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Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

ISSN: 1369-183X (Print) 1469-9451 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjms20

The 3×1 Program for migrants and vigilante groups in contemporary Mexico

Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz & Lauren Duquette-Rury

To cite this article: Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz & Lauren Duquette-Rury (2019): The 3×1 Program for migrants and vigilante groups in contemporary Mexico, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2019.1623345

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1623345

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The 3×1 Program for migrants and vigilante groups in contemporary Mexico Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriza and Lauren Duquette-Ruryb

aPolitics and Latin American Studies, Bates College, Lewiston, ME, USA; bDepartment of Sociology, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, USA

ABSTRACT What explains the emergence of armed vigilante groups in Mexico over the past decade? This article links the recent emergence of armed vigilante organisations to United States-Mexico migration. Drawing on an original dataset collected from 2352 Mexican municipalities between 2002 and 2013, we find that a given community’s participation in programmes through which migrant organisations called hometown associations (HTAs) produce public goods in collaboration with sending state authorities is associated with a higher probability of observing an armed vigilante group. More specifically, armed vigilante groups are more likely to operate in those municipalities where HTAs repeatedly participate in the formal co-provision of public goods with government authorities. Contrary to our theoretical expectations, we also find that the presence of vigilante groups does not appear to be driven by HTA’s desire to protect their collective investments. We are not more likely to observe vigilante groups in those communities in which HTAs invest the most money. We argue that the positive relationship between frequent HTA participation in programmes where government authorities and migrants co-produce public goods obtains because the processes that this collaboration entails enable community members to act collectively to provide self-help forms of security and justice for their communities.

KEYWORDS Vigilantism; migration; remittances; social capital; Mexico

What explains the emergence of armed vigilante groups (autodefensas) in Mexico over the past decade? Vigilante groups are parochial organisations comprised of private citizens who, acting outside of the formal mechanisms or institutions sanctioned by the state, decide to take up arms to provide security for their communities. Understanding why they emerge is important because they can threaten state capacity and the rule of law. While they tend to be community-based organisations (Carey and Santamaría 2017; Schu- berth 2015) and have contributed to reducing violent crime (Osorio, Schubiger, andWein- traub 2016), the mechanisms for citizens to hold these groups accountable are limited and human rights violations and extrajudicial killings are common (Huggins 1991; Mazzei 2009; Schuberth 2015; Smith 2015).

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

CONTACT Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz [email protected]

JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1623345

Researchers argue that vigilante groups emerge where predatory criminal organisations operate in the context of a weak state (Baker 2004; Huggins 1991); where there exist his- tories of collective armed organisation (Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub 2016) or high levels of social capital (Zizumbo-Colunga 2017); and where economic inequality manifests itself as unequal access to security (Phillips 2017). Some scholars also suggest that private and public actors incentivize the formation of these organisations (Abrahamsen and Wil- liams 2009; Dupont, Grabosky, and Shearing 2003).

The scholarly literature has overlooked the role of international migration in vigilante group formation. Yet the geography of these groups coincides with Mexican communities where outmigration is particularly intensive (see Figure 2); the media reports that many vigilante group leaders previously lived in the United States (Grillo 2014); and, there are rumours that migrants provide the groups with funding and arms. This article, along with Ley, Ibarra, and Meseguer’s in this Special issue, is thus among the first to for- mally explore how migration and vigilante groups are systematically linked. Specifically, we examine how cooperation between state authorities and migrant social groups called hometown associations (HTAs) in the provision of public goods contributes to vigilante groups emergence across Mexico.

Migrant HTAs are voluntary civic associations or clubs located in migrants’ destination countries comprised of individuals with a shared attachment to a common place of origin. Membership includes migrants from the same village, municipality, state, or sending country. Within HTAs, migrants raise funds that they remit collectively to their common places of origin to fund public goods such as roads, health clinics, potable water, electricity, drainage and sanitation, and schools often in partnership with origin government authorities (Bada 2014; Fitzgerald 2008; Iskander 2010).

Drawing on an original dataset of 2352 Mexican municipalities between 2002, the first year in which systematic data was collected on HTA’s formal involvement in local public goods provision, and 2013, the year in which the recent surge of vigilante forces reached a critical high point, we find compelling evidence of a social learning relationship at work: armed vigilante groups are more likely in those municipalities where HTAs have, between 2002 and 2012, repeatedly donated collective monetary resources to support public goods that they coproduce with government authorities. We argue that, over time, repeated transnational experiences pooling money together through an HTA, deciding collabora- tively with residents and government authorities at origin how the money might best be spent, and then coordinating the implementation of projects in the hometown, teaches people who span national borders and long distances – including both migrants and nonmigrants – how to work collectively to obtain public goods and builds on local collective action where it was previously present. A spillover from this transnational col- lective action includes an increase in migrants’ and local citizens’ interest and ability to participate in local civic and political processes, which, we argue, includes organising to protect the safety of their communities.

Contrary to our theoretical expectations, we find that the presence of vigilante groups is not driven by the desire to protect migrants’ collective investments. Given that Mexico’s predatory non-state actors have been known to target wealthy municipalities (Trejo and Ley 2015), we expected to observe vigilante groups in those communities where migrant groups have invested more collective remittances in public projects. Nevertheless,

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our data show that those communities that receive the most collective remittances are not more likely to have vigilante groups.

