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Chapter 1

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIV ES:

THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

What experience and history teaches us is that people and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it. -Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Since the dawn of time, humankind has had the need to deal with crises of all types. For much of history, this response was personal and intimate, and the victim did not always survive the encounter. As people grouped together for the common good, the idea of some sort of collective response to crisis gradually evolved. As governments came into being, this idea became an expectation that it was part of the responsibility of government to provide protection and assistance in times of crisis. From this expectation came the discipline of emergency management, the mechanism by which government discharges this perceived obligation.

Emergency management rests on three pillars as follows: a knowledge of his tory, an understanding of human nature expressed in the social sciences, and specialized technical expertise in crisis management. History tells us what hap pened , suggesting what events could occur again, and provides examples of how others have dealt with crisis. Social science suggests why people react to crisis in certain ways and why some methods of crisis management succeed and others fail. The technical expertise demanded of the emergency manager addresses how crisis is managed, both in the immediate response, but more importantly, in the development of strategies to reduce risk and build community resilience. This chapter and the one that follows consider the first leg of the tripod on which emergency management rests, that of historical perspective.

Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition. Lucien G. Canton.

2 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

WHY STUDY HISTORY?

In a posting to the email list service for the International Association for Emergency Managers, a veteran emergency manager asked the question: "Given our advances in technology, what can we possibly learn from past disas ters?" His query was prompted by a student's request for i11f ormation on bio terrorism response and the suggestion by several members that the student examine historical disasters, particularly the Flu Pandemic of 1918 (Figure 1.1). The emergency manager asked the question as to how an eaJ·ly twentieth century response using limited technology could have relevance for a practi tioner in the twenty-first century, where mass communication is almost instantaneous and modern methods of treatment and diagnosis are so much further advanced. It is a reasonable question.

A slightly different way of phrasing the question is "Does the study of the history of disasters have any relevance for emergency managers?" The answer is a resounding, "Yes!"

It is common to look at an institution, process, or system and assume that it sprang into existence as the result of conscious decision-making. In other words, there is an assumption that the end result is what was intended all along. In reality, institutions tend to develop and evolve over time and are influenced by a variety of factors. The result is almost always an imperfect system that is

Figure 1.1 Emergency hospital during the 1918 influenza pandemic, Camp Funston, Kansas. Source: Courtesy of U.S. Army Photo.

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 3

a result of compromises between an ideal state and political and economic real ities, many of which shift over time. Understanding how an institution devel oped can tell a lot about why it operates the way it does and the likelihood of its changing or adapting to future conditions.

The study of historical disasters offers a number of benefits to the emergency manager:

• Historical Disasters Suggest What Could Happen in a Community. In con ducting a hazard analysis, many planners are driven by the immediate past or by disasters that had a major impact on the community. For example, emergency planners in San Francisco are heavily influenced by the memory of the 1906 earthquake and fires and by the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. On the other hand, New Yorkers plan almost exclusively for terrorist attack, a legacy of the 11 September 2001 tragedy. Few San Franciscans are aware that hazards such as tsunamis and tornadoes have occurred in the history of their city or that an outbreak of the plague occurred in the early 1900s. Likewise, many New Yorkers would be surprised to find that a fault line runs under Manhattan Island.

• Historical Disasters Identify Hazards That are Foreseeable. Emergency planners are expected to identify and plan for hazards that could have an impact on the community. Events that are foreseeable are of particular concern as the question is always asked after the event "Why didn't we plan for this?" Prior to 11 September 2001, would anyone have thought that an airplane could be used to attack a building? Possibly not, but the possi bility of an airplane flying into a building was foreseeable. On 28 July 1945, a military bomber whose pilot was disoriented by fog and drizzle crashed into the Empire State Building, igniting a major fire and forcing the evac uation of 1500 people. This historical incident did in fact influence building design throughout the United_States. These design parameters helped pre vent the immediate collapse of the World Trade Center buildings and allowed the safe evacuation of thousands of occupants.

• Historical Disasters Provide Long-range Views of Potential Hazards. By nature, people tend to focus on the near term and on incidents that are part of institutional memory. However, a brief review of the historical record, particularly those events involving geological hazards, can give one pause. Prior to the 1990s, few remembered the series of earthquakes that shook New Madrid, Missouri, in 1811-1812. Yet these were among the largest earthquakes in history, changed the course of the Mississippi River, destroyed almost 150 000 acres of forest, and were felt throughout most of the United States. The overall impact was low because of the sparse population of the region at the time. The probability of a similar earth quake is estimated at 90% by 2040 and would result in great loss of life and billions in damages.

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• Historical Disasters Provide Examples of the Social Impacts of Disasters. When most people think of disaster, they think in terms of immediate needs and the response to the consequences of the event. An emergency manager, however, must be concerned with the long-range impact of the event and the need to restore the community to some semblance of normalcy. By studying the long-range impact of historical disasters, it may be possible to make rea sonable assumptions as to what might occur. While the Black Death of the 1300s is remembered for its toll on human lives, it had a profound impact on the economics and social contracts of the Middle Ages, leading ultimately to increased wages, better living conditions, and the end of the feudal system. In his book, Krakatoa: The Day the World Exploded: August 2 7, 1883, author Simon Winchester suggested that the eruption of Krakatoa exacerbated anti-Dutch sentiment and contributed to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Eastern Pacific.

• Historical Disasters Provide Examples of Cascading Events. Cascading events are disasters in which an initial incident creates a ripple effect that triggers additional disasters or expands to encompass areas that would otherwise be unaffected by the incident. Such an event was the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan that spawned a tsunami and lead to a meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The historical record is replete with many other such events. In April 1815, Mount Tambora , an island east of Java, exploded, spewing an estimated 1. 7 million tons of ash and debris into the atmosphere and casting a blanket of ash over 1 million square miles. The lighter ash formed a barrier at an altitude of some 25 miles that reflected sunlight back into space, resulting in a cold wave in 1816 that sparked world-wide crop failure and famine. A similar record of unseasonable cold and famine found in Dark Age chronicles has also been associated with a volcanic event in the Pacific .

• Historical Disasters are Focusing Events. Social scientist Thomas Birkland (1994) defined a focusing event as an unexpected event of such consequence that it causes the public and elite decision-makers to recognize a potential policy failure. A focusing event is a combination of factors that frequently result in significant changes to public policy. For example the Triangle Waist Factory fire in New York on 25 March 1911 was not particularly significant as a fire. The fire.lasted less than 20 minutes and only affected the three top floors of a 10-story building . However, poor safety practices led to the deaths of 146 workers, most of whom were young immigrant women, making the fire the deadliest industrial disaster in the city's his tory. It occurred at a time when the women's labor movement was at a high point and well organized, drawing the attention of Tammany Hall politi cians who were seeking to remain in power. The result was the passage of some 38 new laws that significantly improved safety and working condi tions in New York State.

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LESSONS FROM HISTORY

The gift shop at Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s Emergency Management Institute in Emmitsburg, Maryland, used to offer a T-shirt with a cartoon of Noah's Ark and the caption "The Original Emergency Manager." One can certainly make a case for this: Noah conducted a hazard analysis based on a reliable weather forecast and the potential for catastrophic loss of life and developed and implemented plans to mitigate the effects of the coming calamity (selection of the animals) and to respond to it (the construction of the ark). At the onset of the event, he implemented his plan, conducted a preplanned evac uation, and managed a sustained shelter and feeding operation for 40 days and 40 nights. At the end of the incident, he implemented a recovery plan by releasing his animals and re-establishing a community.

