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The emergence of moral leadership

Solinger, O.N.; Jansen, Paul; Cornelissen, J.P.

published in Academy of Management Review 2020

DOI (link to publisher) 10.5465/amr.2016.0263

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citation for published version (APA) Solinger, O. N., Jansen, P., & Cornelissen, J. P. (2020). The emergence of moral leadership. Academy of Management Review, 45(3), 504-527. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2016.0263

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r Academy of Management Review 2020, Vol. 45, No. 3, 504–527. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2016.0263

THE EMERGENCE OF MORAL LEADERSHIP

OMAR N. SOLINGER PAUL G.W. JANSEN

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

JOEP P. CORNELISSEN Erasmus University Rotterdam

The emergence of “moral leadership,” discussed here as a situation wherein individuals take a moral stance on an issue, convince others to do the same, and together spur change in a moral system, abounds in practice. Existing ethical and moral leadership theories, however, have remained confined to micro-level behavioral research. There- fore, in this paper, we develop a process theory of the socially situated emergence of moral leadership and its development into a broader movement affecting moral systems within and across formal organizations. We theorize the pathways through which moral leadership emerges; the triggers that bring about moral awareness and the moral courage to offer an alternative moral stance toward an issue, and leaders’ ability to deftly connect followers and their moral convictions into a broader movement, such that a moral system changes from within. With our process theory, we bridge between micro and macro levels of analysis, and highlight the crucial ability of leaders to be both principled and pragmatically savvy, and thus capable of bridging between their own moral convictions and those of others in order to develop a common and mutually binding ground toward change.

Recent years have witnessed plenty of positive examples inwhich formal and informal leaders have inspired and mobilized others to take a moral stance with regard to issues affecting their organizations and society at large. Think, for instance, of leaders challenging an organization’s modes of thinking and acting around unsustainable energy production (Gond, Barin Cruz, Raufflet, & Charron, 2016), equal rights for women in the workplace (Meyerson & Tompkins, 2007), perceived violations of human dignity (Gutierrez, Howard-Grenville, & Scully, 2010; Guynn, 2018; Shaban, 2018), or unsustain- able food production practices (Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008). Typically, such change is spur- red by individuals who emerge as informal leaders and who seek to overhaul a moral system from within. In some cases, such reform-oriented ini- tiatives will lead to the development of new organi- zational subcommunities (Gutierrez et al., 2010), or to even completely new organizations that swell into movements (Pless, 2007; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015;

Weber et al., 2008). Yet, there are also more local examples of informal leaders who emerge in orga- nizations to gradually change the moral system from within and manage to initiate organizational-level changes (Meyerson & Scully, 1995). Such examples include David Berdish of Ford Motor Company ini- tiating anewmorally charged codeof conductwithin the automotive industry and Kevin Thompson’s (IBM) efforts to establish a communal ethos through citizenship initiatives within the technology in- dustry (see Davis & White, 2015).

These and other recent examples of moral leader- ship indicate that individuals may disrupt the moral fabric of organizations and society by taking organi- zational members and other stakeholders along in embracing an alternative moral view of issues. In fact, by creating such “value-infused” organizations (Selznick, 1957), individuals who become moral leaders realize their own and others’ ideological pursuits for a better world, and may, in the process, mobilize their employees and other stakeholders to take corrective action regarding social grievances and identified moral shortfalls or transgressions (Benford&Snow, 2000).Although examples and case studies of moral leadership and value infusion in or- ganizations in fact abound (starting with Selznick, 1957), the subject has only recently been receiving

The authors gratefully acknowledge our action editor Gary Ballinger, anonymous reviewers, Riku Ruotsalainen, Edina Doci, JohanWempe, Brian Spisak, Karianne Kalshoven for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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more focused research attention (Gehman, Treviño, & Garud, 2013; Kraatz, Ventresca, & Deng, 2010; Voronov & Weber, 2016).

While there is a literature at the micro level on in- dividual moral intuitions in organizations (e.g., Haidt, 2012; Weaver, Reynolds, & Brown, 2014) and on the behavioral qualities of “ethical leaders” (e.g., Hoch, Bommer, Dulebohn, &Wu, 2018; Lemoine, Hartnell, & Leroy, 2019) and “responsible” CEOs (Maak & Pless, 2006), the theory development in this body of work re- mains limited to formal, generalized descriptions of the ethical qualities or behaviors of individual leaders. While leadership studies focusing on CEOs and cap- tains of industry indeed suggest a connection with strategic, organization-levelprocesses (e.g.,Maak,Pless, &Voegtlin, 2016), the leadership literature at large tends to obscure thewider institutional context withinwhich processes of moral leadership emerge (Day, Fleenor, Atwater, Sturm, & McKee, 2014; Dinh, Lord, Gardner, Meuser, Liden, & Hu, 2014).

Disconnected from this body of work, there is at the same time an emerging macro literature on “values work” that deals with the disruption, crea- tion, and maintenance of values at an organiza- tional level (Gehman et al., 2013; Kraatz et al., 2010; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015). For its part, this stream of research is attentive to the change of value regimes, but, to date, has largely featured inductive theorizing based on case studies of organizations as opposed to more systematic and formal theory development across levels of analysis. Considering both sets of literatures, we argue that, as a field, we still lack an integrated theoretical understanding that links mi- cro and macro levels of analysis and specifies how the process of moral leadership unfolds, and how, through a decisive influence on others, this form of leadership swells into a broader movement that changes the moral system fromwithin. We therefore theorize in this paper about the specific conditions and processes that are involved in the situated emer- gence and development of moral leadership within and beyond formal organizations.

With our theory development, we thus contribute to the existing management literature by pulling the phenomenon of leadership out of its “straitjacket” of micro-level research and by integrating this literature with (macro) institutional approaches to morality. We thus blend and integrate both streams of work into an integrative process theory of moral leadership that suggests that the meaning and function of moral lead- ership can only be understood in relational terms as something that isperformedandenacted in thecontext of more or less institutionalized moral systems in

organizations. We develop this theory into a process model of the initiation, development, and mainte- nance of moral leadership with key steps formalized into testable propositions. The model and proposi- tions may form the center point for further cross- disciplinary research onmoral leadership, as well as provide a base for extended theory development within subsequent leadership and organizational research. As such, we foresee, in line with our in- tegrative ambitions, a number of emergent theoret- ical and methodological opportunities for further research.

The paper is structured as follows. We first syn- thesize past research on ethical forms of leadership, and position ourselves in between micro organiza- tional behavior and macro organizational and insti- tutional traditions of research. We draw in concepts from micro and macro streams of research on moral intuitions, framing, and social movements and de- velop an integrated theoretical base for our theory development. Then, in the subsequent two sections, we unfold our arguments and theoretical proposi- tions regarding the emergence of moral leadership. We close with a brief discussion of the implications of this theory for future research.

CONCEPTUALIZING MORAL LEADERSHIP

Prior Research on Ethical Leadership

According to the organizational behavior litera- ture, ethical leaders are described as honest, trust- worthy, and fair; they treat followers with respect and care, do not have favorites, keep promises, allow followers to have input and share in decisions, and clarify their expectations and responsibilities (see Brown&Treviño, 2006; Treviño, Brown, &Hartman, 2003). Brown, Treviño, and Harrison (2005) argued that ethical leaders act both as a “moral person” (in being benevolent, honest, and caring toward employees) and as a “moral manager” by being a credible role model and by installing rewards and punishments for complying with ethical norms, standards, andprocedures (seeTreviño,Hartman, & Brown, 2000). The question, however, is whether these behaviors fully reflect what it means to be an ethical leader in the context of an organization. Fehr, Yam, andDang (2015), for example, suggested that the “moral person” facet of the ethical leader- ship construct presently captures only a narrow slice of the moral domain—generally, a leader’s trustworthiness and prosociality—while failing to highlight those processes that give a leader’s actions moralweight inaparticular socialcontext.Paradoxically,

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there is evidence that the present emphasis on rule following and compliance in the “moral manage- ment” part of ethical leadership can be experienced as overly controlling and judgmental toward fol- lowers (Stouten, van Dijke, Mayer, De Cremer, & Euwema, 2013). It thus appears, from theperspective of organizational behavior research, thatmore theory is needed to account for such paradoxical effects, and that moral leadership may be a broader concept than previously assumed.

In an attempt to start to address such limitations and allow for a broader definition of moral leader- ship, Fehr et al. (2015) outlined the role of followers in “moralizing” leader behaviors and defined “ethi- cal leadership” as the demonstration and promo- tion of behavior that is positively “moralized” by others—and by followers in particular—in that it is perceived as more or less morally right. Regard- ing moralization, the authors contended that an ob- server’s perception of behavior is a matter of “right and wrong,” whereby positive moralization means perceiving a givenbehavior as being “the right” thing to do, as opposed to, for instance, a matter of truth or error (e.g., when explaining the correctness of some procedure). Fehr et al. (2015) subsequently theorized that moralized perceptions of a leader’s actions originate from followers’ moral intuitions, as out- lined in moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2012). Moral foundations theory postulates that some is- sues or behaviors are more typically moralized than others. Individuals have intuitive, stock conceptions of care as opposed to harm, fairness as against cheating, loyalty versus betrayal, sanctity set against degradation, authority as compared to subversion, and liberty contrasted with oppression (Fehr et al., 2015; Haidt, 2012) on which they draw when they evaluate issues, and they do so in an immediate and largely intuitive manner (e.g., “It’s not right because it doesn’t feel right”; Haidt, 2001).

