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Journal of Asian and African Studies 45(5) 504–521

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Corresponding author: Mohammed Nuruzzaman, Gulf University for Science and Technology, PO Box 7207 Hawally, 320 93 Kuwait Email: [email protected]

Federalism and State Disintegration – United Pakistan, 1947–1971: Some Historical Lessons for Afghanistan and Iraq

Mohammed Nuruzzaman Gulf University for Science and Technology, Kuwait

Abstract Multiethnic, multilingual and socially divided large states usually, though not always willingly, prefer a federal system of government to build state institutions and promote national integration. Recently, there has been a surge in interest in federalism following the US-led invasions of Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in March 2003. There are, however, both successes and failures in federal endeavors. This article analyzes the underlying reasons behind United Pakistan’s (1947–1971) choice of federalism right after its independence in 1947, probes the complex factors that eventually led to the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, and finally highlights the historical lessons the failure of federalism in United Pakistan holds for Afghanistan and Iraq which are ethnically, socially, culturally and politically diverse and share many of the characteristics of United Pakistan. It argues that both Afghanistan and Iraq have much to learn from failed federal experiment in United Pakistan if they wish to avert their possible disintegration in future.

Keywords Afghanistan, federalism, Iraq, state disintegration, United Pakistan

Introduction Federalism is often considered the best way to deal with complex political, economic and social problems in multiethnic and culturally diverse large states. In some cases, such as Canada, Germany, India and Switzerland, the system has proved extremely beneficial to the development of functional state structures and a sense of collective national identity to preserve state structures and unity. In other cases, most notably Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia and the USSR, federalism ended up in frustration and the eventual disintegration of the state itself. While scholars keep debat- ing the underlying reasons for the failure of federal arrangements in the latter group of countries (Adeney, 2004, 2007; Barry, 1993; Coakley, 2003; Lapidun et al., 1992), the euphoria for federal- ism has re-emerged in the context of tumultuous developments after the American invasions of Afghanistan in October 2001 and Iraq in March 2003. In the immediate post-invasion period, both Afghanistan and Iraq considered federal system of government to patch up their multiethnic and multicultural social and cultural order, and build state institutions accommodating the interests of

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their diverse ethnic and social groups. Indeed, the multifaceted social, political, religious and cultural fabrics of Afghanistan and Iraq clearly underscore the need for a federal system to mitigate violent conflicts through clear division of powers and better political, social and cultural under- standings between the contending groups to achieve stability and peace (Brancati, 2004). Both Afghanistan and Iraq, however, as per their 2004 and 2005 constitutions respectively, eventually opted for a unitary system of government, although the Afghans and the Iraqis are still debating the merits and demerits of a federal arrangement to build their state and nation (Bruno, 2007).

Interestingly, both Afghanistan and Iraq share many of the characteristic features of United Pakistan that experimented with a federal system of government from 1947 to 1971 but eventually disintegrated. Although the historical contexts and realities in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are quite different, still all three countries share a good number of similarities, including an over- whelming Islamic identity, ethnic and linguistic divides, sectarian divisions, colonial experiences and foreign interference. Historically, all three countries have been run by dictatorial regimes, were and still are anti-democratic in orientations and structures, and have witnessed ethnic as well as sectarian competitions to capture state power at the cost of rival groups. The purpose of this article is to investigate whether the failure of the federal experiment in United Pakistan holds any lessons and brings to light any insights for Afghanistan and Iraq should these two politically fractured and socially divided countries finally decide to embark on state-building and national integration initia- tives on federal lines. First, the article presents a comprehensive account of federal state-building process and its failure in Pakistan from 1947 to 1971 and then sheds light on the relevant historical lessons for Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Federal Experiment in United Pakistan United Pakistan’s (1947–1971) federal experiment and the causes of its failure can be better compre- hended once the meaning of federalism is clearly defined. Recognizably, there is a multiplicity of views on what federalism actually means and what benefits it brings for socially divided multiethnic states (see e.g. Earle, 1968; Filipov et al., 2004; King, 1982; Watts, 1999). Two dominant views on federalism stand out here. Riker (1964: 11) defines federalism as a division of powers between two levels of government where each level enjoys a certain degree of autonomy, usually in the form of constitutional guarantees that one level will not encroach into the jurisdictions of the other level. This is a general understanding of federalism as a power-sharing arrangement between the regional/ provincial governments and the central/national government. Elazar (1987: 12) goes beyond the power-sharing formula and defines federalism as ‘self-rule plus shared rule’. Federalism definitely rests on a clear division of political authority between the two levels of government but it does not stop there. It is the consensus between multiple ethnic, religious and cultural groups on how power will be shared while accommodating the needs and interests of all groups. Hence, the emphasis on ‘shared rule’. This article, following Elazar’s view, defines federalism as constitutionally guaranteed mechanisms that clearly divide the jurisdictional domains of the two levels of government and open up avenues for meaningful inclusion of all ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural groups in the state and nation-building processes to promote collective national identity and preserve the territorial integrity of a state. The discussion presented below tests Pakistani federalism up until 1971 on this basis and then accounts for its failure to create a successful federal structure.