Whether or not Noah is the original emergency manager, there is no question that as long as there have been disasters, people have attempted to avoid them and deal with the consequences. One could make the argument that primitive attempts to touch and influence the Divine through sacrifice and ritual are in fact an early form of mitigation, an attempt to avoid disaster or reduce its impact by placating some outside force. The myths and legends that predate recorded history contain many examples of attempts to stave off or prepare for catastrophe, many of which may have been inspired by actual historical inci dents. Stories of a great flood are common to all cultures, and variations on the story of Noah can be found in the Sumerian tales of Gilgamesh, in the Indian stories of Vishnu, and even in the Popul Vuh of the Mayans. Ancient texts also contain examples of more prosaic attempts to mitigate catastrophe: The Book of Genesis tells of Joseph's stockpiling of grain against the predicted years of famine in Egypt.

These early legends of catastrophe are more than just simple stories. In many cases, archeological evidence suggests that they might in fact be records of actual historical disasters. Geologists Walter Pitman and William Ryan in their book, Noah's Flood: The New Scientific Discoveries about the Event That Changed History, theorize that Noah's flood may recall an event in 5600 BCE that led to the formation of the Black Sea . According to the theory, the sudden formation of the Bosporus Strait caused the Mediterranean Sea to flood into an existing freshwater lake at the rate of IO cubic miles of water per day (about two hundred times the rate of Niagara Falls), creating what is now known as the Black Sea. Plato's writings on Atlantis in 350 BCE, although generally regarded as myth, may in fact be related to the volcanic destruction of the island of Thera c. 1628 BCE that may have hastened the end of the Minoan civilization in the Aegean.

Not all ancient disasters are accessible only as myths. Historians of all ages have evinced an interest in disaster, and those of the Classical Age were no different. Many of their accounts are factual records based on firsthand observation.

6 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Thucydides provides a vivid description of the plague that struck Athens in 430- 428 BCE and presaged the end of the Golden Age of Greece. Thucydides' record is of particular interest as he contracted and survived the plague.

Perhaps the most gripping eyewitness account of catastrophe is Pliny the Eider's description of the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and the destruction of Pompeii and Herculaneum in 62 BCE (Figure 1.2). While a minor footnote in history now, modern scientists have estimated that the eruption of Mount Vesuvius released thermal energy equivalent to 100 000 times that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945. The consummate naturalist, Pliny chose to leave a safe vantage point in Misenum and move closer to Pompeii to make more detailed observations from the deck of a small galley. He recorded his observations moment by moment until he collapsed and died, most likely from a heart attack brought on by overexertion.

Accounts of catastrophe such as those of Thucydides and Pliny offer more than just historical interest. In many cases, they contain detailed observations of the onset and effects of the event. These accounts also chronicle the reaction of people affected by disaster and allow one to draw conclusions about human nature. The reaction of people to catastrophe in the past is not significantly different from those in the present time.

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Figure 1.2 Mount Vesuvius from space. Source: Courtesy of National Aeronautics and Space Administration .

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30- As one considers the historical record, it is also possible to identify precur- ord sors to modern emergency management concepts. Over time, one begins to

note the demand by people that their governments provide them with protec- the tion against potential disasters, leading to striking parallels to current emergency of management concepts and methods. This suggests that there may be a certain

! m commonality in how humans respond to crisis. This gives rise to the specula- L1nt tion that there may be certain default mechanisms for crisis response that are me both natural and comfortable. If so, the closer emergency plans resemble this ist, mechanism, the more effective they are likely to be. ,en Elements of emergency management make their appearance early in recorded led history. In response to public demand that something be done about the fires :ely that frequently plagued Rome, the Emperor Augustus established a brigade of

vigiles in 6 CE who served as firefighters and night watchmen. The brigade ore consisted of seven cohorts of 560 men each, with each cohort responsible for ms two of Rome's 14 districts. A special detail of 320 vigiles was drawn from the lon Roman cohorts and rotated to the ports of Ostia and Portus every four months. tan The vigiles were stationed in seven major barracks and 14 watchtowers and 1tly performed nightly patrols to ensure the safe use of fires and lamps. In addition

to the expected hooks, axes, ladders, rope, and buckets, equipment included high-pressure water pumps capable of reaching to a height of 60-l00ft. Each cohort also had four physicians and the Roman equivalent of a chaplain, the victimarius, assigned to it. The parallels to modern firefighting organizations are striking.

In the plague that struck Europe in 1348 (Figure 1.3), one can see reflections of modern fears of bioterrorism or pandemics, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or Asian bird flu or Ebola, and of modern emergency management practices. The arrival of the disease was stunningly swift: within three years, anywhere from 25% to 50% of Europe's population had been killed. Major cities such as Florence, Venice, Hamburg, and Bremen lost at least 60% of their populations. Paris lost 50 000 people, half of its population. Many of the problems and solutions found in the plague record are reminiscent of those faced by twenty-first century responders. To deal with the vast number of sick people, makeshift hospitals, usually run by the clergy or volunteers, were established. These hospitals would have looked remarkably similar to the tem porary hospitals of 1918 shown in Figure 1.1. The large number of dead almost immediately overwhelmed the churches that normally disposed of remains through burial in consecrated ground, forcing the use of mass graves and cre mation, techniques that are still used in disasters despite the fact that such practices are unnecessary and create severe problems for the victims' families. Cremation and mass burial continue to be used for the same reasons they were used in the Middle Ages: fear of contagion and a misunderstanding of the health hazards posed by mass fatalities.

8 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Figure 1.3 The Dance of Death by Michael Wolgemut (1434-1519) was inspired by the Black Death and was a common theme in medieval art.

The Black Death forced a reexamination of traditional medical practices. Up to this point, many treatments were based on biblical cures and traditional remedies. The almost universal failure of these remedies resulted in their replacement by techniques based on observed results. In some cases, observa tion supported traditional methods. For example, the frequent misdiagnosis of the plague as leprosy led to the imposition of a biblically mandated 40-day quarantine. Despite this misdiagnosis, physicians noted that quarantining those ill with plague helped to protect others. The success of this practice led in turn to harsh quarantine restrictions in several areas. The city of Pistoia ceased all imports of wool and linen and barred citizens who had visited plague-ridden towns from reentering the city. In other locations, such as Milan, houses where the plague appeared were sealed up, with both the dead and living inside. Other jurisdictions used fire to burn out the contagion. These measures did result in slowing the spread of the disease.

The outbreak of SARS (Figure 1.4) in 2003 forced a reexamination of the use of quarantine as a method for preventing the spread of contagion. The epi demic began in November 2002 and came to public attention in February 2003. In April, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued an advisory recom mending only essential travel to Toronto, Canada, based on the number of cases there and concerns over the potential spread of the disease to other coun tries. However, only one confirmed case of SARS was "exported" from Canada, and new cases were all from among medical personnel who had treated SARS

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Figure 1.4 The spread of SARS virus as of 28 March 2003, about a month after the initial outbreak in February. Source: Librar y of Congress Geography and Map Division.

patients and who were subjected to severe quarantine restrictions. Nevertheless, the WHO persisted in prompting similar advisories from other countries that resulted in a severe blow to tourism in Canada. In the reaction of the WHO, one hears echoes from Pistoia.

The relationship between disaster and attempts to prevent its reoccurrence or reduce its impact is one that repeats itself throughout history. The Great Fire of London in 1666 (Figure 1.5) offers another example of this relation ship. Started by a careless baker who had failed to douse his oven fire at night,

10 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Figure 1.5 London, as it appeared from Bankside, Southwark, during the Great Fire - From a print by Nicolaes Visscher. Source: Robert Chambers, Book of Days, 1864.

the fire burned for five days and destroyed some 436 acres, most within the City of London. Eighty-seven churches and 13 200 houses, about 90% of the city's houses, were destroyed and between 100 000 to 200 000 people were left home less. Oddly, only six fatalities are recorded, although there is anecdotal evidence that the initial toll was much higher and increased over time as survivors suc cumbed to disease and starvation. (Inaccurate casualty figures are common in historical accounts: until 2005, the official death toll for the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire was only 478. Research by historian Gladys Hansen con vinced the board of supervisors to amend the official count in 2005 to over 3400. The original number had been deliberately distorted for political reasons.)

