Methods II Paper Assignment

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Running head: SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION 1

Scenario Mutability and Need for Cognition: Appointing Blame

Former Student

Florida International University

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

Abstract

Methods One Students: Typically, authors add their abstract for the paper here on the

second page. As you can see, the abstract for this paper is missing. Your job is to supply that

abstract! Read over the following paper, which is an actual paper turned in by a former

student taking Research Methods and Design II at FIU. This is similar to a paper you will

write next semester. Review the studies in this paper, and spot the hypotheses,

independent and dependent variables, participants, results, and implications, and write it

up in one paragraph (no more than 200 words maximum). Make sure to include keywords

as well (keywords are words or short phrases that researchers use when searching

through online databases like PsycInfo – they need to be descriptive of the paper, so come

up with three or four that seem to suit this paper). Good luck!

Keywords: Methods II Paper, Abstract Assignment, Methods II Preview

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

Counterfactual Thinking and Need For Cognition: Appointing Blame

As free-willed beings, humans are often the victims of their own decisions. Imagine

accidentally running over a stray cat because you decided to look away from the road at the exact

moment the cat decided to cross the street. Following the accident, most people would be

plagued with thoughts of how alternative circumstances or decisions could have prevented such

an unfortunate situation. Every time an individual forms a ‘what if’ scenario in which he or she

mentally alters the course of events occurred, they are participating in a process that is known as

counterfactual thinking (Ruiselová, Prokopčáková, & Kresánek, 2007). This process allows

individuals to consider the multiple factors at play in a situation (i.e mutability), and to decide

what specific condition was responsible for the ultimate outcome of the event (Williams, Lees-

Haley, & Price 1996). The primary focus of our study is to analyze the extent of culpability

people place on a particular factor depending on the preventability of the outcome.

The development of counterfactual thoughts relies on the variability of the situation as

well as the knowledge that different actions could have resulted in alternate outcomes (Alquist,

Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, & Stillman, 2015). According to Alquist et al., situations that are

believed to be highly changeable generate more counterfactual thoughts than events that seem

unavoidable. However, ruminating on every conceivable alternative of a situation would take an

unlimited amount of time and resources. Instead of allotting so much time and energy on a

cognitive task, people tend to narrow down the different scenarios that come to mind according

to the degree of controllability of the factors involved (McCloy & Byrne, 2000). For example,

the deliberate decisions individuals make that ultimately lead to a certain outcome is considered

to be a controllable event, whereas uncontrollable events are unavoidable circumstances, such as

traffic jams or natural disasters (McCloy & Byrne, 2000). When mentally forming a scenario

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different than the one occurred, individuals tend to change controllable rather than uncontrollable

events (2000). Therefore, events that are within an individual’s jurisdiction generally receive the

brunt of the blame for the resulting situation.

In a similar light, a study performed by McCloy and Byrne (2000), discovered that

inappropriate events are more often changed through the process of counterfactual thinking than

appropriate ones, especially when the outcome of these events was negative. Inappropriate

events include the decisions individuals make that are considered to be ‘socially wrong’, whereas

appropriate events are ‘socially acceptable’ actions. Due to these results, we can conclude that

what McCloy and Byrne consider to be “inappropriate controllable” events, will likely be

regarded as highly culpable factors in the outcome of a situation.

Another contributing factor to perceived culpability is the extent of knowledge of the

actors involved in an event, as well as the intent of their actions (Gilbert, Tenney, Holland, &

Spellman, 2015). For example, in the aforementioned scenario, had the driver known that

looking away from the road would have caused her to run over the stray cat, the driver would

have been more likely to be perceived guilty, even though the actions and the outcome of the

situation remained the same. This rationalization is the product of a bottom-up method of

thinking in which individuals are able to generate more counterfactual thoughts due to the actor’s

knowledge of the outcome (Gilbert et al., 2015). The increased development of counterfactual

thoughts will in turn attribute more responsibility to the actor, which will ultimately increase

perceived blame (Gilbert et al., 2015).

Study One

In pursuance of counterfactual thinking and its relationship to perceived blame, we have

devised a study that analyzed the extent of culpability people place on a particular factor

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depending on the preventability of the outcome. We provided participants with one of three

scenarios, each of which depicted a variation of the same situation where alternate events lead to

different conclusions. In the changeable condition, an actor engaged in a behavior that led to an

undesirable outcome (death) that could have been avoided had he acted differently. In the

unchangeable condition, the same actor engaged in a behavior that once again led to an

undesirable outcome, but here the outcome could not have been avoided if he acted differently.

