PHI

Phaedo 63

be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must be somewhere whence they can come back again.

I think, Socrates, he said, that this follows from what we have agreed on. Consider in this way, Cebes, he said, that, as I think, we were not wrong

to agree. If the two processes of becoming did not always balance each b other as if they were going round in a circle, but generation proceeded from one point to its opposite in a straight line and it did not turn back again to the other opposite or take any turning, do you realize that all things would ultimately be in the same state, be affected in the same way, and cease to become?

How do you mean? he said. It is not hard to understand what I mean. If, for example, there was

such a process as going to sleep, but no corresponding process of waking up, you realize that in the end everything would show the story of Endym- ion7 to have no meaning. There would be no point to it because everything c would have the same experience as he and be asleep. And if everything were combined and nothing separated, the saying of Anaxagoras8 would soon be true, “that all things were mixed together.” In the same way, my dear Cebes, if everything that partakes of life were to die and remain in that state and not come to life again, would not everything ultimately have d to be dead and nothing alive? Even if the living came from some other source, and all that lived died, how could all things avoid being absorbed in death?

It could not be, Socrates, said Cebes, and I think what you say is alto- gether true.

I think, Cebes, said he, that this is very definitely the case and that we were not deceived when we agreed on this: coming to life again in truth exists, the living come to be from the dead, and the souls of the dead exist. e

Furthermore, Socrates, Cebes rejoined, such is also the case if that theory is true that you are accustomed to mention frequently, that for us learning is no other than recollection. According to this, we must at some previous time have learned what we now recollect. This is possible only if our soul 73 existed somewhere before it took on this human shape. So according to this theory too, the soul is likely to be something immortal.

Cebes, Simmias interrupted, what are the proofs of this? Remind me, for I do not quite recall them at the moment.

There is one excellent argument, said Cebes, namely that when men are interrogated in the right manner, they always give the right answer of their own accord, and they could not do this if they did not possess the

7. Endymion was granted eternal sleep by Zeus. 8. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was born at the beginning of the fifth century B.C. He

came to Athens as a young man and spent most of his life there in the study of natural philosophy. He is quoted later in the dialogue (97c ff.) as claiming that the universe is directed by Mind (Nous). The reference here is to his statement that in the original state of the world all its elements were thoroughly commingled.

64 Phaedo

knowledge and the right explanation inside them. Then if one shows themb a diagram or something else of that kind, this will show most clearly that such is the case.9

If this does not convince you, Simmias, said Socrates, see whether you agree if we examine it in some such way as this, for do you doubt that what we call learning is recollection?

It is not that I doubt, said Simmias, but I want to experience the very thing we are discussing, recollection, and from what Cebes undertook to say, I am now remembering and am pretty nearly convinced. Nevertheless, I should like to hear now the way you were intending to explain it.

This way, he said. We surely agree that if anyone recollects anything,c he must have known it before.

Quite so, he said. Do we not also agree that when knowledge comes to mind in this way,

it is recollection? What way do I mean? Like this: when a man sees or hears or in some other way perceives one thing and not only knows that thing but also thinks of another thing of which the knowledge is not the same but different, are we not right to say that he recollects the second thing that comes into his mind?

How do you mean?d Things such as this: to know a man is surely a different knowledge from

knowing a lyre. Of course. Well, you know what happens to lovers: whenever they see a lyre, a

garment or anything else that their beloved is accustomed to use, they know the lyre, and the image of the boy to whom it belongs comes into their mind. This is recollection, just as someone, on seeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes, and there are thousands of other such occurrences.

Thousands indeed, said Simmias. Is this kind of thing not recollection of a kind, he said, especially so

when one experiences it about things that one had forgotten, because onee had not seen them for some time?—Quite so.

Further, he said, can a man seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre recollect a man, or seeing a picture of Simmias recollect Cebes?—Certainly.

Or seeing a picture of Simmias, recollect Simmias himself?—He cer- tainly can.

In all these cases the recollection can be occasioned by things that are74 similar, but it can also be occasioned by things that are dissimilar?—It can.

