

and Huff, 1993; Martin, 1992; Vigil, 2010). Although many of these programs share common ground in defining their goals (e.g., reduction in drug abuse, violence, and gang membership), they have adopted strategies that range from increased education about violence prevention to community-based centers that provide an array of services (e.g., self-esteem enhancement, job training, drug counseling, crisis intervention, etc.). Some offer recreational alternatives to gang activities (e.g., basketball, football, etc.). The strategies adopted by these programs frequently overlap. Nearly all of these programs suffer from sporadic and insufficient funding, more and more a result of legislative priority shifts from community-based services to law-enforcement interventions. Many of these programs were propagated from community grassroots movements, while others have religious foundations, and some have formed alliances with components of the criminal justice system (Martin, 1992).

One of the most popular and long-lasting gang intervention programs has been the "detached worker" program (Goldstein, 1993: 22–32). Such efforts date as far back as the mid-nineteenth century with settlement houses, Boy Scouts, Boys Clubs, and others. The Chicago Area Projects of the 1920s and 1930s utilized various kinds of detached worker programs. By the 1960s, such programs could be found in most large urban areas (New York, Boston, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco, among others). Unfortunately, the results of these kinds of programs have been disappointing. The theoretical rationale of such programs is that instead of bringing gang youths to programs, the programs should be brought to the gang youths themselves, in their own community or turf. Detached worker programs have typically involved various kinds of social work and counseling interventions, including recreational activities, tutoring, family and individual counseling, casework, and job training. These programs have also included various kinds of control efforts (e.g., surveillance), treatment (usually based on psychoanalytic perspectives), providing various opportunities (educational, recreational, and/or employment), and changing values. The last (changing values), which over time became one of the main goals of these programs, involved a rechanneling of the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of gang youths in more positive directions.

The results of detached worker programs have been mostly negative. For example, the Roxbury Project evaluated by W. B. Miller (1974) failed to significantly alter the anti-social behavior of the gang youths who participated. The Los Angeles Group Guidance Project actually made things worse, as delinquency among gang members increased, especially for those who received the most attention from the detached workers (Klein, 1968, 1995). One of the main reasons for the failure of most of these programs is the lack of program integrity.

As Goldstein (1993: 27–32) notes, many programs suffer from high staff turnover, low or inadequate funding, low staff morale, bureaucratic red tape, and extremely high caseloads (sometimes as high as 1 caseworker to 92 youths), among other problems. Many programs suffer from the fact that the workers are not as "detached" as the theory suggests they should be, with many spending the bulk of their time in the office or traveling alone from one spot to another. Further, most programs failed to have direct delinquency-reduction techniques and

offered no techniques tailored to different kinds of gang youths (e.g., hard-core versus marginal members, aggressive youths versus nonaggressive youths). Finally, detached worker programs have not been comprehensive enough; the workers were not adequately trained and were often overworked.

Another common type of gang-intervention program is one that involves opportunities provisions. Such programs have attempted to attack the multiple problems facing gang youths—unemployment, low wages, lack of recreational and educational opportunities, poor health, inadequate housing, and other problems. Among the most popular programs addressing these factors have been Mobilization for Youth (a New York program based on Cloward and Ohlin's [1960] theory), the Latino Hills Projects (Miller, 1974), the Citywide Mural Project (Albuquerque), the New York City Police Probation Diversion Project, the House of Umoja (Philadelphia), and the Community Access Team, Youth Enterprises, and SEY Yes programs (all in the Southern California area) (Goldstein, 1993: 34–35). Opportunities provisions programs have not been systematically evaluated. There is a great deal of anecdotal and impressionistic evidence that such programs are effective, as the survey by Spengel and Curry (1990) found.

Some Major Gang-Control Programs. In this section, we briefly summarize six major gang control programs identified by Klein and Maxson (2006, Ch. 3). They selected these programs because they were major multi-million dollar efforts that included full-scale evaluations. What is interesting about their discussion is that Klein and Maxson conceptualized these programs as ideological, political, or bureaucratic. The "ideological" programs were all initiated by law-enforcement agencies, which led to "a narrow conception of street gangs and yielded an uncompromising police presence in the program, without recourse to alternative social and community resources" (Klein and Maxson, 2006: 89). The L.A. Plan and the Gang Resistance, Education, and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) program are included within the ideological category. The one "political" program was initiated by the attorney general of Illinois (a program that included "a number of easy-to-swallow social and educational initiatives quite devoid of gang-related reasoning"), which ended up with no evaluation (Klein and Maxson, 2006).

The "bureaucratic" programs included L.A. Bridges (set up by a city bureaucracy called the Community Development Department of Los Angeles) and the Safe Futures program (a branch of the U.S. Department of Justice).

What do these programs have in common? What connects them (aside from the obvious concern with gangs) "is their reliance on conventional wisdom, albeit quite different versions thereof." By "conventional wisdom" Klein and Maxson mean "the combination of untested assumptions and relatively unchallenged facts that we normally take to represent truth" (2006: 90). For the most part, the convention wisdom of these programs was rooted in the deterrence theory that became so popular in the 1980s and 1990s.

The L.A. Plan consisted of six different programs: 1) Community Youth Resources Gang Services, 2) Operation Safe Streets (OSS) and Community Resources