chapter assignments 3393

The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Mitigation

What You’ll Learn ● The variety of mitigation tools available to planners ● Impediments to mitigation and other associated problems ● Federal and nonfederal mitigation programs ● Mitigation methods in practice through specific case studies

Introduction Disasters are a reality of living in the natural world. Despite humans ’ attempts to con- trol nature that began with the early Egyptians and continue to today’s massive flood- control efforts, natural hazards are something we constantly face. Over the last decade, the social and economic costs of disasters to the United States and throughout the world have grown significantly. From 2000 to 2008, the costs of disasters in the United States are estimated to be over $355 billion. Deaths and economic losses from natural disasters worldwide jumped significantly in 2008 compared to the previous seven years. In 2008 the UN estimated that 235,816 people were killed in natural disasters, 211 million were impacted, and the cost was over US$181 billion. Costs from dealing with disasters were 50 percent higher than the average costs per year from 2000 to 2007. The causes of this growth are myriad. Climatological changes such as El Ni ñ o, global warming, and a rise in sea level are some of the factors. When you add the effects of societal actions, such as increased development, deforestation and clear-cutting, the migration of populations to coastal areas, and the filling in of floodplains, you have total calamity.

Mitigation , the means for reducing these impacts, is defined as a sustained action to reduce or eliminate the risks to people and property from such hazards and their effects. In our discussion of mitigation, we focus on natural hazards mitigation efforts and pro- grams in the United States. We will examine some of the techniques for mitigation of technological hazards, but the body of knowledge and applications in this area are still evolving. Many of the successful natural hazards techniques such as building codes, how- ever, can be applied to technological hazards.

The function of mitigation differs from the other emergency management disciplines because it looks at long-term solutions to reducing risk as opposed to preparedness for hazards, the immediate response to a hazard, or the short-term recovery from a hazard

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event. Mitigation is usually not considered part of the emergency phase of a disaster as in response or as part of emergency planning as in preparedness. The definition lines do get a little blurred regarding recovery. Applying mitigation strategies should be a part of the recovery from disaster (see Chapter 7), but even in this context, these are actions that will reduce the impacts, or risks, over time.

The recovery function of emergency management still represents one of the best opportunities for mitigation, and until recently, this phase in a disaster plan provided the most substantial funding for mitigation activities. Recently, however, the trend has shifted toward greater federal spending on predisaster mitigation, which is discussed later in this chapter.

Another thing that sets mitigation apart from the other disciplines of emergency man- agement is the participation and support of a broad spectrum of players outside of the traditional emergency management circle. Mitigation involves land-use planners; con- struction and building officials, both public and private; business owners; insurance companies; community leaders; and politicians. The skills and tools for accomplishing mitigation (i.e., planning expertise, political acumen, marketing and public relations, and consensus building) are different from the operational, first-responder skills that more often characterize emergency management professionals. In fact, historically, emergency management professionals have been reluctant to take a lead role in promoting mitiga- tion. To paraphrase a state director of emergency management, “ I will never lose my job for failing to do mitigation, but I could lose my job if I mess up a response. ”

With the exception of the fire community, whose members were early leaders in the effort to mitigate fire risks through support for building codes, code enforcement, and public education, the emergency management community has remained focused on their preparedness planning and response obligations. Throughout the decade of 2000, leadership at the federal level has supported these priorities through their funding, espe- cially after the events of September 11, where terrorism planning and preparedness were top priorities. Even in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, mitigation was not viewed as a programmatic imperative. Some exceptions, such as new federal mitigation programs supported to reduce exposure under the NFIP and more interest at the local level to apply mitigation postdisaster, were evidenced. The rise in local initiatives is important because that is where mitigation can be the most effective in reducing future losses ( Figure 3-1 ). However, the lack of leadership at the federal level is troubling, since state and local emer- gency managers traditionally reflect federal priorities in their actions.

This chapter discusses the tools of mitigation, the impediments to mitigation, federal programs that support mitigation, and several case studies that demonstrate how these tools have been applied to successfully reduce various risks.

Mitigation Tools Over the years, the United States has made great strides in reducing the number of deaths that occur in natural disasters. Through building codes, warning systems, and public

Chapter 3 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Mitigation 71

education, the number of deaths and casualties from natural disasters in the last century has significantly declined. Economic effects and property damages, however, have esca- lated. Many people believe that these costs are preventable and that the tools required to dramatically reduce these costs are now available ( Figure 3-2 ).

Technological disasters such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are not as easy to analyze. There is much speculation about how improved intelligence and security could reduce the human effects of these disasters. From a property perspective, many people believe that some reduction in impacts could be achieved through application of traditional mitigation techniques such as improved building construction for blast effects. Other technological disasters such as the Valdez oil spill, the Three Mile Island emergency, and so on could have been prevented through better inspections, training, education, and exercises. These measures reflect good pre- paredness activities more than mitigation. In any case, further research and analyses are needed to answer the questions posed by the effects of terrorist events and similar tech- nological hazards.

Most practitioners agree that the primary intent of mitigation is to ensure that fewer communities and individuals become victims of disasters. The goal of mitigation is to create economically secure, socially stable, better built, and more environmentally sound communities that are out of harm’s way ( Figure 3-3 ).

FIGURE 3-1 Pascagoula, Mississippi, November 29, 2005, and August 8, 2006. Before (top) and after (bottom) photos of the elevation of a house flooded by the storm surge of Hurricane Katrina. Elevating a house is an excellent way to protect it against flooding. Mark Wolfe/FEMA.

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The following mitigation tools are known to reduce risk:

● Hazard identification and mapping ● Design and construction applications ● Land-use planning ● Financial incentives ● Insurance ● Structural controls

FIGURE 3-2 Pass Christian, Mississippi, October 4, 2005. Aerial photo of the only surviving home in the area that was completely destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Foundations are all that remain of most of the neighboring homes. The surviving home was built using many FEMA standards. John Fleck/FEMA.

FIGURE 3-3 Malibu, California, November 16, 2007. The irrigation sprinkler system at Pepperdine University Campus is an example of how fire prevention and mitigation practices can save homes and vegetation. Susie Shapira/FEMA.

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Hazard Identification and Mapping The hazard identification mitigation tool is fairly obvious. You can’t mitigate a hazard if you don’t know what it is or whom it affects. The most essential part of any mitigation strategy or plan is an analysis of what the hazards are in a particular area. The resources for hazard identification are numerous. The federal government has extensive programs that map virtually every hazard, and these products are available to communities. FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) provides detailed flood maps and studies, and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) provides extensive earthquake and landslide studies and maps. Many state agencies have refined the products for hazard identification. For example, special soil stability studies and geological investigations, which are required in some parts of California, further refine this analysis.

Geographic information systems (GIS) have become ubiquitous and are staples for all local planning organizations. What is often missing from the available tools is the ability to superimpose the human and built environment onto the hazards, thereby providing a quantified level of risk. FEMA’s HAZUS methodology, which was developed in the 1990s, has become a user-oriented tool for both state and local emergency managers to assess potential losses from floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes. Potential losses estimated in HAZUS include physical damage, economic loss, and societal impacts. This tool is also available to the private sector.

The newest addition to the mapping tool kit is a program called RiskMAP that aims to reduce the losses of life and property through effective local mitigation activities driven by quality flood hazard data, risk assessments, and mitigation planning. On March 16, 2009, the U.S. Congress approved FEMA’s Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (RiskMAP) Multi-Year Plan for Fiscal Years 2011 – 2014.

ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

FEMA ’s Multi-Year Plan outlines the goals, objectives, and strategies for RiskMAP and identifies the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders. It is available at http:www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/ flhm .

Design and Construction Applications

The design and construction process provides one of the most cost-effective means of addressing risk. This process is governed by building codes, architecture and design cri- teria, and soils and landscaping considerations. Code criteria that support risk reduction usually apply only to new construction, substantial renovation, or renovation to change the type or use of the building. Enactment of building codes is the responsibility of the states, and most state codes are derivatives of one of the three model codes, which reflect geo- graphical differences across the United States. Some states delegate code adoption respon- sibility to more local governmental authorities. Because of the cost, codes that require rehabilitation of existing potentially hazardous structures have been rarely implemented.

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The Los Angeles seismic retrofit ordinance is a rare example. The case study of the new design codes to decrease the impacts of wildfires in California, which have become an increasing threat, illustrates the importance of building codes to mitigation.

CASE STUDY: NEW DEVELOPMENTS ’ CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS REQUIRE WILDFIRE MITIGATION

Rancho Santa Fe, California. More than 2,460 multimillion-dollar houses that were constructed with the strictest construction standards possible, including expansive defensible space around and within the home development areas, survived extremely well when the Witch Fire stormed through the area in October 2007.

The blaze burned up to plants on defensible spaces and stopped. Embers blown into areas of the estates bounced off tile roofs with boxed-in eaves, stucco walls, patios, and other areas and then died out without leaving more than incidental damage, mostly scorched plants. Although a half-dozen charred embers the size of footballs were found in the Cielo estates, according to Ken Crosby, one of the realtors for the estate areas, “ Nothing was burned. ”

Five Rancho Santa Fe developments, completed just three-plus years before the Witch Fire, basically set construction standards on the “ shelter-in-place ” concept developed in Australia. The standards for construction and mitigation, including mandated interior fire sprinklers, extensive defensible space, and use of fire-resistant vegetation, are the “ toughest in the country, ” according to Cliff Hunter, fire marshal for the Rancho Santa Fe Fire Protection District, which provides fire protection for the five developments.

The strict development standards also make these homes in the shelter-in-place communities safer places to stay if the residents are unable to evacuate. Fire officials, however, advise people to evacuate rather than stay and try to fight the fires and to not get a false sense of security because their homes are considered to be a safe refuge.

The estate homes were constructed with materials and techniques intended to make the structures as resistant as possible to the effects of wildland fires. Only slow-to-ignite plants are planted near the homes. The standards are strictly maintained by the Rancho Santa Fe Fire Protection District’s fire marshal.

The Sargentis ’ home is on the eastern edge of The Crosby, with a wide swath of defensible space adjoining the backyard. During the fire, smoke and ash entered their home through the drier vent, and the garage filled with smoke. The Sargentis explained that they had attended a program that explained how the shelter-in-place program worked. They learned that the concept had not been tested in the United States and that they should “ get out early ” if they chose to evacuate, as well as what to do if they stayed in their home.

When they learned that the fire was headed their way, they immediately left — well before the automatic alert that was sent to their house at 9 a.m. that Monday morning. Steve Sargenti said he “ knew the house was intact, ” and when the family returned, they found their house untouched, other than the smoke inside. Embers that had landed on the concrete tile roof had burned out, and the courtyard in front of the house “ was a repository ” for spent embers, said Steve.

Source : FEMA.gov. http://www.fema.gov/mitigationbp/bestPracticeDetailPDF.do?mitssId � 5368

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Performance -based design and construction are becoming more critical, especially when building in earthquake-prone areas. This concept incorporates not just life safety requirements but continued use of the building in the aftermath of any disaster. In lieu of updated building codes, performance-based design can play a significant role in ensur- ing the viability of our built environment in the aftermath of a disaster.

The federal government has made a significant investment in developing technical guidance for improving the building and construction of structures in hazard areas, par- ticularly earthquake-, wind-, and flood-prone areas. The International Code Council’s (ICC) attempts to establish a single building code that would be adopted by local and state jurisdictions are moving forward and have experienced some success. The ICC is not promoting a National Code, as such, but there has been some discussion of develop- ing a National Code to support mitigation efforts. Because the constitutional responsibil- ity for public health and safety resides with the states, a National Code developed by the federal government is not politically feasible or practical.

Land-Use Planning

Mitigation programs are most successful when they are undertaken at the local level, where most decisions about development are made. The strategies for land-use plan- ning offer many options for effecting mitigation, including acquisition, easements, storm water management, annexation, environmental review, and floodplain management plans. It also encompasses a myriad of zoning options such as density controls, special uses permits, historic preservation, coastal zone management, and subdivision controls.

Land -use planning was one of the earliest tools used to encourage mitigation. In 1968, Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act that established the NFIP. This act required local governments to pass a floodplain management ordinance in return for fed- erally backed, low-cost flood insurance being made available to the community. This act started one of the largest federal mapping efforts because the government promised local governments that they would provide them with the technical tools to determine where the floodplains were in their communities so they could steer development away from these areas. A more complete discussion of the NFIP can be found later in this chapter.

Moving structures out of harm’s way through property acquisition is clearly the most effective land-use planning tool, but it is also the most costly. Following the Midwest floods of 1993, FEMA worked with Congress to make property acquisition more feasible by providing a substantial increase in funding for acquisition after a disaster. This is one of the mitigation programs that has flourished, with numerous communities working with their citizens to voluntarily agree to be moved out of harm’s way in light of signifi- cant or repetitive flooding.

Land -use planning and ordinances can promote risk reduction in many other ways. The North Carolina coastal setback ordinance seeks to preserve the fragile and eroding coastlines of its barrier islands. The Alquist-Priola Act in California limits development near known earthquake faults.

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Financial Incentives

The financial incentives tool is an emerging area for promoting mitigation. Among the approaches being used by localities to reduce risks are creating special tax assessments, passing tax increases or bonds to pay for mitigation, offering relocation assistance, and targeting federal community development or renewal grant funds for mitigation.

CASE STUDY: A SMALL VILLAGE WITH BIG CONCERNS

Riverton , Illinois. The Sangamon River forms the west boundary of the Village of Riverton, a quaint community that 2,997 residents call home. But the Village of Riverton has had a long flood history. To lessen the impact of floods on its residents, the village joined forces with other communities in Sangamon County to devise a plan. Acquisition was definitely the mitigation measure of choice, and council members have encouraged the creation of green space in the floodplain area. According to Linda Viola, office manager and grant administrator for the Village of Riverton, “ This was the second time these homes were hit. The first time was in 1994. We knew that something needed to be done. ”

Riverton is 550 feet above sea level. The village has a total area of 2.1 square miles: 2 square miles of land and 0.04 square miles of water (1.93 percent). Heavy rainfall causes the creek, which runs through the middle of Riverton, to frequently overtop its banks.

The Acquisition Project was initiated in July 2002 and completed in August 2006. Riverton received a grant totaling $272,867.66 from FEMA through its Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). HMGP pays 75 percent of approved projects that will prevent or reduce damage from storms and other natural hazards. These grants are made available for both public and private projects.

“ We filled out all the grant information, and we notified the homeowners. They also knew that they had a choice, ” said Viola. “ They could choose to participate or not. Participation is voluntary. We completed the project without any major problems. When you buy someone’s home, they always think that it’s worth more. There were some who disagreed with the appraisal. The properties were appraised a second time. The homeowner has a right to request a second appraisal. ”

Buyouts of flood-prone homes located near the Sangamon River began in July 2004. The average value was $75,000, and the total project cost was $376,048.66. The village acquired six homes that were then demolished, resulting in open space within the floodplain.

