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SCENARIO MUTABILITY & COGNITION

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SCENARIO MUTABILITY & COGNITION

Comment by Ryan Winter: I will only make a few comments in this final paper, as I have commented on prior versions of this paper for example Papers I, II, III, and IV. Revisit those example papers if you need to see the comments again

Scenario Mutability and Need for Cognition: Appointing Blame When A Car Accident Seems Avoidable

Former Student

Florida International University

Abstract Comment by Ryan Winter: The Abstract is a new element to Paper V, so take some time to compose this paragraph. It should cover both studies and provide information about the study in general and your findings Comment by Ryan Winter: The word Abstract is centered and in bold

Research shows that Need for Cognition (NFC) and scenario mutability (how easy it is to alter the outcome of an event) can play a role in the way people interpret those outcomes. The current studies analyzed culpability assessed when a situation varied in mutability (in study one and two) and when the NFC of each subject was assessed (study two). In both studies, undergraduate participants read a scenario involving a taxi-accident in which an undesirable outcome could have been avoided (changeable) or was unavoidable (unchangeable). In both studies, the participants generated as many “If Only” statements as they could and rated how much blame the actor in the scenario deserved for the undesirable outcome. For both studies, participants assessed more blame in the changeable condition, but neither scenario nor NFC impacted counterfactual statement generation. These results suggest that the mutability of a scenario is important, but that counterfactual statements may explain how participants assess that mutability. Comment by Ryan Winter: The whole abstract is flush left (no indenting) but the right side is jagged Comment by Ryan Winter: In this course, try to keep the abstract to 150 to 250 words (this one is 156).

Keywords: need for cognition, counterfactual thinking, “If Only” statements, changeable condition, unchangeable condition Comment by Ryan Winter: The keywords are not included in the word count

Scenario Mutability and Need for Cognition: Appointing Blame When A Car Accident Seems Avoidable

As free-willed beings, humans are often the victims of their own decisions. Imagine accidentally running over a stray cat because you decided to look away from the road at the exact moment the cat decided to cross the street. Following the accident, most people would be plagued with thoughts of how alternative circumstances or decisions could have prevented such an unfortunate situation. Every time an individual forms a ‘what if’ scenario in which he or she mentally alters the course of events occurred, they are participating in a process that is known as counterfactual thinking (Ruiselová et al., 2007). This process allows individuals to consider the multiple factors at play in a situation (i.e mutability), and to decide what specific condition was responsible for the ultimate outcome of the event (Williams et al. 1996). The primary focus of our study is to analyze the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor depending on the preventability of the outcome. That is, if it is easy to “undue” an event that ends in a tragic outcome, will participants find an actor who fails to engage in that easy behavior more at fault?

The development of counterfactual thoughts relies on the variability of the situation as well as the knowledge that different actions could have resulted in alternate outcomes (Alquist et al., 2015). According to Alquist et al., situations that are believed to be highly changeable generate more counterfactual thoughts than events that seem unavoidable. However, ruminating on every conceivable alternative of a situation would take an unlimited amount of time and resources. Instead of allotting so much time and energy on a cognitive task, people tend to narrow down the different scenarios that come to mind according to the degree of controllability of the factors involved (McCloy & Byrne, 2000). For example, the deliberate decisions individuals make that ultimately lead to a certain outcome is considered to be a controllable event, whereas uncontrollable events are unavoidable circumstances, such as traffic jams or natural disasters (McCloy & Byrne, 2000). When mentally forming a scenario different than the one occurred, individuals tend to change controllable rather than uncontrollable events. Therefore, events that are within an individual’s jurisdiction generally receive the brunt of the blame for the resulting situation.

In a similar light, a study performed by McCloy and Byrne (2000), discovered that inappropriate events are more often changed through the process of counterfactual thinking than appropriate ones, especially when the outcome of these events was negative. Inappropriate events include the decisions individuals make that are considered to be ‘socially wrong’, whereas appropriate events are ‘socially acceptable’ actions. Due to these results, we can conclude that what McCloy and Byrne consider to be “inappropriate controllable” events, will likely be regarded as highly culpable factors in the outcome of a situation.

Another contributing factor to perceived culpability is the extent of knowledge of the actors involved in an event, as well as the intent of their actions (Gilbert et al., 2015). For example, in the aforementioned scenario, had the driver known that looking away from the road would have caused her to run over the stray cat, the driver would have been more likely to be perceived guilty, even though the actions and the outcome of the situation remained the same. This rationalization is the product of a bottom-up method of thinking in which individuals are able to generate more counterfactual thoughts due to the actor’s knowledge of the outcome (Gilbert et al., 2015). As these authors have noted, the increased development of counterfactual thoughts will in turn attribute more responsibility to the actor, which will ultimately increase perceived blame. But this is not the full picture when it comes to focusing on the role of counterfactual thoughts in altering participant responses.