Following the fire, houses were rebuilt from brick and stone instead of wood and thatch to reduce the risk of fire. Insurance companies were chartered to provide both insurance indemnification and, in some cases, firefighting com panies that would attempt to rescue insured properties. A water main system of hollowed tree trunks was laid under city streets to provide water to firefighters, who would dig down to the main and drill a hole to access the water. (The wooden plug used to seal the hole is the origin of the term "fireplug" still in use today.)

These examples of historical disasters demonstrate a number of key points. First, they emphasize that while catastrophic events often seem sudden and unexpected, in many cases, they are at least foreseeable. This unwillingness to see the possibility of catastrophe and to instead treat foreseeable disasters as "Acts of God" is a common theme throughout history. The refusal of the Lord Mayor to deal with London's fire risk in 1666 is echoed again in the failure of San Francisco's Mayor Schmitz to act on the warnings of his fire chief prior to

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 11

the earthquake and fires in 1906. The potential for failure of the New Orleans levee system was well known prior to Hurricane Katrina, but little was done to prevent it .

A study of historical disaster shows another disturbing trend: the practice of preparing to deal with the last catastrophe instead of considering all possible hazards. The Great Plague of London had begun in 1664 and reached its peak in 1665, killing 68 596 (this is the official figure, but it is highly likely the total exceeded 100 000). The primary concern of the citizens of London, despite warnings and predictions of destruction by fire that included a letter of con cern from King Charles II to the Lord Mayor, was plague, not fire. One sees the same pattern in the focus on nuclear war planning in the civil defense era that resulted in inadequate response during Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The overwhelming emphasis on terrorism prevention and response after September 11 at the expense of all-hazards planning and the resulting debacle during Hurricane Katrina is yet another example.

A subtler lesson , however, is how quickly good emergency management practices can deteriorate. London had a firefighting capability similar to that established by Augustus in Rome in the first century. However, when the legions withdrew in 451 CE, the system was allowed to fall into disuse. William the Conqueror had established a law in the eleventh century requiring that all fires be put out at night to reduce the danger from fire (called couvre-feu or "cover fire" from which we derive the modern term "curfew"), but this was not well enforced in 1666. Building codes that dated from the twelfth century requiring party walls to be built of stone were likewise unheeded.

There are similar parallels to San Francisco in 1906. The city had suffered from several major fires throughout its brief history and had established a series of underground cisterns to provide firefighters with emergency water sources, the first being built in 1852. By 1866, a system of some 50 cisterns was in place across the city. The last cistern was built in 1872, at which time the city had 64 cisterns with a capacity of 3million gallons. The advent of volunteer fire departments and the development of steam pumps made the system obsolete in the public mind, and cisterns were routinely used to dispose of rubbish or were destroyed during construction. By 1906, only 23 cisterns were still listed as active, the rest being considered "lost." Pleas by fire chiefs for funding for the system, including Dennis Sullivan in 1905, went unheeded, with catastrophic results.

History also holds the lessons of those who got it right. The first "modern" disaster is considered to be the Lisbon earthquake of 175 5 . The earthquake and the tsunami that followed were the eighteenth-century equivalent of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004 or the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011. The response by the Marquis of Pombal was effective because it was based on a long-range strategy that incorporated reconstruction, economic incentives for growth, and mitigation against future disasters (see Case Study 1.1).

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CASE STUDY 1.1: THE LISBON EARTHQUAKE

OF 1755-COORDINATED DISASTER RESPONSE

At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of 1 November 1755, Lisbon, Portugal, was struck by an

earthquake estimated to be close to 9.0 on the Richter scale that lasted anywhere from three

to six minutes. The temblor spawned a tsunami that struck the city In three waves shortly after

the earthquake. Cooking fires and candles in the debris sparked a series of fires that burned

for five days. About 85% of Lisbon's buildings were destroyed, and as many as 90 000

citizens, roughly one-third of the city's population, are thought to have been killed. In all, the

earthquake and tsunamis claimed between 60 000 to 100 000 lives worldwide, and the

shockwaves were felt as far away as Finland and North Africa.

Case Figure 1.1 Lisbon, Portugal was virtually destroyed on 1 November 1755 by an earthquake, tsunami, and fire. From a copper engraving dated 1755. Source: Courtesy of the National

Information Service for Earthquake Engineering (NISEE), University of California, Berkeley.

The response to the Lisbon earthquake is the first example of a coordinated

government relief effort. Sebastiao Jose de Carvalho e Melo, later the first Marquis of Pombal,

took charge by order of the King and directed the chief justice to appoint 12 district leaders

with emergency powers. Gallows were erected to deter looters, and at least 34 such looters

were executed. Pombal ordered the Portuguese army to surround the city to prevent workers

from leaving and to provide transportation for the delivery of food from outside the city. Food

prices were controlled to prevent gouging. Fishing was encouraged, and taxes were

suspended for fish sold in the impacted area. Workers were then pressed into service in

debris clearance and body recovery. Contrary to the customs of the time, Pombal directed the

disposal of remains by mass burial at sea.

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As the situation came under control, Pombal turned to reconstruction. Almost

immediately, he ordered military engineers to draw up new plans for a redesigned city. He

ordered a survey of property rights and claims and passed legislation to prevent evictions and

to control rents. Debris was sorted to salvage building materials. Most importantly, Pombal

had scholars study the effects of earthquakes on building design and incorporated the results during reconstruction, creating the first seismically protected structures In the world and

giving birth to the science of seismology. Pombal's response to the Lisbon earthquake is significant because he used an

approach that not only addressed immediate issues but also looked toward the future. It was

not enough, for example to feed the hungry; by using economic incentives in suspending the tax on fish, he encouraged the development of a new industry and potential tax base. Pombal

had a clear vision; prior to the earthquake, he had been dedicated to modernizing Portugal

and increasing its influence throughout the world. He viewed the earthquake as a mere delay

in achieving that goal and focused his efforts on restoring the city of Lisbon as quickly as

possible. He used the opportunity presented by the earthquake to build a better, safer city.

Recommended Reading Shrady, N. (2008). The Last Day: Wrath, Ruin, and Reason In the Great Lisbon Earthquake of 1755.

New York, NY: Viking.

The Lisbon earthquake is also significant because it marks the beginning of a change of attitude toward the nature of disaster itself. For much of recorded history, disasters have been viewed as "Acts of God." Viewed this way, disasters are beyond control and nothing can be done to prevent them from happening. However, the Lisbon earthquake occurred in the middle of the Age of Enlightenment, at a time when reason was valued over traditional beliefs. In this context, there was an attempt to define disasters in scientific terms and to view them as "Acts of Nature," implying that disasters could be both explained and affected by human action.

It is also interesting to note that one of the reasons Lisbon's recovery was so effective was that it fit in with the long-term vision of the community. The Marquis of Pombal had been working for years to make Portugal a significant world power. The earthquake afforded an opportunity for advancing his vision through a program of modernization during reconstruction. This integration of community vision into reconstruction is a precursor of what in now known as holistic disaster recovery.

The study of historical disasters is also a study of the record of progress in public protection. Tragically, it sometimes takes a catastrophe for people and government to make the social changes necessary for effective mitigation and response. As was noted, the Great Fire of London spurred the development of improved fire prevention methods and led to the growth of fire insurance. San Francisco today has a system of cisterns that are regularly maintained. Smaller events likewise played a role: the explosion at Port Chicago of a fully loaded

14 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Liberty ship on 17 July 1944 and the subsequent mutiny by black sailors that followed led to integration of the US Navy.