Notably, our analysis is not subject to problems of reverse causation. As we explain further below, our dependent variable Vigilante Group accounts for groups that appeared in 2013, while our key independent variables measure repeated (six years or more) or consistent (once every three years) participation in the co-production of public goods between 2002 and 2012. Even if our dependent variable captures vigilante groups that experts contend formed as early as 2011, it would be theoretically difficult for such a group to have incentivized repeated or consistent participation by a group of migrants living in the United States in Mexico’s migrant-state coproduction programme, after its formation.

A key implication of our research is that Mexico’s vigilante groups are not merely a response to the country’s contemporary security crisis or to the perceived or actual incapacity of state institutions to provide citizens with public security; nor are they simply a solution to the problem of unequal access to security and justice. Rather, their emergence is a function of enhanced citizen capacity to mobilise collectively to provide security for their communities. Our findings add to existing explanations for vigilante groups that focus primarily on the role of domestic factors by expanding the analytic lens to encompass the role of transnational forces – namely, transnational migration. Moreover, in demonstrating that HTA-state collaboration in the provision of public goods contributes to the emergence of groups that compete with the state to provide public security, our work expands debates about the consequences of migrants’ political transnationalism beyond their current emphasis on democratisation and democratic consolidation to include questions of their impact in violent democracies (Pérez-Armendáriz 2019).

We begin with a conceptual definition of vigilante groups. Then, drawing on research that explains vigilante group formation and how HTA-state collaboration strengthens broader local collective organisation, we explain our hypothesis that HTA-state collabor- ation contributes to vigilante group emergence through two mechanisms: social learning and investment protection. Subsequently, we turn to describing our data and analytical approach. Following the presentation of our results, we discuss their broader theoretical implications and suggest some future research pathways.

What are vigilante groups?

Vigilante groups are armed actors who, acting outside of the formal mechanisms or insti- tutions sanctioned by the state, decide to take up arms to provide security for their com- munities. Unlike other informal armed actors, such as paramilitaries, guerrillas, or criminal gangs, vigilante groups are not primarily driven by ideologies or economic inter- ests1 (Mazzei 2009; Schuberth 2015). Since their core motivation is to protect their own community (i.e. a town or a neighbourhood) from which they derive their legitimacy (Carey and Santamaría 2017), their geographic scope is limited as compared with guerril- las or criminal gangs whose goal is to expand political influence or increase economic profits (Schuberth 2015). Still, while vigilante groups do not seek to overthrow or replace leadership or the state, they are not altogether apolitical insofar as they seek pro- tection from predators, including sometimes, the state itself and because the protection

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they provide is itself a public good. Vigilante group members may therefore understand their involvement as a form of civic participation (Jones, Troesken, and Walsh 2017).

In contrast with social movements or spontaneous mobs, vigilante groups are insti- tutional and professionalised organisations capable of carrying out highly coordinated activities over a sustained period of time (Guerra 2017; Phillips 2017). As organisations, they have the structural capacity to carry out armed collective activities in high risk con- texts. These groups can develop strategic, tactical, and operational plans; establish a chain of command and rules of engagement; train their members; and develop relationships with the local community that ensure the group is seen as a legitimate purveyor of security (Guerra 2017).

Existing explanations for vigilante group formation

Five theoretical perspectives explain why vigilante groups have recently proliferated in Mexico. The first considers vigilante groups as a direct reaction to violence and crime in the context of state weakness (Baker 2004; Huggins 1991) and argues that citizens take security into their own hands in response both to the actions of violent criminal organisations and to citizens’ perception that the state cannot control the violence (García-Ponce and Lajous 2014; Schedler 2016).2 A problem with this explanation is that although the recent wave of vigilante groups began in the Tierra Caliente of Guerrero and Michoacán – a region notorious for being particularly unruly and violent and domi- nated by despotic local political bosses – both violence and the state’s failure to provide security are diffuse. Additionally, as Figure 1 shows, the geographic distribution of vigi- lante groups indicates that these groups are not more likely to be found in the country’s most violent communities.

A second perspective attributes the emergence of vigilante groups to inequality (Phillips 2017; Ungar 2007; Zurita Eraña 2014). Phillips (2017) holds that vigilante organisations are motivated by unequal access to security. Citizens who live in wealthier communities either enjoy more state-sponsored security or can afford to hire private police. However, lacking access to either of these sources of security, the poor turn to self-help organisations. While there is compelling evidence for this thesis, it leaves open the ques- tion of how citizens gain the will and capacity to organise these armed groups.

A third explanation emphasises how culture and socialisation make informal armed collective vigilantism ‘available’ as a possible course of action, legitimize that response, and provide the know-how required to carry it out.3 Drawing on the case of Guatemala, Bateson (2013) shows that the vigilantism during that country’s civil war shaped the organisation of contemporary self-help forms of justice. Prior experiences conditioned communities’ understandings of violence and punishment as well as their preferred strat- egies to confront given threats (Bateson 2013). Similarly, Osorio, Schubiger, and Wein- traub (2016) argue that vigilante groups are more likely to emerge in Mexican communities with histories of armed mobilisation because intra- and inter-generational political socialisation helps community members to overcome barriers to specifically armed collective action.

A fourth explanation suggests that social capital – meaning ‘individuals and their relationships that enhance their ability to solve collective action problems’ (Ostrom and Ahn 2009, 20) also plays a role in the emergence of vigilantism. Malone (2012) writes

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that for ‘failure of the justice system to translate into collective action, citizens would need to have some sense of solidarity with other members of their community and view citizen action as a viable means for achieving their goals’ (p.117). Zizumbo-Colunga (2015) argues that in contexts where authorities are regarded as untrustworthy and citizens are less likely to turn to them for help, social capital can translate into para- and anti-state political par- ticipation, including the formation of vigilante groups (20). More specifically, he claims that in these settings, the more connected individuals are within a community through community organisations and social networks, the greater their social capital, and the more likely they are to address questions of security extralegally by ‘finding a point of contact from which to engage in co-operative action to solve it’ (Zizumbo-Colunga 2015, 17).

