homework

1

David Hume

Selections from Dialogues on Natural Religion (1779)

This work is an imagined dialogue among three individuals about whether the existence and

nature of God can be proved.

The characters:

Cleanthes defends the teleological argument for the existence of God but criticizes the

cosmological argument for the existence of God

Philo criticizes the teleological argument for the existence of God and also challenges the

existence of God using the problem of evil

Demea criticizes the teleological argument for the existence of God but defends the cosmological

argument for the existence of God

Note that these characters often speak for many paragraphs without interruption.

Read the appropriate section for the appropriate module.

__________________________________________________________

On the Teleological argument:

CLEANTHES: Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said Cleanthes, addressing himself to

Demea, much less in replying to the pious declamations of Philo; I shall briefly explain how I

conceive this matter. Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: you will

find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser

machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and

faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are

adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever

contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles

exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs,

thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to

infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is

somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to

the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this

argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind

and intelligence.

DEMEA: I shall be so free, Cleanthes, said Demea, as to tell you, that from the beginning, I

could not approve of your conclusion concerning the similarity of the Deity to men; still less can

I approve of the mediums by which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration of the

2

Being of God! No abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! Are these, which have hitherto been so

much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject

than experience and probability? I will not say that this is betraying the cause of a Deity: but surely,

by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists, which they never could obtain by the

mere dint of argument and reasoning.

PHILO: What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said Philo, is not so much that all religious

arguments are by Cleanthes reduced to experience, as that they appear not to be even the most

certain and irrefragable of that inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the

earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new

instance of this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference. The

exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger

evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, from the

similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a

very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having

experienced the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place

in Titius and Maevius. But from its circulation in frogs and fishes, it is only a presumption,

though a strong one, from analogy, that it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical

reasoning is much weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our

experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily followed that imperfect

analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments, to have been mistaken.

If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or

builder; because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed

from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a

resemblance to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the

analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here

pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how that

pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider.

It would surely be very ill received, replied Cleanthes; and I should be deservedly blamed and

detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture.

But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a

resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every

part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that human legs may use them in mounting; and this

inference is certain and infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and

this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the dissimilarity which you

remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture?

DEMEA: Good God! cried Demea, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders of

religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect evidence! And you, Philo, on whose

assistance I depended in proving the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you

assent to all these extravagant opinions of Cleanthes? For what other name can I give them? or,

why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority,

before so young a man as Pamphilus?

3

PHILO: You seem not to apprehend, replied Philo, that I argue with Cleanthes in his own way;

and, by shewing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our

opinion. But what sticks most with you, I observe, is the representation which Cleanthes has

made of the argument a posteriori; and finding that that argument is likely to escape your hold

and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you can scarcely believe it to be set in its true

light. Now, however much I may dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principles of

Cleanthes, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and I shall endeavour so to

state the matter to you, that you will entertain no further scruples with regard to it.

Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he would be altogether

incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind of scene the universe must be, or

to give the preference to one state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he

clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, every chimera of his

fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign any just reason why he adheres to one

idea or system, and rejects the others which are equally possible.

Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really is, it would be impossible

for him at first to assign the cause of any one event, much less of the whole of things, or of the

universe. He might set his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety of

reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being all equally possible, he would

never of himself give a satisfactory account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience

alone can point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon.

Now, according to this method of reasoning, Demea, it follows, (and is, indeed, tacitly allowed

by Cleanthes himself,) that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself

any proof of design; but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle. For

ought we can know a priori, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within

itself as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several

elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to

conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall

into that arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by

experience, we find, (according to Cleanthes,) that there is a difference between them. Throw

several pieces of steel together, without shape or form; they will never arrange themselves so as

to compose a watch. Stone, and mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But

the ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, arrange themselves so

as to form the plan of a watch or house. Experience, therefore, proves, that there is an original

principle of order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar causes. The

adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a machine of human contrivance. The

causes, therefore, must be resembling.

I was from the beginning scandalized, I must own, with this resemblance, which is asserted,

between the Deity and human creatures; and must conceive it to imply such a degradation of the

Supreme Being as no sound Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, Demea, I shall

endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, and

4

shall refute this reasoning of Cleanthes, provided he allows that I have made a fair representation

of it.