A June 2008 flood event tested the success of the acquisition project as waters from the Sangamon River crept upon the 140,506-acre tract of land. If those six homes had not been removed, they would have been flooded with two to three feet of water.

A local alderman contacted Ron Davis, the state hazard mitigation officer, who acknowledged, “ It was great this year when the waters came up, [and we were] able to sit back and relax and not have to mobilize our forces to fight the flood. ” Said Viola, “ Those [acquired] homes were in the floodplain. Flooding would continue to occur. I don’t know how the people could have lived with the flood and continued to rebuild in the same area knowing that it would happen again. We found a way to help them. ”

Source : FEMA. http://www.fema.gov/mitigationbp/bestPracticeDetailPDF.do?mitssId � 6057

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The economic effects of repetitive flooding led the citizens of Napa, California, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, to pass small tax increases to pay for flood-mitigation activities. In both cases, the tax had a minimal effect on the community citizens but had a major effect in reducing the potential economic losses from future floods. Berkeley, California, has passed more than ten different bond issues to support seismic retrofit of public build- ings, schools, and private residences.

Funding from the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), a HUD program, has been used extensively to support local efforts at property acquisition and reloca- tion. These funds have been used to meet the nonfederal match on other federal funding, which has often been a stumbling block to local mitigation. Other federal programs of the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Economic Development Administration provide financial incentives for mitigation.

Other emerging areas of financial tools include special assessment districts, impact fees, and transfer of development rights. All of these tools provide either incentives or pen- alties to developers as a means of promoting good risk-reduction development practices.

CASE STUDY: NAPA RIVER FLOOD PROTECTION PROJECT

Napa , California. In the flood-prone valley of the Napa River lies the world-class traveler’s destination of Napa, California. Over the span of 36 years (1961 – 1997), a total of 19 floods caused more than $542 million in residential property damage alone. That total does not include economic losses in the tourism industry, environmental damage, or the loss of human lives. During a 1986 flood, 20 inches of rain fell in a 48-hour period, resulting in 3 deaths, the destruction of 250 homes, damage to 2,500 homes, and the evacuation of 5,000 residents. Flood events in March 1995 and January 1997 were similarly destructive. The City of Napa subsequently embarked on an ambitious effort to mitigate flood losses in the community. The Napa River – Napa Creek Flood Protection Project was voted into reality by the passage of Napa County Measure A in March 1998. This half-cent local sales tax levy passed by the citizens of Napa County provided a funding mechanism for the local share of the project cost and helped solidify the partnership between the Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (NCFCWCD) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Measure A funds flood protection, drainage improvements, dam safety, and watershed management projects for each community in Napa County and in the unincorporated area of the county. The project was still ongoing in 2006 and components include the following: the acquisition and removal of more than 50 mobile homes, 16 residences, and 28 commercial buildings from flood-prone areas; the creation of over 400 acres of emergent marsh and 150 acres of seasonal wetlands; the removal, reconstruction, and elevation of several bridges; the elevation of railroad tracks; home and utilities elevations; the creation of structural flood control elements such as widened stream beds, flood walls, levees, and culverts; and the construction of three detention basins with accompanying pump stations. According to NCFCWCD, “ When all these project components are in place, the City of Napa will have a system to keep homes and businesses dry in the future. ” December 2005 was the first test of Napa County’s new flood mitigation efforts when nearly 10 inches fell in a 24-hour period. Local officials were ready for the flood

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Insurance

Some people would argue with the inclusion of insurance as a mitigation tool. Their reason- ing is that insurance by itself really only provides for a transfer of the risk from the individual or community to the insurance company. Although this is true, the NFIP is the prime exam- ple of how, if properly designed, the insurance mechanism can be a tool for mitigation. The NFIP is considered to be one of the most successful mitigation programs ever created.

The NFIP was created by Congress in response to the damages from multiple severe hurricanes and inland flooding and the rising costs of disaster assistance after these floods. At that time, flood insurance was not readily available or affordable through the private insurance market. Because many of the people being affected by this flooding were low-income residents, Congress agreed to subsidize the cost of the insurance so the premiums would be affordable. The idea was to reduce the costs to the government of disaster assistance through insurance. The designers of this program, with great insight, thought the government should get something for their subsidy. So in exchange for the low-cost insurance, they required that communities pass an ordinance directing future development away from the floodplain.

The NFIP was designed as a voluntary program and, as such, did not prosper during its early years, even though flooding disaster continued. Then in 1973, after Hurricane Agnes, the legislation was modified significantly. The purchase of federal flood insurance became mandatory on all federally backed loans. In other words, anyone buying a property with a Veterans Administration (VA) or Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan had to pur- chase the insurance. Citizen pressure to buy the insurance caused communities to pass ordinances and join the NFIP. The NFIP helped the communities by providing them with a variety of flood hazard maps to define their flood boundaries and set insurance rates.

The 1993 Midwest floods triggered another major reform to the NFIP. This act strength- ened the compliance procedures. It told communities that if they didn’t join the program,

and had already placed sandbags and warned residents. Within four days of the flood the City had placed debris containers around town which greatly facilitated cleanup and repair. At the time of the December 2005 floods, officials estimated that the project was only 40% completed. Nevertheless, significant economic losses were avoided. A sense of confidence in the economic vitality of the City of Napa is evidenced by an all-time high in construction activity for both the residential and commercial sectors, the opening of four new downtown restaurants, the proposal for three new hotels, and an increase in commercial assessment in the downtown area. In addition to mitigating flood losses, the community has placed a revitalized, healthy river as the centerpiece of Napa. Many people now take advantage of the resources the river has to offer, including fishing, boating, walking along river trails, bird watching, and scenic dining. For up-to-date information on flood mitigation activities in Napa County, please visit the Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District website.

Source : FEMA. http://www.fema.gov/mitigationbp/bestPracticeDetailPDF.do?mitssId � 3045

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they would be eligible for disaster assistance only one time. Any further request would be denied. As a positive incentive, the act established a Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) fund for flood planning, flood mitigation grants, and additional policy coverage for meet- ing the tougher compliance requirements such as building elevation.

Over the years, the NFIP has created other incentive programs such as the Community Rating System. This program offers reduced insurance premiums to communities that go beyond the minimum floodplain ordinance requirements. The NFIP represents one of the best public/private partnerships. Through the Write Your Own program, private insurers are given incentives to market and sell flood insurance.

Today more than 20,000 communities in the NFIP have mitigation programs in place. Other attempts have been made to duplicate this program for wind and earthquake haz- ards, but these have not received the support necessary to pass in Congress. If another major earthquake occurs, the issue of creating a federally supported earthquake or all- hazards insurance will resurface.

Major disasters commonly instigate changes within the national and international private insurance industries, as firms attempt to adjust operations such that they are able to continue profitable operations according to newly acquired hazard information. Industry changes resulting from the 9/11 terrorist events, which focused solely on dam- ages caused by a perceived “ long-shot ” subsequent terrorism incident, focused on the availability of specialized terrorism insurance (and affected mainly a business clientele). However, Hurricane Katrina, which ranked as the costliest U.S. disaster, with between $40 to $55 billion in insured losses, has resulted in new changes whose impacts are just beginning to be understood and that are expected to profoundly affect the ever-growing coastal populations who depend on insurance coverage for financial security.

