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PART IV: PEACEMAKING

CHAPTER 16

INTRODUCTION

Peacemaking Criminology In A World Filled With Conflict

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As we approach the end of the twentieth century we find ourselves in a world ridden with conflict and violence. The Persian Gulf War — widely celebrated in the United States as a victory — has been estimated to have resulted in tens of thousands of Iraqi deaths. The FBI's Uniform Crime Report in the Spring of 1991 reported a significant rise in violent personal crime. We continue to be plagued by all manner of corporate violence, including destruction of the natural environment, on-going tolerance of dangerous working conditions, and the production of unsafe consumer products. Racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination are far from extinct, despite the rights movements of recent decades. And in the United States we allegedly have the highest rate of imprisonment of any nation. The revived death penalty appears to be quite widely supported.

The emergence of a criminological perspective which has come to be known as peacemaking criminology, in such a world, is almost startling. This perspective has many roots, and these roots cannot be easily separated from the biographies of the two individuals who, to date, are the leading lights of peacemaking criminology: Richard Quinney and Harold E. Pepinsky. It may be premature to speak of peacemaking criminology as a school of thought; rather, it is the shared (but hardly identical) vision of two prolific, highly original and personally charismatic criminologists. Others have been moved to explore how this vision impacts on their own special concern (e.g., Bohm on the death penalty, and Schwartz and DeKeseredy on domestic violence, in Pepinsky and Quinney, 1991). Still others (e.g., Milovanovic, 1991), it seems, have been interested in the enterprise of establishing a peacemaking criminology, and have undoubtedly been provoked to reconsider some of their own premises.

What, then, are the roots of peacemaking criminology? Firstly, it can be traced back to the radical or critical criminology which emerged in the United States primarily in the 1970s. Richard Quinney had first come into prominence in the 1960s, especially for his contributions to the understanding of white-collar crime and criminal behavior typologies. His book *The Social Reality of Crime* (1970) was a powerful and influential new version

of a conflict perspective. In the 1970s Quinney was the most prolific and best-known radical criminologist, setting forth and applying different versions of a Marxist approach to understanding crime and criminal justice. Harold Pepinsky came into prominence in the 1970s with his book, *Crime and Conflict* (1976), and a series of articles which promoted a radical perspective most closely aligned with the anarchist tradition, although it was sufficiently idiosyncratic and unique to defy easy classification within any existing perspective. Moving into the 1980s we find Quinney engaged in a search for a radical humanistic understanding of social existence and human experience. Among other traditions, his search led him into explorations of Christian socialism, liberation theology, Eastern meditative thought, and reflexive or narrative discourses. Through much of this period, this 'journey' carried Quinney away from criminological concerns in the conventional sense. It was during this time that he traveled to China and to Ireland to seek insight and inspiration from cultures quite different from our own. He also came home to his native Midwest to resettle there.

During this same decade, Pepinsky was writing and editing books and articles which challenged conventional criminological theory and methodology. He was engaged in an intellectual and geographical odyssey of his own — leading him to chaos theory, for example, and taking him to Norway and elsewhere — searching for new ways to make sense of violence and to promote reconciliation.

In the 1980s the youngest of the three scholars who have contributed to this section, W. Byron (Casey) Groves, began to make a real name for himself. He is perhaps best-known for his co-authored (with Michael J. Lynch) *A Primer in Radical Criminology* (1989), but he also wrote a series of articles which sought to identify links between various critical and mainstream theoretical and policy-related perspectives.

And so it is that in 1990, at the beginning of the last decade of the century, we find these three quite original criminologists writing essays which are taken to contribute to a peace-making criminology. The tragic death of the youngest of these scholars, Casey Groves, in an automobile accident in December, 1990, has to be noted with great sadness here. His death was a traumatic personal loss for those who knew him; it was a great loss, as well, for progressive criminology, as he would surely have made substantial contributions in the decades to come but for this cruel twist of fate.

Peacemaking criminology is a heresy of the first order. It proposes to turn the criminological enterprise on its head, to challenge the most

fundamental premises of this enterprise. The very name 'peacemaking criminology' appears to take exception to the typical positivistic assumption that the principal mission of criminology is dispassionate analysis. For peacemaking criminology, the promotion of a world of less crime, violence and oppression takes precedence over rigorous empirical research which claims to more fully explain crime and criminal justice. Some years ago, Pepinsky edited a volume of papers entitled "Rethinking Criminology;" his original choice of a title for this collection was "Breaking the Criminological Mold." Peacemaking criminology seeks, on some level, to break the existing mold, and replace it with a new and very different mold. Mainstream criminologists are viewed as being restricted in their inquiry by reified concepts and assumptions and imprisoned within a false and distorted framework. It is necessary to break free and see crime and criminal justice in a wholly new light. In a sensitive and perceptive essay on peacemaking criminology Michael Braswell (1990) identified three of its themes as connectedness, caring, and mindfulness. Connectedness refers to our recognition of our bonds with each other and our environment, and the need for reconciliation; caring refers to the privileging of a traditionally feminine concern with nurturance over other objectives for the correctional system; mindfulness refers to the cultivation of inner peace as a fundamental point of departure for our responses to crime and to those we designate as criminals.