The Birth of United Pakistan British colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent came to an end in August 1947 with the creation of two independent states – India and Pakistan. The state of Pakistan comprised the Muslim-dominated

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areas of southeast and western India – the so-called areas of ‘West Pakistan’ and ‘East Pakistan’ (present-day Bangladesh) – separated by a thousand miles of Indian territories. Unlike India which had some obvious advantages, for instance an already established federal capital city and much of the machinery of the former colonial central government, Pakistan started its post-independence journey with no pre-established federal administrative site or a sizable number of skilled bureau- crats to run the activities of the state. Nevertheless, Pakistan, led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah – the founder of the new state, undertook the task to build itself as a federal state.

United Pakistan’s experiment with federalism, however, did not usher in the development of a federal structure and identity acceptable to all ethnic groups and regional interests. In fact, its post-independence efforts to build a federal identity based on overarching values, accommoda- tion of diverse interests, and shared-rule eventually resulted in the disintegration of the state in December 1971 when the Bengalis in erstwhile ‘East Pakistan’ established their own indepen- dent state – Bangladesh. Two specific factors that precipitated the failure were the indomitable tendency of the federal government to centralize most powers while emasculating the provincial governments that gave rise to multiple conflicts, and the failure to develop a strong sense of Pakistani nationalism. The over-centralization of powers created political and economic imbalances between the central and provincial governments, and between different regions of the country, particularly between East and West Pakistan. And in the absence of a strong sense of Pakistani nationalism, different ethnic groups tended to express themselves in their particularistic linguistic and cultural identities, often attempting to move out of the federal orbit. Still, post-independence political realities and social structure dictated that Pakistan opt for a federal system of government.

Pakistan’s Social Structure and the Move toward Federalism At independence, Pakistan’s social structure came to be dominated by three social groups/classes which had contradictory interests and interest perceptions (Wilcox, 1968: 347). The first group comprised the West India-based Muslim commercial minorities who participated and thrived in the capitalist system of British India and migrated to West Pakistan after India was partitioned in 1947. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the political spokesperson of this group. The secular-educated, English- literate urban Muslims constituted the second group. This group had few ties to Islamic religion and was ready to chart out a secular course of development for Pakistan. The third group originated from rural Pakistan and they were known as the ‘zamindars’ (landlords). This group presided over a vast feudal rural order and exercised immense powers over the peasant population. Together, these three groups provided the leadership for Pakistan’s development and, except for the zamind- ars, the two other groups had no social base in Pakistan since they migrated to Pakistan from dif- ferent parts of India. They suffered huge problems of social and political acceptability in the newly created state and were generally doubtful about their political future (with the exception of Jinnah). Naturally, they were less interested in making quick and effective moves to constitution- making and general elections to establish Pakistan on a firm federal democratic footing (Singhal, 1962: 20). Consequently, a fourth group with stakes in the political process emerged – the civil- military oligarchs – which came into existence as a response to the failure of the first three groups to steer Pakistan on an effective course of democratic and federal development.

The social disadvantages for the new leadership notwithstanding, Pakistan had no option other than try a federal system of government to avoid being a cockpit of future feuds and to promote a federal national identity over time. A series of geographic, ethnic, linguistic and cultural factors made this choice obvious (Sayeed, 1954: 139). On the one hand, the two parts of Pakistan – East and West – lacked geographic proximity. Superimposed on this geographic reality were the prob- lems of ethnic composition and cultural differences of the diverse groups making up the new state.

