homework

1

William Paley

Selections from Natural Theology, or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of

the Deity. (1802)

Chapter One

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone

came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain

there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But

suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened

to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any

thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for

the watch as well as for the stone? why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first?

For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive

(what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a

purpose, e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so

regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently

shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other

manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would

have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now

served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to

one result:-- We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavour

to relax itself, turns round the box. We next observe a flexible chain (artificially wrought for the

sake of flexure), communicating the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find

a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in, and apply to, each other, conducting the motion

from the fusee to the balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and at the same time, by the

size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion, as to terminate in causing an index, by

an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice

that the wheels are made of brass in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other

metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed

in no other part of the work, but in the room of which, if there had been any other than a

transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism

2

being observed (it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous

knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said,

observed and understood), the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a

maker: that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or

artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended

its construction, and designed its use.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made;

that we had never known an artist capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of

executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was

performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of

some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern

manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this

kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist's skill, if he be unseen and unknown,

but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former

time, and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether the

question arise concerning a human agent, or concerning an agent of a different species, or an

agent possessing, in some respects, a different nature.

II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went

wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the

designer, might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we

accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is

not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made: still less

necessary, where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all.

III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of

the watch, concerning which we could not discover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner

they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not

ascertain, whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first

branch of the case; if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of

the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in

3

our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate

the manner according to which, or the connexion by which, the ultimate effect depended upon

their action or assistance; and the more complex is the machine, the more likely is this obscurity

to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be

spared, without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by

experiment,--these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such,

would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of

contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch, with its

various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of

material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have

contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure

now exhibited, viz. of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure.

V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction to be answered, that there existed

in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form

and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to

himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the

watch-maker.

VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of

contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so:

VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than

the result of the laws of metallicnature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the

efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode,

according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order, according to which

that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the

law does nothing; is nothing. The expression, "the law of metallic nature," may sound strange

and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more

familiar to him, such as "the law of vegetable nature," "the law of animal nature," or indeed as

4

"the law of nature" in general, when assigned as the cause of phænomena, in exclusion of agency

and power; or when it is substituted into the place of these.

VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion, or from his

confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows

enough for his argument: he knows the utility of the end: he knows the subserviency and

adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his

doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of

knowing little, need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.

. . . .

Chapter Five

Every observation which was made in our first chapter, concerning the watch, may be repeated

with strict propriety, concerning the eye; concerning animals; concerning plants; concerning,

indeed, all the organized parts of the works of nature. As,

I. When we are inquiring simply after the existence of an intelligent Creator, imperfection,

inaccuracy, liability to disorder, occasional irregularities, may subsist in a considerable degree,

without inducing any doubt into the question: just as a watch may frequently go wrong, seldom

perhaps exactly right, may be faulty in some parts, defective in some, without the smallest

ground of suspicion from thence arising that it was not a watch; not made; or not made for the

purpose ascribed to it. When faults are pointed out, and when a question is started concerning the

skill of the artist, or dexterity with which the work is executed, then indeed, in order to defend

these qualities from accusation, we must be able, either to expose some intractableness and

imperfection in the materials, or point out some invincible difficulty in the execution, into which

imperfection and difficulty the matter of complaint may be resolved; or if we cannot do this, we

must adduce such specimens of consummate art and contrivance, proceeding from the same

hand, as may convince the inquirer, of the existence, in the case before him, of impediments like

those which we have mentioned, although, what from the nature of the case is very likely to

happen, they be unknown and unperceived by him. This we must do in order to vindicate the

artist's skill, or, at least, the perfection of it; as we must also judge of his intention, and of the

5

provisions employed in fulfilling that intention, not from an instance in which they fail, but from

the great plurality of instances in which they succeed. But, after all, these are different questions

from the question of the artist's existence: or, which is the same, whether the thing before us be a

work of art or not: and the questions ought always to be kept separate in the mind. So likewise it

is in the works of nature. Irregularities and imperfections are of little or no weight in the

consideration, when that consideration relates simply to the existence of a Creator. When the

argument respects his attributes, they are of weight; but are then to be taken in conjunction (the

attention is not to rest upon them, but they are to be taken in conjunction) with the

unexceptionable evidences which we possess, of skill, power, and benevolence, displayed in

other instances; which evidences may, in strength; number, and variety, be such, and may so

overpower apparent blemishes, as to induce us, upon the most reasonable ground, to believe, that

these last ought to be referred to some cause, though we be ignorant of it, other than defect of

knowledge or of benevolence in the author.