In his brief essay reprinted here, Richard Quinney insists that we must attend to the inseparable character of our personal suffering and suffering in the larger world. We must recognize our 'oneness' with other forms of being in the world. And if we are to respond to crime effectively, and promote justice, it is necessary to begin with the transformation of ourselves, to be more compassionate toward and concerned with others, and to reach out and connect with other beings. In his contribution, Pepinsky picks up on this theme and calls upon us to avoid falsely classifying and pigeon-holing other human beings. For Pepinsky, the only real solution to crime is the promotion of 'democracy', by which he means true participation, reconciliation, and responsiveness to the needs of others. Only decentralization of authority and power and promotion of peaceful over violent responses can in the course of time diminish the problem of crime and the oppression carried out in the name of justice. And Groves, as well, urges us (especially if we wish to think of ourselves as progressives) to avoid personalizing evil and to choose affirmative and positive ways of relating to others over vindictiveness and vengeance.

Does peacemaking criminology project a utopian vision? On some level it is admittedly difficult to avoid an impression of utopianism. Would human beings, if placed in 'the original position' behind a "veil of ignorance," to use the language of Rawls, choose to live in world governed by peace and harmony, as opposed to some other type of world? In his "Notes from the Underground," Dostoyevsky long ago questioned whether humans really want to live in a 'crystal palace', as some claim. For Dostoyevsky's 'man from underground', humans seem to actually thrive on suffering; humans are irrational and ungrateful; humans do not want to live by formulae; and the various socialists and scientists have failed fully to understand the complex and contradictory character of human nature. As a political prisoner, Dostoyevsky learned that those on the outside are not much better than those on the inside — not the reverse, as peacemaking criminology tends to imply.

For me, a contemplation of peacemaking criminology brings to mind two celebrated films, one of which made a considerable impression on me in my early years, and one which has more recently affected me: "High Noon" and "Witness." In both films the protagonists, Marshall Kane and Lieutenant Booker, are clearly moved by their encounter with pacifist perspectives (the Quakers in one case, the Amish in the other). And yet, both are compelled to resort to violence when confronted with vicious, violent individuals. Perhaps a message in both of these films is that the ways of peace are superior, and are powerful; force and violence, alas, is sometimes unavoidable. Peace-making criminology would have us privilege what Pepinsky broadly labels as democratic responses: "peace, participation, accommodation, adaptation, healing, reconciliation, community, cooperation, mutual aid, communism, anarchism, music making, romance, harmony, charity, love, compassion, and the fruits of justice" (Pepinsky, this volume) over other traditional types of responses to crime. The premise here is that the predominance of what can be labeled as authoritarian responses (*i.e.*, war, exclusion, control, repression, confinement, conflict, isolation, retribution, hate, pain, and the grapes of wrath) has been counter-productive. In its essence, this message is, of course, a very old one. The persistent historical failure of this message to be more widely embraced and applied remains, even today, a question which we must continue to grapple with and seek to answer more fully. Perhaps the single most provocative claim of peacemaking criminology is this: there can be no meaningful separation between our responses to the crime and violence we confront in the world and our objective of creating a less violent, more peaceful, and more just world. The latter objective,

widely embraced, is indeed the orthodox aspiration and a standard feature of political rhetoric. There is far less consensus on the means necessary to achieve this objective. In the realm of conventional crime the question is whether we can promote more peace and justice without dealing with existing predators in a tough-minded way. In a recent article Martin Schwartz and Walter DeKeseredy (1991) have noted the conflict between many radical feminists, who favor more punitive responses toward men who inflict violence and pain on women, and progressives who want to reduce the reach of the state, especially its retributive policies. Schwartz and DeKeseredy suggest that 'net widening' of state intervention can and should take a reconciliatory, re-educative form which should benefit women without necessarily directly reducing violence towards them. And in the realm of corporate crime there is a fairly vigorous on-going debate today between those who favor punitive and those who favor co-operative responses. Laureen Snider (1990) and Frank Pearce and Steve Tombs (1990) are among the progressives who have recently expressed fundamental reservations about the co-operative response, or have specifically advocated a punitive regulatory approach to corporate crime.

In a certain sense, peacemaking criminology can be seen as calling for us to engage in an extraordinary historical experiment: abandon repression quite uniformly and embrace fully cooperative and compassionate responses. To make such an experiment requires a Kierkegaardian 'leap of faith' which many resist, with the possible outcome contemplated with 'fear and trembling'. Should we be laying the groundwork now to implement 'the great experiment' at the beginning of the twenty-first century, with a peacemaking response to crime replacing a retributive, deterrent, incapacitative response? Should we assume the 'snowball' principle: the great historical movements have all had humble beginnings? Or does realism dictate that we should recognize that compromises and trade-offs, and the privileging of some peace-making objectives over others, is the best way to diminish repressive dimensions of our existing response to crime?

A peace-making criminology compels us to consider, as fully as possible, the human potential for goodness, and it calls for us to recognize the commonalties and connections between ourselves and others. Although the extreme differentiation characteristic of much nineteenth century criminology — *e.g.*, Lombroso's born criminals — is less pronounced today, it is hardly extinct. But at least in one reading, peacemaking criminology absolves individual wrong-doers of

responsibility (or blame) for their actions, and obliterates all differences between people. What, finally, are the consequences of indiscriminate compassion? Is there a danger that such a response might over time provide pernicious rationales for engaging in predatory or wantonly anti-social activities? Do we really understand fully enough the real impact of such responses on those who receive them?