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The Bengalis in East Pakistan alone constituted the majority ethnic group (55 percent of the total population), although they inhabited only one-eighth of the total territories of Pakistan. The Punjabis, the Sindhis, the Baluchis, the Pathans, and other tribal groups in West Pakistan accounted for the rest of the population. Culturally, the Bengalis were also different from their Muslim breth- rens in West Pakistan and had much in common with the Bengali-speaking Hindus in the Indian province of West Bengal. The overriding factor that united the Bengalis with their counterparts in West Pakistan was the common religion of Islam (Ahmed, 1981: x–xii). It should also be noted that the Punjabis, the Sindhis and others in West Pakistan did not constitute a homogeneous West Pakistani group; rather, cultural and linguistic differences characterized their mutual relationships. Federalism was, therefore, an inevitable response to the need to ensure the future unity of Pakistan.

In response to the need for federalism, the post-independence political leaders immediately adapted the Government of India Act (GIA) of 1935 as the Unrepealed Constitutional Legislation for Pakistan in August 1947 (Sayeed, 1954: 139–40). A brief analysis of this Unrepealed Constitutional Legislation is necessary here since it laid down the basic foundation on which subsequent efforts to build Pakistani federalism were based. As the following discussion suggests, Pakistan could never disassociate itself from the basic modalities of this colonially-inherited Constitutional Legislation. Pakistan’s 1956 and 1962 constitutions discussed below amply testify to this argument.

The British government crafted the GIA of 1935 as a colonial legal instrument to rule its Indian subjects with a heavy hand. In its adapted version, the Unrepealed Constitutional Legislation gave the new federal government of Pakistan exclusive powers over 59 subjects, including defense, external affairs, banking and currency, income tax and foreign trade, etc. The provincial list of powers included 54 subjects, such as education, public health, provincial law and order, agricul- ture, land revenue and a host of other subjects. Although the central and provincial governments were considered sovereign in their respective domains, the central government had the extraordi- nary powers (Section 10(1) of the Unrepealed Constitutional Legislation) to declare a state of emergency on the grounds of external attacks or internal disturbances. The Governor-General (then the chief executive of the state) had used this Section 10(1) to arbitrarily dismiss many provincial governments in the early 1950s.

The Unrepealed Constitutional Legislation was, however, adopted as a provisional constitution. Efforts were underway to draft a permanent constitution that would reflect the future direction of state and nation-building in Pakistan. On March 12, 1949 the Legislative Assembly passed an ‘Objective Resolution’ setting out the aims and objectives of the future constitution of Pakistan. The ‘Basic Principle Committee’ set up thereafter was directed to recommend the principles that the constitution of Pakistan should reflect. The Committee’s 1952 Report called for a federal form of government, and a constitution based on Islamic teachings and ideals (Burks, 1954: 551–5). This was, however, underwritten by two problems. The first problem was over the composition of the Legislative Assembly and the powers the upper and the lower chambers of the Legislative Assembly would exercise. The second problem concerned the Islamic character of the new state. As a result, in October 1953, a revised version of the Basic Principles Committee Report presented a mechanism fashioned on the GIA of 1935. To the utter displeasure of some provinces, particu- larly East Pakistan, Punjab, and North-West Frontier Province, the Report vested wide-ranging powers in the central government that included some 73 subjects while the powers of the provinces were further reduced. The Report also recommended sweeping emergency powers for the Governor- General who could declare a state of emergency if the security or economic life of Pakistan was threatened by grave internal and external developments. Declaration of the state of emergency would also empower the Governor-General to take over all powers and responsibilities of the provincial governments (Sayeed, 1954: 141).

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Additionally, the Report recommended a policy of parity between East and West Pakistan according to which both units would have equal representations in both lower and upper chambers of the Legislative Assembly. The ruling elites based in West Pakistan subsequently merged all the provinces and areas in West Pakistan into one unit in 1955 in order to create parity between East and West Pakistan. The central government adopted this measure to counter the numerical superi- ority of the Bengalis in East Pakistan but it soon gave rise to nationalist movements in Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province and Sind that had obvious fears of being dominated by Punjab – the largest and most populous part of West Pakistan. The Baluchis, the Pathans and the Sindhis lost their own provincial governments and felt alienated.

The Legislative Assembly met on 7 October 1953 to draft a new constitution without delay but the resultant wrangling slowed down the progress considerably. Citing the reason that the Assembly completely failed to draft a constitution for Pakistan, the Governor-General dissolved the Legislative Assembly in October 1954. The Second Constituent Assembly, formed subsequently, finally adopted a federal constitution on February 29, 1956, nine years after the creation of Pakistan, whereas India succeeded in crafting its own constitution in 1950, only three years after her independence.

