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Anthropology, Science or Humanity? Author(s): George B. Pepper Source: Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Jul., 1961), pp. 150-157 Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3316673 Accessed: 05-01-2020 13:18 UTC

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ANTHROPOLOGY, SCIENCE OR HUMANITY?

GEORGE B. PEPPER

Iona College, New Rochelle, N. Y.

Rev. Robert J. Henle's article "A Philosopher's Interpretation of Anthropology's Contribution to the Understanding of Man" (1959: 22-40) is another instance of the fruitful interchanges taking place between cultural anthropologists and philosophers. However, it is unfortunate for two reasons that Fr. Henle limited his clarifying analysis to Redfield's one essay: one. the back- ground literature on the issue of anthropology's relation to the natural sciences and to the humanities is crucial for an adequate understanding of Redfield's position; and, two, Fr. Henle may have inadvertently fostered a dichotomy now current among some anthropologists which philosophical analysis would dispel. In the following I wish to present a brief survey of some anthropologists' views on anthropology as a science and as a humanity and analyze the philosophical implications contained therein.'

The conflict over whether anthropology is a "science" or a "humanity" is presented possibly in its boldest terms among British social anthropologists. Radcliffe-Brown insists that there is a place within the natural sciences for a study of society. Social anthropology, for him, seeks to establish generalizations by which particular social institutions can be understood (1952:3). Its methods are essentially similar to those used in the physical and biological sciences (1952:189). Firth substantially agrees with this position (1951: 19). Nadel also agrees with this position but adds a few important qualifications (1951:8). In sharp contrast to this position Evans-Pritchard contends that social an- thropology is an art and a branch of the humanities. The social anthropologist seeks descriptive integration of pertinent phenom- ena and not universal laws, claims Evans-Pritchard (1951:60- 61).

Among Americans, White is perhaps the most extreme advo- cate of the "scientific" character of anthropologry (1949:8-13). In opposition to White, Kroeber regards anthropology as primari-

1The philosophical position on personality in this article is based on the Scholastic tradition, except when otherwise noted. Thonston's article, which came to my attention after this article was written, is a valuable analysis.

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ANTHROPOLOGY, SCIENCE OR. HUMANITY? 151

ly a type of history; he does not seem inclined to call it a human- ity. But Kroeber does not deny that the methods of natural sci- ence can be applied to culture. For him both the methods of his- tory and of natural science can be applied to culture but with a sliding scale of effectiveness. Culture history does not seek causes or time sequences; it seeks, rather, descriptive integration of sig- nificant phenomena. In contrast, natural science is concerned with causes and space-time factors; and it seeks universal laws. However, cultural data are best explained by the historical meth- od, for Kroeber (1952: 101-102). Redfield substantially agrees with Kroeber (1953:728).

The views of Kroeber and Redfield contain an added complica- tion. For Kroeber, while culture depends on individuals it is primarily impersonal in character. Consequently, his descriptive integration of significant phenomena would always be impersonal (1952: 119-121). Redfield's approach to this procedure must be different since he perceives a definite connection between an- thropology and the humanities; the description of integrated and significant phenomena would necessarily be, then, personal (1953:728). Oddly, Redfield and also Evans-Pritchard acknowl- edge the similarity between their positions and Kroeber's (Red- field, 1953: 728; Evans-Pritchard, 1951: 61) but they do not rec- oncile Kroeber's insistence that culture is impersonal.

The problem takes on another complicated coloring when the psychologically oriented anthropologists are examined. Roheim insists on the universal and decisive role of the psychodynamic principles in man as explained by Freud but with exception to the primal horde theory (1950:458). For him, all of culture is the result of sublimation (1943:81). Kardiner attempts to break out of the deterministic world of Freud but he still ends up with a very narrow view of personality. The only system in human per- sonality capable of objective verification is a "pure empirical

projective system" whose only purpose is utility (1945:-30-41). For both Roheim and Kardiner, then, anthropology is apparently a natural science and not a humanity. In opposition to these two men, Kluckhohn insists that anthropology is in part, at least, a humanity (1955 :338 ff.).

Since each of these anthropologists has made important con- tributions to anthropology the conflict between them on this issue

apparently cannot be resolved exclusively in favor of one group.