Exposure to the writings of peacemaking criminologists should impel other criminologists to reflect more deeply on their own work, and what they imagine it is accomplishing. Is 'conventional', mainstream criminological research worthy of the enormous expenditure of human intelligence, effort and time devoted to it? On the other hand, is peacemaking criminology destined to be perceived as but one more form of advocacy, with no real credibility as a means for achieving a serious understanding of crime and criminal justice?

It is my own view that we live in an endlessly complex and contradictory world, where life is often unfair and perfect justice is an aspiration, not something we can ever hope to realize fully. We should always be humble about what we do and do not know, and should always be open to new modes of understanding and interpretation which offer at least the potential for promoting peace and justice. We are inevitably confronted with difficult choices and must weigh competing factors. An overriding objective should be to diminish suffering and the loss of innocent life. Peacemaking criminology offers us a provocative way of thinking about what we should do and how we should live, and it provides us with a way of stepping outside our conventional approaches to the study of crime and criminal justice.

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CHAPTER 17

Peacemaking in Criminology

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I have been asked to write a follow-up to Richard Quinney's essay on peacemaking. With apologies to our authors, Richard and I are making slow progress toward publishing a book of fascinating readings on this topic. Richard and Kevin Anderson especially have taken the initiative to organize conference sessions on peacemaking in criminology over the past several years. Now in the last *Critical Criminologist*, Marty Schwartz (1989) has elevated us to the status of a major school of thought in radical criminology. I'm flattered but I'm worried.

Consider seriously Casey Groves' point in his essay in the same issue of the *Critical Criminologist*. Ours is a field founded on name-calling, which only gets in the way of understanding and relieving crime and punishment. As I say to a friend who advocates just deserts: Crime and punishment are a matter of who's who, not what's what. We can't punish acts, we punish actors. The history of criminology is largely one of evaluating people by their stigmata. Lombroso lives. This is true whether one studies the infirmities of prison inmates or the taint of membership in the power elite (as I myself have done). And it is true, as Casey tells us, even when we turn from classifying offenders to classifying criminologists. If our classifications of ourselves constitute knowledge, and if knowledge is power, then our classifications relegate us to treating even ourselves as categories, body and soul — to elevate some of us to the status of good, true and beautiful people, to damn others rhetorically to our own subjection. The struggle to establish who is chosen and who ought to be subdued continues apace.

My mother tells me that if I really knew what a positivist is, I'd know that I am one. I have been called a number of mutually contradictory things, and I don't deny any of them. The more names I'm called, the safer I feel. Nils Christie puts it this way: It's harder to inflict pain on a person you know in many respects. You're more likely to see that that person's soul is not embodied in any single act, and that you cannot punish an act without contaminating a complex actor. People are safer the less easily they can be put in a single category. Insofar as we get past putting each other in pigeonholes, we get past victimizing and criminalizing each other.

WHAT DO I MEAN BY PEACEMAKING?

I don't claim to represent any other single person let alone a school, but I will say for myself that I aim to figure out how we can get along without criminalizing and victimizing one another. As a theoretical physicist might seek to define anti-matter, so I seek to define anti-crime — anti-crime, not

punishment, which isn't even good homeopathic medicine for crime unless it is administered in microdoses.

The definition of anti-crime, conceptually or empirically, has hardly appeared in criminology. We criminologists shouldn't feel too bad. The human vocabulary much more easily describes what is wrong with people than what is right. We are left to define what is right by negation. Doctors will tell you that health is the absence of pathology. Diplomats will tell you that peace is the absence of war. Criminologists will tell you that the virtuous citizen refrains from doing what is against the law.

What, I have long wondered, do people do that is so great when they are free of pathology, not at war, and refraining from crime? And how does what they are doing keep them from making or letting other people get sick, fight wars or commit crimes? This criminologist wants to know, on the premise again that knowledge is power.

DEFINING ANTI-CRIME

I have found in my reading and personal experience that the definition of crime and the criminal vary widely by political, economic, historical, and cultural context. That's no news, Thorsten Sellin pointed it out more than half a century ago. The cynic in me long believed that anything could be called crime, anyone could be called criminal. Now I don't think so. It is true that today's crime can be yesterday's or tomorrow's act of heroism, but lately I have noticed a vast range of human interaction which is never called criminal, or for that matter violent. Any time any interaction begins, it could go either way. I seek to make democratic choices realistic alternatives to violent ones.

We are born into two vast seas of interaction — interaction which may be described as violent or criminal, and that which may never be described as violent or criminal. These seas co-exist in the soul of every human being and in all interaction from human dyads to global economies.

There are many ways to describe interaction in the anti-crime sea. Just now for myself in a monograph I'm writing on "the geometry of violence and democracy," I call anti-crime 'democracy'. I boil democracy down to a particular form of interaction which Buckminster Fuller called 'synergetic' and depicted as movement along edges of a tetrahedron. I define 'violence' as variance from this form. (I'm really a theoretical statistician). Basically, in democratic interaction people attend to their impact on others, and seeing that the others are attending likewise, shift motives. The 'democratic' would-be mugger,

for instance, notices the victim's pain and decides to want something other than valuables. This reciprocal orbiting of shifting motives takes the same double helical form as other synergetic processes, among them homeostasis and DNA. As an ideal type, democracy is known to all religious and political traditions I can see, under such names as peace, participation, accommodation, adaptation, healing, reconciliation, community, co-operation, mutual aid, communism, anarchism, music-making, romance, harmony, charity, love, compassion, and the fruits of justice. Democracy represents the free exchange of information, which as Charles Darwin would tell us, maximizes chances of species survival. Unlike the material world of scarcity, information grows as it is used and exchanged — that is, information is synergetic.