Although we acknowledge the fruitfulness of this psychologically grounded perspective on moral leadership for both research and practice, it could at the same time be seen as a rather atomistic, under- socialized account of morality in general and of the moral leadership process in particular. In line with this critique, ethical leadership scholars have re- cently started to carve out mechanisms through which ethical leadership has its effects—the most significant of which is ethical culture, as a “micro- cosm” within which followers share similar values (e.g., Schaubroeck et al., 2012: 1054). We extend this work by arguing that, when deciding on what is moral in a leader’s behavior, individuals rely on

socially conditioned and institutionalized ways of seeing things that are available as cultural registers in society and that align with typical evaluation schemas, such as moral universals (e.g., fairness, dignity), familyorcommunityvalues, religiousbeliefs, or institutional logics (Abend, 2014; Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Any moral judgment of issues and leader behavior thus strongly depend on which type of moral system happens to be salient in the indi- vidual’s mind. To illustrate this point, Leavitt, Reynolds, Barnes, Schilpzand, and Hannah (2012) have shown that dual-occupation individuals with “medical” and “military” orientations dynamically alternated between moral obligations related to these different identities when judging situations, iterating between an ethos of universal care (medical identity) and an ethos of particularistic care (i.e., only caring for an in-group “military” identity). In a similar way, we expect leaders and followers to navigate between differentmoral systems(seealsoVerplanken,Trafimow, Khusid, Holland, & Steentjes, 2009), some of which are already part of a given moral system in their organiza- tions, and others being part of alternativemoral systems that are available in society and that theypull in tomake sense of moral issues (McPherson & Sauder, 2013).

Having identified a number of limitations in prior work that underscore the need for more integrative cross-disciplinary theory, we next define the key foundational concepts upon which we build our process theory and theoretical model.

Morally Charged Leadership in Organizations

Consistent with Donaldson and Dunfee’s (1994) theory of social contracts, we consider organizations as localized social orders (at themacro level) through which members of that organization interpret and prioritize among the different moral positions that are available in society and negotiate or drift toward their own “moral free space” (see alsoRhodes, 2016). This definition is consistent with research by Gächter and Herrmann (2009) that showed that there can be considerable variation in the norms of cooperation, or moral ethos, between groups and organizations (see also Carnes, Lickel, & Janoff-Bulman, 2015; Leavitt et al., 2012), which in turn suggests that leaders and followers construct their own “social contracts” about what is or is not moral within their organized group (see Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994).

From this perspective, an organization is con- ceptualized as a community with a characteristic ethos—a moral system—that consists of shared and

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binding moral norms (analogous to “contracts”) that tie its members together (Ouchi, 1980). As a morally organized communal group, the notion of organiza- tion is accordingly not restricted to formal organi- zations, such as firms or public institutions, but may take on amore sprawling form across an entire industry or an entire field of actors in society (e.g., Weber et al., 2008). The formation of such an organization, as an organized group or movement, is in this sense also an emergent phenomenon, and one that results from repeated interactions between leaders,who initiate a newmoral framing of an issue, and others, as “followers,”whocome to embrace and share the new alternative framing. This view harks back to Selznick (1957), who famously described how the morally charged acts of a leader around is- suesmay influence and shape interaction patterns in such a way that a new set of moral or values-based ideals becomes established and so that follower moralizations become coherently structured as part of a moral “system.”

Moral systems and organizations. Inorder tocon- ceptualize such moral systems, we draw on Haidt (2008: 70), who defined them as “interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, insti- tutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regu- late selfishness andmake social life possible.”Haidt (2008) coined this term to start a more interdisci- plinary conversation on morality beyond moral psychology, pursuing the question of when indi- viduals in localized social orders (e.g., groups, or- ganizations, professions, families) guide their moral reasoning and collective deliberations on the basis of such a system and beyond their own moral intu- itions. Note that the ethical culture construct can also be seen as a moral system according to Haidt’s definition, the former being defined as “a subset of organizational culture, representing a multidimen- sional interplay among various ‘formal’ and ‘infor- mal’ systems of behavioral control that are capable of promoting either ethical or unethical behavior” (Treviño, Butterfield, & McCabe, 1998: 45). How- ever, neither Haidt (2007, 2008, 2012) nor the re- cent protagonists of the ethical culture construct (e.g., Treviño et al., 1998; Schaubroeck et al., 2012) have elaborated further on how amoral system can be an emergent outcome of bottom-up, interac- tional processes between individuals.

We explicitly take that turn here, supported by evidence in prior research showing that leadership and the interactions it creates is effectively at the core of organizational climates and cultures that

drive the moral (or immoral) behavior of organiza- tion members (e.g., Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009; Schaubroeck et al., 2012; Palanski & Yammarino, 2009; Yammarino, Dionne, Chun, & Dansereau, 2005). From this bottom-up, micro perspective, the moral norms that make up a moral system are first of all constructed and nego- tiated in interactions between initiative-taking leaders and others as followers in an institutional field (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014). Further inter- action among them may then lead to the confir- mation and reinforcement of a broadly shared set of moral norms. When this happens, the proposed norms extend beyond the individual and become part of the communally held moral norms between collectives of actors in an institutional field (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 75). These moral norms in- volve the set of moral presuppositions that actors, as a result of their ongoing sensemaking and in- teraction with others, take to be right and true— and believe their partners also take to be proper.

This process of building up a common “moral system” assumes that moral meanings are locally negotiated, and initially around provisional and al- ternative moral framings of an issue. Over time, however, a dominant moral framing and under- standing may propagate among a population of interacting individuals until an entire community within an institutional field shares the samemoral code, or system, of thinking and talking about is- sues (e.g., Gehman et al., 2013). When such a system is established and forms the binding glue between members of an organization, the built-up macro-level conventions at this communal level will intersect with local contexts of interaction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Goffman, 1974), so that pairs or groups of actors will from then on refer in their interactions toa sharedmoral systemthat is salient and recurrent. At this point, a “moral sys- tem” is recognizableas“a localized socialorderwitha characteristic set of values.”

Defined in this manner, the emergence of moral systems assumes a process of institutionalization, where—over a course of interactions—a moral con- sensus (or “social contract” in Donaldson &Dunfee’s, 1994, terminology) comes to be as native, factual, and natural in the minds of leaders and followers, thus guiding evaluations of themselves and of their orga- nizations, as well as of the actions that they deem morally just (see Creed, DeJordy, & Locke, 2014; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Kraatz, 2009; Wright, Zammuto, & Liesch, 2017). For example, “care and respect for patients” (de Rond & Lok, 2016: 1979) is a

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fundamental moral value, or ethos, of the medical profession and guides the energies and emotions of medical professionals toward competent behavior, regardless of the specific circumstances in which they operate (de Rond & Lok, 2016; Wright et al., 2017). While the notion of institutional “ethos” that is discussed within the institutional literature (see also Voronov & Weber, 2016) overlaps to an extent with our conceptualization of moral system, we intentionally apply the term “moral system” in order to signal that we build on, and extend, micro-level theories of morality and leadership (i.e., work by Fehr et al., 2015; Haidt, 2007, 2008, 2012; Schaubroeck et al., 2012) and connect such theoriz- ing to the macro-organizational level of analysis.

Acts of moral framing. To substantiate the bridge betweenmicro-level moral leadership (e.g., follower perceptions and intuitions) and moral systems in organizations, we argue that moral systems originate from social interactions and, in particular, through the way leaders and followers interact and exchange ideas with one another over how issues should be interpreted (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). Such social interactions are con- ditioned by the specific issues a group is facing at a particular moment in time. Within organizations, individuals and groups encounter a range of work- and organization-related issues that are uncertain and equivocal (Sonenshein, 2006, 2016), meaning that they can be “framed” in alternate (e.g., moral values, economic efficiency, or procedural rational- ity) ways and can form the basis for extensive group deliberation and debate (Sonenshein, 2006). Moral systems can inform this debate by providing moral templates for acts of framing that are perceived as a legitimate or natural way of interpreting the issue. However, when the meaning of issues is equivocal and open for debate (e.g., “Is it our responsibility as an organization to alleviate poverty in the commu- nity?”), the boundaries of moral systems may be- comemore flexible and permeable as organizational members tend to draw on values, ideologies, and frames that are imported from broader public dis- courses within other institutional orders, such as the family, religion, the community, one’s profession, the market, the corporation, the state, and so forth (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012).

The interactional processes that produce and re- produce a moral system can be conceptualized in differentwaysandusingdifferent theoretical lensesand constructs. We work here with the notion of framing and frame-based interactions (Cornelissen & Werner,

2014;Goffman, 1974;Gray, Purdy, &Ansari, 2015).Our emphasis on framing is motivated by its theoretical linkages to pastmicro-level research onmoral behavior (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008), its value as a boundary object for cross-level theorizing (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014), and its usefulness to understand influencing skills in leadership processes (Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996).

