Paper 3
wendyperezramos
PaperIII-LitReviewExamplePaper-U1.docx1
Running head: SCENARIO MUTABILITY & COGNITION
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SCENARIO MUTABILITY & COGNITION
Counterfactual Thinking and Need for Cognition: Appointing Blame Comment by Ryan Winter: I want to bring your attention to a slight title change from Papers I and II. This student added in the phrase “Need for Cognition” to her title page, since her new papers also assess this new independent variable. Make sure you switch as well. Make your title descriptive enough that someone searching on PsycInfo would stop and read your paper if they are doing a study on a similar topic
Former Student
Florida International University
Counterfactual Thinking and Need For Cognition: Appointing Blame Comment by Ryan Winter: Again, the title is identical to the one on the title page. The phrase “Running head” is omitted from the header, but the header title (Here, it is SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION) is the same as on the title page.
As free-willed beings, humans are often the victims of their own decisions. Imagine accidentally running over a stray cat because you decided to look away from the road at the exact moment the cat decided to cross the street. Following the accident, most people would be plagued with thoughts of how alternative circumstances or decisions could have prevented such an unfortunate situation. Every time an individual forms a ‘what if’ scenario in which he or she mentally alters the course of events occurred, they are participating in a process that is known as counterfactual thinking (Ruiselová, Prokopčáková, & Kresánek, 2007; Williams, Lees-Haley, & Price 1996). This process allows individuals to consider the multiple factors at play in a situation (i.e mutability), and to decide what specific condition was responsible for the ultimate outcome of the event. The primary focus of our study is to analyze the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor depending on the preventability of the outcome. That is, if it is easy to “undue” an event that ends in a tragic outcome, will participants find an actor who fails to engage in that easy behavior more at fault? Comment by Ryan Winter: This first section in the paper is essentially a revised version of Paper I. You’ll see a few changes in this section compared to Paper I that are based on feedback we gave to this student on that first paper. Look at your own Paper I feedback and USE IT to make this first section better. In fact, the first few sections here are based on Papers I and II. Copy and paste them (but make sure to revise them first!) To get to the new stuff, jump down to page nine for the new lit review section for Paper III
The development of counterfactual thoughts relies on the variability of the situation as well as the knowledge that different actions could have resulted in alternate outcomes (Alquist, Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, & Stillman, 2015). According to Alquist et al., situations that are believed to be highly changeable generate more counterfactual thoughts than events that seem unavoidable. However, ruminating on every conceivable alternative of a situation would take an unlimited amount of time and resources. Instead of allotting so much time and energy on a cognitive task, people tend to narrow down the different scenarios that come to mind according to the degree of controllability of the factors involved (McCloy & Byrne, 2000). For example, the deliberate decisions individuals make that ultimately lead to a certain outcome is considered to be a controllable event, whereas uncontrollable events are unavoidable circumstances, such as traffic jams or natural disasters (McCloy & Byrne, 2000). When mentally forming a scenario different than the one occurred, individuals tend to change controllable rather than uncontrollable events (2000). Therefore, events that are within an individual’s jurisdiction generally receive the brunt of the blame for the resulting situation.
In a similar light, a study performed by McCloy and Byrne (2000), discovered that inappropriate events are more often changed through the process of counterfactual thinking than appropriate ones, especially when the outcome of these events was negative. Inappropriate events include the decisions individuals make that are considered to be ‘socially wrong’, whereas appropriate events are ‘socially acceptable’ actions. Due to these results, we can conclude that what McCloy and Byrne consider to be “inappropriate controllable” events, will likely be regarded as highly culpable factors in the outcome of a situation.
Another contributing factor to perceived culpability is the extent of knowledge of the actors involved in an event, as well as the intent of their actions (Gilbert, Tenney, Holland, & Spellman, 2015). For example, in the aforementioned scenario, had the driver known that looking away from the road would have caused her to run over the stray cat, the driver would have been more likely to be perceived guilty, even though the actions and the outcome of the situation remained the same. This rationalization is the product of a bottom-up method of thinking in which individuals are able to generate more counterfactual thoughts due to the actor’s knowledge of the outcome (Gilbert et al., 2015). As these authors have noted, the increased development of counterfactual thoughts will in turn attribute more responsibility to the actor, which will ultimately increase perceived blame. But this is not the full picture when it comes to focusing on the role of counterfactual thoughts in altering participant responses.
Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: This is a new element in this first section, but not a radically new feature. If you look at the example paper for Paper I again, you’ll see that the author here simply added the words “Study One” before the hypothesis. This is fine, as the hypothesis paragraph only relates to Study One.
In pursuance of counterfactual thinking and its relationship to perceived blame, we have devised a study that analyzed the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor depending on the preventability of the outcome. We provided participants with one of three scenarios, each of which depicted a variation of the same situation where alternate events lead to different conclusions. In the changeable condition, an actor engaged in a behavior that led to an undesirable outcome (death) that could have been avoided had he acted differently. In the unchangeable condition, the same actor engaged in a behavior that once again led to an undesirable outcome, but here the outcome could not have been avoided if he acted differently. In the neutral condition, the actor engaged in an alternative behavior, but the outcome was still undesirable. We predicted that participants would place more blame on the actor in the changeable condition where the actor could have avoided the undesirable outcome had he behaved differently than in both the unchangeable and neutral conditions, where the actor’s behavior could not be altered. This is because we expected changeable participants to generate more counterfactuals (more statements about how the actor could have behaved) in the changeable condition.
Methods Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: This is basically the same methods section from Paper II (with some revisions). Feel free to use your revised study one methods, too!
Participants
One hundred and twenty six students from Florida International University were randomly selected to participate in our study. Of these 126 participants, 37% (n = 47) were male and 63% (n = 79) were female. Ages ranged from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 58 with an average of 22.32 years (SD = 6.30). Our sample population consisted of 68.3% Hispanic Americans (n = 86), 8.7% African Americans (n = 11), 19% Caucasians (n = 24), 1.6% Asians (n = 2), and 2.4% who did not specify their ethnicity (n = 3). See Appendix A.
Materials and Procedure
In accordance with the standardized guidelines for informed consent, prospective participants were notified of the potential risks and benefits of participating in the study before being introduced to the research material. If the student verbally agreed to participate, he or she was given one of three different documents, each of which consisted of four parts or sections. In part one of the study, the participant read a short scenario concerning a paraplegic couple, Tina and Eugene, who requested a taxi for a night out with friends. Each of the three documents depicted the same initial situation with alternate conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral) that ultimately led to different outcomes of events.
In the changeable condition, the taxi driver arrived to pick up the couple, only to promptly decline their fare upon seeing that they were both paraplegic. Without enough time to call for another taxi, Tina and Eugene decided to take Tina’s car, which was handicap equipped. In order to reach their destination, they had to cross a bridge that had been weakened the night before due to a severe storm. The damaged bridge collapsed mere minutes before the couple reached it. Unable to see the missing portion of the bridge in the night, Tina and Eugene drove off the road, into the river below, and drowned. The taxi driver, who had left 15 minutes earlier, managed to make it safely across, before the collapse. In the unchangeable condition, the situation remained mostly the same with the exception that the taxi driver arrived at the bridge after it had collapsed and plummeted into the water as well. He managed to make it out of the car and swim to safety, but Tina and Eugene drowned. In the neutral condition, the taxi arrived to pick up the couple but promptly refused their fare as soon as he realized that they were both paraplegic. In this condition, the taxi driver did eventually agree to take Tina and Eugene to their destination downtown, albeit after much argument. Due to the recently collapsed bridge, the taxi driver drove his passengers and himself off the road and into the river below. He barely managed to make it out of the car before drowning. Tina and Eugene’s outcome remained the same.