When the recollection is caused by similar things, must one not of necessity also experience this: to consider whether the similarity to that which one recollects is deficient in any respect or complete?—One must.

Consider, he said, whether this is the case: we say that there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone,

9. Cf. Meno 81e ff., where Socrates does precisely that.

Phaedo 65

or anything of that kind, but something else beyond all these, the Equal itself. Shall we say that this exists or not?

Indeed we shall, by Zeus, said Simmias, most definitely. b And do we know what this is?—Certainly. Whence have we acquired the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things

we mentioned just now, from seeing sticks or stones or some other things that are equal we come to think of that other which is different from them? Or doesn’t it seem to you to be different? Look at it also this way: do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to another to be unequal?—Certainly they do.

But what of the equals themselves? Have they ever appeared unequal c to you, or Equality to be Inequality?

Never, Socrates. These equal things and the Equal itself are therefore not the same? I do not think they are the same at all, Socrates. But it is definitely from the equal things, though they are different from

that Equal, that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of equality? Very true, Socrates. Whether it be like them or unlike them? Certainly. It makes no difference. As long as the sight of one thing makes you

think of another, whether it be similar or dissimilar, this must of necessity be recollection? d

Quite so. Well then, he said, do we experience something like this in the case of

equal sticks and the other equal objects we just mentioned? Do they seem to us to be equal in the same sense as what is Equal itself? Is there some deficiency in their being such as the Equal, or is there not?

A considerable deficiency, he said. Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he

now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be e like that other since it is inferior, do we agree that the one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says it is like, but deficiently so?

Necessarily. Well, do we also experience this about the equal objects and the Equal

itself, or do we not? Very definitely. We must then possess knowledge of the Equal before that time when

we first saw the equal objects and realized that all these objects strive to 75 be like the Equal but are deficient in this.

That is so. Then surely we also agree that this conception of ours derives from

seeing or touching or some other sense perception, and cannot come into our mind in any other way, for all these senses, I say, are the same.

66 Phaedo

They are the same, Socrates, at any rate in respect to that which our argument wishes to make plain.

Our sense perceptions must surely make us realize that all that web perceive through them is striving to reach that which is Equal but falls short of it; or how do we express it?

Like that. Then before we began to see or hear or otherwise perceive, we must

have possessed knowledge of the Equal itself if we were about to refer our sense perceptions of equal objects to it, and realized that all of them were eager to be like it, but were inferior.

That follows from what has been said, Socrates. But we began to see and hear and otherwise perceive right after birth? Certainly. We must then have acquired the knowledge of the Equal before this.c Yes. It seems then that we must have possessed it before birth. It seems so. Therefore, if we had this knowledge, we knew before birth and immedi-

ately after not only the Equal, but the Greater and the Smaller and all such things, for our present argument is no more about the Equal than about the Beautiful itself, the Good itself, the Just, the Pious and, as I say, aboutd all those things which we mark with the seal of “what it is,” both when we are putting questions and answering them. So we must have acquired knowledge of them all before we were born.

That is so. If, having acquired this knowledge in each case, we have not forgotten

it, we remain knowing and have knowledge throughout our life, for to know is to acquire knowledge, keep it and not lose it. Do we not call the losing of knowledge forgetting?

Most certainly, Socrates, he said.e But, I think, if we acquired this knowledge before birth, then lost it at

birth, and then later by the use of our senses in connection with those objects we mentioned, we recovered the knowledge we had before, would not what we call learning be the recovery of our own knowledge, and we are right to call this recollection?

Certainly. It was seen to be possible for someone to see or hear or otherwise76

perceive something, and by this to be put in mind of something else which he had forgotten and which is related to it by similarity or difference. One of two things follows, as I say: either we were born with the knowledge of it, and all of us know it throughout life, or those who later, we say, are learning, are only recollecting, and learning would be recollection.

That is certainly the case, Socrates. Which alternative do you choose, Simmias? That we are born with

this knowledge or that we recollect later the things of which we hadb knowledge previously?