Study One

In pursuance of counterfactual thinking and its relationship to perceived blame, we have devised a study that analyzed the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor depending on the preventability of the outcome. We provided participants with one of three scenarios, each of which depicted a variation of the same situation where alternate events lead to different conclusions. In the changeable condition, an actor engaged in a behavior that led to an undesirable outcome (death) that could have been avoided had he acted differently. In the unchangeable condition, the same actor engaged in a behavior that once again led to an undesirable outcome, but here the outcome could not have been avoided if he acted differently. In the neutral condition, the actor engaged in an alternative behavior, but the outcome was still undesirable. We predicted that participants would place more blame on the actor in the changeable condition where the actor could have avoided the undesirable outcome had he behaved differently than in both the unchangeable and neutral conditions, where the actor’s behavior could not be altered. This is because we expected changeable participants to generate more counterfactuals (more statements about how the actor could have behaved) in the changeable condition.

Methods

Participants

One hundred and twenty six students from Florida International University were randomly selected to participate in our study. Of these 126 participants, 37% ( n = 47) were male and 63% ( n = 79) were female. Ages ranged from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 58 with an average of 22.32 years ( SD = 6.30). The sample population consisted of 68.3% Hispanic Americans ( n = 86), 8.7% African Americans ( n = 11), 19% Caucasians ( n = 24), 1.6% Asians ( n = 2), and 2.4% who did not specify their ethnicity ( n = 3). See Table 1.

Table 1

Demographics – Study One

Materials and Procedure

In accordance with the standardized guidelines for informed consent, prospective participants were notified of the potential risks and benefits of participating in the study before being introduced to the research material. If the student verbally agreed to participate, he or she was given one of three different documents, each of which consisted of five parts or sections.

In Part One, the participant read a short scenario concerning a paraplegic couple, Tina and Eugene, who requested a taxi for a night out with friends. Each of the three documents depicted the same initial situation with alternate conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral).

In the changeable condition, the taxi driver arrived to pick up the couple, only to promptly decline their fare upon seeing that they were both paraplegic. Without enough time to call for another taxi, Tina and Eugene decided to take Tina’s car, which was handicap equipped. In order to reach their destination, they had to cross a bridge that had been weakened the night before due to a severe storm. The damaged bridge collapsed mere minutes before the couple reached it. Unable to see the missing portion of the bridge in the night, Tina and Eugene drove off the road, into the river below, and drowned. The taxi driver, who had left 15 minutes earlier, managed to make it safely across, before the collapse. In the unchangeable condition, the situation remained mostly the same with the exception that the taxi driver arrived at the bridge after it had collapsed and plummeted into the water as well. He managed to make it out of the car and swim to safety, but Tina and Eugene drowned. In the neutral condition, the taxi arrived to pick up the couple but promptly refused their fare as soon as he realized that they were both paraplegic. In this condition, the taxi driver did eventually agree to take Tina and Eugene to their destination downtown, albeit after much argument. Due to the recently collapsed bridge, the taxi driver drove his passengers and himself off the road and into the river below. He barely managed to make it out of the car before drowning. Tina and Eugene’s outcome remained the same.

After reading one of the scenarios described above, the participant continued on to the remainder of the study, which was composed of a series of open, partially open, and close-ended questions.

In Part Two, the participants was asked to provide as many ‘If Only’ statements as they could that would essentially “undo” the accident. That is, they were asked to list all the factors they could think of that could have possibly changed the outcome of the event. This question was open-ended, and participants had a blank page where they were encouraged to write down as many “If only” statements as they liked. This could range from zero to as many as they could imagine, though no participant wrote down more than ten statements, giving us a ratio scale that ranged from 0 to 10 statements. An example statement that frequently occurred was, “The accident could have been avoided if only the taxi driver had agreed to drive the couple.” We did not content analyze these statements, but rather counted the number of statements participants provided.

In Part Three, the participant was presented with a series of questions about their thoughts regarding the specific situation they read about. After reading each question, the participant was asked to record his or her response in a scale of one to nine, though the descriptors for each question differed depending on the question prompt. These questions included, “How avoidable do you think the accident was (1 = not at all avoidable, 9 = very avoidable)?”, “How causal was the role of the taxi driver in the couple’s death (1 = not at all causal, 9 = the most important cause)”?, “How much control do you think the taxi driver had (1 = no control, 9 = complete control)?”, “How negligent was the taxi driver (1 = not at all negligent, 9 = completely negligent)?”, “How much money for damages should the taxi driver be responsible for (1 = no money, 9 = as much as possible)?”, “How foreseeable was the couple’s death (1 = not at all foreseeable, 9 = completely foreseeable)?”, “How guilty should the taxi driver feel about the accident (1 = no guilt at all, 9 = as much guilt as possible)”, and “How much blame does the taxi driver deserve for the accident (1 = no blame at all, 9 = total blame)?” Remaining questions focused on a series of statements about the taxi drive, all rated on scales ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 9 (Strongly Agree). These statements included, “The taxi driver was reckless”, “The taxi driver was patient”, “The taxi driver was careful”, and “The taxi driver was hasty”.