Finally, vigilante group formation also requires material resources and incentives. A fifth perspective argues that such groups emerge when there exist patrons or sponsors. In the context of weak states, private actors often collaborate with local citizens, including civil society organisations, to provide public security (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009; Dupont, Grabosky, and Shearing 2003; Phillips 2017). Phillips (2017) contends that groups of poor citizens seeking to close the security gaps that exist in unequal societies may rely on local wealthy patrons to fund their work. Dupont, Grabosky, and Shearing (2003) note that vigilante group patrons can include transnational organisations or firms. Sponsors can also include the state, as in the case of Mexico after 2013, when the Peña Nieto Presidential administration moved to fund, formalise, and legitimize many of the country’s armed vigilante groups.

In sum, the literature concerning why vigilante groups emerge raises a number of ques- tions. The cultural and socialisation perspective compels us to consider what prior

Figure 1. Map of armed vigilante organisations and homicide rates.

JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 5

experiences could contribute to socialising community members in ways that encourage armed collective action. The social capital research begs the question: what networks exist in the communities where vigilante groups are active that contribute to heightening social trust and autonomous efficacy in ways that encourage citizens to cooperatively take security into their own hands? Finally, taken together, the inequality and sponsorship per- spectives invite us to consider to whom poor citizens of any given community can turn for support (e.g. funding, legitimation, knowhow) in the provision public security? It is within these debates about vigilante group formation that we centre our theoretical and empirical intervention. Linking this literature to the research on migrant transnationalism, we propose that migrant actors, specifically HTAs, through their involvement in the provision of public goods in their origin communities, contribute to the emergence of vigilante groups.

HTA involvement, social learning, and vigilante groups

While previous research shows that migrant HTAs have effectively provided public goods in their hometown communities, we argue the process of providing public goods transna- tionally may have important spillover effects on vigilante group emergence in Mexico. Specifically, we contend that migrant organisations, local citizens, and state agents, when they are involved, repurpose the experiential knowledge and social capital they gain from coordinating public goods using collective remittances to mobilise local social actors, and their migrant allies and resources, into the formation of vigilante groups. Col- lective remittances are fundamentally different from household remittances, the subject of Ley, Ibarra, and Meseguer’s piece (2019). While the latter are private transfers sent by migrant individuals to cover household expenses such as medicine, food, clothing, and housing improvements (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996; Goldring 2004), the former are resources pooled together by migrant HTAs and typically fund public infra- structure and services for the use of non-migrant and migrant families alike. Since collec- tive remittances involve collaboration and planning by groups of migrants, groups of migrants and state actors, and the latter two and non-migrant citizens, we expect the mechanism by which they affect the presence of vigilante groups to be fundamentally different from that of household remittances, which do not entail collective action at all. Put differently, collective remittances involve the transfer of money, but also the trans- fer of significant social and organisational capital.

Some research has shown that collective and household remittances contribute to citi- zens’ access to public goods in different ways. Adida and Girod (2011) show, for example, that some citizens use household remittances to finance private access (e.g. plumbing) to public services such as water and drainage. However, other research shows that when HTAs are present and use collective remittances for public goods, they substitute for remittance-funded private access to public goods (Duquette-Rury 2014). In Mexico, some HTAs provide public goods independently; however, many more become involved in public goods provision through the Mexican 3×1 Program for Migrants (Programa 3×1 Para Migrantes).4 The 3×1 Program is a federal social spending programme launched in 2002 by the Fox presidential administration that matches the collective remittances that migrant HTAs send back to their origin community at the local, state, and federal levels of government.5 Between 2002 and 2013, half of Mexican municipalities had

6 C. PÉREZ-ARMENDÁRIZ AND L. DUQUETTE-RURY

participated in the programme and more than 25,000 public goods projects were com- pleted, most of them involving small-scale public infrastructure (e.g. pavement projects, water, electricity, drainage) and social services such as schools and health clinics.

Research shows that migrants, local residents, and political officials are involved in transnational public goods partnerships to varying degrees (Duquette-Rury 2016). For example, in some origin places, HTAs and local citizens substitute for local-state involve- ment by financing the majority of the local government’s contribution and coordinating public goods projects. In fact, in many participating 3×1 communities, citizens create new civic associations to support the coproduction of public goods with HTAs (e.g. public works committees) (Duquette-Rury 2016). In other places, pre-existing civic associ- ations such as neighbourhood associations, Catholic church groups, and patron saint fes- tival groups aid in the coordination of HTA sponsored projects (Bada 2014; Duquette- Rury 2016; Duquette-Rury and Chen 2018; Fitzgerald 2008; Iskander 2010). Everyday citi- zens, including those with and without ties to migrant HTAs who are recruited into copro- duction activities, increasingly take more ownership over project coordination over time during migrants’ absence. This recruitment facilitates an expansion in the range of non- state actors involved in collective decision-making about public affairs, a process that nur- tures more social awareness, political interest, and capacity to solve local problems with and without migrant HTAs. Drawing on this evidence, we propose that the social and pol- itical consequences that Mexico’s 3×1 Program produce also encourage the formation of vigilante groups tasked with tackling a different kind of public goods provision – public security.

