Essay.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 1

METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Plato – The Republic, Book VII

Source: http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.8.vii.html

The following is a dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon (Glaucon’s words are in italics).

And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: --Behold!

Human beings living in a underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all

along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that

they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their

heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there

is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which

marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

I see.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures

of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them

are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the

fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their

heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner, they would only see the shadows?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what

was actually before them?

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 2

Very true.

And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure

to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing

shadow?

No question, he replied.

To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.

And now look again, and see what will naturally follow it' the prisoners are released and disabused of

their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck

round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he

will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then

conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is

approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision, -

what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they

pass and requiring him to name them, -will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows

which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Far truer.

And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make

him turn away to take and take in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to

be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True, he said.

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until

he 's forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he

approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are

now called realities.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 3

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows

best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he

will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and

the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Last of he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in

his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Certainly.

He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of

all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have

been accustomed to behold?

Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do

you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?

Certainly, he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honors among themselves on those who were quickest to

observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and

which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think

that he would care for such honors and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with

Homer, ‘Better to be the poor servant of a poor master, and to endure anything, rather than think as they

do and live after their manner?’

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in

this miserable manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation;

would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 4

To be sure, he said.

And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had

never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and

the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he

not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it

was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the

light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-

house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you

interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my

poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether

true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is

seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful

and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason

and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in

public or private life must have his eye fixed.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 5

Aristotle – Posterior Analytics

Source: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/posterior.2.ii.html

Part 19

We have already said that scientific knowledge through demonstration is impossible unless a man

knows the primary immediate premises. But there are questions which might be raised in respect of the

apprehension of these immediate premises: one might not only ask whether it is of the same kind as the

apprehension of the conclusions, but also whether there is or is not scientific knowledge of both; or

scientific knowledge of the latter, and of the former a different kind of knowledge; and, further,

whether the developed states of knowledge are not innate but come to be in us, or are innate but at first

unnoticed. Now it is strange if we possess them from birth; for it means that we possess apprehensions

more accurate than demonstration and fail to notice them. If on the other hand we acquire them and do

not previously possess them, how could we apprehend and learn without a basis of pre-existent

knowledge? For that is impossible, as we used to find in the case of demonstration. So it emerges that

neither can we possess them from birth, nor can they come to be in us if we are without knowledge of

them to the extent of having no such developed state at all. Therefore we must possess a capacity of

some sort, but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed states. And this at least is an

obvious characteristic of all animals, for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which is

called sense-perception. But though sense-perception is innate in all animals, in some the sense-

impression comes to persist, in others it does not. So animals in which this persistence does not come to

be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of perceiving, or no knowledge of objects of which

no impression persists; animals in which it does come into being have perception and can continue to

retain the sense-impression in the soul: and when such persistence is frequently repeated a further

distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop

a power of systematizing them and those which do not. So out of sense-perception comes to be what we

call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a

number of memories constitute a single experience. From experience again-i.e. from the universal now

stabilized in its entirety within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single identity within them

all-originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of

coming to be and science in the sphere of being.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 6

We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor developed

from other higher states of knowledge, but from sense-perception. It is like a rout in battle stopped by

first one man making a stand and then another, until the original formation has been restored. The soul

is so constituted as to be capable of this process.

Let us now restate the account given already, though with insufficient clearness. When one of a number

of logically indiscriminable particulars has made a stand, the earliest universal is present in the soul: for

though the act of sense-perception is of the particular, its content is universal-is man, for example, not

the man Callias. A fresh stand is made among these rudimentary universals, and the process does not

cease until the indivisible concepts, the true universals, are established: e.g. such and such a species of

animal is a step towards the genus animal, which by the same process is a step towards a further

generalization.

Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction; for the method by which

even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive. Now of the thinking states by which we

grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error-opinion, for instance, and calculation,

whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further, no other kind of thought except

intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable

than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive. From these considerations it follows

that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since except intuition nothing

can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises-a result

which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration,

nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. If, therefore, it is the only other kind

of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific

knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premise, while science as a

whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 7

Aristotle – Categories

Source: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/categories.1.1.html

Part 5

Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither

predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a

secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are

included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included

in the species 'man', and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore-that is to

say, the species 'man' and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary substances.