The sea of crime and violence might well be called the sea of domination, the sea of retribution or the sea of creationists. In it, people act on the premise that some people are closer to divine or scientific reality than others. These chosen people have a corollary duty to make soldiers and workers march through life in straight, well-disciplined lines, as when legislators, judges or doctors decide whether a mother shall carry a fetus to term. This is the sea in which interaction requires telling people what to do or not to do, and in case of conflict, requires establishing in advance who is entitled to give the orders, and who is obliged to obey. In this sea, capacity to survive is equated with having preordained, chosen authorities determine who people are and where they ought to be headed so as to preclude conflict and negotiation. In this sea, people refuse to agree to disagree.

If my theory is correct, life in this sea builds anxiety. An instinctual alarm tells ruler and subject alike that this form of interaction, rather than sustaining life, kills. The social body literally feels sick to its members. The ruler *fears* loss of control, while the subject *experiences* loss of control. The greater the determination with which people are forging straight ahead (*i.e.* the larger the scale on which social life is formally organized and institutionalized), the greater the voltage of violence in the social system. The voltage releases like lightning, toward points of least resistance — those too powerless or too loyal to resist. Among other things that happen when voltage mounts in the nation state, alarm over crime and violence rises, and punishment and other warfare proliferate.

I for one believe that democracy is the only way to cool out violence. The only path to peace is peace itself. Punishment merely adds heat. Graeme Newman and Michael Lynch (1989) concluded a year ago in *Contemporary Crises* that non-retaliation is the only way to break cycles of violence. I don't think non-retaliation, or indeed

failure to confront conflict, is enough. I think relief from violence requires people to indulge in democracy, in making music together. Knowing how to reduce crime and punishment means knowing and recognizing the empirical signs that democracy is occurring, and knowing how to build and nurture democratic forms of interaction. If all humanity, including all criminologists, were not steeped in experience of how to make democratic interaction happen, our fragile species would not have survived even one generation. Indulgence in our violent sides is something all criminologists know and understand. How much more practical, how much more realistic it would be for us to spend more of our scarce time and energy learning how people can and do make democracy work in place of crime and violence.

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CHAPTER 18

Us and Them: Reflections on The Dialectics of Moral Hate

Casey Groves

And the message is clear: without peace within us and in our actions, there can be no peace in our results. Richard Quinney

In 1975 I attended my first criminology conference. I was about to meet my heroes. I was excited. At the time, radical criminology was more controversial than it is today. It was also more lively. I attended a radical panel, which drew about 200 people. The presentations were engaging. Afterward, a select few were invited for a private caucus. I wormed my way in. I'll spare you details of the meeting — save one.

There was a person who caught my eye, an attractive person who never smiled. The meeting progressed, our discussion rolled round and round. It had the usual what-is-to-be-done flavor. At a particularly inopportune time, the attractive face burst forward and, twisted with righteous hostility, said: "I have never seen a larger collection of pigs assembled in one place." The pigs, of course, were members of the American Society of Criminology.

I mention this because it captures an extreme version of a tendency I have detected in radical criminologists (though it is hardly unique to radicals). That tendency is to carve people into *Us* and *Them*. The 'Them' in this case are mainstream or traditional criminologists. In listening to radical condemnations of The Mainstream, one often finds the following ingredients: righteous anger, moralistic condemnation, bitter outrage, and aggressive defensiveness. You probably recognize these ingredients. They appear with regularity in the bitter brew of hate stew.

Certainly, there are issues which call for anger and bitterness. Class injustice, bourgeois moralism, structures of domination and humiliation, poverty, inequality, racism, sexism — in short, the vast litany of ills bred under this mode of production. It is difficult to avoid a permanent sense of outrage when confronted with these tragic realities. But there is irony in the radical response to tragedy. I think I speak for the reader when I say love is preferred to hate, that compassion is superior to condemnation, that understanding is better than indifference. Love, warmth, compassion, understanding, sharing, community, empathy — how do these values square with a twisted face? With 'pig' accusations? With a metaphysics of hate? Let me hazard a guess concerning the source of this irony. People are inclined to personalize evil, to embody it, to stuff it into another human being. That way we can find the culprit, detect the enemy. This is psychologically tempting. It allows us to 'locate' evil, to see it, spit at it, hate it, blame it, perhaps even to kill it. This is one 'logic' behind the death penalty. It animates the

Ayatollah's death threat against Salman Rushdie. It feeds the tendency to heap scorn on criminals, to punish most of those who may deserve it the least. It is the psychological foundation for superstructures of hate. Radicals are no exception to this all-too-human rule — only arrogant self-deception could suggest that we are.