We define “framing” as an act of communication, initiated by leaders (or by followers in reaction to leaders), which foregrounds certain preferred inter- pretations while at the same time backgrounding others. For instance, an issue can be “framed” in a communicated message as, for example, a matter of care or harm, fairness or cheating, loyalty or betrayal, liberty or oppression, or as an economic, legal, or technical matter. While it is possible for issues to be completely and exhaustively framed through the selection of a distinct moral frame (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008), in practice, leaders may as part of their framing include moral elements (such as fair- ness and righteousness) alongside frames coming from other moral systems (around, say, legal or economic elements) (Goffman, 1974; Gray et al., 2015; Hahn, Preuss, Pinkse, & Figge, 2014). Furthermore, framing is a socially situated processwherein the resulting frame- based interactions have an emergent and dynamic character; such interactions and the moral norms they give rise to are not a product of design or a direct outcome of the actions of an individual leader. Individualsmay, aswewill elaborate below, resist a particular moral framing of a leader or argue for alternative framings, effectively then under- mining the establishment of a new moral system.

Politics around moral systems. A further crucial assumption is that moral systems are inherently contested and pliable. Moral systems are subject to revision and negotiation,with alternative values and ideologies being entertained and with alternative moral framings continuously vying for prominence (e.g., Kaplan, 2008; McPherson & Sauder, 2013). In this sense, frame-based interactions are analogous to a political turf game (Buchanan & Badham, 2008) with emergent leaders and followers positioned as politically motivated, embedded agents who ac- tively seek to maintain or disrupt the moral systems they inhabit (see Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Lok, 2010; Thornton et al., 2012). Moral systems change when leaders manage to mobilize followers to resist the present moral order and consensus in favor of an alternative. Besides such plasticity, moral systems are also plural in nature, meaning that leaders and followers may, as members of an organization and as

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members of society, at the same time inhabitmultiple moral systems (Ashforth, Kreiner, & Fugate, 2000; Leavitt et al., 2012; Lok, 2010; Thornton et al., 2012; Verplanken et al., 2009).

In summary, moral systems are negotiated orders wherein leaders and followers actively engage through framing in “moral boundary work” by seg- menting or integrating ideals and values that belong to the various moral systems in which they partici- pate (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006; Lamont & Molnár, 2002). They may seek to broaden the moral system to subsume other values and ideals, thereby actively reshaping, dismantling, or stretching moral systemboundaries (seeAshforth et al., 2000; Zietsma &Lawrence, 2010), resulting in aprocess of emergent moral leadership. And, once the moral system has been revised, leaders and followers may seek to maintain and protect moral system boundaries (see Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, & Smith-Crowe, 2014; Kreiner, Hollensbe, & Sheep, 2009; Wright et al., 2017) in order sustain the new moral order in their organization.

In what follows, we will first elaborate the emergence of moral leadership and then discuss in more detail how leadership and political processes contribute to the emergence and maintenance of moral systemswithin organizations. In doing so, we limit our scope to the emergence, development, and maintenance of moral systemswithin organizations and will thus only discuss societal-level moral systems insofar as they are drawn in by leaders or followers and impact moral matters within organizations.

THE EMERGENCE OF MORAL LEADERSHIP

Emergentmoral leaders essentially defy an existing moral order and spur change in moral systems over time. When thinking about moral leaders that have spearheaded transformations of moral systems, we often think of top-level executives like Ray Anderson (Interface) or Peter Löscher (Siemens). Less obvious, but no less important, are cases in which moral sys- tems are transformed from the bottom up following episodes of emergent moral leadership by low- or mid-level-ranked employees. Awell-known example is how Elizabeth Whalen took a moral stance, while an intern at Columbia Forest Products, on the issue of toxic formaldehyde in plywood glues. Defying heavy resistance from organizational incumbents, she suc- ceeded in transforming the organizational moral sys- tem into a more community-sensitive one, and, in doing so, changed her entire industry toward more

responsible and sustainablepractices (Pinchot, 2017). Likewise, Darcy Winslow at Nike moralized the lack of diversity andwhat she saw asmaleparochialism in sports shoe design, and, based on her success in campaigning for a change in the industry, now leads Nike’smostprofitable shoe-makingbranch targetedat especially women (Pinchot, 2017). And Tariq Yusuf, a Google employee, took a moralized stance against issues of internal harassment at Google; his grass- roots leadership built up a strong following internally within Google and helped start a broader movement aroundchanging thecultureofSiliconValley (Guynn, 2018).

Within the management literature, current con- ceptualizations of ethical leadership place a strong emphasis on the maintenance of the moral order (Brown et al., 2005; Lemoine et al., 2019: Treviño et al., 2000). However, what these examples of ex- emplary moral leaders have in common is not how they maintained a particular moral order, but how they defied a moral regime by taking an alternative, morally charged stance toward an issue and mobi- lized others to do the same. These examples are prototypical for what we regard as “emergent moral leadership.” Such leadership is informal and emer- gent, such that an individual’s voice around an issue takes root and subsequently becomes the voice of a moral leader. This double interact is consistent with interactive leadership theory, which suggests that leadership is an emergent phenomenon resulting from a group member’s claim to a particular kind of leadership and other groupmembers then endorsing this type of leadership (DeRue &Ashford, 2010).We argue that an episode of moral leadership emer- gence subsequently comes to a conclusionwhen the leader’s proposed moral framing gains common ground in the organization andbecomes established and—possibly, in time—institutionalized (see Green, 2004; Hoefer & Green, 2016).

This view of emergent moral leadership as a form of “reformist boundary work” around existing moral systems is consistent with Burns’s (1978: 427, 434) seminal theory of “transforming” leadership, accord- ing towhich the “test of the leadership function is their contribution to change, measured by purpose drawn fromcollectivemotives andvalues . . . theachievement of real change in the direction of ‘higher’ values.”

Inwhat follows,we theorize about six critical steps in the emergent moral leadership process, starting at the informal, micro level and gradually becoming more formalized at the macro, organizational level (seeFigure 1). Theprocess startswith the “initiation” of a moral reframing of issues via “moral awareness”

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and the “moral courage” of a leader to speak up. The leader thenbecomes a focal point of influence as they attempt to “scale up” a moral reframing of issues by “building a coalition” and “negotiating” a moral understanding with others, such that leaders’ and followers’ individual frames amplify into a common footing for followers in the organization. In the final phase, the focus of the moral leader and their fol- lowers shifts, as already mentioned, toward pro- tecting the boundaries of the revised moral system via “formalization” and “guardianship” so that this new moral order, or “character” (Selznick, 1957), can bemaintained. Taken together, “emergentmoral leadership” can be defined “a process where a person becomes a focal point of influence in initi- ating, scaling up, and securing a moral reframing of issues.”

The Initiation of Moral Leadership: Moral Awareness and Moral Courage

From moral awareness to moral motivation.Not all issues are experiencedmorally, as the individuals perceiving them are not always morally aware (Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011; Tenbrunsel & Smith- Crowe, 2008). Any episode of emergent moral lead- ershipmust first startwith an awareness of a particular moral discrepancy or grievance, triggered by an

issue at hand. For instance, an institutionalized practice at Nike to not sufficiently cater to women’s needs in sports shoe design (purportedly known as “shrink them and pink them”) came to be perceived byDarcyWinslow as amoral issue; namely, as a form of male parochialism and as reflecting a dearth of diversity in the industry’s moral system. This moral awareness, in turn, stirred Winslow’s moral moti- vation to try and change the status quo.

To outline the steps that lead to awareness and motivation, we argue that moral awareness is first and foremost embedded within existing, systemic tensions, known as “institutional contradictions” (Seo & Creed, 2002; Wright et al., 2017). These con- tradictions provide the raw material, or meaning structure, for subsequent moralizations and thus the seedbed for the emergence of moral leadership. Such perceived contradictions may be readily pres- ent within organizations when interest groups in the organization have different and conflicting al- legiances to alternative moral systems, such as professional versus corporate systems in hospi- tals (Wright et al., 2017), professional versus market systems in accounting firms (Suddaby&Greenwood, 2005), andmarket versus community systemswithin governmental agencies (Tilcsik, 2010), universities (Kraatz et al., 2010), social enterprises (Ramus, Vaccaro, & Brusoni, 2017), and in the investment

FIGURE 1 Successive Steps in How Emergent Moral Leaders Spur Change in Moral Systems

Macro level

Micro level

Moral awareness or motivation

Defiance

Initiating Scaling up Securing

Conservative boundary workReformist boundary work

Coalition building

Negotitation

Formalizing

Guardianship

Institutional contradictions

moral courage

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banking industry (Morrison & Wilhelm, 2008). In other instances, the individual experiences a contra- diction between the local moral system and “moral universals,” the latter being a society’s more or less universally accepted notions of equality, fairness, dignity, honesty, do-no-harm, and human rights (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Taylor, 1989). Darcy Winslow’s apprehension of male parochialism in sports shoe design, for instance, resulted from a contradiction between Nike’s shoe design practices and broader notions of a woman’s independence, dignity, and the value of diversity. Alternatively, tensions may arise from schisms within the moral self, and thus from within the individual, such as being a church leader and gay (Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010), scientist and feminist (Meyerson & Tompkins, 2007), or a member of both the Peace Corps and IBM (Davis & White, 2015).