It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate must be

predicable of the subject. For instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the

name of the species man' is applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the

individual; and the definition of 'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual

man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are predicable of the

individual. […]

Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being more nearly related

to primary substance. For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would

render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by

stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that

he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual

in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of

an individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by

mentioning the genus 'plant'.

Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the

entities which underlie everything else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present

in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists

also between the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 8

the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we

have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus.

Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than

another. We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to

which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same method of definition.

In the same way, of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than another; an individual man

is not more truly substance than an individual ox.

Aristotle – Physics, Book II

Source: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html

Part 3

Now that we have established these distinctions, we must proceed to consider causes, their character

and number. Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they

have grasped the 'why' of (which is to grasp its primary cause). So clearly we too must do this as

regards both coming to be and passing away and every kind of physical change, in order that, knowing

their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our problems.

In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called 'cause', e.g.

the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are

species.

In another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence, and its genera, are

called 'causes' (e.g. of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the

definition.

Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the man who gave advice is a cause,

the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of

what is changed.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 9

Again (4) in the sense of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of

walking about. ('Why is he walking about?' we say. 'To be healthy', and, having said that, we think we

have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate

steps which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards the end,

e.g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health. All these

things are 'for the sake of' the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities,

others instruments.

This then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term 'cause' is used.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 10

Descartes – Meditations on First Philosophy

Source: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/descartes/1639/meditations.htm

First Meditation (On what can be called into doubt)

Some years ago I was struck by how many false things I had believed, and by how doubtful was the

structure of beliefs that I had based on them. I realized that if I wanted to establish anything in the

sciences that was stable and likely to last, I needed – just once in my life – to demolish everything

completely and start again from the foundations. It looked like an enormous task, and I decided to wait

until I was old enough to be sure that there was nothing to be gained from putting it off any longer. I

have now delayed it for so long that I have no excuse for going on planning to do it rather than getting

to work. So today I have set all my worries aside and arranged for myself a clear stretch of free time. I

am here quite alone, and at last I will devote myself, sincerely and without holding back, to

demolishing my opinions.

I can do this without showing that all my beliefs are false, which is probably more than I could ever

manage. My reason tells me that as well as withholding assent from propositions that are obviously

false, I should also withhold it from ones that are not completely certain and indubitable. So all I need,

for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, is to find in each of them at least some reason for doubt. I

can do this without going through them one by one, which would take forever: once the foundations of

a building have been undermined, the rest collapses of its own accord; so I will go straight for the basic

principles on which all my former beliefs rested.

Whatever I have accepted until now as most true has come to me through my senses. But occasionally I

have found that they have deceived me, and it is unwise to trust completely those who have deceived us

even once. Yet although the senses sometimes deceive us about objects that are very small or distant,

that doesn’t apply to my belief that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown,

holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on. It seems to be quite impossible to doubt beliefs like

these, which come from the senses.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 11

Another example: how can I doubt that these hands or this whole body are mine? To doubt such things

I would have to liken myself to brain-damaged madmen who are convinced they are kings when really

they are paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked, or that they are pumpkins, or

made of glass. Such people are insane, and I would be thought equally mad if I modelled myself on

them.

What a brilliant piece of reasoning! As if I were not a man who sleeps at night and often has all the

same experiences while asleep as madmen do when awake – indeed sometimes even more improbable

ones. Often in my dreams I am convinced of just such familiar events – that I am sitting by the fire in

my dressing-gown – when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet right now my eyes are certainly

wide open when I look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it isn’t asleep; when I rub one hand

against the other, I do it deliberately and know what I am doing. This wouldn’t all happen with such

clarity to someone asleep.

Indeed! As if I didn’t remember other occasions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoug hts

while asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I realize that there is never any reliable way of

distinguishing being awake from being asleep.

This discovery makes me feel dizzy, which itself reinforces the notion that I may be asleep! Suppose

then that I am dreaming; it isn’t true that I, with my eyes open, am moving my head and stretching out

my hands. Suppose, indeed that I don’t even have hands or any body at all. Still, it has to be admitted

that the visions that come in sleep are like paintings: they must have been made as copies of real things;

so at least these general kinds of things – eyes, head, hands and the body as a whole – must be real and

not imaginary. For even when painters try to depict sirens and satyrs with the most extraordinary

bodies, they simply jumble up the limbs of different kinds of real animals, rather than inventing natures

that are entirely new. If they do succeed in thinking up something completely fictitious and unreal (not

remotely like anything ever seen before) at least the colours used in the picture must be real. Similarly,

although these general kinds of things – eyes, head, hands and so on – could be imaginary, there is no

denying that certain even simpler and more universal kinds of things are real. These are the elements

out of which we make all our mental images of things – the true and also the false ones.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 12

These simpler and more universal kinds include body, and extension; the shape of extended things;

their quantity, size and number; the places things can be in, the time through which they can last, and

so on.