The 1956 Constitution and Federalism The 1956 Constitution was a comprehensive document with 13 parts and 6 schedules. Apart from adopting Islamic teachings and beliefs as a part of the national life of Pakistan, it detailed the federal structure, relations between the centre and the provinces and the range of powers the central and the provincial governments would exercise in future. However, many of the provisions in the constitution were taken from the GIA 1935 and as such had much in common with the Unrepealed Constitutional Legislation, 1947 (Choudhury, 1956: 244).

Several important features marked the 1956 Constitution. Firstly, it adopted the provision of par- ity of representation between the two wings of Pakistan – East and West. This provision created con- troversy between the Bengalis and other ethnic groups in West Pakistan. The Bengalis saw it as a political ploy to deprive them of their numerical superiority. Secondly, Pakistan was designed as a parliamentary system of government with a unicameral National Legislative Assembly. Both East and West Pakistan would have equal representation in the Assembly. Thirdly, the constitution provided for delegation of considerable powers to the two constituent units. The federal government had jurisdic- tion over 30 items, including defense, foreign policy, currency and banking, and foreign trade while the provincial list of jurisdictions included 94 items. Some other areas such as railways and communica- tions, previously controlled by the centre, were vested in the provinces (Choudhury, 1956: 246–7).

The powers of the chief executive, now called the president of Pakistan, were also considerably scaled down. The constitution provided that the president would be elected by an electoral college consisting of the elected members of national and provincial assemblies, and the president must exercise powers in accordance with the constitution. The arbitrary powers previously exercised by the Governor-General were drastically reduced as the new constitution did not permit the president to dissolve the central government as long as the Prime Minister commanded the sup- port of the majority members of the National Assembly. Indeed, things boded well, at least at the initial stage, for the establishment of a democratic and federal Pakistan but the good beginning came to an abrupt end in October 1958 when the Chief of Army Staff General Ayub Khan seized political power on the ground of massive corrupt practices by political leaders, abrogated the constitution and declared martial law. General Ayub also declared himself the President of Pakistan (Stern, 2001: 129).

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Federalism under the 1962 Constitution

General Ayub Khan promised to revive democratic institutions in a way that would make democ- racy really work in Pakistan. The plan he subsequently devised and introduced in 1959 was dubbed ‘basic democracy’, an indirect democratic scheme that started with elected representatives at the village level and gradually moving up to the highest level of government (Singhal, 1962: 15–16). General Ayub got himself elected as President of Pakistan in early 1960 and soon formed a Constitution Commission on 17 February 1960 to frame a constitution combining the adaptability of democracy in the context of Pakistan and the Islamic principles of justice, equality and tolerance.

The Constitution Commission submitted its final draft constitution in March 1962. In contrast to the 1956 constitution, the new constitution marked a drastic departure from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government and the political party system was suspended for the time being. The National Assembly was given limited legislative powers and limited control over the national budget while all executive powers remained concentrated in the hands of the President, including the powers to appoint ministers, invalidate any bills passed by the Assembly and dissolve the Assembly during a period of crisis (see Singhal, 1962: 18). It sounded like that the President was a genuine dictator with a democratic garb, and his powers far exceeded even the powers of the President of the United States of America. Nothing in the constitution or in the country could in any way challenge President Ayub Khan.

Like the 1956 constitution, the new constitution of 1962 adopted the principle of parity between East and West Pakistan and the two provincial governments were designed in conformity with the central government. The provincial governments were deprived of most of the powers they had received under the 1956 constitution. The provincial governors, in contrast, were granted extraor- dinary powers to rule the two provinces by issuing ordinances while the provincial assemblies were not in session. Further, conflicts between a governor and the concerned provincial assembly were required to be referred to the National Assembly for a decision. Any decision in favor of the governor would mean the dissolution of the provincial assembly and a new round of elections. This element was incorporated in the constitution to keep the provincial assemblies under constant fear of being punished for any assertive role that would question President Ayub’s undemocratic style of rule.

East Pakistan Challenges the New Federal Arrangement President Ayub’s 1962 constitution made the Bengalis in East Pakistan quite unhappy as they viewed it as a West Pakistani mechanism to suppress their interests and aspirations. The Awami League, the dominant political party in East Pakistan, seriously took up the cause of the Bengalis and in 1966 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Awami League leader, launched the ‘Six-point Demand’ movement that, among other things, included the demand for a separate currency, a regional militia for East Pakistan and a federal form of government where the central government would delegate all powers, except defense and foreign affairs, to the two provinces. Evidently, the Six-point Demand was a response to the over-centralization of powers and the suppression of Bengali politi- cal and economic interests by President Ayub Khan. The situation took a critical turn by 1969 when President Ayub instead of addressing the Bengali demands decided to hand over power to another army officer General Yahya Khan. Under the new military administration a new round of elections was held in late 1970 in which the Awami League won the majority of National Assembly seats but was denied the right to form the central government.