Anger, outrage and blame are understandable, even forgivable. But are we not on the receiving end of a grotesque dialectic when a yearning for peace breeds sneers of contempt? When a desire for love is twisted into anger, resentment, and rejection? I have been told that it is blasphemy to publish in anything but a radical journal, that gatherings which include non-radicals are 'mixed crowds', that theoretical borrowings from the mainstream amount to polluted revisionism. On the other side I have heard jokes about radicals from mainstreamers, but I have seldom encountered moral hate. When it comes to day-to-day moral praxis, we may be closer to hate than those we so readily condemn. I say this with a sense of sadness and dismay. After all, most of us suffer moral spasms when blacks or women are maligned in the same manner as we occasionally malign our colleagues. It is fair to ask: "What is going on here?" Are structural incentives and psychological temptations too much for reflexive intellectuals to overcome? Have Marxists become too comfortable with contradictions? Is the quest for peace doomed to end in negative dialectics?

Let me make clear that I am not requesting bourgeois acquiescence. Nor am I suggesting that we all stand arm in arm, that we turn the other cheek when confronted with unacceptable mainstream interpretations. There are serious intellectual, moral, and practical differences between radical and traditional approaches, and nothing I have said is designed to minimize those differences. It is simply a question of truly respecting the heart and soul of other people, be they black, yellow, green, or mainstream. Marx was right when he spoke of the social determination of consciousness. But let's not forget that in his everyday behavior Marx was abrasive and cruel. He was no role model as far as interpersonal relations were concerned. And let us not forget that Marx's determinism does not condemn us to the dialectics of hate. It took an existentialist to remind us that we as individuals have the ability to choose between respect and rejection, between love and hate. Negative dialectics aside, we *can* fight the urge to ugliness, *can* live by moral visions of community and compassion. Believing or acting otherwise is a living testimonial to the power of tragedy.

CHAPTER 19

Oneness of All: The Mystical Nature of Humanism

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As humanists we would do well to practice what the Poet Robinson Jeffers calls 'inhumanism.' In a poetry reading at Harvard University in 1941, Jeffers told the audience that his verse intends to express "the feeling — I will say certitude — that the world, the universe, is one being, a single organism, one great life that includes all life and all things, and is so beautiful it must be loved and revered, and in moments of mystical vision we identify ourselves with it" (1987:xxxiii). Jeffers noted that his own poetry expresses "a protest against human narcissism." He suggested that the happiest and freest human being is the one who is investigating or appreciating the things that are not human, or when considering human things, letting them be seen as a part of a great music. In an early poem, *Roan Stallion*, Jeffers wrote: "Humanity is the mold to break way from, the crust to break through, the coal to break into fire, the atom to be split" (1987:42).

In expanding our understanding and practice of humanism — an enterprise which I assume will inform our social theory — I would like to offer another introductory source of inspiration. The Rumanian novelist, Petru Dumitriu, writing from the stance of Eastern Orthodoxy, in his book *To the Unknown God*, observes: "For nothing is simple, and the universe is mathematicable, but incomprehensible — really incomprehensible, and really constructed according to a plan that is not a human one" (1982: 42). He adds: "We have been inserted into this universe, we form a part of it with every particle of our energy in our beings." And as human beings in this intimate connection, we ask of this incomprehensible universe, "What do you want of us?" This Rumanian writer then poses the ultimate challenging question for humanists:

What does that something unknown, incomprehensible and supremely difficult want of us, if not the impossible itself? Why are we chained to an unbearable system, and to the ineradicable compulsion to free ourselves from its limitations? Why can we not bear our condition, and yet not free ourselves from its limitations? (1982:46)

As Marxist humanists we rightly have rejected an analysis that removes the human being from concrete social reality. Our concern is for the welfare of humankind. Asserting the essential dignity and worth of the human being, we recognize the human being as an active agent in the world. Yet, in doing so, we have too readily and unwisely placed our human species always at the center of all things. The result is an anthropocentrism that not only exaggerates and misrepresents the importance of the human in the larger

scheme of things, but has the effect of denying what is essential to our being human: our intimate and integral connection to all else. To recognize the oneness of all, as the mystical sensibility would have it, is to reconfirm our humanism and to recognize that as human beings we are on the path to enlightenment.

The great challenge of our developing humanism, I am suggesting, is to incorporate the human firmly within the whole of all that is. Certainly we are a part of the community of sentient beings. But more than this, there is an inter-penetration of all things, animate and inanimate. A Zen master notes: "We are all of us interrelated — not just people, but animals too, and stones, clouds, trees" (Aitken, 1984:10). All phenomena — of which we are an integral part — are transparent, ephemeral, and totally one in the great void of existence. Nothing can exist by itself; nothing has a separate existence, a separate self. Being empty of a separate self, we are everything. Thich Nhat Hanh, the Vietnamese Buddhist and peace activist, commenting on the Heart Sutra, calls this the truth of 'interbeing.' Take this sheet of paper, for example, Hanh instructs:

If we look into this sheet of paper even more deeply, we can see the sunshine in it. If the sunshine is not there, the forest cannot grow. In fact, nothing can grow. Even we cannot grow without sunshine. And so, we know that the sunshine is also in this sheet of paper. The paper and the sunshine inter-are. And if we continue to look, we can see the logger who cut the tree and brought it to the mill to be transformed into paper. And we see the wheat. We know that the logger cannot exist without his daily bread, and therefore the wheat that became his bread is also in this sheet of paper. And the logger's father and mother are in it too. When we look in this way, we see that without all of these things, this sheet of paper cannot exist (1988:3-4).