The insurance industry was lambasted during the recovery from Hurricane Katrina when it was reported that victims often faced long delays in receiving their insurance checks or, even worse, were informed that their insurance coverage did not apply to the type of damage that was caused by the hurricane (many victims found themselves without coverage when it was determined that their damages were not caused by wind, which was covered in their policies, but rather by the excluded storm surge hazard). Class action lawsuits gave many of these Gulf Coast victims some recourse, but they have in turn caused the insurance industry to reconsider whether risk assessments of coastal areas are still valid if insurers are being mandated to pay damages on events their original calculations did not consider. As a result, the insurance industry has steadily withdrawn their coverage from many of these Gulf Coast areas and in coastal areas as far away as Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, claiming that new conditions brought about by the lawsuits would require them to raise premiums to unaffordable levels. State Farm Insurance, the nation’s largest residential insurer and one of the largest companies operating on the Gulf Coast (which paid over $1 billion in claims in Mississippi alone fol- lowing Katrina), has refused to renew policies that cover homes within 1,000 feet of the water. Allstate Insurance Company has canceled or refused renewed coverage in a dozen coastal states.

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However , residents in coastal areas are not the only people who will feel the ramifi- cations from such costly megaevents. Industry experts predict that policy premiums will rise, even if slightly, in all “ catastrophe-prone ” areas regardless of risk level to ensure ample backing of all policies within the risk pool. In Louisiana, the state Insurance Rating Commission has approved premium rate increases of over 23 percent in some cases. Many may even find it difficult to acquire insurance as companies pull out of these areas in favor of low-risk, “ safe ” markets (where policies may even decrease due to competition for low-risk policies). Those living in areas where no company will provide coverage have traditionally been able to find policies under state-provided “ pools ” like the Mississippi Wind Pool. However, even those resources are experiencing rate hikes over 250 percent. With no insurance options, many people in these affected areas are choosing to rebuild elsewhere in places where they are able to better protect themselves.

Some states are considering state-run hurricane insurance programs. Florida was the first to approve a measure that would lower insurance premiums by pledging up to $32 billion of state money to back insurers of homeowners whose houses have been damaged or destroyed by a hurricane. The money for this “ state catastrophic fund ” will come from increased taxes on houses and automobiles and on other types of insurance policies that are sold in Florida. Florida state officials, recognizing that, unlike floods, not all states are affected by hurricanes, have appealed to their neighbor states that share similar risks to join the program and make it more effective in the event of a future hurricane as destructive as Katrina.

Structural Controls

Structural controls are controversial as a mitigation tool. Structural controls usually have been used to protect existing development. In doing so, they can have both positive and negative effects on the areas they are not protecting. In addition, as the name implies, they are used to control the hazard, not reduce it. Invariably, as was seen so graphically in the Midwest floods, the structures lose control and nature wins; however, in some cir- cumstances, structural controls are the only alternative.

The most common form of structural control is the levee ( Figure 3-4 ). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has designed and built levees as flood-control structures across the United States. Levees are part of the aging infrastructure of America. As mitigation tools, they have obvious limitations. They can be overtopped or breached, as in the 1993 Midwest floods; they can give residents a false sense of safety that often promotes increased development; and they can exacerbate the hazard in other locations. After the 1993 floods, a major rethinking of dependency on levees has occurred. Efforts are being made to acquire structures built behind the levees, new design criteria are being considered, and other more wetland-friendly policies are being adopted. For a city like New Orleans, however, which is built below sea level and where relocation is impractical, levees can be used effectively to protect flood-prone areas.

Other structural controls are intended to protect coastal areas. Seawalls, bulk- heads, breakwaters, groins, and jetties are intended to stabilize the beach or reduce the

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impacts of wave action. These structures are equally controversial because they protect in one place and increase the damage in another. New Jersey’s shoreline is a prime exam- ple of the failure of seawalls as a solution to shoreline erosion problems. Cape May, New Jersey, where cars used to be raced on the beach, lost all of its beachfront. An ongoing beach replenishment project is the only thing that has brought some of it back. Figure 3-5 shows another example of erosion mitigation.

FIGURE 3-4 Valley City, North Dakota, April 13, 2009. Members of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers inspect the site of a levee where severe seepage threatens the integrity of the levee in downtown Valley City, North Dakota. The Corps is working with city officials and the National Guard to ensure the safety of the levees in the town. Photo by Patsy Lynch/FEMA.

FIGURE 3-5 Sargent County, North Dakota, May 4, 2009. Rocks and an angled culvert help prevent bank erosion on drain 11 in Sargent County. Many areas of North Dakota were covered with floodwater weeks after the storms and floods occurred in March. Eliud Echevarria/FEMA.

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CASE STUDY: MITIGATION MEASURES ALLEVIATE DRAINAGE PROBLEM

Grapevine , Texas. Oak Grove Park’s ball field complex, located in Grapevine, Texas, was built in the 1960s and is home to local baseball and soccer teams. Over the years, surface water resulting from inadequate drainage, along with additions to the park, caused flood and maintenance issues and posed problems for pedestrians.

Acting upon requests and recommendations for new fields, the city of Grapevine came up with a master plan that involved creating berms, drainage ditches and retention walls, installing storm water drainage pipes, uprooting and replanting trees, and elevating the land in targeted areas to prevent future flooding of the park. Kevin Mitchell, Assistant Director of Parks and project manager, explained, “ During the design and development stage, I along with several staff members toured many, many complexes. We wanted to look at the good as well as the bad. And we tried not to make the same mistakes that we noted. ”

The first obstacle was the temporary removal of hundreds of oak trees. Grapevine, Texas, is a member of “ Tree City USA, ” a tree planting and tree care program sponsored by the National Arbor Day Foundation for cities and towns in the United States. A temporary tree farm and irrigation system were created to house and nourish the relocated trees during construction. Construction occurred around groups of trees that could not be uprooted. “ We spent just shy of one-fourth of a million dollars digging up trees, moving them, and then moving them back, ” said Mitchell.

By nature, storm water collects debris, chemicals, dirt, and other pollutants before flowing into a storm sewer system or directly into a lake, stream, river, or wetland. Hence, the planners used storm water management as a tool to prevent this debris from entering the water system. “ We used storm scepters, something new to the project, to separate the sand, silt, and clay and keep debris from going back into the lake, ” said Mitchell. The scepters allow water to enter into a swirl chamber, where it is filtered before moving into a “ floatable ” chamber. There, general debris is collected before the water is sent to the outlet chamber for disbursement into Lake Grapevine. Berms, raised mounds of soil, were created as an additional filtering system, allowing water to flow through grassy areas that serve as a biofiltering system before it reaches the lake. Design and development also included land elevation at varying heights. For example, the area where the newly constructed concession building and public restrooms are located was elevated above nine feet. Retention walls were strategically placed to stabilize the soil from runoff and erosion, especially since tiered landscaping was utilized throughout the park. It also created useable land. Stone pavers created a solid surface for sidewalks but water was still able to drain into the ground through the spaces between the pavers.

The Oak Grove ball field complex now backs to Lake Grapevine. Part of the project was to irrigate the athletic field with water from Lake Grapevine. An irrigation pond that holds approximately 3.5 million gallons of water was created, and a pumping station was built. Water is purchased from Dallas, which is a savings for the park.