II. There may be also parts of plants and animals, as there were supposed to be of the watch,

of which, in some instances, the operation, in others, the use, is unknown. These form different

cases; for the operation may be unknown, yet the use be certain. Thus it is with the lungs of

animals. It does not, I think, appear, that we are acquainted with the action of the air upon the

blood, or in what manner that action is communicated by the lungs: yet we find that a very short

suspension of their office destroys the life of the animal. In this case, therefore, we may be said

to know the use, nay we experience the necessity, of the organ, though we be ignorant of its

operation. Nearly the same thing may be observed of what is called the lymphatic system. We

suffer grievous inconveniences from its disorder, without being informed of the office which it

sustains in the œconomy of our bodies. There may possibly also be some few examples of the

second class, in which not only the operation is unknown, but in which experiments may seem to

prove that the part is not necessary; or may leave a doubt, how far it is even useful to the plant or

animal in which it is found. This is said to be the case with the spleen; which has been extracted

from dogs, without any sensible injury to their vital functions. Instances of the former kind,

namely, in which we cannot explain the operation, may be numerous; for they will be so in

proportion to our ignorance. They will be more or fewer to different persons, and in different

stages of science. Every improvement of knowledge diminishes their number. There is hardly,

perhaps, a year passes, that does not, in the works of nature, bring some operation, or some mode

6

of operation, to light, which was before undiscovered,--probably unsuspected. Instances of the

second kind, namely, where the part appears to be totally useless, I believe to be extremely rare;

compared with the number of those, of which the use is evident, they are beneath any assignable

proportion; and, perhaps, have never been submitted to a trial and examination sufficiently

accurate, long enough continued, or often enough repeated. No accounts which I have seen, are

satisfactory. The mutilated animal may live and grow fat (as was the case of the dog deprived of

its spleen), yet may be defective in some other of its functions; which, whether they can all, or in

what degree of vigour and perfection, be performed, or how long preserved, without the

extirpated organ, does not seem to be ascertained by experiment. But to this case, even were it

fully made out, may be applied the consideration which we suggested concerning the watch, viz.

that these superfluous parts do not negative the reasoning which we instituted concerning those

parts which are useful, and of which we know the use: the indication of contrivance, with respect

to them, remains as it was before.

III. One atheistic way of replying to our observations upon the works of nature, and to the

proofs of a Deity which we think that we perceive in them, is to tell us, that all which we see

must necessarily have had some form, and that it might as well be its present form as any other.

Let us now apply this answer to the eye, as we did before to the watch. Something or other must

have occupied that place in the animal's head: must have filled up, we will say, that socket: we

will say also, that it must have been of that sort of substance which we call animal substance, as

flesh, bone, membrane, cartilage, &c. But that it should have been an eye, knowing as we do

what an eye comprehends,--viz. that it should have consisted, first, of a series of transparent

lenses (very different, by-the-bye, even in their substance, from the opaque materials of which

the rest of the body is, in general at least, composed; and with which the whole of its surface, this

single portion of it excepted, is covered): secondly, of a black cloth or canvass (the only

membrane of the body which is black) spread out behind these lenses, so as to receive the image

formed by pencils of light transmitted through them; and placed at the precise geometrical

distance at which, and at which alone, a distinct image could be formed, namely, at the

concourse of the refracted rays: thirdly, of a large nerve communicating between this membrane

and the brain; without which, the action of light upon the membrane, however modified by the

organ, would be lost to the purposes of sensation:--that this fortunate conformation of parts

should have been the lot, not of one individual out of many thousand individuals, like the great

7

prize in a lottery, or like some singularity in nature, but the happy chance of a whole species; nor

of one species out of many thousand species, with which we are acquainted, but of by far the

greatest number of all that exist; and that under varieties, not casual or capricious, but bearing

marks of being suited to their respective exigencies'--that all this should have taken place, merely

because something must have occupied those points in every animal's forehead;--or, that all this

should be thought to be accounted for, by the short answer, "that whatever was there, must have

had some form or other," is too absurd to be made more so by any augmentation. We are not

contented with this answer; we find no satisfaction in it, by way of accounting for appearances of

organization far short of those of the eye, such as we observe in fossil shells, petrified bones, or

other substances which bear the vestiges of animal or vegetable recrements, but which, either in

respect of utility, or of the situation in which they are discovered, may seem accidental enough.