And we are in this sheet of paper too: The sheet of paper is part of our perception, part of our mind and very being. As Hanh notes: "Everything co-exists with this sheet of paper." The truth is in interbeing, beyond the dualism of Western thought. Everything is everything else. As human beings, we are a part of all things, and as human beings we are connected to all other humans, in all the joy and all the suffering in the world. "Everyone," Hanh observes, "is responsible for everything that happens in life" (1984:51-52).

The terrible wound of Western existence is that of separation, the loss of oneness. In Christian terms, in its extreme form, this is hell, and our human lives are lived in a state of sin. With such awareness, Christian mystics have longed for union, healing the separation from the divine, a separation that is manifested daily in the alienation of humans from one another (see Johnston, 1981: 132-171).

The humanist must finally come to grasp the meaning of mysticism. And to grasp the meaning of mysticism is to let go of much of intellectual humanism, transcending the conceptual thought and reasoning that excludes all else. Mysticism is essentially non-discursive. "Here," William Johnston writes, "one is in darkness, in emptiness, in the cloud of unknowing precisely because one does not know through clear images and thought nor with the eyes of the body" (1978:18). But, he adds, "the inner eye is filled with light," a light now under the guidance of a love for the divine mystery. The life and work of the humanist thus becomes transformed. The pilgrimage is as much spiritual as it is intellectual, in fact, the two become one.

We begin the mystical journey by first becoming empty, waiting without expectation of anything. T.S. Eliot writes in his poem *East Coker*: "I said to my soul, be still, and wait without hope" (1971:28). A few lines later, he writes:

Wait without thought, for you are not ready for thought: So the darkness shall be light, and the stillness the dancing.

In the concluding lines of the poem, Eliot describes where our lives are leading:

Home is where one starts from. As we grow older
The world becomes stranger, the pattern more complicated
Of dead and living. Not the intense moment
Isolated, with no before and after,
But a lifetime burning in every moment
And not the lifetime of one man only
But of old stones that cannot be deciphered.
There is a time for the evening under starlight,
A time for the evening under lamplight
(The evening with the photograph album).
Love is most nearly itself
When here and now cease to matter.
Old men ought to be explorers
Here and there does not matter
We must be still and still moving
Into another intensity
For a further union, a deeper communion
Through the dark cold and the empty desolation,
The wave cry, the wind cry, the vast waters
Of the petrel and the porpoise. In my end is my beginning. (1971:180-181)

I would suggest, especially, that it is to such an end, to such a beginning, that our lives as mystical humanists are leading. It is with this awareness that I carry with me on a piece of paper the lines from Eliot's *Little Gidding*:

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time (1971:59).

That first place, where we started, is our oneness with all. Coming to the place of our beginning requires a letting go of the ego self as well as much of the interpersonal. What is being tempered in a humanism informed by the mystical is the egoistic and interactive self of conventional social psychology. And, of course, our very selves as practitioners of the art of sociology are being altered in the process. We are dying to our attachments, including the illusion of a permanent and independent self, as Buddhism suggests:

The truth of our being is simply this process of flowing change. Everything is impermanent. Nothing is worth grasping because nothing lasts. It is all empty, without self, like clouds moving through the sky. Knowing that nothing is secure, that there is no solid place on which to stand, we can let go, let be, and come to rest. We discover the depths of what it means to let go. For as much as we grasp and hold the body and senses, the feeling, the memory, ideas, reactions, and observation, so much do we make a separate "self", and so much do we suffer through this attachment (Goldstein and Kornfield, 1987:56).

What is left is the sense of oneness, of union, and actions come out of a human compassion for all of existence.

Offered in a recognition of the mystical nature of humanism is no less than an integration of our internal being. In a recent book, the British psychiatrist Anthony Storr refers to the integration as a "healing by means of an inner change of attitude," (1988:195) as a move toward wholeness. He describes the insights achieved by some of Carl Jung's patients and he notes the observations William James makes about reaching a sense of unity. Inner completeness is found in the realization that everything (including what we know as ourselves) is a part of everything else. The mystical vision is simply the acceptance of our wholeness — or to use the Zen term, our emptiness, everything beyond human definition and separation — or in Christian terms, our surrender to the infinite love of the divine.

Where does this lead? The objective is quite simple, that we be kinder to one another, that we break down the barriers between ourselves and others, that we realize and live moment-to-moment our connection to all that is. Such is the objective, it seems to me, of humanism, and of a social theory that is humanist. The peace and social justice we seek comes in the awareness of our interconnectedness — our oneness. Returning to the source, as in the

Zen search for the ox (see Sekida, 1975:223-237), our wonder is of the one fact: that we exist, and exist in the interpenetration of all things. Only one thing remains when we are aware of our ultimate existence: to go to town with helping hands — serving others (including ourselves) with great compassion. The oneness of all, I do not know its human name; let us call it love.

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CHAPTER 20
CONCLUSION

The Future of Critical Criminology

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I once tried to introduce the four areas covered in this book (1989), and Henry and Milovanovic (1991) have recently tried to synthesize them. Now, my assigned task is to discuss and assess the future, which is tough when we are not all sure exactly what the words 'critical criminology' mean. Must one be opposed to the current mode of production? Or does just complaining and whining count? This is no idle question. There are liberal feminists and peacemakers who are pro-capitalism, and right-wing conflict theorists and semioticians. Personally, I am drawn to Thomas and O'Maolchatha's (1989) idea that 'critical criminology' is a *metaphor* for those of us who work in a common tradition with common goals, not a closed set of membership rules.