After reading one of the scenarios described above, the participant continued on to the remainder of the study, which was composed of a series of open, partially open, and close-ended questions. In part two, the student participating in the study was asked to procure as many ‘If Only’ statements as possible, meaning that they had to list all the factors they could think of that could have possibly changed the outcome of the event. In part three, the participant was presented with a series of questions about their thoughts regarding the specific situation they read about. After reading each question, the participant was asked to record his or her response in a scale of one to nine. These questions included how avoidable they thought the accident was (1 = not at all avoidable, 9 = very avoidable), the causal role of the taxi driver in the couple’s death (1 = not at all causal, 9 = the most important cause), their thoughts on how much control the taxi driver had (1 = no control, 9 = complete control), the negligence of the taxi driver (1 = not at all negligent, 9 = completely negligent), how much money for damages the taxi driver was responsible for (1 = no money, 9 = as much as possible), the foreseeability of the couple’s death (1 = not at all foreseeable, 9 = completely foreseeable), and how much blame the taxi driver deserved for the event (1 = no blame at all, 9 = total blame). The last question of part three was a yes or no question that asked the participant whether the taxi driver agreed to drive the couple or not. This final question served as an attention check, which informed us if the participant was actually attentive to the study and allowed us to exclude potentially misrepresentative responses form our data. Part four asked for the participant’s demographic information, including gender, age, ethnicity, their first language, and whether they were a student at Florida International University. Concluding the study, the participant was debriefed on his or her contribution to the study as well as our insights on counterfactual thinking and our main hypothesis. Comment by Ryan Winter: You can see her procedure, right! Very clear, very step-by-step
Although we had several dependent variables, our primary focus involved the perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver, the number of ‘If Only’ statements the participants could create, and the manipulation check regarding whether the driver agreed to take the couple. We hypothesized that participants would find the taxi driver more blameworthy for the couple’s death in the changeable condition, since he refused to drive Tina and Eugene while safely passing over the bridge himself. We also predicted that the participants in the changeable condition would generate more counterfactual (‘If Only’) statements than in the unchangeable or neutral conditions.
Results Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: Similarly, the results from study one are merely copied and pasted here (with revisions) from Paper II
Using survey condition (changeable vs. unchangeable vs. neutral) as our independent variable and whether participants recalled whether the taxi driver picked up the paraplegic couple as the dependent variable, we ran a manipulation check in which we saw a significant effect, X2(2) = 93.95, p < .001. Participants in the changeable and unchangeable conditions correctly said the taxi did not pick up the couple (95.2% and 90.5%, respectively) while few participants in the neutral condition said the driver picked up the couple (4.8%). Phi showed a large effect. This indicates that participants did pay attention to whether the taxi driver picked up the couple. See Appendix B.
For our main analysis, our first One-Way ANOVA test revealed significant differences among our independent variable, the scenario conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral) and our dependent variable, perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver, F(2, 122) = 3.55, p = .032. A subsequent Tukey post hoc test supported our hypothesis by demonstrating that participants were more likely to blame the taxi driver in the changeable condition (M = 4.51, SD = 2.06) than in the unchangeable condition (M = 3.38, SD = 2.14).. However, there were no significant difference for perceived blame between the neutral condition (M = 4.36, SD = 2.11) and either the changeable or unchangeable conditions. These results indicate that in situations where the outcome is perceived as mutable (changeable), individuals are more likely to assign blame to the actor who could have acted differently (unchangeable). See Appendix C.
We were also interested in the number of ‘If Only’ statements generated for each condition. We ran a One-Way ANOVA test using the different conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral) as our independent variable, and the number of counterfactuals produced as our dependent variable. The results revealed that the relationship between condition and number of ‘If Only’ statements produced was not significant, F(2, 123) = 1.79, p = .171. Our initial prediction that participants would develop more counterfactuals in the changeable condition was not supported since the number of counterfactuals generated in the changeable condition (M = 5.41, SD = 2.21), the unchangeable condition (M = 4.57, SD = 2.04), and the neutral condition (M = 4.88, SD = 1.85) did not differ. Since the p-value for the ANOVA test was not significant, there was no need to run post hoc tests. See Appendix D.
Using survey condition (changeable vs. unchangeable vs. neutral) as our independent variable and whether participants recalled whether the taxi driver picked up the paraplegic couple as the dependent variable, we ran a manipulation check in which we saw a significant effect, X2(1) = 42.33, p < .001. Participants in the changeable and unchangeable conditions correctly said the taxi did not pick up the couple (98% and 100%, respectively) while few participants in the neutral condition said the driver picked up the couple (3%). Phi showed a large effect. This indicates that participants did pay attention to whether the taxi driver picked up the couple.
For our main analysis, our first One-Way ANOVA test revealed significant differences among our independent variable, the scenario conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral) and our dependent variable, perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver, F(2, 72) = 3.91, p = .024. A subsequent Tukey post hoc test supported our hypothesis by demonstrating that participants were more likely to blame the taxi driver in the changeable condition (M = 4.24, SD = 2.09) than in both the unchangeable condition (M = 2.68, SD = 2.08) and the neutral condition (M = 4.12, SD = 2.40). However, there were no significant difference for perceived blame between the unchangeable or neutral conditions. These results indicate that in situations where the outcome is perceived as mutable (changeable), individuals are more likely to assign blame to the actor who could have acted differently.
