Analytical Report Help

To: Emergency Management Class 5391

From: Eric J. Neal

Date: March 21, 2019

Re: Identification and Description of Participants

Class 5391,

The explosion in West Texas, on April17, 2013, created a lot of questions about safety when responding to incidents. The number one question being how to prevent this type of incident from occurring again. The primary goal of any first responder is life safety, followed by property conservation. Life safety involves the responders taking the risks. A preplan could have revealed the dangers associated with the West Fertilizer Plant explosion and saved the lives of those involved. The responders killed the day of the explosion were unaware of the amount of ammonia nitrate stored inside the fertilizer plant, which led to a miscalculation of danger while attempting to extinguish the fire. The West Volunteer Fire Department was staffed with a competent personal, but without preplanning of facility, they didn’t know the dangers they were facing. An investigation report written states,

“The lack of adherence to nationally recognized consensus standards and safety practices for the fire department exposed firefighters to excessive risks and failed to remove them from a critically dangerous situation. The strategy and tactics utilized by the West Volunteer Fire Department were not appropriate for the rapidly developing and extremely-volatile situation, and exposed the firefighters to extreme risks. The predominant factors identified in the analysis of the fire department operations included the following: 1. There were no incident command system and senior ranking members did not perform supervisory roles. 2. The essential duties of an incident commander were not performed. 3. The emergency scene operation was conducted in an unstructured and uncoordinated manor, without overall direction and without adequate supervision.” (Investigation Number FFF FY 13-06)

OSHA is constantly challenged by the act of supply and demand. It is obvious the Fertilizer Plant was overloaded with more than the recommended amount of ammonia nitrite and didn’t store the materials correctly. Prior to the explosion site inspections were not completed as recommended due to a lackadaisical system. An article written by James Drew states, “

■ Sixty-two of 115 facilities registered to handle ammonium nitrate in fiscal 2013 lacked either secure fencing or locked storage areas.

■ The law says an ammonium nitrate storage facility must be “fenced or otherwise enclosed and locked when unattended.” The state chemist says a facility fails inspection if it lacks both secure fencing and locked storage areas, and added that there were no such failures in fiscal 2013.

■ Using that double criteria, The News found two facilities in the state’s records that should have failed inspection in the last fiscal year and 40 over the fiscal 2008-13 period.

■ The agency said it did not tally the number of failed inspections until receiving inquiries from The News and other public record requests. Last week, the agency’s director said it had always kept such a tally.

■ Under the law, the agency does not have the power to issue fines. The law also does not give the agency authority to address other issues, such as whether facilities pose a fire hazard, have security cameras or are too close to schools or homes.” (Drew, pg. 1, 2013)

Without the assurance that inspectors are doing their jobs and making facilities safer for employees and the immediate environment, companies will continue to push the envelope to maximize profits, while violating codes. Also first responders have to stay current with fire preplans for business, schools and others fire targets that may pose danger to the public. If both OSHA and West Volunteer fire department did these things, the result undoubtedly would have been different, prevented the loss of life on that very day.

References:

Drew, J. Jacob, M. Law's lax standards may endanger lives. Many facilities without secure areas rarely failed checks

Texas State Fire Marshal - 2013 - Firefighter Fatality Investigation.pdf