of his moral theory, ,vhar do you suppose he would say? Would Hobbes regard che story as reinforcing his views or contradicting che,n?

For Further Read ing

Joh n Arthu r and W illian1 Shaw, eds.,Justice and Economic Distribution (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice H all, 1991) . A collection of writings on justice.

Steven M. Cahn, e.d., Political Philosophy: The Essentials (New York: Oxford Univer- s ity Press, 2011). A collection of the most impo rtan t readings.

Samuel Fleishacker, A Short History of Distributive Justice (Boston : H arvard Univer- s ity Press, 2005). An overview of the development of major perspectives o n justice.

David Miller, Political Philosophy: A very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2003) . A concise int rod uction to the concepcs and iss ues of polit ical p hilosophy.

Robert Nozick , Anarch;1 State, and Utopia (Ne,v Yo rk: Basic Books, 1974). A class ic wo rk of political philosop hy defending a fo rm of libertarian ism.

Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989). A femi nist view of distribut ive justice, argui ng th at gen der inequal ities p reclu de any

form of social justice.

Lou is P. Pojman an d Owen McLeod , eds., What Do We Deserve: A Reader of Justice and Desert (New Yo rk: Oxford University Press, 1999). An an th ology of articles on social just ice as it relates to what people do and d on't deserve. Special attention given t o Rawls's concept of desert.

Joh n Ra,vls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: H arvard University Press, 1999). A class ic-and very influ ential-exam inatio n of th e fu ndan1ental requirements of social justice.

Michael J. Sand el, ed.,Justice: A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) . A comp rehensive a nth ology of the most sign ificant a rt icles o n social and polit ical just ice, ed ited by one of America's favo rite college p rofessors.

Lord of the Files 405

CHAPTER

THE MEANING OF LIFE

CHAPTER O BJECTIVES

9.1 OVERVIEW: PHILOSOPHY AND THE MEANING OF LIFE

• Understand why people t hin k questio n s con cerning t he meaning o f h uman existence a re extremely important a nd relevant.

• Understand why and how examining the q uestion of life 's meaning is personal.

• Expla in t he d iffe rence between external a nd inte rna l meaning.

9.2 PESSIMISM: LIFE HAS NO MEANING

• Summarize t he pessim istic views o f Tolstoy, Schopenha uer, and Da rrow.

• Critically exam ine t he case for pessim ism and t hat for o ptim ism .

• Assess Baggin i's charge t hat pessim is t s confuse external a nd inte rnal meani ng.

9.3 OPTIMISM: LIFE CAN HAVE MEANING

• Expla in t he rel igious externalis t a pp roach to life 's meaning .

• Critically exam ine Tolstoy' s view and his jus t ification for it .

• Expla in why some philosophers th ink the notion of a God assigning a purpose to human s shou ld be o bj ectiona bl e to believers a nd nonbe lievers a like.

• Summarize the inte rnalist's position on life 's mean ing and p roduce a n a rgument for or against it.

• Devise a n a rgument fo r t he idea that death and t he ephemeral n atu re o f h uman endeavors a re irre levant to t he meaningf ulness o r meaninglessness of a person' s existence.

Overview: Phi losophy and the Meaning of Life 407

9.1 OVERVIEW: PHILOSOPHY AND THE MEANING OF LIFE

Enter: a contented man. He makes his living crafting ornate clay pors, ,vh ich he sells to the people in h is village. He loves h is ,vork and is mostly satisfied with h is li fe. But one day a friend gives him a ph ilosophy textbook, which he begins to read, starting ,vith the last chapter entitled "The Meaning of Life." A question in the first paragraph jumps out at h im : "Does life have meaning?" H e has never thought seriously about the meaning of life, and as he ponders the question, he realizes he has no answe r. And he does not have an answer even after frett ing over the question for several days. For most of his life, he has made pots, day after day, a ll of them the same shape and size, all of them produced in exactly the same way-and he seems destined to endure th is monotony into old age. What is the point? he thinks. What does it matter ,vhether I make a mi ll ion pars or none? What has my life been about? What meaning or purpose does my li fe have? Is life meaningless? He has no idea. And the thought of a meaningless existence b rings on a crushing despa ir that cannot be eased by drink, or d rugs, or d istracting ac- t ivity. As his misery deepens, the potter stops making pots, and he ,vonders why he ever started .

Figure 9.1 People often begin their search f or meaning by asking, "What is the meaning of life?" But the f irst step in finding answers i s to understand the question.

For ,he meaning of life differs from man to man, from day ,o day and from hour ,o hour. \Vhar mar- tcrs, therefore, is nor the

meaning of life in general bu, rarher ,he specific meaning of a person's life at a given moment.

-Viktor E. Frankl

408 Chapter 9 The Meaning of life

Life has no meaning the

mo me nt you lose th e illu- sio n of being eternal. -Jean-Paul Sartre

D o you see any resemblance bet\veen the potter and yourself in this little tale? It would not be su rp rising or unusua l if you d id. At o ne time or another, in o ne \vay o r a nother, most people ask themselves if life has a ny meaning, a ny poi nt. Li ke our potter, many of them seem satisfi ed w ith t heir lives-until they begin to \vond er \vhether it is a mea ningless cha rade. Then "the mea ning of li fe"-a ph rase often tossed around in mock seriousness o r fo r comedic effect-is infused with a more somber tone. A few insist that q ues tio ns about t he meaning of ex istence are themselves mea ningless. But most who have contemplated such things take t hem to be ext remely importa nt and releva nt to their lives. Many philosophers have tried to cla rify the concepts involved a nd to give discussio ns of li fe's meaning more p recisio n, bu t they too think the questions about meaningful or meaningless lives are worth asking and anS\vering. The existentialist philosopher Albert Camus, for one, d eclares that "judging whether life is o r is not worth livi ng amou nts to an- swering the fundamental quest ion of philosophy. All the rest-whether the \vorld has th ree dimensions, whether the mind has ni ne or n velve categories-comes afterwards."'

Some people, including a fa ir nu mber of stude nts, think philosophy is mostly about the q uestion of life's meaning. In a sense, they are not far wrong. Most of the topics covered in the p receding chapters-God, free will, k no\vledge, ethics, and justice-can inform your thinking about this importa nt sort of meaning. And your conclusions abou t the meaningfulness of life are directly o r indirectly related to your actions a nd beliefs regarding lifestyle, wo rk, morality, political involve- ment, free will, God, and other issues. lfby thinking carefully about li fe's meaning (or lack thereof) you d ecid e to dramat ically change your career choice, you would not be t he first.

What, besides a cou rse in philosophy, ca n push someone into this kind of serious reflection? Often the tripwire is a d isturbing thought-the inevitabil ity of death, the brevity of life, the smallness and triviality of our lives compared with the unimagin- ably vast un iverse, the sho rtness of our lives in the context of eternity, or the eventual obliteration of everyth ing \Ve have cared for o r created.

Consider this odd fa irytale based very loosely o n a real event. A g raduate st udent \vith a master's degree in business pays a visit to a philosophy professor. The st ud en t has come seek ing something that she h as so far fa iled to acquire in her studies: the ultimate secret, the meaning of life. The professor pauses, then answers in his best g uru-like voice, "The meaning of life is . .. a big p urple thing." Silence. The professor chuckles; the student doesn't k now \vhether to laugh or sigh.

With his absu rd answer the professor means to make a point, or severa l. There is no great secret concerning the meaning of life, no cryptic bit of k nowledge that, once k nown, \viii reveal all . There is no slogan or incantation or pa rable that wi ll ensure your life is worth living. Moreover, no one can simply hand you the meaning of life as if it were a gift basket. The process of exami ning the question of life's meaning or purpose is personal. You have to make that journey you rself. No one can bestow upon you what you must fi nd for yourself, no more than a friend can tell you what your favo rite foods a re supposed to be.

Overview: Phi losophy and the Meaning of Life 409

Probably most philosophers \vould agree \Vith all th is. Many \vould also add that although there is no straight road to understand ing the "big question," there a re guideposts here and there that can help you find your \vay, some of \vhich we d iscuss in the fo llowing pages.

Many people think they have an intuitive grasp of what is meant by "the meaning of life." But the concept in common usage is actually vague and slippery. So, for purposes of this discussion, \Ve can say that to ask whethe r your life has meaning is to ask whether it has sign ificant value or purpose over time beyond t he good of merely being alive. Through the centuries, people have claimed that such sign ificant value is derived from being part of God's plan, serving the greater good of humankind , helping others, car ing for and protect ing fam ily, giving and receiving love, creating art, searching for kno\vledge, and many other activ ities and states.

Philosophers have gone further and distingu ished life's value or mean ing from happiness and moral rightness. Someone might be continually and bl issfully happy because she is, for example, tak ing psychotropic drugs, but few would call such a life mean ingful. And some people can lead meaningful lives wh ile being m iserable because their meaningful activities a re arduous or dangerous. Physicians working in a war zone treating wounded ch ildren may be sad because of the suffering they witness-and still feel their lives have mean ing. Moreover, many things that people do to add meaning to their lives a re also morally right, but moral rightness and meaningfu lness need not go together. W h ile creating a beautiful pa inting, an artist might add mean ing to his life, but the act of creation seems to be morally neutral. Morality and mean ingfulness are not synonymous.

Perhaps the main impediment to clear thinking about life's meaning is confu- s ion about \vhat meaning refers to. Consider the ph rase "the mean ing of life." For most people, these words refer to external meaning-mean ing o r purpose that comes

Figure 9.2 Is a meaningful life possible only when lived in accordance with God's plan?

My li fe has no purpose, no direction, no aim, no meaning. and yet I'm happy. I can't fi gure it ou t. \Vhat am I doing righ t? -Charles M . Schulz

410 Chapter 9 The Meaning of life

1 When you t alk about the mean ing of life, wh ich sense of the term do you use- externa l meaning o r interna l meaning?

Life takes on meaning when you become motiv· ared, set goals and charge after them in an unstop· pable manner. -Les Brown

PHILOSOPHY LAB - Imagine char you are a devour person who feels chat your life can be meaningful only if you ace according to God's plan. Forrunarely, an oracle can tell you exacdy what God has in store. He wanes you (and everyone else on rhe planet) co ... serve as food for beings on anorher planer, who happen to be God's favorite people. You and all other humans, on the ocher hand, are co be mear for aliens.

Now that you know God's plan, is your life f inally meaningful? That is, if you know on ly that God has a plan for you but know nothing

about it, wou ld that fact alone make your life meaningful?

from outside human ity. Whatever mean ing people have in their lives is besto\ved or assigned by God, by some metaphysical o rder, or by the work ings of some universal principle. For Christians, co have a meaningful life is co be part of God's p lan for all of humankind. But many people also speak of a different k ind of mean ing-wh at some refer co as "mean ing in life." This is internal meaning-meaning or purpose that comes from inside people, that humans can give co themselves. In this vie\v, life can be mean ingful for persons if they come co see their goals or purposes as inher- ently valuable or worthwh ile.

Many people, including those \vho accept a religious worldview, ass ume chat if life has no external meaning, it has no meaning period. They believe humans ca n have a purposeful life only if God created them \vith a purpose. The opposing vie\v is that even if there is no external meaning, people's lives can still be meaningful because mean ing and purpose come from within. Because of these different senses of mean ing, a person who states that life is mean ingless may actually be asserting on ly chat life has no external meaning but sti ll h as internal meaning. Someone who declares that life has meaning may reject the notion that humans a re given a purpose by a higher po\ver, claiming chat lives are made meaningfu l only by human choices. Unfortunately, the phrase "the meaning of life" is frequently used co refer co both external and internal meaning.

To the question of whether life holds any meaning for us, there are t\VO prin- cipal answe rs: (I) Life has no meaning (the pessimist's view) and (2) life in some sense does have meaning (th e optimist's view). The optim ise's answer can be fur- ther divided: Either (1) life's meaning is external (the common religious perspec- tive) or (2) life's meaning is interna l (the view held mostly by the nonreligious or nontheiscic).

Pessimism : Life Has No Meaning 4 11

9.2 PESSIMISM: LIFE HAS NO MEANING

The pessimists (also called nihilists) have something in common ,vich the religious optimises: They both believe chat unless a divine entity o r transcendent reality has provided the world ,vich ultimate purpose o r value, life is meaningless. In ocher words, life ca n have no meaning if external meaning is nonexistent.

Among famous pessimists we ca n co unt the re nowned Russian novelise Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910). Before undergoing a Christian conversion (and becoming an optimise), he found himself at age fift y doubting the ex istence of God and being tortured by the thought chat life was entirely ,vichouc meaning o r purpose. H ere ,ve can see ch at his agony at the loss of meaning ,vas extreme:

Leo Tolstoy, My Confession

[F]ive years ago something very strange began to happen with me: I was overcome by minutes at fi rst of perplexity and then of an arrest of life, as though I d id not know how to live or what to do, and I lost myself and was dejected. But that passed, and I continued to live as before. Then those m inutes of perplexity were repeated oftener and oftener, and always in one and t he same form. These arrests of life fou nd their expression in ever the same questions: "Why? Well, and then?"

At fi rst I t hought that those were simply ai m less, inapprop riate questions . It seemed to m e t hat that was all well known and that if I ever wanted to busy myself with t heir solution, it would not cost me much labou r,- that now I had no time to attend to them, but that if I wanted to I shou ld fi nd the prope r answers. But the questions began to repeat themselves oftener and oftener, answers were de- manded more and more persistently, and, like dots that fall on the same spot, t hese questions , wi thout any answers, thickened into one black blotch .

There happened what happens with any person who falls ill with a mortal internal d isease. At first there appear insignificant symptoms of indisposition, to which the pa· tient pays no attention; t hen t hese symptoms are repeated more and more frequently and blend into one temporally indiv isible suffering. The suffering keeps growing, and be- fore the patient has had ti me to look around, he becomes conscious that what he took for an ind isposition is the most sign ificant th ing in the world to hi m,- his death.

Life is without meaning. You bring the meaning to it. The meaning of life is whatever you ascribe it to be. Being alive is rhc meaning.

-Joseph Campbell

The same happened with me. I understood that it was not a passi ng indisposition, but something very importa nt, and that, if the questions were going to repeat themselves, it would be necessa ry to find an answer for them. And I tried to answer them. The questions seemed to be so foolish, simple, and childis h. But the moment I touched them and tried to solve them , I became convinced, in the first place, Figure 9.3 Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910).

412 Chapter 9 The Meaning of life

Leo Tols toy, My Confession

2 Is Tolst oy's pessim ism about life's meaning a resu lt of h is object- ive assessment of h is life, o r is it merely a product of h is unique personality traits?

that they were not ch ildish and foolish, but very important and profound questions in life, and, in the second, that, no matter how much I m ight try, I shou ld not be able to answer them. Before attend ing to my Samara estate, to my son's education, or to the writing of a book, I ought to know why I shou ld do that. So long as I did not know why, I cou ld not do anyth ing. I cou ld not live. Amidst my thoughts of farming, wh ich inter- ested me very much during that t ime, there wou ld suddenly pass through my head a question like this: "All right, you are going to have six thousand desyatfnas of land in the Government of Samara, and th ree hundred ho rses,- and then?" And I comp letely lost my senses and did not know what to th ink farther. Or, when I thought of the educa- tion of my ch ildren, I said to myself. "Why?" Or, reflecting on the manner in which the masses might obtain their welfare, I suddenly said to myself: "What is that to me?" Or, thinking of the fame wh ich my works wou ld get me, I said to myself: "All right, you will be more famous than G6gol, Push kin; Shakespeare, Moliere, and all the writers in the world ,- what ofit?" And I was absolutely unable to make any reply. The questions were not wa iting, and I had to answer them at once; ifl did not answer them , I could not live.

I felt that what I was stand ing on had given way, that I had no foundation to stand on, that that which I lived by no longer existed, and t hat I had nothing to live by . .. .

All that happened with me when I was on every side surrounded by what is consid- ered to be complete happiness. I had a good , loving, and beloved wife, good children , and a large estate, which grew and increased without any labour on my part. I was respected by my neighbours and friends, more than ever before, was praised by strang- ers, and , without any self-deception, could cons ider my name famous. With all that, I was not deranged or mentall y unsound,-on the contrary, I was in full command of my menta l and physica l powers, such as I had ra rely met with in people of my age: physica lly I cou ld work in a field, mowing, without fa ll ing beh ind a peasant; mentally

Figure 9.4 Is life any less meaningful because it is short?

Pessimism : Life Has No Meaning 4 13

I cou ld work from eight to ten hours in succession, without experiencing any conse- quences from the strain. And whi le in such condition I arrived at the conclusion that I could not live, and, fearing death, I had to use cunn ing aga in st myself, in order that I might not take my life.

This menta l condi tion exp ressed itself to me in this form: my life is a stupid, mea n t rick played on me by somebody. Although I did not recognize that "somebody" as hav- ing created m e, the form of the conception that some one had played a m ean, stupid t rick on me by bringing me into the world was the most natura l one that presented itself to m e.

Involuntari ly I im agined that there, somewhe re, there was somebody who was now having fun as he looked down upon me and saw m e, who had lived for thirty or forty years, learni ng, developin g, growing in body and mind, now that I had become strengthened in mind and had reached that summit of life from which it lay all before me, stand ing as a complete fool on that summ it and seeing clearly that there was noth- ing in life and never would be. And t hat was fun to him-

But whether there was or was not that somebody who made fu n of me, did not make i t easier for me. I could not ascribe any sensible meaning to a single act, or to my whole life. I was on ly surprised that I had not understood t hat from the start. All that had long ago bee n known to everybody. Sooner or later there would come diseases and death (they had come already) to my dea r ones and to me, and t he re wou ld be nothi ng left but stench and worms. All my affairs, no matter what they might be, wou ld sooner or later be forgotten , and I myself shou ld not exist. So why shou ld I worry abou t all t hese things ? How could a man fail to see that and live,-that was surprising! A person cou ld live on ly so long as he was drunk; but the moment he sobered up, he cou ld not help seeing that all that was on ly a deception, and a stup id deception at that! Really, t he re was nothing funny and ingenious about it, bu t only something cruel and stupid.'

The German philosopher Arthur Schopen hauer (1788- 1860), a not her famous pess imist, argues that life is so bereft of meaning a nd so fraught w ith misery that the no nexisten ce of the world is preferable to its ex istence.

Arthur Schopenhauer, " On the Sufferi ngs of the World"

Unless suffering is the direct and immediate object of life, our exis tence must entirely fail of its aim. It is absu rd to look upon the enormous amount of pain that abounds everywhere in the world , and origin ates in needs and necessi ties in separable from life itself, as serving no purpose at all and the result of mere chance. Each separate mis- fortune, as it comes, seems , no doubt , to be something exceptional; but mis fo rtune in general is the ru le ... .

The best consolation in misfo rtune or affl iction of any kind will be the though t of other people who are in a still worse pli ght than yourself; and this is a form of consola- t ion open to every one. But what an awful fate this mea ns for man kind as a whole!

We are like lambs in a field , disporting themselves under the eye of the butcher, w ho chooses out first one and then another for his prey. So it is that in our good days we are all unconscious of t he evil Fate m ay have prese ntly in store for us- sickness, poverty, mutilation , loss of sight or reason.

3 What bearing, if any, does the ephemeral nature of our existence have on the quest ion of whether life has meaning? Does the fact t hat we w ill d ie negate the possib il ity of meaning in life?

The sole meaning of life is to serve humanity.

-Leo Tolstoy

4 Is Schopenhauer right about the mean- ing lessness of life? Does t he w retchedness of our existence show that life has no meaning?

414 Chapter 9 The Meaning of life

No li ttle part of the torme nt of existence lies in th is, that Time is con· tinually press ing upon us, never letting us take breath, but a lways com ing after us, like a taskmaster with a whip. If at any moment Time stays his hand, it is only when we are delivered over to the m isery of boredom ....

Certain it is that work, worry, labor and trouble, form t he lot of almost all men their whole life long. Bu t if a ll wishes were fu lfilled as soon as t hey arose, how wou ld men occupy their lives ? what wou ld they do with their time? If the world were a paradise of luxury and ease, a land flow ing with milk and honey, where every Jack obta ined his Jill at once and without any difficulty, men wou ld either d ie of bo redom or hang t hemselves; or there wou ld be wars, massacres, and murders; so that in the end mankind wou ld inflict more suffering on itself than it has now to accept at t he hands of Nature . .. .

Again, you may look upon life as an unprofi tab le episode, d isturbing the blessed ca lm of non -existence. And, in any case, even though th ings have gone with you tolera bly well, the longer you live the more clearly you will fee l that, on the whole, life is a disappointment, nay, a cheat . .. .

Figure 9.5 Arthur Schopen haue r ( 1788-1860).

If ch ildren were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, wou ld the human race continue to exist? Wou ld not a ma n rather have so much sympathy with the com ing generation as to spare it the burden of existence? or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose that burden upon it in cold blood .l

Arthur Schopenha uer,

"On the Sufferings of the World"

5 What is Schopen- hauer's argument fo r the meaninglessness of life? Is his assess- ment of life based on object ive facts or on his distinctive frame of mind?

I h ave always believed, an d I still believe, t hat what· ever good o r bad fo rcune may come o ur way we can

always give it meaning and transform it inm some· t h ing of value. -Hermann Hesse II 111111111111111111111II111111 I II I II Ill 1111111

The distinguished atheist la\vyer C larence Darrow (1857-1938), defense attorney in the famous Scopes "monkey trial," came to the same conclusion that Tolstoy and

Schopenhauer d id: Life is not worthwhile. "Life is like a sh ip on the sea," he says, "tossed by every wave and by every wind; a ship headed for no port and no harbor, \vith no rudder, no compass, no p ilot; simply Aoacing for a time, then lose in the waves." 4

Against the p essimists, it has been argued chat most of them have been guilty of

perpetrating the confusion mentioned earlier-m ixing up the two senses of mean- ing. Contemporary philosopher Jul ian Baggini explains:

Julian Baggini , What's It All About?

It seems to me that when most people say t hat life is meaningless, t hey are talking about meaning in one or both of these senses. They are saying- right ly, in my view- that our lives were not created with any purpose or goal in mind and that there is noth· ing beyond or after life that can provide a purpose for what we do in this life. But to conclude t hat "therefore life is meaningless" is simply to ignore the many other ways in w hich life can be meaningfu l. ...

What is missi ng is the recognition that life can be meaningful if we find it worth living for its own sake, without recourse to further aims, goals or purposes ....

The same kinds of consideration apply when dealing with [existentialist Albert] Camus's question about how we can live life if it is absurd and mea ningless. Aga in it is only "meaningless" in certain particu lar senses of the word ....

Pessimism : Life Has No Meaning 4 15

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Nietzsche: Reflections on Meaning

Friedrich Wilhelm N ieczsche (1844-1900) lived in the n ineteenth century, bur his ideas echoed loudest rhroughour rhe rwencieth, and they resound still, over one hundred years after h is passing. Today he is borh reviled and embraced, and he has outraged ,nany-including exponents of Christian ity, conce,nporary culture, cradicional morality, democratic socialis,n, and Western philosophy. Among chose who have claimed ro be inspired by h is ,vords are Marx- ists, poscmoderniscs, a cheiscs, anarchists, fem inises, reactionaries, vegetarians, and Nazis. Sorne have claimed him as one of their own even d1ough he has given chem no explicit reason co (as in the case of che Nazis). The divergent perspectives on his work are due in pare co his writing style, which is mosdy brilliant bur by turns opaque, poetic, aphoristic, vague, and ironic. Bur most debate is over che substance of his views, of which che ,nosr famous (or notorious) are his doctrine of the will co po,ver, h is notion of d1e rnighty human being known as che Ubemumch (Overman or Superman), and his claim char "God is dead." On d1ese copies sorne philosophers con- sider hi,n a nih ilist, but od1ers reject d1ac characrerizacion, arguing that Nierzsche ,vas concerned about ulcimace meaning and che incellecrual and spiritual vicalizacion ofhurnanity.

Figure 9.6 Fried rich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900).

