Virtue Ethics – Symposium

Reading Philosophy Philosophical Texts

Utilitarianism – John Stuart Mill

1. The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded- namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. Mill, J.S. (1863)

2. According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self- consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation. Mill, J.S. (1863)

Deontology – Immanuel Kant

1. So an action’s moral value doesn't lie in the effect that is expected from it, or in

any principle of action that motivates it because of this expected effect. All the

expected effects something agreeable for me or even happiness for others could

be brought about through other causes and don't need the will of a rational being,

where is the highest good but is unconditionally good can be found only in such a

will. So this wonderful good which we call moral goodness can't consist in

anything but the thought of law in itself that only a rational being can have with

the will being moved to act by this thought and not by the hope for effect of the

action when the person acts according to this conception this moral goodness is

already present in him we don't have to look for it in The upshot of his action so

we have a law the thought of which can settle the will without reference to any

expected result and must do so if the will is to be called absolutely good without

qualification. What kind of law can this be? Since I have robbed the will of any

impulses that could come to it from obeying any law, nothing remains to serve as

a guiding principle of the will accept conducts universally conforming to law as

such that is I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn't also will that the

maximum on which I act should be a universal law.

Kant, I. (1785)

2. Consider the question: may I when in difficulties make a promise that I intend not

to keep? The question obviously has two meanings: is it prudent to make a false promise? Does it conform to duty to make a false promise? No doubt it often is prudent but not as often as you may think obviously the false promise isn't made prudent by its merely extricating me from my present difficulties I have to think about it whether it will in the long run cause more trouble than it saves in the present even with all my supposed cunning the consequences can't be so easily foreseen people's loss of trust in me might be far more disadvantageous than the trouble I am now trying to avoid and it is hard to tell whether it mightn't be more prudent to act according to a universal maxim not ever to make a promise that I don't intend to keep. Kant, I. (1785)

3. Being truthful from duty is an entirely different thing from being truthful out of fear

of bad consequences; for in the former case a law is included in the concept of the action itself whereas in the latter I must first look outward to see what results my action may have. How can I know whether a deceitful promise is consistent with duty? The shortest way to go about finding out is also the surest. It is to ask myself: Would I be content for my maxim (of getting out of a difficulty through a false promise) to hold as a universal law, for myself as well as for others? That is tantamount to asking: Could I say to myself that anyone may make a false promise when he is in a difficulty that he can’t get out of in any other way? Immediately, I realize that I could will the lie but not a universal law to lie; for a law would result in there being no promises at all, because it would be futile to offer stories about my future conduct to people who wouldn’t believe me; or if they carelessly did believe me and were taken in ·by my promise·, would pay me back in my own coin. Thus, my maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal law. Kant, I. (1785)

4. So, if there is to be a supreme practical principle, and a categorical imperative for the human will, it must be an objective principle of the will that can serve as a universal law. Why must it? Because it has to be drawn from the conception of something that is an end in itself and therefore an end for everyone. The basis for this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Human beings necessarily think of their own existence in this way, which means that the principle holds as a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being also thinks of his existence on the same rational ground that holds also for myself; and so it is at the same time an objective principle—·one that doesn’t depend on contingent facts about this or that subject·—a supreme practical ground from which it must be possible to derive all the laws of the will. So here is the practical imperative: Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means. Kant, I. (1785)

Virtue Ethics - Aristotle

1. Book 2, Chapter 6 I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate. Aristotle. (1931)

2. Book 2, Chapter 1

It is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of

anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference. Aristotle. (1931)

3. Book 10, Chapter 6

Now that we have spoken of the virtues, the forms of friendship, and the varieties of pleasure, what remains is to discuss in outline the nature of happiness, since this is what we state the end of human nature to be. Our discussion will be the more concise if we first sum up what we have said already. We said, then, that it is not a disposition; for if it where it might belong to someone who was asleep throughout his life, living the life of a plant, or, again, to someone who was suffering the greatest misfortunes. If these implications are unacceptable, and we must rather class happiness as an activity, as we have said before, and if some activities are necessary, and desirable for the sake of something else, while others are so in themselves, evidently happiness must be placed among those desirable in themselves, not among those desirable for the sake of something else; for happiness does not lack anything but is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And of this nature virtuous actions are thought to be; for to do noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake. Aristotle. (1931)

Letter from a Birmingham Jail – Martin Luther King Jr.

1. We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have never yet engaged in a direct-action movement that was "well timed" according to the timetable of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word "wait." It rings in the ear of every Negro with a piercing familiarity. This "wait" has almost always meant "never." It has been a tranquilizing thalidomide, relieving the emotional stress for a moment, only to give birth to an ill-formed infant of frustration. We must come to see with the distinguished jurist of yesterday that "justice too long delayed is justice denied." We have waited for more than three hundred and forty years for our God-given and constitutional rights. The nations of Asia and Africa are moving with jet-like speed toward the goal of political independence, and we still creep at horse-and- buggy pace toward the gaining of a cup of coffee at a lunch counter. King, M.L. (1963)