So it seems reasonable to conclude that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other sciences dealing

with things that have complex structures are doubtful; while arithmetic, geometry and other studies of

the simplest and most general things – whether they really exist in nature or not – contain something

certain and indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two plus three makes five, and a square has

only four sides. It seems impossible to suspect that such obvious truths might be false.

However, I have for many years been sure that there is an all-powerful God who made me to be the sort

of creature that I am. How do I know that he hasn’t brought it about that there is no earth, no sky,

nothing that takes up space, no shape, no size, no place, while making sure that all these things appear

to me to exist? Anyway, I sometimes think that others go wrong even when they think they have the

most perfect knowledge; so how do I know that I myself don’t go wrong every time I add two and three

or count the sides of a square? Well, you might say•, God would not let me be deceived like that,

because he is said to be supremely good. But, I reply, if God’s goodness would stop him from letting

me be deceived all the time, you would expect it to stop him from allowing me to be deceived even

occasionally; yet clearly I sometimes am deceived.

Some people would deny the existence of such a powerful God rather than believe that everything else

is uncertain. Let us grant them – for purposes of argument – that there is no God, and theology is

fiction. On their view, then, I am a product of fate or chance or a long chain of causes and effects. But

the less powerful they make my original cause, the more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be

deceived all the time – because deception and error seem to be imperfections. Having no answer to

these arguments, I am driven back to the position that doubts can properly be raised about any of my

former beliefs. I don’t reach this conclusion in a flippant or casual manner, but on the basis of powerful

and well thought-out reasons. So in future, if I want to discover any certainty, I must withhold my

assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I withhold it from obvious falsehoods. It isn’t

enough merely to have noticed this, though; I must make an effort to remember it. My old familiar

opinions keep coming back, and against my will they capture my belief. […]

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 13

So I shall suppose that some malicious, powerful, cunning demon has done all he can to deceive me –

rather than this being done by God, who is supremely good and the source of truth. I shall think that the

sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely dreams that the demon

has contrived as traps for my judgment. I shall consider myself as having no hands or eyes, or flesh, or

blood or senses, but as having falsely believed that I had all these things. I shall stubbornly persist in

this train of thought; and even if I can’t learn any truth, I shall at least do what I can do, which is to be

on my guard against accepting any falsehoods, so that the deceiver – however powerful and cunning he

may be – will be unable to affect me in the slightest. This will be hard work, though, and a kind of

laziness pulls me back into my old ways. Like a prisoner who dreams that he is free, starts to suspect

that it is merely a dream, and wants to go on dreaming rather than waking up, so I am content to slide

back into my old opinions; I fear being shaken out of them because I am afraid that my peaceful sleep

may be followed by hard labour when I wake, and that I shall have to struggle not in the light but in the

imprisoning darkness of the problems I have raised.

Second Meditation (The nature of the human mind; how it is better known than the body)

[…] I will suppose, then, that everything I see is fictitious. I will believe that my memory tells me

nothing but lies. I have no senses. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are illusions. So what

remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain!

Still, how do I know that there isn’t something – not on that list – about which there is no room for

even the slightest doubt? Isn’t there a God (call him what you will) who gives me the thoughts I am

now having? But why do I think this, since I might myself be the author of these thoughts? But then

doesn’t it follow that I am, at least, something? This is very confusing, because I have just said that I

have no senses and no body, and I am so bound up with a body and with senses that one would think

that I can’t exist without them. Now that I have convinced myself that there is nothing in the world – no

sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies – does it follow that I don’t exist either? No it does not follow; for if

I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 14

But there is a supremely powerful and cunning deceiver who deliberately deceives me all the time!