Fro,n 1873 ro 1876 Nietzsche prod uced Untimely Meditations (actually four essays un- der che single tide). In 1879 he resigned h is university post because of h is fai ling hea lth and spent che following decade ,vricing and ,vandering about lca ly and Switzerland, lonely and in great physica l pain . Our of ch is period came such ,vorks as 1he Wonderer and His Shadow (1880), Daybreak (188 1), 1he Gay Science or Joyful Wisdom (1882), Beyond Good and Evil (1887), and 1he Genealogy of Morals (1887). 7hus Spoke Zarathustro, his well-known ,nascer- p iece, appeared in che years 1883 co 1885. In 1889, on a street in Turin , he collapsed after seeing a horse being whipped. He spent che remain ing cen years of his life insane, dying in August 1900. By che rime of h is death, he was world-reno,vned, and his ,vrirings were the subject of extensive scholarship and controversy.

A central concept of N ietzsche's is rhe will to power, rhe fundamenta l nature of existence as a drive ro control and dominate. The ,viii ro po,ver is nor che rea l world beh ind appear- ances (as in Descartes), nor ideas in che universa l mind (as in Hegel), nor che w ill ro live, nor the conscious will of God or hu,nans. Jc is life, striving co overco,ne, ro ru le, co break our. All human struggles and striving are manifestations of the will ro power.

To Nietzsche, che will co power is evident in hu,nank ind 's search for kno,vledge, es- pecially in science, ph ilosophy, and religion. "Knowledge," he says, "is an instrument of power." The will ro kno,v arises from che ,viii co power-from che desire co master and control a particular domain of real ity. Rea lity is in Aux, a kaleidoscope of sense data and concepts, and on rh is chaos we cry co irnpose order, theory, and parcern so we can rurn rea lity co our advantage. We do no r seek truth for rruch 's sake. There is only che ,viii ro power char impels us co cry ro ,nake sense of rhe muddle.

41 6 Chapter 9 The Meaning of life

6 Do you th ink many people who say t hat life is meaning less a re assum ing that mean- ing refers to external meaning?

7 If we reject the reli - gious view of meaning in life, are we forced to conclude that life is meaning less?

Fairh consists in bei ng virally concerned w ith th a t u ltimate reality to wh ich I give the symbolical name

of God. Whoever rc Accts earnestly on chc meaning o fl ifc is on the verge of a n

act of faith. -Paul Tillich

Almost all deniers of meaning in life really seem to be rejecting only the idea that life has a s pecific kind of mean ing: one determ ined by agen ts, purposes or principles somehow externa l to this world . This does not justify t he conclusion that life has no meaning at all. Their pronoun cement that "life is meaningless" thus just appears to be a ki nd of hyperbole.s

9.3 OPTIMISM: LIFE CAN HAVE MEANING

Optimises say human existence can be mean ingful but are divided on how ch is mean ing is poss ible. As noted earlier, some bel ieve life's meaning has an external source, and some thin k it arises internally.

Meaning from Above

Mose of those who cake che externalise approach view che matter from a religious standpoint. Typically, che cent ral doctrine is that a human life has meaning only be- cause it is pa re of God's p lan, a grand cosm ic o rder that encompasses every entity in che universe. As participants in ch is plan, people have a p reeminent role co play a nd a purpose preordained by God. To have a meani ngful existence is co align your life ,vich God's plan, either by perform ing certain duties or by bei ng a particular k ind of person. To live contrary co God's plan is co live a m eaningless life. A nd, of cou rse, if there is no God, there is no point co living.

Tolst oy not o nly gave us a glimpse of his fall into pess imism, he also w rote about his gradual acceptance of a deeply religious understand ing of life's mean ing:

Leo Tolstoy, My Confession

Long ago has been told t he Eastern story about t he traveller who in the steppe is over- taken by an infu riated beast. Trying to save himself fro m t he anima l, t he traveller jumps into a waterless well , but at its bottom he sees a dragon who opens his jaws in order to swallow him. And the unfortunate man does not dare cl imb out, lest he perish from the infuriated beast, and does not dare jump down to the bottom of the well , lest he be devoured by the dragon, and so cl utches the twig of a wild bush growing in a cleft of the well and ho lds on to it. His hands grow weak and he fee ls that soon he shall have to surrender to t he peri l which awaits him at e ither s ide; but he sti ll ho lds on and sees two m ice, one white, the other black, in even measure making a circle around t he main trunk of t he bus h to which he is cl inging, and nibbling at it on all sides. Now, at any moment, the bush will break and tear off, and he will fa ll into the dragon's jaws. The travell er sees that and knows that he will inevitab ly perish; but w hile he is stil l clinging, he sees some drops of honey ha nging on the leaves of t he bush, and so reaches out fo r them with his tongue and licks the leaves. Just so I hold on to the branch of life , know- ing that the dragon of death is waiting inevitably for me, ready to tear me to pieces, and I cannot understand why I have fa llen on s uch s uffe ring. And I try to lick that honey which used to give me pleasure; but now it no longer gives me joy, and the white and

Optim ism: life Can Have Meaning 4 17

t he black mouse day and night nibble at the branch to which I am holding on. I clea rly see the dragon, and the honey is no longer sweet to me. I see only t he inevitable dragon and the mice, and am unable to t urn my glance away from them. That is not a fable, but a veritable, indisputable, comprehensible t ruth.

The former deception of the pleasures of life, which stiffed the terror of the dragon, no longer deceives me. No matter how much one shou ld say to me, "You cannot under- stand the meaning of li fe, do not thi nk, live!" I am unable to do so, because I have been doing it too long before. Now I cannot help seeing day and night, which run and lead me up to death. I see that alone, because that alone is the truth. Everything else is a lie.

The two drops of honey that have longest turned my eyes away from the cruel t ruth, the love of family and of authorship, which I have ca lled an art, are no longer sweet to me ....

I lived for a long tim e in th is madness, which, not in words , but in deeds , is par- t icu larly characteristic of us, the most liberal and learned of men . But, t ha nks either to my strange, physica l love for the real working class, which made me understand it and to see that it is not so stupid as we suppose, or to t he sincerity of my conviction which was that I cou ld know nothing and that t he best that I cou ld do was to hang myself,- I felt that if I wanted to live and understand the meaning of life, I ought naturall y to look for it, not among those who had lost t he meaning of li fe and wanted to kill themselves, but among those bill ions departed and living men who had been carryin g thei r own lives and ours upon their shou lders. And I looked around at t he enormous masses of deceased and living men,- not learned and wealthy, but simple men,- and I saw somethin g quite different. I saw that all these billions of men that lived or had lived, all, with rare exceptions, d id not fit into my subd ivisions, and that I could not recogn ize t he m as not understandi ng the question , beca use t hey themselves put it and answered it with surprising clea rness. Nor cou ld I recognize them as Epicureans, because their lives were composed rather of privations and suffering than of enjoyment. St ill less cou ld I recogn ize t he m as senselessly living out their meaningless lives, because every act of theirs and death itself was explained by them . They regarded it as t he greatest evil to kill themselves. It appeared , then, that all hu manity was in possession of a knowledge of t he meaning of life, which I did not recognize and which I condemned. It turned out that rational knowledge did not give any meaning to life, excluded life, whi le t he meaning which by billions of peop le, by all humanity, was ascribed to life was based on some despised, false knowledge .. . .

Thus, outside the rational knowledge, which had to me appeared as the only one, I was inevitably led to recognize t hat all living humani ty had a certa in other irrational knowl- edge, faith, which made it possible to live .. . .

8 How do you think Tolstoy wou ld respond to t he claim t hat many people appear to have very meaningful lives? What would he say, for example, about mean ing in the life of Ma hatma Gand hi or Albert Einstein?

The rational knowledge brought me to the recognition that life was mean ingless,-my life stopped, and I wanted to de- stroy myself. When I looked around at people, at all humanity, I saw that people lived and asserted that they knew the mean- ing of life. I looked back at myself: I lived so long as I knew the meaning oflife. As to other people, so even to me, did faith give the meaning of life and the possibility ofl iving .. . .

Then I began to cultivate the acquain tance of the believ- ers from among the poor, the simple and unlettered folk, of

Figure 9.7 Gand hi was not a Christian. Did he never- theless lead a meaningful life? What about Socrates? Einstein?

418 Chapter 9 The Meaning of life

Leo Tolstoy, My Confession

Ever more people today have the means to live, but

no meaning to live for. -Viktor E. Fr,nkl

pi lgrims, monks, d issenters, peasants . The doctrine of these people from among the masses was a lso the Christian doctrine that the quasi-believers of our circle professed. With the Christian truths were also mixed in very many superstitions, but there was this difference: the superstitions of our circle were quite unnecessary to them , had no connection with their lives, were only a kind of an Epicurean amusement, while the superstitions of the believers from among the laboring cl asses were to such an extent blended with their life that it would have been imposs ible to imagine it without these superstitions,-it was a necessary cond ition of that life. I began to examine closely the lives and beliefs of these people, and the more I examined them, the more did I beco me convinced that they had the real faith, that their faith was necessary for them, and that it alone gave them a mea ni ng and possibili ty of li fe. In contradistinction to what I saw in our circle, where life withou t fa ith was poss ible, and where hard ly one in a thousand pro- fessed to be a bel iever, among them there was hardly one in a thousand who was not a believer. In contradistinction to what I saw in our circle, where all life passed in idleness, amusements, and tedium of life, I saw that the whole life of these people was passed in hard work, and that they were satisfied with life. In contradistinction to the people of our circle, who struggled and murmured against fate because of their privations and their suffering, these people accepted diseases and sorrows without any perplexity or opposi- tion, but with the calm and firm conviction that it was all for good. In contradistinction to the fact that the more intell igent we are, the less do we understand the mea ning of life and the more do we see a ki nd of a bad joke in our suffering and death, these people live, suffer, and approach death, and suffer in peace and more often in joy .... I cast a broader glance about me. I examined the life of past and present vast masses of men, and I saw people who in like manner had understood the meaning of life, who had known how to live and die, not two, not three, not ten, but hundreds, thousands, mil - lions. All of the m, infinite ly d iversified as to habits, intellect, culture, situation, all equally and quite contrary to my ignorance knew the meaning of life and of death, worked calmly, bore privations and suffering, lived and died, seeing in that not vanity, but good.

I began to love those people. The more I penetrated into the ir life, the life of the men now living, and the life of men departed, of whom I had read and heard, the more did I love them, and the eas ier it became fo r me to live. Thus I lived for about two years, and withi n me took place a transformation, which had long been working with in me, and the germ of which had always been in me. What happened with me was that the life of our circle,-of the rich and the learned,-not only disgusted me, but even lost all its mea ning. All our acts, reAections, sciences, arts ,- all that appeared to me in a new light. I saw that all that was mere pampering of the appetites, and that no mea n- ing cou ld be fo und in it; but the life of all the working masses, of all human ity, which created life, prese nted itself to me in its rea l significance. I saw that that was li fe itself and that the meani ng given to this life was truth, and I accepted it.6

So Tolstoy says he fo und the true meaning of life through a leap of faith, not through the rational knowledge of his circle of sophisticates. He chose the religio us path trod by mi ll ions of the poor and unlearne.d.

C ritics of such externalise views argue that the notion of God creating people to be part of his plan is an affront to human dignity, that it's difficult or impossible to k no\v \vhat God's plan is, that his plan may not be as benign and agreeable as bel ievers assume, and that a plan from God imposed on our lives undermines free \viii. They typically deny that death renders life meaningless or that a life can be

Optim ism: life Can Have Meaning 4 19

PHILOSOPHY NOW

Is Religion Necessary for a Meaningful Life?

Rick Warren, author of The Purpo1e-Driven Life and the pastor who delivered the in- vocation at Barack O baina's 2009 inaugu- ration cere,nony, maintains char religion is required if your life is ro have mean ing. "You were made by God and for God," he says, "and unril you understand char, life ,viii never ,nake sense." Is that true?

The results of a Gallup poll ra ise doubts about it. The pollsters surveyed thousands of people in eighry-four countries. They concluded chat "there is some support in Gallup's d ata for War- ren's prem ise char rel igious involvement makes d evotees rnore likely co feel their lives have a purpose. On the o rher hand, the results also suggest chat rel ig ious in- volvement is nor neceSJary for ,nose people co feel char way." Here are some of the results.

Figure 9.8 Suppose y ou are not relig ious, yet yo u have alw ays felt t hat y our life has meaning Gust as many athei sts believe t heir lives h ave mea ning). Th en someone tells y ou t hat y our life cannot possibly have meaning because yo u are not relig ious. Would you think t he person w as denying t he obvious o r speaki ng t ruth? Why?

Do yo u feel yo u r life has a n imp or ta n t mean ing or purpose? A,nong those cla iming any religious affi liation : 92o/o yes; 6% no. A,nong those cla iming co be secu lar, nonrel ig ious, atheist, or agnostic: 83% yes; 14% no.

Do yo u feel yo u r life has a n imp or ta n t mean ing or purpose? Percentage anS\veringyes: Christian: 93%; H indu: 92%; Muslim : 91%; Buddhist: 90%; ocher: 89%; Jewish: 88%; secu lar/acheisc/agnoscic: 83%.

Do yo u feel yo u r life has a n imp or ta n t mean ing or purpose? Percentage answering yes: ele,nencary education or less: 88%; secondary ed ucation u p co three years of tertiary ed ucation : 91%; a r least four years of tertiary education: 91%; have a job: 92%; do not have a job: 89%.

Gallup survey, 2007, data from one thousand adults per country across eighryfour popularions; ±4 percentage points sampling error.

Do these results surp rise yo u, or are they what yo u would expect? Do they

corrobo rate the idea that people can have a meaningful life without reli- gion? Do they show that meaning in life can arise internally? Explain.

420 Chapter 9 The Meaning of life

9 According t o Bag- gini, how is God's creating us for his purposes supposed to denigrate human life? Do you agree?

mean ingful only if it is immortal. Moreover, some critiques of Tolstoy's view do not depend on a denial of God's existence. Several philosophers have argued that t he notion of a God assigning a purpose to humans sho uld be objectionable to believers and no nbelievers a like. This is how Baggini expresses the point:

Julian Baggini , What's It All About?

It is often said t hat we are here to do God's will. If this were true ... [o]ur lives would have a purpose for the being that created us but not a purpose for us. We would each be li ke Sartre's being-in-itself- an object to be used for the ends of others and not a being-for-itself- a conscious being making choices meaningful for itself. If we found that our sole purpose was to serve God then we might think that was a worse fate than to have no predeterm in ed purpose at all. Is it better to be slaves with a role in the uni- verse or to be free people left to create a role for ourselves?

This view that we are created to serve God is not only objectionable on t he grounds that it robs human ity of its d ignity. It also has to be seen as extremely implausible within the world-view of the religions t hat sometimes propound it. After all , what could seem more unlikely than that the supreme being would feel the need to create human bein gs, with all t he ir complexity, and with a ll the suffering and toil that hu man li fe entails, solely so that it can have creatures to serve it? Th is is an im age of God as an egotistical tyra nt, determined to use its power to surround itself with acolytes and have pra ise heaped upon it. Th is is not the God which most reli gious bel ievers worship, and so the idea that we are here just to serve such a God is not one that should be seriously countenanced e ither ....

I think t hat most refl ective reli gious bel ievers wou ld agree that saying God's pur- pose for us is to serve it or live full lives is not adequate. They might prefer to say that the existence of God shows that there must be a purpose, s ince God would n't have

Figure 9.9 Baggini asks, "Is it better to be slaves with a role in t he universe or to be free people left to create a role fo r ourselves?"

Optim ism: life Can Have Meaning 421

created us without one, but that we do not know what that purpose is. Fa ith requires us to trust God and its purposes for us. As Jesus is reported in John's Gospel to have sa id, "Trust in God; trust a lso in me. In my Father's house are many rooms" (14:1- 2). This is a perfectly coherent pos ition and probably the one most sensible religious bel ievers occupy. But doing so requires an honest acceptance that they have no more idea as to what the purpose of life is than the atheist has.

The leap of faith required to adopt such a pos ition also needs to be clearly under- stood. This is fa ith that a God we cannot know to exist has a purpose we cannot discern for an afterl ife we have no evidence is to come. Further, we wou ld also be trusting that this purpose is one we would be pleased with. If it turned out that our purpose was to fight Satan's hordes for eternity or just to have lived as a beacon of fortitude under duress on earth before dying, we m ight not be too pleased that God had a purpose for us after all.

A bel ief that we were created by God for a purpose does not then provide us with the kind of adequate account of life's meaning we m ight expect. Religions are not clear about what th is purpose is. The idea that it is to serve God seems deeply implausible and contrary to most conceptions of God's nature. The idea that it is to live life to the fu ll is a platitude, only turned in to someth ing more by a belief in an afterlife. The idea that God's purpose is something we just have to trust is an adm ission that we have no answer to the question of why we are here and must leave everyth ing to the unknown .7

Meaning from Below

lncernalists believe they can have meaningful lives without relying on che concepts of God or transcendent real ms. They hold chat they can confer meaning on thei r O\vn lives. The proof of chis, they might say, is all a round us. There are many people who seem co lead meaningful lives, and we would judge this co be the case even if we thought no external being or force existed co confer meaning. Consider Socrates, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther K ing., Jr., Rosa Parks, Elizabeth Cady Stanton,

Marie Curie, George Washington, Confucius, Thomas Aquinas-these men and women, by all accounts, were d riven by a sense of purpose and led lives full of meaning.

Bue exactly what property or state of affairs is che conveyor of meaning? lncer nal- ists differ on that score. Here is Pau l Ed\vards's view:

Paul Edwards , The Encyclopedia of Philosophy

When we ask whether a particular person's life has or had any meaning, we are usually concerned not with cosmic issues but with the question of whether certain purposes are to be found in his life. Thus, most of us would say without hesitation that a person's life had meaning ifwe knew that he devoted himself to a cause (such as the spread of Chris- tianity or communism or the reform of mental institutions), or we wou ld at least be ready to say that it "acquired mean ing" once he became sufficiently attached to his cause. Whether we approve of what they d id or not, most of us wou ld be ready to adm it- to take some random examples- that Dorothea Dix, Pasteur, Len in, Margaret Sanger, An - thony Comstock, and Winston Church ill led meaningful lives. We seem to mean two things in characterizing such lives as meaningful: we assert, first, that the life in question

Religion is th e sta te of be- ing gra.,ped by an ultimate concern, a concern whic h

q ualifi es all o ther concerns a.s preliminary a n d whic h itself contains the an\wcr

to rhc qucscio n of a mean~

ing of our life. -Paul Tillich

422 Chapter 9 The Meaning of life

Paul Edwards, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I wou ld rathe r live my life as if th e re is a God a nd d ie to find our there isn't} than live my life as if there isn't

and die to fin d o ut there is. -Albert Camus

10 Do you agree wit h Edwards t hat the length of one's life does not by itself determ ine whet her life is meaningful?

had some dom inant, over-all goal or goals which gave direction to a great many of the individual's actions and, second, that these actions and possibly others not immediately related to the overrid ing goal were performed with a special zest that was not present before the person became attached to his goa l or that would not have been present if there had been no such goal in his life. It is not necessary, however, that a person should be devoted to a cause, in the sense just indicated , before we call his life meaningful. It is sufficient that he should have some attachments that are not too s hallow.'

A common reply to any internalise view is that the prospect of death and t he eventual obliteration of a ll human creations rob our lives of meaning. Ho\v ca n our lives be mean ingful, they ask, when life is so short and death is cer tain? What's t he

point of living if ever yth ing we a re and do \vill soon sink into nothingness? Many philosophers reject th is d ismal outlook, arguing that the fact of death and

the ephemeral natu re of human endeavors are irrelevant to the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of a person's existence. If life is mean ingful, then it is meaningful no

matter ho\v long or short it is. Edwards is one of the philosophers \vho make this point:

Let us consider some everyday occurrences: A man with a toothache goes to a dentist, and the dentist he lps him so that the toothache disappears. A man is fa lsely accused of a crime and is faced with the possibility of a severe sentence as well as with the loss of his reputation; with the help of a devoted attorney his innocence is establ ished, and he is acqu itted . It is true that a hundred years later all of the participants in these events will be dead and none of them will then be able to enjoy the fruits of any of the efforts involved. But this most emp haticall y does not imply that the dentist's efforts were not worthwh ile or that the attorney's work was not worth doing. To bring in considerations of what will or will not happen in the remote future is, in [this and other] human s itua- tions , totally irrelevant. Not on ly is the finality of death irrelevant here; equally irrelevant are t he facts, if they are facts, that life is an endless cycle of the same kind of activities and that t he history of the universe is not a drama with a happy end ing.9

Internalises can be divided into two camps: those \vho bel ieve that meaning is something they create (subjectivists) and those who think meaning is someth ing they discover (objectivists).

Among the subjectivists, \Ve can count not on ly Baggini and Edwards, but also the philosophers R. M. Hare (1919-2002), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), R ichard Taylor (1919-2003), Kai N ielsen, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), Robert Solomon (1942-2007), E. D. Klemke (1926-2000), and Lucretius (c. 100-55 BC).

For subjectivists, mean ing is relative to each person and depends on his or her attitudes, desires, and goals. So subjectivists m ight say their lives are mean ingful if they do \vhat they deem most important or satisfy thei r strongest desires or act out of love or concern. A common criticism of subjectivist views is that it's intuitively obvious t hat sometimes objective standards apply. If satisfying our strongest desires leads to obv iously immoral or t rivial acts, subjectivism is implausible. Th ings aren't mean ingful just because we say they are.

The classic example of a subjectivist is Sartre. As one of the modern founders of existentialism, he argues that humans are profoundly free to create their O\vn lives and thus are entirely respons ible for defining the meaning and moral relevance of

Optimism: life Can Have Meaning 423

their existence. There are no objective standards to define what is and is not mean- ingful fo r them. "Man," he says, "is noth ing else but what he makes of himself."

Cons ider these two subjectivists who lived two mi llennia apart but came to much the same conclusion about meaning in life. E. D. Klemke, editor of the highly regarded anthology The Meaning of Life, was an astute subjectivist philosopher. In a well-kno\vn essay, " Living W ithout Appeal: An Affirmative Ph ilosophy of Life," he responded to those who claim that (1) there exists a "transcendent u lti mate" (a deity, fo r example) with which we can have a relationship through faith; (2) \Vithout such an entity and faith in it, life is mean ingless; and (3) without such mean ing, life is not worth\vhile.

Regard ing the fi rst cla im, he asks what evidence supports it. The assertions of some sacred text p rove nothing, he says, since they p rove only that "someone believed that a t ranscendent ultimate exists." Like\vise the testimony of large numbers of be- lievers p roves noth ing. The traditional arguments for the existence of a god a ll fa il to p rov ide reasons fo r believing, and a rguments from rel ig ious experience can p rove no more than that "someone has had an unusual experience." He concludes that there is zero evidence for the existence of a transcendent anything.

As to the second claim-that without faith in the transcendent, human existence is without meaning-Klemke anS\vers by distinguishing benveen objective meaning and subjective mean ing. An objective mean ing is one that is either structu rally part of the un iverse (apart from human evaluation) or dependent on some nonhuman external agency. If there is objective mean ing, he says, there is no reason why it must be linked to a transcendent being. But even more important, " I find the notion of an objective meaning as difficult to accept as I do the notion of a t ranscendent being. It seems to me that there is no sh red of evidence for the ex istence of an objective mean- ing in the universe .... From the standpoint of present evidence, evaluational com- ponents such as mean ing o r purpose are not to be found in the universe as objective aspects of it." 1° Klemke also rejects the related claims that subjective meaning is pos- sible but only through the transcendent, o r that even subjective mean ing is impossible without fa ith in the t ranscendent. He says of the latter assertion, " I know of many humans \vho have found a mean ingful existence without fa ith in the transcendent.""

In response to the th ird claim-that without meaning, life is not worth\vhile- Klemke says that it confuses objective and subjective meaning. He says that indeed life has no objective meaning, "but from th is it does not fo llow that life is not worth- while, for it can still be subjectively meaningful. ... I, for one, am glad that the uni- verse has no meaning, fo r thereby is man all the more glorious. I will ingly accept the fact that exter nal meaning is non-existent (or if ex istent, cer tainly not apparent), fo r this leaves me free to forge my own meaning."' 2 He declares that he has found subjec- t ive meaning th rough knowledge, art, love, and work, for \Vith his consciousness, he can endow events, objects, and persons \Vith value.