Significantly, the migrant coproduction process and its political consequences are transnational. HTA members become political actors with the capacity to transform civic and political activism of the non-migrant citizenry remaining behind (Bada 2014; Burgess 2016; Duquette-Rury 2016; Iskander 2010; Lacroix 2015). As citizens of their origin countries, emigrants leverage their resources to substantively participate in origin country public affairs in ways that entail significant risks and costs, even as they remain safely outside the country’s borders. As residents in richer countries, emigrants acquire newfound resources, which can be mobilised for public goods back home. These include not only financial resources, but also social remittances (Levitt 2001; Pérez- Armendáriz and Crow 2010). For example, the ideas that migrants acquire abroad could contribute to vigilante group formation when they include receiving country norms about the proper role of the state, as well as values concerning non-state armed self-defense and self-help justice. To the extent that these social remittances influence mobilisation and collective organisation, some scholars might refer to them as political remittances (Krawatzek and Müller-Funk 2019, 2). Migrants might also access with greater ease abroad the material goods that vigilante group organisations require, such as vehicles, communication devices, uniforms, and arms.

HTA investment, private interests, and vigilante groups

Although they generally finance public goods, we have reason to believe that HTAs who participate in the 3×1 Program may seek to protect these investments much as they would private goods. HTA-state coproduction in origin communities entails migrant associ- ations investing their private monies in, and attracting local, state, and federal public

JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 7

resources to, their local communities. Some funded projects are actually club goods that can be captured by predatory criminal organisations. The 3×1 Program has funded the construction of facilities such as baseball fields, rodeo rings, and health clinics, as well as the establishment of academic scholarships, for example. Moreover, even in the case of pure public goods, the presence of predatory actors in migrants’ origin communities threatens the private interests of 3×1 Program participants insofar as they can demand kickbacks in exchange for allowing public projects to proceed.

Research showing that drug trafficking organisations target Mexico’s wealthiest muni- cipalities for extortion and violent crimes (Trejo and Ley 2015) suggests that commu- nities that participate in the 3×1 Program might be vulnerable. For example, in southern Guanajuato, an HTA leader revealed to us that criminal gangs extorted or threatened to extort local mayors and HTAs for 3×1 resources. News reports indicate that the threat of extorsion is a key reason why local citizens and migrants support the formation of vigilante groups (Veledíaz 2014). Extortion can inflate the costs of pro- jects funded through the 3×1 Program or reduce the amount of monies that flow directly to public goods. HTAs thus have an interest in protecting their private monies from falling into the hands of criminal organisations. Furthermore, both migrants and political authorities who participate in the 3×1 Program have an interest in protecting their ability to attract collective remittances for future projects. We therefore expect communities that receive the most collective donations to the 3×1 Program to be more likely to have vigilante groups in order to protect both private and public resources from unscru- pulous criminal networks.

Hypotheses

In light of the nature of armed vigilante groups and research on why these groups emerge, and given current knowledge of what HTA’s involvement in the provision of public goods entails as well as its social and political consequences, we offer two sets of hypotheses for empirical testing. The hypotheses relate to two possible mechanisms by which HTA-state partnerships might contribute to vigilante group formation: social learning and invest- ment protection.

Our social learning hypothesis proposes that municipalities that participated in the pro- gramme many times in an eleven-year period are more likely to have a vigilante group, since the social capital, knowhow, civic and political awareness, interest, and organis- ational capacity required to carry out sustained armed collective activities requires repeti- tive practice. Within this general social learning hypothesis, we test whether frequent or consistent versus any HTA involvement produces observable effects. Evidence affirming Hypothesis 1a and 1b would indicate support for the social learning hypothesis, whereas evidence affirming Hypothesis 1c would undermine our social learning hypoth- esis since one-shot collaborations are hardly sufficient to set in motion the social and pol- itical externalities that facilitate organised collective action.

Social Learning Hypothesis 1a: Municipalities that engage with high frequency in the 3×1 Program are more likely to have vigilante groups.

Social Learning Hypothesis 1b: Municipalities that engage consistently in the 3×1 Program over the entire program period are more likely to have vigilante groups.

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Social Learning Hypothesis 1c: Municipalities that participate at least one time in the 3×1 Program are more likely to have vigilante groups.

The investment protection mechanism specified in Hypotheses 2a and 2b below concern the relationship between the amount of collective remittances that migrant HTAs invest in public goods projects and vigilante group presence in a given municipality. We expect to see vigilante groups where 3×1 expenditures are highest, if it is the case that migrants and community members seek to protect from criminal groups remittances donations, match- ing government contributions, and the projects they fund. The distinct hypotheses below reflect two differing ways of measuring collective remittance expenditures.

Investment Protection Hypothesis 2a: Municipalities where HTAs have invested more money per project in the 3×1 Programs are more likely to have vigilante groups.

Investment Protection Hypothesis 2b:Municipalities where HTAs have invested the great- est total sum of money in the 3×1 Program are more likely to have vigilante groups.

Data sources, research method, and measures

Since the indicator of vigilante group presence across Mexican municipalities – our depen- dent variable – is dichotomous, we use logistic regressions to test our hypotheses. We cluster the standard errors by state to account for the fact that municipalities in any given state are subject to similar unobserved forces that may be associated with vigilante group presence. All of the international migration and 3×1 Program data was taken from Duquette-Rury and Chen (2018). The data on vigilante groups is from Phillips (2017). Our sample encompasses a cross-section of all Mexican municipalities for which complete data was available on or before 2013, the year for which we observe the incidence of vigilante groups; data are missing for about 100 municipalities. Even though our data are not longi- tudinal, we are able to glean some insight into how repeated municipal interactions with HTAs affect vigilante group formation because we have comprehensive data on the 3×1 Program from 2002 to 2013 and our models include indicators of municipal 3×1 partici- pation that capture temporal variation over the 11-year period preceding 2013.