In the neutral condition, the actor engaged in an alternative behavior, but the outcome was still

undesirable. We predicted that participants would place more blame on the actor in the

changeable condition where the actor could have avoided the undesirable outcome had he

behaved differently than in both the unchangeable and neutral conditions, where the actor’s

behavior could not be altered. This is because we expected changeable participants to generate

more counterfactuals (more statements about how the actor could have behaved) in the

changeable condition.

Methods

Participants

Seventy-five students from Florida International University were randomly selected to

participate in our study. Of these 75 participants, 38.7% (n = 29) were male and 61.3% (n = 46)

were female. Ages ranged from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 29 with an average of 21.72

years (SD = 2.56). Our sample population consisted of 69.3% Hispanic Americans (n = 52),

13.3% African Americans (n = 10), 9.3% Caucasians (n = 7), 2.7% Asians (n = 2), 1.3% Native

American (n = 1), and 4% Others (n = 3).

Materials and Procedure

In accordance with the standardized guidelines for informed consent, prospective

participants were notified of the potential risks and benefits of participating in the study before

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

being introduced to the research material. If the student verbally agreed to participate, he or she

was given one of three different documents, each of which consisted of four parts or sections. In

part one of the study, the participant read a short scenario concerning a paraplegic couple, Tina

and Eugene, who requested a taxi for a night out with friends. Each of the three documents

depicted the same initial situation with alternate conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or

neutral) that ultimately led to different outcomes of events.

In the changeable condition, the taxi driver arrived to pick up the couple, only to

promptly decline their fare upon seeing that they were both paraplegic. Without enough time to

call for another taxi, Tina and Eugene decided to take Tina’s car, which was handicap equipped.

In order to reach their destination, they had to cross a bridge that had been weakened the night

before due to a severe storm. The damaged bridge collapsed mere minutes before the couple

reached it. Unable to see the missing portion of the bridge in the night, Tina and Eugene drove

off the road, into the river below, and drowned. The taxi driver, who had left 15 minutes earlier,

managed to make it safely across, before the collapse. In the unchangeable condition, the

situation remained mostly the same with the exception that the taxi driver arrived at the bridge

after it had collapsed and plummeted into the water as well. He managed to make it out of the car

and swim to safety, but Tina and Eugene drowned. In the neutral condition, the taxi arrived to

pick up the couple but promptly refused their fare as soon as he realized that they were both

paraplegic. In this condition, the taxi driver did eventually agree to take Tina and Eugene to their

destination downtown, albeit after much argument. Due to the recently collapsed bridge, the taxi

driver drove his passengers and himself off the road and into the river below. He barely managed

to make it out of the car before drowning. Tina and Eugene’s outcome remained the same.

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

After reading one of the scenarios described above, the participant continued on to the

remainder of the study, which was composed of a series of open, partially open, and close-ended

questions. In part two, the student participating in the study was asked to procure as many ‘If

Only’ statements as possible, meaning that they had to list all the factors they could think of that

could have possibly changed the outcome of the event. In part three, the participant was

presented with a series of questions about their thoughts regarding the specific situation they read

about. After reading each question, the participant was asked to record his or her response in a

scale of one to nine. These questions included how avoidable they thought the accident was (1 =

not at all avoidable, 9 = very avoidable), the causal role of the taxi driver in the couple’s death (1

= not at all causal, 9 = the most important cause), their thoughts on how much control the taxi

driver had (1 = no control, 9 = complete control), the negligence of the taxi driver (1 = not at all

negligent, 9 = completely negligent), how much money for damages the taxi driver was

responsible for (1 = no money, 9 = as much as possible), the foreseeability of the couple’s death

(1 = not at all foreseeable, 9 = completely foreseeable), and how much blame the taxi driver

deserved for the event (1 = no blame at all, 9 = total blame). The last question of part three was a

yes or no question that asked the participant whether the taxi driver agreed to drive the couple or

not. This final question served as an attention check, which informed us if the participant was

actually attentive to the study and allowed us to exclude potentially misrepresentative responses

form our data. Part four asked for the participant’s demographic information, including gender,

age, ethnicity, their first language, and whether they were a student at Florida International

University. Concluding the study, the participant was debriefed on his or her contribution to the

study as well as our insights on counterfactual thinking and our main hypothesis.