Lucretius, a Roman poet and philosopher, believes that life can be meaningful even in a completely materialistic un iverse bereft of the supernatu ra l. He is best kno\vn for a seven-thousand-line poem on science and philosophy called The Nature of Things, or De rerum natura, a masterpiece that has influenced many th inkers throughout the centuries as \veil as in moder n life.

424 Chapter 9 The Meaning of life

Lucretius was an atomist. Two mi llen nia ago some p hilosophers a rgued t hat t he \vorld consists entirely of atoms moving in space, just as modern science has sho\vn us. H e decla res that everything-hu mans, a nimals, the ea rt h, the stars, t he sun-is made of atoms. The universe is infinite a nd entirely material. There is no des ig ner \vho created everythi ng. The universe is eternal; it has always been here. Things have come about through t he laws of nature and cha nce. The soul is a lso material, which means that it d ies just as the body does. There is no afte.rlife; the present world is a ll \Ve have.

This view may seem d reary, but Lucretius thinks the opposite. Because death is fina l, we nee.d not fear it, because we wi ll not be p resent to confront it. As he says, "Death is noth ing to us." There wi ll be no pain, anguish, or tormen t after death.

Religion causes pain, Lucretius says, because it instills a fea r of everlasti ng tor- ment o r some other uncertain fate after death. Religion causes anxiety because it teaches superstitions about m ischief or terror caused by demons, angels, o r g hosts. Religio n d iscourages the pursuit of happiness a nd p leasure, when these t hings should be central to o ur lives. Religion causes ruin when it holds out the false hope of mi- raculously transcend ing our finite lives. The most famo us line of Lucretius's poem refers to a particularly evil act performed in t he name of religion. He says, "So poten t \vas religion in persuading to do wrong."

Lucretius \vasn't an atheist exactly, for he bel ieved there \vere gods, but he thought the gods had no interest in, and nothing to do \Vit h, humans. To be truly happy, he says, we must dispel illusions about our abilit y to live foreve r, find perfect satisfac- tion, control events, and be the center of t he un iverse's attention. By avoid ing these delusions, we can attain a realistic measure of happiness, even joy.

Lucretius decla res t hat we ca n experience a sense of awe, gratit ude, and rever- ence when \Ve see that t he universe is beautiful and boundlessly complex. We are made of t he same st uff as stars and seas a nd trees and clouds. We huma ns are all connected-to each other and to every part of t he cosmos. We a lso experience a\ve \vhen \Ve contemplate the mysteries that science reveals, a nd we feel the del ight of discovery \vhen \Ve solve those mysteries.

Lucretius bel ieves that the mea ning of li fe can be found in pleasure-seeki ng t hat is rational and realistic. O ne of his disciples said t hat it is not possible to live a life of pleasure '\vit hout living p rudently a nd hono rably and justly, a nd also \vithout living courageously a nd temperately and magnan imously, and without making friends, and without being phila nt hropic."

For objectivists, meaning is m ind-independent. Objectively \VOrthwhile activi- ties o r states convey objective mean ing that everyone can recognize as such. If a li fe is mea ningful, it is so because it h as objective value, not because of someone's subjec- tive p references o r desi res. A n objectivist might say t hat helping others and creating art are genera lly believe.cl to give meaning to life, and the best explanation for such bel iefs is objectivism-some things a re inherently \VOrthwhile.

Notable objectivisrs include James Rachels (194 1-2003), Susan Wolf, Terry Eagleton, John G. Messerly, Christopher Belshaw, Thaddeus Metz, Victor Fra nk l (1905-1997), a nd Moritz Schlick (1882-1936).

Optimism: life Can Have Meaning 425

Susan Wolf, philosopher and author of Meaning in Life and Why ft Matters, a rgues chat mean ing in life muse cons ist of both subjective and objective elements. As she says, "Mea ningful lives are lives of active engagement in projects of \vorch."13

Active engagement is involvement in something that grips o r excites a person, some- thing that arouses passion. Bue chis subjective response alone is not enough co add s ignificant meaning co someone's life. Mere passion about an activity is, in itself, insufficient co contribute meaningfulness co a life. The passion muse be directed at projeccs that are in themselves worth\vhile. "What is clear co me," she says, "is chat there can be no sense co che idea of meaningfulness without a distinction benveen more and less \vorchwhile ways co spend one's time, \vhere che cesc of \vorch is at lease parcly independent of a s ubj ect's ungrounded preferences or enjoymenc." 14

This vie\v belies che often-expressed notion chat what someone does doesn't mat- ter as long as che person enjoys it o r prefers it or gees satisfaction out of it. Coun- terexamples abound. People do wonder sometimes if an activity they enjoy is in face worth\vhile. Some people \vich satisfying lives do feel that their ex istence is meaningless.

Wolf lists some of che activities chat seem objectively \vorchwhile: "Mo ral and incelleccual accomplishmencs and che ongoing activities chat lead co chem. Re- lationships \vich fr iends and relatives a re perhaps eve n mo re important for most of us . Aesthetic enterprises (both creative and appreciative), the cu lt ivation of personal virtues, and religious practices frequencly loom large ." She sums up he r vie\v in a slogan: "Meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective att ract iveness. " 15

The contemporary philosopher C hristopher Belsha\v, another objeccivisc, exam- ines some of che reasons chat lead people co think life may be meaningless. Perhaps life is mean ingless because it is so brief, because we and our world are so minuscu le compare.cl co the inconceivably vase cosmos, because life for us is so filled \vich misery and loss, and because there is no god or creator co give us a purpose or p lan for living. Bue, Belshaw says, none of these reasons shows chat life is meaningless. Why should the brevity of life or our relative size matter? These faces seem irrelevant. Yes, life is fraught with suffering, but it also contains moments of joy and satisfaction. And as fo r being pare of God's p lan, Belshaw wonders if our worries about the meaningless- ness or pointlessness of our lives are really going co be put co rest because God has a scheme into wh ich \Ve fie. "Are we really going co be satisfied by finding that \Ve fie into someone else's grand scheme?" Belshaw asks. "There's some sore of meaning and purpose in ch is, but is it che sore \Ve wanc?"16

H e suggests that \vhac we really \vane is our O\vn mean ing that we find for our- selves. Bue the mean ing can't be completely subjective; meaning cannot be \vhacever we chink it is. "Whether or not your life is successful depends on ho\v it matches up against certain external criteria," Belsha\v says. " l e doesn't depend s imply o n how you feel about it. And I think it's the same for \vhecher your life is meaningful. Here, coo, thinking doesn't make it so." 17

What are some of che things chat objectively matter? "Relationships," he says, "pursuing some p lan or project, living a good life." 18

426 Chapter 9 The Mean ing of life

Review Notes

9.1 OVERVIEW: PH ILOSOPHY AND THE MEAN ING OF LIFE

• Mose \vho have thought about it believe chat questions co ncerning the meani ng of human existence are extremely importan t and relevant.

• The process of exami ning the q uestion of life's meani ng is personal-no one can do it for you.

• The main impediment co clear chin king abou t life's meaning is confusion abou t \vhac meaning refers co. The word can refer co extern al mean ing or internal meaning.

9.2 PESSIMISM: LIFE HAS NO MEANING

• Pessimists believe chat life has no meaning; optimists believe chat it does. Some optimises bel ieve th at life's meani ng is external; other opti mists ch in k it's internal.

• Tolstoy (at one poi nt in his life), Schopenhauer, and Darro\v are pessimists. Baggin i th inks they mix up the two senses of mean ing, so when they say, " Life is meani ng- less," they likely mean o nly ch at life has no mean ing in th e external sense.

9.3 OPTIM ISM: LIFE CAN HAVE MEANING

• Mose of those \vho cake the externalise approach view th e matter from a rel igious standpoi nt. Typ ically, they believe that a human life has mean ing only because it is part of God's plan. Tolstoy cook ch is view an d mai ntained that fi ndi ng meani ng in life requi res a leap of faith.

• Unbel ievers \vould insist the religious vie\v of mean ing be backe.d by reasons and argumen ts. Several philosophers h ave argued chat the notion of a God assigni ng a purpose co humans should be objectionable co believers and nonbelievers alike. They maintai n chat chis idea of God creating people for a p urpose is an affront co human dign ity.

• l ncernalists believe th ey can have mean ingful lives without relyi ng on the concepts of God or transcendent realms. They ho ld ch at they can confer mean ing on th eir own lives. lncernalists can be subjectivists o r objecciviscs.

• Many philosophers reject the notion that death robs people of mean ing in life. They argue that th e fact of death and the ephemeral nature of human en deavors are irrelevant co th e mean ingful ness o r mean ingless ness of a perso n's existence. If li fe is mean ingful, then it is meani ngfu l no matter ho\v lo ng o r sho rt it is.

Review Notes 427

WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE?

What Can and Cannot Give Life Meaning?

Here is a quiz co help you assess your views on life's ,neaning. For each scacemenc below, indi- cate whether you agree or disagree ,vich it (or have no opinion on it). This is che easy pare. The 1nore d ifficult cask is to support your beliefs with good arguments or evidence. This exercise asks you co specify not what has caused your beliefs, but what justifies chem.

I. Unless there is an eternal afterlife, hu,nan life can have no meaning. 2. Life has 1neaning only if there is a God ,vho has created us for a purpose. 3. Life has 1neaning if you are happy. 4. Life has no meaning and no purpose. 5. Having a ,neaningfu l or purposefu l life does not maccer; ,vhac maccers is the next life

of everlasting bliss. 6. People cannot g ive 1neaning co their o,vn lives; life's meaning is derived from God or

some ocher transcendental reality. 7. A study of people past and present would show chat some of che1n live or have lived

meaningful lives, and ch is sense of ,neaning does not depend on their bel ief in God. 8. Death has no bearing on ,vhecher ,ve can live meaningful lives. 9. The eventua l obliteration of everything ,ve have created or strived for is irrelevant co

,vhecher our lives can be ,neaningfu l. JO. The notion chat God has assigned co humans a purpose or plan co live by is an affront

to human dignity. 11. Without a cranscendencal reality and hu,naniry's relationship co it through fa ith, hu-

man life is meaningless. 12. Some ,noral, aeschecic, or intellectual goa ls or endeavors are enough co confer ,neaning

on one's life. 13. As Tolstoy says, a ,neaningfu l life requires a leap of fa ith. 14. People ,vho cruse chat God has a plan for their lives have no understanding of ,vhar the

purpose of their lives is. 15. Socrates, Mahanna Gandhi, Marie Curie, and Confucius led mean ingful lives.

Figure 9.10 Det ermining w hether your life has meaning usually requires a broad, encompassing view of t hings.

428 Chapter 9 The Meaning of life

WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:

ARGU ING YOUR OWN VIEWS CHAPTER 9

1. D evise a n a rgument for the p roposition that life is (or is not) mean ingful.

2. Explain Tolstoy's case fo r bel ievi ng that life can have mean ing th rough a leap of faith-then sho\v how skeptics have argued against Tolstoy's vie\v. C-onclude by stating which side in th is cont roversy you think is stronger.

3. Some maintain that \Ve are here to d o God's w ill . Lay out an argu- ment showing th at such a purpose would or would not make life mea ningful.

4. State \vhether you believe th at Socrates and Marie Curie led mean in g- ful lives. G ive reasons for your asser tion.

5. D oes the prospect of death underm ine life's meaningfu lness? G ive reasons for your a nswer.

The Good Brahmin 429

FI CT ION

The Good Brahmi n

Voltaire

Voltaire (1694- 1778) , a French philosopher and writer, was one of t he most impor- tant thinkers of his day. He was t he author of both fiction and nonfiction, including Candide, Treatise on Tolerance, and Philosophical Dictionary.

On my travels I met an old Brahmi n, a very wise man, of marked intellect and great learning. Furthermore, he was rich and, consequently, all t he wiser, because, lacking nothing, he needed to deceive nobody. His household was very well managed by three handsome women who set t hemselves out to please him. When he was not amusing himself with his women, he passed t he time in ph ilosoph izing. Near his house, which was beautifu ll y decorated and had charming gardens at- tached , there lived a narrow-minded old Ind ian woman: she was a simpleton, and rather poor.

Said the Brahmin to me one day: " I wish I had never been born !" On my asking why, he answered: "I have been studying forty years, and t hat is forty years wasted. I teach others and myself am ignorant of every- t hing. Such a state of affairs fill s my sou l with so much humiliation and disgust that my life is intolerable. I was born in Time, I li ve in Time, and yet I do not know what T ime is. I am at a point between two eternities, as our wise men say, and I have no conception of eternity. I am composed of matter: I th in k, but I have never been able to learn what produces my thought. I do not know w hether or not my understanding is a simple faculty inside me, such as those of wa lking and digesting, and whether or not I think with my head as I grip with my hands. Not only is the cause of my thought unknown to me; the cause of my actions is equa lly a mystery. I do not know why I exist, and yet every day people ask me questions on all these poin ts. I have to reply, and as I have nothing reall y worth saying I talk a great dea l, and am ashamed of myself afterward for having talked.

"It is worse still when I am asked if Brahma was born of Vishnu or if they are both eternal. God is my witness t hat I have not the remotest idea, and my igno- rance shows itself in my replies. 'Ah, Holy One,' people say to me, 'tell us why evil pervades the earth.' I am in

Vol taire, " The Good Brahmin," from The Portable Voltaire, ed. Ben Ray Redman (New York: Viking Pengu in, 1949, 1977).

as great a difficulty as those who ask me this question. Sometimes I tell them that everyth ing is as well as can be, but t hose who have been ruined and broken in t he wars do not believe a word of it- and no more do I. I retire to my home stricken at my own curiosity and ignorance. I read our ancient books, and they doub le my darkness. I talk to my companions: some answer me that we must enjoy li fe and make game of mankind; others t hink t hey know a lot and lose themselves in a maze of wild ideas. Everything increases my anguish. I am ready sometimes to despair when I th in k that after all my seeking I do not know w hence I came, whither I go, w hat I am nor what I shall become."

The good man's condition reall y worried me. No- body was more rational or more sincere than he. I per- ceived that his unhappiness increased in proportion as his understand ing developed and his insight grew.

The same day I saw the old woman who lived near him. I asked her if she had ever been troub led by t he thought t hat she was ignorant of the nature of her soul. She did not even understand my question. Never in all her li fe had she reflected for one single moment on one single poin t of all those wh ich tormented the Brahmin. She believed with all her hea rt in t he metamorphoses of Vishnu and, provided she cou ld obtain a little Gan- ges water wherewith to wash hersel f, thought herself the happiest of women.

Struck with this mean creature's happiness, I re- turned to my wretched ph ilosopher. "Are you not ashamed," said I, "to be unhappy when at your very door there lives an old automaton who th in ks about nothing, and yet lives contented ly?"

"You are right," he replied. "I have told myself a hundred times that I should be happy if I were as brainless as my neighbor, and yet I do not desire such happiness."

My Brahmin's answer impressed me more than all the rest. I set to exam ining myself, and I saw that in truth I wou ld not care to be happy at the price of being a simpleton.

430 Chapter 9 The Mean ing of Life

I put the matter before some philosophers, and t hey were of my opinion. "Nevertheless," said I, "there is a tremendous contrad iction in this mode of t ho ught, for, after all , the problem is- how to be happy. What does it matter whether one has bra ins or not? Further those who are contented with their lot are certain of their con- tentment, whereas those who reason are not certain that they reason correctly. It is quite clear, therefore," I continued, "that we must choose not to have common sense, however li ttle common sense may contribute to

Probing Questions

our discomfort." Everyone agreed with me, bu t I fou nd nobody, notwithstanding, who was willi ng to accept the bargain of becoming a simpleton in order to become contented. From which I conclude that if we consider t he question of happin ess we must consider still more t he question of reason.

But on reflectio n it seems that to prefer reason to felicity is to be very senseless. How can this contradic- t io n be explained? Li ke all the other contradictions. It is matter for much talk.

I. The concemplacive Brahm in is unhappy and haunted by the question of the ,neaning of life. The old ,voman is unreflective and contented. Which person ,vould you rather be? Why?

2. Does chis story suggest chat happiness is essential if you ,vane your life co be meaningful? Are happiness and meaningfulness che sa,ne thing?

3. Can a person be miserable and still live a ,neaningful life? If so, how? Can a person be happy and live a life ,vichouc meaning?

For Further Read ing

Julian Baggini, What's ft All About? Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (Oxfo rd: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2005). An excellent p ri mer on meaning in life; argu es chat meaning can have an internal source.

Ku rt Baier, "The Meaning of Life," in The Meaning of Life: A Reader, E. D. Klemke and Steven M. Cahn, eds. (New Yo rk: Oxfo rd Univers ity Press, 2008), 82- 113. A classic essay on che basic issues.

E. D. Klemke and Steven M. Cahn, eds., The Meaning of Life: A Reader (New York: Oxford Univers ity Press, 2008). A good anth ology featuring most of the muse-read ar ticles.

John E. Messerly, The Meaning of Life (Washington Scace: Durant & Russell, 2012). A su rvey of religious, ph ilosophical, and scienti fic perspectives.

Bertrand Russell, "A Free Man's Worsh ip," in Wiry I Am Not a Christian (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957). A much-anthologized essay by ch e famous cwenciech - cencury philosopher; d iscusses how life can have mean ing in a godless ,vorld.

APPENDIX A: THE TRUTH ABOUT PHILOSOPHY MAJORS

................................................................................ ._ ......... . .... ._ ............... __. .................. .._ ................ __. ................................. __. ...... __. ............ __. ............................... ........ ._ .................. ............. ...... ..... .. .

Here's the inaccurate, old-school way of thinking: • Philosophy majors have no marketable skills; they are unemployable. • They are unprepared for professional careers in anything but teaching

philosophy. • They are useless in an economy built on exploding tech, speed-of-light

innovation, and market· \vrenching globalization. • They are destined co earn low salaries.

Here's the new reality: A ll these assumptions are FALSE.

CAREERS

A wide range of data suggest chat philosophy majors are not just high ly employable; they a re thriving in many careers chat used co be considered unsuitable for chose holding " impractical" philosophy degrees. The unemployment race for recent BA philosophy g raduates is 4.3 percent, lower than the national average and lower than that for majors in biology, chemical engineering, g raphic des ign, mathematics, and economics.'

Nowadays most ph ilosophy majors don't gee PhDs in ph ilosophy; they instead land jobs in many fields outside academia. They \vork in business consulting firms, guide investors on Wall Street, lead teams of innovators in Silicon Valley, do hu· manicarian work for nongovernmenc organizations, go into policies, and cover the world as jou rnalises. They teach, \vrice, design, publish, create. They go co medical school, la\v school, and graduate school in everything from arc and a rchitecture co education, business, and computer science. (Of course, besides majoring in phil- osophy, scudenrs can also m inor in it, combining a philosophy BA with ocher BA p rograms, or cake philosophy courses co round out other majors or minors.)

Many successful companies-especially those in the tech \vorld-don'c see a philosophy degree as impractical at a ll. To be competitive, they wane more than just engineers, scientists, and mathematicians. They also \vane people with broader, big-picture skills-people who can think cricically, question assumptions, fo rmulate and defend ideas, develop unique perspectives, devise and evaluate arguments, write effectively, and analyze and simplify complicated problems. And these competencies are abundant in people \vich a philosophy background.

Plenty of successful bus iness and tech leaders say so. Speaking of her under· graduate studies, Ca rly Fiorina, philosophy major and eventual chief executive of

431

432 Appendix A: The Truth about Ph il osophy Ma jors

Photo 1: Ca rly Fiorina, busi nessperson and po li tical fig ure Photo 2: St ewart Butter field, cof ounder of Flickr and Sl ack Photo 3: Sheila Bair, ninet eent h chair of t he FDIC Photo 4: Katy Tu r, author and broadcast journali st f o r NBC News Photo S: Damon Ho rowit z, ent repreneur and in -hou se ph ilosopher at Goog le

He\vlett-Packard, says, "I learned how to separate the \vheat from the chaff, essential from just interesting, and I thin k that's a pa rticularly critical sk ill now when there is a ton of interesting but u ltimately irrelevant information floating arou nd." 2

Flick r and Slack cofounder Stewart Butterfield, who has both bachelor's a nd master's degrees in ph ilosophy, says, "I think if you have a good background in \vhat it is to be huma n, a n understandi ng of li fe, cult ure and society, it gives you a good perspective on starting a busi ness, instead of an education purely in business. You can always pick up ho\v to read a bala nce sheet and ho\v to figure out p rofi t a nd loss, but it's ha rder to pick up the other stuff on the Ry."3

Sheila Bair got her p h ilosophy degree from the University of Kansas and went o n to become chair of the Federal Deposit I nsurance Corporation from 2006 to 20 11. She says that philosophy " helps you break things do\vn to their simplest elements. My p hilosophy trai ning really helps me with that intellectual rigor of simplifying things and find ing out what's importa nt.'"

Philosophy: A Natural Segue to Law and Medicine La\v schools \vi ii tell you that a major in ph ilosophy p rov ides excellent preparation for law school and a career in law. Ph ilosophy excels as a pre-law major because it teaches you the very proficiencies that la\v schools require: developing and evaluating a rguments, w riting carefully and clearly, applying principles and rules to specific cases, sorting out evidence, and understanding ethical and political no rms. Ph ilosophy majors do very \vell on the LSAT (Law School Admission Test), typi- cally scoring higher than the vast majority of other majors.

Ph ilosophy has also proven itself to be good preparation fo r med ical school. C ritical reason ing is as importa nt in med icine as it is in law, but the study a nd p ractice of medicine requires somethi ng else-expertise in g rappling \Vith the vast array of moral questions that now confront doctors, nurses, medical scientists, administrators, and government of- ficia ls. These are, at their core, p h ilosophy questions.

David Silbersweig, a H arva rd Medical School p rofessor, makes a good case fo r ph ilosophy (and a ll the liberal a rts) as a n essential part of a \vell-rounded medical education . As he says,

If you can get through a one-sentence paragraph of Kant, hold ing all of

irs ideas and clauses in j uxtaposition in your m ind, you can thin k through

,nost anything .... I d iscovered t hat a philosophic.a l seance and approach could identify and inform core issues associated ,vich everythi ng from sci-

entific advances to hea ling and biomed ica l e thics.5

Appendix A: The Truth about Philosophy Majors 433

Philosophy major and NBC journalist Katy Tur says, "I would argue that for the vast majority of people, an education of teach ing you to th ink critically about the world you are in and what you know and what you don't know is useful for absolutely ev- erything that you could possibly do in the future.'>6

It's little wonder, then, that the top ranks of leaders and innovators in business

and technology have thei r share of philosophy majors, a fair number of whom cred it their success to their philosophy background. The list is long, and it includes7:

Patrick Byrne, entrepreneur, e-commerce pioneer, founder and CEO of Overstock.com

Damon Horowitz, entrepreneur, in-house ph ilosopher at Google Ca rl Icahn, businessman, investor, philanth ropist Larry Sanger, Internet p roject developer, cofounder of Wikipedia George Soros, investor, business magnate, philanth ropist Peter Th iel, entrepreneur, venture capitalist, cofounder of Pay Pal Jeff Weiner, CEO of Linked l n

Of cou rse, there are a lso many \vith a philosophy background who a re famous fo r their achievements outside the business world. This list is even longer and includes:

Wes Anderson, filmmaker, screenw riter (The Royal Tenenbaums, The Grand Budapest Hotel)

Stephen Breyer, Supreme Court justice Mary H iggins Clark, novel ist (All By Myself, Awne) Ethan Coen, fi lmmaker, d irecto r Stephen Colbert, comedian, TV host Angela Davis, social activist Lana Del Rey, singer, songwriter Dessa, rapper, singer, poet Ken Follett, author (Eye of the Needle, Pillars of the Earth) Harrison Ford, actor Ricky Gervais, comedian, creato r of The Office Philip Glass, composer Rebecca Ne\vberger Goldstein, author (Plato at the Googleplex) Matt Groening, creator of The Simpsons and Futurama Chris Hayes, MSNBC host Kazuo Ishiguro, Nobel Prize-winn ing author (The Remains of the Day) Phil Jackson, NBA coach Thomas Jefferson, U.S. president Charles R. Johnson, novelist (Middle Passage) Rash ida Jones, actor Martin Luther King, Jr., civil r ights leader John Le\vis, civil rights activist, congressman Terrence Malick, fi lmmaker, director (The Thin Red Line) Yann Martel, author (Lift of Pi)

Photo 6: Larry Sanger, Internet p roject developer, cofounder of W ikipedia Photo 7: Stephen Breyer, Supreme Court justice Photo 8: Stephen Colbert, comedian, TV host Photo 9: Angela Davis, social activist Photo 10: Lana Del Rey, singer and songwrit er Photo 11: Ch ri s Hayes, MSNBC host Photo 12: Rashida Jones, actor

434 Appendix A: The Truth about Phi losophy Ma jors

Photo 13: Marti n Luther King Jr., civil r ig hts leader Photo 14: John Lewis, civil rights act ivist, cong ressman Photo 15: Terrence Malick, f ilmmaker, di rector Photo 16: Yann Mart el, aut hor (Life of P11 Photo 17: Deepa Mehta, d irect or, screenwriter (Fire) Photo 18: Susan Sont ag, aut hor, MacArth ur Fellow

Deepa Mehta, directo r, screenwriter (Fire, Water) I ris Murdoch, aut hor (Under the Net) Robert Pa rris Moses, e.ducacor, civil righcs leader Scone Phi llips, broadcaster Susan Sara ndon, acto r Susan Sontag, autho r (Against Interpretation), MacA rt hur Fello\v David Souter, Supreme Court justice Alex T rebek, hose of jeopardy! George F. W ill, journalise, aut hor (Men at Work: The Craft of Baseball) Jua n Will iams, journalise

Philosophy Majors and the GRE Ph ilosophy majors score higher than all other majors o n the Verbal Rea- soni ng and Analytical Writi ng sections of che G RE (G raduate Record Examinations).