Part Four asked for the participant’s demographic information, including gender, age, ethnicity, their first language, and whether they were a student at Florida International University. Concluding the study, the participant was debriefed on his or her contribution to the study as well as our insights on counterfactual thinking and our main hypothesis.

Finally, in Part Five we asked “Did the taxi driver agree to drive the couple?” The answer options were yes or no, or a nominal response. This final question served as an attention check, which informed us if the participant was attentive to the study and allowed us to exclude potentially misrepresentative responses from our data.

Although we had several dependent variables, our primary analyses focuses on the perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver, the number of ‘If Only’ statements the participants could create, and the manipulation check regarding whether the driver agreed to take the couple. As such, these are the only three dependent variables that we analyzed.

Results Comment by Ryan Winter: Results is centered and bold. The results section comes right after the methods – there is no page break

Using survey condition (changeable vs. unchangeable vs. neutral) as our independent variable and whether participants recalled whether the taxi driver picked up the paraplegic couple as the dependent variable, we ran a manipulation check in which we saw a significant effect, X2(2) = 93.95, p < .001. Participants in the changeable and unchangeable conditions correctly said the taxi did not pick up the couple (95.2% and 90.5%, respectively). Most participants in the neutral condition said the driver did pick up the couple (95.2%). Cramer’s V, which is most appropriate for a 3 X 2 chi square, showed a large effect. This indicates that participants did pay attention to whether the taxi driver picked up the couple. See Table 2.

Table 2

Crosstabs and Chi Square – Study One

For our main analysis, our first One-Way ANOVA test revealed a significant difference between our independent variable, the scenario conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral) and our dependent variable, “How much blame does the taxi driver deserve for the accident”, F(2, 122) = 3.55, p = .032 A subsequent Tukey post hoc test supported our hypothesis by demonstrating that participants were more likely to blame the taxi driver in the changeable condition ( M = 4.51, SD = 2.06) than in the unchangeable condition ( M = 3.38, SD = 2.14).. However, there were no significant difference for perceived blame between the neutral condition ( M = 4.36, SD = 2.11) and either the changeable or unchangeable conditions. These results indicate that in situations where the outcome is perceived as mutable (changeable), individuals are more likely to assign blame to the actor who could have acted differently (unchangeable). See Table 3.

Table 3

ANOVA Blame – Study One

We were also interested in the number of ‘If Only’ statements participants generated for each condition. We ran a One-Way ANOVA using the condition (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral) as our independent variable and the number of counterfactuals participants produced as our dependent variable. The relationship between condition and number of ‘If Only’ statements generated was not significant, F(2, 123) = 1.79, p = .171. Our initial was not supported since the number of counterfactuals generated in the changeable condition ( M = 5.41, SD = 2.21), the unchangeable condition ( M = 4.57, SD = 2.04), and the neutral condition ( M = 4.88, SD = 1.85) did not differ. Since the p-value for the ANOVA test was not significant, there was no need to run post hoc tests. See Table 4.

Table 4

ANOVA Number of Counterfactuals – Study One

Finally, we ran an independent samples t-Test with the changeable and unchangeable conditions only and “How avoidable was the accident” as the dependent variable, which was significant, t(82) = 2.71, p = .008. Participants thought the accident was more avoidable in the changeable condition ( M = 5.31, SD = 1.77) than in the unchangeable condition ( M = 4.21, SD = 1.85). See Table 5.

Table 5

t-Test “Was the accident avoidable?” – Study One

Discussion

We predicted that participants would place more blame on an actor whose behavior led to an undesirable outcome (death) when that actor could have acted differently primarily because these participants would generate more “If Only” counterfactual statements that would lead them to see the outcome could have been avoided. Conversely, we predicted that participants who read about an undesirable outcome that could not have been avoided would assign less blame to the actor and would think of fewer counterfactual “If Only” statements. Results partially supported these predictions, as we did find more blame for in the changeable condition compared to the unchangeable (though neither differed from the neutral condition), and they thought the accident was more avoidable in the changeable condition than in the unchangeable condition. However, the number of counterfactual statements that participants generated did not differ among our three conditions. It could be that participants were unfamiliar with the counterfactual task, which requires some deep thinking, though on a more unconscious level they could have seen the changeable condition as evidencing more elements of blame. This begs the question: what if participants were forced to think deeper? This is the focus of our second study.

Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: This study two literature review section is nearly identical the study two literature review section in Paper III. See my comments there.