According to Mitchell, transformation of the 33-acre park into a sports haven cost approximately $13 million, and construction was completed within ten months. “ The good thing about this is that we paid cash for the project, ” said Mitchell. “ We used tax money spent by people coming into our town to shop. ”

The design development stage took nearly a year to complete, but it was time well spent. Visiting Oak Grove Park’s ball field complex after a heavy rain is no longer a problem thanks

Chapter 3 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Mitigation 83

Impediments to Mitigation If so many tools can be applied, why haven’t risk-reduction and risk-mitigation programs been more widely applied? Some of the reasons are denial of the risk, political will, costs and a lack of funding, and taking on the issue. Despite the best technical knowledge, his- toric occurrence, public education, and media attention, many individuals don’t want to recognize that they or their communities are vulnerable. Recognition requires action, and it could have economic consequences as businesses decide to locate elsewhere if they find the community is at risk. Some people are willing to try to beat the odds, but if a disaster strikes, they know the government will help them out. Gradually, however, such attitudes are changing. Potential liability issues are making communities more aware, media attention to disasters has brought public pressure, and the government has pro- vided both incentives for, and penalties for not, taking action.

As previously mentioned, mitigation provides a long-term benefit. The U.S. political system tends to focus on short-term rewards. Developers are large players in the political process and often are concerned that mitigation means additional costs. Mitigation strat- egies and actions require political vision and will. When Tip O’Neill was Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, he said, “ All politics is local. ” Well, so is mitigation. Local elected officials are the individuals who have to promote, market, and endorse adopting risk reduction as a goal. For many elected officials, the development pressures are too much, funding is lacking, and other priorities dominate their agendas; however, with the increasing attention to the economic, social, and political costs of not dealing with their risks, more elected officials are recognizing that they can’t afford to not take action.

Mitigation costs money. Most mitigation of new structures or development can be passed on to the builder or buyer without much notice. Programs to retrofit existing structures or acquisition and relocation projects are expensive and almost always beyond

to the steps taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risks to both people and property. Good mitigation planning and cooperation with local authorities worked together to create a paradise for Little Leaguers that will be enjoyed for years to come.

Source : FEMA. http://www.fema.gov/mitigationbp/bestPracticeDetail.do;jsessionid � 4F92446D3E1C2D38CA1BA 62E7EBACCD4. WorkerTheCage?mitssId � 7032

CRITICAL THINKING

• What mitigation measures are best suited to address the hazards you face as an individual? • What mitigation measures are best suited to address the hazards faced by your community? • Do you feel that more should be done to address your community’s hazards? If so, what

could or should be done?

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the capacity of the local government. Funding for mitigation comes primarily from fed- eral programs that need to be matched with state or local dollars. As state and local bud- gets constrict, their ability to match is reduced. Strong arguments can be made that it is in the best financial interest of the federal government to support mitigation. These argu- ments and a series of large disasters resulted in substantial increases in federal funding, including new monies for predisaster mitigation, but the fact remains that mitigation needs far outweigh mitigation funding.

Many mitigation actions involve privately owned property. A major legal issue sur- rounding this is the “ taking ” issue. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pro- hibits the taking of property without just compensation. What constitutes a taking, under what circumstances, and what is just compensation have been the focus of numerous legal cases. Several have dealt with the use of property in the floodplain and the use of oceanfront property on a barrier island. The decisions have been mixed, and taking will continue to be an issue in implementing mitigation programs and policies. In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a case brought by homeowners in Florida dealing with property lines and ownership on properties where beach replenishment was undertaken with public funds. As of the writing of this text, no decision on the case had been issued by the Court.

ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

“ No Adverse Impact and the Courts: Protecting the Property Rights of All ” is a report issued in November 2007 by the Association of State Flood Plain Managers (ASFPM). It discusses the general law of the nation and selected legal issues associated with a “ no adverse impact ” floodplain management approach.

Source : www.floods.org .

Federal Mitigation Programs FEMA is responsible for most of the programs of the federal government that support mitigation, and in this section we examine some of them. As noted earlier, the SBA, Economic Development Administration (EDA), and HUD have policies that support mitigation. The PATH program at HUD supports incorporating mitigation into public housing. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has several programs in floodplain management, and in 2002 it initiated a new pilot program for national watersheds. The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program includes several other federal agencies, but the predominant federal agency involved in disaster mitigation is FEMA. FEMA’s pro- grams include the NFIP, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) ( Figure 3-6 ), the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM), the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program (FMA),

Chapter 3 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Mitigation 85

the Repetitive Flood Claims Program (RFC), the Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP), the National Hurricane Program, and the Fire Prevention and Assistance Grant Program.

In 2000, Congress passed the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA2000), which amended the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act in an effort to encourage mitigation planning at the state and local levels, requiring that states main- tain mitigation plans as a prerequisite for certain federal mitigation funding and disas- ter assistance programs. The program also provided incentives to states that could show increased coordination and integration of mitigation activities by establishing two differ- ent levels of state plan certification: standard and enhanced. States that demonstrated what was considered “ an increased commitment to comprehensive mitigation plan- ning ” through the development of an approved Enhanced State Plan could increase the amount of funding they received through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). DMA2000 also established a new requirement for local mitigation plans and authorized up to 7 percent of HMGP funds available to a state to be used for development of state, tribal, and local mitigation plans.

The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program

The HMGP is the largest source of funding for state and local mitigation activities. This program provides grants to state and local governments to implement long-term hazard mitigation programs after a major disaster has been declared by the president. HMGP

FIGURE 3-6 Albany, New York. This church is being moved half a mile to higher ground as part of the Stryker Road relocation project in Schoharie County, New York. The Hazard Mitigation Grant and Public Assistance Programs helped fund the project. Schoharie County Planning and Development Agency photos.

86 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

projects must reduce the risks, and the benefits of the project must exceed the costs. Here are some examples of activities supported by the HMGP:

● Acquisition of property on a voluntary basis and commitment to open use of the property

● Retrofitting of structures and lifelines ● Elevation of structures ● Vegetation management programs ● Building code enforcement ● Localized flood-control projects ● Public education and awareness

This program was enacted by Congress in 1988 as part of the Robert T. Stafford Act, which was a major reworking of federal disaster policy. Besides creating the HMGP, it established a cost sharing of disaster assistance by the states. At the time, the formula for state HMGP funding was 15 percent of the public assistance costs, and it had a 50 percent federal/50 percent state cost share.

From 1988 to 1993, many states did not take advantage of the HMGP funding because it was difficult to meet the matching requirements, even though the 15 percent cap was often not very much. After the devastation of the 1993 Midwest floods, Representative Volkmer from Missouri championed a change to the legislation that would significantly increase the states ’ ability to mitigate. Congress amended the legislation to allow for a 75 percent federal/25 percent state match and dramatically increased the amount of fund- ing to 15 percent of the total disaster costs. The rationale for these changes was to work aggressively to move people and structures out of the floodplain. The HMGP has allowed states to hire staff to work on mitigation and requires development of a State Hazard Mitigation Plan as a condition of funding. This program brought about a change in the emergency management community at the state and local levels. With adequate funding, states and localities began to hire staff designated to work on mitigation.

The HMGP has its detractors, and in 2002, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposed that this program be eliminated in favor of a new predisaster competi- tive grant program. However, Congress did not agree, and the HMGP program remains intact and provides the most significant funding for mitigation at the federal level.

The Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM)

Through the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Congress approved the creation of a national Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM) to provide mitigation funding not dependent on a disaster declaration. The genesis of PDM was an initiative of the Clinton administration called Project Impact: Building Disaster-Resistant Communities. Project Impact grew out of the devastating disasters of the 1990s. Many of the communities hit by these disasters took months and even years to recover emotionally and financially. James Lee Witt, then director of FEMA, questioned the wisdom of spending more than $2.5 billion per year

Chapter 3 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Mitigation 87

on disaster relief and not a penny to reduce disasters before they happen. The mitigation tools and techniques were available, so why not work to prevent individuals and com- munities from becoming victims of disasters? With a small amount of seed money, FEMA launched Project Impact in 1997 in seven pilot communities.

The concept behind the initiative was simple: The mitigation activities had to be designed and tailored to the hazards in that community, and all sectors of the commu- nity had to become involved in order for it to be effective and sustainable. Project Impact brought the business community into the emergency management umbrella. Communities were asked to achieve the following four goals:

● Build a community partnership ● Assess the risks ● Prioritize risk-reduction actions ● Build support by communicating your actions

By 2001, more than 200 communities were participating in Project Impact, and Congress had appropriated $25 million to the initiative. Seattle, Washington, was one of the original pilot communities. In 2002, when a 6.8 earthquake struck Seattle, the mayor attributed the success of their Project Impact activities for the minimal damages and prompt recovery.

CASE STUDY: PROJECT IMPACT AND THE NISQUALLY EARTHQUAKE

On February 28, 2001, a magnitude 6.8 earthquake occurred 32 miles below the Nisqually wetland north of Olympia, the Washington state capital. Ironically, the quake occurred as the Seattle Project Impact Steering Committee was preparing to celebrate the initiative’s third anniversary with several hundred of its partners. Had the quake occurred one hour later, all of the region’s emergency managers would have been gathered at the Phinney Ridge Neighborhood Center in Seattle. Instead, committee members and a few early birds guided children from the center’s two daycare programs to safety.

Members of the response and recovery community were not fully tested by the earthquake, largely because it was deep, and drought conditions in the Puget Sound region reduced the number of landslides and amount of liquefaction that would normally be caused by a quake of that magnitude. There was only one significant aftershock and a few secondary impacts (one fire and several major landslides). However, the quake did interrupt business operations and damaged numerous building components, such as chimneys, facades, water pipes, and equipment.

Many historic, commercial, and manufacturing facilities were damaged, including key government structures such as the state legislative building and the regional airport control tower. Additional damage was uncovered while engineering teams performed inspections, although structural losses (i.e., damage to components essential to a building’s structural integrity) will undoubtedly be a fraction of nonstructural losses (i.e., damage to nonessential building structural elements, such as architectural features and heating and electrical systems, and losses due to lost productivity, etc.).

88 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

What effect did FEMA’s Project Impact have, if any, in reducing the damage from this earthquake? In short, the program transformed the way residents deal with disasters and established an organizational structure that takes advantage of this change.

Project Impact has the broad goal of reducing risks by changing the way communities think about and deal with disasters. More importantly, it asks communities to be farsighted, to assess hazards rather than just respond to them, to protect themselves, and to become disaster- resistant. The program is based on three simple principles:

● Preventive actions must be decided at the local level and must be responsive to local hazards. ● Private sector participation is vital. ● Long-term efforts and investments in prevention are essential.

The Seattle/Tacoma metropolitan area, which includes King, Pierce, and Kitsap counties, has been heavily involved in Project Impact, and Seattle was a pilot participant in the program. It is useful to examine Project Impact’s effectiveness by assessing how well its goals were met in the context of the Nisqually earthquake.

Change the way we think about and deal with disasters . Perhaps the most significant (and most difficult to measure) effect the initiative had is in

demystifying and personalizing earthquake risk reduction for thousands of individuals, small businesses, and corporate partners.

Preventive actions must be decided at the local level . The Seattle and King, Pierce, and Kitsap County Project Impact programs were essentially

collective actions taken by hundreds of partners. Seven programs can be linked directly to Project Impact, including efforts in home and school retrofitting, hazard mapping, transportation corridor vulnerability mitigation, office and home nonstructural retrofitting, and small business resumption planning. It is too early to assess the full impact of these programs, but here are some early conclusions. (For a description of individual programs, see the FEMA website: http://www.fema.gov/impact .)

● The most signifi cant benefi t of Project Impact might be the reduction (or minimalization) of structural damage in retrofi tted buildings.

● Project Impact decommissioned very heavy and hazardous water tanks located in the attics of seven Seattle schools, and one of these schools was damaged signifi cantly by the quake. Had the water tank been in use, the building would have suffered even more damage, and the ceilings above several classrooms most likely would have failed. The school program also included extensive nonstructural retrofi tting. No losses were reported in participating schools, and, even more important, evacuation was not impeded. Other schools were not so fortunate.

● Over 1,000 homeowners attended home retrofi tting workshops, and over 300 had retrofi tted their homes before the quake. None of these retrofi tted residences were damaged.

● Each of the four Project Impact jurisdictions had implemented long-range transportation corridor and hazard mapping programs. Information generated through these programs is greatly aiding the inspection process and helping to jump-start discussion on mitigation alternatives. In addition, these projects brought together public road managers who created “ tool kits ” for contingency routing that will be useful in other kinds of disasters. The quake elevated the priority of these initiatives, and funding is expected.

Chapter 3 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Mitigation 89

Private sector participation is vital .

● All four Project Impact jurisdictions and their private sector partners had developed aggressive business resumption programs. Over 100 large businesses and more than 500 small businesses were involved in Project Impact, and tens of thousands of earthquake safety products were in their offi ces. Business hazard reduction programs had been created by partners such as Washington Mutual, Bank of America, PEMCO, SAFECO, the Boeing Company, Bartell, the Russell Corporation, the King County Labor Council, and Home Depot, and many of the employees of these partners had implemented earthquake safety measures in their own homes as well.

● Project Impact communities and their partners ambitiously pursued risk-reduction outreach prior to the earthquake. Home Depot stores displayed home retrofi tting techniques. Grocery and drug stores displayed earthquake safety products. Informational fl yers accompanied utility bills, paychecks, and insurance renewal forms. A computer tie- down campaign attracted funding partners and garnered donations of computer tie-downs for area schools. The Project Impact logo was prominently displayed along with the message “ Creating Disaster-Resistant Communities ” during hundreds of newscasts.

Effects that were not directly related to specific programs .

● During and immediately following the earthquake, participating news organizations provided a consistent message about the earthquake hazard and described methods for preventing damage. Since its inception, Project Impact has worked regularly with the press, and the ABC and CBS local affi liates are formal Project Impact partners.

● Shortly after the quake, homeowners were able to obtain lists of area contractors trained in seismic retrofi tting. This information is particularly useful immediately after a disaster, when unscrupulous contractors can prey on disaster victims.

Long -term efforts and investments in prevention are essential . Research is currently under way to assess the more indirect long-term impacts of the

Nisqually quake. FEMA and the University of Washington have established a clearinghouse to facilitate research, but an examination of efforts that are directly attributable to Project Impact indicated that Puget Sound residents accepted the responsibility for their hazard vulnerability and focused on protecting themselves. Here are three examples:

● “ SecureIt ” was a Pierce and King County Project Impact program, but all four project participant areas noted increased availability of computer tie-downs and other offi ce- related items that were diffi cult to obtain when the programs began. After the earthquake, many vendors saw a dramatic increase in orders for these products.