Verbal Quan titative Analytic R easoning Reasoning Writing

Phi lo so phy 160 154 4 .3

Ave rag e 149.97 152 .57 3.48

Educational Testing Service, 2017 GRE Scores, between July 1, 2013 and June 30. 2016.

SALARIES

According co recent surveys by PayScale, a major sou rce of college salary informa- tion, p hilosophy majors can expect co earn a media n starting sala ry of $44,800 a nd a med ian mid-career sala ry of $85, I 00. As you might expect, most of che higher sala- r ies go co STEM graduates (those with degrees in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics). Bue in a surprising number of cases, salaries for ph ilosophy majors are comparable co chose of STEM graduates. For example, wh ile che ph ilosophy gradu ate earns $85, 100 at mid-career, che mid-career salary fo r b iotechnology is $82,500; for civil engineering, $83,700; fo r chem istry, $88,000; for industrial tech- nology, $86,600; and fo r applied computer science, $88,800. Media n end-of-ca reer salaries for ph ilosophy majors (ten co nineteen years' exper ien ce) is $92,665-noc che highest pay among college gradu ates, but far h igher t ha n many ph ilosophy-is- useless critics \vou ld expecc.8

Another facto r co consider is t he increase in salaries over time. O n t h is score, philosophy majors rank in the cop ten of all majors with che h ighest salary increase from scare co mid-career, at JOI percent. The major with che highest increase: gov- ern ment, at 118 percen t. Molecu lar biology is che fift h hig hest, at 105 percenc.9

Appendix A: The Truth about Philosophy Majors 435

Salary Potential for Bachelor's Degrees Median Median

Major Early Pay Mid-Career Pay

{0-5 yrs. (10+ yrs. work experience) work experience)

Mechan ical Engineering $58,000 $90,000

Applied Computer Science $53,100 $88,800

Information Technology $52,300 $86,300

Civil Engineering $51,300 $83,700

Business and Finance $48,800 $91, 100

Biotechnology $46,100 $82,500

Business Marketing $45,700 $78,700

Philosophy $44,800 $85, 100 History $42,200 $75,700

Advertising $41,800 $84,200

General Science $41,600 $75,200

Telecommunications $41,500 $83,700

Eng lish Literature $41,400 $76,300

Marine Biology $37,200 $76,000

PayScale. "H ighest Paying Bachelor Degree, by Salary Potential," 2017-2018 CollrgrSala7 Report, h ct ps://w ww. pay sc.a le .com/ col lege-sa la ry-report/majors-that-pay-you-ba:c k/bache lo rs.

And among liberal arrs majors, philosophy salaries are near the cop of the list. All liberal arcs majors except economics earn lower starting and mid-career pay than philosophy does .

Salar y Pot ential for Liberal Art s Bachelor Degr ees

Major

Economics

Philosophy Political Science

Modern Languages

Median Early Pay

{0-5 yrs. work experience)

$54, 100

$44,800

$44,600

$43,900

Median Mid-Career Pay

(10+ yrs. work experience)

$103,200

$85,100

$82,000

$77,400

436 Appendix A: The Truth about Ph il osophy Majors

Salar y Poten tial for Liberal Arts Bachelor Degrees (continued)

(0-5 yrs. (IO+ yrs. work experience) work experience)

Geography $43,600 $72,700

History $42,200 $75,700

Eng li sh literature $41,400 $76,300

Anthropology $40,500 $63,200

Creative Writ ing $40,200 $68,500

Theatre $39,700 $63,500

Psychology $38,700 $65,300

Fine Art $38,200 $62,200

PayScale, "Highest Paying Bachelor Degree, by Salary Potential." 2017-2018 Coll,g, Sala,, &port, ht t ps:// www. pa ysc.a le .com/ college-sa I a ry-repo r t1 majors-that-pay-you-back/bachelors.

MEANING

In all this talk about careers, salaries, and superior test scores, we should not forget that for many students, the most impor tant reason for majoring in philosophy is the mean ing it can add to thei r lives. They know that philosophy, after two-and-one-half mi llennia, is still alive and relevant and influential. It is not only for studying but also for living-for gu iding our lives toward what's true and real and valuable. They ,vould ins ist that philosophy, even with irs ancient lineage and seemingly remote concerns, applies to your life and your times and you r world. The ,vorld is fu ll of students and teachers ,vho can attest to these claims. Perhaps you wi ll eventually decide to join them.

RESOURCES

American Philosophic.al Association, "Who Studies Philosophy?" http://www.apaonline.org/?whostudies philosophy.

BestColleges.com. "'Best Careers for Philosophy Majors," 2017, http://www.besccolleges.com/careers/ ph ilosophy-majo,s/.

George Anders, "That 'Useless' liberal Arts Degree Has Become Tech's Hotcest T icket," ForbN, July 29, 2015, h ttps:// w ww. fo rbes. co mis i tes/ georgea nders/2 0 I 5/07 /2 91 Ii be ral-arts-degree-tee h/ #5 fb6d7 4 07 4 5d.

Laura Tucker. '" \'7hac Can I Do with a Philosophy Degree?" TopUni\fersities.com. March 2, 2015. h ttps:// w ww. copu n i ve rsi c ies. com /st uden t-i n fo/ ca reers-ad vice! wha L- ca n-you-do-ph i losoph y-degree.

University of Cali forn ia, Sal\ Diego. Department of Philosophy. "What Can I Do with a Philosophy Degree?" h tcps:// philosophy. ucsd .edu/ undergrad ua ce/caree rs. hem I.

University of Maryland, Department of Philosophy. '"Careers for Philosophy Majors," http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/undergraduate/careers.

Universicy ofNonh Carolina ac Chapel Hill, Department of Philosophy, · why Major in Philosophy?" http:// ph i Josoph y .u nc .ed u1 u nde rg rad ua tel the-major/ wh y-major-i n-ph i Josoph y/.

APPENDIX B: ANSWERS TO EXERCISES

................................. --........... ._ ............................... ._ ......... . .............. . ....................... __. .......................... __. ......... __.__. ........ __.__. ......... __. ................ __. .......... __._ ........ __._ ........ ·-----· ... __._. .... __. . .._ ...... ......... .

EXERC ISE 1.1

1. Argument. Conclusion: Faster-tha n-light t ravel is not possible. Prem ise: Faster-than-light travel ,vould violate a law of nature.

2. Argument.

Conclusion: Therefore, you are not fit to ser ve in you r current capacit y. Prem ise: You have neglected your du ty on several occasions. Prem ise: You have been absent from work too many times.

3. No argu ment.

4 . Argument. Conclusion: The Au epidem ic o n t he East Coast is real. Prem ise: Government health officials say so. Prem ise: And I personally have read at least a dozen ne,vs stories t hat ch arac-

terize the situatio n as a "Au epidemic."

5. No argu ment.

6. Argument. Conclusion: Current-day Christia ns use violence to spread t heir right-to-life

message. Prem ise: These Christians, often referred to as the religious r ight, a re well

know n fo r violent demonstrations against Plan ned Parenthood and other abortion cli nics.

Prem ise: Doctors and other person nel are threat ened w it h death. Prem ise: Clinics have been bombed .

Prem ise: There have even been cases of doctors being m urdered.

7. No argu ment.

8. No argu ment.

9. Argument. Conclusion: Witches are real. Prem ise: They are ment ioned in the Bible. Prem ise: There are many people today w ho claim t o be witches. Prem ise: Histo rical records reveal that t here were w itches in Salem.

10. No argument.

437

438 Appendix B: Answers to Exercises

EXE RC I SE 1.2

1. C,onclusion: The idea that God is required to be the en fo rcer of the mora l law

is not p lausible. Premises: (4) In the fi rst p lace, as an empirical hypothesis about t he psychol-

ogy of human beings, it is questionable. (5) There is no unambig uous evidence that t heists a re more moral than nontheists. (6) Not o nly have psychological studies fa iled to find a significant correlat ion between fre- quency of religious worship and m o ral conduct, but convicted criminals are much more likely to be theists than atheists. (7) Second, the threat of divine punishment ca nnot impose a mora l obligation. (8) Might does not

make right .

2. Conclusion : (I) When [G illespie) refers to [President Bush) as "the mi ll ion-

aire president who wa ited out the Vietnam War in the Texas Air National G uard," it rem inds me of the garbage rhetoric that I might see if I ,vere reading Ted Rall, or Susan Sontag, or one of the other hate-monger ing, America-bashing, leftist whiners. [Paraphrase: Gillespie's rhet oric is inappropriate.]

Premises: (2) That k ind of ad hom inem attack [is) dis resp ectful t o a m an ,vho

is doing a d amned good job as commander-in-ch ief. (3) [The rhetoric) detracts fro m the whole point of the article.

3. C,onclusion: (I) Therefore some intelligent being exists by ,vhom all natu ra l

things are di rect ed to thei r end; and t h is being we call God. Premises: (2) We see that things wh ich lack knowledge, such as natu ral bod ies,

act fo r an end, and this is evident from thei r acting ahvays, o r nearly always, in the sam e way, so as to obt ain the best result. (3) H ence it is plain that they ach ieve thei r end, not fo rtu itously, but designedly. (4) Now ,vhat- ever lacks kno,vledge cannot move to,vards an end , unless it be directed

by some being e ndowed ,vith knowledge and intell igence; as the a rrow is directed by the archer.

4 . Conclusion : (I) [The) position is certainly untenable. Premises: (2) The first thing t hat must occu r to anyone studying moral sub-

jectivism [the view that the r ig htness or wrongness of an action depends on the beliefs of an individual or group) seriously is that the view allows the poss ibil ity that an action can be both right and not r ig ht, o r ,vrong and not wrong, etc. (3) This poss ibil ity ex ists because, as we have seen,

the subjectivist cla ims that the mora l character of an action is d etermined by individual subjective states; and these st ates can vary from person to person, even when directed to,vard the same action on the same occasion.

(4) H ence one and the same action can evidently be determined to have-s imultaneously-radically different mo ra l characters . ...

Appendix B: Answers to Exercises 439

5. Conclusion: (1) I submit that the dism issal was proper and ethical cons ideri ng the community stature and function of priesrs and the benefits that accrue to society in the aftermath of the decision.

Prem ises: Let's consider community stature fi rst. The community st ature of p riests must always be taken into account in these abuse cases. (2) A priest

is not just anybody; he performs a special role in society-namely, to p rov ide spiritual guidance and to remind people that there is both a mora l order and a divine order in the world. The priest's role is special because it helps to underpin and secure society itself. (3) Anyth ing that could under- mine this role must be neutralized as soon as possible. (4) Among those things t hat can weaken the p riestly role a re publicity, public debate, and legal actions. Abuse cases are better handled in p rivate by those w ho are keen ly a,vare of the importance of a positive public image of p riests. And what of the benefits of curta iling the legal proceedings? (5) The benefirs to society of dismissing the legal case ounveigh all the alleged disadvantages of continuing with public hea ri ngs. (6) The primary benefit is the contin- ued nurturing of the commun ity's fa ith, ,vithout ,vhich the commun ity

would cease to function effectively.

EXERC ISE 1.3

1. Genetic fallacy

2. Stra,v man

3. Division

4. Appeal to the person

5. Genetic fallacy

6. Equ ivocation

7. Appeal to ignorance

8. Appeal to the person

9. Appeal to ignorance

10. Equivocation

APPENDIX C: HOW TO WRITE A PH I LOSO PHY PAPER

In conversations, letters to the ed itor, or on line d iscuss ions, have you ever taken a position on an issue and offered reasons why you r view is correct? If so, then you have defended a thesis. You have p resented an argument, giving reasons for accept- ing a particular thesis, or conclusion. If you elaborate on you r argument in a \vritten paper, you create something even more valuable-a thesis defense (or argumentative) essay. In a thes is defense essay, you t ry to sho\v the reader that your view is worthy of acceptance by offering reasons that support it. You r thes is may assert your pos ition on a philosophical, social, o r political issue; on the arguments or claims of other writers (including some famous o r not-so-famous philosophers); or on the interpret- ation of a single work o r several \vorks. In every case, you affirm a thesis and g ive reasons for you r affirmation.

This type of essay is not merely an analysis of claims, a summary of poinrs made by someone else, o r a reiteration of \vhat other people believe or say-though a good thesis defense essay may contain some of these elements. A thesis defense essay is supposed to be a demonstration of what you believe and why you believe it. What other people think is, u ltimately, beside the point.

BAS IC ESSAY STRUCTURE

Thesis defense essays usually contain the fo llowing elements, though not necessarily in th is o rder:

I. Introduction (or open ing)

A. Thesis statement (the claim to be supported)

B. Plan for the paper

C. Background for the thesis

II. A rgument supporting the thesis

III. Assessment of objections

IV. Conclusion

Introduction

The introduction often consists of the paper's fi rst pa ragraph, sometimes just a sen- tence or nvo. Occasionally it is longer, perhaps several pa ragraphs. The length de- pends on how much g round you must cover to introduce the a rgument. Whatever

441

442 Appendix C: How to Write a Phi losophy Paper

the length, the introduction shou ld be no lo nger tha n necessary. In most cases the best introductions are short.

If there is a ru le of thumb for what the introduction must conta in, it is this: The introduction should set forth the thesis statement. The thesis statement usually appears in the first pa ragraph. It is the claim that you hope to support o r prove in your essay, the conclusion of the argumen t that you intend to present. You may want to pose the thes is statemen t as the answer to a question that you raise, o r as the solution to a p roblem that you wish to discuss. H o,vever p resented, your thesis statement is the assertion you must s upport with reasons. It is like a compass to your readers, g uiding them from paragraph to paragraph, premise to p rem ise, sho,ving them a clear pat h from introduction to conclusion. It also helps you stay on cou rse. It reminds you to relate ever y sentence an d paragraph to your one controlling idea.

You r thesis statement shou ld be restricted to a claim that you can defend in the space allowed. You wa nt to state it in a single sentence and do so as ea rly as possible. You may need to add a few ,vords to explai n or elaborate o n the statement if you think irs mea ning or implications unclear.

The other two parts of a n introduction-the p la n for the paper (B) a nd back- ground information for the thesis (C)-may or may not be necessary, depending on you r thesis and your intent. I n more forma l essays, you ,viii nee.cl not only to state your thes is, but a lso to spell out ho,v you intend to a rg ue for it. You wi ll have to summarize your whole argument-each of your premises a nd conclusion-or, if your argu ment is lo ng or complex, at least the most importa nt points. Provid ing background information for you r thesis is a matter of explai ning ,vhat your thes is means (wh ich includes defini ng terms a nd clarifying conceprs), what its implications are, why the issue is so important or p ressing, or ,vhy you have decided to address it. Sometimes the nee.ded background information is so extens ive that you must supply much of it after the introduction. At any rate, by addi ng the right k ind of background information, you g ive your readers good reason to care about what you are saying and to continue reading.

In ma ny ph ilosophy papers, the background information includes a summa ry or sketch of the views of other philosophers-what they have said that is releva nt to the issue or to your thesis. Providing this kind of material ca n help the reader u nder- stand ,vhy your topic is ,vorth exploring and why your a rgument is relevant.

Argument Supporting the Thesis

Benveen your paper's introduction and conclusion is the body of the essay. The basic componenrs of the body a re (1) the premises of your argu ment plus the material that supporrs or expla ins them and (2) an evaluation of objections to your thesis. Each premise must be clea rly stated, carefully explained and illustrated, and prop- erly backed up by examples, statistics, expert opinion, argu ment, or other reasons or evidence. You may be able to adequately develop the essay by devoting a s ingle pa ragraph to each premise, or you may have to use several paragraphs per premise.

Whatever tack you take, you must stick to the central ru le of paragraph de- velopment: Develop just one main point in each pa ragraph, embodying that point

Appendix C: How to Write a Philosophy Paper 443

in a topic sentence. Make sure chat each paragraph in turn relates co you r thesis statement.

If your essay is a critique of someone else's arguments, you shou ld examine chem in che body, explaining ho\v they work and laying out the author's response co any major criticisms of chem. Your account of the a rgumencs should be accurate and complete, putting forth che author's best case and providing enough detail for you r readers co understand che import of your own argument. After the presentation of che author's side of th ings, you can then bring in your critique, asserting and ex- p laining each premise.

Some premises, of cou rse, may be so obvious that they do not require support. The determining factor is \vhecher your readers \vould be likely co question chem. If your readers are likely co accept a premise as it is, no backup is requ ired. If they are not, you need co support che premise. A common mistake is co assume chat a p rem ise would be accepted by ever yone when in face it is controvers ial.

Recall chat in a good argument che conclusion logically follows from che prem- ises, and che premises a re true. You r cask in che body of your essay is co put forth such an argument and co do so plainly-co demonstrate clearly co your readers chat your p remises a re properly related co your conclusion and that they are true. You should leave no doubt about \vhac you are crying co prove and how you a re crying co prove it. In longer papers, you may \vane co back up your thesis \vich more than one a rgument. This is an acceptable way co proceed, provide.cl you make che relationships between the separate a rgumencs and your thesis clear.

Assessment of Objections

Very often an argumentative essay includes an assessment of objections-a sincere effort co cake into account any objections or doubts chat readers are likely co have about poincs in your essay. (In some cases, however, there may be no significant ob- jections co assess.) You muse show you r readers chat the objections a re unfounded, chat your argument is not fatally wounded by likely criticisms. Contrary co what some may chink, when you deal effectively \vich objections in your essay, you do not weaken it-you strengthen it. You lend credibility co it by making an attempt co be fair and thorough. You make your position stronger by remov ing doubts from you r readers' minds. If you don't confront likely objections, your readers may conclude chat either you are ignorant of che objections o r you don't have a good reply co chem. An extra benefit is chat in dealing with objections, you may see \vays co make you r a rgument stronger.

On the ocher hand, you may discover chat you do not have an adequate ans\ver co the objections. Then what? Then you look for \vays co change your arguments or thesis co overcome che criticisms. You can weaken your thesis by making it less S\veeping or less probable. Or you may need co abandon your thesis alcogether in favor of one that is stronger. Discovering chat your beloved thesis is full of holes is not necessarily a setback. You have increased your understand ing by find ing out \vhich boats will float and \vhich will not.

444 Appendix C: How to Write a Ph ilosophy Paper

Conclusion

U nless you r essay is very short, it should have a conclusion. The conclusio n usually appea rs in the last paragraph. Ma ny conclusio ns simply reiterate the thesis state- ment and then go on to emphasize ho,v important it is. Others iss ue a call to action, present a compell ing perspective o n the issue, or d iscuss further implications of the thesis statement. Some conclusions contain a summary of the essay's argument. A summary is ahvays a good idea if the argument is complex, long, or formal.

WRITING THE ESSAY: STEP BY STEP

No,v we examine the steps involved in crafting a good thesis defense essay. You have the best chance of ,vriting a good essay if you try to follow these steps. J ust remember that the p rocess is not linear. You may not be able to fo llow the steps in the sequence suggested. You may have to backtrack or rearrange the order of the steps. This k ind of improvis ing on the Hy is no rmal-and often necessary. At any stage in the pro- cess, you may discover that your argu ment is not as good as you thought, or that you did not take a n important fact into account, or that there is a way that you can alter the essay to make it stronger. You may then ,vant to go back and rework your outl ine or ti nker with the draft you are working on-and your essay wi ll be better for it. Rethinking and revis ing a re no rmal p rocedu res for even the best writers.

H ere are the steps:

I. Select a topic and narrow it to a specific issue.

2. Research the issue.

3. Write a thesis statemen t.

4. Create an outline.

5. Write a first draft.

6. Study and revise you r first draft.

7. Produce a final d raft.

Step 1 . Select a topic and narrow it to a specific issue.

This step is fi rst for a reason . It is here to help inexperience.cl w riters avoid a tempt- ing but nasty trap: picking a thesis out of the a ir and ,vriting their paper on it. Caution: Any thesis that you dream up ivithout knowing anything about it is likely to be unusable-a nd a waste of time. It is better to begin by selecti ng a topic or issue a nd narrowing it through research a nd ha rd thinking to a manageable thesis.

A topic is s imply a broad category of s ubject matter, such as human cloning, the mind, capital punishment, and God. Within topics there lurk a n infinite number of issues-that is, questions that a re in dispute. From the topic of capital punish ment,

Appendix C: How to Write a Philosophy Paper 445

for example, countless issues arise: whether executing criminals deters crime, whether executing a human being is ever mora lly permissible, whether it is ethical to execute people who are insane o r mentally impaired, \vhether the system of capital pun ish- ment in the United States is unfair, \vhether the death penalty should be mandatory for serial killers, \vhether executing juven iles is immoral ... the list could go on and on. The basic idea is to select from the roster of possibilities an issue that (1) you a re interested in and (2) you can adequately address in the space allowed.

Step 2. Research the issue.

The main reason fo r researching an issue is to find out \vhat viewpoints and argu- menrs are involved. Often you r instructor will suggest good sources to resea rch fo r a pa rticular \vriting assignment. Your assigned reading may be the on ly source you need to check. Otherwise, you can read a rticles and books, talk to people who have studied the issue or at least thought about it carefu lly, or go online to revie\v topical or philosoph ical sites.

Step 3. Write a thesis statement.

The conclus ion of your selected argument will serve as the basis for your thesis state- ment. Often the conclusion is your thesis statement. W riting a good thesis statement is an essential step, because the entire essay is built on it. An imprecise o r clumsy thesis statement can lead to an imprecise or clumsy argument, which can wreck any a rgumentative essay.

At this stage, you should try to get the wording of your statement just right, even though you may revise it later on. !rs scope should be restricted to \vhat you can handle in the space you have. It should also be focused on just one idea, not several. A good thes is statement must be clear. No one should have to guess about the mean- ing of your thesis. The thesis "Same-sex marriages are intolerable," for example, is intolerably vague, since there are many ways that someth ing can be intolerable. It gives us very little information about \vhat \vill be discussed in the essay.

It is possible to devise a thesis statement that is restricted, focused, clear-and trivial. A t rivial thesis statement is one that either concerns an insignificant issue o r makes an insign ificant cla im. People generally don't care about insign ificant issues, and few would bother to disagree \Vith an insignificant claim. Who cares whether pens a re better than pencils, or whether gambling is more fun than beachcombing? And who would care to contest the claim that pleasure is better than pain? An essay built on a trivial thesis statement wastes your readers' time (if they bother to read it at all), and you learn noth ing and change noth ing by writing it. Thesis statemenrs should be worthy.