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

Although we had several dependent variables, our primary focus involved the perceived

blameworthiness of the taxi driver, the number of ‘If Only’ statements the participants could

create, and the manipulation check regarding whether the driver agreed to take the couple. We

hypothesized that participants would find the taxi driver more blameworthy for the couple’s

death in the changeable condition, since he refused to drive Tina and Eugene while safely

passing over the bridge himself. We also predicted that the participants in the changeable

condition would generate more counterfactual (‘If Only’) statements than in the unchangeable or

neutral conditions.

Results

Using survey condition (changeable vs. unchangeable vs. neutral) as our independent

variable and whether participants recalled whether the taxi driver picked up the paraplegic

couple as the dependent variable, we ran a manipulation check in which we saw a significant

effect, X2(1) = 42.33, p < .001. Participants in the changeable and unchangeable conditions

correctly said the taxi did not pick up the couple (98% and 100%, respectively) while few

participants in the neutral condition said the driver picked up the couple (3%). Phi showed a

large effect. This indicates that participants did pay attention to whether the taxi driver picked up

the couple.

For our main analysis, our first One-Way ANOVA test revealed significant differences

among our independent variable, the scenario conditions (changeable, unchangeable, or neutral)

and our dependent variable, perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver, F(2, 72) = 3.91, p =

.024. A subsequent Tukey post hoc test supported our hypothesis by demonstrating that

participants were more likely to blame the taxi driver in the changeable condition (M = 4.24, SD

= 2.09) than in both the unchangeable condition (M = 2.68, SD = 2.08) and the neutral condition

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

(M = 4.12, SD = 2.40). However, there were no significant difference for perceived blame

between the unchangeable or neutral conditions. These results indicate that in situations where

the outcome is perceived as mutable (changeable), individuals are more likely to assign blame to

the actor who could have acted differently.

We were also interested in the number of ‘If Only’ statements generated for each

condition. We ran a One-Way ANOVA test using the different conditions (changeable,

unchangeable, or neutral) as our independent variable, and the number of counterfactuals

produced as our dependent variable. The results revealed that the relationship between condition

and number of ‘If Only’ statements produced was not significant, F(2, 72) = 2.30, p = .107. Our

initial prediction that participants would develop more counterfactuals in the changeable

condition was not supported since the number of counterfactuals generated in the changeable

condition (M = 5.56, SD = 2.76), the unchangeable condition (M = 4.36, SD = 2.06), and the

neutral condition (M = 5.76, SD = 2.63) did not differ. Since the p-value for the ANOVA test

was not significant, there was no need to run post hoc tests.

Discussion Study One

We predicted that participants would place more blame on an actor whose behavior led to

an undesirable outcome (death) when that actor could have acted differently primarily because

these participants would generate more “If Only” counterfactual statements that would lead them

to see the outcome could have been avoided. Conversely, we predicted that participants who read

about an undesirable outcome that could not have been avoided would assign less blame to the

actor and would think of fewer counterfactual “If Only” statements. Results partially supported

these predictions, as we did find more blame for in the changeable condition compared to both

the unchangeable and neutral conditions. However, the number of counterfactual statements that

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

participants generated did not differ among our three conditions. It could be that participants

were unfamiliar with the counterfactual task, which requires some deep thinking, though on a

more unconscious level they could have seen the changeable condition as evidencing more

elements of blame. This begs the question: what if participants were forced to think deeper? This

is the focus of our second study.

Study Two

Although most of the general population engages in counterfactual thinking, the number

of counterfactual thoughts created varies between people. This is because the development of

numerous counterfactual thoughts is determined by the overall mutability of a situation as well as

the distinct differences between individuals (Alquist, Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, & Stillman,

2015). For example, people who have an inclination for structuring situations in meaningful,

integrated ways, or more aptly put, have a high need for cognition, are more prone to elaborate

on presented information (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Therefore, these individuals might be more

likely to participate in the generation of counterfactual thoughts than individuals who typically

avoid effortful cognitive activity, or have a low need for cognition (Sargent, 2004). Despite the

fact that several studies have researched scenario mutability and need for cognition, no prior

findings have examined the influence these two variables have on the assignment of blame. The

primary focus of our second study, therefore, is to analyze the extent of culpability people place

on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as the distinct Need for

Cognition of each subject.