Not all disasters lead to progress. Following the Texas City disaster on 16 April 1947, the survivors sued the US government for negligence in preventing the explosion of two ships loaded with ammonium nitrate bound for farmers in Europe (see Case Study 1.2). The case was the first class action lawsuit against the US government and went all the way to the Supreme Court. Although a lower court had found for the plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court determined that the government was not liable for negligent planning decisions on the part of subordinate agencies, thus establishing a pre sumption of limited governmental liability that continues to this day.

THE ADVENT OF DISASTER LEGISLATION

As one studies the history of disaster, one soon notices a trend over time for governments to become increasingly involved in emergency management. Hence, one sees rulers such as Augustus and William I establishing rudimen-

CASE STUDY 1.2: THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER

1947 - GOVERNMENT NEGLIGENCE

Shortly before 8:00 a.m. on 16 April 1947, In the port of Texas City, Texas, a fire was discovered in the hold of the Grandcamp, a former mothballed Liber ty Ship that had been provided by the United States government to assist in Europe's reconstruction. T he vessel was loaded with 7700tons of ammonium nitrate, along with small arms ammunition and other

goods, and was loading in Texas City because the Port of Houston did not allow the loading of such dangerous cargo.

Efforts to extinguish the fire were Ineffective, in part because the French captain did not want to ruin his cargo by dousing it with water. Instead, he ordered the hatches closed and

covered with tar paulin, turned off the ventilators, and turned on the steam system. It was only when the heat forced the crew off the ship that the fire department was finally notified.

At approximately 9:12 a.m., the Grandcamp exploded, hurling huge metal fragments, some weighing several tons, which sparked numerous fires as they ripped through buildings and oil storage tanks In nearby refineries. The blast was said to have knocked people off their

feet in Galveston, 10miles away, and shattered windows in Houston, 40miles away. The shockwave was felt In Louisiana, some 250 miles away.

Moored at the adjoining slip to the Grandcamp was another Liber ty Ship, the Grandf/yer, loaded with 900tons of ammonium nitrate and 1 800tons of sulfur. The explosion on the Grandcamp set this ship ablaze, forcing the crew to evacuate after an hour of

firefighting. The Grandf/yer exploded at about midnight, adding to the carnage. The Texas City explosion is considered the worst industrial disaster in US history. T he

official death toll was 581, with an additional 113 missing, and over 5000 injured. Over 500 homes were destroyed, displacing some 2000 people. Damage was estimated at over $600million (in 1947 dollars).

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Case Figure 1.2 Aerial view of the Monsanto plant, refinery structures, and port after the 1947 Texas City Disaster, photograph, 16 April 1947. Source: Courtesy of University of North Texas

Libraries, T he Portal to Texas History, crediting Moore Memorial Public Library.

The explosion spawned hundreds of lawsuits against the federal government. Many of these were consolidated in a class action suit, Elizabeth Dalehite, et al. v. United States. On 13 April 1950, the district court found for the plaintiffs , citing numerous acts of omission and commission on the part of 168 government agencies that resulted in the explosions. The Fifth US Circuit Court reversed the decision on the basis that the district court had no jurisdiction to find the government as a whole liable for the negligence of subordinate agencies. The Federal Tort Claims Act, the legislation under which the suit was brought exempts "failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty," and the court found that all the acts of commission or omission were discretionary in nature . The Supreme Court, in a four to three opinion, affirmed the ruling in 1953.

The decision in Elizabeth Dalehite, et al. v. United States is significant because it affirmed the protections of government agencies against personal responsibility. There was no question that the government was negligent. Justice Robert Jackson noted this in his minority opinion, " ... the disaster was caused by forces set in motion by the government, completely controlled or controllable by it. Its causative factors were far beyond the knowledge or control of the victims." However, the fear was that a victory for the plaintiffs

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16 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

(continued from previous page)

would paralyze government and open the door for many more lawsuits of a similar nature.

The need to protect the government's ability to act, to exercise "discretion," was paramount.

Justice Stanley Reed alluded to this in his majority opinion, "Congress exercised care to

protect the government from claims, however negligently caused, that affected governmental

functions."

Recommended Reading Minutaglio, B. (2003). City On Fire: The Forgotten Disaster that Devastated a Town and Ignited a

Landmark Legal Battle. New York: Harper Collins.

tary fire codes and committing public resources to enforce them. Following the Black Death, towns in Italy in the 1350s started to implement initiatives aimed at controlling public sanitation. In London following the Great Fire, the government issued charters to insurance companies to support fire suppression efforts. However, these measures were based almost exclusively on a disaster that had occurred or were specific to a regularly occurring hazard. While gov ernments acknowledged their responsibility to act during a crisis, they tradi tionally did little to either mitigate potential effects or to build the capacity to respond. Instead, they tended to be driven by focusing events.

In these days of perceived entitlement to disaster relief from the government, it is startling to many to find that this was neither the intentional consequence of legislative decision-making nor even necessarily an easy choice for legisla tors. In fact, the opposite is true. From the earliest disaster legislation in 1790 to well into the twentieth century, there was considerable disagreement in Congress over what constituted appropriate disaster relief or, indeed, if such relief was even constitutional.

The first involvement of the US government in disaster relief occurred in June 1790 in response to a petition from one Thomas Jenkins and Company (Figure 1.6). Jenkins had lost a cargo of hemp, linen, cotton duck, and molasses as a result of a fire on the vessel transporting his cargo and was asking for a remission of customs duties in the amount $167. Congress approved his request.

A more· significant instance of disaster relief was the response to a fire in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1802 that destroyed a significant portion of the town's business district. Portsmouth at the time was the only major deep water anchorage between Portland, Maine, and Boston and was the center of US shipbuilding, making it essential to the region's economy. In 1803, Congress authorized an additional year to pay off bonds owed to the local customs house to help ease the financial burden on town merchants (Figure 1.7). Similar mea sures were passed for Norfolk, Virginia, in 1804, Portsmouth in 1807 (Portsmouth actually suffered four "Great Fires" between 1802 and 1845) and New York in 1836.

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 17

June ♦, 1'790.

AllllUIIJ ot 2,600 dol a. ror lfre, In full ot cht.imo,

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P�y111onl <o John McConl, In full or all olal.m.t,

PRIVATE ACTS OF TIIB FIRST CONGRESS

OF TR&

UNITED STATES.

Passed at the second smion, which was begun aml held at tht City of NtlD York, on Monday, t/1efu11rth rlay of January, 179U, ancl ended on the twelfth day of August, 1790.

GEOR<Hl WAsHINOTON, President. JoHN Ao.A.Ms, Vice President of the Unite<l States, and Pr esident of the Senate, FREDERICK Au ousTus Mum,ENBEJto, Speaker of the llouse of Reprc�entatives.

STATUTE II. Csu. XVI,-,911 .llct for fin<,ll

y_ fldju1ti1,g �11d rnt�f!!ing t/,e claim, of Fred•

•tk/1 WiUiam d� 6louhn,

Be it e11<tdtd by the Stnatt and House of R.eprestnl11l.ivts qf tl,e United States of America, in Oo"fr�.u assmwltd1 That, in orcler to make full and adequate compensation to Fredericli: Willinm de Steu ben, for the sac•rif\ces and eminent services made and rendered to the United States during the late wnr1 there be paid to the saidFrederick William de Steuben, an annu1ty of two t.huusrmd five hun dred dollars, during life, to commence on the first day of Janunry lnat; to bo pB.id in qunrterly p11yments, nt the treasury of the United Statca ; which said annuity ahnll ho considered in full discharge of nil clnims nnd demands whatever, of tho eaid Frederick William do Steuben ugainst the United States.