Even then, if he is deceiving me I undoubtedly exist: let him deceive me all he can, he will never bring

it about that I am nothing while I think I am something. So after thoroughly thinking the matter through

I conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, must be true whenever I assert it or think it. […]

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms,

denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

That is a long list of attributes for me to have – and it really is I who have them all. Why should it not

be? Isn’t it one and the same ‘I’ who now doubts almost everything, understands some things, affirms

this one thing – namely, that I exist and think, denies everything else, wants to know more, refuses to

be deceived, imagines many things involuntarily, and is aware of others that seem to come from the

senses? Isn’t all this just as true as the fact that I exist, even if I am in a perpetual dream, and even if

my creator is doing his best to deceive me? These activities are all aspects of my thinking, and are all

inseparable from myself. The fact that it is I who doubt and understand and want is so obvious that I

can’t see how to make it any clearer. But the ‘I’ who imagines is also this same ‘I’. For even if (as I am

pretending) none of the things that I imagine really exist, I really do imagine them, and this is part of

my thinking. Lastly, it is also this same ‘I’ who senses, or is aware of bodily things seemingly through

the senses. Because I may be dreaming, I can’t say for sure that I now see the flames, hear the wood

crackling, and feel the heat of the fire; but I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This

cannot be false; what is called ‘sensing’ is strictly just this seeming, and when ‘sensing’ is understood

in this restricted sense of the word it too is simply thinking. […]

Let us consider the things that people ordinarily think they understand best of all, namely the bodies

that we touch and see. I don’t mean bodies in general – for our general thoughts are apt to be confused

– but one particular body: this piece of wax, for example. It has just been taken from the honeycomb; it

still tastes of honey and has the scent of the flowers from which the honey was gathered; its colour,

shape and size are plain to see; it is hard, cold and can be handled easily; if you rap it with your knuckle

it makes a sound. In short, it has everything that seems to be needed for a body to be known perfectly

clearly. But as I speak these words I hold the wax near to the fire, and look! The taste and smell vanish,

the colour changes, the shape is lost, the size increases; the wax becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 15

touch it, and it no longer makes a sound when you strike it. But is it still the same wax? Of course it is;

no-one denies this. So what was it about the wax that I understood so clearly? Evidently it was not any

of the features that the senses told me of; for all of them – brought to me through taste, smell, sight,

touch or hearing – have now altered, yet it is still the same wax.

Perhaps what I now think about the wax indicates what its nature was all along. If that is right, then the

wax was not the sweetness of the honey, the scent of the flowers, the whiteness, the shape, or the

sound, but was rather a body that recently presented itself to me in those ways but now appears

differently. But what exactly is this thing that I am now imagining? Well, if we take away whatever

doesn’t belong to the wax (that is, everything that the wax could be without), what is left is merely

something extended, flexible and changeable. What do ‘flexible’ and ‘changeable’ mean here? I can

imaginatively picture this piece of wax changing from round to square, from square to triangular, and

so on. But that isn’t what changeability is. In knowing that the wax is changeable I understand that it

can go through endlessly many changes of that kind, far more than I can depict in my imagination; so it

isn’t my imagination that gives me my grasp of the wax as flexible and changeable. Also, what does

‘extended’ mean? Is the wax’s extension also unknown? It increases if the wax melts, and increases

again if it boils; the wax can be extended in many more ways (that is, with many more shapes) than I

will ever bring before my imagination. I am forced to conclude that the nature of this piece of wax isn’t

revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the mind alone. (I am speaking of this particular piece

of wax; the point is even clearer with regard to wax in general.) This wax that is perceived by the mind

alone is, of course, the same wax that I see, touch, and picture in my imagination – in short the same

wax I thought it to be from the start. But although my perception of it seemed to be a case of vision and

touch and imagination, it isn’t so and it never was. Rather, it is purely a perception by the mind alone –

formerly an imperfect and confused one, but now clear and distinct because I am now concentrating

carefully on what the wax consists in. […]

Something that I thought I saw with my eyes, therefore, was really grasped solely by my mind’s faculty

of judgment. However, someone who wants to know more than the common crowd should be ashamed

to base his doubts on ordinary ways of talking. Let us push ahead, then, and ask: When was my

perception of the wax’s nature more perfect and clear? Was it when I first looked at the wax, and

thought I knew it through my senses? Or is it now, after I have enquired more carefully into the wax’s

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 16

nature and into how it is known? It would be absurd to hesitate in answering the question; for what

clarity and sharpness was there in my earlier perception of the wax? Was there anything in it that a

lower animal couldn’t have? But when I consider the wax apart from its outward forms – take its

clothes off, so to speak, and consider it naked – then although my judgment may still contain errors, at

least I am now having a perception of a sort that requires a human mind.