Here are some thesis statements that meet the preceding criteria: • Jeremy Bentham's moral theory known as act-utilitarianism conflicts with

our commonsense ideas about human rights. • The U.S. government should be al lowed to arrest and indefinitely imprison

without trial any American citizen who is suspected of terrorism .

446 Appendix C: How to Write a Phi losophy Paper

• Subjective relativism-the view that truth depends on what someone believes-is self-refuting.

• Racial p rofiling should not be used to do security screening of airl ine pas- sengers.

Step 4. Create an outline of the whole essay.

If you can write out your thesis statement and outline the argument used to defend it, you have already come far. Your argument and thesis statement w ill const itute the skeleton of your essay. The next step is to Resh out the bones \vith introductory or explanatory material, responses to objections, and support for the premises (\vhich may consist of subordinate a rgumencs, examples, explanations, analogies, statistics, scientific research, expert opinion, or other evidence). Producing a detailed, coherent outline of the \vhole essay is the best way to manage this task, and if you a lready have an outline of your argument, creating an outline fo r the whole essay will be easy. An outline helps you fill out your a rgument in an orderly fashion, showing you how the pieces fit together, and whether any parts are m issing or m isaligned. Th is fi lling-out process wi ll probably require you to research your thesis further-to check the truth of premises, exam ine a lternative arguments, look for additional evidence, or assess the strength of objections to your a rgument.

Do not be afraid to alter your outline at any stage. As you write, you may realize that your thesis is weak, your argument Hawed, or your p rem ises vague. If so, you should go back and adjust the outline before writing any further. Writing is an act of exploration, and good writers a re not afraid to revise when they find someth ing amiss.

When you outline your essay, include your full thesis statement in the introduc- tion. Then, as you work on the outline, you ca n refer to the statement for gu idance. The major points of your outl ine wi ll include the premises, conclusion, objections, and responses to objections.

You \vill find that as you nveak the outline, you may need to adjust the thesis statement. And as you perfect the thesis statement, you may need to adjust the out- line. In the end, you \Vant to satisfy yourself that the outl ine is complete, accu rate, and struc turally sound, tracing a clear and logical p rogression of points.

Step 5. W rite a fi rst draft.

Good \vriters revise ... and revise and revise. They either write multiple d rafcs, revis- ing in successive passes, or revise continuously as they write. They know that their first tries \vi ll always be in need of improvement. Inexperienced \vriters, on the other hand, too often dash off a first draft without a second look-then turn it in! A much more reasonable approach (a nd the best one for most studencs) is to at least write a first draft and a fina l d raft or-better-several drafts and a final one.

In argumentative essays, because of the importance of articulating an a rgument carefu lly, and the difficulty of writing later drafts of the essay unless the first one is in reasonable shape, the first draft should be fairly solid. That is, in your first draft,

Appendix C: How to Write a Philosophy Paper 447

you shou ld write a tentative version of each paragraph a nd the wording of you r thesis statement, and all p remises should be at least close to final fo rm.

Give you r d raft a good introduction that lays out your thesis statement, p rovid es backg round info rmatio n on the issue, and d raws your readers into the essay. Make it interesting, informative, and pertinen t to the question at hand. Do not assume that you r readers will automatically see that you r paper is \VOrth reading.

Ever y paragraph in you r paper shou ld relate to the thes is; ever y sentence in each paragraph should relate to a topic senten ce. Delete any sentence that does not serve the essay's purpose. Ensure that paragraphs appear in a logical sequence and are clearly linked by transitional \vords and ph rases or references to material in preced- ing paragraphs. Your readers should never h ave to wonder what the connection is between pa rts of you r paper.

Step 6. Study and revise your first draft.

Your first draft is li kely to have problems, both big and small. At this stage, though, you should scrutin ize mostly the big ones. Th is is no time for p roofreading (correct- ing spelling, fi xing pu nctuation, repairing typos, and the like). This is the time to make substantive cha nges.

Step 7. Produce a final draft.

After completing all substantive changes, you should generate a final d raft, the one you \viii turn in . The fin al d raft shou ld reflect not on ly the b ig changes, but the cor- rections of all minor errors as well-misspellings, typos, grammatical errors, mis- placed words, fau lty punctuatio n, and documen tation mis takes. This task should be primarily a p roofreading job. At this stage, you sho uld also fo rmat the manuscript according to you r instructor's requirements.

The key to p roducing a clean fi nal draft is down time-an interim in which you leave the last draft alo ne a nd focus o n something else. C,oming back to your paper after a day or so away from it can help you see errors that passed right by you before. You may be surprised how ma ny m istakes this fresh look can reveal. If you cannot set the essay aside, ask a frie nd to read it and give you some constructive criticism .

448 Appendix C: How to Write a Phi losophy Paper

Further explains the divine command theory.

A SAMP LE PH IWSOPHY PAPE R

The Dile m ma of the Divine Comma nd Theory

by Jane D oc

Phi losop hy I O I

What is the connection between God a nd morality? In the p ast , many people would

take this q uestion to b e a bo ut w hethe r someone can be have morally even if they a rc

atheists. Bu t nowadays m ost people in the \Vest would p robab ly answer yes to this

question. If the re arc moral standards o f be havio r, then it seems that anyone can

live by them. A more important question (for bo th the religious and nonreligious)

is no t whether someone can be mo ral without belief in God, but whether m orality

itseJ/ is p ossible without God. The answer that many give to this question is the divine

command theory, the view that m orality absolu tely requires God.

Ir says that an actio n is right if God commands o r wills it. In other words, certain

actio ns arc right o r wro ng o nly because God says they a rc, fo r he is the autho r o f the

moral law. God's commanding an actio n is wh at makes it right; God 's forbiddi ng it is

wha t makes it fo rbidde n.

Those w ho accep t the d ivine command t heory could consistently t h ink that t hey

sho uld perform actio ns that pro mo te the common gooct as an act-utilitarian would.

O r they could believe that they s ho uld always ac t to serve their own interests} as an

eth ical egoist d ocs. O r they cou ld assume t hat their d u ty is ro ac t accord ing to a set

of dcontological p rinciples. Bu t no matter w hat approac h they ta ke, they would still

maintain that ultimately an actio n is right because God commands it.

Introduces topic.

Defines key term.

Provides background for the issue.

Appendix C: How to Write a Philosophy Paper 449

But is the d ivine command theory p lausible? D ocs God make rig ht? I inte nd to

a rgue tha t the theory is u ntenable-and fo r reasons that both theists and nonthcisL<

can app reciate. I w ill show that there is a c rucial difficul ty for the theory that would

come to fo re even if God's exis ten ce and our knowledge of h is wiJI arc assured. The

source of the problem is that the divi ne command theory forces a dilemma o n us

that can be satisfactorily resolved o nly by aband o n ing the theory.

Plato lays ou t the dilemma in his d ialogue Eurhyphro. In it Socrates asks, in

effect} Arc actio ns right because God comm ands them, o r docs God command the m

because they arc right> The fi rst optio n says that God c reates mo rality, and t he divine

comm and theory is true. The second option says that the divin e command theory is

false : morality exists independen tly of God's w ill, and even he must o bey it.

If one acccp L< the theory, u n palatable implicat io ns arise. If an action is morally

right o nly because God says so, the n any action a t all could be morally right. If God

so ,villcd , the torture of c hildren or the murder o f innocen ts would be morally right.

A, the divine command t heory would have it, there could be n o reasons for God's

willing o ne "'"'Y o r t he o ther. H e just commands, a nd that makes a n ac tion rig ht (or wrong). But if God has no reasons for h is command s, no standard s o ther than his

say~so, his commands arc arbitrary. If the theory is correct, then God d oesn't have

reasons-and d oesn't need reasons - to make the moral rules. Bu t in chat case, God's

d ccL'iions would amo unt to no mo re than a throw of the dice. If rape and mu rder arc

morally wro ng (or morally rig ht), they a rc arbitrarily so. This result is implausible,

a nd bo th theists a nd no nthcists agree. In fact, most C hristian p h ilosophers reject the

divine command theory.

To reject the theory is t o give up the idea that God is t he ma ke r of the mo ral law

a nd to ack nowled ge that morality is independent o f God's w ill. Actions a rc right

or w ro ng fo r reasons that d o no t depe nd o n God. We try to d o right because it's

right, not because a divine power has made an arbitrary decis io n. Theist~ w ho reject

the divine command theory believe that God commands humans t o obey moral

standards tha t exist regardless of w hat God commands. God is pe rfect . H e o beys the

moral law a nd expects his childre n to obey it also.

Thesis statement.

The main argument for the thesis.

450 Appendix C: How to Write a Phi losophy Paper

Writer explains and rebuts the chief argument against the thesis.

The chief argumcnr againsr the charge of a rbitrariness is this: God would n ever

command the m urder of one's neighbors, the to rture of children} o r any o ther evil

acL< because God is all-good. An d because God is all-good, h is comma nds would

not be arbitrary- they would be good. Bu t to say this is to argue in a circle and

undermine-not strengthen- the d ivine command theory. The theory is supposed

to tell us what moraliry is, o r what makes something good. Bu t if goodness is a

defining propcrry of God, then God cannot be used to define goodncs.s. Su ch a tack

would rc.sult in an empry defin ition of the divi ne command theory: Good actions

arc those commanded by an all-good God. When theists say that God is good , they

surely mean mo re than thL'i.

In conclusio n, the d ivin e comman d theory is unfounded. To avoid the

arbitrariness problem, and to preserve a c redi ble idea of goodm:s..'it the theory must

be rejected. The much mo re p lausible view is located o n the o ther side of Socrates'

dilemma: The moral law is independe n t of God and applies to both God a nd man.

Conclusion and brief re- iteration of the argument in its favor.

NOTES

............................................ · ----· -------- .. .._ ....................................... ._ .................... --... ·-------· ................. __. ......... __. .......... __. ..... __. ............ _. ...... __. ....................... ........... __._ ..... __.____. ..................... _. ........ .

CHAPTER 1

1. Plato, lhe Republic, in The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 2, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Hea rst's Inter· national Library, 1914), 18- 20.

CHAPTER 2

1. Thomas Aquinas, Stunma 17uoiogica, Questio n 2, ''Whe the r God Ex isrst in Basic \Y/rirings of St. Thomas Aquinas, tra ns. Anton C . Pegis (New York: Random House, 1944), 22.

2. Will iam Lane Cra ig, Reasonable Faith: Christia11 Tntth and Apologetics (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1994), 92.

3. Will iam Lane Cra ig, God? A Debate Benueen a Christian and a11 Atheist (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4.

4. Craig, God> A Debate Betwee11 a Christian and an Atheist, 7. 5. Will iam Paley, Natural 77,eology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity

Collected from the Appearances of Nature (1802). 6. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). 7. Hume, Dialogues. 8. Richard Swinburne, Is lhere a God> (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 1996), 2 . 9. Swinburne, ls 77,erea God>4 1- 42.

10. Anselm, Proslogium, ch. 11- 11 1 (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1962), 53- 55. 11. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan & Compa ny and St. Martin's

Press, 1929), 504- 505. 12. Will iam L. Rowe, Philosophy ofReligio11: A11 !11troductio11 (Bel mont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993),

80- 82. 13. Will iam L. Rowe, "The Empirical Argument fro m Evil," i n Rationality, Religious Belief,

and Moral Commitme11t, ed . Robert Aud i and Wi lliam). Wai nwright (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 227- 247.

14. J. L. Mackie, 17,e Miracle of17,eism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 156. 15. Swinburne, Is 77,ere a God> 98. 16. Mackie, Miracle of171eis111, 164. 17. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: HarpcrCollins, 1966, 1977), 253- 259. 18. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion, 85 - 86. 19. St. Teresa, 77,e Lift of Teresa of Jesus, trans. a nd ed. E. Allison Peers (Garden C ity, NY:

Image Books, 1960), 249. Q uoted in M ichael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 156.

20. Q uoted in \Villiam James, 77,e Varieties of Religious Experie11ce (New York: New American Library, 1958), 68- 69.

21. Mackie, Miracle of171eis111, 179- 181. 22. Richard Swinburne, 77,e Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 204), 304. 23. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion, 60- 61. 24. Swinburne, Existence of God, 316- 317. 25. W. K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan, 1886).

451

452 Notes

26. \"1illiam James, "The \"1ill to Believe," in 71,e \Vil! to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1896), 11.

27. James, "W ill to Believe," 26. 28. James, "W ill to Believe," 2- 30. 29. M ichael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical justification ( Ph iladelphia: Temple University Press,

1990), 246. 30. Blaise Pasca l, Pensees and Other W'ritings, trans. Honor Levi (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1995). 31. Pascal, Pensees and Other W'ritings. 32. Buddhist Surtas, trans. T. \"1. Rhys Davids ( New York: Dover, 1976), 148. 33. Ajahn Sumedho, cited in Satnacirro Bhikku, ed., Buddha-Nature (London: World Wide Fund

for Nature, 1989). 34. \"1alpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1974), 43. 35. Chuang Tzu, trans. Richard Welhelm and Dschuang Dsi (Jena, Germany: Diederichs, 1912),

158, 7.18b. 36. Tao-te chingby Lao Tzu, translated with an introduction by D. C . Lau ( Penguin C lassics, 1963).

CHAPTER 3

1. Russ Shafer-Landau, \'(lhatever Happened to Good and EuiJ> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 8 1- 82.

2. John Stuart M ill, "\"1hat Utilitarianism Is," in Utilitarianism (1861). 3. M ill, "What Utilitarianism Is." 4. M ill, "What Utilitarianism Is."

5. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. T. K. Abbott (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909, 1873), 3- 4, 9- 10.

6. Kant, Groundwork, 18. 7. Kant, Groundwork, 47. 8. Kant, Groundwork, 46- 47. 9. Aristorle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press, 1980), bk.

I, chs. 1, 2, 7; bk. 2, chs. 6 -7. 10. Rosal ind Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics," in 71,e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2003

edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta, hrrp://plato.Stanford.edu/archives/fu ll2003/entries/ethics-virtue/. 11. Russ Shafer-Landau, 71,e Fundamentals of Ethics ( New York: Oxford University Press,

2010), 257. 12. Alison Jaggar, "Feminist Ethics," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence Becker and C harlotte

Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), 364. 13. Jan Crosthwaite, "Gender and Bioethics," in A Companion to Bioethics, ed. Helga Kuhse and

Peter Singer (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 200 1), 32- 40. 14. Crosthwaite, "Gender and Bioeth ics," 37. 15. Carol G illigan, In a Different Voice: Psychological 7beory and \\7omen'.r Development

(Cambridge: Harva rd University Press, 1982). 16. Virginia Held, 71,e Ethics of Care (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10- 13. 17. Annette C. Baier, "The Need for More Than Justice," Canadian journal of Philosophy, suppl. 13

(1988): 56. 18. "The Myth of Sisyphus" from 71,e Myth of Sisyphus by Albert Camus, translated byJustin

O ' Brien, translation copyright © 1955, copyright renewed 1983 by Penguin Random House LLC. Used by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

19. Analects, trans. Arthur Waley, 2:13- 14, 14:30, 14:45. 20. Analects, trans. Arthur Waley, 2:5, 7. 21. John B. Noss, A History of the Worlds Religions (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 323.

CHAPTER 4

I. Rene: Descartes, Discourse 011 the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, in Philosophical \fforks of Descartes, ed. Elizaberh Haldane and G . R. T . Ross (Cambridge, England: Cambridge Universiry Press, 191 1), 101.

2 . Theodore Schick, Jr., and Lewis Vaughn, Doing Philosophy: A11 !11trodttctio11 Through Thought Experiments (New York: McG raw-H ill, 20 10), 88.

3. Rene: Descarres, Meditations 011 First Philosophy, Med itation V I, in Philosophical \fforks of Descartes, ed . Elizabeth Ha ldane and G. R. T. Ross (Ca mbridge, England: Cambridge Universiry Press, 191 1), 196.

4. John R. Searle, Mind· A Brief !11troductio11 ( New York: O xford University Press, 2004), 29- 30. 5. Searle, Mind, 21. 6. J. J.C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 144- 145. 7. David J. Cha lmers, 17,e Conscious Mind: !11 Search ofa Fundamental 7heory ( New York: O xford

Universiry Press, 1996), 94- 95. 8. David J. Cha lmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings ( New York:

Oxford University Press, 2002), 249. 9. Thomas Nagel, "W hat Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435- 500.

11. Ned Block, "T roubles with Functionalism," i n Readings i11 the Philosophy of Psychology, ed. Ned Block (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 276, 278.

12 . Searle, Mind, 45. 13. Searle, Mind, 46. 14 . Searle, Mind, 48- 49. 15. Searle, Mind, 62- 63. 16. John Searle, " Is t he Brain's M ind a Computer Progra m?" Scientific American 262 (January 1990). 17. From Forbes.com, June 29, 2009 © 2009 Forbes LLC . All rights reserved. Used by permission

and protected by the Copyright Laws of t he United Srates. The printing, copying. redistribution, or re transmissio n of rhis Content witho ut express w ritten pe rmissio n is prohibited.

18 . Chalmers, Conscious Mind, 125.

CHAPTERS

I. Baron d ' Holbach, "Of t he System of Man's Free Agency," in 7he System of Nature, trans. H . D. Robinson (1770), chap. 11.

2 . Wi lliam James, "The D ilemma of Determinism," in The Will to Believe and Other Essays i11 Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), 145- 183.

3. John Locke, A11 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed . Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: C larendon Press, 1975), bk. II, sec. 33.

4. W. T. Stace, Religion and the Modern Mind (New York: Ha rperCollins, 1952), 254- 255. Copyright 1952 by W.T. Stace, renewed © 1980 by Blanche Stace. Reprinted by Permi ssion of HarperCollins P ublishers

5. Wi ll iam L. Rowe, ..:Two Concepts of Frccdomt in Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays 011 Indeterminism and Free \'(!jl/, ed. Timorhy O 'Connor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 154- 155.

Notes 453

454 Notes

6. Peter van lnwagen, AJ1 &say on Free \'(!j/1 (Oxford: C larendon Press, 1983), 16. 7. Richard Taylor, Metaphysic, (Englewood C liffs, NJ: Prentice HaJI, 1992), 51 - 53. 8 . Jca n~Paul Sartre, ('Existe ntialism Is a H um an ism," in E.xisre11tiaiism, trans. Bernard Frcchtman

(New York: Ph ilosophica l Library, 1947) 524- 533.

CHAPTER 6

I. Plato, Meno, in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Hearst's International Library, 19 14), 24- 36.

2 . RcnC Descartes, ''Med itation Onct in Meditations on First Philosophy, volume 1, 7he Philosoph ~ ical \Vorks of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Halda ne a nd G . R. T. Ross (Cambridge, Engla nd: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 144- 145.

3. Rene Descartes, "Med itation O ne," in MeditarioJ1s on First Philosophy, 146. 4. Descartes, "Meditation One," in Meditatiom OJI First Philosophy, 145- 146. 5. Descartes, "Meditation One," in Meditatiom OJI First Philosophy, 147. 6. Descartes, "Meditation Two," in Meditatiom 011 First Philosophy, 149- 150. 7. Descartes, "Meditation Two," in Meditatiom 011 First Philosophy, 158. 8. Descartes, "Meditation Five," in MeditatioJ1s 011 First Philosophy, 184- 185. 9. Descartes, "Meditation Two," in Meditation, 011 First Philosophy, 154- 155.

10. John Locke, An Essay Concerning HumaJI Understanding, ed. Peter H . Nidd itch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), bk. I, ch. 2, and bk. IV, ch. 11, parts 1- 9.

11. Locke, Essay ConcerJ1i11g Human Understanding. 12. Locke, Essay ConcerJ1i11g Human Understanding 13. George Berkeley, Of the Principles of H11man KJ1owledge in Principles of Huma11 Knowledge and

Three Dialogues, Part I, sec. 1- 4, 6, 8 (Oxford: O xford University Press, 1999). 14. Berkeley, Part I, sec. 9- 10, 14- 15. 15. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1912 , 1959), 24. 16 . David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understandi11g, sec. 2 and 4, parts 1- 11, ed. Peter

M illica n (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2008). 17. Hume, Enquiry Concerning HumaJI Understanding. 18. Hume, Enquiry Concerning HumaJI U11dersta11ding. 19. Hume, Enquiry Concerning HumaJI U11dersta11ding. 20. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Paul Carus (New York: Open

Court Publishing, 1912). 2 1. Imma nuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: H uma nities

Press, 1929), 44. 22 . Kant, Critique of Pure Reaso11, 4 1- 42, 46- 47. 23. Kant, Critique of Pure Reaso11, 22. 24. Kant, Critique of Pure Reaso11, 92- 93. 25. Alison Ainley, "Femin ist Philosophy," in The Oxford Compa11io11 to Philosophy, ed. Ted

Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 273. 26. Louise M. Antony, "Embodiment and Epistemology," in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 465. 27. Elizabeth Anderson, "Feminist Epistemology and Ph ilosophy of Science," in The St01,fard

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2011 edition, ed. Edward N. Zalra, http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/spr201 1/entries/fcminism-epistemology.

28. Eve Browning Cole, Philosophy a11d Feminist Criticism (New York: Paragon House, 1993), 83- 84. 29. Cole, Philosophy a11d Feminist Criticism, 84 - 85. 30. Cole, Philosophy a11d Feminist Criticism, 88- 90. 31. Cole, Philosophy a11d Feminist Criticism, 94- 95. 32. Cole, Philosophy a11d Feminist Criticism, 95- 96.

CHAPTER 7

I . Leo To lstoy, \'((hat Is Art? ( Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960). 2 . Cl ive Bell, A rt (Lo ndon: C hatto a nd W ind us, 1914). 3. Ma rtin Ga rd ner, lhe \'(fhys of a Philosophical Scrivener (New Yo rk: St. Martin's G riffin, 1983),

77-78. 4. Curt J. Ducasse, 7be Philosophy of Art (New York: Dover Pu blicatio ns, 1929). 5. Aristotle, Poerio, t rans. M . E. Hubbard, in Classical Literary Cri ticism, ed. D. A. Russell and

M . \"1interborrom (Oxford: C larendon, 1972, 2008) 60- 66. 6 . David Hume, "Of the Stand ard o f Taste," fro m Fot1r Dissertations ( Lo ndo n: A. M iller, 1777),

david hume.o rg.

CHAPTER 8

I. Plato , lhe Republic, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Hearst's Inte rnat io nal Library, 19 14), I 53-155. 2 . Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651. 3. H obbes, Leviathan. 4. H obbes, Leviathan. 5. Declara rion o f Ind e pe ndence, July 4, 1776. 6 . Joh n Locke, Second Treatise of Government, cha ps. 8, 9, 19 (1690) . 7. Joh n Rawls, A 7heory of justice, rev. ed . (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press,

1999), I 0, 266. 8. Rawls, 7beory of justice, 266. 9. Rawls, 7beory of justice, 13.

JO. No rman D a n iels, " Health Ca re Needs a nd D istributive Justice," in justice and justification (Camb ridge: C amb rid ge U niversiry Press, 1996).

11. Ka rl Ma rx and Fried ric h Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, t ra ns. Samuel Moore (1888). 12. Susan Moller O kin,justice, Gender, and the Family (New Yo rk: Basic Books, 1989), 3- 5,

124- 127. 13. David M iller, Political Philosophy: A Very Short l ntroducrion (Ox ford: O x ford U n iversit y Press,

CHAPTER 9

I . Albe rt Ca mus, 7he Myth of Sisyphus, t rans. J. O ' Brien (New York: Alfred A. Kno p f, 1955), i. 2 . Leo To lstoy, My Confession, rra ns. Leo W ie m e r (New York: J. M. Dent a nd Sons, 1905). 3. Arthur Schopen hauer, "On the Sufferi ngs of the World," in Parerga and Paralipomena, trans.

T . Bailey Saunders (1851). 4. C larence D arrow, "Is Life Worth Livi ng?" (debate), Ma rc h 28, 1920.

5. Julian Baggini, Whats It All About? Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (Oxford: O x ford University Press, 2005), 160- 161.

6 . Tolstoy, My Confession. 7. Baggini, Whats !tAl!About? 17, 19- 20. 8 . Paul Ed wards, 7he Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4, ed. Paul Ed wards (New York:

Macm illan, 1967). 9. Edwards, 17,e Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

JO. E. D. Klemke, " Living W ith o ut Appeal: An Affirmative Ph ilosophy o f Life," in lhe Meaning of Life: A Render, ed. E. D. Klemke and St even M . Cahn (New Yo rk: O xfo rd University Press, 2008), I 90.