Yet, as is evident from the examples listed above, for these perceived tensions to trigger a strong moral awareness and the motivation to change the status quo, they have to be more than simple observations and cannot remain abstract ponderings. Instead, the tensions described above must be perceived as per- sonal moral violations to the individual to autono- mously trigger strongly felt moral emotions (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Voronov & Yorks, 2015). In other words, “emotions arise in re- sponse to events that are important to the individ- ual’s goals, motives, or concerns” (Frijda, 1988: 351), such as strongly identifying with an issue personally or with the suffering it causes to others. Male paro- chialism at Nike’s sport shoe design felt personal to Darcy Winslow because she herself is a woman. Thus, an issue triggers an awareness of an existing institutional contradiction, which, when felt as per- sonal to the individual, sets off a set of moral emo- tions (e.g., shame, guilt, pride, anger, indignation, disgust). These emotions in turn impel the individ- ual to reify the issue as morally “wrong” and repre- hensible (Fehr et al., 2015;Haidt, 2001;Weaver et al., 2014), and as something that has to be acted upon and addressed.

An action tendency to change the status quo— thus, a “moral motivation”—follows naturally from the experience of deeply felt, and thus personal, moral emotions (Frijda, 1986, 1988; Haidt, 2012). As such, individuals become motivated to change the status quo in order to resolve an uncomfortable ten- sion within themselves (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Gutierrez et al., 2010; Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Voronov &Yorks, 2015). This particular role of a personally experienced conflict in the emergence

of moral leadership is in fact consistent with the following broader observationmade by Burns (1978: 38–39): “Leadership is . . . grounded in a seedbed of conflict. Conflict is intrinsically compelling; it gal- vanizes, prods, motivates people ... Leaders do not shun conflict; they confront it, exploit it, and ulti- mately embody it.” Thus:

Proposition 1. The degree to which individuals are motivated to defy a moral regime—and potentially evolve into a moral leader—is dependent on the emotional intensity with which they experience the existing framingof issuesas conflictingwith their own investments in alternative moral systems.

The buildup toward moral courage. A moral motivation impels leaders and followers to want to defy a moral regime, even in the face of risk. Persis- tence in the face of risk asks for a particular kind of action tendency, which we know as moral courage (see alsoConger&Kanungo, 1998;Hannah,Avolio, & Walumbwa, 2011). “Moral courage” can be defined as an action tendency that impels an individual to act ethically, even in the face of opposition, fear, or personal risk. While some individuals are generally more courageous than others, the notion of moral courage as an action tendency (following Frijda, 1988) means that it is a psychological state that can vary both between persons and within persons over time. The latter implies that there can just as well be episodes of moral courage as well as episodes re- vealing a lack of couragewithin the same individual. It also implies that moral courage can build up over time following (a combination of) triggers in an in- dividual’s environment.

At first, a person’s moral courage to defy a moral regime will, as suggested above, stem from having a personal stake in, and emotional involvement with, an issue. As an individual becomes increasingly in- volvedwith the issue, personal involvement becomes entangled with a sense of duty and responsibility for easing the suffering of others (Levinas, 1972). For in- stance, ElizabethWhalen felt she could not stand idly by while others were dying (Pinchot, 2017). Research shows that individuals are more likely to escalate on their commitments on altruistic initiatives (con- cerning the welfare of others) than on self-serving initiatives (Schaumberg & Wiltermuth, 2014). In- deed, personal suffering can often bewithstood, but the suffering of others introduces an extra factor— namely, the potential of guilt after inaction. Research shows that individuals are prepared to make huge sacrifices to preserve their moral self-regard and to free themselves of guilt (Bastian, Jetten, & Fasoli,

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2011; Cormack, 2002; Inbar, Pizarro, Gilovich, & Ariely, 2013). Additionally, taking responsibility for and facing personal risks for the sake of others is likely to boost one’s positive self-image, as it is universally seen as one of the noblest things we can do as human beings (Cormack, 2002; Oliner, 2003).

When building up moral courage, a moral moti- vation and a sense of duty to act for the sake of others are unlikely to remain purely individual matters. Rather, we expect that thesewill amplify in response to experiences of resonance with others in the orga- nization, as followers. This is consistent with a broader notion, argued for by Burns (1978), that leaders and followers raise each other to higher levels of moral functioning. In early stages, interac- tions with others as potential followers may provide resonance and support for raising the moral aware- ness of the issue and for the alternative framing, which then reinforces the resolve of the individual to change the status quo. In a later stage, as leader and follower roles have become established, moral courage on the part of followers is similarly required as they are likely to face the same moral policing from conservative “guardians.” Indeed, historical accounts clearly detail that the first ring of followers faced similar risks as the initial system-defying leader (e.g., physical danger; Chaleff, 2009; Oliner, 2003).

Thus, experiencing resonance with followers in the defiance of a moral regime, even to the point of collectively facing risk and peril, will strengthen the resolve of an emergent moral leader to continue on a courageous line action. With others facing risk, and with the leader directly sharing this experience with them, they are compelled to carry on. The emergent leader may in fact escalate in their commitment to action and may not see a way back, in the sense that the leader cannot let others down and now also acts directly on the follower’s behalf. Ac- cordingly, we hypothesize:

Proposition 2. An individual’s moral courage to defy a moral regime builds up as their personal involve- ment with an issue becomes entangled with a sense of duty for the sake of others.

Moral courage is a crucial enabler in the process of moral leadership emergence. It is needed because an alternative, moral framing of any issue may invite moral policing by incumbent organizational mem- bers who are emotionally invested into maintaining the status quo andwhomay as such be likely to resist or rebuff alternatives (Creed et al., 2014; Haidt, 2007; Wright et al., 2017). Without courage, an individual

maybeaware of a grievance, andeven feel personally touched by the issue, but they will lack the fortitude to publicly voice an alternative. Harking back to the political nature of moral systems as a struggle be- tween reformists and conservatives, an alternative voicemust scale up and gain a robust followership in order to stand a chance against acts of conservative boundary work from the incumbent moral system “guardians.”Recall also our notion of emergentmoral leadership as a process of becoming a focal point of influence in initiating, scaling up, and securing a moral reframing of issues; in accordance with this definition, moral leadership fails to materialize with- out courage. For instance, Elizabeth Whalen at Co- lumbia Forest Products (Pinchot, 2017)—the intern who moralized the issue of toxic formaldehyde in plywood glues—faced fierce opposition from power- ful incumbents athermanufacturingdepartment; they even mobilized the industry press against her. Being only an intern (as well as pregnant at the time), there was strong pressure to leave the issue to rest. Without the moral courage to speak up, Whalen would have felt forced to refrain from action, thus terminating the moral leadership process. Yet, she stayed involved with the issue andhad the courage to act, evendespite the apparent opposition and potential risks to her position and career. Her moral courage was therefore an important enabler (or “moderator,” in more ana- lytical terms) of her emergence as a moral leader.

Proposition3. Thedegree towhichanemergentmoral leader is compelled to stand up and offer an alterna- tive moral framing of an issue is moderated by their moral courage, such that, with higher levels of cour- age, they are compelled to act on an issue, whereas a lower level of couragemay lead to continued inaction on the issue.

Moral Leadership Scaling Up: From Individual to Collective Action Frames

From an institutional perspective, emergentmoral leadership can be viewed as reform-oriented insti- tutional work (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009) around moral systems, but with a more interactional focusonhowframe-based interactionsbetweenleaders and followers initiate a change to or reform of existing moral systems. Work on framing within the social movement and leadership domains has demonstrated the importance of leadership tactics whereby emergent leaders are able to offer compelling frame-based visions that motivate followers into action (e.g., Antonakis, Bastardoz, Jacquart, & Shamir, 2016; Benford & Snow, 2000; Cornelissen & Werner, 2014). An important

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insight arising from this body of work as a whole is that, in order to mobilize a broad base of followers into a reform-oriented movement, leaders use spe- cific framing-based tactics such as transforming or rekeying existing moral frames so that these accom- modate alternative framings of issues and bring al- ternative viewpoints together as part of commonly defined “collective action frames.” An example is Kevin Thompson’s initiative of developing a community initiative within IBM and instilling a community logic within the broader technology industry, analogous to the Peace Corps (Davis & White, 2015). Thompson cleverly construed the ini- tiative as incorporating and blending moral univer- sals for reaching out to the poor (which includes frames of inclusion or exclusion, care, fairness, dig- nity), a professional logic (offering a trainee program for IBM entrants), a market logic (forming a client base in emerging markets), and a corporate logic (retaining staff). As a result of this creative blend, preexisting meanings were transformed and com- bined as part of an attractive overall framing and to such an extent that the perception of a win–win sit- uation was created (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gray et al., 2015; Hahn et al., 2014). The result of such a process is a compelling “collective action frame” that not only resonates with but also actually inte- grates the beliefs and values of multiple followers.