Although most of the general population engages in counterfactual thinking, the number of counterfactual thoughts created varies between people. This is because the development of numerous counterfactual thoughts is determined by the overall mutability of a situation as well as the distinct differences between individuals (Alquist et al., 2015). For example, people who have an inclination for structuring situations in meaningful, integrated ways, or more aptly put, have a high need for cognition, are more prone to elaborate on presented information (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Therefore, these individuals might be more likely to participate in the generation of counterfactual thoughts than individuals who typically avoid effortful cognitive activity, or have a low need for cognition (Sargent, 2004). Despite the fact that several studies have researched scenario mutability and need for cognition, no prior findings have examined the influence these two variables have on the assignment of blame. The primary focus of our second study, therefore, is to analyze the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as the distinct Need for Cognition of each subject.

Need for Cognition (NFC) is defined as an individual’s dispositional tendency to participate in demanding cognitive behaviors (Curseu, 2006). People with a high-NFC tend to enjoy engaging in cognitive endeavors and generally undergo a deep elaboration of information (Strobel et al., 2015), while individuals with a low-NFC use cognitive heuristics and often rely on others’ opinions (Furnham & Thorne, 2013). Petrocelli and Dowd (2009) proposed that individuals with a high-NFC employ complex attributional systems that allow them to think theoretically and recognize situational elements as causes of behavior. For example, in the previously mentioned scenario, people with a high-NFC are likely to consider the external or environmental aspects—such as distracting traffic—as blameworthy factors in the unfortunate, accidental death of the stray cat. According to Curseu (2006), individuals with a high-NFC also tend to generate more alternative solutions to problems compared to low-NFC individuals who tend to avoid strenuous cognitive activities (Petrocelli & Dowd, 2009). Taking these components into account, it is reasonable to expect high-NFC subjects to produce more counterfactual thoughts than low-NFC subjects.

Considering the distinct attributes of individuals with a high and low NFC, it is highly probable that attitudes towards judgments of blame are significantly different between the two conditions (Sargent, 2004). According to Sargent (2004), people with high-NFC usually prefer to tackle social problems involving crime rather than actually punishing the criminal responsible. This might be due to the complex attributional systems used by high-NFC individuals, which attributes behavior to “abstract, contemporary, external causes” and ultimately withdraws responsibility from the perpetrator and places it on societal influences instead (Sargent, 2004). Therefore, it is not surprising that Sargent found a negative correlation between high-NFC and punitive responses to crimes, since high-NFC individuals tend to view the criminal as a victim of circumstantial events. However, Sargent also notes that understanding the consequences of a criminal act through exposure to particular criminal cases can cause high-NFC individuals to think more about the consequences of a committed crime, which in turn might result in a positive correlation between high-NFC and punitive reactions to criminal acts. Thus, whether a high-NFC individual finds a perpetrator blameworthy or not depends on the specific details of the crime, and the resulting consequences of the events occurred.

On a related note, an experiment conducted by Wevodau et al.(2014) investigated the correlational interaction between NFC and perceived blame. According to Wevodau et al., there is a substantial positive association between NFC and the allocation of blame. The researchers found that that highly motivated individuals who enjoy effortful cognitive processing tend to assign more culpability than cognitively reserved individuals (Wevodau et. al, 2014).

In pursuance of scenario changeability and NFC, study two analyzed the extent of culpability placed on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as the distinct need for cognition of each subject. In order to manipulate NFC in our study, we presented participants with a set of high-NFC and low-NFC statements and asked them to agree somewhat with each statement in reference to themselves. We then provided participants with the same taxi scenario used in study one, though we dropped the neutral condition since it provided results nearly identical to the unchangeable condition.

We have two main analyses in the present study, each of which examines two main effects and one interaction for each of our main dependent variables (number of counterfactuals and level of blame). When it comes to our first dependent variable, the number of counterfactual statements generated in study two, we predicted a main effect for NFC such that participants high in NFC generate more counterfactuals than those low in NFC. We did not, however, predict a main effect of condition. Study one showed that participants generated a similar number of counterfactuals in both the unchangeable and unchangeable conditions, and thus we do not expect to see differences in study two. However, we did predict an interaction for number of counterfactuals generated. That is, we expected participants high in NCF in the changeable condition to generate the most counterfactuals since the outcome was more changeable! Participants in remaining conditions (high NFC unchangeable, low NFC changeable, and low NFC unchangeable) should generate comparable levels of counterfactuals.

For our second dependent variable, blame, we predicted a main effect for condition such that those in the changeable condition should find more blame than those in the unchangeable condition. This follows from study one, where participants blamed the taxi driver more when his cab made it safely across the bridge than when he passed safely. We also predicted a NFC main effect for blame wherein those high in NFC would find more blame than those low in NFC. That is, thinking deeply about the accident might elevate blameworthiness assessments compared to thinking shallowly. More important, we predict an interaction of condition and NFC on blame such that participants find the taxi driver more blameworthy in the high NFC and changeable condition compared to all other conditions. Low NFC and unchangeable participants should produce the lowest levels of blame.