We were also interested in the number of ‘If Only’ statements generated for each condition. We ran a One-Way ANOVA test using the different conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral) as our independent variable, and the number of counterfactuals produced as our dependent variable. The results revealed that the relationship between condition and number of ‘If Only’ statements produced was not significant, F(2, 72) = 2.30, p = .107. Our initial prediction that participants would develop more counterfactuals in the changeable condition was not supported since the number of counterfactuals generated in the changeable condition (M = 5.56, SD = 2.76), the unchangeable condition (M = 4.36, SD = 2.06), and the neutral condition (M = 5.76, SD = 2.63) did not differ. Since the p-value for the ANOVA test was not significant, there was no need to run post hoc tests.
Discussion Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: The discussion for study one is similarly copied from Paper II
We predicted that participants would place more blame on an actor whose behavior led to an undesirable outcome (death) when that actor could have acted differently primarily because these participants would generate more “If Only” counterfactual statements that would lead them to see the outcome could have been avoided. Conversely, we predicted that participants who read about an undesirable outcome that could not have been avoided would assign less blame to the actor and would think of fewer counterfactual “If Only” statements. Results partially supported these predictions, as we did find more blame for in the changeable condition compared to the unchangeable (though neither differed from the neutral condition), and they thought the accident was more avoidable in the changeable condition than in the unchangeable condition. However, the number of counterfactual statements that participants generated did not differ among our three conditions. It could be that participants were unfamiliar with the counterfactual task, which requires some deep thinking, though on a more unconscious level they could have seen the changeable condition as evidencing more elements of blame. This begs the question: what if participants were forced to think deeper? This is the focus of our second study. Comment by Ryan Winter: Ok, this last sentence hopefully will make more sense as it leads the reader into study two!
Study Two Comment by Ryan Winter: Study two here is the new element to your Paper III. In it, you will discuss a second independent variable of interest to your class section. You need five more references in Paper III, so you can either add them to the first study literature review or add them here in study two.
Although most of the general population engages in counterfactual thinking, the number of counterfactual thoughts created varies between people. This is because the development of numerous counterfactual thoughts is determined by the overall mutability of a situation as well as the distinct differences between individuals (Alquist, Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, & Stillman, 2015). For example, people who have an inclination for structuring situations in meaningful, integrated ways, or more aptly put, have a high need for cognition, are more prone to elaborate on presented information (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Therefore, these individuals might be more likely to participate in the generation of counterfactual thoughts than individuals who typically avoid effortful cognitive activity, or have a low need for cognition (Sargent, 2004). Despite the fact that several studies have researched scenario mutability and need for cognition, no prior findings have examined the influence these two variables have on the assignment of blame. The primary focus of our second study, therefore, is to analyze the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as the distinct Need for Cognition of each subject. Comment by Ryan Winter: This is not a new reference, but something the student author talked about in Study One. It is fine to reuse references (and I actually encourage it), but make sure that you still have a minimum of ten references in the paper
Need for Cognition (NFC) is defined as an individual’s dispositional tendency to participate in demanding cognitive behaviors (Curseu, 2006). People with a high-NFC tend to enjoy engaging in cognitive endeavors and generally undergo a deep elaboration of information (Strobel, Fleischhauer, Enge, & Strobel, 2015), while individuals with a low-NFC use cognitive heuristics and often rely on others’ opinions (Furnham & Thorne, 2013). Petrocelli and Dowd (2009) proposed that individuals with a high-NFC employ complex attributional systems that allow them to think theoretically and recognize situational elements as causes of behavior. For example, in the previously mentioned scenario, people with a high-NFC are likely to consider the external or environmental aspects—such as distracting traffic—as blameworthy factors in the unfortunate, accidental death of the stray cat. According to Curseu (2006), individuals with a high-NFC also tend to generate more alternative solutions to problems compared to low-NFC individuals who tend to avoid strenuous cognitive activities (Petrocelli & Dowd, 2009). Taking these components into account, it is reasonable to expect high-NFC subjects to produce more counterfactual thoughts than low-NFC subjects. Comment by Ryan Winter: This is going to be the second independent variable for this student author’s study two. You’ll notice that she spends a lot of time on NFC in this second literature review and less on the concept of counterfactuals (which she detailed in study one). It’s a good way to write this paper, as it doesn’t get repetitive