Need for Cognition (NFC) is defined as an individual’s dispositional tendency to

participate in demanding cognitive behaviors (Curseu, 2006). People with a high-NFC tend to

enjoy engaging in cognitive endeavors and generally undergo a deep elaboration of information

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

(Strobel, Fleischhauer, Enge, & Strobel, 2015), while individuals with a low-NFC use cognitive

heuristics and often rely on others’ opinions (Furnham & Thorne, 2013). Petrocelli and Dowd

(2009) proposed that individuals with a high-NFC employ complex attributional systems that

allow them to think theoretically and recognize situational elements as causes of behavior. For

example, in the previously mentioned scenario, people with a high-NFC are likely to consider the

external or environmental aspects—such as distracting traffic—as blameworthy factors in the

unfortunate, accidental death of the stray cat. According to Curseu (2006), individuals with a

high-NFC also tend to generate more alternative solutions to problems compared to low-NFC

individuals who tend to avoid strenuous cognitive activities (Petrocelli & Dowd, 2009). Taking

these components into account, it is reasonable to expect high-NFC subjects to produce more

counterfactual thoughts than low-NFC subjects.

Considering the distinct attributes of individuals with a high and low NFC, it is highly

probable that attitudes towards judgments of blame are significantly different between the two

conditions (Sargent, 2004). According to Sargent (2004), people with high-NFC usually prefer to

tackle social problems involving crime rather than actually punishing the criminal responsible.

This might be due to the complex attributional systems used by high-NFC individuals, which

attributes behavior to “abstract, contemporary, external causes” and ultimately withdraws

responsibility from the perpetrator and places it on societal influences instead (Sargent, 2004).

Therefore, it is not surprising that Sargent found a negative correlation between high-NFC and

punitive responses to crimes, since high-NFC individuals tend to view the criminal as a victim of

circumstantial events. However, Sargent also notes that understanding the consequences of a

criminal act through exposure to particular criminal cases can cause high-NFC individuals to

think more about the consequences of a committed crime, which in turn might result in a positive

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

correlation between high-NFC and punitive reactions to criminal acts. Thus, whether a high-NFC

individual finds a perpetrator blameworthy or not depends on the specific details of the crime,

and the resulting consequences of the events occurred.

On a related note, an experiment conducted by Wevodau, Cramer, Clark, and Kehn

(2014) investigated the correlational interaction between NFC and perceived blame. According

to Wevodau et al. (2014), there is a substantial positive association between NFC and the

allocation of blame. The researchers found that that highly motivated individuals who enjoy

effortful cognitive processing tend to assign more culpability than cognitively reserved

individuals (Wevodau et. al, 2014).

In pursuance of scenario changeability and NFC, study two analyzed the extent of

culpability placed on a particular factor depending on the mutability of the situation as well as

the distinct need for cognition of each subject. In order to manipulate NFC in our study, we

presented participants with a set of high-NFC and low-NFC statements and asked them to agree

somewhat with each statement in reference to themselves. We then provided participants with

the same taxi scenario used in study one, though we dropped the neutral condition since it

provided results nearly identical to the unchangeable condition.

We have two main analyses in the present study, each of which examines two main

effects and one interaction for each of our main dependent variables (number of counterfactuals

and level of blame). When it comes to our first dependent variable, the number of counterfactual

statements generated in study two, we predicted a main effect for NFC such that participants

high in NFC generate more counterfactuals than those low in NFC. We did not, however, predict

a main effect of condition. Study one showed that participants generated a similar number of

counterfactuals in both the unchangeable and unchangeable conditions, and thus we do not

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expect to see differences in study two. However, we did predict an interaction for number of

counterfactuals generated. That is, we expected participants high in NCF in the changeable

condition to generate the most counterfactuals since the outcome was more changeable!

Participants in remaining conditions (high NFC unchangeable, low NFC changeable, and low

NFC unchangeable) should generate comparable levels of counterfactuals.