Methods Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: This study two methods section is nearly identical the study two methods section in Paper IV. See my comments there. Just note that there is NO page break between the second lit review and the methods section

Participants

One hundred and sixty subjects, 90% ( n = 144) university students, were recruited to participate in study two. Of these 160 participants, 33% ( n = 52) were male and 67% ( n = 108) were female. Ages ranged from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 64 with an average of 22.38 years ( SD = 5.14). Our sample population consisted of 76% Hispanic Americans ( n = 122), 9% African Americans ( n = 15), 9% Caucasians ( n = 14), 3% Asian American ( n = 5), and 3% Others ( n = 4). See Table 6.

Table 6

Demographics – Study Two

Materials and Procedure

Prospective participants were asked to take part in an online study being conducted for research purposes. If the subject agreed to participate, verbally or otherwise, he or she was directed to the survey developed through Qualtrics software. In accordance with the standardized guidelines for informed consent, subjects were first notified of the potential risks and benefits of participating in the study before being introduced to the research material. Once the participant confirmed their approval, they were eligible to continue with the rest of the survey, which consisted of six different parts or sections.

In Part One of the study, we manipulated the subject’s Need for Cognition (NFC) by randomly assigning them to one of two possible groups. Depending on which group the subject was appointed to, they were presented with either five low-NFC or five high-NFC statements procured from the 18-item NFC scale developed by Caccioppo et al. (1984). After reading each statement, the participant was then asked to rate how much they agreed with each remark on a number scale. The numbers on the scale ranged from one (somewhat agree) to seven (completely agree). For example, a participant presented with a set of high-NFC statements was asked to rate the statement “I prefer complex to simple problems,” while a participant presented with a set of low-NFC statements was asked to rate the statement “I only think as hard as I have to” on the previously mentioned number scale.

In Part Two of the study, participants read one of two short scenarios concerning a paraplegic couple, Tina and Eugene, who requested a taxi for a night out with friends. These scenarios were identical to the ones used in study one. Here, however, we omitted the neutral condition since it rarely differed from the unchangeable condition in study one. Once again, and similar to study one, participants continued on to Part Three of the study, which asked them to provide as many ‘If Only’ statements as possible, meaning that they had to list all the factors they could think of that could have possibly changed the outcome of the event. Subjects were able to complete an unlimited number of statements, though the most any participant completed was ten statements.

Similar to study one, Part Four presented participants with a series of 12 questions or statements about their general thoughts regarding the specific situation they read about. The questions included “How avoidable do you think the accident was (1 = not at all avoidable, 9 = very avoidable)?”, “How causal was the role of the taxi driver in the couple’s death (1 = not at all causal, 9 = the most important cause)”?, “How much control do you think the taxi driver had (1 = no control, 9 = complete control)?”, “How negligent was the taxi driver (1 = not at all negligent, 9 = completely negligent)?”, “How much money for damages should the taxi driver be responsible for (1 = no money, 9 = as much as possible)?”, “How foreseeable was the couple’s death (1 = not at all foreseeable, 9 = completely foreseeable)?”, “How guilty should the taxi driver feel about the accident (1 = no guilt at all, 9 = as much guilt as possible)”, and “How much blame does the taxi driver deserve for the accident (1 = no blame at all, 9 = total blame)?” Remaining items focused on a series of four statements about the taxi drive, all rated on scales ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 9 (Strongly Agree). These statements included, “The taxi driver was reckless”, “The taxi driver was patient”, “The taxi driver was careful”, and “The taxi driver was hasty”.

Part Five of the survey consisted of the remaining eight manipulation check questions for NFC. Similar to section one of the study, the participant was asked to rate eight dispositional statements on a scale of one to seven. For example, the statement “Thinking is not my idea of fun” would be rated from a scale of one (extremely uncharacteristic) to seven (extremely characteristic).

Part Six of the study asked for the participant’s demographic information, including gender, age, ethnicity, country of birth, their first language, whether they are a student at Florida International University, etc. Several questions asked about information directly relevant to the scenario such as if the subject had ever been in a major car accident or if he or she knew anyone who was paraplegic.

Finally, in Part Seven we asked “Did the taxi driver agree to drive the couple?” The answer options were yes or no, or a nominal response. This final question served as an attention check, which informed us if the participant was attentive to the study and allowed us to exclude potentially misrepresentative responses from our data. Concluding the study, the participant was debriefed.

Although we had several dependent variables, our primary focus involved the perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver and the number of ‘If Only’ statements the participants could create. We also analyzed the interaction between scenario mutability and NFC for both dependent variables.