Considering the distinct attributes of individuals with a high and low NFC, it is highly probable that attitudes towards judgments of blame are significantly different between the two conditions (Sargent, 2004). According to Sargent (2004), people with high-NFC usually prefer to tackle social problems involving crime rather than actually punishing the criminal responsible. This might be due to the complex attributional systems used by high-NFC individuals, which attributes behavior to “abstract, contemporary, external causes” and ultimately withdraws responsibility from the perpetrator and places it on societal influences instead (Sargent, 2004). Therefore, it is not surprising that Sargent found a negative correlation between high-NFC and punitive responses to crimes, since high-NFC individuals tend to view the criminal as a victim of circumstantial events. However, Sargent also notes that understanding the consequences of a criminal act through exposure to particular criminal cases can cause high-NFC individuals to think more about the consequences of a committed crime, which in turn might result in a positive correlation between high-NFC and punitive reactions to criminal acts. Thus, whether a high-NFC individual finds a perpetrator blameworthy or not depends on the specific details of the crime, and the resulting consequences of the events occurred.
On a related note, an experiment conducted by Wevodau, Cramer, Clark, and Kehn (2014) investigated the correlational interaction between NFC and perceived blame. According to Wevodau et al. (2014), there is a substantial positive association between NFC and the allocation of blame. The researchers found that that highly motivated individuals who enjoy effortful cognitive processing tend to assign more culpability than cognitively reserved individuals (Wevodau et. al, 2014).
In pursuance of scenario changeability and NFC, study two analyzed the extent of culpability placed on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as the distinct need for cognition of each subject. In order to manipulate NFC in our study, we presented participants with a set of high-NFC and low-NFC statements and asked them to agree somewhat with each statement in reference to themselves. We then provided participants with the same taxi scenario used in study one, though we dropped the neutral condition since it provided results nearly identical to the unchangeable condition. Comment by Ryan Winter: The author is getting into the meat of study two now, focusing on how both her new study variable and the independent variable she used in study one might interact
We have two main analyses in the present study, each of which examines two main effects and one interaction for each of our main dependent variables (number of counterfactuals and level of blame). When it comes to our first dependent variable, the number of counterfactual statements generated in study two, we predicted a main effect for NFC such that participants high in NFC generate more counterfactuals than those low in NFC. We did not, however, predict a main effect of condition. Study one showed that participants generated a similar number of counterfactuals in both the unchangeable and unchangeable conditions, and thus we do not expect to see differences in study two. However, we did predict an interaction for number of counterfactuals generated. That is, we expected participants high in NCF in the changeable condition to generate the most counterfactuals since the outcome was more changeable! Participants in remaining conditions (high NFC unchangeable, low NFC changeable, and low NFC unchangeable) should generate comparable levels of counterfactuals. Comment by Ryan Winter: These last paragraphs cover the hypotheses. For your second study, you will also look at several analyses. Rather than a One Way ANOVA, though, you’ll do a Two Way ANOVA, or a factorial ANOVA. A factorial ANOVA consists of main effects and interactions. There are two main effects and one interaction for EACH dependent variable. You will look at two different dependent variables Read over the student author’s first dependent variable analyses. You’ll see predictions for the main effects (each independent variable on its own) and an interaction of those two independent variables.
For our second dependent variable, blame, we predicted a main effect for condition such that those in the changeable condition should find more blame than those in the unchangeable condition. This follows from study one, where participants blamed the taxi driver more when his cab made it safely across the bridge than when he passed safely. We also predicted a NFC main effect for blame wherein those high in NFC would find more blame than those low in NFC. That is, thinking deeply about the accident might elevate blameworthiness assessments compared to thinking shallowly. More important, we predict an interaction of condition and NFC on blame such that participants find the taxi driver more blameworthy in the high NFC and changeable condition compared to all other conditions. Low NFC and unchangeable participants should produce the lowest levels of blame. Comment by Ryan Winter: Again, here is the second analysis, which also has two main effects and one interaction Comment by Ryan Winter: This is as far as you need to go with the lit review (though make sure to look at references on the next page). In Paper IV, you’ll pick up with the methods, results, and brief discussion for study two
References Comment by Ryan Winter: Once again, references start on their own page. The difference in this paper is at you will include ALL references from the WHOLE paper (from both the lit review for Study One and the lit review for Study Two Make sure you have a minimum of ten references and that they match up with citations from throughout the paper. If you cite it, reference it. If it is in your reference section, make sure it is in your paper somewhere For more guidance on correct APA formatting, refer to the instructions for Paper I.