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There was an immediate call for a mass movement in East Pakistan that forced the military ruler General Yahya Khan to negotiate issues involved in the transition of power to the Awami League but which produced no fruitful results (Jahan, 1972). The situation was further complicated by the late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto whose party won a majority of National Assembly seats in West Pakistan and proposed forming a coalition government on the ground that the Awami League and his own party emerged victorious respectively in the eastern and western wings of the country and hence they should share power jointly. General Yahya Khan, fearing that a central government dominated by the Awami league might reduce budgetary allocations for the military, preferred a military solution to a political problem and ordered a military crackdown on the unarmed Bengalis on 25 March 1971 that culminated in the creation of independent Bangladesh on 16 December 1971. The whole story of federalism in erstwhile United Pakistan came to a permanent end.

The Fault Lines in Federalism in United Pakistan Federalism in United Pakistan failed due to a host of multifaceted factors – political and social as well as economic. These factors are briefly highlighted below.

The Political Fault Lines Pakistan’s beginning as a federal democratic state was a correct choice but the system that devel- oped from 1947 to 1970 was neither federal nor democratic. This was because the political system was fraught with undemocratic norms and practices, the most important being the unscrupulous use of powers by the Governor-General in the initial formative years, and then the concentration of enormous powers in the executive office by late President Ayub Khan at the beginning of the 1960s. There was no single general election, nor was there any genuine national political party to spearhead the arduous task of state and nation-building. The Muslim League championed the cause of Pakistan but once Pakistan was established the immigrant Muslim League leaders found them- selves without any credible social base of support. The vacuum was filled by local and regional leaders, particularly the landlords from Punjab and Sind provinces who soon began to dominate the Muslim League leadership. The Muslim League Council at that time had a total membership of 503 and out of this number the landlords represented 163 members while 145 members came from the lawyers’ community (Alam, 1995: 26–7).

It should be mentioned that there was no Bengali Muslim landlord represented on the Muslim League Council. Most of the landlords in East Pakistan were Hindus and they migrated to India after 1947. Further, the institution of landlords in East Pakistan was permanently dismantled in 1950 when the State Assembly passed the Bengal Tenancy Act in 1950 (Abdullah, 1976). Understandably, the Muslim League did not represent the interests of the Bengalis and the ensuing political imbalance in party representation was never corrected. Such initial concerns became more acute over the course of time and the Bengalis moved in the direction of particularistic identity development by launching their regional political parties.

The Social Fault Lines By 1958 when President Ayub Khan seized power with the support of the military the basic char- acter of the West Pakistan-based ruling oligarchy had developed a solid shape. Included in this oligarchy were the high ranking military officers, top brass in the civil bureaucracy and a small

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group of West Pakistan-based emergent bourgeoisie who were looking for active state patronage for rapid advancement. The representation of the Bengalis in the oligarchy was strikingly negligible. Right after Pakistan came into being, the upper echelons of both the civil and military bureaucracies fell into the hands of the West Pakistanis. Lambert (1959: 49–58) notes that out of a total of 741 top posts in the civil bureaucracy the West Pakistanis occupied 690 posts while the Bengalis had only 51 positions and most of these were at the lower levels of the bureaucratic set-up. In the Pakistan army the Bengali Muslims occupied no top-ranking positions either. They had only 81 lower-ranking positions while the West Pakistanis occupied 2127 positions, including all the posi- tions above the rank of Brigadier General. The absence of the Bengalis from top positions in the important military and civil sectors of Pakistan meant relentless domination of the Bengalis by the West Pakistan-based civil-military oligarchy. The Bengalis gradually developed a sense of social alienation that proved harmful to the national unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan.