2. I guess it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation to say "wait." But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate-filled policemen curse, kick, brutalize, and even kill your black brothers and sisters with impunity; when you see the vast majority of your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the midst of an affluent society; when you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech stammering as you seek to explain to your six-year-old daughter why she cannot go to the public amusement park that has just been advertised on television; … when you take a cross-country drive and find it necessary to sleep night after night in the uncomfortable corners of your automobile because no motel will accept you; when you are humiliated day in and day out by nagging signs reading "white" and "colored… when you are harried by day and haunted by night by the fact that you are a Negro, living constantly at tiptoe stance, never knowing what to expect next, and plagued with inner fears and outer resentments; when you are forever fighting a degenerating sense of "nobodyness" -- then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait. King, M.L. (1963)

3. Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The urge for freedom will

eventually come. This is what has happened to the American Negro. Something within has reminded him of his birthright of freedom; something without has reminded him that he can gain it. Consciously and unconsciously, he has been swept in by what the Germans call the Zeitgeist, and with his black brothers of Africa and his brown and yellow brothers of Asia, South America, and the Caribbean, he is moving with a sense of cosmic urgency toward the promised land of racial justice. Recognizing this vital urge that has engulfed the Negro community, one should readily understand public demonstrations. The Negro has many pent-up resentments and latent frustrations. He has to get them out. So let him march sometime; let him have his prayer pilgrimages to the city hall; understand why he must have sit-ins and freedom rides. If his repressed emotions do not come out in these nonviolent ways, they will come out in ominous expressions of violence. This is not a threat; it is a fact of history. So I have not said to my people, "Get rid of your discontent." But I have tried to say that this normal and healthy discontent can be channeled through the creative outlet of nonviolent direct action. Now this approach is being dismissed as extremist. King, M.L. (1963)

4. I wish you had commended the Negro demonstrators of Birmingham for their

sublime courage, their willingness to suffer, and their amazing discipline in the midst of the most inhuman provocation. One day the South will recognize its real heroes. They will be the James Merediths, courageously and with a majestic sense of purpose facing jeering and hostile mobs and the agonizing loneliness that characterizes the life of the pioneer. They will be old, oppressed, battered Negro women, symbolized in a seventy-two-year-old woman of Montgomery,

Alabama, who rose up with a sense of dignity and with her people decided not to ride the segregated buses, and responded to one who inquired about her tiredness with ungrammatical profundity, "My feets is tired, but my soul is rested." They will be young high school and college students, young ministers of the gospel and a host of their elders courageously and nonviolently sitting in at lunch counters and willingly going to jail for conscience's sake. One day the South will know that when these disinherited children of God sat down at lunch counters they were in reality standing up for the best in the American dream and the most sacred values in our Judeo-Christian heritage. King, M.L. (1963)

A Theory of Justice – John Rawls

1. The circumstances of justice may be described as the normal conditions under

which human cooperation is both possible and necessary. Thus, as I noted at the

outset, although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is

typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests. There is an

identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all

than any would have if each were to try to live solely by his own efforts. There is

a conflict of interests since men are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits

produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends

they each prefer a larger to a lesser share. Thus, principles are needed for

choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this division of

advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares.

These requirements define the role of justice. The background conditions that

give rise to these necessities are the circumstances of justice.

Rawls, J. (1990)

2. If wealth, position, and influence, and the accolades of social prestige, are a

person's final purposes, then surely his conception of the good is egoistic. His

dominant interests are in himself, not merely, as they must always be, interests

of a self. There is no inconsistency, then, in supposing that once the veil of

ignorance is removed, the parties find that they have ties of sentiment and

affection and want to advance the interests of others and to see their ends

attained. But the postulate of mutual disinterest in the original position is made to

ensure that the principles of justice do not depend upon strong assumptions.

Recall that the original position is meant to incorporate widely shared and yet

weak conditions. A conception of justice should not presuppose, then, extensive

ties of natural sentiment. At the basis of the theory, one tries to assume as little

as possible.

Rawls, J. (1990)

3. Thus, there follows the very important consequence that the parties have no

basis for bargaining in the usual sense. No one knows his situation in society nor

his natural assets, and therefore no one is in a position to tailor principles to his

advantage. We might imagine that one of the contractees threatens to hold out

unless the others agree to principles favorable to him. But how does he know

which principles are especially in his interests? The same holds for the formation

of coalitions: if a group were to decide to band together to the disadvantage of

the others, they would not know how to favor themselves in the choice of

principles. Even if they could get everyone to agree to their proposal, they would

have no assurance that it was to their advantage, since they cannot identify

themselves either by name or description.

Rawls, J. (1971)

References Aristotle. (1931). Nicomachean ethics (W. D. Ross, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University

Press (Original work published ca. 350 B.C.E.) Kant, I. (2008). Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals. In J Bennett (Ed & Trans)

Early Modern Philosophy. Retrieved from: http://222.earlymoderntests.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785,pdf (Original work published 1785).

King , M. L., Jr (1963, August). Letter from a Birmingham Jail. The Atlantic Monthly. Vol

22. No 2, p. 78-88. Mill, J. S. (2008). Utilitarianism. In J. Bennett (Ed. & Rev.), Early Modern Philosophy.

Retrieved from http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/mill1863.pdf Rawls, J. (1971,1999). A theory of justice. Oxford University Press.