Results Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: Results are again brand new for this paper, so make sure they reflect your new Factorial design

Using condition (changeable versus unchangeable) as the independent variable and whether the taxi driver agreed to drive the couple as the dependent variable, the manipulation check was not significant. That is, most participants in both the changeable (95%) and the unchangeable (97.5%) conditions said the taxi driver failed to pick up the paraplegic couple, X2(1) = 0.69, p = .405. Phi, which is most appropriate for a 2 X 2 chi square, showed a weak effect. This is not surprising, as we eliminated the neutral condition (in study one, this was the only condition where the taxi did, in fact, pick up the couple). Thus participants did pay attention to their condition in study two. See Table 7.

Table 7

Crosstabs and Chi Square – Study Two

To test our first dependent variable, we ran a 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA with NFC (high vs. low) and scenario condition (changeable vs. unchangeable) as our independent variables and participant’s responses to the question, “How much blame does the taxi driver deserve for the accident?” as our dependent variable. Results demonstrated no significant main effect for NFC on perceived blame, F(1, 152) = 1.69, p = .196. This means that there was no meaningful differences in the assignment of blame between the high-NFC ( M = 3.72, SD = 2.44) and low-NFC groups ( M = 4.12, SD = 2.49). There was, however, a significant main effect for scenario condition, F(1, 152) = 3.98, p = .048. Participants in the changeable condition ( M = 4.27, SD = 2.35) perceived the taxi driver to be more blameworthy for the couple’s death than participants in the unchangeable condition ( M = 3.56, SD = 2.47). Unfortunately, there was no interaction of NFC and scenario, F(1, 152) = 0.00, p = .985, indicating that perceived culpability did not significantly differ among high NFC changeable participants ( M = 4.04, SD = 2.28), high NFC unchangeable participants ( M = 3.27, SD = 2.44), low NFC changeable participants ( M = 4.56, SD = 2.44), and low NFC unchangeable participants ( M = 3.77, SD = 2.51). See Table 8

Table 8

ANOVA Perceived Blameworthiness – Study Two

To test our second dependent variable, we ran another 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA with NFC (high vs. low) and scenario condition (changeable vs. unchangeable) as our independent variables and number of “If Only” counterfactual statements as our dependent variable. There was no main effect for NFC on the number of “If Only” thoughts generated, F(1, 156) = .001, p = .975. This means that there was no difference in the number of counterfactual thoughts generated between the high-NFC group ( M = 3.87, SD = 1.77) and low-NFC group ( M = 3.81, SD = 2.46). Similarly, there was no main effect between for scenario, F(1, 56) = 2.05, p = .154. That is, there was no significant difference in the number of “If Only” statements generated between the changeable condition ( M = 4.09, SD = 2.28) and the unchangeable condition ( M = 3.60, SD = 1.97). We also examined the interaction between the two independent variables (high vs. low-NFC and unchangeable vs. changeable scenario) and the dependent variable. We found no interaction of NFC and scenario condition, F(1, 156) = 1.04, p = .310, indicating that the number of “If Only” thoughts created did not vary between the high NFC unchangeable condition ( M = 3.79, SD = 1.92), high NFC changeable condition ( M = 3.93, SD = 1.68), low NFC unchangeable condition ( M = 3.46, SD = 2.01), or low NFC changeable condition ( M = 4.29, SD = 2.93). See Table 9.

Table 9

ANOVA Number of Counterfactuals – Study Two

Finally, we were interested in seeing if participants differed in the amount of guilt they felt the taxi driver should be feeling. Thus we ran another 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA with NFC (high vs. low) and scenario condition (changeable vs. unchangeable) as our independent variables and the “How guilty should the taxi driver feel about the accident” as our dependent variable. Results showed no significant main effect for need for cognition, F(1, 156) = 0.97, p = .326. That is, those high in need for cognition ( M = 7.26, SD = 1.03) did not differ in their assessments of the taxi driver’s guilt compared to those low in need for cognition ( M = 7.05, SD = 0.93). There was a significant main effect for scenario, F(1, 156) = 8.78, p = .004. Participants felt the taxi driver should feel more guilt in the changeable condition ( M = 7.39, SD = 0.92) than in the unchangeable condition ( M = 6.93, SD = 0.99). This main effect, however, was qualified by a significant need for cognition X scenario interaction, F(1, 156) = 10.27, p = .002. This required four additional simple effects tests.