Notes 455

456 Notes

11. Klemke, "Living Withou, Appeal," 191. 12. Klemke, "Living Withou, Appeal," 193. 13. Susa n Wolf, " Meaning in Life," in 71,e Meaning of Lift: A Reader, ed. E. D. Klemke a nd Steven

M. Cahn (New Yo,k: Oxford University Press, 2008), 232. 14. \Vol f, "Mean ing in Life," 233. 15. \Vol f, "Mean ing in Life," 234. 16. Christophe, Belshaw, JO Good Questio11s about Lift and Death (Oxford: Blackwel l, 2005), 113. 17. Belshaw, JO Good Quesrio11s, 115. 18. Belshaw, JO Good Quesrio11s, 116.

APPE NDIX A

I. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "The Labor Market for Rcccn, College Graduates," January 11, 2017, https:/lwww.ncwyorkfed.org/rcscarch lcollcgc-labor-markc,/collcgc-labor- markct_ comparc .. majors. htm I.

2. T. Recs Shapiro, " For Ph ilosophy Majors, the Q ucsrion after Graduation Is: W har Next?" Washington Post, June 20, 2017.

3. Carolyn G regoire, "The Unexpected Way Philosophy Majors Arc Cha nging the \Vorld of Business," Huffingto11 Post, March 5, 2014, https:/lwww.huffingtonposr.com/2014103105/why -phi losophy-majors-ru lc_n_ 4891404. h tm I.

4. Shapiro, " For Ph ilosophy Majors." 5. David Silbcrswcig, "A Harvard Medical School Professor Makes a Case for , he Liberal Arts

and Ph ilosophy," \'(fashington Post, December 24, 2015. 6. Shapiro, " For Ph ilosophy Majors." 7. American Philosophical Association, "Who S,udics Philosophy>" http:/lwww.apaon linc.org/>

whosmd icsphilosophy. 8. PayScalc, " H ighest Paying Bachelor Degrees by Sa lary Po,cntial," 2017-2018 College Salary

Report, htrps:/lwww.payscalc.com/collcgc·salary· rcport/majors-that· pay-you-back/bachclors. 9. PayScalc; reported by Rachel G illert and Jacquelyn Sm ith, "People with These College Majors

Get the Biggest Raises," Business Insider, January 6 , 2016, http://www.busincssinsidcr.com/ college-majors-that· lcad-ro-, hc-bi ggcst-pay-ra iscs-20 J 6 -J /#20-physics- 1.

GLOSSARY

............................................ · ----·-------- .. .._ ....................................... ._ .................... --... ·-------· ................. __. ......... __. .......... __. ..... __. ............ _. ...... __. ....................... ........... __._ ..... __.____. ..................... _. ........ .

aesthetics 1he study of the fee lings and jud g- ments involved in experiencing the arts or other object.~ d eemed beautiful.

a posteriori k n owledge Knowledge that de- pends entirely on sense experience

a priori k n owled ge Knowledge ga ined inde- pend ently of or prior to sense experience.

act-utilitarianism The idea t hat t he rightness of actions d epends solely on t he overall well- being produced by individual actions.

agen t causation The v iew t hat a free action is caused by an agent (person) and is not whol- ly d eterm ined by previous events.

agn ostic Someone who neither accepts nor de- nies God 's existence.

analy tic statemen t A logical truth wh ose de- nial results in a contrad iction.

appeal to ignoran ce The fallacy of argui ng chat either (I) a claim is true because it hasn't been proven false or (2) a claim is fa lse because it hasn't been proven true.

appeal to popularity 1he fallacy of argui ng chat a claim must be true not because it is backed by good reasons, but simply because many people believe it.

appeal to the person The fa llacy of rejecting a statement on the grounds t hat it comes from a particular person, not because t he state- men t, or claim, itself is fa lse or dubious.

argument A statement coupled with other state- ments that are meant to support that statement.

a rgumen t fro m evil An argument purporting to sho,v t hat since t here is unnecessary evi l, an all-powerful, a ll-knowing, and all-good God must not exist.

a rgumen t from religious experience An argument of this form: A person seems to have experienced God ; the experience must have actually been a genui ne encounter with God; t herefore, God probably exists.

aristocracy A society ruled by t he best citizens.

ath eism The denial of the existence of God .

ath eist Someone who den ies God 's existence.

lltmau One's soul or self.

axiology 1 he study of value, includ ing both aesthetic va lue a nd moral value.

beggin g the q uestion The fallacy of trying to prove a conclusion by using t hat very same conclusion as s upport.

Bhagavad-Gita 1he most highly venerated and influential scriptures in Hinduism.

Brahman 1he impersonal, all-pervading Spirit t hat is t he universe yet transcends all space and time.

brahmin A priest or teacher; a man of the priestly caste.

capita lism A political economic system that lets the means of production accrue to fewer people through t he workings of a free mar- ket. In such a system, wealth goes to anyone who can acquire it in t he marketplace.

Cartesian dualism 1he view that mind {or soul} and body are completely independent of on e another and in teract causally.

categorical imperative Kant's fu ndamental moral principle, which he form u lates as (I) "I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a univmal law"; and (2) "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thin e own person or in chat of any other, in every case as an en d withal, never as a means only."

catharsis 1 he purgin g of t he emotions of pity and fear by experiencing t hem vicariously in a theatrical context.

causal closure of the p hysical 1he principle t hat t he world is a closed system of physical causes and effects.

classical liberalism The v iew that the state s ho uld protect personal freedoms ~~ ,veil as

457

458 Glossary

the right ro pursue one's own social and eco- nomic well-being in a free market w ithout interference from ochers.

cognitive relativism The doctrine char the truth about something d epends on what persons or c ultures believe.

communism Common ly, socialism within a roralicarian system.

compatibilism 1he v iew char although deter- min ism is true, our actions can s till be free.

composition 1he fallacy of a rguing errone- ously char what can be said of the parts can also be said of the whole.

conclusion In an argument, t he statement be- in g s upported.

consequentialisr theory A moral theory in which the rig htness of actions depends sole- ly on their consequences or results.

cosmological arguments Arguments rhar try co s how rhar from the fact rhar rhe un iverse exists, God exists.

cultural relativism 1he view char rig ht actions are chose endorsed by one's culture.

deductive argument An argument intended ro g ive logically conclusive support ro irs con- clusion.

deism Belief in one God who created rhe world bur left it unattended co run on its own.

democracy Rule by t he people as a who le.

deon tological (or n on consequen tialist) the- ory A moral theory in which the rightness of actions is determined nor solely by t heir consequences, but partly or e,uirely by t heir intrinsic nature.

determin ism The doctrine char every event is d eterm ined by preceding events and the laws of nature.

dharma The Buddha's system of teachings about the true nature of reality and how co live correctly to transcend it.

d istr ibutive justice (or social justice) 1he fa ir dL~rribucion ofsociery's benefirsand burdens- such th ings as jobs, income, property, liberties, rig hts, ,velfare a id, taxes, and public service.

d ivine command theory The doctrine char God is the creator of morality.

division The fa llacy of arguing erroneously char what can be said of the who le can be said of che pares.

empiricism 1he view char our knowledge of the empirical world comes solely from sense experience.

epiphenomen alism 1he notion char mental properties do nor cause anything, bur mere- ly accompany physical processes.

epistemology 1he study of knowledge.

equivocation 1he fallacy of as.~igni ng c,vo different meanings co the same sign ificant word in an argument.

ethical egoism 1he view chat right actions are chose char further one's own best interests.

ethics (moral philosophy) The study of mor- a lity using rhe methods of ph ilosophy.

ethics of care A moral perspective chat empha- sizes the unique d emand~ of specific situa- tions a nd t he v irtues and fee lings chat are ce,ural co close personal relationsh ips.

evid en tialis m 1he view chat we are justified in believing someth ing on ly if it is s upported by sufficient evid en ce.

fallacy A common bur bad argument.

false d ilemma The fallacy of arguing errone- o usly chat sin ce t here are only two a ltern a- tives co c hoose from , and one of chem is un- acceptable, t he ocher one must be true.

fem in ist ethics An approach co 1nora licy a imed at advancing women's interests, underscor- ing their d istin ctive experiences and char- acteristics, and advancing the obvio us truth chat ,vomen and men are morally equal.

formalism 1he view char arc is d efined by its form, rhe structure or organization of its pares.

function alism The v iew rhar the mind is the functions chat the brain performs.

genetic fal lacy The fallacy of arguing char a statement can be judged true or false based on its source.

hard determin ism The view char free will does nor exist, rhac no one acrs free ly.

id en tity theory 1he view char mental states are identical co physical brain states.

incompatib ilis m The view that if determin ism is true, no one can act freely.

ind ete rminis m The view t hat nor every even t is determin ed by preceding events and t he laws of nature.

ind u ctiv e a rg umen t An argument intend ed to give probable s upport to its conclusion .

justice The idea t hat people should get what is fa ir or what is t heir due.

Kant's th eory 1 he t heory that right actions are tho.,;e chat accord with rhe categorical imperative.

k a rma The un iversal principle chat o ur actions result in deserved pleasure or pain in this life or the next.

Ii In early Con fucia n ism, ritual, etiquette, prin- ciple, an d propriety; conscientio us behavior and right action .

liberalism The po litical theory that puts primary emphasis on the liberry and rights of individ- ua ls against encroach ments by t he scare.

liberta rianis m (metaphysica l) 1 he view chat some actions are free, for they are caused, or controlled , by t he person, or agent.

liberta rianis m (political) The d octrine chat emphasizes person al freedoms and the right to pursue one's own social an d economic well-being in a free marker without interfe r- ence from others.

logic The study of correct reasoning.

logical b eh aviorism The idea chat menta l stares are d ispositions to be have in a particu- lar ,vay in certain circumstances.

materia lism (or physicalism) 1 he doctrine th at every object and event in the ,vorld is physical.

me rit ocracy A system of ru le by t hose most qualified co govern.

me taphysics 1 he study of reality, an inquiry into rhe fund amen tal n ature of the un iverse and che t h ings in it.

mind-body problem The issue of what menta l phen omena are an d how th ey rela te to t he physical world.

mon oth e is m Bel ief in one God.

moral absolutis m The belief chat objective moral principles a llow no exceptions or

must be applied t he same way in all cases and c ultures.

mora l evil Evil chat comes fro m human choic- es and actions a nd the bad things char arise from chem.

moral objectivis m The view ch at t here are moral standards char are true or correct fo r everyone.

moral relativism The view chat moral stand ards do not have independent status bur are relative co what ind ividua ls or cultures believe.

mora l th e ory A t heory char explains why an action is right or wrong or why a person or a person's c haracter is good or bad.

mo rality Bel iefs about right and ,vrong ac- tions and good and bad persons or char- acter.

multiple realiza bility 1 he capacity to be real- ized or insra,uiared in a variety of forms an d materials.

natura l evil Evil that results from the workings of nature.

n irva n a En lightenment: t he u lt imate aim of all Buddhist practice an d the fina l liberation co which all the Bud d ha's teach ings point.

objectivis m (in arr) 1 he vie,v char works of arr have objective properties by which we can judge their aesthetic good ness o r badnes.~.

ontolog ical a rg umen t An argument chat cries co demonstrate God's existence by logical an alysis of the concept of God.

pa n en th eis m The view chat God is in t he un i- verse and the universe is in God .

pa n th eism The view t hat God and t he un iverse a re on e and t he same th ing, a d ivine W hole.

political philosophy 1 he s tudy of political so- cieties using t he methods of ph ilosophy.

poly t h eis m Belief in many gods.

premise In an argument, a statement support- ing the conclusion.

prin ciple of in duc tion The presumption chat even ts char fo llowed one another in t he past will do t he same in t he future, that the fu- ture wi ll be li ke the past.

problem of fre e w ill The challenge of reconcil- ing determin ism with our intuitions or ideas about persona l freedom.

Glossary 459

460 Glossary

proper ty dualism The view that mental proper- ties are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, physical properties.

prop osition al k n owled ge Knowledge of a proposition.

psycholog ical egois m 1 he t heory that people always act o ut of self-in terest.

rationalism The view that through unaided reason we can come to know what the world is like.

red uctio ad absurdum An argu,nent of t his form: If you assume that a set of statemen ts is true, and yet you can deduce a false or absurd statement from it, t hen t he origin al set of statements as a whole must be false.

re111he essential Confucian virtues, including be- nevolence, sympathy, kindness, generosity, respect for others, and human-heartedness.

r ule-utilitarianism 1 he doctrine that a right action is on e t hat con forms to a rule t hat, if followed consisten tly, ,vould create for ev- eryon e involved the most beneficial balan ce of well-being over suffering.

sa111sara O ne's cycle of repeated deaths and rebirths.

s k ep ticism 1 he view that we lack knowledge in some fundamental way.

slippe ry slope The fallacy of argui ng errone- ously that a particular action s hould not be taken because it will lead inevitably to other actions resulting in some di re oucco,ne.

social contra ct th eory The view t hat justice is secured , and t he state is mad e legitimate, through an agreement among citizens of the state or between t he citizens a nd t he rulers of the state.

socialism 1 he doctrine that the means of pro- duction (property, factor ies, busines.~es) should be owned or controlled by the people, eit her communally or through the state.

Socrat ic method Question-and-answer d ia- logue in which propositions are method i- cally scrutinized to uncover t he truth.

statemen t (claim} An assertion that somethi ng is or is not the case and is therefore t he k ind of utterance chat is eit her true or fa lse.

straw m an 1 he fa llacy of misrepresen ting a person's views so they can be more easily at- tacked or d ismissed .

subjective idealism The d octrine that a ll t hat exist are minds and t heir ideas.

subjective relativis m The view that right ac- tions are those endorsed by an in d ividual.

subjectivism (in arr) The view that aesthetic criteria are purely subjective; the good ness or bad nes.~ of a work of arr depends on how the audience responds co it.

subs ta n ce d u alis m The notion that mind and body consist of nvo fundamenta lly d ifferent kinds of stuff, or substances.

sy nthetic statemen t A statement that is not ana lytic.

t eleolog ical a rgumen ts Argu ments that try to sho,v t hat God must exist because feat ures of the universe show signs of purpose or d esign.

theism Belief in the existence of God.

theist Someone who believes in God.

theodicy A d efense of the tradit ional concep - tion of God in light of the existence of evil.

Upa11ishad s Ved ic literature concerning the self, Brahman, samsara, and liberation.

utilitarianism 1 he view that right actions are t hose chat result in the most beneficial balance of good over bad consequences for everyone involved.

Ved a.s Early Hindu scriptures, d eveloped be- c,veen 1500 and 600 BCE.

virtue ethics A moral t heory that foc uses on the development of v irtuous character.

welfa re libe ralism A form of liberalism, the a im of which is to preserve individual liber- ties whi le ensuring the general welfare of the citizenry.

CREDITS

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photo.com/Chris Schmidt

1. 1 Uni\fersa.1

1. 2 Uni\fersa.l

1.3 SuperStock/Sup

1.4 Gianni Dagli

1.5 Corbi,

1.6 Thale, of M iletus: Courtesy of the Yale University Arr Gallery

1.7 Empedocles: Universal Images Group/Getty I mages

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photo.com/Phoco_HamsterMan

2. 1 Distinctive

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2. 14 Manin No\-a.k/Shutcerscock

2. 18 Phoco of Buddhist monk praying: ASSOCIATED P RESS

Chapter 3 Chapter opening phoco Siegfried

Layda/Geuy l mageS

3. 1 Allen G raham - P Dlmage,/ Shutrerstock

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3. 11 Ft.d.i1/Shutterscock

3. 13 Scala/Art Resource. NY

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3. 15 Mary W'ollstonecraft: G l Archive/Alamy Stock Photo

3. 16 H ung Chung Chih/ Shutterstock

Chapter 4 C hapter opening photo

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Chapter 5 Chapter opening photo David

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462 Credits

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Images

Appendix A Photo 1, Carly Fiorina: Commons

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Photo 3, Sheila Bair: Commons \Xlikimedia/1llatcher Cook for Pop Tech

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Photo I 5. Terrence Ma.lick: Commons \Xlikimedia/Hadean-mind

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Photo 17. Deepa Mehta.: Commons \Xlikimedia/Ca.na.dian Film Cencre

Photo 18, Susan Sontag: Commons \Xlikimedia/Lynn Gilbert

INDEX OF MARGINAL QUOTATIONS

............................................................ .._ ........... .._ ................................................ __ ......... __ ................................... __. .......... __. ...... __.__. ........ __.__. .................... __. ................... ........ ........... ....... ........... _. .......... ... ... .

Th is index helps you locate pa rticular q uotations in the text's margins a nd find all the marginal quotations by a specific autho r.

Adams, Scott, 259 Ainley, Alison, 320 Allen, Woody, 73 Amyl, Henri Frederic, 168 Anderson, Elizabeth, 321 Anselm, 79-8 1 Antony, Louise M., 320-21 Aquinas, Thomas, 45, 66-67 Aristotle, 3, 176-77, 181, 247, 282,

334, 340-43, 357 Augusti ne, 58, 356 Ayer, Alfred Jules, 147

B Bacon, Fra ncis, 18, 30 Baggini, J ulia n, 414-16, 420-2 1 Baier, A nnette C., 188 Bair, Sheila, 4 32 Bell, C live, 335 Belshaw, C hristopher, 425 Berkeley, George, 300-302 Bierce, Ambrose, 208 Bisson, Terry, 237-38 Block, Ned, 223 Blum, Lawrence, 20-2 1 Bombeck, Erma, 223 Brau lt, Robert, 97 Broughton, James, 207 Brown, Les, 410 Butterfield, Stewart, 432

c Cabanis, Pierre-Jean Georges, 213 Campbe ll, Joseph, 411 Camus, Albert, 190-91, 408, 422 Capp, A l, 340 Carroll, Lewis, 330 C halmers, David J., 218-19, 232

C havez, Hugo, 379 C hesterton, G. K., 139 C hinese Proverb, 175 C huang Tzu, 123 Clarke, Arthur C., 131-33 Clifford, W. K., 99 Cole, Eve Browning, 321-25 Collins, Francis, 78 Confucius, 193-95, 276 Cortazar, Julio, 165 Craig, William Lane, 70-7 1 Crosthwaite, Jan, 182 Cuppy, \Viii, 220

Darrow, Clarence, 75, 414 Darwin, C harles, 77 Davis, Thomas D., 270-72 Dershowitz, Alan, 109, 167 Descartes, Rene, 212, 285-86,

288-92 d'Holbach, Baron, 246-47 Dickens, C harles, 179, 365 Disraeli, Benjamin, 279 Dockri ll, Peter, 224-25 Douglass, Frederick, 359 Ducasse, Curt J ., 339 Durant, \Vi ii, 2

E. D. K lem ke, 423 Edison, Thomas A., 2 13 Edwards, Paul, 421-22 Ehrenreich, Barbara, 387 Ei nstein, A lbert, 69, 82, 144, 184, 284,

287, 292 Eliot, T. S., 314 Emerson, Ralph \Valdo, 121 Engels, Friedrich, 381-86 Epictetus, 22, 265

Fiorina, Carly, 432-33 Fodor, Jerry A., 222-23 Forude, James A., 173 Frankl, Viktor E., 407, 418 Franklin, Benjami n, 99

Galileo Galilei, 59 Gandhi, Mahatma, 118 Gardner, Marti n, 338-39 Glaspell, Susan, 39 Golding, Wi lliam, 397-404 Grau, Christopher, 287

Ham ilton, Alexa nder, 370 Hawki ng, Stephen, 72, 78 Held, V irginia, 184-85 Hesse, Hermann, 414 Hick, John, 88-91 Hobbes, Thomas, 366-70 Hodge, C harles, 148 H ubbard, Elbert, 154, 278 H ume, David, 8, 74-76, 305-10,

346-48 H untington, Ellsworth, 2 10 H ursthouse, Rosalind, 179 H uxley, Thomas H., 281

Inge, Dean, 25 Ingersol, Robert, 157 Isaiah 5:20, KJV, 91

J Jagger, A lison, 182 James, W ill iam, 38, 92, 99-105, 249 Jefferson, Thomas, 146

463

464 Index of Margi nal Quotations

Jewish Proverb, 66 Johnson, B. C., 87

Kant, Immanuel, 83, 137, 169-73, 309, 3 12-15, 3 18

Ken nedy, Joh n F., 335 Kierkegaard, S0ren, 115 King, Ma rtin Luther, Jr., 355 Kitcher, Philip, 8 1 Klemm, W. R., 256

Lacy, Suzanne, 344 Lao Tzu, 123-25 Le G uin, Ursu la K., 200-203 Leonardo da V inci, 296 Lewes, George H enry, 26 Lewis, C . S., 62, 65, 2 11 Lichtenstein, Roy, 338 L iebknecht, Karl, 380 L in, Patrick, 230-31 L incoln, Abraham, 178 Locke, Joh n,251, 293-99,371-74, 391 L ucretius, 424 L uther, Martin, 262 L uyah, Ha l Lee, 257

Mackie, J. L., 87, 93 Martin, Michael, I 06 Marx, Karl, 381-86 Maug ham, \Y/. Somerset, 66, 87 McCarthy, Cormac, 255 McGi ll, Bryant H., 366 Michelangelo, 333 Mi ll, John Stuart, 46, 157-64, 216 Mi ller, David, 392 Mi nsky, Marvin, 2 10 Mizner, \Y/i lson, 103 Montague, Ph illip, 45 Montesquieu, Cha rles de, 83 Morris, R ichard, 69

Nagel, Thomas, 208, 220-21 Namazie, Ma ryam, 153 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 244 Nietzsche, Friedrich, JOI, 163

N in, Anais, 303 Noddings, N el, 185 Noss, John B., 195 Novalis, 34 2 N ussbaum, Martha, 2

O kin, Susan Moller, 388-91 O'Rourke, P. J., 244, 377 Orwell, George, 382

Pa ley, \Y/i lliam, 72-73 Pasca l, Blaise, I 06-8 Picasso, Pablo, 333 Pigliucci, Massimo, 108 Pike, Al bert, 28 Plato, 3, 5, I O-I I , 47-55, 283-84, 316,

322, 361-62 Poe, Edgar Allan, 351-52 Pope, Alexander, 206 Pugh, Emerson, 219

R achels, James, 183 R ahula, Wa lpola, 112-13 Rand, Ayn, 254 Rawls, John, 376-77 Reagan, Ronald , 374 Roosevelt, E leanor, 17 Rowe, Wi lliam L., 84-87, 9 1, 95,

254-55 Russell, Bertrand, 4 , 8 , 33, 7 1, 150,

280,289, 303

s Sagan, Ca rl, 77, 78 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 262-65, 360,

408, 422-23 Schick, Theodore, Jr., 212, 277 Schopen hauer, Arthur, 222,

248, 4 13-14 Schrodinger, Erwin, 78 Schulz, C harles M., 7, 114, 409 Searle, Joh n R., 216, 226-29, 23 1 Shafer-Landau, Russ, 147, 180 Shakespea re, \Y/i lliam, 36, 149, 311 Shaw, George Bernard, 119, 171 Silbersweig, David, 432

Singer, Isaac Bashevis, 242 Sin nott-A rmstrong, Walter, 6 1 S mart,]. J. C., 2 17-18 S now, C. P., 168 Socrates, 3, 8-11, 42, 47-55, 140,

275,278 Spinoza, Ba ruch, 148, 24 2 Spong, John, 64 Stace, W. T., 25 1-52 S umed ho, Ajah n, 112 Swam i Vivekananda, 117 Swi nbur ne, Richard, 87, 97

Taylor, R icha rd , 258-60 Tennyson, Alfred Lord, 307 Teresa of Avila, 92 Tertullian, 168 The Budd ha, 68, 111-12 Thoreau, Henry David, 117, 173 T illich, Paul, 11 , 416, 421 Tocquevi lle, A lexis de, 382 Tolstoy, Leo, 250, 335, 4 11-13,

416-18 T ru mbull, H . C., 171 T ryon, Edward, 69 Tur, Katy, 433 Twa in, Mark, 122

u U nknown, 299 U rlaub, Ivan, 304

v Vanbrugh, Joh n, 151 van l nwagen, Peter, 257 Vaughn, Lewis, I 41, 277 Voltaire, 82, 143, 319, 429-30 von Brau n, Wernher, 78

w \Y/aithe, Mary E llen, 31 \Vest, Rebecca, 323 \Y/hitehead, A lfred North,

16, 149 \Y/ittgenstein, Ludwig, 19 \Y/olf, Susa n, 4 25 \Y/olls tonecraft, Mary, 187, 321 \Y/right, Frank Lloyd, 347

GENERAL INDEX

..................................... __.__. ............................................. ....... .... ...._.__._ .. ------· .............. .......... __.__. ... ...... .. ...... .......... .............................................. .