ArPROVF.D, June 4, 1790,

Cuu. XX,-.Rll Atl for IA• rdiif of 1'/lbmas Jrn/uns and Compa,iy.

Be it enacted, 4•c., Thnt the ilutiee, nmountlng to one hvndred apd sixty-seven doll11rs and tiny centa, be remitted on III pnrcel of hemp, duck, t ieklenburg, nnd molas es, tho proporty of Thomas Jenkins ond Company, merchl\nts, of the cit y of Hudson, io the State of New York, which were lost by lire in tho brig Minerve1 on her pnRsagefrom New York to the city of Hudson, her port of delirery: and tlio Secreta1y of Urn Trr.naury of Lhe United Stntes is hereby n.uthorized 1md dircotod to nllow· a erodit on the bond or bonds executed by tho said 'l'homns Jenkins and Company, for payment of the duties on the soid goods.

AFra.onm, June 14, 1700.

C1JAr, XXIII,-An Act to aatisfy tlts dnim, 1>/ JqAn HeCortl agn,n,t tAs Unitotl Slate,.

& u cnactul, 4tc., That there be paid to John McOord, out of tbn duties arising on impost ond tonnage, the eum of eigbL hundred nine dollars serenty-one ccnLs, boing the amount of his acco11nt ng\\in3t tbn United Staten, ns aetUed and admitted by the Auditor ancl Comptroller of the Treasury, on o. bill of oxchlmgP. doled the finh of August, in the year of our Lord one thousrtnd seven hundrec1 and aevenly-aix, Jrawn in Cannc!a ror st1pplles, by GonornJ William Thompson, General Willinm Irvine Qnd olher otlicera, ·in fovor of Willinm Pagan, on Messieurs Moro clith and Clym4lr or Phlladclpbia: And the farther sum of five hundred

(2)

Figure 1.6 An Act for the Relief of Thomas Jenkins and Company-The first disaster legislation in the US, passed by Congress in 1790. Source: Library of Congress.

The two cases of Thomas Jenkins and Company and Portsmouth, NH high light the two different approaches taken by Congress to provide relief in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The initial method of seeking

18 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

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7 E 101

SEVENTH CONOR&BS. Sue. D. Ca.�, 38. 1803.

tian o( Mid collector, (a, the •uru or 1bclr ru1nie, bood, roipecd1ol7 p•r•�I• In 1weJ,.., .,,..,u,. fr and aflo, 11M> day of 1' 7m 111 q,cc,111;:J 111 1h b<•1d. 10 I,., 1alicn up « ewoelkd u af11re11id; and 1ha oqid CJ<ll. lee.tor u har b e.urJiorlrod and dh.-.clNI to gi,u up, nr oancd, all ■uah bond• "I'"" tho r ui pl ru otl rw •• dcKribed i11 1hi• act : wbiob lut memioncd bond hilll I r11occe<led with, in all r (>NIUI, 1ik other 1,ond, wliloJ, u 11t"11 bf MIi ton (, r du1ic, dua lo llu, Uulted &,.,.,.: Prori,kd, "-tr, Th11 11od1io11 in 1Jii. ul c0<11-&h10<l oh1II 1110d In bond1 which had follon duo bi,filfe tho 1we111y,.iJ.1h daJ o llournbcr fut.

Arnoni,, February 10, 1803.

Figure 1.7 An Act for The Relief of Sufferers of Fire in The Town of Port smouth-The first disaster legislation aimed at the local level, passed by Congress in 1803. Source: Library

of Congress.

assistance was by a private bill for the relief of specific individuals. The person affected by the disaster personally petitioned Congress for relief and Congress determined whether or not to provide relief on the basis of the facts and the precedent it might set. The alternative was for relief to be requested by elected officials on behalf of a community. However, such relief was limited to the delaying or remitting debts owed to the government.

The fledgling US government was small with limited resources and so had no interest in providing immediate disaster relief. Furthermore, there were no provisions in the Constitution providing for this duty, and hence, it was deemed the responsibility of the states. Coupled with the prevailing attitude of self-reli ance, this meant that the government focused on limited economic stimulus.

This was the case following the Great New York Fire of 1835. Occurring in the dead of winter, the fire burned out over 50 acres in the center of the city, destroying the stock exchange, warehouses, the post office, and banks. The fire lasted almost 24 hours and is considered the worst fire in an English-speaking country since the Great Fire of London. Among the many firms forced into bankruptcy were a number of fire insurance firms, making the economic impact of the hazard considerably greater.

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 19

In the aftermath of the fire, the Mayor of New York City petitioned the fed eral government for relief. In response, Congress provided relief similar to that provided to Portsmouth in 1803. The relief bill authorized the Collector of the Port of New York to, at his discretion, extend the time of payment on bonds for customs duties for up to five years and to provide for installment payments if needed. Note again that the disaster relief provided by Congress was only economic relief intended to serve as a stimulus to reconstruction.

A notable exception to the adjustment of taxes as disaster relief occurred following the New Madrid earthquakes of 1811-1812. In 1815, Congress passed a bill allowing landowners who had suffered damage during the earth quakes to relocate onto public land in the Missouri Territory, with title to their New Madrid holdings passing to the federal government. While possibly being the first example of the use of relocation as mitigation in the United States, the measure was largely unsuccessful, generating considerable corruption and fraudulent transfers. As late as 1827, Congress was receiving complaints about the actions of the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The land patents that had been issued to disaster victims had been resold many times, and in some cases, multiple lots had been issued to the same person, contrary to law. The Commissioner, under an opinion from the Attorney General, was refusing to honor the patents, and the State of Missouri was petitioning for relief for the claimants. (See American State Papers, House of Representatives, 19th Congress, 2nd Session, Public Lands: Volume 4, pp. 881-885).

One interesting side note to the New Madrid relief was an attempt during debate to amend the bill to also provide relief to victims of a windstorm occur ring in Washington DC in August 1814. The bill would have allowed victims to purchase public land in the area specified for the New Madrid victims at the rate of $2 per acre (Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 13th Congress, 3rd Session, pp. 1072-1073). The amendment did not pass, but it was indicative of interest in obtaining public lands at reduced rates and indicated a willingness on the part of some legislators to use disaster relief for political purposes.

Beginning in 1794, Congress also began passing general relief bills aimed at assisting statutorily defined classes of claimants. One of the first of these bills was intended to provide relief for those affected by the Whiskey Rebellion and is representative of this type of relief. Congress established a fund that was administered by a commissioner appointed by the Executive Branch and who had broad powers in determining how compensation was awarded. A similar approach would be used in providing compensation to the victims of the War of 1812 and to the victims of the September 11 attacks. Although private bills continued to be used for a time, by 1822, most relief was provided through gen eral relief bills.

T he use of general relief bills was not without controversy. On the morning of 18 January 1827, a fire broke out in Alexandria, VA, destroying 40 structures

20 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

and causing considerable suffering. Alexandria at the time was a part of the District of Columbia. Congress appropriated $20 000 for distribution to "indi gent sufferers" by the mayor and city council.

The legislation to provide assistance to the Alexandria fire victims sparked considerable debate in Congress. Supporters of the measure argued for relief on the basis of humanitarian need and the fact that no constitutional provision prohibited such aid. In addition, supporters pointed out that Alexandria would have enjoyed the support of the State of Virginia, but since it was part of the District of Columbia, no such assistance would be forthcoming. The only source of appeal was to Congress.