The Economic Fault Lines After independence in 1947, Pakistan followed a pattern of a skewed social and economic devel- opment process that had glaring anti-Bengali biases. In 1947 Pakistan, unlike India, had no well- developed bourgeois class. Pakistan got only 9.6 percent of the total industrial units, 5.3 percent of the electricity producing capacity and 6.5 percent of the industrial workers of British India (Alam 1995: 25). There was virtually no industrial capital in Pakistan. This situation changed qualitatively under President Ayub Khan. The development strategy he pursued from 1958 to 1968 consisted of three important elements: (i) private-sector-led industrialization; (ii) the policy of ‘functional inequality’; and (iii) the adoption of a ‘one economy’ thesis (Ahmed, 1980: 23). In support of this development strategy, the Ayub Khan government established the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) to underwrite industrial capital and set up other banking facilities for the private entrepreneurial class who were expected to lead the development process. A certain degree of economic inequality was tolerated by the state. Although equality in income distribution was considered desirable, growth was considered vital before income could be distributed among citizens on a fair basis (Ahmed, 1980: 426). The thesis of ‘single economy’, in a similar way, was justified on the ground that efficiency and maximization of output dictated that investment should go to the areas where maximum output and maximum profit could be made. A lion’s share of state resources and foreign aid was thus allocated for the West Pakistan- based bourgeoisie (Alam, 1995: 35).

The consequence of the development strategy was that the Bengali Muslims were denied the opportunity to develop as an entrepreneurial class. Moreover, Bengal’s revenue from agricultural resources was diverted to finance industrialization in West Pakistan. In the trade and industrial sectors, the discrimination was much more glaring. The Bengalis received a tiny share of govern- ment development expenditure, military expenses, external aid and commercial import licenses. The gap widened so much in the 24 years from 1947 to 1971 that only two Bengali business firms could find a place on a list of the top 29 business firms of Pakistan – occupying the bottom two positions. According to one study, conducted in 1959–60, Bengal Muslims owned and con- trolled only 2.5 percent of all the industrial assets of Pakistan (Papanek, 1969: 122). In one single decade from 1959–60 to 1969–70, the per capita income in West Pakistan was a recorded 61 percent higher than in East Pakistan (Choudhury, 1972: 246). Consequently, unequal wealth and resource sharing became a serious issue driving the Bengalis down the path towards a secessionist movement.

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Responses by the Ruling Oligarchy

The Pakistani civil-military oligarchy, of course, responded negatively to Bengali demands and mass protests. The government was in the habit of finding a foreign hand behind mass demonstra- tions in East Pakistan. References were often made to the Americans and the Indians as the instiga- tors of political violence in East Pakistan (Choudhury, 1972: 245). The proponents of the Bengali cause and interests were frequently branded as the enemies of Islam as well as of Pakistan. The President and other top officials of Pakistan regularly reminded the Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan of their religious responsibilities to keep away from disruptive activities planned against the state. This was rather an attempt to divert public attention from the core political, social and economic issues in dispute. East Pakistani political leaders, particularly Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh, were also charged with complicity with India to break up the new state of Pakistan, a form of political repression that only fomented separatist tendencies in East Pakistan. The important issues of central government’s disregard for regional and ethnic interests, resource sharing, over-centralization of powers, etc., were never accorded due to significance.

Afghanistan and Iraq Perspectives The current experiences of state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq, as post-occupation develop- ments indicate, are progressing along similar lines to the events in United Pakistan between 1947 and 1971. The basic difference is that while Pakistan was free of foreign occupation and direct interference, Afghanistan and Iraq are building state institutions and structures under the shadow of American military presence. Another big difference is the ongoing armed conflicts and vio- lence that continue to characterize political development processes both in Afghanistan and Iraq while United Pakistan was free of such domestic violence and armed conflicts. Apart from these differences, the two countries are experiencing similar obstacles to building their state institutions and promoting a strong sense of national identity reflective of the common feelings and popular aspirations of their peoples.

The State of Afghanistan and the Question of Federalism Historically, Afghanistan has never been a Western-type modern state based on a strong collective national identity (although the diverse ethnic groups share some sense of Afghan national identity), with a well-defined and nationally accepted constitutional framework permitting a democratic system of governance, and a viable domestic resource base to provide essential economic goods for its people. The origins of Afghanistan lie in its tribal character and the pattern of dominance by the Pashtuns, the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan (Parvanta, 2001). Ahmed Shah Durrani (1722–1772), the founder of Afghanistan, established this country as a tribal confederacy in 1747 by uniting the different Pashtun tribes, ruling over it with the support of a council of tribal chiefs (the Jirga). Subsequent Afghan rulers depended on tribal and Islamic traditions to gain legitimacy and the tribal chiefs were usually hostile to modernity. Amanullah Kahn’s reform programs (1919–1929) to introduce modern education and rights of universal citizenship to strengthen accountability and promote the legality of the state, for example, were resisted by tribal chiefs and religious elites (Cramer and Goodhand, 2002: 893).

The Musahiban monarchs who ruled Afghanistan from 1929 to 1978 were adept in balancing between religious and tribal traditions on the one hand and gradual social and political reforms on