

In addition to the theories of the policy process just discussed, the wealth of new knowledge about human cognition, human rationality, emotions, and beliefs is starting to filter into the public policy literature. For example, Campbell and Kay (2014) show that the solutions offered help determine whether an individual thinks climate change is a problem. In other words, they found that much of the disbelief in climate change can be attributed to individuals not liking the solutions that go along with the problem.

For example, if a free market solution is offered, individuals who are more conservative are more likely to agree that climate change is a problem compared to those conservatives that are offered a regulatory solution. This finding helps us understand how individuals define problems and shows the nonrational element to such problem definition (if climate change is a problem then it is a problem regardless of the solution).

Likewise, Oxley, Vedlitz, and Wood (2014) found that the perceived credibility of the information source was related to whether an individual believes climate change is a problem, and the perceived credibility of the source is dependent on the perceiver's political ideology. Conservatives were more likely to believe that climate change was a problem if then President George W. Bush was making such a claim. Similarly, liberals were more likely to trust scientists, and a scientist's opinion positively impacted their rating of climate change as a problem (though, we know that liberals do not always follow science, as indicated in Box 4-2).

Finally, in "Priming Assad" Clemons, Peterson, and Palmer (2016) created an original experiment to examine U.S. citizen evaluations of the Syrian crisis and Bashar al-Assad. Their study demonstrated that a subtle manipulation darkening Assad's skin tone led respondents to view him more negatively and increased their support for U.S. intervention to effect regime change. That is, respondents primed with an image of Assad with darker skin were more likely to support aggressive policies than those who saw him with lighter skin.

In the face of low public support for action against the Assad dictatorship, the authors had hypothesized that Assad's appearance might be playing a role in limiting the mobilization of public support for intervention. His Westernized image diverged from those of recent previous U.S. foreign policy villains—such as Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, or Mu'ammar al-Gaddafi—even though his actions and their consequences were easily comparable with, or worse than, past military dictators in the region. That is, because Assad—with his modern haircut, business suit, and light skin—represented a divergence from the images of those leaders recently cast as enemies to the United States, they suspected it limited his susceptibility to being portrayed as a villain in foreign policy narratives. It is difficult to define him as the "other" when he looks like "us."

Sadly, but not unexpectedly, the prime had the expected effect in line with the research literature on racial priming and colorism (e.g., Viglione, Hannon, and Defina, 2011; Banks, 2009; Hochschild, 2006; Maddox and Gray, 2002; Hunter, 1998) and on the impact of priming on shaping public opinion on issues (Druckman, 2004; Bargh, 1999; Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). (It is a well-established fact that white men are sentenced to shorter prison terms than black men sentenced for similar crimes. Colorism is the well-established fact that more "stereotypically black" facial features and skin tone affect sentencing, including a correlation with those sentenced to death.)

Respondents in their experiment all read the same faux but factual news story describing the danger Assad posed and the harm he had caused. The only change was the altering of his skin tone in his official photo; yet this subtle treatment was enough to prime individuals and alter opinion (Clemons, Peterson, and Palmer, forthcoming).

Substantively, the results were modest shifts in opinion, though statistically significant. The fact is that his appearance seemed to impact public opinion. Luckily, making people aware of their vulnerability to such primes and the biases of colorism can have the effect of making them less vulnerable (this is when the slow part of our brain has time, and the wherewithal, to overrule

the fast part of our brain. We may not be aware of it. Increasingly, people are demanding a better understanding of the policy phenomena.

It is our conclusion that the claim that the fast part of our brain is not aware of the policy phenomena is a continuation of Chapter 4. This chapter introduces a new policy-making model. Before moving on to the next chapter, we present the models presented in this chapter. What do you think? and succeed?

groupthink (p. 132)

Case in

This case study evaluates the quality of services provided by nearly three decades of Home Rule as a vehicle for evaluating the first four chapters. Allegheny County, including Pittsburgh, has Home Rule under its constitution and the executive and legislative branches of its own government since 1933 and modified