Opponents of the bill argued that such legislation was "improper and inexpe dient." They pointed out that the suffering of victims was mitigated by insurance, and there was every expectation that they would "experience the same extension of sympathy and assistance which had been given to other places,. when over taken by similar disasters, by individual contribution" (Register of Debates, Senate, 19th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 68-71). Significantly, they also cited pre cedent: Congress had given no such aid to similar disasters such as a fire in Maine in 1826 that had burned some 50 square miles and destroyed houses, barns, and fields. A chief concern was that such relief would in fact establish a precedent that would require Congress to provide relief for future disasters.

The use of precedent as an argument for or against disaster relief is impor tant. Many legislators were lawyers and used precedent as a guide to making decisions. Although the Alexandria fire relief did not immediately open the floodgates of direct federal assistance in disasters, it did establish a precedent that the provision of relief was not unconstitutional as held by some of the bill's opponents (an argument that would reoccur into the early twentieth century) and that Congress had the authority to provide such relief.

This authority for Congress to provide relief was further amplified in a dramatic way during the Civil War as Congress sought to provide assistance to former slaves through the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (also known as the Freedmen's Bureau) (Figure 1.8). The Freedmen's Bureau was formed in March 1865 toward the close of the Civil War to control refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands in the rebel states during the remainder of the war and for one year afterward. Administrative oversight of the Bureau was provided by the War Department. The intent behind the legis lation was to deal with large numbers of runaway or abandoned slaves that were hampering military operations by providing immediate relief and then resettling them on abandoned lands.

From the beginning, the Bureau was not particularly popular. Because the law permitted relief to "refugees," the Bureau was criticized for providing assistance to disloyal Southerners masquerading as refugees while the southern press claimed that federal aid was causing black laborers not to seek work (Dauber 2005).

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 21

Figure 1.8 The Freedmen's Bureau evolved from a wartime source of labor to a major relief operation immediately following the Civil War. From an engraving by Alfred R. Waud,

1828-1891. Source: Library of Congress.

The winter of 1865-1866 was particularly harsh, and the resulting flooding raised the specter of mass starvation in the South. The Freedman's Bureau continued to provide relief to both refugees and freedmen despite orders lim iting relief to those in cases of "extreme suffering." W ith the Bureau's mandate about to expire (the Civil War had ended in April 1865), Congress began consideration of a bill to extend the Bureau for two more years.

The proponents of the bill, mainly moderate Republicans, pointed out the suffering that was taking place across the South, and the need for federal assistance was readily apparent. Indeed, they proposed that the Freedman's Bureau be extended indefinitely and expanded to encompass the whole country. In addition to citing precedents for government aid (although not specifically disaster relief), the Republicans postulated the argument that the freedmen were innocent victims of slavery and emancipation and therefore deserving of assistance.

Democrats countered with the argument that such aid was unconstitutional. The original mission of the Freedman's Bureau had been authorized under the War Powers granted to Congress under the Constitution but with the war over, there was now no constitutional justification for federal relief. The responsi bility to provide for the destitute had always been a state responsibility and not that of the federal government. To counter the arguments about the "inno cence" of the freedmen, the Democrats used stereotypical racial imagery to portray the freedmen as victims of their own inherent moral vices.

22 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The extension bill was passed on 9 February 1866 and was immediately vetoed by President Andrew Johnson. Attempts to override the veto also failed. A second, more moderate, bill was introduced and passed over the President's veto on 16 July 1866. In addition to the arguments about the innocence of vic tims, this time the Republicans also argued the precedent of previous disaster relief acts. In 1867, Congress extended the eligibility for relief under the Bureau to all white southerners, regardless of whether or not they had supported the war.

The Freedman's Bureau is a significant turning point for disaster relief policy for the United States on several levels. First, it established a precedent that the government had the authority to provide disaster relief. Arguments that such relief was not provided for in the Constitution and were a state responsibility were glossed over or set aside by "humanitarian concerns." Future disaster vic tims could point to the Freedman's Bureau as precedent where relief was given to blacks and previously disloyal whites and ask, "Don't we deserve help, too?"

The debate over the Freedman's Bureau also established a less obvious pre cedent: what Michelle Landis Dauber calls "moral blamelessness" (Chong 2002). Moral blamelessness considers disaster victims to be innocent, that is they are not responsible for their condition. To a certain extent, this is similar to the old idea that a disaster was an "Act of God." By portraying refugees and freedmen as victims of slavery and emancipation, the Republicans moved the debate on relief from one of need to one of moral standing. Innocent victims are deserving of assistance while those who caused their situation are not.

It is important to note that disaster relief legislation was not typical and did not represent a commitment by Congress to provide such relief in all cases. Disaster relief legislation was in all cases reactionary and limited. In many cases, Congress was motivated to act not by the disaster itself but through lob bying by disaster victims. This was the case in 1836 following the Great Fire in New York. This reactive approach to disaster relief continued for over 50years, with some 1 28 pieces of legislation enacted between 1803 and 1950.

The ultimate responsibility for relief, however, rested with the local jurisdic tion. For example following the Johnstown, Pennsylvania, flood in 1889, relief and reconstruction were funded by almost $4 million in private donations and a 10% state tax on alcohol. (The tax is still in effect and was raised to 18% in 1968. The $200million in annual revenues it generates now goes to the general fund, not flood victims. )

THE GROWTH OF DISASTER BUREAUCRACY

As the twentieth century opened, a new trend in disaster relief policy began to develop: the growth of a government bureaucracy intended to administer disaster relief. This trend consisted of several components, principally the

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 23

transition from military to civilian leadership in disaster relief operations, the emergence of a Civil Defense bureaucracy, and legislation providing for disaster relief funding.

From Military to Civilian Leadership

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, disaster relief was delivered through two very disparate mechanisms: the US Army and through a series of special commissioners. For most of that period, the US Army was the federal government's primary agent for disaster relief. In many cases, Congressional funding to purchase and deliver relief supplies was given to the War Department rather than directly to disaster victims. In 1908, for example Congress appro priated $250 000 for disaster relief following a series of tornadoes in the southern United States. The funds were provided to the War Department, which used it for supplies and medical assistance. In 1912, some $1 240000 was appropriated to reimburse costs incurred by the Army for relief operations in response to flooding along the Mississippi (Foster 1983).

The Army's role evolved from simple expediency: there was no one else to do the job. The United States at the time lacked any organization, civilian or government, capable of dealing with disaster. With its hierarchical structure, stockpiles of supplies, and established logistics system, the Army, by default, was responsible for dealing with floods, earthquakes, fires, and other natural disasters both at in the United States and abroad. In addition, Congress on occasion asked the War Department to provide assessments of disasters that were used to determine the appropriateness and extent of any required relief.

On those pccasions where Congress provided direct relief, the implementing legislation also provided for the establishment of a commissioner with broad powers to determine eligibility for relief This was the case, for example in the New Madrid earthquake relief in 1815, where a Commissioner of the General Land Office oversaw the distribution of land grants. It was also the case in the victim compensation following the War of 1812 and, indeed, was the same mechanism used to manage victim compensation following September 11 (Dauber 2013).

The -use of civilian commissioners has always been problematical. Commissioners were granted broad powers but little guidance on how to deter mine eligibility for disaster relief. In many cases, the commissioners tended to take a broader interpretation of need than originally intended by Congress. The was the case, for example in the compensation for the War of 1812. The legisla tion was intended originally to compensate those whose homes and possessions were damaged as the result of their use or comandeerment by federal troops. This rapidly expanded to include any person who had suffered damage in the war. As has been discussed, the Freedman's Bureau also expanded beyond the original intent of handling freed slaves during the Civil War to provide relief to destitute Southerners for several years following the war.

24 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

However, the role of commissioners was primarily administrative in nature and limited to economic compensation. It was not until the formation of the American Red Cross in 1881 that an organization began to emerge that could provide direct relief to disaster victims.