Phaedo 67

I have no means of choosing at the moment, Socrates. Well, can you make this choice? What is your opinion about it? A man

who has knowledge would be able to give an account of what he knows, or would he not?

He must certainly be able to do so, Socrates, he said. And do you think everybody can give an account of the things we were

mentioning just now? I wish they could, said Simmias, but I’m afraid it is much more likely that

by this time tomorrow there will be no one left who can do so adequately. So you do not think that everybody has knowledge of those things? c No indeed. So they recollect what they once learned? They must. When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Certainly not since

we were born as men. Indeed no. Before that then? Yes. So then, Simmias, our souls also existed apart from the body before they

took on human form, and they had intelligence. Unless we acquire the knowledge at the moment of birth, Socrates, for

that time is still left to us. Quite so, my friend, but at what other time do we lose it? We just now d

agreed that we are not born with that knowledge. Do we then lose it at the very time we acquire it, or can you mention any other time?

I cannot, Socrates. I did not realize that I was talking nonsense. So this is our position, Simmias? he said. If those realities we are always

talking about exist, the Beautiful and the Good and all that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we perceive to that reality, discovering that it existed before and is ours, and we compare these things with it, then, just e as they exist, so our soul must exist before we are born. If these realities do not exist, then this argument is altogether futile. Is this the position, that there is an equal necessity for those realities to exist, and for our souls to exist before we were born? If the former do not exist, neither do the latter?

I do not think, Socrates, said Simmias, that there is any possible doubt that it is equally necessary for both to exist, and it is opportune that our argument comes to the conclusion that our soul exists before we are born, 77 and equally so that reality of which you are now speaking. Nothing is so evident to me personally as that all such things must certainly exist, the Beautiful, the Good, and all those you mentioned just now. I also think that sufficient proof of this has been given.

Then what about Cebes? said Socrates, for we must persuade Cebes also. He is sufficiently convinced I think, said Simmias, though he is the most

difficult of men to persuade by argument, but I believe him to be fully convinced that our soul existed before we were born. I do not think myself, b however, that it has been proved that the soul continues to exist after

68 Phaedo

death; the opinion of the majority which Cebes mentioned still stands, that when a man dies his soul is dispersed and this is the end of its existence. What is to prevent the soul coming to be and being constituted from some other source, existing before it enters a human body and then, having done so and departed from it, itself dying and being destroyed?

You are right, Simmias, said Cebes. Half of what needed proof has beenc proved, namely, that our soul existed before we were born, but further proof is needed that it exists no less after we have died, if the proof is to be complete.

It has been proved even now, Simmias and Cebes, said Socrates, if you are ready to combine this argument with the one we agreed on before, that every living thing must come from the dead. If the soul exists before, it must, as it comes to life and birth, come from nowhere else than deathd and being dead, so how could it avoid existing after death since it must be born again? What you speak of has then even now been proved. However, I think you and Simmias would like to discuss the argument more fully. You seem to have this childish fear that the wind would really dissolve and scatter the soul, as it leaves the body, especially if one happens to diee in a high wind and not in calm weather.

Cebes laughed and said: Assuming that we were afraid, Socrates, try to change our minds, or rather do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child in us who has these fears; try to persuade him not to fear death like a bogey.

You should, said Socrates, sing a charm over him every day until you have charmed away his fears.

Where shall we find a good charmer for these fears, Socrates, he said,78 now that you are leaving us?

Greece is a large country, Cebes, he said, and there are good men in it; the tribes of foreigners are also numerous. You should search for such a charmer among them all, sparing neither trouble nor expense, for there is nothing on which you could spend your money to greater advantage. You must also search among yourselves, for you might not easily find people who could do this better than yourselves.

That shall be done, said Cebes, but let us, if it pleases you, go back tob the argument where we left it.

Of course it pleases me. Splendid, he said. We must then ask ourselves something like this: what kind of thing is

likely to be scattered? On behalf of what kind of thing should one fear this, and for what kind of thing should one not fear it? We should then examine to which class the soul belongs, and as a result either fear for the soul or be of good cheer.