Alquist, J. L., Ainsworth, S. E., Baumeister, R. F., Daly, M., & Stillman, T. F. (2015). The making of might-have-beens: Effects of free will belief on counterfactual thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(2), 268-283. doi:
10.1177/0146167214563673
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 42(1), 116-131. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for
cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306-307. doi: 10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13
Curseu, P. L. (2006). Need for cognition and rationality in decision-making. Studia
Psychologica, 48(2), 141-156.
Gilbert, E. A., Tenney, E. R., Holland, C. R., & Spellman, B. A. (2015). Counterfactuals, control, and causation: Why knowledgeable people get blamed more. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(5), 643-658. doi: 10.1177/0146167215572137
Furnham, A., & Thorne, J. D. (2013). Need for cognition: Its dimensionality and personality and
intelligence correlates. Journal of Individual Differences, 34(4), 230-240. doi: 10.1027/1614-0001/a000119
McCloy, R., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2000). Counterfactual thinking about controllable events. Memory & Cognition, 28(6), 1071-1078. doi: 10.3758/BF03209355
Petrocelli, J. V., & Dowd, K. (2009). Ease of counterfactual thought generation moderates the
relationship between need for cognition and punitive responses to crime. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(9), 1179-1192. doi: 10.1177/0146167209337164
Ruiselová, Z., Prokopčáková, A., & Kresánek, J. (2007). Counterfactual thinking in relation to the personality of women--doctors and nurses. Studia Psychologica, 49(4), 333-339.
Sargent, M. (2004). Less thought, more punishment: Need for cognition predicts support for
punitive responses to crime. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(11), 1485-1493. doi: 10.1177/0146167204264481
Strobel, A., Fleischhauer, M., Enge, S., & Strobel A. (2015). Explicit and implicit need for
cognition and bottom-up/top-down attention allocation. Journal of Research in Personality, 55, 10-13. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2014.11.002
Wevodau, A. L., Cramer, R. J., Clark, John W., I.,II, & Kehn, A. (2014). The role of emotion
and cognition in juror perceptions of victim impact statements. Social Justice Research, 27(1), 45-66. doi: 10.1007/s11211-014-0203-9
Williams, C. W., Lees-Haley, P., & Price, J. R. (1996). The role of counterfactual thinking and causal attribution in accident-related judgments. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 26(23), 2076-2099. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1996.tb01789
Appendix A – Demographics – Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: Don’t forget to add your appendices to the paper. I need to see one for each analysis (demographics, the chi square, your first DV ANOVA, and your second DV ANOVA). Make sure they are properly labeled and that the numbers in your tables align with the numbers in your results section Note that these come AFTER the references Also note that normally you would not submit SPSS tables to a journal. You can submit tables and figures, but not SPSS tables. For this class, though, I want to make sure you did the interpretation correctly and looked at the right tables, so I want you to include the actual SPSS output in a series of appendices. Comment by Ryan Winter: To add these charts, simply go into your SPSS output. You can right-click on the table and then copy it. Then just paste it into your appendix! Alternatively, you can use the “Snipping tool” function available on most computers. (Do a search for it!). This allows you to draw a virtual box around text and then copy it like a picture. Then just paste the picture into the appendix Finally, your last option is to do the work by hand. Insert a table with rows and columns and transfer over the information. This is the hard way, though. Both of the options above took me less than a minute. Recreating a table manually will take a much longer time!
Appendix B – Crosstabs and Chi Square – Study One
Appendix C – ANOVA Blame – Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: Again, use your own study description here (this student used blame because that was a DV in her study)
Appendix D – ANOVA Number of Counterfactuals – Study One
Appendix E – t-Test “Was the accident avoidable?” – Study One Comment by Ryan Winter: Note that you may not run a t-Test in your study. If you do, make sure to include both the group statistics and the independent samples t-Test tables!