Similar to many organizations, the initial purpose of the American Red Cross was very different from what eventually evolved. The International Red Cross was formed originally to serve those wounded on the battlefield. At the time Clara Barton was organizing the American Red Cross, the horrors of the Civil War were very fresh, and Americans held the view that such a war could not be allowed to happen again. Coupled with the innovations in the Army Medical Department, this meant that the original idea behind the Red Cross was difficult to sell to the American public. However, by advocating the use of the Red Cross for other purposes, such as disaster relief, Barton was able to gain the support of President James Garfield and his successor, Chester A. Arthur. So successful was this approach that the International Red Cross amended the Treaty of Geneva (the international agreement that established the Red Cross) following a speech by Barton at the third International Conference in 1884 to include disaster relief as a mission of the organization, now known as the "American Amendment."

The American Red Cross encountered a literal "baptism by fire." Founded on 21 May 1881, the Red Cross had its first disaster operation in September of that year in the Great Thumb Fire in Michigan (named for the thumb-shaped area affected by the fire. See Figure 1.9). The cause of the fire is not known, but the area had been suffering from drought for some time, temperatures were high, and the winds were of hurricane force. The fire burned over a million acres, causing an estimated $2347000 in damages (in 1881 dollars) and killing almost 300 people. The Red Cross responded with money, clothes, and household items.

The initial Red Cross response to the Great Thumb Fire was followed by major relief work in the Johnstown flood of 1889 and the Galveston hurricane of 1900, in addition to service in the Spanish American War in 1898. In 1900, the American Red Cross received its first congressional charter (a second charter was granted in 1905) that among other purposes, directed the Red Cross to "carry on a system of national and foternational relief in time of peace and to apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities." This charter began a unique rela tionship between the US government and the American Red Cross that con- tinues to this day.

It was inevitable that the US Army and the American Red Cross would come into conflict. Having two organizations with responsibility for relief made this inevitable. Although the two organizations worked well in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire, the first use of the Red Cross under its charter, there was tension between them. Part of this was caused by the Army not

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 25

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Natural Resources.

having any specific statutory authority for disaster relief and the subsequent reluctance on the part of army officers to surrender military property to a civilian organization. Added to this were pressures created by the military's pri mary mission of war fighting. During World War I, for example the Red Cross and the US Public Health Service primarily handled the response to the flu pandemic in 1918 because military resources were unavailable.

This conflict came to a head in 1925. Congress had traditionally provided reimbursement to the War Department for disaster relief expenditures, but beginning in 1920 following an operation in West Point, Georgia, Congress began either delaying or refusing reimbursement. In 1925 John Barton Payne, president of the Red Cross, formally complained to the Secretary of War about the lack of support he was receiving from local commanders, stating that they recognized neither the supremacy of the Red Cross nor their own authority to assist the Red Cross in providing relief. Payne suggested a revision to the Army regulations to correct this problem. The War Department refused and tensions between the two organizations increased (Foster 1983).

26 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

A significant change in civil-military relations occurred in 1927 when President Calvin Coolidge appointed Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover to oversee disaster relief to extensive flooding along the Mississippi River, plac ing responsibility for disaster relief in the hands of civilian authority for the first time (see Case Study 1. 3). This shift to civilian leadership of disaster relief

CASE STUDY 1.3: THE MISSISSIPPI FLOODS 1927-COORDINATED

RESPONSE UNDER CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP

The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 has been called the most destructive river flood in US

history, inundating over 27000square miles to a depth of up to 30ft. An unusually wet

summer in 1926 has swollen the river's tributaries and rains continued through the winter. By

spring, the Mississippi River was beginning to overtop the levees. In all, the river would break

through in 145 different places, but the most disastrous break was at Mounds Landing on 21

April. Here, the river flowed through at twice the volume of Niagara Falls.

Case Figure 1.3 The beginning of the levee breach at Mounds Landing, Mississippi, 21 April 1927. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency.

Faced with a disaster of such magnitude, President Calvin Coolidge decided that a

coordinated response was necessary. He selected Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover to

chair a cabinet committee consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Treasury, and

Agriculture that would cooperate with the Red Cross in providing relief.

Hoover was not without experience. In August 1914, he had led 500 volunteers in

helping to evacuate and provide relief services to 120 000 American citizens fleeing the war in

(continued on next page)

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 27

(continued from previous page)

Europe. He spent the next two years as chair of the Commission for Relief in Belgium

administering the distribution of relief supplies to war victims. In 1917, he was appointed to

head the Food Administration overseeing food reserves in the United States. After the war

ended, Hoover headed the American Relief Administration providing relief supplies to Europe.

Hoover's wartime experience had led him to believe that centralization was the key to a

successful relief operation. He created an on-scene organization that consisted of the cabinet

committee, the American Red Cross, and local officials to coordinate relief activities. In a

departure from the past, Hoover stressed the use of local over military resources. For

example, a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation funded the establishment of health units

throughout the affected area.

Hoover's actions gained him a reputation as a humanitarian, revived his flagging

political career, and carried him into the White House. More importantly, his approach

demonstrated the importance of coordinated response and public-private partnership and led

eventually to the creation of the position of Federal Coordinating Officer with responsibility for

on-scene coordination of federal disaster relief. It also marked the first time that civilian

officials had taken charge of disaster relief rather than the US Army, starting a trend that

would eventually become an established practice.

Recommended Reading Barry, J.M. (1997). Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How it Changed America. New

York: Simon and Schuster.

operations continued through the 1920s and 1930s. In 1938, the US Army issued Army Regulation 500-60, formally acknowledging the Red Cross as the primary relief agency for United States. AR 500-60 also affirmed both the Army's support role and the Army's autonomy. The Red Cross would oversee relief operations but would have no authority over the military.

Civil Defense and Disaster Relief Merge

The advent of war in 1916 led to the United States Army Appropriation Act of 1917 that established an embryonic civil defense structure consisting of the Council of National Defense (CND) and a network of state and local councils. These councils would languish both during and after World War I, but as hos tilities grew in the late 1930s, the councils were resurrected and the CND was linked to a new Office of Emergency Management created in 1939 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1941, President Roosevelt abolished the CND and created an Office of Civil Defense (OCD) within the Office of Emergency Planning. President Harry Truman, in turn, abolished the OCD following the cessation of hostilities in 1945.

Following the dissolution of the OCD in 1945, the government commissioned a number of studies on civil defense that urged evacuation planning and shelter construction to protect the civilian population from the nuclear threat of the

28 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Cold War. In 1948, President Truman created an Office of Civil Defense Planning, and in 1949, he temporarily assigned civil defense responsibility to the National Security Resources Board before finally creating the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA ) in December 1949.

The piecemeal approach to dealing with disasters was to change significantly in 1950 when two important pieces of legislation laid the foundation for modern emergency management in the United States. The Federal Disaster Act of 1950 established the federal government's role in domestic disaster relief, whereas the Civil Defense Act of 1950 established a federal, state, and local framework for preparedness. It is important to note that, at this point, the two functions of relief and preparedness were not viewed as components of a system but rather as two separate functions. For almost 40 years, the two functions would develop along separate lines.

The Federal Disaster Act of 1950 had its genesis in the need for an ongoing authority to respond to disaster. Between 1803 and 1950, Congress had enacted 128 separate acts to provide relief after local disasters and larger catastrophic events. The process was cumbersome and meant that most local disasters did not receive federal aid. The Federal Disaster Act provided for a continuing authority for the federal government to provide assistance without returning to congress for separate legislation for each disaster.