● Home retrofi tting activities increased substantially. Roger Faris of the Phinney Ridge Neighborhood Center Home Improvement program indicated at the time that the program could not keep up with the demand for the Project Impact home retrofi tting course. Before the quake, he scheduled one course per month with 20 to 30 attendees. After the quake, he held four per month and had 60 participants per class. Private contractors could not keep up with the substantially increased demand for retrofi tting services. Homeowners had diffi culty hiring the 60 contractors who had taken the University of Washington (a Project Impact

90 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

In 2002, the Bush administration decided to drop the Project Impact name and con- cept in exchange for a competitive grant program as their approach to predisaster miti- gation through the PDM program. The program’s original budget request was $300 million, and it was proposed that PDM replace both Project Impact and the HMGP. Although Congress did not agree with combining the programs, it did agree to the PDM. As designed, PDM is designed to provide “ funds to states, territories, Indian tribal govern- ments, communities, and universities for hazard mitigation planning and the implemen- tation of mitigation projects prior to a disaster event. ” The program requires jurisdictions to submit applicants for a competitive grant selection.

In 2007, some changes were made to the program, including a significant eligibil- ity requirement that local applicant communities maintain an approved FEMA Hazard Mitigation Plan in place as required by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA2000). Many of the original mechanisms remain the same, however, such as the 25 percent com- mitment that must be covered by the local applicant and the fact that the state office of emergency management serves as grantee, while local agencies apply to the state. A sub- grantee category was created for small, impoverished communities. Under this category the cost share is 90 percent federal and 10 percent local.

partner) earthquake retrofi tting course. Due to the increased interest among contractors, additional courses were scheduled.

● The Project Impact coordinator for the Seattle school district received the following letter from a school principal:

Just wanted to let you know the good news on how well the building did during the earthquake — and a big thanks for the retrofitting. We did not even have a single light cover come down, a computer fall over, a book come off a shelf. Now, . . . how do we get more straps to do the new things we have installed since retrofitting was done here? Thank you. You made believers out of us!

PERFORMANCE MEASURES Were there fewer property losses, lower costs for repairs, and less time lost from productive activity as a result of Project Impact? It depends on how one measures the costs of repairing a school that did not decommission a water tank to prevent damage, the injuries or deaths of children in classrooms directly under such a tank, the loss of homes that were not retrofitted, and the closure of firms that had not implemented business resumption measures. Whatever the savings, it looks like we will be even better prepared when the next quake occurs, and isn’t that, after all, the goal of Project Impact?

Robert Freitag, Director, Institute for Hazard Mitigation Planning and Research, University of Washington

Source : Natural Hazards Observer, University of Colorado For more information on the earthquake in Seattle, view the Clearinghouse on the Nisqually Earthquake website: http://maximus.ce.washington.edu/ � nisqually .

Chapter 3 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Mitigation 91

The Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program provides annual funding for commu- nities to take action to reduce or eliminate the risk of flood damage to buildings insured under the NFIP. The Repetitive Flood Claims (RFC) program provides funding to reduce the risk of flood damages to individual properties insured under the NFIP that have had one or more claim payments for flood damages. This program can provide up to 100 per- cent federal funding for eligible properties.

The Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) program provides annual funding to reduce the risk of flood damage to individual residential properties insured through the NFIP. To qualify, the structure must be designated a severe repetitive loss structure, in which case the fed- eral share can be as high as 90 percent.

The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) is a federal government effort established by Congress in 1977 (Public Law 95-124) as a long-term, nationwide program to reduce the risks to life and property in the United States resulting from earth- quakes. This is accomplished through the establishment and maintenance of an effective earthquake hazards reduction program.

The NEHRP is a multiagency effort that works to improve understanding, character- ization, and prediction of hazards and vulnerabilities; improve model building codes and land-use practices; reduce risk through postearthquake investigations and education; develop and improve design and construction techniques; improve mitigation capacity; and accelerate application of research results. The NEHRP provides funding to states to establish programs that promote public education and awareness, planning, loss estima- tion studies, and some minimal mitigation activities.

The specific roles of each of the agencies within NEHRP are as follows:

● FEMA is responsible for emergency response and management, estimation of loss potential, and implementation of mitigation actions.

● NIST conducts applied earthquake engineering research to provide the technical basis for building codes, standards, and practices, and provides the NEHRP lead agency function.

● NSF conducts basic research in seismology, earthquake engineering, and social, behavioral, and economic sciences, and it operates the Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (which includes the tsunami wave basin research facility and supporting tsunami research).

● USGS operates the seismic networks, develops seismic hazard maps, coordinates postearthquake investigations, and conducts applied earth sciences research (which includes tsunami research and risk assessment).

● NSF and USGS jointly support the Global Seismographic Network (GSN), the main facility for pinpointing earthquakes in real time.

92 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Since its inception, NEHRP has been reviewed and reauthorized by Congress every two or three years. Congress recently completed a thorough two-year review of NEHRP, resulting in enactment of the NEHRP Reauthorization Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-360), which President Bush signed into law on October 25, 2004. Public Law 108-360 designates NIST as the lead agency for NEHRP, transferring that responsibility from FEMA, which had filled that role since the program’s inception.

The NEHRP Reauthorization act of 2004 authorized $900 million to be spent during the period from 2004 to 2009. The law also authorized the spending of $72.5 million over a three-year period for the creation of a National Windstorm Impact Reduction Program modeled according to NEHRP. Funds have never been appropriated for this new program, but supporters introduced the concept again in 2009 as part of the NEHRP reauthorization.

The National Hurricane Program

This FEMA program supports activities at the federal, state, and local levels that focus on the physical effects of hurricanes, improved response capabilities, and new mitigation techniques for the built environment. The program has done significant work in storm surge modeling and evacuation planning, design and construction of properties in hur- ricane-prone areas, and public education and awareness programs for schools and com- munities. The amount of funding that FEMA receives for this program is in the range of $3 million annually, which is clearly not commensurate with the risk.

The Fire Prevention and Assistance Act

This program was created in 2001 to address the needs of the nation’s paid and volunteer fire departments and to support prevention activities. Congress had long-standing con- cerns about the status of this first-responder community. New threats from potential bio- chemical terrorism, increasing wildfire requirements, and a stagnant search-and-rescue capability provided the rationale for funding this program. This multimillion-dollar grant program provides competitive grants to fire companies throughout the United States. In the wake of 9/11, the appropriations for this program tripled in 2002 and have continued at around the $600 million level.

Other federal agencies such as the previously mentioned HUD, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Department of Agriculture (DOA), and the Economic Development Administration (EDA) will provide in the after- math of a disaster varying levels of support for local mitigation projects.

CRITICAL THINKING

• Should mitigation funding from the federal government be tied to individual disasters like it is with the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, or should it be independent of disasters altogether like with the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program? Explain your answer.

• What are the advantages of having a hazard-specifi c grant program such as the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP)? Are there any disadvantages?

Chapter 3 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Mitigation 93

Nonfederal Mitigation Grant Programs The most significant mitigation funding in the United States comes from federally funded grant programs. However, all states have established State Hazard Mitigation Officers (SHMOs) to manage the programmatic and financial matching requirements of the fed- eral programs. SHMOs are responsible for producing a statewide hazard mitigation plan, which is a requirement for receiving HMGP funding postdisaster, and the quality of the plan can become a factor in altering the cost share formula after an event. Increasingly, states are playing a more active role in historic preservation and mitigation of historic, cultural, and environmentally sensitive areas.