What you say is true. Is not anything that is composite and a compound by nature liable toc

be split up into its component parts, and only that which is noncomposite, if anything, is not likely to be split up?

Phaedo 69

I think that is the case, said Cebes. Are not the things that always remain the same and in the same state

most likely not to be composite, whereas those that vary from one time to another and are never the same are composite?

I think that is so. Let us then return to those same things with which we were dealing

earlier, to that reality of whose existence we are giving an account in our d questions and answers; are they ever the same and in the same state, or do they vary from one time to another; can the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be affected by any change whatever? Or does each of them that really is, being uniform by itself, remain the same and never in any way tolerate any change whatever?

It must remain the same, said Cebes, and in the same state, Socrates. What of the many beautiful particulars, be they men, horses, clothes, or e

other such things, or the many equal particulars, and all those which bear the same name as those others? Do they remain the same or, in total contrast to those other realities, one might say, never in any way remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other?

The latter is the case; they are never in the same state. These latter you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses, 79

but those that always remain the same can be grasped only by the reasoning power of the mind? They are not seen but are invisible?

That is altogether true, he said. Do you then want us to assume two kinds of existences, the visible and

the invisible? Let us assume this. And the invisible always remains the same, whereas the visible never

does? Let us assume that too. Now one part of ourselves is the body, another part is the soul? b Quite so. To which class of existence do we say the body is more alike and akin? To the visible, as anyone can see. What about the soul? Is it visible or invisible? It is not visible to men, Socrates, he said. Well, we meant visible and invisible to human eyes; or to any others,

do you think? To human eyes. Then what do we say about the soul? Is it visible or not visible? Not visible. So it is invisible?—Yes. So the soul is more like the invisible than the body, and the body more c

like the visible?—Without any doubt, Socrates. Haven’t we also said some time ago that when the soul makes use of

the body to investigate something, be it through hearing or seeing or some other sense—for to investigate something through the body is to do it

70 Phaedo

through the senses—it is dragged by the body to the things that are never the same, and the soul itself strays and is confused and dizzy, as if it were drunk, in so far as it is in contact with that kind of thing?

Certainly. But when the soul investigates by itself it passes into the realm of whatd

is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and being akin to this, it always stays with it whenever it is by itself and can do so; it ceases to stray and remains in the same state as it is in touch with things of the same kind, and its experience then is what is called wisdom?

Altogether well said and very true, Socrates, he said. Judging from what we have said before and what we are saying now,e

to which of these two kinds do you think that the soul is more alike and more akin?

I think, Socrates, he said, that on this line of argument any man, even the dullest, would agree that the soul is altogether more like that which always exists in the same state rather than like that which does not.

What of the body? That is like the other. Look at it also this way: when the soul and the body are together, nature80

orders the one to be subject and to be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Then again, which do you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the nature of the divine is to rule and to lead, whereas it is that of the mortal to be ruled and be subject?

I do. Which does the soul resemble? Obviously, Socrates, the soul resembles the divine, and the body resem-

bles the mortal. Consider then, Cebes, whether it follows from all that has been said that

the soul is most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble,b always the same as itself, whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble and never consistently the same. Have we anything else to say to show, my dear Cebes, that this is not the case?

We have not. Well then, that being so, is it not natural for the body to dissolve easily,

and for the soul to be altogether indissoluble, or nearly so? Of course.c You realize, he said, that when a man dies, the visible part, the body,

which exists in the visible world, and which we call the corpse, whose natural lot it would be to dissolve, fall apart and be blown away, does not immediately suffer any of these things but remains for a fair time, in fact, quite a long time if the man dies with his body in a suitable condition and at a favorable season? If the body is emaciated or embalmed, as in Egypt, it remains almost whole for a remarkable length of time, and even if the body decays, some parts of it, namely bonesd and sinews and the like, are nevertheless, one might say, deathless. Is that not so?—Yes.