For our second dependent variable, blame, we predicted a main effect for condition such

that those in the changeable condition should find more blame than those in the unchangeable

condition. This follows from study one, where participants blamed the taxi driver more when his

cab made it safely across the bridge than when he passed safely. We also predicted a NFC main

effect for blame wherein those high in NFC would find more blame than those low in NFC. That

is, thinking deeply about the accident might elevate blameworthiness assessments compared to

thinking shallowly. More important, we predict an interaction of condition and NFC on blame

such that participants find the taxi driver more blameworthy in the high NFC and changeable

condition compared to all other conditions. Low NFC and unchangeable participants should

produce the lowest levels of blame.

Methods

Participants

One hundred and sixty subjects, 90% (n = 144) university students, were recruited to

participate in study two. Of these 160 participants, 33% (n = 52) were male and 67% (n = 108)

were female. Ages ranged from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 64 with an average of 22.38

years (SD = 5.14). Our sample population consisted of 76% Hispanic Americans (n = 122), 9%

African Americans (n = 15), 9% Caucasians (n = 14), 3% Asian American (n = 5), and 3%

Others (n = 4).

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

Materials and Procedure

Prospective participants were asked to take part in an online study being conducted for

research purposes. If the subject agreed to participate, verbally or otherwise, he or she was

directed to the survey developed through Qualtrics software. In accordance with the standardized

guidelines for informed consent, subjects were first notified of the potential risks and benefits of

participating in the study before being introduced to the research material. Once the participant

confirmed their approval, they were eligible to continue with the rest of the survey, which

consisted of six different parts or sections.

In section one of the study, we manipulated the subject’s Need for Cognition (NFC) by

randomly assigning them to one of two possible groups. Depending on which group the subject

was appointed to, they were presented with either five low-NFC or five high-NFC statements

procured from the 18-item NFC scale developed by Caccioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984). After

reading each statement, the participant was then asked to rate how much they agreed with each

remark on a number scale. The numbers on the scale ranged from one (somewhat agree) to seven

(completely agree). For example, a participant presented with a set of high-NFC statements was

asked to rate the statement “I prefer complex to simple problems,” while a participant presented

with a set of low-NFC statements was asked to rate the statement “I only think as hard as I have

to” on the previously mentioned number scale.

In section two of the study, participants read one of two short scenarios concerning a

paraplegic couple, Tina and Eugene, who requested a taxi for a night out with friends. These

scenarios were identical to the ones used in study one. Here, however, we omitted the neutral

condition since it did not differ from the unchangeable condition. Once again, and similar to

study one, participants continued on to section three of the study, which asked them to provide as

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many ‘If Only’ statements as possible, meaning that they had to list all the factors they could

think of that could have possibly changed the outcome of the event. Subjects were able to

complete a total of ten statements, though they were not required to fill in all ten.

Similar to study one, section four presented participants with a series of 12 questions

about their general thoughts regarding the specific situation they read about. These questions

included how avoidable they thought the accident was, the causal role of the taxi driver in the

couple’s death, their thoughts on how much control the taxi driver had, the negligence of the taxi

driver, their dissatisfaction of scenario outcome, the foreseeability of the couple’s death, how

much blame the taxi driver deserved for the event, how much control Eugene and Tina had in the

event, how legally responsible the taxi driver was, how guilty the taxi driver should feel, how

fair the taxi driver’s decision was, and how difficult it was to imagine a different outcome. After

reading each question, the participant was asked to record his or her response in a scale of one to

nine. The last question of section four was a yes or no question that asked the participant whether

the taxi driver agreed to drive the couple or not. This final question served as an attention check,

which informed us if the participant was actually attentive to the study and allowed us to exclude

potentially misrepresentative responses form our data.

Section five of the survey consisted of the remaining eight manipulation check questions

for NFC. Similar to section one of the study, the participant was asked to rate eight dispositional

statements on a scale of one to seven. For example, the statement “Thinking is not my idea of

fun” would be rated from a scale of one (extremely uncharacteristic) to seven (extremely

characteristic).

The last section of the study asked for the participant’s demographic information,

including gender, age, ethnicity, country of birth, their first language, whether they are a student

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at Florida International University, etc. Several questions asked about information directly

relevant to the scenario such as if the subject had ever been in a major car accident or if he or she

knew anyone who was paraplegic. Concluding the study, the participant was debriefed.