THE LEFT REALIST CHALLENGE

Similarly, it can be difficult to get a handle on exactly what left realism is. Young points to an 18 page bibliography which is constantly updated. In which of the mixed quality, often contradictory pieces is the *real* left realism? What is evident is that the core realists began with one major practical concern: policing. They set aside a range of other issues, from economic policies to prisons to gender relations. I am convinced, partially from as yet unpublished materials, that one by one these issues are being attended to. However, their least helpful contribution was the split they attempted of critical criminology into left realists and left idealists (the rest of us). As many have pointed out, this is a reductionist caricature (Schwartz and DeKeseredy, 1991).

Actually, I remember the era a little differently than some of the others here. Many of us were sort of idealists 20 years ago. We were outraged that the state only saw crime in the actions of African-American and poor youth. In Albert K. Cohen's terms, some of us were 'negativistic' — if James Q. Wilson says yes, then I say no. There was some rooting for the underdog, and great concern that any actions against the underdog were giving succor to the 'Great Enemy'. But, as Michalowski points out, we as a field did come to our senses long before Jock Young came around to point fingers. Still, left realism has much to offer.

From my vantage point, left realism's first plus is that it does not just acknowledge realism, it makes it a centerpiece of its agenda. It sees that people in this society are victimized both from above and below, and that people at the bottom are double-victimized. Left realist theorists are at least working to move critical criminological theory forward, synthesizing prior

theories to extract what value they have, and bringing these ideas into new frameworks. They demand we turn our attention to workable crime control political strategies.

There are still many problems with left realism, however. First, as many have pointed out, the project needs to be broadened to include the concerns of feminists, abolitionists and a variety of other critical criminologists. Second, this entire idea of community control needs to be taken beyond a slogan and turned into carefully worked out political strategy. In London boroughs where left-wing politicians have a strong foothold, community control sounds great. As Michalowski so clearly points out, what about communities where racist and sexist elements are in political control? More confusing is how most of us live — where there is a pluralism of views, and which one is preeminent depends on how you worded the last public opinion poll.

The other fear many have of left realism is whether it has the potential of degenerating into another form of state control. Personally, I would like to legislate against any further discussion of how left realism and right realism are different because they begin with different presuppositions. If you end up at the same place, who cares? Do you suppose that Soviet citizens sent to Siberia by Stalin felt better than their Czarist-punished predecessors about their exile? I am haunted by Pashukanis. With the highest motives of following Marx's most important precepts, he wrote Stalin's new constitution suspending many citizen rights. Now that he had no rights, Stalin had Pashukanis shot. E.P. Thompson may be correct in supposing that having our anti-female (Smart, 1989) mystified, capitalist, hegemonic, oppressive 'Rule of Law' might be better than not having it.

THERE IS FEMINISM AND THERE IS FEMINISM

There are many feminisms. Tong (1989) lists eight, and there are debates within each. As one example, Danner here defines socialist feminism as "a woman-centered description and explanation ... Women's inner lives and daily experiences are considered to be the focus of inquiry." A few pages later, however, Ahluwalia writes that "others, including myself, vehemently disagree with a definition that so narrowly defines the research agenda." At the same time, still others dispute any role for feminism in criminology at all (Carlen, 1990).

Speaking of narrow agendas, most critical feminist criminology today is still primarily concerned with the victimization of women. The challenge of Daly and Chesney-Lind (1988) — to recognized the fact that criminology has been a white man's discipline, and the need to center the study of gender within it — is only slowly developing, and more so in Britain than in North America. As Ahluwalia points out, there is a difference between incorporating feminist work within

Conclusion

existing paradigms and providing a gendered analysis of crime. The goal is not to have more women and crime courses, although that would be nice. The key is to understand at every point of the enterprise the role that gender plays in the construction of our perceptions, speech and behavior. I just read a large new sourcebook on family violence. Although most authors noted that most 'perpetrators' are male, their constant search for typologies and 'risk markers' never included gender. What is there about being male in this society that puts us at so much risk of raping and beating our intimates and children? Feminism, to me, not only needs to examine women's lives. Feminism must also provide a gendered analysis of why all men have the option of being violent, even if not all of them regularly employ violence; why women's participation in crime is so different from men's; and why we react to women deviants in the ways we do.

CONSTRUCTING DECONSTRUCTION

I once read an economics article which proposed a cycle in the popularity of theories. Every decade a new theory arises but it is so dense and impenetrable that only a very few scholars will learn it. Since (being new) it is an attack on the old guard, however, graduate students and junior professors champion its cause. Unfortunately, in the next decade the old champions will find that they are themselves now members of the old guard, and really without the energy to learn something totally new.

I must admit that I have developed a rather serious bias. If people cannot write so that I can understand the material, then I have trouble maintaining an enthusiasm for it. Years ago, during my project of mastering the works of the Frankfurt School, I suddenly realized that since there were only a few hundred people who could understand Habermas, how could he possibly be the primary force behind radical transformation of society? Habermas? Who is he? Where have you gone, Jürgen Habermas?

