management of vessel operations

Instructions to Students:

Read through the below case study, analysing the actions of the:

· Bridge Team

· Fire Team

· Passenger Control

Your analysis should include, as a minimum:

· Comments on the actions of each team at each stage of the emergency, including why they were taking each action

· Comments on each action, including if you thought they had taken the correct action at the correct time, including your reasoning for this. If they were not taking the correct action, discuss what you thought should have been done instead.

· If you would change anything with how the situation was handled.

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At 0309 (UTC+5) on 23 May 2020, a fire was detected on board the cruise ship Regal Princess. The ship was on passage from Grand Cayman to Montego Bay, Jamaica, with 2693 passengers and 1123 crew on board.

At 0309, the Autronica fire alarm system sounded on the bridge and engine control room indicating multiple fire alarms in the engine spaces and funnel casing.

An emergency was declared on board, and a ‘Code BRAVO’ announcement made with the fire location as the Forward Separator Room. Shortly thereafter, the location of the fire was identified as the port side funnel casing. Multiple fire alarms were triggered in the engine spaces.

The vessel’s Chief Officer, who was on watch at the time, was dispatched from the Bridge by the Master to coordinate and control the firefighting effort.

The vessel’s power was transferred to the three engines in the aft engine room. This would aid firefighting efforts by stopping the exhaust gases passing through the fire location in the forward port casing.

The water fog system for the Forward Separator Room was manually activated at 0315.

The Chief Officer and Mobile Fire Group (MFG) #3 made entry to the engine space via the stairway on the starboard side of the Forward Switchboard Room, down to the Generator room and then through the AC Compressor room to the Separator Room. In all spaces only greyish smoke was observed, emanating from overhead vents. There was no fire present.

The search continued into the Forward Engine Room. Again, there was no observed fire. The smoke was dark and burning embers were falling from the casing onto Engine #3. The water fog system was started to protect Engine #3.

Mobile Fire Group (MFG) #3 was stationed in the Forward Engine Room, to extinguish any remaining embers.

The Chief Officer proceeded to Deck 1 and opened the door to the casing on the port side. Fire was visible within the casing at Decks 1, 2 and 3. Burning material was falling from above, within the casing. The Chief Officer closed the door and proceeded back to the staging area.

At 0328, a second Code Bravo announcement was made, with the fire location given as deck 13.

MFG No. 4 was assigned to fight the fire from deck 1 casing access on the port side, using hoses they were able to spray water as high as deck 4 within the casing. Water spray was used to extinguish falling embers within the casing. MFG No.1 provided back up with fire extinguishers, additional hoses, and changing out air bottles.

The lower fire damper at deck 1 did not close. This was later found to be blocked with debris from melted polyethylene (PE) piping and burnt embers from scaffold planks. MFG No.4 reported seeing the damper remaining open.

MFG No.4 could not contact the On Scene Commander and reported to the Bridge they were hampered by hot water cascading down the casing from firefighting efforts on the upper decks.

The wind was producing strong gale to storm winds (Beaufort 9-10) from the southwest which was causing the hot water from the firefighting efforts to be pushed down onto the pool deck and causing a large roll.

At 03:46 a number of passengers had gathered on the pool deck to see what was going on.

At 03:48 lubricating oil low level and low volume alarms were registered by the operational Diesel Generators. Each alarm, having been accepted, cleared within a few seconds.

No more alarms were registered until 03:58 when DG4 registered an alarm indicating that the DG was shedding load as a result of low lubricating oil pressure. A few seconds later it registered a low lubricating oil pressure alarm. At 03:59, DG1 registered a low lubricating oil sump level alarm. A little over five minutes later, at 04:01, DG4 shut down followed by DG2 eight seconds later. DG2 was restarted after approximately 11 minutes. At this point, the vessel was in open water and in no danger of grounding.

The bridge team, immediately on blacking out, called the engine control room but, at that early stage, the engineers were unsure of the cause, or causes, of the blackout and therefore could not estimate when it would be possible to restore power.

Having assessed the situation, the master broadcast a mayday. He then instructed the crew to drop both anchors. However, the anchors did not hold, and the ship continued to drift astern towards the shore at a speed of 6–7 knots. The General Alarm was activated at 04:03 and the passengers and crew began to muster.

The Horizon Court called to request assistance, as one passenger was requiring assistance to get to the muster station.

A number of passengers from cabins E106, R309, L221 and A419 called the 911 line requested assistance.

One of the staircase teams called the bridge to ask for assistance as the lifts are not in operation and they need help evacuating three wheelchairs.

During Passenger Muster, the muster stations at Crooners, Princess Live! Cafe and the Art Galley and Theatre were noted as complete, but not reported to the Bridge. The passenger muster was incomplete in the vista lounge, one family from cabin A628 have reported their teenage son, who was out at the disco, was not in the cabin when the general emergency alarm rang. He had not reported for Muster. This information was communicated to other muster stations, but not to the Bridge and Fire Teams.

At 04:09 the lube oil pressure alarm sounded again and the vessel blacked out. Within 30 seconds of the blackout, the emergency diesel generator started and powered the emergency switchboard. The engineers transferred a total of 10.8 m3 of lubricating oil to the lubricating oil sump tanks of the three operational DGs. They then started DG2 and restored power to the main switchboard, in manual load-sharing mode2. The port propulsion motor was re-started and, approximately five minutes later, the starboard propulsion motor was started, providing sufficient propulsive power to maintain slow speed ahead. Over the next hour, DG1 and DG4 were re-started in automatic load sharing mode and the starboard propulsion motor was re-started to enable the propulsion motors’ output to maintain between slow ahead and half ahead. Although the three operational DGs had been restarted, the engineers had to continuously balance the electrical load manually. The vessel was maneuvered towards open waters, still with both anchors lowered.

At 04:23 the cabin evacuation teams confirmed to passenger control that all cabins had been searched and were clear.

At 04:25 one elderly passenger at the muster station at the Princess Theatre was starting to feel cold, she was dressed in her pyjamas and a jumper. She told the muster station that she had left her medications in the cabin and was granted permission to leave the muster station to go and get it.

At 04:34 the ship started to roll heavily, up to about 15 degrees, and large objects in the Vista Lounge started to come loose, including plant pots and a piano, causing potential injury to passengers. The passenger control team reported this to the Bridge, who asked them to move the passengers to lifeboat stations. The passengers were taken in a ‘snake’ formation to their lifeboat station. All passengers were re-counted once they reached the lifeboat station.

At 04:41, a large wave breached a window in the Allegro dining room, causing a foot of water to flood the muster station. The water was not draining away, meaning passengers were sat ankle deep in water. The decision was made by the muster station team leader to move the passengers up to a back-up muster station which was 1 deck higher.

At 04:42 the lube oil low pressure alarm continued to sound and the DGs were likely to shut down within 2 minutes.

The Bridge re-issued a Mayday at 04:42, stating they required assistance as they had lost engine power.

MRCC Sola (Norway) answered the Mayday call and advised that they had 5 helicopters available that could take 15 passengers each and would be able to do evacuation by helicopter. The sea conditions limited the use of the lifeboats due to the heavy rolling and a tug would have an ETA of 5 hours.

The engines were unable to be re-started and the vessel started drifting towards rocks.