Dependent variable: vigilante group

In all of the specifications the dependent variable, Vigilante Group, is a dichotomous vari- able that takes on a value of one if in the year 2013 a given municipality had one or more vigilante groups (n = 75), otherwise its value is zero (n = 2383). 21 of the municipalities containing these groups were in Guerrero state, while 19 were in Michoacán. Nevertheless, vigilante groups were observed in 13 of the 32 federal entities.

Independent variables

We use several indicators of 3×1 Program participation to explore the relationship between formal HTA participation and vigilante group presence at the municipal level. To provide a window into whether municipalities in which HTAs that participate very fre- quently are more likely to have vigilante groups (Hypothesis 1a), we useHigh Frequency, a dichotomous variable that indicates whether a municipality participated in the 3×1

JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 9

Program six or more times between 2002 and 2012 (Model 2).6 Over the period of study, a municipality could have engaged in a migrant-state partnership 11 times. Our frequency dummy captures those municipalities that participated in about half or more of all pro- gramme years. Of the 46% of municipalities that participated in the programme during the period we study, about 38 (n = 318) were involved at this high level of frequency.

To test Hypothesis 1b (Model 3) we use Cycle, a variable that takes the value of one if a municipality participated in the 3×1 Program at least once in every three-year electoral cycle during our observation period (12.33%) and zero, otherwise. The Cycle indicator, unlike High Frequency, measures municipal 3×1 participation that is consistent over time (Hypothesis 1b).

Finally, to test Hypothesis 1c, we use Ever, a dichotomous variable coded as one if a municipality participated in the 3×1 Program at least once since 2002, the year in which programme became active, and zero otherwise. This indicator gives us a sense of whether any municipal participation in the 3×1 Program between 2002 and 2012 played a role in vigilante group formation (Hypothesis 1c). About fifty percent of munici- palities have participated in the 3×1 Program (n = 1234). The raw data provide initial evi- dence of a possible link as 63% of municipalities with vigilante groups also participated in the 3×1 Program at least once.

To test our investment protection hypotheses, Models 4 and 5 include two different measures of 3×1 expenditures on public goods. Total 3×1 Spending is a continuous vari- able that reflects the total 3×1 funds (per capita) from all contributors (local, state, and federal government, and migrant HTAs) spent on public goods projects in the years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the three years prior to 2013 when we observe vigilante groups (Hypothesis 3a). The mean was $ 209,927 MXN (median was zero). Spending per Project 2012, is a continuous variable that measures the average 3×1 spending for all pro- jects (per capita) funded in the calendar year 2012 (Hypothesis 3b). The mean is $108 MXN; the median is $38.

Control variables

Our models also control for potential confounders likely to affect the formation of vigi- lante groups. First, we include the Consejo Nacional de Poblacion (CONAPO) migration intensity index for the year 2010 to control for the ways in which several different features of international migration contribute to the formation of vigilante organisations. As Ley, Ibarra, and Meseguer (2019) show in this issue, household remittances, an individual aspect of migration, are associated with the emergence of vigilante groups, just as they influence other aspects of political behaviour. We also know from journalists’ accounts that migrants who return permanently and temporarily to their hometowns are involved in vigilante groups. Finally, studies suggest that if migrants abroad discuss vigilante group activity with non-migrants, these discussions could potentially motivate the latter to par- ticipate (Pérez-Armendáriz 2014).

Migration Index thus accounts for numerous pathways, other than through HTA par- ticipation in public goods provision, by which migration can influence vigilante group presence. The index is an additive scalar index that measures the percent of households in each municipality in which: the head of the household lives abroad; and household members receive migrant remittances from abroad, have returned from living abroad,

10 C. PÉREZ-ARMENDÁRIZ AND L. DUQUETTE-RURY

or engage in circular migration between the U.S. and Mexico. Figure 2 maps the incidence of vigilante groups in 2013 and the migration intensity index in 2010. The dark blue areas of the map indicate municipalities with higher levels of migration intensity, while the black crosses show where vigilante groups exist. The overlap in migration intensity and vigilante organisations mapped from the raw data provides some initial evidence of a correlation between higher levels of international migration and armed organisations.

Since crime is widely believed to be the motivation for vigilante groups, we control for it using three different indicators, CIDE-PPD, Extorsion Rate, and Cartel. CIDE-PPD, is a count of the cumulative number of drug war executions recorded in each municipality between December 2006 and November 2011. Drug war executions are defined as homi- cides in which either the victim or perpetrator belonged to a criminal organisation. They also include deaths involving ‘extreme violence’ including decapitation, dismemberment, mutilation or burning, as well as violent homicides involving multiple victims. The indi- cator is from Base-CIDE-PPD, a dataset developed by a team of researchers fromMexico’s Program on Drug Politics and CentroGeo (Atuesta, Siordia, and Madrazo 2016). Extortion is a continuous variable drawn from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) that measures the rate of extortion in each municipality per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. Extortion Squared is also in our model since we suspect a curvilinear relationship between rates of extortion and vigilante group formation. Cartel is a dichotomous variable created using data from Base-CIDE-PPD that we coded one if, between 2006 and 2007, there were reports of violence in the municipality involving at least one of seven cartels (Golfo, Beltran, Zetas, Familia, Sinaloa, Juarez, Guerrero) and zero, otherwise.