I wonder about postmodernism for that reason. Reading Lacan or Luhmann is like reading Cervantes in the original when you cannot read Spanish. I am not completely stupid. I once got great grades in graduate school, and have published theory articles. Still, after reading the postmodernist articles in this book several times, I cannot rid myself of the feeling that deep down I really do not know what the hell they are talking about. Where I *do* know, I worry a lot. When being a smart aleck, I follow in the footsteps of the British literary scholar, Malcolm Bradbury, who suggests that, if the author is decentered and meaningless, who are all these people writing articles on the subject?

If we deconstruct deconstructionism, the level of nihilism we can reach is mind-boggling.

I worry about a methodology which some claim denies us the ability to make knowledge judgments about which philosophies are or are not liberating (Melichar, 1988). If we deconstruct our categories to show they are merely fictions, do we lose the ability to speak out against sexism, racism and classism (Alcoff, 1988)? While I understand the attraction of postmodern techniques to feminists and others, I worry that the losses may be greater than the gains.

As Milovanovic and Manning both point out, the power of postmodernism and semiotics as tools of demystification is strong, and may yet prove to be important in the future of critical criminology. Maybe I am wrong. After all, Talcott Parsons parlayed impenetrable prose into leadership in functionalism. But I suspect that few of us will find our leadership in works we cannot understand, or that do not seem to offer an obvious and immediate relevance to our life concerns.

Worse, when I think about theories which problematize and deny meaning to concepts of crime, I have flashbacks of survivors I have met in shelter houses. There are many types of 'crime', to be sure, but to someone who has just been beaten or raped and received 75 stitches, the idea that crime only exists because we affirm the reality of its existence sounds a lot like victim-blaming, or at least, as Hunt points out, an ethical relativism that can be very scary. The absence of a presence, so to speak.

Perhaps what I want are *Classic Comics* versions of Lacan and Derrida. Then maybe I will not be not-Saussure.

MAKE PEACE NOT WAR (ON CRIME)

Friedrichs says it is probably premature to give 'school of thought' status to peacemaking. Pepinsky himself claims to be worried that people will think this. OK, I withdraw the claim.

What role, then, do people actually see for peacemaking criminology? If it is to implement all of Hal Pepinsky's ideas before the end of the decade, then it is silly utopianism with no chance of success. On the other hand, if it is the voice of conscience for us all, it offers many avenues for success.

First, peacemaking criminologists need to continue investigating projects to implement their claims. We cannot create a more just and peaceful world by imposing violence and injustice on those with whom we disagree. But, in the exact and technical sense, what does that mean as an alternative? In a new edited book (Pepinsky and Quinney, 1991) several criminologists take the initial steps to provide this information. In the years to come, many more need to outline concrete

Conclusion

plans. Second, peacemaking criminologists can stand witness by disassociating themselves from the system's violence. Pepinsky (1992) points out that he has no illusions that prisons will go out of business soon, but that does not mean that he has to support them. Third, as a voice of conscience, peacemaking criminology can constantly alert the criminological community that there are alternatives to wars on crime, and force us to think through our facile acceptance of violence against others.

THE FUTURE

Of course, if I actually knew the future, I would be out at a race track, not writing this piece. Still, there are three major conclusions that I draw from this book.

First, although critical criminology still must define itself, and develop a theory which is something more than exposing the weaknesses of everyone else, it is infused with more energy and exciting alternatives than at any point in the past 20 years. As exemplified by many of the authors here, there are so many more avenues and ideas to develop. Left realism probably will not become our central focus without developing a great many more adherents over here, but its insights and concerns do have the potential to infuse a North American criminology with enormous energy, a new focus, and an interest in developing workable and supportable strategies.

Both feminist theory and peacemaking criminology have the potential to change a great deal in the field. Each offers radical opposition to business as usual (I am getting a headache from being 'stood on my head' so often). As a matter of course, we all should reflect on the operation of gender relations at every step of all of our work, and further on whether we are proposing to expand or reduce the total sum of violence in this world. Postmodernism can be a powerful tool for deconstruction, but it remains to be seen whether it can spread beyond the six or seven major figures who now use it in critical criminology.

What is most important is what is *not* in this book, except for the comments of Ahluwalia. What is the role of an African-American or Hispanic criminology? Feminist theorists could not be more correct in demanding that we view crime as a gendered experience. But, with more than 50% of U.S. prisoners today being people of color, we must think about a criminological focus which also includes race and ethnicity (Simpson, 1991). As the left realists point out, you can attempt to explain away this statistic by talking about racism, state manipulation of crime statistics, or insisting that no one talk about African-American crime until after a discussion of industrial waste fraud, but that does not mean that fewer 'Crips' or 'Bloods' will die this

year. If critical criminology has been historically male, it has been just as much historically white and middle class.

The lack of literature in this area can be astounding. I heartily recommend a library trip to confirm this. There are many works on whether the system's operations are racist, a worthy discipline, but much fewer on the extent to which our basic theories are relevant to people of color. For example, I was recently working on an article comparing African-American and white women who were victims of wife abuse (Mattley and Schwartz, 1990). Given the thousands of articles which have been written on wife abuse, the absolute paucity of material which discussed this experience from an Afrocentric point of view was shocking. I remain fairly ignorant on the subject.

Part of the problem is that we have very few people of color in criminology, and only some of them are critical. We need to consider how to bring more into the field rather than continually fighting over hiring those few already here. The old ad said "you don't have to be Jewish to enjoy Levy's rye," but it is also true that we would not have Levy's without the influence of Jewish bakers.

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