Abolitionists, of capital punishment, 160-61

Abortion rights, 39 1 Above, mea ning from, 416-2 1,

419j 420/ Abse,uqualia objections, 2 10, 223 Absolute d uty, 173 Absu rdity, of existence, 188-91 Active read ing, 30, 32 Act-utilitarian ism

consequences in, 156-58 defined, 156, 198, 457

Addison, Joseph, 347 Ad ht>minem fallacy. See Appeal to the

person Aegisthus, 343 Aesthetics

Aristotle inAuenci ng, 340-43 defined ,333, 350, 457 Hume inAuencing, 346-48 philosophy of beauty and, 333 Plato inAuencing, 340 va lue, 338-40, 339/ See also Art

Affirmi ng t he a ntecedent. See Modus pt>nens

Affirmi ng t he consequent, 22 Agent causation

defined ,258, 268,457 libertaria nism (metaphysic,,l)

a nd,258-60 Agnostic, 64-65, 129, 457 Ahimsa {non harm), 116 Al. See Artificial intelligence Ai nley, Alison, 320 Alienation, 380 Aliens, 209 Ana logical induction, 24-25 Ana lytic statement, 3 11-12, 329, 457 Anatta (impermanence of the self),

l l l-12

Anderson, Elizabeth, 32 1 Anguish, 264 Anicca (impermanence), 111 Anselm (sai nt)

criticism of, 82-83 ontological a rgument of, 62, 79-83 Prt>slt>gium by, 79-82

Antecedent, 19 Antisocial be havior, belief in free w ill

inAuencing, 252-53 Antithesis, 379 Antony, Louise M., 320-21 The Apt>logy ( Plato), 47-55 A pt>sterit>ri a rguments, 66 A posteriori knowledge, 278, 3 12,

329,457 Appeal to ignorance, 37, 42, 457 Appeal to popularity, 35-36, 42, 457 Appeal to t he person, 33-35, 42, 457 A prit>ri arguments, 66 A priori knowledge, 278, 312, 313-19,

327, 329, 457 Aqu inas, Thomas

argu ment from motion of, 67-68 biography of, 68 criticism of, 69-71 firs t-cause argument of, 68-7 1 God and, 44-45, 61, 66-70, 126 meaning from below and, 42 1 Summa 7het>lt>gica by, 44-45, 66-70

Arbitrariness problem, of divine command t heory, 147-48, 448-50

Argument from evil defi ned,63-64, 129,457 God and, 63-64, 84-87, 126-27,

129,457 ignorance and, 86-87 Rowe's, 84-87

Argument from motion, 67-68 Argument from religious experience,

62-63,92-98, 12~ 129,419,457 Arguments

a pmteriori, 66 a priori, 66 claims in, 15-18 conclusion in, 15-19, 28-32 defi ned, 15,42, 458 eva luation of, 32 exercises, 43-46, 437-39 invalid , 22, 23 knowledge, 219-2 1 premise in, 15-19, 28-32 sound, 19 statements in, 15-18, 28-29 strong, 18-19 symbolization of, 19-26 theodicies, 64 thesis s upported by, 379-80 in thi nki ng ph ilosophica lly,

14-40, 4 1 valid, 18-21, 23 weak, 18 See also Teleological a rg uments;

specific arguments Arignote, 3 1 Aristocracy, 361, 395, 457 Aristonexus, 3 1 Aristotle, 3, 4j 7j 115, 349

aesthetics inAuenced by, 340-43 happiness and, 176-78 Hypatia and, 29 Nict>machean Ethics by, 176-77 objectivism of, 340-43 The Poetics by, 340-43 in The Schot>l t>f Athens {Raphael), 178/ soul and, 2 14 virtue ethics a nd, 176-78 women and, 320, 322

Art aesthetic va lue of, 338-40, 339/ c haracterization of, 333-35,

336/-337/ as controversial, 336-37, 336/-337/ defi ned, 333-35

465

466 General Index

Art (contintted) as expression, 335 fe minist, 344-46, 344/-346/ form of, 335 museum, 341 objectivism in, 338-43, 350, 459 as representation, 334-35 subjectivism in, 338, 346-48,

350, 460 Art (Bell), 335 Arti fi cial intelligence (AI)

autonomous, 230-3 l a nd human rights, 224-25 strong, 208-10, 226-29, 230-31

Artworld, 339 Aryans, 117 Assessment of objections, in essay

structure, 443 Atheism

defined,64-65, 129,457 problem o f evil and, 84-87 in U.S., 60

Atheism: A Philosophical fustifict1tion (Marti n), 106

Atheistic existentia lism, 263 Atheists, 64, 419 Atmt1r1, 118 Atomist ph ilosophers, 249 Authoritaria nism, 361 Autonomous Al, 230-31 Auxiliaries, 360 Ax iology, 6-7, 42, 457

Baggini, Ju lian mea ning o fl ife and, 414-16,

420-21, 420/ What'.r It All About? by, 414-16,

420-2 1, 420/ Baier, Annette, 188 Bai r, Sheila, 432 Bats, 219-21 Bats, materialism and, 221/ Baumeister, Roy F., 253 Beauty

aesthetics and, 333 Form of, 340 Hume on, 346-48 philosophy of, 333, 349

Begging the question, 38-39, 42, 457 Behavior

a ntisocial, belief in free wi ll in flu encing, 252-53

fait h a nd, 107-8 Behaviorism. See Logica l behaviorism

Belief in free will, 252-53 in God, 58-109 ha rd-wired, 63 insu fficient evidence fo r, 99, 102-3 in intercessory prayer, 96 justi fication of, 276 ph ilosophical, survey of, 5 without reason, 98-109, 127

Bell, C live, 335 Below, mea ning fro m, 421-25 Belshaw, C hristopher, 425 Bentham, Jeremy, 157-58, 165 Berkeley, George, 299/

criticism of, 303 empiricism o f, 279, 280, 299-303 God and, 303 Lockeand,299,30 1-2 "Of the Principles of H uma n

K nowledge" by, 300-303 sensations and , 299-303 subjective idealism and, 280

Bhagt1ut1d-Gitt1, 120-22, 457 bhaltti, 122 Bible, soul in, 214 Big Bang, 70-71, 70/ Bigfoot, 233 Bios (biological life of man), 90 Bisson, Terry, 237-38 Block, Ned, 223, 226 Blum, Lawrence, 20-2 1 Body. See M ind-body problem Body, in essay structure, 442-43 Bourgeoisie, 379-86 Brahman, 119, 457 Brahm in, 457 Brai n

consciousness and, 212-13, 215, 2 17-23

m ind a nd, 207- 10, 223-29, 231-33 pi neal gla nd in, 215/

Braue New \Vorl.d (Hux ley), 242 Brillo Box, 339, 339/ The Buddha, 109-16, 110/, 127-28 Buddht1-Nt1ture (Sumedho), 112 Buddhism

Buddha and, 109- 16, 127-28 complex ity of, 110 d harma in, 111- 16, 128, 130, 458 dultltht1 in, 111-16 Five Precepts of, 116 Four Noble Truths of, 111-16 God, ph ilosophy and , 109-10, 11 l,

114-16 history of, I 09-16

in India, 110-l l karma in, 110, 113-14, 130, 459 n irvana in, 112-16, 114-16, 128,

130, 459 Noble Eightfold Path of, 114-16 overview of, 109-16 and science, 114, 115 Temple of the Dawn and , 113/

Bunyan, Joh n, 347 Butterfi eld, Stewart, 432 Byrd, Randolph, 96

c Cam us, Albert

existentialism of, 189-92, 197, 408 meani ng of life a nd, 408, 414 morality a nd, 189-92, 197 "The My th of Sisyphus" by, 189-91

Capita lism defi ned,379,395,457 socia list t heory and, 379, 380

Caring, 142, 181-88, 197 Carro ll, Lewis, 330 Cartesia n d ualism

c riticism of, 212-13, 215-16 defi ned,20~236, 457 identity theory and, 207-8, 218

Caste system, 117, 120, 121 Categorical imperative

defi ned, 171, 198-99, 457 in Kant's theory, 171-75

Catharsis, 340-43, 350, 457 Causa l closure of the physical, 215-15,

236,457 Causa lity, 307-8, 307/ Cerebra l commissurotomy, 213, 215 Certai nty

o f Descartes, 288-92, 292/, 326 o f Locke, 293-99

Cha lmers, David J., 218-20, 219/ Character

morality based on, 175-81, 197 in virtue ethics, 175-80

Ch ild ca re, 388-91 Ch ild hood, religion acquired in, 59, 61/ Ch ina, 192-95, 197-98, 223, 226 Ch inese Room thought experiment,

226-29 Ch isholm, Roderick, 258 Chuang Tztt, 123-24 Clai m. See Statement Clarke, Arthur C., 131-33 Clarke, Randolph, 258 Classical liberalism, 374-75, 395,

457-58

C lassic utilitaria nism, 157-58 C lass struggle, 379-87 C leanthes, 73-76 C lifford, W. K.

insufficien t evidence for belief a nd, 99, 102-3

Ja mes a nd, 101-2, 102-4 C lon ing, human, 144-45, l44-45f Cogn itive relativism

criticism of, 277 defi ned, 277,329, 458 problem of knowledge and , 277-78

Cole, Eve Brown ing, 321-25 Comedy, 343 Commun ism

defi ned, 379,395,458 Manifesto of tht Comm,mist Party

and, 381-86 socialist theory a nd, 379-87

Commun ity, 360, 371-72, 393 Compatibilism

Consequence Argument rejected by, 257

criticism of, 244, 255 defi ned, 243-44,268, 458 free wi ll, determ inism and, 250-55,

268, 458 Hobbes and, 250 H ume and, 250-51 libertarianism (metaphysical) a nd,

255,257-58 Locke and, 250-51, 254-55 overview of, 267 Stace a nd, 251-54 trad itional, 243-44, 250-55

Competition, 367 Composition, fallacy o f, 39, 42, 458 Computers, strong Al and, 208-10,

226-29, 228f Conceivability a rg uments

of Descartes, 212-13 aga inst identity t heory, 2 18-20

Conceptualized experience, 314-19, 315/, 316/, 317f

Conclus ion in arguments, 15-19, 28-32 defi ned, 15,42,458 in essay structure, 444 identi fi ed, 29-32, 44-45, 437-39 indic,itor words, 17

Cond itional premise, 19 Confucius, 123, 192-95, 192/, 197-98 Conscience, 138-39 Tiu Conscious Mind (Chalmers),

218-19, 232

Conscious ness brai n a nd, 212-13, 215, 217-23 d ivided, 213, 215

Consent, in socia l contract theory, 356, 364, 37 1-74

Consequence Argu ment, 257, 267 Consequences

in ethica l egoism, 140, 143, 165-69 Kant's theory and, 141, 169-70 mora lity based on, 155-69 in utilitarian ism, 140, 143, 155-64

Consequent, 19 Consequentialist theory, 140, 143, 155,

199, 458 Conservatism, 26, 143 Considered moral judgments, 143-46,

168, 173 Controversial art, 336-37, 336f-337f Copernicus, 314, 315f Cosmological arguments

Cra ig's, 70-7 1 defi ned, 61, 129, 458 for God 's existence, 61, 66-71,

126,458 Kalam, 70-71

Cra ig, \Vi lliam La ne, 70-7 1 Credulity, pri nciple of, 93, 94-95 Criteria of adequacy

defi ned, 26 mora l, 143-46, 149-50, 196 Swi nburne and, 77 types of, 26

Critical read ing, 30, 32 Critique of Purt Reason (Kant), 83,

312-15, 318 Crosthwaite, Ja n, 182 Cultura l relativism

argument for, 153-54 defi ned, 149, 199,277-78,329, 458 infa llibi lity problem o f, 151-52, 278 mora l progress and, 151-53 mora l relativism a nd, 149, 151-55 problem of knowledge and, 277-78 social reformers and, 152-53 women's rights and, 152-53, 152-53f

Curie, Marie, 421

Da la i Lama, 114 Da nto, Arthur C., 339 Dao, 123-24 Daoism, 123-26 Da rrow, C la rence, 28/, 75f

determinism of, 27-28 as pes.~imist, 414

General Index 467

Darwin, C harles, 13 Data, theory a nd, 143-46 David, 335 David, Jacques-Louis, !Of Da Vi nci, Leonardo, 335, 338, 343 Davis, Thomas D., 270-72 Dawkins, Richard, 63 Dead hypothesis, 100 Death

euthanasia, 156-57, 157f penalty, 160-61, !60-6 lf rebi rth and , 11 3-14 of Socrates, 9, !Of, 47-55

Declaration o f Independence, 356, 356/, 371

Deductive a rg ument, 42, 458 defined , 17 examples of, 17-19

Deep Blue, 209-10, 209f Defi lements, 113 Deism, 65, 129, 458 Demea, 73 Democracy

defined ,360,395,458 Plato opposing, 360, 364

Denying the antecedent, 22, 23 Denying the consequent.

See Modus tollens Deontologica l t heory, 140, 141, 155,

199, 458 Dependent premise, 28 Descartes, Rene

biography of, 290-91, 290f certa inty of, 288-92, 292/, 326 conceivability argument

of, 212-13 despair and, 265 Discour.re 011 the Method of Rightly

Conducting the Reason by, 212 divisibility argument of, 213-15 doubt of, 284-87 dream argument of, 285-86 God a nd, 289-90, 292 innate knowledge and, 285 Meditations on First Philosophy by,

213,285-86,288-92 principle o f clarity and d istinctness

of, 289-90 rationalism of, 279, 281, 284-92,

292/, 295 skepticism of, 285-87 substa nce dua lism of, 206-7,

211-13, 215-16, 230, 234-35 Ste also Cartesian dua lism

Desert, 357, 359

468 General Index

Design a rguments evolution and, 80-81 for God's existence, 61-63, 62/,

72-77, 80-81, 127 Hume critiqui ng, 73-77 Kant a nd, 83

Desire, 112 Despair, 264-65 Determinism

compatibi lism and, 250-55, 268, 458 Darrow's, 27-28 defined,241,268,458 d'Holbach and, 246-47 fata lism compa red with, 245 free will problem and, 27-28, 241-45 indetermi nism and, 242-43,

246-50,266-67 James and, 249 libertaria nism (metaphysical) and,

244-46, 249-50,255-60 "A Little Omniscience Goes a Long

Way" and, 270-72 science a nd, 243, 247-48, 250 See also Hard determi nism

Dewey, John, 320 Dharma, 111 , 120-21, 458 d'Holbach, Baron, 246-47, 247/ Dialectic process, 379-80 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

(H ume), 73-77 Diffidence, 367 "The Dilemma of Determin ism"

(James), 249 "The Dilemma of the Divine Command

Theory" sample essay, 448-50 Disbelief, 64-66 Discourse on the Method of Rightly

Conducting the Reason (Descartes), 212

Disembodied existence, 212-13 Distributive justice, 357, 395, 458 Divi ne comma nd theory

a rbitrari ness problem of, 147-48, 448-50

defined, 146-47, 199, 458 God in, 139, 146-48, 199, 458 as moral theory, 139, 146-48, 180,

196, 199,448-49,458 in sample essay, 448-50 virtue ethics and, 180

Divi ne right, 364 Divisib ility argument, 213-15 Division, fallacy of, 39, 42, 458 Doing Philosophy (Schick), 212-13 Doubt, of Descartes, 284-87

Downward causation, 232 Dreams, 93, 276, 276/ Dttkkha (suffering), 111-16 Duty

absolute, 173 Ka nt and, 183 morality based on, 169-75, 197 to opi nion, 102-3 virtue ethics and, 175-76, 178-80

Eagleton, Terry, 424 Eastern religious traditions, 109-22,

127-29. See also Buddhism Edwa rds, Paul, 421-22 Efficient cause, 67 Einstein, Albert, 65, 145, 284, 287, 292 "Embodiment a nd Epistemology"

(Antony), 320-21 Emotions

ethics and, 137-38, 182-85 tragedy invoking, 340-43

Empedodes, 13, 13/ Empiricism

of Berkeley, 279, 280, 299-303 defi ned,278,329,458 feminist, 322 of Hume, 279, 280, 303-10, 307/ Kant and, 311-19, 315/, 316-17/ of Locke, 279-80, 293-99 morality and, 170 problem of knowledge and, 278-80,

293-3 10, 307/, 326-27 skepticism in, 280

The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edwards), 421-22

Engels, Friedrich, 381-86 En lightenment, 246-47, 304 An Enquiry Concerning Human

Understanding (Hume), 305-10 Entitlement, 359 Enumerative induction, 22-23 Epicureans, 41, 159, 417 Epicurus, 3, 159, 178/ Epiphenomenalism

criticism of, 216, 232 defi ned,2 10, 236,458 mind-body problem and, 210-11 property d ualism and, 232-33

Epistemic justi fi cation, 98 Epistemology

defi ned,6,42,275,329,458 feminist, 321-22 Ka nt's revolution in, 314-15,

315/, 318-19

q uestions, 6, 276 traditiona l, 321-22

Equality genderand,388-92 Hobbes a nd, 366-67 justice as, 357, 359, 363, 363/ of opportunity, 377-78 o rgan transplants and, 363, 363/ in political ph ilosophy, 357, 359 Rawls and, 357

Equal liberty principle, 376-78 Equivocation, 36-37, 42, 458 An Essay Concerning Httman

Understanding (Locke), 25 1, 293-99

An Essay on Free Will (van Inwagen), 257 Essay structure, 441-44. See also

Philosophy papers Essence, ex istence preceding, 189-9 1,

262-65 Ethical egoism

arguments agai nst, 167-69 consequences in, 140, 143, 165-69 defi ned, 140, 143, 199,458 as moral t heory, 140, 143,

165-69, 458 psychological egoism and, 166-69,

460 utilitarianism and, 165-66

Ethics defi ned, 6, 43, 136, 199, 458 emotions a nd, 137-38, 182-85 fem in ist, 181-88, 197, 199, 458 morality distinguished from, 137-38 in Nicon1achea11 Ethic,, 176-77 overview of, 136-48, 196 of strong AI, 230-31 See also Virtue ethics

Ethics of care c riticism of, 185, 188 defi ned, 142, 182, 199, 458 femin ist ethics and, 181-88, 197 as moral t heory, 142-43, 181-88,

197, 199, 458 The Ethics of Care (Held), 184-85 Eudaimonia (h appi ness), 176 Euripides, 34 3 Europe, belief in God in, 60 Euthanasia, 156-57, 157/ Euthyphro (Plato), 147, 449 Evidence, insufficient for belief, 99,

102-3 Evidentialism

defi ned, 99, 130, 458 James repudiati ng, 99-106

Evil argument from, 63-64, 84-87,

127, 129, 457 atheism and, 84-87 free wi ll defense and, 64, 87-88 God and, 63-66, 84-91, 127,

129, 133 moral, 84, 130, 459 natural, 84, 130, 459 necessar)', 64 problem of, 84-9 1, 127 soul-maki ng defense a nd, 88-9 1 suffe ring from, 84-87 un necessar)', 64, 66

Evil and the God of Love (Hick), 88-9 1 Evolution, design arguments and,

80-81 Examined life, Socrates and, 3, 8-11,

14, 40-4 1 Existence

absurdit)' of, 188-91 d isembodied, 212-13 essence preceded b)', 189-91, 262-65 God's, arguments fo r, 61-63, 62/,

66-83, 126-2~ 129-30,457 persona l, recognition of, 291

Tiu Existence of God (Swinburne), 97 Existentia lism

atheistic, 263 of Camus, 189-92, 197, 408 defi ned, 188-89 of Sartre, 189, 262-66

"Ex istentialism Is a Humanism" (Sartre), 262-65

Explanation defi ned, 25 in inductive a rguments, 25-26

Explosive O rdna nce Disposa l Robot, 230-31, 230-31/

Expres.~ion, art as, 335 Extension, of physical th ings, 211 External mean ing, 410-11

Fact, fa ith creating, 104 Faith

beh avior a nd, 107-8 fac t created by, 104 living b)', 107 pragmatic, 99- 108 reason and, 65-66 Tolstoy's, 4 17-18

Fallac)' appea l to ignora nce, 37, 43, 457 appea l to popularity, 35-36, 43, 457

appeal to the person, 33-35, 43, 457 begging t he q uestion, 38-39, 43, 457 composition, 39, 43, 458 defi ned,33, 43,458 d ivision, 39, 43, 458 equivocation, 36-37, 43, 458 exercise, 439 fa lse d ilemma, 37-38, 43, 458 genetic, 36, 43, 458 identified, 45-46 slippery slope, 39, 43, 460 straw man, 33, 43, 460

Fa lse d ilemma, 37-38, 43, 458 Fam ii)'

power relationships in, 388-89, 390/ responsibilities, 388-91 si ng le-parent, 388-89

Fatalist, 245 Fate, 245 Father, God as, 90 Fear, 340-43 Fem in ism

concerns of, 319 criticism of, 391-92 jus tice, political ph ilosoph)' and,

387-92,394-95 Miller a nd, 391-92 O kin and, 388-91, 389/

Fem in ist art, 344-46, 344/-346/ Fem in ist empiricism, 322 Fem in ist epistemology, 321-22 "Fem inist Epistemology and Philosoph)'

of Science" (Anderson), 321 Fem in ist ethics

defi ned, 181, 199, 458 ethics of care and, 181-88, 197

"Feminist Ethics" Qaggar), 182 Fem in ist perspective, on k nowledge

Ain ley's, 320 Anderson's, 321 Antony's, 320-21 Cole's, 321-23 criticism of, 323, 324 problem of kn owledge and, 3 19-25,

327-28 "Feminist Philosophy" (Ai nle)'), 320 Fem in ist postmodern ism, 322-25 Fem in ist standpoint t heor)', 322-24 Fiction

"The Good Bra hmin," 429-30 "A Little Omniscience Goes a Long

Way," 270-72 Lord of the Flies, 397-404 "The O nes Who \Val k Awa)' From

Ornelas" (Le Guin), 200-203

General Index 469

"The Ova l Portrait," 351-52 "The Star," 131-33 "They're Made O ut of Meat"

(Bis.~on), 237-38 Through the Looking Glass, 330 See also Narrative

Final draft, of philosophy paper, 447 Fiori na, Carly, 431-32 First-cause a rgument, 68-7 1 First draft, of philosophy paper,

446-47 First Mover, 68, 69-70 First Noble Truth, 111-12 Five Precepts, 116 Fodor, Jerry A., 222-23 Forlorn ness, 264 Formalism, 45, 335, 350 Forms, 282

of art, 335 of Beauty, 340

Four Noble T ruths, 111-16 Fourth Noble T ruth, 114-16 Frank, Anne, 174/ Frankl, Viktor, 424 Free acts, 251-54 Freedom

Sartre's, 261-65, 268 va lue of, 24 1

Free will bel ief in, 252-53 compatibi lism and, 250-55, 268, 458 defense, evil and , 64, 87-88 incompatibilism a nd, 243, 244-45,

254-55 libertaria nism (metaphysical) and,

244-46,249-50,255-60 "A Little Om niscience Goes a Long

\Va)'" and, 270-72 science and, 243, 247-48, 250, 256 See also Problem of free wi II

Fruitfulness, 142 Functiona lism

criticism of, 223, 23 1, 235 defined ,209,236,458 identity theory and, 222-23 logical behaviorism a nd, 222-23 m ind-body problem in, 209-10,