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152 ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLr

Redfield is quite right in insisting that anthropology must main- tain the polarity towards both the humanities and the natural sciences (1953:736). This does not, however, release the an- thropologist from the duty to work out continuously more effec- tive theoretical syntheses for his data. Philosophy may aid in this endeavor and it is towards this end that the following remarks are directed. The aim is not to formulate a new anthropological theory. As Lang has underlined, the anthropologist is not lacking in theories as much as he is in their testing (1959:58). The phil- osophical contribution to anthropology is concerned with an examination of basic attitudes and concepts as demanded by the human, cultural data.

Redfield correctly pointed out the source of the tension that gives rise to the dichotomy, science vs. humanity, in anthropology. We find one group of anthropologists, enamored with the scien- tific ideal of the physical and biological sciences, seeking for an- thropology the same kind of precision and control found in those sciences. But science in these contexts is detached and atomiz-

ing, characteristics which are very much opposed to what is studied by anthropologists, that is, more or less discrete human wholes. Other anthropologists attempt to overcome the short- comings of the ideal of natural science by explaining culture "holistically" or "humanistically." And the absence of universal laws, it is claimed, gives empirical support to the latter (Redfield, 1955 :23).

As already mentioned, only a synthesis of both attitudes will satisfy most anthropologists. It is my understanding that the synthesis will not come from a new theoretical principle but from a deeper appreciation of the human situation. The problem may be restated this way: how is it possible that human cultures mani- fest both regularities which imply laws and unique qualities best explained humanistically?

Acceptance of the following statements will depend on em- pirical and philosophical justification, the adequate presentation of which is well beyond the scope of an article of this sort. The ensuing statements, therefore, will be restricted to attempt to con- vey in some degree an appreciation of the human situation, the ultimate fact with which all theories of culture must come to terms.

The classical definition of man as rational animal clearly and

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ANTHROPOLOGr, SCIENCE OR HUMANITY? 153

legitimately indicates that man's conscious life has toots deep within the physical and organic orders. And, as analysis of physi- cal and organic creatures has led to laws so too can the analysis of man's physical and biological make-up lead to laws. This has extreme importance for an understanding of culture because it establishes the limits within which man's self-cultivation must un-

fold. But, further, man has been found to undergo behavior unique to him which is also amenable to scientific generalization. The psychodynamic principles formulated by Freud cast much light on panhuman behavior despite the fact that there are many questionable points in his theory (Cf. Kluckhohn, 1953:515). The sociological studies of the interaction of role behavior and social institutions similarly have yielded universal elements within culture which has been somewhat demonstrated by the work of Firth (1951). It is not being contended here that human be- havior is essentially like animal behavior plus the subconscious and the conditions of human social interaction. Man's conscious life, it is becoming more realized, qualitatively distinguishes his entire behavior from that of subhumans. For example, Ernest Hilyard shows that there is a qualitative difference between ani- mal and human perception (1945:329-30) and T. C. Schneirla demonstrates a basic difference in the psychological capacities of animals in their social organization (1949 and 1951). The con- tention is, rather, that the search for cultural laws is a viable and important approach to the study of culture.

Perhaps the main thing that cultural "scientists" have failed to appreciate is the autonomy of human consciousness. While man lives in the milieux of physical, organic, subconscious, and social processes, all these processes are capable of being raised to the level of consciousness and thereby controlled for diverse purposes. It is by reason of our consciousness that we attempt to unify our multiple existences through value oriented choices. But values are not restricted to just our rational levels of consciousness. Values will arise wherever the human spirit gives itself to the realms of values (Cf. Scheler, 1958: ch. 2).

In the above I tried to indicate that the multiple conditionings of man's conscious life are amenable to scientific generalizations akin to those in the natural sciences in the sense that Henle uses this term (1959:35). But if these generalizations are left in this

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154 ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

form they are radically incomplete. They are not incomplete in the sense that what they convey is devoid of factual support. Rather, they are incomplete in that they omit the qualities of conscious life which necessitate a qualitative reevaluation of those generalizations.