In comparison, emergent moral leadership fails to materialize when a collective action frame is not established and supported by followers; that is, when organizational members, as potential followers, hold onto their own moral frames (Lakoff, 2016) and ac- tively retort with framings of their own when inter- preting the moral intentions of a leader (e.g., Fehr et al., 2015; Offermann, Kennedy, & Wirtz, 1994). In other words, moral leaders need to successfully bridge between their own moral convictions and those of others, either by appealing to resonant overarching moral principles and emotions, or, in other instances, by gradually convincing followers of the appropriateness of their moral framing. The degree to which leaders succeed in bridging be- tween personal and others’ framings of issues depends on their communicative and persuasive skills, but also on how leadership manifests itself in social interactions. Below, we suggest three ideal- typical approaches to how leaders approach such relationship building (see also Figure 2), as (1) the principled theologian, (2) the pragmatic politician, and (3) the statesperson. While these figurative im- ages are of course theoretical idealizations, we sug- gest that they are predictive of whether leaders can

successfully engage with the moral viewpoints of others, and whether, based on such engagement, they are able to establish a settlement, or new moral “contract” (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994), that can bring about a durable change in the moral system within the organization.

“Principled theologians.” The “principled theo- logian” is a puritan moral leader who has a strong attachment to their own moral convictions because of high degrees of internalization and identifica- tion with the values and issue concerned (i.e., high self-centrality [Aquino & Reed, 2002; Verplanken & Holland, 2002]). They typically have a high need for cognitive closure (i.e., high desire for definitive knowledge on some issue), which comes with emotion- ally charged (Haidt, 2001) and cognitively entrenched positions regarding an issue (Dane, 2010; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Lakoff, 2016). The principled theologian treats valuesas sacredandbeyondcompromise (Tetlock, 2002) while placing strong taboos on the blending or as- similation of their view of issues with other potential interpretations (e.g., administrative, strategic, economic, technical; Lakoff, 2016; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). In fact, there is experimental research showing that principled theologians are motivated to preventmoral“failure,”which they imagine tohappen if their moral causes are thwarted or diluted by secular encroachments (Tetlock et al., 2000). Yet, other experi- mental research shows that threats of moral failure invite increased resistance, persistence, and behavioral rigidity in these kinds of principled moral leaders (Bélanger, Lafreniere, Vallerand, & Kruglanski, 2013).

To illustrate, consider, as a fictional example, a tenured academic in a business school trying to convince his colleagues in the business and man- agement community of the need for recasting re- search and teaching in terms of their impact on society. When operating as a principled theologian, the academic will engage in a strictly parochial framing as a dominant strategy toward relationship building; forwarding an exclusive, one-sided moral interpretation of an issue that chimes with their own personal convictions and their interest group (Lakoff, 2016). For instance, they may contrast the closed-off nature of academic research with the need for academics to become community servants and be practically relevant. Insofar as this principled framing then resonates with such an in-group (e.g., academic faculty already involved with business and societal engagements), the principled theologian may garner success,with followersattributingextraordinarymoral qualities to the leader, enabled and reinforced by their own already held moral beliefs and into which they

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have been culturally socialized (DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Lakoff, 2016). However, when the context is characterized by adiversity of individuals and groups having different moral beliefs, the staunch commit- ment of the “principled theologian”will backfire. For example, the academic in our case example may en- counter fierce opposition from tenured professors in the community who have a more fundamental re- search orientation, as well as from those (e.g., faculty on tenure-trackcontracts)whoaredependent on such anorientation tomanage their careers.Unable to adjust their moral framing to entertain, let alone accommo- date, alternative viewpoints, the principled theologian will then in turn be seen as a forlorn figure. Thus:

Proposition 4.Whenmoral leaders staunchly commit themselves to a singular and self-referential framing of an issue, they are not likely to build a strong enough following to change the moral system in their organization.

“Pragmatic politicians.” The “pragmatic politi- cian” is comparatively less personally invested in a moral framing of an issue; the pragmatist tends to have a lowneed for cognitive closure andpossesses a calculative stance toward the social issue involved. They have a great deal of cognitive flexibility and do not need to settle for one specific interpretation of an issue (Buchanan & Badham, 2008; Dane, 2010;

Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). The pragmatist tends to be aware of the various moral views and framings held by others, including other interest groups, and will engage in strategic framing to bridge between, and skillfully address, the views of others (e.g., Chen, Shechter,&Chaiken,1996;Cornelissen,2012;Werner& Cornelissen, 2014). Inpractice, this oftenmeans that the moral leaderwill render the social issue in away that is consistent with dominant or already familiar frames of others (Sonenshein, 2006; Wickert & de Bakker, 2018). For instance, investments in staff may be framed prag- matically as a means to gain competitive advantage to ultimately drive profits; non-discrimination policies may be framed as a means to prevent legal actions and ultimately save costs; and implementing ethical guide- lines may be framed as a way to comply with exoge- nous institutional rules and regulations.

Insofar as this kind of moral leader is effectively able to frame the issue in the already existing termsof themoral system, the pragmatic politician is, similar to the principled theologian, brittle in their likeli- hood to be successful—the difference then being their motives and the starting point of their framing efforts (i.e., others or themselves). Through framing tactics and adjustments (i.e., keying, rekeying, and laminations; see Gray et al., 2015), moral leaders of this kindmay however skillfully accommodate parts of alternative framings into their own frame, or

FIGURE 2 Leader Ideal-Types in the Scaling Up of Moral Leadership

Unitary (in-group only)

Heterogeneous (multiple interest groups)

Pragmatic politician

(strategic framing)

Principled theologian

(parochial framing)

Lo w

M od

er at

e H

ig h

E n

tr en

ch m

en t

in m

or al

c on

vi ct

io n

s Locus of accountability

Statesperson (relational framing)

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present more abstract frames that span the frames of structurally disconnected individuals and groups in the community (Fligstein, 2001; Fligstein&McAdam, 2011). Consider, for example, again the academic in- troduced above, who, now acting as a pragmatic pol- itician, invents the inclusive catchphrase “business scholarship for society.”With this phrase, he may be able to appeal to a broad coalition of academics with varied backgrounds and orientations. In a subsequent attempt to enroll further faculty into this collective frame, including those that would likely be resistant, he may add an additional lamination to the frame (e.g., fundamental research also contributes to society in the long run, and publication outputs contribute to visibility of the business school), in order to enable a settlement around this newly shared moral framing.

At the same time, however, the tactical way in which frames are then connected may also lead to the construction of “compromise frames” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012), a “patchwork” of prior frames, or an overarching frame that designates “something for ev- eryone” (Rao & Kenney, 2008) and that only loosely connects various moral ways of thinking about an is- sue,mayonlypartiallyaddress themoralviewpointsof followers, and is oftentimes hard to translate into ac- tual policy. As a consequence, the proposed moral framing may be seen as representing a fragile moral truce or settlement (Reinecke &Ansari, 2015). If such a brittle settlement (Rao & Kenney, 2008) is then for- malized without a thorough integration of viewpoints and values-based commitments on the part of fol- lowers, it runs the risk of becoming a form of “window dressing”—for example, when the “business scholar- ship for society” catchphrase comes to be only used to appease accreditation bodies and practice-based stake- holders. In such instances, the moral framing may be loosely coupled to followers’ ongoing daily prac- tices regarding the issue (Ramus et al., 2017; Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999), and, as such, the proposed framing will not fundamentally lead to a significant breakaway from followers’ existing modes of thinking and behaving. The net result is a perceived lack of be- havioral integrity and moral consistency in the eyes of followers, which is then detrimental to the leader’s moral authority and continued success in sustaining momentum around a moral framing (Simons, 2002).

Proposition 5. When moral leaders pragmatically combine the views of different followers in their framing of an issue, they may secure some initial common ground for the proposed change but run the risk that, in time, the framing is seen as superficial and as not suf- ficiently moral to warrant continued follower support.

The “statesperson.”1Compared to the “pragmatic politician,” moral leaders in the image of the “statesman” (Selznick, 1957) similarly recognize the need to balance between moral views and to accom- modate theviewsofothers,yet the typeof framingand reframing that they engage in is not strategic but re- lational in nature, which means that the statesperson actively tries to rekey and blend frames into a coher- ent common ground (Cornelissen, 2012; Maak et al., 2016; Meyerson & Scully, 1995;Wickert & de Bakker, 2018). In such a relational approach to framing, a statespersonmay laminate one framing over the other (Gray et al., 2015; Hahn et al., 2014), or rekey moral elements (such as principles or outcomes) of frames, all the while ensuring that the grounds of combining frames remains recognizably moral and values-based in nature (e.g., no longer accepting of ivory-tower, quantity-focused publication practices in the exam- ple of the business school above). They may do this, for example, by appealing to an overarching moral principle or moral universal, or by demonstrating that trade-offs should reinforce a moral conviction (e.g., about the fundamental place of a university in society) and should not be supplanted with more short-termgoaldisplacements (e.g., immediate rewards gained by fast, low-impact publication strategies).