First, for participants low in need for cognition only, there was no difference in guilt perception between participants in the changeable condition ( M = 7.03, SD = 1.06) and participants in the unchangeable condition ( M = 7.07, SD = 0.83), F(1, 78) = 0.03, p = .866. Second, for participants high in need for cognition only, participants felt the taxi driver should feel significantly more guilt in the changeable condition ( M = 7.65, SD = 0.71) than participants in the unchangeable condition ( M = 6.74, SD = 1.16), F(1, 78) = 19.12, p < .001. Third, for participants in the changeable condition only, participants felt the taxi driver should feel significantly more guilt if the participant was high in need for cognition ( M = 7.65, SD = 0.71) rather than low in need for cognition ( M = 7.03, SD = 1.06), F(1, 78) = 9.96, p = .002. Finally, for participants in the unchangeable condition, there was no difference in guilt perception between participants high in need for cognition ( M = 6.74, SD = 1.16) and participants low in need for cognition ( M = 7.07, SD = 0.83), F(1, 78) = 2.20, p = .142. See Table 10.

Table 10

2 X 2 ANOVA Perceived Guilt of the Taxi Driver – Study Two

Discussion Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: The study two discussion is pretty short once again. Just describe your results, but use plain English this time!

Although study two posited that Need for Cognition would impact participants and their generation of counterfactual statements and their assessment of blame, results did not support this contention. For both dependent variables, Need for Cognition did not result in main effects. Despite predictions to the contrary, those high in NFC did not generate any more counterfactuals than those low in NFC, and those high in NFC did not blame the taxi driver any more than those low in NFC. Nor did NCF interact with scenario, despite our prediction that those high NFC would generate the most counterfactuals and find the most blame when given the changeable scenario compared to other conditions. However, scenario did show a significant main effect such that participants found more blame for the taxi driver in the changeable condition than the unchangeable condition. The more interesting results occurred for perceptions about how guilty the taxi driver should feel. When the situation was changeable (that is, preventable in some way), those high in need for cognition thought the taxi driver should feel more guilt. If the situation was unchangeable or participants were low in need for cognition, the participants did not feel the taxi driver should feel guilty. This supports our predictions.

General Discussion Comment by Ryan Winter: This is a new section in Paper V that you have not done before. It wraps up the paper, talking about both study one and study two at the same time. Compare and contrast the papers, and then tie your results back to prior research in this area (you can refer to other papers, especially those you cited in your two literature reviews)

Across both studies, the data collected demonstrates a significant effect of scenario condition on the assignment of blame only. In both studies one and two, participants presented with the changeable condition, where the taxi driver remained unaffected by the bridge collapse, perceived the driver to be more blameworthy than those presented with the unchangeable condition, where the driver also fell into the water along with the couple. This result is reinforced by McCloy and Byrne’s (2000) proposition that “inappropriate controllable” events will likely be regarded as highly culpable factors in the outcome of a situation. We saw this across mediums as well, as study one used a face-to-face survey while study two used online materials. The fact that both studies showed an effect for scenario argues for the robust nature of the changeable manipulation and increases our study reliability. Furthermore, Alquist et al. (2015) also suggests that events that are within an individual’s jurisdiction tend to increase counterfactual thinking and, ultimately, receive the brunt of the blame for the resulting situation.

Taking these findings into consideration, it would be reasonable to assume that participants assigned to the changeable condition should also generate more counterfactual thoughts than participants in the unchangeable condition. However, our hypothesis was not supported since the results demonstrated that there was no significant difference in the number of “If Only” thoughts produced between the changeable, neutral, and unchangeable groups in study one and the changeable and unchangeable groups in study two. A possible reason for this result may be that many of the “If Only” thoughts proposed were based on uncontrollable factors such as the collapse of the bridge and the couple’s handicap status. This counters previous findings, which propose that situations that are believed to be highly changeable generate more counterfactual thoughts than events that seem unavoidable (Alquist et al. 2015). The contradictory results might be due to differences in methodologies or the influence of different independent variables. Comment by Ryan Winter: You can summarize your findings a bit as this student did, but make sure you use plain English. I don’t need to see statistics in this section.

In regards to our NFC variable in study two, our hypothesis was not supported since we found no difference in the number of counterfactual thoughts created between high-NFC and low-NFC groups. This finding is especially surprising considering the characteristics of individuals with a high-NFC, which include engaging in effortful cognitive tasks (Strobel et al., 2015) and generating more alternative solutions to problems compared to low-NFC individuals (Curseu 2006). However, differences in the number of “If Only” thoughts created was too insignificant to suggest a meaningful effect between the two groups. This result might explain why, contrary to our initial hypothesis, we also found no differences in the assignment of blame between the high-NFC and the low-NFC group. We predicted that participants in the high-NFC group would place more blame on the taxi driver than participants in the low-NFC group because individuals with a high-NFC were previously found to produce more counterfactual thoughts, which in turn, leads to more allocation of blame. However, since we found that participants in both groups generally produced the same number of “If Only” thoughts, it stands to reason that there would be no significant difference in the amount of blame assigned to the taxi driver. Furthermore, prior studies have found evidence to suggest that individuals with a high-NFC tend to blame societal influences instead of the perpetrator, and typically avoid punishing the criminal responsible (Sargent, 2004). Therefore, our findings contribute to the previously established notion that high-NFC and low-NFC individuals do not differ in the assignment of blame, despite their notable differences. Additionally, we found no overall interaction of NFC and scenario condition, for either dependent variable (number of counterfactual thoughts created and assignment of blame). However, we did find NFC impacting assessment of guilt. That is, participants high in NFC thought the taxi driver should feel guilty, but only when the situation was changeable. Why participants felt this way about guilt but not blame is unclear, but it could be based on their assessment of feeling “bad”. That is, people might feel bad (feel guilty) even if they are not responsible. More research needs to address this possibility.