Given the evidence linking vigilante groups and inequality, we include Gini in our models. The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of income inequality that theoretically ranges from zero to one, where zero indicates equality and one indicates perfect inequality.

Figure 2. Map of armed vigilante organisations and migration intensity index.

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Our indicator measures municipal inequality between 2010 and 2012 and comes from Mexico’s National Council of Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL). The coefficient ranges from .286 to .591 with a mean value of .412.

Cristero is included as a proxy for measuring local historical legacies of armed organ- isation that can serve to socialise and legitimize armed non-state collective action. The Cristero Rebellion (La Cristiada, 1926–1929) was a major peasant uprising in the central-western states of Mexico in which rebels, called cristeros, organised an armed rebellion against the Mexican government in the wake of President Calles’s enforcement of secular articles of the 1917 Mexican constitution. Drawing on data compiled by Sellars (2017) based on Meyer’s (1973, 2008) seminal research, we code as one those municipa- lities located in states that experienced fighting in the majority of their territory at the peak of the uprising and zero, otherwise.7

Three control variables serve as proxies for preexisting forms of collective action. The dichotomous variable, Usos, takes the value of one if a given municipality observes a tra- ditional form of indigenous self-governance called usos y costumbres and zero, otherwise. Usos is important to include since previous research shows that municipalities that observe this form of self-governance often have better public goods provision and higher levels of social trust and network ties (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Ruiz-Euler 2014) required for community collective action. Ejidomeasures the number of rural collective interest associ- ations in each municipality in 2007. These formally constituted associations comprise ejidos, including both individual and communal landholders, that mutually assist one another in an effort to strengthen both agriculture productivity and markets. The values of the indicator range from zero to five or more organisations. Over 70% of municipalities have zero associations, while just under seven percent have five or more. Finally, we use Literacy, a continuous variable that captures the total percentage of citizens over the age of 12 that are literate in a given municipality as a proxy for preexisting stocks of pol- itical participation and social capital likely associated with collective mobilisation for which more precise measures are unavailable (Cleary 2010). The data for Usos, Ejido, and Literacy are from INEGI.

Our models also contain two geographic controls. Neighbor is to account for a potential demonstration effect as neighbouring municipalities are likely to share information, skills, and know-how required for the formation of vigilante groups. Neighbor is a dichotomous measure that we code as one if a neighbouring municipality has one or more vigilante groups and zero, otherwise. Region accounts for the regional variation in levels of violent crime and state capacity throughout Mexico in 2013. The variable is coded one if a municipality is located in the Northwest (Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihua- hua, Sinaloa, and Sonora); 2 if in the Northeast (Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, and Tamaulipas); 3 if in the West (Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Querétaro, and Zacatecas); 4 if in Central Mexico (Federal District, State of México, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala); and 5 if in the South- east (Campeche, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz y Yucatán). To further account for varying state capacity, we follow Phillips (2017) and include State GDP Per Capita for the year 2008 in thousands of pesos. We add GDP Per Capital Squared to test a possible non-linear relationship. Finally, the models also use INEGI data to control for Population (logged), which is the total municipal population over the age of 12 in 2010.

12 C. PÉREZ-ARMENDÁRIZ AND L. DUQUETTE-RURY

Endogeneity

Potentially, vigilante groups either appeared at the same time that HTA’s formed transna- tional partnerships with the sending state or prior to the development of these partner- ships. If vigilante groups in fact motivated HTA participation in the 3×1 Program rather than the other way around, then our argument that transnational public goods part- nerships contribute to the formation of well-organised armed security organisations that operate outside of the rule of law is poorly unsubstantiated because our key covariate is biased.

We are confident that our analysis is not subject to this problem. Our dependent vari- able measures the presence of armed vigilante groups in 2013. Our key independent vari- ables concern frequent and consistent 3×1 Program Participation up to 2012. It is possible that our vigilante group indicator captures armed groups that formed prior to 2013; however, the author of the dataset notes that he included only those armed vigi- lante groups created by citizens illegally in 2013 (Phillips personal communication, 2018).8 A review of the Sedesol (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social) database of 3×1 Project participation reveals that 44 and 51 municipalities joined the 3×1 Program for the first time in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Of those 95 municipal cases, only two had vigilante groups in 2013, Múgica, Michoacán and Chihuahua, Chihuahua, according to Phillips’ dataset (2017). Vigilantes in these municipalities may have sought the support of HTAs that officially collaborate with local officials to provide public goods. However, they could not be driving our frequent or consistent participation indicators, since both of these variables measure participation over six or more years between 2002 and 2012. This would be impossible, even if these armed groups had formed as far back as 2010.

Results

The odds ratios for each of our models appear in Table 1. For ease of interpretation, we also report the average marginal effects of the 3×1 Participation indicators that are statisti- cally significant in the text.

The results support our social learning hypotheses. There is a statistically significant and positive relationship between municipalities that participated with high frequency or consistently in the 3×1 Program and the presence of vigilante groups. In communities that participate with high frequency, the odds of seeing one or more vigilante groups are 67% higher than in those where the frequency of participation is low. Additionally, the odds of seeing a vigilante group are 62% higher in municipalities that participated in the programme in each of the three electoral cycles than in those that did not participate at all. In contrast, participating in the 3×1 Program just one or more times is not associated with vigilante organisations.