The above-presented academic, acting as a states- person, will yet also stay in dialogue with opposing groups, look for win–wins, or provide catered solu- tions (e.g., luringalternative incentives) to thosewith opposing interests. Anchoring a diverse set of view- points in a recognizably moral vision and tractable practices gives the statesperson credibility in the eyes of heterogeneous followers and the mandate to forge collaborative connections between disparate groups. Because of their moral courage, their con- tinued grounding of actions and communications in a moral conviction, and their demonstrated care for others, a statesperson is as amoral leader also seen as more authentic and virtuous, instilling further trust in followers (Lemoine et al., 2019; Maak et al., 2016; Meyerson, 2008; Meyerson & Scully, 1995). The upshot of this approach is that, in comparison to the pragmatic politician, the statesperson may be able to create more lasting and “integrated” moral settlements (Rao & Kenney, 2008), as opposed to a “patchwork” compromise solution that only partially satisfies the moral concerns of followers (as in the mentioned example of Kevin Thompson’s integrative

1 We have changed Selznick’s (1957) original term “statesman” into “statesperson” in order to signal that this concept refers to both men and women.

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settlement within IBM and the technology industry creating win–wins for all parties involved). When emergent moral leaders subsequently manage to bro- ker moral expectations in this manner, they achieve common ground around a proposed moral framing, which may then, when shared, become the “collec- tive action frame” of an organized group (Benford & Snow, 2000). As followers recognize themselves in the frame, and agree with the solution that it offers, they in turn are likely to go out of their way to spread thenewmoral framingwithin theorganization. In this way, followership across the organization continues to broaden out, and provides the base for a newmoral settlement that changes the existing moral system (Gehman et al., 2013). Accordingly:

Proposition 6. When moral leaders, in their framing, mediate between their own convictions and themoral views of others on the basis of substantive, moral grounds, they are more likely to create a new moral settlement that warrants continued follower support.

Securing the Change: Formalizing a New Moral Framing

Symbolic leadership practices.Toachieve sucha widespread diffusion of a new framing requires, we argue, a number of leadership processes targeted at maintainingmomentumand at institutionalizing the moral framing, securing the change of the moral system from within. First, emergent moral leaders need to continue to articulate, embody, and sym- bolize the values that are shared as part of the new moral framing to foster active and continued fol- lowership. Their role is to actively weave an invisi- ble “moral fabric” (Brooks, 2017;Maak&Pless, 2006) that followers can recognize, relate to, and subse- quently refer to in their own experiences and be- haviors and in interactionswith others. For example, leaders may create and sustain myths that speak about the origin and meaning of the system’s moral underpinnings (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). They furthermore “walk the talk” in linewith theproposed framing (Brown et al., 2005; Lemoine et al., 2019; Simons, 2002) and they are visible during staged events and ritualized practices that have a performa- tive and educational function (e.g., meetings, study groups, rallies, discussion fora). Moral leaders may furthermore strengthen follower identification with the proposed frame-based values by creating reso- nance with broader societal discourses connected with alternative social orders (e.g., religion, family, environmental, or civic value frameworks) or by contrasting the moral frame with other framings or

logics (e.g., anti-consumerism, anti-corporate, etc.; see Weber et al., 2008). Through this role and by continuing to articulate the consensus values of the group, the moral leader becomes a surrogate target for followers’ identification, as a proximal repre- sentation of the moral values that are at stake (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993; Shils, 1965). In other words, followers may form attachments to a proposed moral framing via their interactions with leaders.

Moral management. Such symbolic manage- ment, while necessary, at the same time signifies the precarious nature of informal leaders trying to es- tablish a newmoral regime. Support for a framemay waver unless emergent leaders manage to win over a large enough following, and, in doing so, either di- rectly or indirectly influence crucial opinion leaders or powerful others (e.g., senior managers, industry representatives) to change practices, behaviors, and formal policies in the organization in line with the new moral frame. Unless such a formalization hap- pens, the proposed framing is at risk of returning to its incipient state of simply being seen as an alter- native possible framing of an issue and alongside other possible framings as part of the previous moral system or yet other imagined alternatives (Ramus et al., 2017). To spearhead such formalization, moral leaders themselves also need to change tack toward leadership practices that have bureaucratic over- tones (Burns, 1978; Lemoine et al., 2019; Treviño et al., 2000).

From early leadership theory (e.g., Weber, 1947/ 1978), we learn that charismatic (or transformational) leadership eventually becomes traditionalized or ra- tionalized, which also implies a transitioning from emergent and informal to more procedural and for- malized forms of moral leadership (see also DeRue & Ashford, 2010). The consequence of a switch to a more formalized formofmoral leadership comeswith a focus on “moral management,”whereby the leader, together with followers in the organization, works on formalizing and installing newcompliance structures and incentive schemes (Smith-Crowe, Tenbrunsel, Chan-Serafin, Brief, & Umphress, 2015) and con- tinues to specify the importance and implications of the new moral system (in terms of scorecards, be- havioral guidelines, etc.). The consequence of such formalization is that the new moral framing is exter- nalized as a “given” set of moral norms that are em- bedded in practices, incentive structures, and general policies and guidelines within the organization. We argue that, unless such formalization in official structures, policies, and guidelines takes place, the

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new moral framing, while collectively shared, risks remaining a secondary concernwhen organizational members are making operational decisions (Ramus et al., 2017; Selznick, 1957). Without formalization, the moral settlement that was established may be- come more brittle, with the potential of waning fol- lower support. Without formalization, it will also be harder to sustain the same levels of moral aware- ness and involvement with the issue among fol- lowers, who, in time, may resort to alternative framings or may lose interest in the issue alto- gether. Hence:

Proposition 7. The degree to which moral leaders are able to secure broad-based and continued support for their moral framing depends on the degree to which they are able, alone or with others, to formalize the moral framing into organizational structures, poli- cies, and guidelines.

Guardianship over the Changed Moral System

Up to this point, we have defined emergent moral leadership as a process whereby a person becomes a focal point of influence in initiating, scaling up, and securing a moral reframing of issues. This definition implies a form of reform-oriented institutional work around moral systems that revolves around redefin- ingwhat is considered asmoral within the context of organizational issues. When a novel moral framing has taken hold and has become institutionalized, moral leadership transitions into a maintenance function,whereby themoral leader comes to act as a guardian to uphold the boundaries around a moral system (Maak & Pless, 2006; O’Gorman, Henrich, & Van Vugt, 2008; Selznick, 1957). In doing so, they aim to secure the integrity of the newly established moral system and may thereby assure a group’s stable moral identity, climate, and infrastructure (Schaubroeck et al., 2012; Smith-Crowe et al., 2015). Such a role is needed, as the institutionalization of a new frame into practices and policies does not ne- gate the need for ongoing leadership. The settlement arounda frame remainsaprecariousarrangement that needs safeguarding bymoral leaders to protect it from outside challenges. Therefore, episodic or intermit- tent acts of moral leadership continue to be required to protect the boundaries of the moral system over time. The need for moral leadership becomes es- pecially conspicuous when the system’s consensus values are challenged, and when the (present or future) integrity of the system is insecure or at stake. In those moments, moral leaders have to step up as beacons of recognition, such that followers

continue to be reassured of their own shared values and of the moral system that is in place.

Such moral guardianship around the established moral system can be defined as a process wherein a leader within a local social order becomes a focal point of influence (a “beacon of recognition”) in maintaining and developing a characteristic set of values. This definition contains both maintenance and development as key elements within the work thatmoral leaders do toprotect andmaintain anewly established moral system. In terms of development, moral leaders support the willing participation in moral systems by others and enable them to develop and elaborate their own subjective experiences and behaviors as part of the moral system. Without fos- tering suchdevelopment of followers as autonomous thinkers with voluntary attachments to institutional arrangements, moral systems may otherwise evolve to become repressive systems that are marked by an authoritarian leadership structure. In other words, moral systems are not impersonal vehicles for sub- jugation, propaganda, or control. When they are enacted, they are experienced as highly personal by followers; as objects of personal attachment and commitment (Voronov & Weber, 2016) and as vehi- cles for the development of their own moral self, or “character” (Selznick, 1957).

Besides developmental work toward the mainte- nance of a moral system, moral leaders also engage simultaneously in activities aimed at controlling and protecting the core values at the heart of the moral system. Without a degree of control to maintain the moral system that has been put in place, moral sys- tems may otherwise erode such that followers may start behaving according to other motives, including self-interestedmotives (Selznick, 1957; Treviño et al., 1998). Moral systems may then drift away from their values-based underpinnings and start incorporating “exogenous” frames from, for example, alternative corporate, market, or legal orders (Kraatz et al., 2010; Rhodes, 2016; Selznick, 1957).