Certain limitations in the present study, such as a narrow pool of participants, might have implicated the results. Future studies should procure a larger and more diverse sample population in order to expand our applications to the general public. Our approach to NFC may also be improved by actually measuring the NFC (either high or low) of each individual, instead of just manipulating it. Additionally, the scenario presented might have been too difficult to relate to for most participants, which might have limited the number of counterfactual thoughts generated. Future applications of this study design might benefit from adapting a more engaging scenario and analyzing whether participants generated more counterfactual thoughts if they at some point have found themselves in a similar situation. Comment by Ryan Winter: All studies have limitations, including those from our class. Make sure to note them. I also recommend mentioning future studies that can and should be pursued to get a better idea of how your variables would work in other situations.

As free-willed beings, we can often become the victims of our own decisions. Making a wrong choice might lead us to become immersed in futile thoughts of what could have been; which is why having an in-depth understanding of the way we think and grasp situations has the potential to lead us towards a stable and more prudent method of decision-making. Analyzing our NFC and the influence of scenario mutability is an important step forward in understanding. Our findings have suggested that certain factors of an event could potentially alter the way we regard a situation, and ultimately play a role in who or what we deem culpable. We have also determined that the differences between individuals with a high-NFC and a low-NFC are less significant than previously established. Regardless of whether NFC or scenario mutability has a momentous impact on our counterfactual thinking or assignment of blame, they undoubtedly have an impact on the way we interpret situations and, ultimately, the decisions we make.

References Comment by Ryan Winter: This final references section is nearly identical the references section in Paper III. See my comments there.

Alquist, J. L., Ainsworth, S. E., Baumeister, R. F., Daly, M., & Stillman, T. F. (2015). The making of might-have-beens: Effects of free will belief on counterfactual thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(2), 268-283. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.1177/0146167214563673

Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 42(1), 116-131. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116

Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for cognition.  Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13

Curseu, P. L. (2006). Need for cognition and rationality in decision-making. Studia

Psychologica, 4 8(2), 141-156. http://ezproxy.fiu.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest.com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/docview/621384383?accountid=10901

Gilbert, E. A., Tenney, E. R., Holland, C. R., & Spellman, B. A. (2015). Counterfactuals, control, and causation: Why knowledgeable people get blamed more. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(5), 643-658. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.1177/0146167215572137

Furnham, A., & Thorne, J. D. (2013). Need for cognition: Its dimensionality and personality an intelligence correlates. Journal of Individual Differences, 34(4), 230-240. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.1027/1614-0001/a000119

McCloy, R., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2000). Counterfactual thinking about controllable events.  Memory & Cognition, 28(6), 1071-1078. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.3758/BF03209355

Petrocelli, J. V., & Dowd, K. (2009). Ease of counterfactual thought generation moderates the relationship between need for cognition and punitive responses to crime. Personality and

Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(9), 1179-1192. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.1177/0146167209337164

Ruiselová, Z., Prokopčáková, A., & Kresánek, J. (2007). Counterfactual thinking in relation to the personality of women--doctors and nurses. Studia Psychologica, 49(4), 333-339. http://ezproxy.fiu.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.fiu.edu/docview/622099723?accountid=10901

Sargent, M. (2004). Less thought, more punishment: Need for cognition predicts support for punitive responses to crime. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(11), 1485-1493. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.1177/0146167204264481

Strobel, A., Fleischhauer, M., Enge, S., & Strobel A. (2015). Explicit and implicit need for cognition and bottom-up/top-down attention allocation. Journal of Research in Personality, 55, 10-13. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.1016/j.jrp.2014.11.002

Wevodau, A. L., Cramer, R. J., Clark, John W., I.,II, & Kehn, A. (2014). The role of emotion and cognition in juror perceptions of victim impact statements. Social Justice Research, 27(1), 45-66. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.1007/s11211-014-0203-9

Williams, C. W., Lees-Haley, P., & Price, J. R. (1996). The role of counterfactual thinking and causal attribution in accident-related judgments. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 26(23), 2076-2099. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1996.tb01789.x Comment by Ryan Winter: My advice is to turn on the ruler when using a Word document. Using the ruler, you can make sure that you properly indent all but the first line of each reference (instead of using the space bar or tab) Comment by Ryan Winter: Use the & before listing the name of the last author