The evidence does not support the investment protection hypotheses that municipali- ties where HTAs donate more money in the 3×1 Program are more likely to have vigilante groups because HTAs and their local partners seek to protect their private donations and public goods investments. Total 3×1 Spending 2010–2012 is not associated with vigilante group presence. Moreover, although there is a statistically significant relationship between Average Spending per Project 2012 and Vigilante Group, the odds ratio is less than one,

JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 13

pointing to an almost negligible decline (about two percent) in the odds of observing a vigilante group. Average Spending per Project 2012 also has substantial missing data, so the coefficient should interpreted cautiously.

What do these odds ratios imply about the probability of observing a vigilante group in a given municipality? The average marginal effect ofHigh Frequency is 0.012, meaning that the probability of seeing a vigilante group is 1.2% higher in municipalities that participated in the 3×1 Program six or more times between 2002 and 2012 than in those that partici- pated between zero and five times. It is worth noting that our finding is robust to varying

Table 1. Logistic regression – vigilante group on 3×1 Program indicators. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Ever (Base = Never)

High Frequency

Cycle (Base = No)

Total Spending 2010–2012 ($MX)

Ave. 3×1 Spending per Project

(2012) ($MX)

OR OR OR OR OR (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)

3×1 Indicator 0.629 1.670** 1.623* 1.000 0.984* (0.260) (0.300) (0.377) (1.57e-07) (0.00775)

Migration Index 1.082 0.926 0.931 0.979 1.404 (0.218) (0.190) (0.188) (0.179) (0.406)

Cristero 0.667 0.607 0.606 0.669 0.301** (0.222) (0.182) (0.186) (0.212) (0.136)

Ejido 1.122 1.130 1.135 1.129 0.906 (0.0849) (0.0855) (0.0849) (0.0835) (0.0803)

Gini 44,959** 18,967* 20,011* 30,877** 12,243 (174,393) (78,012) (80,247) (119,418) (113,692)

CIDE-PPD 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.000 1.000 (0.00132) (0.00112) (0.00111) (0.000820) (0.00101)

Cartel 1.193 1.314 1.298 1.233 1.513 (0.358) (0.338) (0.357) (0.327) (0.445)

Extortion 1.012* 1.012* 1.012* 1.012* 1.015*** (0.00482) (0.00503) (0.00516) (0.00488) (0.00426)

Extortion Sq. 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 1.000** (1.04e-05) (1.14e-05) (1.17e-05) (1.05e-05) (6.85e-06)

Population (logged) 1.577* 1.493* 1.493* 1.517* 1.491 (0.282) (0.295) (0.305) (0.298) (0.656)

Usos 2.910 3.063* 3.117* 3.141* 8.529*** (1.864) (1.707) (1.745) (1.777) (2.267)

Municipal GDP 0.982 0.987 0.988 0.988 1.101 (0.0299) (0.0230) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.116)

Literacy 0.967 0.960* 0.961* 0.961 0.883 (0.0230) (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0211) (0.0972)

Neighbour 23.43*** 22.34*** 21.81*** 22.71*** 10.58*** (11.83) (10.81) (10.70) (10.72) (6.785)

Region (base = Northwest)

Northeast 3.111 2.600 2.643 2.566 – (2.464) (1.903) (1.942) (1.775)

Center 3.693* 3.476* 3.566* 3.353* 0.735 (1.933) (2.030) (2.092) (1.908) (1.204)

West 6.333*** 4.690** 4.703** 4.810* 1.421 (3.334) (2.682) (2.798) (2.944) (2.299)

Southwest 0.582 0.584 0.593 0.572 – (0.409) (0.448) (0.458) (0.422)

Constant 7.31e-06*** 2.78e-05*** 3.35e-05 1.77e-05*** 0.854 N 2352 2352 2352 2352 367 Wald chi2 6212.14 6126.46 5285.10 4965.98 75048.32 Pseudo R2 0.399 0.399 0.399 0.391 0.332

Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.

14 C. PÉREZ-ARMENDÁRIZ AND L. DUQUETTE-RURY

measures of the variableHigh Frequency. As for our Cycle variable, municipalities that par- ticipated in the 3×1 Program in every three-year electoral cycle between 2002 and 2012 are 1.1% more likely to have vigilante forces. Although these effects are modest, their magni- tude is greater than that of other widely espoused explanations of vigilantism in our model, such as homicide levels, the presence of a cartel, or prior histories of armed organisation.

Figure 3 shows the marginal effects of Average Spending per Project 2012. We can see that the probability of observing a vigilante group is higher in municipalities where spend- ing is lower. Specifically, the probability of vigilante group presence becomes negligible as spending per project per capita approaches $500 Mexican pesos.

Discussion and conclusion

We find compelling evidence for the social learning hypothesis and negative results for the investment protection hypothesis. The repeated process of coproducing public goods between migrants and state and local actors appears to increase the probability of a vigi- lante group in a given municipality, while more spending on coproduction projects may possibly reduce their incidence. These results mean that the transnational socialisation and learning process that occurs through the process of collective action in public goods pro- vision plays a more important role in the emergence of vigilantes than interest in protec- tive remittance funds or investments.

The implications of these findings are significant as they demonstrate that Mexico’s vig- ilante groups are not merely a response to its contemporary security crisis, state incapacity, or unequal access to security, but rather a function of enhanced citizen capacity to organise collectively to produce public goods. Our research thus complements research that high- lights the role of culture, socialisation, and social capital. However, our contribution is novel in its emphasis on transnational migration as a source underlying collective mobilisation.

Perhaps more importantly, our finding of a transnational social learning mechanism casts our understanding of migrant transnationalism’s effects on sending countries in a

Figure 3. Predictive margins with 95% CIs.

JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 15

new light.9 Research shows that transnational coproduction partnerships contribute to strengthening collective organisational capacity by enhancing preexisting levels of social capital, resources, and knowledge. Our findings imply that HTAs and their communities can marshal this new capacity to form organisations that carry out informal, non-state, extra-legal armed actions. This adds a new transnational layer to debates concerning whether social capital – and organisational capacity more generally – necessarily strength- ens democracy (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994) or if it is just as likely to buttress citizens’ ability to challenge the state and democracy and strengthen bases for extralegal violence and the rule of law (Berman 1997). Our findings suggest that this debate is germane to the study of migrant transnationalism, particularly transnationalism situated, at least partially, in violent democracies where citizens’ perceptions of the state as incap- able of controlling violence and maintaining the rule of law facilitate the pursuit of non- state, informal, and extralegal solutions.

Although we do not find support for the investment protection hypothesis, we believe that the question of how HTAs, their leaders and local government partners sponsor or incentivize vigilante group formation merits further inquiry. HTAs, and their local co- sponsors that are targets of extortion by criminal gangs, may seek to protect their current and future public goods investments; however, the 3×1 Program rules prohibit the funding of private security in municipalities. There is evidence that programme funds can be misallocated strategically (Simpser et al. 2016), but insofar as doing so in order to fund nonstate armed groups is possible, it would entail significant risks and costs. It would be easier for HTAs to simply reallocate their collective remittances toward projects – including public security – that do not formally involve the state.

The decrease in odds of vigilante groups in municipalities with higher per capita project investments could potentially signal that HTAs turn away from the 3×1 Program to infor- mally support vigilante groups. We lack the municipal data to explore this hypothesis, yet information provided to us anecdotally by HTA leaders, as well as news reports, suggest that this is plausible. For example, in a community in southern Guanajuato, a local crime spree left residents and migrant families vulnerable to a criminal gang newly in the area. In response, the HTA members and local citizens formed a public security committee inde- pendent of the state to solve the local crime problems themselves using unorthodox methods. Members of the public security committee, who first became acquainted through their participation in the coproduction of road pavement projects, decided to fight violence with violence threatening members of the criminal gang themselves. In other communities, HTAs have directly provided resources for arms and vehicles (Alejan- dro 2014; Rueda and Fuentes 2014; Sanchez 2014).

It is also worth exploring the role of local leaders that participated in the 3×1 Program in sponsoring – or at least motivating and legitimising transnational cooperation in the formation of extralegal vigilante groups. Some scholars attribute the most recent wave of Mexican vigilante groups to former President Calderon’s 2009 call for citizens to become involved in the creation and implementation of strategies for the production of safety (Payan 2015). And President Peña Nieto’s decision to fund, formalise, and legiti- mize many of the country’s armed vigilante groups in late 2013 highlights that state actors have incentives to sponsor such groups despite their extralegal nature.

Finally, while we know that transnational coproduction changes what people know as well as the ideas, values and resources communities can marshal for public good provision

16 C. PÉREZ-ARMENDÁRIZ AND L. DUQUETTE-RURY

(Duquette-Rury 2016), we do not yet comprehend what types of ideational and material resources that migrants access abroad specifically enable vigilante group formation in origin countries and how local actors adapt foreign information to suit their community’s pre-existing norms, laws, resources, and needs. The role of return migrants from the United States, including Jose Manuel Mireles and Luis Antonio Torres (El Americano) as key leaders of the vigilante groups that emerged in 2013, makes the question of social and political remittances all the more compelling.

Notes

1. Strictly speaking, their objective is not resource mobilisation. 2. Some claim that public support for vigilante groups, and potential vigilante group emergence,

is associated with citizens’ distrust in the capacity or willingness of state institutions to provide security and justice, rather than with inherent state weaknesses (Rojo Mendoza 2015; Zizumbo-Colunga 2017).

3. The term ‘available’ refers to the availability heuristic, a cognitive device by which individuals make behavioural choices based on the ease with which a given menu of possibilities comes to mind (Tversky and Kahneman 1973).

4. At present, there is no systematic data on the number of hometown associations that finance public goods in their origin communities, which precludes us from examining their explicit role in the formation of vigilante groups.

5. The federal programme has its roots in state level matching grants programmes that were spearheaded by HTAs and state level federations of HTAs in traditional Mexican emigration states with a large population of migrants in the US.

6. We analyse additional dichotomous variables for high frequency including participation that is equal to or greater than 4–7 and find consistently statistically significant, positive results.

7. The boundaries of municipalities have evolved over time. To date, data that document Cris- tero activity according to the geography of present-day municipalities are not available. Cris- tero is an admittedly crude measure of the breadth of non-state armed organisational activity in Mexico. Our choice to include it as a proxy follows Osorio, Schubiger, and Weintraub’s (2016).

8. This is consistent with other scholars’ conceptualisation of the wave of vigilante groups that appeared in Mexico 2013 as sui generis, even given the country’s long history with subna- tional armed groups, particularly community police groups (see Merino and Hernández Col- orado 2013).

9. See also recent research on transnational social learning through regional advocacy networks by Piper and Rother (2019).

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Joel Herrera for excellent research assistance, Ana Isabel López García, and participants at the 2018 Latin American Studies Association Annual Conference in Barcelona, Spain and the Seminar Presented for the Master’s Program in Applied Economics and Doctoral Program in Social Sciences at the Colegio de la Frontera Norte in April of 2018, Tijuana, B.C., Mexico for critical feedback. We also appreciate data shared with us by Emily Sellers and Brian Phil- lips and thoughtful comments from two anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 17

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