The statesperson as a guardian.Themoral leader thus actively has to balance between processes of de- velopment andmaintenance or controlwhile engaging in conservative boundary work practices. Too much emphasis on control resembles a “principled theolo- gian” (entrenched inmoral content while forgetting the relational aspect), while too much emphasis on development seems to resemble the “pragmatic politician” (i.e., too easily swayed along with cur- rent developments and insufficiently “grounded” in a moral conviction). This balance between the two also resembles a paradoxbetween reformingyet

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simultaneously conserving the moral system that has been established in interactions with followers (Ansell, Boin, & Farjoun, 2015; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, &Hunt, 1998). Selznick (1957) referred to this balancing act as the continuous development of the “character” of the organization, which involves leaders and followers updating and adjusting the moral course of the organization, yet in ways that are anchored in past commitments and a collec- tively established set of convictions—that is, a shared moral system.

In line with our earlier arguments, we argue that the stewardship of this character development pro- cess requires moral leaders who act as “statesmen” (Selznick, 1957). In this role, the moral leader rec- ognizes the value of engaging with others in a fair and transparent manner, and will, where neces- sary, make adjustments or allow for compromises in daily practices and routines, but in ways that still conform to the previously established moral system. This degree of recognizing fairness and delib- eration in ongoing conservative boundary practices— as opposed to a leader being too parochial (the “prin- cipled theologian”) or too superficial (the “pragmatic politician”)—will have as an effect on followers that the protection of the moral system is more likely to become actively shared as a common concern and set of convictions—in short, a common “organizational character” (King, Felin, & Whetten, 2010). The crite- rion for effective moral guardianship is thus not only whether amoral leader is able to control andmaintain the boundaries of a moral system for a short period of time,butalsowhether followers, after interactionswith the leader, would willingly maintain the boundaries of the moral system themselves. This self-perpetuating aspect is a key characteristic of institutionalized moral systems (Jepperson, 1991) and rooted in leader–follower interactions. In other words, if the initial institutionalizing work of individual moral leaders around newly established moral systems is initially effective, it is likely to lead to ongoing in- stitutional maintenance work that is shared be- tween members of the organization. The individual moral leadermay then continue to act as a “beacon” of the shared moral values, but, equally, others may come to perform similar roles and through their own actions will continue to affirm the boundaries of the moral system. Put formally:

Proposition 8. The institutionalization of a newmoral framing into a moral system is associated with the degree to which followers start to actively protect the boundaries of the newly established moral system.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Theoretical Implications

In the present paper, we have emphasized the embeddedagencyofmoral leadershipby elucidating how leaders and followers, through frame-based in- teractions, (re-)produce “moral systems,” defined as localized social orders with a characteristic set of values. Local settings may stir up an emergent moral leadership process that might produce dynamic shifts within moral systems in organizations. In particular, moral systems transform as emergent moral leaders resist the localized order, initiate an alternative, moral framing of issues, and influence followers to do the same, such that the new moral frames become shared.After newmoral frameshave suffused the organization to make for a revised moral order, there is a temporal shift from the initial disruption to themaintenance of the moral system, whereby a leader becomes a focal point of influence (a beacon of recognition) in maintaining the integ- rity of a newly established moral system.

Moral leadership, organizations, and institutions. Through our positioning of moral leadership at the crossroads of micro and macro levels of analy- sis, we aim to build bridges between theories concern- ing micro-level leadership research and macro-level accounts of localized interaction orders (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994) and of the institutionalization of a moral ethos, or character (Selznick, 1957; Gehman et al., 2013). Doing so offers new pathways for research that could examine “institutional” ingredients as the very source of moral endeavors (via institutional contradic- tions within the self and the workplace), including the rules by which moral leaders play and how they con- nect with others who tend to frame and see issues dif- ferently. We have developed the argument that leaders are successful to the extent that they can skillfully me- diate between the values and beliefs of others and le- verage their emotional investments. In addition, moral systems are established interaction orders that, in turn, operate as cultural registers in leaders’ and followers’ minds (Voronov & Yorks, 2015) and thus influence the kinds of institutional contradictions one might be ex- pected to witness, including the alternative moraliza- tions individuals are likely to come up with and feel courageousenoughabout topursue.This institutionally embedded leadership perspective is much more situated and processual in orientation than con- ventional leadership approaches that tend to be person-centric and emphasize formal “styles” of leadership (e.g., Lemoine et al., 2019; Maak et al., 2016). Thus, pursuing this line of inquiry opens up

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new questions and candidate inferences compared to the traditional person-based emphasis on leader- ship emergence, which is restricted to a focus onwho is likely to stand up as a moral leader (Dinh et al., 2014; Foti & Hauenstein, 2007; Mayer et al., 2009).

In addition, we also believe that our theorizing has implications for macro-level research on the organization-wide dissemination of values and the establishment of a moral “character” in organiza- tions (King et al., 2010; Kraatz, 2009; Selznick, 1957). We offer amore detailed account of theway inwhich a moral system in organizations is established and then, through ongoing interactions, maintained or revised over time.Where Selznick (1957) previously highlighted the role of leaders as “statesmen” in this process, but in a very general manner, we flesh out what such a form of leadership entails and how it is instrumental to the establishment of a moral char- acter in the organization through initially reformist boundary work and then maintained through con- servative boundarywork (as depicted inFigure 1). As such, and despite the fact that macro scholars after Selznick (but see Kraatz, 2009) have, for the most part, avoided the mention of leadership (preferring labels such as “institutional entrepreneurship” in- stead), we show the potency of seeing leadership as a form of institutional work that emergent leaders and followers engage in to establish, revise, or maintain moral systems in organizations.

Values-based leadership. With the focus on the institutional embeddedness of moral leadership, our theorizing prompts further research to examine existing theorizing about values-based leadership with a fresh pair of eyes, such that we may better bring out their respective contributions to moral be- havior in organizations. We first of all advocate a greater emphasis on process studies that trace the values-based actions of leaders andexamine indetail the interactions between leaders and followers to see how a new moral system, as an interaction order, is established.

With our theorizing, we also draw attention to the strengths and limitations of existing values-based leadership constructs. For this purpose, we offer itemized comparisons between existing treatments of values-based leadership (specifically, ethical leader- ship, responsible leadership, charismatic leadership, and the full range model of leadership), various ap- proaches to reformist institutionalwork (institutional entrepreneurship, institutional work, values work, issue selling), and our own treatment of moral lead- ership behaviors that are implied in reformist boundary work around moral systems (Table 1).

Moreover, we have done the same for conservative boundarywork aroundmoral systems, and compared them with relevant values-based leadership and in- stitutional work approaches (Table 2).

An itemized comparison teaches us that our treatment of moral leadership taps into a broader set of leadershipbehaviors thanwhat canbe capturedby existing values-based leadership constructs. For in- stance, the presently dominant theories in values- based leadership (i.e., social exchange theory and social learning theory) share a great deal of variance around leaders’ behavioral consistency with moral universals (e.g., honesty, caring for followers, in- tegrity), such that it breeds trust and high-quality exchanges between leaders and followers (see Hoch et al., 2018; Lemoine et al., 2019; Pless, 2007;Mumford & Fried, 2014). While our theory of moral leadership does account for the alignment with moral universals, we have expanded the criterion of moral leadership from followers’ perceptions of a leader’s benevolence and trustworthiness (however important) into their ability and actions to transform or safeguard a moral system. In support of this proposed analytical shift, we haveofferedanewtheoreticalmechanismfor thestudy ofvalues-based leadership (i.e., boundaryworkaround moral systems) that is capable of accounting for, and explaining, thepotential systemic impact of leadership behaviors.Weexpect that attuning themeasurementof moral leadership to (a) boundary work practices as a new generative mechanism for moral leadership and (b) transforming or safeguarding the moral system as ultimate criterion for moral leadership would solve some of the discriminant validity issues that still be- devil moral and ethical leadership approaches to date (see Hoch et al., 2018; Lemoine et al., 2019).

In addition, current definitions of the ethical leadership construct mainly touch upon control- oriented elements in conservative boundary work (see Table 2). This is because of the fact that the cur- rent measure strongly emphasizes followers’ confor- mity to normative standards (e.g., Lemoine et al., 2019; Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012; Treviño et al., 1998) to the degree that followers may even interpret such leader behaviors as overly con- trolling and judgmental (Stouten et al., 2013). While control is indeed important in the context of conser- vative boundary work, a new measure for ethical leadership that is built around conservative bound- ary work as a theoretical backdrop may want to in- corporate developmentally oriented boundary work aswell, in order to obtain amore complete image (see Table 2). Importantly, what is not incorporated in the current ethical leadership measure is the notion of

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emergent moral leadership, including an important range of “statesmanship” practices that help scale up new moral framings throughout the organization (seeTable 1, “building coalitions” and “negotiating”). While the “responsible leadership” approach does emphasize more “integrative” practices of CEOs (Maak et al., 2016), it remains a micro-level ap- proach, emphasizing a formal leadership style, executed by sitting top-level executives acting as guardians of a particular moral status quo. This is theoretically different from our process approach, which emphasizes the emergence of such leader- ship and the subsequent reform of a moral system.