Although we had several dependent variables, our primary focus involved the perceived

blameworthiness of the taxi driver, and the number of ‘If Only’ statements the participants could

create. We also analyzed the interaction between scenario mutability and NFC for both

dependent variables.

Results

The manipulation check was not significant. That is, very few participants in both the

changeable (5%) and unchangeable (2.5%) conditions said the taxi driver picked up the

paraplegic couple, X2(1) = .69, p > .05. Phi showed a small effect. This is not surprising, as we

eliminated the neutral condition (in study one, this was the only condition where the taxi did, in

fact, pick up the couple). Thus participants did pay attention to their condition in study two (See

Appendix A).

To test our first dependent variable, we ran 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA with NFC (high vs.

low) and scenario condition (changeable vs. unchangeable) as our independent variables and

number of “If Only” counterfactual statements as our dependent variable. There was no main

effect for NFC on the number of “If Only” thoughts generated, F(1, 156) = .001, p = .975. This

means that there was no difference in the number of counterfactual thoughts generated between

the high-NFC group (M = 3.87, SD = 1.77) and low-NFC group (M = 3.81, SD = 2.46).

Similarly, there was no main effect between for scenario, F(1, 56) = 2.05, p = .154. That is, there

was no significant difference in the number of “If Only” statements generated between the

changeable condition (M = 4.09, SD = 2.28) and the unchangeable condition (M = 3.60, SD =

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1.97). We also examined the overall interaction between the two independent variables (high vs.

low-NFC and unchangeable vs. changeable scenario) and the dependent variable. We found that

there was no interaction of NFC and scenario condition, F(1, 156) = 1.04, p = .310, meaning that

the number of “If Only” thoughts created did not vary between the high NFC unchangeable

condition (M = 3.79, SD = 1.92), high NFC changeable condition (M = 3.93, SD = 1.68), low

NFC unchangeable condition (M = 3.46, SD = 2.01), or low NFC changeable condition (M =

4.29, SD = 2.93). (See Appendix B).

To test our second dependent variable, we ran another 2 X 2 factorial ANOVA with NFC

(high vs. low) and scenario condition (changeable vs. unchangeable) as our independent

variables and the perceived blameworthiness of the taxi driver as our dependent variable. Results

demonstrated no significant main effect for NFC on perceived blame, F(1, 152) = 1.69, p = .196.

This means that there was no meaningful differences in the assignment of culpability between

the high-NFC (M = 3.72, SD = 2.44) and low-NFC group (M = 4.12, SD = 2.49). There was,

however, a significant main effect for scenario condition, F(1, 152) = 3.98, p = .048. Participants

in the changeable condition (M = 4.27, SD = 2.35) perceived the taxi driver to be more

blameworthy for the couple’s death than participants in the unchangeable condition (M = 3.56,

SD = 2.47). Unfortunately, there was no interaction of NFC and scenario, F(1, 152) = 0.00, p =

.985, meaning that perceived culpability did not significantly differ among high NFC changeable

participants (M = 4.04, SD = 2.28), high NFC unchangeable participants (M = 3.27, SD = 2.44),

low NFC changeable participants (M = 4.56, SD = 2.44), and low NFC unchangeable

participants (M = 3.77, SD = 2.51) (See Appendix C).

Discussion Study Two

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

Although study two posited that Need for Cognition would impact participants and their

generation of counterfactual statements and their assessment of blame, results did not support

this contention. For both dependent variables, Need for Cognition did not result in main effects.

Despite predictions to the contrary, those high in NFC did not generate any more counterfactuals

than those low in NFC, and those high in NFC did not blame the taxi driver any more than those

low in NFC. Nor did NCF interact with scenario, despite our prediction that those high NFC

would generate the most counterfactuals and find the most blame when given the changeable

scenario compared to other conditions. However, scenario did show a significant main effect

such that participants found more blame for the taxi driver in the changeable condition than the

unchangeable condition.

General Discussion

Across both studies, the data collected demonstrates a significant effect of scenario

condition on the assignment of blame only. In both studies one and two, participants presented

with the changeable condition, where the taxi driver remained unaffected by the bridge collapse,

perceived the driver to be more blameworthy than those presented with the unchangeable

condition, where the driver also fell into the water along with the couple. This result is reinforced

by McCloy and Byrne’s (2000) proposition that “inappropriate controllable” events will likely be

regarded as highly culpable factors in the outcome of a situation. We saw this across mediums as

well, as study one used a face-to-face survey while study two used online materials. The fact that

both studies showed an effect for scenario argues for the robust nature of the changeable

manipulation and increases our study reliability. Furthermore, Alquist et al. (2015) also suggests

that events that are within an individual’s jurisdiction tend to increase counterfactual thinking

and, ultimately, receive the brunt of the blame for the resulting situation.