That all inferences, Cleanthes, concerning fact, are founded on experience; and that all

experimental reasonings are founded on the supposition that similar causes prove similar effects,

and similar effects similar causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But observe, I

entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring of

experiments to similar cases. Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect

confidence in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of

circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new experiments to prove

certainly, that the new circumstances are of no moment or importance. A change in bulk,

situation, arrangement, age, disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars

may be attended with the most unexpected consequences: and unless the objects be quite familiar

to us, it is the highest temerity to expect with assurance, after any of these changes, an event

similar to that which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of

philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from the precipitate march of the vulgar, who,

hurried on by the smallest similitude, are incapable of all discernment or consideration.

But can you think, Cleanthes, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so

wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe houses, ships, furniture,

machines, and, from their similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes?

Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one

of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion,

and a hundred others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some

particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with

any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all

comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn any thing

concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf’s blowing, even though

perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?

But, allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature upon another, for the

foundation of our judgment concerning the origin of the whole, (which never can be admitted,)

yet why select so minute, so weak, so bounded a principle, as the reason and design of animals is

found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which

we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our

own favour does indeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully to

guard against so natural an illusion.

So far from admitting, continued Philo, that the operations of a part can afford us any just

conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a rule for

another part,

5

if the latter be very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, that the

inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, reason, or any thing similar to these

faculties in men? When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small

globe, can we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a universe?

And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow corner, and has even

there so limited a sphere of action, with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of

all things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for the

government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable sophism.

But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling the human, were to be

found throughout the whole universe, and were its activity elsewhere vastly greater and more

commanding than it appears in this globe; yet I cannot see, why the operations of a world

constituted, arranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which is in its

embryo state, and is advancing towards that constitution and arrangement. By observation, we

know somewhat of the economy, action, and nourishment of a finished animal; but we must

transfer with great caution that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more

in the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, we find, even from our

limited experience, possesses an infinite number of springs and principles, which incessantly

discover themselves on every change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown

principles would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a

universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine.

A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to

us; and do we then pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?

Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this time, in this minute globe

of earth, an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance; therefore the universe

could not originally attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art.

But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for the whole?

Is a very small part a rule for the universe? Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in

another situation vastly different from the former?

[skipping over some paragraphs to a new topic . . .]

DEMEA: Who could imagine, replied Demea, that Cleanthes, the calm philosophical Cleanthes,

would attempt to refute his antagonists by affixing a nickname to them; and, like the common

bigots and inquisitors of the age, have recourse to invective and declamation, instead of

reasoning? Or does he not perceive, that these topics are easily retorted, and that

Anthropomorphite is an appellation as invidious, and implies as dangerous consequences, as the

epithet of Mystic, with which he has honoured us? In reality, Cleanthes, consider what it is you

assert when you represent the Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What is the

soul of man? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas; united, indeed, into

one self or person, but still distinct from each other. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the

6

parts of its discourse, arrange themselves in a certain form or order; which is not preserved entire

for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement. New opinions, new passions,

new affections, new feelings arise, which continually diversify the mental scene, and produce in

it the greatest variety and most rapid succession imaginable. How is this compatible with that

perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity? By the same act,

say they, he sees past, present, and future: his love and hatred, his mercy and justice, are one

individual operation: he is entire in every point of space; and compleat in every instant of

duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no diminution. What he is implies not in it

any shadow of distinction or diversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been, and ever

will be, without any new judgment, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed in one simple,

perfect state: nor can you ever say, with any propriety, that this act of his is different from that

other; or that this judgment or idea has been lately formed, and will give place, by succession, to

any different judgment or idea.

[skipping over some paragraphs continuing the same topic . . .]

PHILO: Now, Cleanthes, said Philo, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the consequences.

First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of

the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it

falls under our cognizance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to

ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? You will still insist, that, by removing him so

much from all similarity to human creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at

the same time weaken all proofs of his existence.

Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to the Deity, even in his

finite capacity, or for supposing him free from every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his

undertakings. There are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow

a perfect author to be proved a priori, are easily solved, and become only seeming difficulties,

from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace infinite relations. But according to your

method of reasoning, these difficulties become all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new

instances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must acknowledge, that it is

impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, whether this system contains any great faults, or

deserves any considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real systems. Could a

peasant, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless, or even

assign to it its proper rank among the productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any

other production?

But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain uncertain, whether all the

excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an

exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful,

and beautiful a machine? And what surprize must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic,

who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied

trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving?

Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was

struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a slow, but continued improvement

7

carried on during infinite ages in the art of world‐making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great number of

hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may be imagined?

And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to

prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a

city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing

a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs. By sharing the work among

several, we may so much further limit the attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive

power and knowledge, which must be supposed in one deity, and which, according to you, can

only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such foolish, such vicious creatures as man,

can yet often unite in framing and executing one plan, how much more those deities or demons,

whom we may suppose several degrees more perfect!