It is also worth noting, in that regard, that what is consensually conceived as “transformational” leader- shippracticeswithin the full rangemodelof leadership (Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999) should not be interpreted as necessarily “reformist” in nature, in light of our theory. For instance, to capture transformational leadership, scholars oftentimes use the degree of “fol- lower internalization of their organization’s moral values” as a criterion for followers’moral development (Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002: 736). This mea- sure, however, is indicative of an orientation toward the conservationof amoral system, andnot its reform. The fact that“transformational leadership” shows a

TABLE 1 Reformist Boundary Work and an Itemized Comparison with Adjacent Constructs

Action type Reformist boundary work practices

Macro literaturesa Micro literaturesb

IS IE IW VW EL FRML CH RL

AWARENESS DEFIANCE (initiating)

Sensing needs and opportunities X X IL X X Frame breaking (re-keying) X X X IS X Diagnostic framing X IS Leveraging contradictions X Moral courage X Emotion-laden leader signaling X IC/II(A) X X Reference to moral universals X MP II(B) X Envisioning (prognostic frame) X X X II (B) X X Building collective efficacy IC/II(A) X Setting new normative standards MM

BUILDING COALITIONS (scaling up)

Securing/taking away fear X X X Forming strategic alliances X X Working the bureaucracy Find supportive multipliers/

mobilizing stakeholders X X X

Relational intelligence X X Stay grounded in convictions X X Building trust and reputation X MP II(A) X Resource mobilization X CR Persistence and patience X

NEGOTIATING (scaling up)

Define and break issue down X Provide catered solutions X Maintain dialogue X Respectful of others’ views X X X Frame blending/laminating Create win–wins X X Leverage small wins X Mindful of hidden needs/incentives X Working toward morally

recognizable settlement X

Notes: a IS 5 issue selling (Wickert & de Bakker, 2018); IE 5 institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009); IW 5 institutional work; VW5 values work. b IC1 5 inspirational communication; IC2 5 Individualized consideration; II(A) 5 idealized influence (attributed); II(B) idealized influence (behavior); IL 5 instrumental leadership dimension; IS 5 intellectual stimulation; MM 5 moral manager aspect of ethical leadership; MP 5 moral person aspect of ethical leadership. EL 5 ethical leadership (Brown et al., 2005); FRML 5 full range model of leadership; CH5 charismatic leadership (Antonakis et al., 2016; Conger & Kanungo, 1998); RL5 responsible leadership (Maak & Pless, 2006; Maak et al., 2016; Pless, 2007). X 5 this practice is part of designated construct.

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corrected correlation as high as .70 with the ethical leadership construct (Hoch et al., 2018) is another case in point, as the latter is known to capture an individual’s conformity with a moral regime (Lemoine et al., 2019; Mayer et al., 2009; Schaubroeck et al., 2012). To wit, it is Burns’s (1978: 249) own original work that reads: “The ultimate success of leaders is tested not by peoples’ delight in a performance or personality but by actual social change measured by ideologists’ purposes, pro- grams, and values” (emphasis in the original). The present literature on transformational leader- ship has thus, in effect, subsumed the disruption and

protection of moral boundaries under the same banner (see an itemized analysis in Tables 1 and 2). Here, it is confusing when leadership studies use reformist language (e.g., connotationsbelonging to the word “transformational”) while using established measures and criteria that presume conservative leadershippractices (Thompson,2011).Weargue that conflating two distinct opposite leadership functions under the same banner is confusing unless there is an explicit temporal narrative that logically integrates the two (see our Figure 1). Our process theory may thus provide necessary clarity by distinguishing between reformist boundary work as the initial

TABLE 2 Conservative Boundary Work and an Itemized Comparison with Adjacent Constructsa,b

Conservative boundary practices Key reference Control vs. development

emphasis IWc EL FRML CH RL

Path–goal facilitation (KPIs) Antonakis and House (2014) Control X IL Reformulating strategy/core values Antonakis and House (2014) Control IL X Divesting and clean up Brown and Treviño (2006) Control MM Construct normative networks Lawrence and Suddaby

(2006) Control X O

Formalizing moral standards Weber (1947/1978) Control X X Policing and (outcome) monitoring Zietsma and Lawrence

(2010) Control X MM IL

Deterring Lawrence and Suddaby (2006)

Control X MM

Enable and promote elites to key positions

Weber and Waeger (2017) Control X O

Repetition of characteristic values and frames

Lakoff (2016) Control X MM II(B) X X

Determine degree of coupling with external constituents

Weber and Waeger (2017) Control

Educating and modeling Brown and Treviño (2006) Development X MM X Critical decisions based on high moral

standards Selznick (1957) Development MP X

Translating exogenous shocks Conger and Kanungo (1998) Development X Positive anchoring in societal discourses Boltanski and Thévenot

(2006) Development X IS X

Negative anchoring vis-à-vis societal discourses

Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey (2008)

Development X IS X

Alignment with moral universals in words and deeds

Lemoine et al. (2019) Development MP II(A) X X

Mythologizing Lawrence and Suddaby (2006)

Development X IC X X

Ongoing performativity of values in ritualized practices

Lawrence and Suddaby (2006)

Development X

Constructing a common identity Selznick (1957) on “character”

Development X IC X X

System updating or renewal Zietsma and Lawrence (2010)

Development X

a IW 5 institutional work; EL 5 ethical leadership (Brown et al., 2005); FRML 5 full range model of leadership (Antonakis & House, 2014; Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999); CH 5 charismatic leadership; RL5 responsible leadership (Maak & Pless, 2006; Maak et al., 2016; Pless, 2007). b MP5moral person aspect of EL; MM5moral manager aspect of EL; O5 outcome of EL (Lemoine et al., 2019). IS5 intellectual stimulation; IC15 inspirational communication; II(A)5 idealized influence (attributed); II(B) idealized influence (behavior); IL5 instrumental leadership dimension (Antonakis & House, 2014). c X 5 this practice is part of designated construct.

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leadership process (Table 1) and conservative boundary work (Table 2) as a secondary process that logically follows the other in time.

In line with these contributions, we believe that future scale construction for survey and experimental research may benefit from distinguishing emergent and incumbent moral leadership (or “guardianship’) as separate constructs, while conceptualizing the various steps that we have outlined (Figure 1 and Table 1) as either temporally sequential or latent fac- tors. After all, emergent moral leadership and incum- bent moral leadership have distinct institutionalizing functions (i.e., disrupting vs.maintaining boundaries), and are expected to follow one another over time in an iterative fashion. Again, making such distinctions will help build measurement scales that have greater dis- criminant validity.

As a final comment, we have built our process theory of moral leadership with a notion of bottom- upmoral regime change inmind (Sonenshein, 2016). Yet, we realize that both the ethical and responsible leadership constructs strictly emphasize top-down leadership, whereby moral leaders set the tone from the top (e.g., Maak et al., 2016; Mayer et al., 2009; Schaubroeck et al., 2012). Indeed, most of the moral initiatives we read about, even the cases in which leaders spur change in moral systems, seem to be initiated by top-level executives (e.g., Paul Polman at Unilever, Ray Anderson at Interface). In addition, moral leaders at the lower and mid-levels of an orga- nization may not be noticed because they are sup- pressed or blocked by others in the organization, and may not even be given due credit because their initia- tives are ultimately ratified by the headline-grabbing final actions of senior leaders such as CEOs, exec- utive directors, and public officials. Indeed, CEOs and directors do have a crucial role to play, since creating a powerful guiding coalition is crucial also for low- and mid-level-ranked emergent moral leaders to initiate change (Table 1). Even if moral regime changes spurred by low- to mid-level moral leaders are less conspicuous, they do happen and they do have impact (for examples, see Berg, 2018; Creed et al., 2010; Davis & White, 2015; Meyerson & Scully, 1995). As such, and as we have argued in this paper, these cases of emergent leadership should be acknowledgedasphenomena that areworthyof study.

CONCLUSION

Despite the significance ofmoral leadershipwithin organizations, the subject has not been adequately theorized in a cross-disciplinary manner because of

the division of labor between micro and macro re- search. We draw on micro-level leadership research and Selznick’s (1957) initial writings on the subject, and use that as a base from which to develop a pro- cess theory of moral leadership. We have discussed the emergence of moral leadership as a situation wherein individuals take a moral stance on an issue, convince others to do the same, and together spur social change by revising amoral system. In the spirit of Selznick (1957), we have argued that the most lasting and integrative revisions of moral systems will come from leaders acting as “statespersons” who skillfully mediate between conflicting values and beliefs andwill themselves come to embody the organization’s moral “character,” as a beacon of recognition.

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Omar Solinger ([email protected]) is an associate pro- fessor at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam’s School of Business and Economics. His research focuses on devel- oping a process-based understanding organizational be- havior and emphasizes both theory development and longitudinal methods. Current topics on his research agenda are leadership, change management, commit- ment, and the person-organization relationship.

Paul Jansen ([email protected]) is a professor of indus- trial psychology at theVrijeUniversiteit AmsterdamSchool of Business and Economics. He received his PhD in math- ematical psychology. His current research interests are leadership, psychological assessment, and performance management.

Joep Cornelissen ([email protected]) is a professor of cor- porate communication and management at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University. He re- ceived his PhD from the Manchester Metropolitan Uni- versity. His research focuses on communication and sensemaking in innovation processes, entrepreneur- ship, and change, as well as reasoning and management theory development.

2020 527Solinger, Jansen, and Cornelissen