But what am I to say about this mind, or about myself? (So far, remember, I don’t admit that there is

anything to me except a mind.) What, I ask, is this ‘I’ that seems to perceive the wax so clearly? Surely,

I am aware of my own self in a truer and more certain way than I am of the wax, and also in a much

more distinct and evident way. What leads me to think that the wax exists – namely, that I see it – leads

much more obviously to the conclusion that I exist. What I see might not really be the wax; perhaps I

don’t even have eyes with which to see anything. But when I see or think I see (I am not here

distinguishing the two), it is simply not possible that I who am now thinking am not something.

Similarly, that I exist follows from the other bases for judging that the wax exists – that I touch it, that I

imagine it, or any other basis, and similarly for my bases for judging that anything else exists outside

me. As I came to perceive the wax more distinctly by applying not just sight and touch but other

considerations, all this too contributed to my knowing myself even more distinctly, because whatever

goes into my perception of the wax or of any other body must do even more to establish the nature of

my own mind. What comes to my mind from bodies, therefore, helps me to know my mind distinctly;

yet all of that pales into insignificance – it is hardly worth mentioning – when compared with what my

mind contains within itself that enables me to know it distinctly.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 17

Locke – Essay Concerning Human Understanding

Source: http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Locke/echu/

Book II, Chapter 1

-2. All ideas come from sensation or reflection. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white

paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:- How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that

vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety?

Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from

EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our

observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our

minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the

materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or

can naturally have, do spring.

-3. The objects of sensation one source of ideas. First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible

objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways

wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat,

cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses

convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there

those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses,

and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.

-4. The operations of our minds, the other source of them. Secondly, the other fountain from which

experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is,- the perception of the operations of our own mind

within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got;- which operations, when the soul comes to reflect

on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from

things without. And such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and

all the different actings of our own minds;- which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do

from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses.

This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to

do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 18

I call the other SENSATION, so I Call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the

mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then, in the following part of

this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations,

and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the

understanding. These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of SENSATION, and the

operations of our own minds within, as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from

whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term operations here I use in a large sense, as

comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising

sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

-5. All our ideas are of the one or the other of these. The understanding seems to me not to have the least

glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the

mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us;

and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.

Chapter 8

-9. Primary qualities of bodies. Qualities thus considered in bodies are, first, such as are utterly

inseparable from the body, in what state soever it be; and such as in all the alterations and changes it

suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in

every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived; and the mind finds inseparable from

every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses: v.g. Take a

grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility:

divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become

insensible; they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill,

or pestle, or any other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away

either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct

separate masses of matter, of that which was but one before; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so

many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number. These I call original or primary qualities

of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure,

motion or rest, and number.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 19

-10. Secondary qualities of bodies. Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects

themselves but power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk,

figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c. These I call

secondary qualities. To these might be added a third sort, which are allowed to be barely powers; though

they are as much real qualities in the subject as those which I, to comply with the common way of

speaking, call qualities, but for distinction, secondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new

colour, or consistency, in wax or clay,- by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power

it has to produce in me a new idea or sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before,- by the

same primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts.

-17. The ideas of the primary alone really exist. The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the

parts of fire or snow are really in them,- whether any one's senses perceive them or no: and therefore

they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or

coldness, are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them;

let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell,

and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are

reduced to their causes, i.e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 20

Hume – Enquiry concerning Human Understanding

Source: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-h.htm

Section IV, Part 1

All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of

Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and

in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the

hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition which expresses a relation between

these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these

numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without

dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle

in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

21.Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner;

nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every

matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind

with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-

morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that

it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively

false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.

Section XII, Part 2

It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and

number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are

mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their

relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to

trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances. But as

all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our

utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not

to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the

undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the

hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides, cannot be known, let the terms be ever so

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 21

exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that

where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and

explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect

definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in

every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I

think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration.

All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence; and these are evidently incapable of

demonstration. Whatever is may not be. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-

existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition,

which affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that which affirms

it to be. The case is different with the sciences, properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, is

there confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10, is a false proposition,

and can never be distinctly conceived. But that Caesar, or the angel Gabriel, or any being never existed,

may be a false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable, and implies no contradiction.

The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect; and

these arguments are founded entirely on experience. If we reason a priori, anything may appear able to

produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguish the sun; or the wish of a

man control the planets in their orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of

cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another34. Such is the

foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all

human action and behaviour.

Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the

former; as also all disquisitions in history, chronology, geography, and astronomy. The sciences, which

treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, etc. where the qualities, causes

and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into.

Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed

partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reason,

so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 22

Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty,

whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and

endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general tastes of mankind, or some such

fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.

When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our

hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract

reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning

matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry

and illusion.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 23

Kant – Critique of Pure Reason (Squashed Philosophers Edition)

Source: http://sqapo.com/kant.htm

I. KNOWLEDGE: TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

EXPERIENCE is something of which we are conscious. It is the first result of our comprehension, but

it is not the limit of our understanding, since it stimulates our faculty of reason, but does not satisfy its

desire for knowledge.

While all our knowledge may begin with sensible impressions or experience there is an element in it

which does not rise from this source, but transcends it. That knowledge is transcendental which is

occupied not so much with mere outward objects as with our manner of knowing those objects, that is

to say, with a priori concepts of them.

All our knowledge is either a priori or a posteriori. That is a posteriori knowledge which is derived

from sensible experience as including sensible impressions or states; while a

priori knowledge is that which is not thus gained, but consists of whatever is universal or necessary.

A complete Transcendental Philosophy would be a systematic exposition of all that is a priori in human

knowledge, or of 'all the principles of pure reason.' But a Critique of Pure Reason cannot include all

this. It can do little more than deal with the synthetic element or quality in a

priori knowledge, as distinguished from the analytic elements.

We perceive objects through our sensibility which furnishes us, as our faculty of receptivity, with those

intuitions that become translated into thought by means of the understanding. This is the origin of our

conceptions, or ideas. I denominate as matter that which in a phenomenon corresponds to sensation;

while I call form that quality of matter which presents it in a perceived order. Only matter is presented

to our minds a posteriori; as to form, this must inevitably exist in the mind a priori, and therefore it can

be considered apart from all sensation.

Pure representation, entirely apart from sensation, in a transcendental signification, forms the pure

intuition of the mind, existing in it as a mere form of sensibility. 'Transcendental aesthetic' is the

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 24

science of all the principles of sensibility. But transcendental logic is the science of the principles of

pure thought. In studying the former we shall find that there are two pure forms of sensuous intuition,

namely, space and time.

Are space and time actual entities? Or are they only relations of things? Space is simply the form of all

the phenomena of external senses; that is, it is the subjective condition of the sensibility under which

alone external intuition is possible. Thus the form of all phenomena may exist a priori in the soul as a

pure intuition previous to all experience. So we can only speak of space and of extended objects from

the standpoint of human reason. But when we have abstracted all the forms perceived by our

sensibility, there remains a pure intuition which we call space. Therefore our discussion teaches us the

objective validity of space with regard to all that can appear before us externally as an object; but

equally the subjective ideality of space with regard to things if they are considered in themselves by our

reason, that is, without taking into account the nature of our sensibility.

Time is not empirically conceived of; that is, it is not experimentally apprehended. Time is a necessary

representation on which all intuitions are dependent, and the representation of time to the mind is thus

given a priori. In it alone can phenomena be apprehended. These may vanish, but time cannot be put

aside.

Time is not something existing by itself independently, but is the formal condition a priori of all

phenomena. If we deduct our own peculiar sensibility, then the idea of time disappears indeed, because

it is not inherent in any object, but only in the subject which perceives that object. Space and time are

essential a priori ideas, and they are the necessary conditions of all particular perceptions. From the

latter and their objects we can, in imagination without exception, abstract; from the former we cannot.

Space and time are therefore to be regarded as the necessary a priori pre- conditions of the possibility

and reality of all phenomena. It is clear that 'transcendental aesthetic' can obtain only these two

elements, space and time, because all other concepts belong to the senses and presuppose experience,

and so imply something empirical. For example, the concept of motion pre- supposes something

moving, but in space regarded alone there is nothing that moves; therefore, whatever moves must be

recognized by experience, and is a purely empirical datum.

PHIL 1301, Metaphysics and Epistemology, pg. 25

II. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

OUR knowledge is derived from two fundamental sources of the consciousness. The first is the faculty

of receptivity of impressions; the second, the faculty of cognition of an object by means of these

impressions or representations, this second power being sometimes styled spontaneity of concepts. By

the first, an object is given to us; by the second it is thought of in the mind. Thus intuition and concepts

constitute the elements of our entire knowledge, for neither intuition without concepts, nor concepts

without intuition can yield any knowledge whatever. […]