It is no way of accounting even for these things, to say that the stone, for instance, which is

shown to us (supposing the question to be concerning a petrification), must have contained some

internal conformation or other. Nor does it mend the answer to add, with respect to the

singularity of the conformation, that, after the event, it is no longer to be computed what the

chances were against it. This is always to be computed, when the question is, whether a useful or

imitative conformation be the produce of chance, or not: I desire no greater certainty in

reasoning, than that by which chance is excluded from the present disposition of the natural

world. Universal experience is against it. What does chance ever do for us? In the human body,

for instance, chance, i. e.the operation of causes without design, may produce a wen, a wart, a

mole, a pimple, but never an eye. Amongst inanimate substances, a clod, a pebble, a liquid drop

might be; but never was a watch, a telescope, an organized body of any kind, answering a

valuable purpose by a complicated mechanism, the effect of chance. In no assignable instance

hath such a thing existed without intention somewhere.

IV. There is another answer which has the same effect as the resolving of things into chance;

which answer would persuade us to believe, that the eye, the animal to which it belongs, every

other animal, every plant, indeed every organized body which we see, are only so many out of

the possible varieties and combinations of being, which the lapse of infinite ages has brought

into existence; that the present world is the relict of that variety: millions of other bodily forms

and other species having perished, being by the defect of their constitution incapable of

preservation, or of continuance by generation. Now there is no foundation whatever for this

8

conjecture in any thing which we observe in the works of nature; no such experiments are going

on at present: no such energy operates, as that which is here supposed, and which should be

constantly pushing into existence new varieties of beings. Nor are there any appearances to

support an opinion, that every possible combination of vegetable or animal structure has

formerly been tried. Multitudes of conformations, both of vegetables and animals, may be

conceived capable of existence and succession, which yet do not exist. Perhaps almost as many

forms of plants might have been found in the fields, as figures of plants can be delineated upon

paper. A countless variety of animals might have existed, which do not exist. Upon the

supposition here stated, we should see unicorns and mermaids, sylphs and centaurs, the fancies

of painters, and the fables of poets, realized by examples. Or, if it be alleged that these may

transgress the limits of possible life and propagation, we might, at least, have nations of human

beings without nails upon their fingers, with more or fewer fingers and toes than ten, some with

one eye, others with one ear, with one nostril, or without the sense of smelling at all. All these,

and a thousand other imaginable varieties, might live and propagate. We may modify any one

species many different ways, all consistent with life, and with the actions necessary to

preservation, although affording different degrees of conveniency and enjoyment to the animal.

And if we carry these modifications through the different species which are known to subsist,

their number would be incalculable. No reason can be given why, if these deperdits ever existed,

they have now disappeared. Yet, if all possible existences have been tried, they must have

formed part of the catalogue.

But, moreover, the division of organized substances into animals and vegetables, and the

distribution and sub-distribution of each into genera and species, which distribution is not an

arbitrary act of the mind, but founded in the order which prevails in external nature, appear to me

to contradict the supposition of the present world being the remains of an indefinite variety of

existences; of a variety which rejects all plan. The hypothesis teaches, that every possible variety

of being hath, at one time or other, found its way into existence (by what cause or in what

manner is not said), and that those which were badly formed, perished; but how or why those

which survived should be cast, as we see that plants and animals are cast, into regular classes, the

hypothesis does not explain; or rather the hypothesis is inconsistent with this phænomenon.

9

The hypothesis, indeed, is hardly deserving of the consideration which we have given to it. What

should we think of a man who, because we had never ourselves seen watches, telescopes,

stocking-mills, steam-engines, &c. made, knew not how they were made, or could prove by

testimony when they were made, or by whom,--would have us believe that these machines,

instead of deriving their curious structures from the thought and design of their inventors and

contrivers, in truth derive them from no other origin than this; viz, that a mass of metals and

other materials having run when melted into all possible figures, and combined themselves in all

possible forms, and shapes, and proportions, these things which we see, are what were left from

the accident, as best worth preserving; and, as such, are become the remaining stock of a

magazine, which, at one time or other, has by this means, contained every mechanism, useful,

and useless, convenient and inconvenient, into which such like materials could be thrown? I

cannot distinguish the hypothesis as applied to the works of nature, from this solution which no

one would accept, as applied to a collection of machines.