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

Taking these findings into consideration, it would be reasonable to assume that

participants assigned to the changeable condition should also generate more counterfactual

thoughts than participants in the unchangeable condition. However, our hypothesis was not

supported since the results demonstrated that there was no significant difference in the number of

“If Only” thoughts produced between the changeable, neutral, and unchangeable groups in study

one and the changeable and unchangeable groups in study two. A possible reason for this result

may be that many of the “If Only” thoughts proposed were based on uncontrollable factors such

as the collapse of the bridge and the couple’s handicap status. This counters previous findings,

which propose that situations that are believed to be highly changeable generate more

counterfactual thoughts than events that seem unavoidable (Alquist et al. 2015). The

contradictory results might be due to differences in methodologies or the influence of different

independent variables.

In regards to our NFC variable in study two, our hypothesis was not supported since we

found no difference in the number of counterfactual thoughts created between high-NFC and

low-NFC groups. This finding is especially surprising considering the characteristics of

individuals with a high-NFC, which include engaging in effortful cognitive tasks (Strobel,

Fleischhauer, Enge, & Strobel, 2015) and generating more alternative solutions to problems

compared to low-NFC individuals (Curseu 2006). However, differences in the number of “If

Only” thoughts created was too insignificant to suggest a meaningful effect between the two

groups. This result might explain why, contrary to our initial hypothesis, we also found no

differences in the assignment of blame between the high-NFC and the low-NFC group. We

predicted that participants in the high-NFC group would place more blame on the taxi driver than

participants in the low-NFC group because individuals with a high-NFC were previously found

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

to produce more counterfactual thoughts, which in turn, leads to more allocation of blame.

However, since we found that participants in both groups generally produced the same number

of “If Only” thoughts, it stands to reason that there would be no significant difference in the

amount of blame assigned to the taxi driver. Furthermore, prior studies have found evidence to

suggest that individuals with a high-NFC tend to blame societal influences instead of the

perpetrator, and typically avoid punishing the criminal responsible (Sargent, 2004). Therefore,

our findings contribute to the previously established notion that high-NFC and low-NFC

individuals do not differ in the assignment of blame, despite their notable differences.

Additionally, we found no overall interaction of NFC and scenario condition, for either

dependent variable (number of counterfactual thoughts created and assignment of blame).

Certain limitations in the present study, such as a narrow pool of participants, might have

implicated the results. Future studies should procure a larger and more diverse sample population

in order to expand our applications to the general public. Our approach to NFC may also be

improved by actually measuring the NFC (either high or low) of each individual, instead of just

manipulating it. Additionally, the scenario presented might have been too difficult to relate to for

most participants, which might have limited the number of counterfactual thoughts generated.

Future applications of this study design might benefit from adapting a more engaging scenario

and analyzing whether participants generated more counterfactual thoughts if they at some point

have found themselves in a similar situation.

As free-willed beings, we can often become the victims of our own decisions. Making a

wrong choice might lead us to become immersed in futile thoughts of what could have been;

which is why having an in-depth understanding of the way we think and grasp situations has the

potential to lead us towards a stable and more prudent method of decision-making. Analyzing

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

our NFC and the influence of scenario mutability is an important step forward in understanding.

Our findings have suggested that certain factors of an event could potentially alter the way we

regard a situation, and ultimately play a role in who or what we deem culpable. We have also

determined that the differences between individuals with a high-NFC and a low-NFC are less

significant than previously established. Regardless of whether NFC or scenario mutability has a

momentous impact on our counterfactual thinking or assignment of blame, they undoubtedly

have an impact on the way we interpret situations and, ultimately, the decisions we make.

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

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Appendix A – Manipulation Check – Did the driver pick up the couple?

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

Appendix B – NFC X Scenario Mutability – Number of Counterfactuals

SCENARIO MUTABILITY AND NEED FOR COGNITION

Appendix C - NFC X Scenario Mutability – Perceived Blameworthiness