222-23,235 Fundamental ideas, 2 7he Fundamentals of Ethier

(Sha fer-Landau), 180

Gand hi, Mahatma, 417/, 421 Gardner, Martin, 338

470 General Index

Gaunilo, 82 Gender, equality and, 388-92. See also

Femi nism "Gender and Bioethics"

(Crosthwa ite), 182 Gender-structured marriage, 388-90 General assent, 294 Genetic fu llacy, 36, 43, 458 Genuine option, 99-100, 102 "G host in t he machine," 211 G illigan, Carol, 183 Girl with a Pearl Earring, 335 G lory, 367 God

Aquinas a nd, 44-45, 61, 66-70, 126 a rgument from evil a nd, 63-64,

84-97, 127, 129, 457 a rgument from rel igious experience

a nd,62-63, 12~ 129,457 belief in, 58-109 Berkeley and , 303 cosmological a rg uments for, 61,

66-71, 126, 458 Descartes a nd, 289-90, 292 design argu ments for, 61-63, 62j

72-77, 80-81, 126 d ifficulty recognizing, 97-98 in d ivine com mand theory, 139,

146-48, 199, 458 d ivi ne right and, 364 evil a nd, 63-66, 84-91, 127,

129, 133 experience of, 92-98, 127 as fathe r, 90 in "A Little Omn iscience Goes a

Long \Vay," 270-72 mea ning o fl ife from, 409-10, 409j

4 16-21, 417j 419-20/ morality of, 87 nature of, 108 ontologic"I argu ments for, 62, 66,

79-83, 127, 130 Pascal betting on, 106-9 Paul's experience of, 93/ purpose of, 89-90 theodicies a nd, 64 See also Rel igion; Religious

experience God, philosophy a nd

a rguments for existence, 61-63, 62j 66-83, 126-2~ 129-30,457

belief without re,tson in, 98-109, 127 Buddhism and, 109-10, 111, 114-16 overview of, 58-66, 126-27 in ph ilosopher's quest, 59-64

problem of evil in, 84-91, 127 "The Star" and , 131-33 t heism a nd religious experience in,

92-98, 93j 127 Goldi ng, W illiam, 397-404 "The Good Brah m in" (Volta ire), 429-30 Good will, 170-71 Govern ment

begi nn ing of, 371-72 end of, 372-73 func tions needed from, 370-71 pervasiveness of, 355-56 rebellion against, 371, 375

The Grand Design (Hawki ng), 72/ Grau, Christopher, 287 Greatest Happiness Principle,

158-59, 162 Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals

(Kant), 170-71 Guard ians, 360

Hallucinations, 276 Happiness

Aristotle a nd, 176-78 eudainionia, 176 in Greatest H appiness Pri nciple,

158-59, 162 meaning of life d isti ng uished

from, 409 in uti lita rian ism, 157-64

Hard determi nism defi ned, 243,268,458 of d 'Holbach, 246-47 Sartre and, 265

Hare, R. M., 422 Hawking, Stephen, 72/ Hea lt h care, 378 Held, Virginia, 183-85, 183/ Herodotus, 341-42 Hick, John

Evil and the God of Love by, 88-91 Hume and, 89, 90 and Rowe's criticism of, 91 suffering a nd, 89, 91

Hi nduism, 116-23 Bhagavad-Gita, 120-22 origins, 117 schools of, 122-23 Upanishads, 118-19 Vedas, 117-18

Hitler, Adolf, 15j 149-50 Hobbes, Thomas

biography of, 365, 365/ compatibilism a nd, 250

equa lity and, 366-67 injustice and, 387 justice and , 366, 369-71, 375-76 socia l contract t heory of, 365-70 See also Leviathan

Homer, 343 Hood, Bruce, 63 H uma n cloning , morality of, 144-45,

144-45/ H uma n rights, Al and, 224-25 H uma ns, natural condition of, 366-70 H ume, David, 350

aesthetics influenced by, 346-48 o n beauty, 346-48 biography of, 304-5, 304/ causality and, 307-8, 307/ compatibi lism and , 250-5 1 c riticism of, 77, 375-76 design arguments critiqued by, 73-77 Dialogues Concerning Natural

Religion by, 73-77 empiricism of, 279, 280, 303-10, 307/ An Enquiry Concerning H11man

Understanding by, 305-10 Hick and, 89, 90 infi nite regress and , 69 Kant and, 311-12 o n perceptions, 304-6, 308, 310 pri nciple of induction a nd, 308-9,

329, 459-60 reasoning a rg ument of, 74 self and, 111 skepticism of, 304-5, 307, 310-12 socia l contract t heory criticized by,

375, 376 Of the Standard of Taste by, 346-48 subjectivism of, 346-48 women and, 320

H ursthouse, Rosali nd, 179 Huxley, Aldous, 242 Hypatia

biography of, 29, 29/ in Tiu School of Athens (Raphael),

178/ Hypothesis

dead, 100 live, 100, 106 rel igious, 99-106

Hypothetical imperative, 171

!, Robot, 225 Ideas

perceptions as, 295-99, 304-5 sensations and, 295-99

Identity theory Cartesian dua lism a nd, 207-8, 218 conceivabi lity arguments agai nst,

218-20 criticism of, 218-2 1, 230-31 defi ned, 208, 236, 458 functionalism and, 222-23 See also Mind-body identity

Ignorance appea l to, 37, 43, 457 argument from evil and, 86-87 veil of, 376

Imitation . See Representation Tiu Imitation Game, 227 Immorta l soul, 214 Impartiality, 137, 158, 169, 183, 184-85 Impermanence, 111-12, 113 Impressions, 304-6 In ti Different Voice (G ill igan), 183 Incompatibi lism

defi ned, 243,269,459 free wi ll a nd, 243, 244-45, 254-55 libertarianism (metaphysical) a nd,

255,257 Independent premise, 28 Indetermi nism

defi ned, 243,269,459 determi nism and, 242-43,

246-50, 266-67 India, Buddhism originati ng in, 110-1 1 Indicator words, 17 Induction

analogical, 24-25 enumerative, 22-23 principle of, 308-9, 329, 459 problem of, 309

Inductive argu ment analogical induction, 24-25 defi ned, 18, 43, 459 enumerative induction, 22-23 examples of, 18-19 inference to the best explanation,

25-26 Industry, modern, 384-85 Infallibility problem, 149-51, 278 In ference to the best

explanation, 25-26 In fi nite chain, o f Movers, 67-71 In fi nity, logica l contradictions of, 71 In herent va lue, of persons, 173-74 Injustice

laws of nature and, 369-70 in politica l philosophy, 387

In nate knowledge, 282-84, 283-95 Instagram, 334/

Intell igent design, 61-63, 62/, 80-8 1. See also Design arguments

Intercessory prayer, 96 Internal mea ning, 410, 421-25 Introduction, in essay structure, 441-42 Invalid arguments, 22, 23 Irises, 335 Island, greatest possible, 82-83, 82f

J Jaggar, Alison, 182 James, W ill iam

biography of, 248, 248f Clifford a nd, 101-2, 102-4 criticism of, 106 determinism a nd, 249 "The Dilemma of Determinism"

by, 249 evidentialism repudiated by, 99-106 genuine option of, 99-100, 102 pragmatism of, 99-106, 248 on religious experience, 92 religious hypothesis of, 99-106 The Will to Believe by, I 00- 106

Judge, k nown and ind ifferent, 373 Justice

defi ned,357,396,459 d istrib utive, 395, 458 as equa lity, 357, 359, 363, 363f femin ism a nd, 387-92, 394-95 Hobbesand,366, 369-71,375-76 laws of nature a nd, 369-70 Lord of the Flies and, 397-404 as merit, 357, 360-63 Plato a nd, 10-11, 357, 360-62,

360/, 393 political philosophy a nd, 355-59,

356/, 358-59] 393 in T/,e Republic, 10-11, 360-62 retributive, 357 social, 387-92, 394-95 social contract theory a nd, 364-78 utilitarian theory of, 357

]ttstice, Gender, and the Family (Okin), 388-91

Kalam cosmological a rg ument, 70-7 1 Kane, Robert, 258 Kant, Im manuel

biography, 313, 313f criticism of, 318-19 Critique of Pure Reason by, 83,

312-15, 318 design a rg uments and, 83

General Index 471

d uty and, 183 empiricism and, 311-19, 315/,

316-I7f epistemology revolution of, 314-15,

315/, 318-19 Grottndwork of the Metaphysic of

Morals by, 170-71 Hume and, 311-12 moral theory of, 141, 143, 170-75,

197, 199, 459 Plato and, 3 12-14 problem of knowledge a nd, 280,

31 1-19, 316-17/, 327 rationalism a nd, 312-14, 318 respect for persons a nd , 173-74 skepticism and, 280, 312, 318 on stamp, 17 If utilitarian ism and, 173 women a nd, 321

Kant's theory categorical imperatives in, 171-75 consequences and, 141, 169-70 criticism of, 173-75 defined, 141, 199, 459 as moral theory, 14 1, 143, 170-75,

197, 199, 459 Karma, 110, 113-14, 121, 459 Kasparov, Garry, 209-10, 209f Kaufma nn, Wa lter, 3 Ki ng, Martin Luther, Jr., 355, 421 Ki ngs, divi ne right of, 364 Kitcher, Philip, 8 1 Klemke, E. D., 423 Knowledge

a rg uments, 219-2 1 forms, 275-76, 303,304 innate, 282-84, 283-95 a posteriori, 278, 3 12, 329, 457 a priori, 278, 312, 313-19, 327,

329, 457 propositional, 276, 329, 460 situated, 321 See also Epistemology; Fem in ist

perspective, on k nowledge; Problem of knowledge

Kushner, Haro ld, 66

Labor, sexua l division of, 390, 391 Lao-Tzu, 123-26 Law, mora lity a nd the, 141 Law of conservation of

mass-energy, 2 16 Laws of nature, 368-70 Lawyers, women as, 391

472 General Index

Legal moralism, 141 Le G uin, Ursu la, 200-203 Leibn iz, Gottfried, 269 Leviathan, 366, 371, 372 Leviathan (Hobbes)

fro ntispiece to, 367f laws of nature in, 368-70 natura l condition of man kind in,

366-70 peace in, 368-70 political ph ilosophy in, 365-70 war in, 368-69

Li, 193, 459 Libera lism

classical, 374-75, 395, 457-58 defined ,374,396,459 welfa re, 378, 396, 460

Libertarianism (metaphysical) agent causation and, 258-60 compatibilism and, 255, 257-58 Consequence Arg ument of, 257 criticism of, 257-60 defined ,244, 269,459 determin ism and, 244-46,

249-50, 255-60 free wi ll a nd, 244-46,

249-50, 255-60 incompatibilism a nd, 255, 257 Libet and, 256 overview of, 267-68

Libertarianism (political) classical liberalism

resembling, 375 defined , 375, 396,459 paradise, in U.S., 380

Liberty, 368-69, 370-71 Libet, Benjamin, 256 Life

bios, 90 examined, 3, 8-11, 14, 40-41 length of, 412j 422 mea ninglessness of, 410-16, 412f moral, consistency with facts of,

145-46 private a nd public, 387-92 purpose of, 419 zoe, 90 See also Meaning, of life

The Lift of Teresa of]enis (Teresa of Avila), 92

Lin, Patrick, 230-31 "A Little Omniscience Goes a Long

Way" (Davis), 270-72 Live hypothesis, 100, 106 Living \Vith Darwin (K itcher), 81

Locke, John, 293f Berkeley and, 299, 301-2 biography of, 375, 375f certainty of, 293-99 compatibilism a nd, 250-51,

254-55 criticism of, 296-99 empiricism of, 279-80, 293-99 An Essay Concerning H11man

Understanding by, 25 1, 293-99 injustice and, 387 political philosophy and, 356 social contract theory of, 371-75 Two Treatises of Government

by, 371f women and, 320 See also Second Treatise of Government

Logic defi ned, 7, 43, 459 of ontological arguments, 79 questions, 6

Logical behaviorism defi ned, 207-8, 236, 459 func tionalism and, 222-23 mind-body problem in, 207-8

Lord of the Flies (Goldi ng), 397-404 Love, parental, 90 Lucretius, 423-24 Lyi ng prom ise, 171-72

Mach ine-un iverse a nalogy, 74, 75 Mackie, J. L.

on God's morality, 87 The Miracle of Theism by, 93

Mahabarata, 115-16 Majority, act of, 371-72 Man, natural condition of, 366-70 Manifesto of the Comm11nist Party

(Marx a nd Engels), 381-86 Marriage, gender-structured, 388-90 Martin, Michael, 106 Marx, Ka rl, 379f

infl uence of, 379 Manifesto of the Comm11nist Party by,

381-86 socialist theory of, 379-86

Materialism bats and, 219-21, 22 1f defi ned, 207, 236, 459 as false, 210 property dualism and, 232-33 zombies and, 2 18-19, 220f

The Matrix, 287, 287f Matters of fac t, 303-4, 306, 312

Meani ng from above, 4 16-21 from below, 421-25 external, 4 10-11 interna l, 410, 421-25 meani ng of, 409-10, 414, 4 16

Meani ng, of life from above, 4 16-21 Baggi ni and, 414-16, 420-21, 420f from below, 421-25 Camus and, 408, 414 defi ned,409-10,4 14, 4 16 God's plan for, 409-10, 409j

416-2 1, 417j 419-20f happiness d isti nguished from, 409 interna l, 410 length of life and, 4 l 2j 422 meani ng of meaning in, 409-10,

414,4 16 morality distinguished from, 409 optimist's view of, 4 10, 416-25, 417j

419j 420j 426 overview of, 407-10, 407j 409j 426 as personal, 408-9 pessimist's view of, 411-16,

412j 426 philosophy and, 407-10, 407j 409f for potter, 407-8 q uiz, 427, 427f from religion, 409- 10, 409j 416-21,

417j 4 19-20f suffering and, 4 13-14

Meani nglessness, of life, 410-16, 412f Means of production, 379-81, 384 Meditations on First Philosophy

(Descartes), 2 13, 285-86, 288-92 Meno (Plato), 283-84 Mental discipline, 114-16 Merit

justice and , 357, 360-63 o rgan transpla nts and, 363, 363f

Meritocracy, 360, 396, 459 Messerly, John G., 424 Metaphysics, 4-6, 43, 459 Metaphysics (Taylor, R.), 258-60 Metz, Thaddeus, 424 Michelangelo, 335 M iddle Way o r Path, 114-16 M ill, James, 165 M ill, John Stuart

biography of, 165, 165f Greatest Happiness Pri nciple of,

158-59, 162 The Sttbjection of\Vome11 by, 165 uti lita rianism of, 157-63

"\Vhat Utilitarianism Is" by, 158-63 women and , 165, 320

Mi ller, David, 391-92 Milton, John, 347 Mimesis. See Representation Mi nd

of bats, 219-21 bra in and, 207-10, 223-29, 231-33 conceptual processor of, 316-17,

316-17/ intu ition of, 291-92, 292/ objects conformi ng to, 3 15-18 as properties, 230-35 See also Software, mind as

Mind (Searle), 216, 226-29 Mi nd-body identity

conceivabi lity arguments and, 218-20

criticism of, 218-2 1, 230-31 theory of, 207-9, 217-21, 235

Mi nd-body problem defi ned, 206, 236, 459 epiphenomenalism and, 210-11 in fu nctiona lism, 209- 10, 222-23,

226-27, 235 immortal sou l and, 214j 215 in logica l behaviorism, 207-8 mind as softwa re and, 209-10,

222-29, 235 overview of, 206-10, 234 in property dua lism, 210, 230-35 in substa nce d ualism, 206-7,

211- 16, 214-15] 234-35 "The Mind-Body Problem" (Fodor),

222-23 The Miracle of Theism (Mackie), 93 Mitys, 342 Modern industry, 384-85 Modus ponens (affirming the a ntecedent),

19, 23 Modus to/lens (denyi ng the

co nsequent), 20-21 Mommy track, 39 1 Mona Lisa, 335, 338, 343 Monotheism, 65, 130, 459 Moral absolutism, 148-49, 199, 459 Moral com mon sense, 143-46, 168,

173-74 Moral conduct, 114-16 Moral criteria of adequacy, 143-46,

149-50, 196 Moral disagreement, 149-5 1, 153-55 Moral evil, 84, 130, 459 Moral excellence, 178-79 Morality

based on rights, 169-75, 197 Camus and, 189-92, 197 character and, 175-81, 197 consequences and, 155-69 defined, 136, 199, 459 d ivine command t heory and,

139, 146-48, 180, 196, 199, 448-49, 458

duty and, 169-75, 197 empiric") basis of, 170 ethics d isti ng uished from, 137-38 God's, 87 of human cloning, 144-45, 144-45/ impartiality and, 137, 158, 169, 183,

184-85 and t he law, 141 mean ing of life distinguished

from, 409 as normative enterprise, 137 overview of, 136-48, 196 political philosophy a nd, 365 principle of respect for persons and,

173-74 properties o f, 137-38 reason-based, 137-38 religion and, 146-48 Socrates a nd, 147

Mora l judgments, considered, 143-46, 168, 173

Mora l life, consistency with fa cts of, 145-46

Mora l objectivism, 148-49, 154-55, 199, 459

Mora l obligations, 139 Mora l ph ilosophy. See ethics Mora l problem-solving, resourcefulness

in, 145-46 Mora l progress, 150-52, 151-53 Mora l question, 103-4 Mora l relativism

cultural relativism and, 149, 151-55

defined, 149, 199, 459 infallibi lity problem of, 15 1-52 overview of, 196 subjective relativism and, 148-51

Mora l t heory consequentialist, 140, 143, 155,

199, 458 considered mora l judgments in,

143-46, 168, 173 criteria of adequacy in, 143-46,

149-50, 196 data and, 143-46 defined, 139, 199, 459

General Index 473

deontological, 140, 141, 155, 199, 458 divine command t heory, 139, 146-48,

180, 196, 199, 448-49, 458 ethical egoism, 140, 143, 165-69, 458 ethics of care, 142-43, 181-88, 197,

199, 458 Kant's theory, 141, 143, 170-75, 197,

199, 459 scientific theory ana logous to,

142-46 types, 140-46 utilitarian ism, 140, 141, 143,

155-64, 460 virtue ethics, 142, 175-80, 460

Moral values, 139 Morris, Richard, 69 Motion, a rgument from, 67-68 Motivation, right t hought a nd, 116 Movers, infin ite chai n of, 67-71 Mu lt iple persona lity disorder, 213 Mu ltiple realizability, 209, 236, 459 Museu m, 341 My Confession (Tolstoy), 411-13, 416-18 "The Myth of Sisyphus" (Camus),

189-92

Nagel, Thomas, 219-21 N amazie, Ma ryam, 153 Narrative, "The Tria l and Death of

Socrates" as, 47-55 N atura l condition, of ma n, 366-70 Natura l evil, 84, 130, 459 Natura listic theories, 77 Natura l selection, 80-8 1 Na tttral Theology (Paley), 72-73 Nature

of God, 108 imperfections in, 74-77, 75/ laws of, 368-70 state of, 366, 371, 372-76

Necessary evil, 64 "The Need for More Than Justice"

(Baier), 188 N eedy, assisting, 357, 359, 359/ N ews, philosophy in, 34 Niconiachean Ethics (A ristotle), 176-77 Nielsen, Kai, 422 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 415 N ihilists, 411 Nirvana, 112-16 , 130, 459 N oble Eightfold Path, 114-16 N on-art, 333-35 Nonconsequentialist theory.

See deontological theory

474 General Index

Norma l species f unctioning, 378 Normative, 137 Noumena, 317 Nozick, Robert, 359

0 Obama, Barack, 381 Objections, assessment of, 443 Objectivism, 338-43, 350, 459 Objects, confo rm ing to m ind, 3 15-18 Obligation

moral, 139 theories of, 141-42, 175-76, 178-79

Ockham's razor, 77 O'Connor, Timoth)', 258 Odys,ey (Homer), 343 Oedipus, 34 2 "Of t he Principles of Human

Knowledge" (Berkeley), 300-303 Of the Standard of Taste (Hume),

346-48 "Of t he System of Man's Free Agency"

(d' Holbach), 246-47 Ogilby, John, 347 Oki n, Susan Moller

femi nism and, 388-91, 389f justice, Gender, and the Family by,

388-9 1 Omn iscience, 270-72 "The Ones \Vho Walk Away From

Ornelas" (Le Gui n), 200-203 "On the Sufferi ngs of the World"

(Schopen hauer), 4 13-14 Ontological arguments

Anselm's, 62, 79-83 defined, 62, 130, 459 form of, 66 for God's existence, 62, 66, 79-83,

127, 130 logic of, 79

Opi nion d uty to, 102-3 psychology of, 103-4

Opportunity, equa lity of, 377-78 Optim ists

about mea ning o fl ife, 4 10, 416-25, 417/, 419/, 420/, 426

Edwards, 421-22 Tolstoy, 4 11, 416-18 Warren, 4 19

Orestes, 343 Organ transplants, 363, 363f Original position, of Rawls, 376-77 Outline, of philosophy paper, 446 "The Ova l Portrait" (Poe), 351-52

Overridingness, 137 Ovid, 333

Pa in, 222-23, 297-98 Pa ley, \Vi lliam, 61-62, 72-73 Pa nentheism, 65, 130, 459 Pa ntheism, 65, 130, 459 Papers. See Philosophy papers Pa rental love, 90 Parks, Rosa, 42 1 Parmenides, 13, l 3f Pasca l, Blaise, 106f

criticism of, I 08 God and, 106-9 Pensees and Other Writings by, 107-9 wager of, 99, 102, 106-9

Paul (sai nt), 93f Peace, in Leviathan, 368-70 Pensees and Other \flritings

(Pascal), 107-9 Perceptions

Hume o n, 304-6, 308, 310 as ideas, 295-99, 304-5

Persona l, as political, 390, 390j 392 Persona l existence, recognition of, 291 Persuasion, 15 Pessim ists

abo ut meaning of life, 4 11-16, 412j 426

Darrow, 414 Schopen hauer, 413-14, 414f Tolstoy, 411-13, 416- 18

Phenomena, 317 Philo, 73-76 Philosophers, quest of, 2-7, 40, 59-64.

See also specific philosophers Philosophic"l beliefs survey, 5 Philosophical method, 2 Philosophy

aesthetics a nd, 333 arguments in, 14-40, 4 1 of beauty, 333, 349 bias in, 320-23 careers in, 431-36 as college major, 43 1-36 good of, 2-4 immediacy of, 2 main d ivisions of, 4-7 meaning ofl ife and, 407-10,

407/, 409f in news, 34 in politics, 35, 35f as quest for u nderstanding, 2-7,

40, 59-64

reading, 27-32 reasons in, 15-27 th inking philosophically in,

14-40, 4 1 See also God , philosophy and;

Politica l philosophy Philosophy and Feminist Criticism

(Cole), 321-23 ph ilosophy majors, 431-36

ca reers for, 431-34 salaries of, 4 34-36

Philosophy of Religion (Rowe), 84-87, 95

Philosophy papers fi nal draft of, 447 first draft of, 446-47 o utline of, 446 resea rch fo r, 445 revision of, 447 sample, 448-50 steps of, 444-47 structure of, 441-44 thesis statement in, 442-43, 445-46 topic selection fo r, 444-45 writi ng instructions for, 444-50

Ph)'sica lism. See materialism Ph)'sics, q uantum, 69, 71, 243, 247-48 Pinea l gland, 215f Pity, 340-43 Plato, 7 f, 28 lj 349

Academy of, 360f aesthetics influenced by, 340 The Apology by, 47-55 democracy opposed by, 360, 364 Ettthyphro by, 147 Forms of, 282, 340 H)'patia and, 29 inAuence of, 9 justice and, 10-11, 357, 360-62,

360/, 393 Kant and, 312-14 Meno by, 283-84 propositional knowledge and , 276 rationalism of, 279, 281-84,

281/, 312-14 The Repttblic b)', 10-11, 360-62, 360f in The School of Athens (Raphael), l 78f Socrates a nd, 8-11, 47-55, 147,

283-84,326,361-62, 449 substa nce dualism of, 207 "The Trial a nd Death of Socrates"

by,47-55 women and, 320

Pleasure, sensi ng of, 287-88 Poe, Edgar Allan, 351-52