And what is this qualitative reevaluation? All the informa- tion we obtain from man's physical, psychological, and social make-up is subordinate to knowing what a person is. Explana- tion becomes difficult at this point so perhaps an illustration may be helpful. Let us take the example of a scientific examination. Two basically different contexts are involved in every scientific examination. One context involves the scientist and the data he

is studying according to definite methods. The other context involves the scientist's relation with fellow scientists, e.g., profes- sional organizations, rules of discourse, etc." Both are necessary for any science because no scientific endeavor is undertaken in a social vacuum or without a definite body of facts. However, the natural scientist's orientation toward his data is very different from the social scientist's: it is objective and impersonal rather than intersubjective and personal. In contrast, the social scientist's re- lation with his fellow scientists is very much like the relation he has with his data. The relation between the social scientist and his

data is personal, at least in part, in that he projects his own human qualities into the situation to be understood, as Redfield has pointed out (1953:733). This does not mean that the social scientist has to be friendly with the people he studies. It means, rather, he must cognitively relate with his data similarly to the way he relates with his fellow scientists.

As noted above, Redfield observed the two basic contexts in- volved in every scientific study and, implicitly, the two different kinds of knowledge involved. Has the present analysis, it may be asked, advanced anything beyond Redfield's observation ? Yes, in this sense. It has pointed out the primacy of consciousness in cul- ture and in cultural studies. The impersonal aspects of culture are subordinate to, and ultimately require a personal explanation on the level of consciousness. As important as technology, psy-

2Redfield observes this distinction (1953:728) as does Winch (1958:85) but the latter derives the philosophic importance from it. I am indebted to Winch for part of the ensuing analysis.

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ANTHROPOLOGY, SCIENCE OR HUMANITr? 155

chology, sociology are for culture, the personal element of human behavior is the final problem to be solved, or, in more precise terms, the thing to be confronted.

As we confront people or participate with them in our own lives so must social scientists, at least those who seek an overall explanation of culture, confront their data. This does not mean that historical or humanistic explanations of culture are alone ac- ceptable. Generalizations and even predictability are possible pro- vided that they are personalized. For example, knowing the harsh material conditions of life among the Indians on the alti- plano in Peru one may make a number of predictions about their cultural behavior. And knowing the role structure of physicians, say, in our own society one can make a number of predictions about their behavior, too. But prediction in the social sciences is qualitatively unlike prediction in the natural sciences. The root of all cultural behavior is the person. One can sensibly predict the behavior of a person only if one admits at the same time the possi- bility of being wrong because persons act upon decisions which always imply alternatives. Note how different is predictability in the natural sciences. An error here arises from faulty theory, ob- servation, or data; it is always accidental. In contrast, error in predicting social behavior is intrinsic to the entire scientific en- deavor because the person may always propose alternatives to himself even when the culture does not.

Nadel has made a similar observation (1951: 192-93). He says that anthropology is a science but one which ranks lower in rigor and consistency than the natural sciences. The uniqueness in cul- ture, he claims, is another word for accident or chance which the

anthropologist must always be ready to acknowledge. But in call- ing the uniqueness of culture "accident" or "chance" Nadel seems to fail to appreciate that the uniqueness of each culture stems from the creativeness of human consciousness.

A comment on free will and cultural conditioning is called for. Kroeber claims that the more he focuses attention on the con- tinuity of cultural traditions the less he is sure about free will (1952:8-9). But Kroeber seems to be assuming that free will should enable an individual to develop ways of living entirely different from those of the society and culture in which he is reared and lives. The exercise of free choice may be dramatic but it is most often quite ordinary. Members of a society are more

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156 ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLr

inclined to follow the traditional patterns of behavior because of their proven survival and satisfaction value.

With respect to Fr. Henle's views a few comments are needed. He is quite right in insisting on the humanistic character of culture studies. But when he urges anthropologists to resist be- coming scientific like physicists (1959:39) he oversimplifies the issues. The more anthropologists know about the physical, psy- chological, social and environmental conditionings from which culture emanates the more valuable will be their studies. Max

Scheler's principle is applicable here and should be extended to include all elements of man's composition: "Learn to know animals so that you will know how difficult it is to be man," (1958:26). While the uniqueness characteristic of each culture is best explainable in humanistic terms, the physical, psychological, and sociological processes are intimately conjoined with that u- nique development. In separating the humanistic qualities from the underlying processes in studying culture, Fr. Henle is opening himself to the valid criticism Bidney makes of Kroeber's somewhat similar distinction: he is separating what is in fact united (1953: 256-60). In other words, it is the anthropologist's unique and difficult task to study man in the multiple facets of his existence attempting to grasp the unique forms into which man has molded himself and his environment according to values to which he has responded.

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