To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true philosophy: but this principle

applies not to the present case. Were one deity antecedently proved by your theory, who were

possessed of every attribute requisite to the production of the universe; it would be needless, I

own, (though not absurd,) to suppose any other deity existent. But while it is still a question,

Whether all these attributes are united in one subject, or dispersed among several independent

beings, by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy? Where we see a

body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the opposite scale, however concealed from

sight, some counterpoising weight equal to it; but it is still allowed to doubt, whether that weight

be an aggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if the weight

requisite very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen conjoined in any single body,

the former supposition becomes still more probable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast

power and capacity as is necessary to produce the universe, or, to speak in the language of

ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal exceeds all analogy, and even comprehension.

But further, Cleanthes: men are mortal, and renew their species by generation; and this is

common to all living creatures. The two great sexes of male and female, says Milton, animate the

world. Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous

and limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought back upon us.

And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity or deities to be

corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, etc.? Epicurus maintained, that no man had ever

seen reason but in a human figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this

argument, which is deservedly so much ridiculed by Cicero, becomes, according to you, solid

and philosophical.

In a word, Cleanthes, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps to assert, or conjecture,

that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he

cannot ascertain one single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology

by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty

and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant

deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work only of

some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors: it is the production

8

of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at

adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You justly give

signs of horror, Demea, at these strange suppositions; but these, and a thousand more of the same

kind, are Cleanthes’s suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are

supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think that so wild and unsettled a

system of theology is, in any respect, preferable to none at all.

CLEANTHES: These suppositions I absolutely disown, cried Cleanthes: they strike me,

however, with no horror, especially when proposed in that rambling way in which they drop

from you. On the contrary, they give me pleasure, when I see, that, by the utmost indulgence of

your imagination, you never get rid of the hypothesis of design in the universe, but are obliged at

every turn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere steadily; and this I regard as a

sufficient foundation for religion.

On the Cosmological Argument:

DEMEA: The argument, replied Demea, which I would insist on, is the common one. Whatever

exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for any thing to

produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to

causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all;

or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is necessarily existent: now, that the

first supposition is absurd, may be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and

effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that cause which

immediately preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken together, is not

determined or caused by any thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as

much as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is still reasonable, why

this particular succession of causes existed from eternity, and not any other succession, or no

succession at all. If there be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed

is equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing’s having existed from eternity,

than there is in that succession of causes which constitutes the universe. What was it, then, which

determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular

possibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed to be none. Chance is a

word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that can never produce any thing. We must,

therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his

existence in himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction.

There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a Deity.

CLEANTHES: I shall not leave it to Philo, said Cleanthes, though I know that the starting

objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reasoning. It seems

to me so obviously ill‐grounded, and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true

piety and religion, that I shall myself venture to shew the fallacy of it.

9

I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a

matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the

contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction.

Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non‐existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non‐existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the

whole controversy upon it.

It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this necessity of his existence is

attempted to be explained by asserting, that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should

perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it is

evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present. It will still

be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non‐existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in

being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four.

The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none

that is consistent.

But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent being, according to

this pretended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of

matter; and for aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known,

would make its non‐existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the material world is not the necessarily existent

Being: and this argument is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the

world. “Any particle of matter,” it is said,7 “may be conceived to be annihilated; and any form

may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible.”

But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the

Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be

non‐existent, or his attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his non‐existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable: and no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown

and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with it.

Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to enquire for a

general cause or first author. How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since

that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence?

In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceded it, and

causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty? But the WHOLE, you say, wants a

cause. I answer, that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct

countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by

an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things. Did I shew you the

particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it

very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This

is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.

10

On the Problem of Evil:

PHILO: And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after all these reflections, and infinitely

more, which might be suggested, you can still persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert

the moral attributes of the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same

nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is infinite: whatever he wills is

executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy: therefore he does not will their

happiness. His wisdom is infinite: he is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: but the

course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it is not established for that

purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain

and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the

benevolence and mercy of men? Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to

prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent.

Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

You ascribe, Cleanthes (and I believe justly), a purpose and intention to Nature. But what, I

beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all

animals? The preservation alone of individuals, and propagation of the species. It seems enough

for her purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any care or concern for

the happiness of the members that compose it. No resource for this purpose: no machinery, in

order merely to give pleasure or ease: no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence,

without some want or necessity accompanying it. At least, the few phenomena of this nature are

overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance.

Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives satisfaction, without being

absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species. But what racking pains,

on the other hand, arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheumatisms, where the injury

to the animal machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth, laughter, play, frolic, seems

gratuitous satisfactions, which have no further tendency: spleen, melancholy, discontent,

superstition, are pains of the same nature. How then does the Divine benevolence display itself,

in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? None but we Mystics, as you were pleased to call us,

can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes, infinitely

perfect, but incomprehensible. And have you at last, said Cleanthes, smiling, betrayed your

intentions, Philo? Your long agreement with Demea did indeed a little surprize me; but I find

you were all the while erecting a concealed battery against me. And I must confess, that you have

now fallen upon a subject worthy of your noble spirit of opposition and controversy. If you can

make out the present point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an end at

once of all religion. For to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the

moral are still doubtful and uncertain?

DEMEA: You take umbrage very easily, replied Demea, at opinions the most innocent, and the

most generally received, even amongst the religious and devout themselves: and nothing can be

more surprising than to find a topic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man,

charged with no less than Atheism and profaneness. Have not all pious divines and preachers,

11

who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; have they not easily, I say, given a

solution of any difficulties which may attend it? This world is but a point in comparison of the

universe; this life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena,

therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of existence. And the eyes of

men, being then opened to larger views of things, see the whole connexion of general laws; and

trace with adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the mazes and

intricacies of his providence.

CLEANTHES: No! replied Cleanthes, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be admitted,

contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence can any cause be known but from

its known effects? Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? To

establish one hypothesis upon another, is building entirely in the air; and the utmost we ever

attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to ascertain the bare possibility of our opinion; but

never can we, upon such terms, establish its reality.

The only method of supporting Divine benevolence, and it is what I willingly embrace, is to deny

absolutely the misery and wickedness of man. Your representations are exaggerated; your

melancholy views mostly fictitious; your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is

more common than sickness; pleasure than pain; happiness than misery. And for one vexation

which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a hundred enjoyments.

PHILO: Admitting your position, replied Philo, which yet is extremely doubtful, you must at the

same time allow, that if pain be less frequent than pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and

durable. One hour of it is often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid

enjoyments; and how many days, weeks, and months, are passed by several in the most acute

torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture; and in no

one instance can it continue for any time at its highest pitch and altitude. The spirits evaporate,

the nerves relax, the fabric is disordered, and the enjoyment quickly degenerates into fatigue and

uneasiness. But pain often, good God, how often! rises to torture and agony; and the longer it

continues, it becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted, courage

languishes, melancholy seizes us, and nothing terminates our misery but the removal of its cause,

or another event, which is the sole cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard

with still greater horror and consternation.

But not to insist upon these topics, continued Philo, though most obvious, certain, and important;

I must use the freedom to admonish you, Cleanthes, that you have put the controversy upon a

most dangerous issue, and are unawares introducing a total scepticism into the most essential

articles of natural and revealed theology. What! no method of fixing a just foundation for

religion, unless we allow the happiness of human life, and maintain a continued existence even in

this world, with all our present pains, infirmities, vexations, and follies, to be eligible and

desirable! But this is contrary to every one’s feeling and experience: it is contrary to an authority

so established as nothing can subvert. No decisive proofs can ever be produced against this

authority; nor is it possible for you to compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains and all the

pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals: and thus, by your resting the whole system of

12

religion on a point, which, from its very nature, must for ever be uncertain, you tacitly confess,

that that system is equally uncertain.

But allowing you what never will be believed, at least what you never possibly can prove, that

animal, or at least human happiness, in this life, exceeds its misery, you have yet done nothing:

for this is not, by any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite

goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely. From some cause

then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his

intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear,

so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our

common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I have all

along insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn and indignation.

But I will be contented to retire still from this intrenchment, for I deny that you can ever force me

in it. I will allow, that pain or misery in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in

the Deity, even in your sense of these attributes: what are you advanced by all these concessions?

A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove these pure, unmixed, and

uncontrollable attributes from the present mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone.

A hopeful undertaking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed, yet being finite, they

would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where they are also so jarring and

discordant!

[skipping over some paragraphs continuing this topic . . .]

PHILO: My sentiments, replied Philo, are not worth being made a mystery of; and therefore,

without any ceremony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with regard to the present subject. It

must, I think, be allowed, that if a very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly

unacquainted with the universe, were assured, that it were the production of a very good, wise,

and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from his conjectures, form beforehand a different

notion of it from what we find it to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine, merely from

these attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could be so full of vice and

misery and disorder, as it appears in this life.g