Unfortunately, Congress continued its reactive approach to disasters. Programs were created or expanded by legislation passed in reaction to significant events, creating a confusing fragmentation in relief programs. Many of the programs and structures now considered an integral part of federal relief such as the Federal Coordinating Officer and the Public and Individual Assistance Programs, wel'e created in this manner. An attempt was made to reduce this fragmentation with the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 and again in 1974 with the passage of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Assistance Act (the Disaster Assistance Act of 1974). The Stafford Act also included, for the first time, the provision for federal assistance for disaster preparedness and warning programs.

The Civil Defense Act of 1950 defined the role of local government in disaster preparedness. The act had its genesis in the growing fear of nuclear war and the beginning of the Cold War. The Soviets had detonated a nuclear bomb in 1949, and in 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. Consequently, the primary focus of the act was on national security. The Civil Defense Act of 1950 stated that the principal responsibility fos civil defense rested with state and local government and gave authority to the FCDA to provide guidance and resources to assist in this process. One of the key results of the Civil Defense Act was the creation of a network of government-funded nuclear war planners at the state and local level

Almost immediately the federal government s emphasis on national secmity met with resistance. State and local governments were more concerned with natural disasters that occurred with some regularity and viewed nuclear war

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 29

planning as the responsibility of the federal government . The act was eventu ally amended in 195 8, in response to state and local government complaints, to provide for joint responsibility for civil defense among all levels of government . This conflict in priorities led eventually to an insistence by state and local gov ernments on the use of resources provided under the Civil Defense Act for planning for all hazards, not just nuclear war. The act was amended in 1976 to allow the use of civil defense resources for disaster relief and recovery from natural disasters (referred to as the Dual Use Doctrine) and again in 1981 to allow dual use of government-provided resources for preparedness.

Along the way, responsibility for civil defense shifted through a confusing array of offices that migrated from the Office of the President to the Department of Defense and back to the White House. A similar process was taking place with the responsibility for disaster relief, and the congressional approach of reacting to the needs of current disasters resulted in a wide range of relief programs scattered throughout various departments and agencies. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter consolidated these scattered programs and merged the functions of preparedness and response into a single agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The result was almost immediate chaos. The new agency was composed of programs transferred from a variety of other agencies, each with a staff with its own corporate culture and with separate funding sources and congressional oversight committees. For the first year, staff continued to operate out of sep arate offices scattered around Washington D.C., and it would be over l0 years before the agency became truly effective. Nevertheless, for the first time, the functions of preparedness and disaster relief were the responsibility of a single agency. This consolidation of function received a boost in 1988 with a major amendment to the Stafford Act that effectively merged the Civil Defense Act and the Disaster Relief Act. For the first time, the United States placed respon sibility for preparedness and relief operations in a single agency with a single legislative authority.

The formation of FEMA did more than consolidate various federal relief and preparedness programs. The Civil Defense Act had spawned a network of civil defense offices in each state and in many counties and local jurisdictions. Initially, these positions were funded at a 50% match and were limited to work on national security projects such as shelter surveys and crisis relocation planning. As the Dual Use Doctrine became more acceptable to the federal government, many of these planners began to focus on planning for and responding to natural disasters. FEMA became a source of policy guidance and a perceived repository of expertise. Through its grant requirements and the establishment of a national training center, FEMA also had the potential to standardize emergency management training and doctrine across the United States.

Nowhere was this leadership role more apparent than in the tenure of James Lee Witt as director from 1993 to 2001. Up until Director Witt's nomination by

30 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

President Bill Clinton, FEMA had been led by a succession of political appoin tees with limited experience in emergency management. Witt was the first director to have served as head of a state emergency management agency. Shortly after ms arrival, Witt issued a set of goals and a strategic plan for the agency the first time this had ever been done in FEMA. His principal goal was not to increase response capacity but instead "to make mitigation the corner stone of emergency management." Witt practiced what he preached, lobbying for increased postdisaster mitigation funds under the Stafford Act and ulti mately for predisaster funding of mitigation projects. This emphasis sent a clear message to the emergency management community: emergency management is not just about response.

A major impetus behind the formation of FEMA was a 1978 report from the NationalGovernors'Association concluding a studyof emergencymanagement policies and practices in the United States. The report cited the fragmentation of operations, the lack of connection to state policy, and the lack of an integrated national policy or strategy. The report went on to espouse a new concept called comprehensive emergency management that took an all-hazards approach to dealing with risk and emphasized interagency cooperation. The report also delineated a four-phase model of emergency management, combining preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation into an interre lated process (Figure 1.10).

Comprehensive emergency management rapidly became the basis of a national strategy for emergency management and was quickly adopted by the newly created FEMA . The model was broad enough to encompass both the national security requirements of the federal government and the natural hazard concerns of local government. This broad scope meant that emergency planners now had to consider all the potential hazards facing a jurisdiction and

Figure 1.10 Comprehensive Emergency Management Model. Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 31

not just specific planning requirements such as crisis relocation planning. As emergency planners became more educated across a broad spectrum of sub jects, a specialized body of technical knowledge related to the practice of emergency management began to emerge.

The embryonic profession of emergency management took a major step for ward when the National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management (NCCEM) (now the International Association of Emergency Managers [IAEM]) established the Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) designation in 1990. The CEM designation e stablished a baseline of knowledge and experi ence for members of the profession. The CEM program will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

In 1991, NCCEM, FEMA, and the National Emergency Managers Association (NEMA) helped to establish a disaster management committee to develop standards for emergency management programs. The work of the committee was released under the auspices of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) first as a recommended practice and then, in 2000, as an American National Standard, NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs. NFPA 1600 initially received little attention in the emergency management community. Following the events of September 11, there was an increased demand for standards to guide emergency management programs, and the 9-11 Commission Report recom mended the adoption of NFPA 1600 as the National Preparedness Standard. In October 2009, the Department of Homeland Security adopted three stan dards, including NFPA 1600 as part of its Voluntary Private Sector Preparedness Program. The current versions of these standards are

• ASIS International SPC.1-2009, Organizational Resilience: Security, Preparedness and Continuity Management Systems - Requirements with Guidance for Use Standards

• ISO 22301 :2012: Societal security - Business continuity management systems

• NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity/Continuity of Operations Program, 2016 edition

Within the emergency management community, NFPA 1600 was used as the basis for the development of a program to assess jurisdictional emergency management programs. This program, the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), was a joint project of FEMA, IAEM, and NEMA to adapt the general NFPA 1600 standard specifically to state and local government pro grams. The candidate jurisdiction performs a self-assessment against the EMAP Standard, and the results are peer reviewed by an assessment team of emergency managers. The assessment team provides input to an accreditation committee that makes the final determination on accreditation.

32 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

While NFPA 1600 and the EMAP Standard are voluntary, they are making progress toward being generally accepted in the emergency management community. This was greatly assisted by FEMA's contracting with the EMAP Commission to develop a baseline assessment of state programs in 2005 under the National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assessment P rogram (NEMB-CAP) and the recommendation in the Homeland Secmity Grant Guidance that states move toward adoption of the EMAP Standard. The federaJ fiscal year 2006 guidance for the Emergency Management Perfor mance Grant required that states use the EMAP Standard and the results of NEMB-CAP as a basis for developing work plans and performance evaluations.

CONCLUSION

Over the years, emergency management evolved from what was essentially a personal responsibility to become a perceived responsibility of government. In the United States, this led to the development of a disaster bureaucracy based on the Comprehensive Emergency Management model. Despite conflicts over the role of the state versus the federal government thi bureaucracy has grown to encompass a relatively unified approach under the direction of FEMA and the development of doctrine and a plethora of disaster assistance programs.

Although the system seemed solid, though, it was still evolving, and response to major disasters would bring major changes to disaster policy and force a rethinking of disaster response.