Regional programs such as Rebuild Northwest Florida, administered by a public-pri- vate partnership in Florida, provide grant money to homeowners who wish to structur- ally mitigate their homes from storm damage. Rebuild approves grants from qualified homeowners that help them improve the strength of their houses through such mitiga- tion measures as creating secondary water barriers, improving roofing and roof decks, bracing gable ends, applying tie-down ( “ hurricane ” ) straps, reinforcing wall-to-wall connections, and much more. Some nongovernmental programs, whether private, non- profit, or public, provide the monetary, material, and technical assistance that individ- uals, businesses, and communities require to mitigate their hazard risks. The Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS), for example, creates guidance documents that illustrate various structural and nonstructural mitigation techniques. IBHS employ- ees work with various entities, such as daycare centers, to help them reduce hazard vulnerabilities.

Two other entities are focusing on mitigation and related issues. The Association of State Flood Plain Managers (ASFPM) is a strong proponent of mitigation at all levels and has successfully lobbied Congress for increases in federal mitigation dollars. A goal of the National Hazard Mitigation Association (NHMA) is to promote mitigation nationwide and within the international community. The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), which represents local emergency managers worldwide, has recently become more engaged in promoting mitigation among its membership.

Conclusion Disasters occur in every state. The direct costs of these events are staggering, but the indirect effect to the economy and the social fabric of communities is even worse. A study done for FEMA by the Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council (MMC) of the National Institute for Building Sciences (NIBS) found that for every $1 invested in mitigation, $4 would be saved in future losses. Depending on the type of disaster and locale, this num- ber was as high as $8. Mitigation works. The case studies included in this chapter are just a few examples of successful, sustained programs that are reducing risk and mak- ing communities safer. Mitigation programs exist at all levels of government, and there is a growing interest in the private sector for taking mitigation actions to reduce their risk exposure. To many people, even in a time when terrorism preoccupies the emergency

94 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

management psyche, mitigation is — and should be — the future direction of emergency management.

Important Terms Building codes Hazard identification Land-use planning Mitigation Structural controls

Self-Check Questions 1. How does the function of mitigation differ from other emergency management

disciplines? 2. Which other emergency management function offers the best opportunities for

mitigation? 3. Why is it more difficult to analyze, and therefore mitigate, the effects of terrorism? 4. How have geographic information systems (GIS) aided the practice of mitigation? 5. Why have building codes that require rehabilitation of existing potentially hazardous

structures rarely been implemented? 6. At what government level are mitigation programs most effective, and why? 7. What is the most effective as well as the most expensive land-use planning tool? Why

is it so effective? 8. How has the Community Development Block Grant served to help communities

perform local mitigation? 9. Why do some people consider insurance to not be a proper mitigation method? 10. Why are structural controls a controversial mitigation tool? How can structural

mitigation negatively affect the areas they are presumably protecting? 11. What are some impediments faced by communities wishing to perform hazard

mitigation? 12. Name the primary federal mitigation programs, and explain how they serve to

reduce hazard risk. 13. Do nonfederal mitigation programs exist?

Out-of-Class Exercises Get a copy of your community’s hazard mitigation plan from your local office of emer- gency management. Create a mitigation plan for yourself that addresses the hazards identified in the community plan as they affect you on a personal level. Determine if there are any hazards that you face as an individual that are not covered by the plan, and describe what mitigation measures you can take or have taken to address those hazards.

Chapter 3 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Mitigation 95

● Contact your state’s office of emergency management, and find out what mitigation programs are currently offered. Are they all federally funded, or are there any programs funded by the state or another entity? Find out if your local government participates in any of these programs or if they offer any additional programs funded by other sources. Do you believe that your community is taking advantage of every mitigation program that it can, or do you feel more could be done with what is currently offered?

● The Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS) has developed a mitigation guide for daycare centers ( http://www.ibhs.org/docs/childcare.pdf ). Using this guide, assist a daycare center in your community to perform the mitigation techniques suggested in the guide.

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The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Preparedness

What You’ll Learn ● Why preparedness is considered the building block of emergency management ● The difference between mitigation and preparedness ● How FEMA’s Community and Family Preparedness Program educates the public

about disasters ● Why evacuation planning is important ● Why special consideration must be made for certain populations when planning for

emergencies and disasters ● How the Emergency Management Institute promotes community-level disaster

preparedness ● The types of exercises and what each involves ● How training and equipment help first responders to prepare ● How businesses and nongovernmental organizations prepare for emergencies

Introduction Preparedness in the field of emergency management can best be defined as a state of readiness to respond to a disaster, crisis, or any other type of emergency situation. Preparedness is not only a state of readiness, but it is also a theme throughout most aspects of emergency management. If you look back in U.S. history, you will see that our forebearers practiced the preparedness that emergency managers use today. The fallout shelters of the 1950s and the air raid wardens were promoting preparedness for a poten- tial nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. An early 1970s study prepared by the National Governors Association talked about the importance of preparedness as the first step in emergency management. Since then, preparedness has advanced significantly and con- tinues to do so even today. The federal government dedicates billions of dollars each year to emergency preparedness, and no emergency management organization can function without a strong preparedness capability. The capacity to respond and recover from emer- gency and disaster events is only developed through planning, training, and exercising — the heart of preparedness. It is the expansion of preparedness activities, including a movement into the areas of higher education, that has led to an increased professionalism

4

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within the discipline. And as the role of all sectors of society in the management of emer- gencies and disasters has come to light, preparedness activities have gradually expanded to include the private sector, NGOs, individuals, and others.

Today we recognize that all organizations, whether they are private, nongovernmen- tal, or governmental, are susceptible to the consequences of disasters and must there- fore ensure their preparedness. We also know that preparedness must focus not only on the protection of citizens, property, and essential government services in the aftermath of a disaster event but also on ensuring that the viability of the community — including its businesses and markets, social services, and character — can be sustained despite the hazard risks that exist. Emergency management agencies alone cannot ensure this, which is why the practice continues to expand.

This chapter discusses the preparedness cycle from a systems approach, preparedness programs, hazard preparedness, training programs, and exercise programs. The focus is on federal efforts — predominantly FEMA — and best practices are highlighted through several case studies.

A Systems Approach: The Preparedness Cycle As an academic field as well as an applied practice in the public and private sector, emer- gency management is still in the early stages of its establishment. As such, it has thus far drawn heavily on existing external fields, including emergency medicine, fire suppression, public health, business risk management, and law enforcement, for many of its founda- tional elements and core competencies. However, these disciplines are steeped in their own traditions, methods, and cultures, and they were not developed with the same goals as those in the emergency management field. Without its own foundation joining academia and structured analytic methodologies with the practices and competencies required of emergency management professionals in all sectors, advancement outside of the govern- ment sector will fall behind. The management of major emergency events and disasters requires navigation through extreme complexity and often requires coordination among hundreds to thousands of individuals and dozens of agencies and organizations. It is out of this need that a systematic approach for the preparedness function of emergency man- agement must take such a prominent position today, not only for emergency managers and the traditional emergency services but for all emergency management stakeholders (including individual private citizens).

Figure 4-1 , which was developed by the FEMA National Preparedness Directorate, shows the planning process, beginning with planning for the range of hazards that exist and working in a systematic approach toward a cyclical process to establish and improve preparedness. This cycle recognizes the importance of the four major components of any preparedness effort: planning, equipment, training, and exercise. This cycle also repre- sents preparedness not only for government jurisdictions at all levels but also the pre- paredness actions taken by individuals, businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and other entities.

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Step 1: Planning

In Figure 4-1, the preparedness cycle begins with the creation of various plans through which disaster response and recovery become possible. Planning is an ambitious effort in and of itself, and it requires significant effort to achieve the many tasks involved. Planning most often begins with the hazards risk assessment process described in Chapter 2, wherein all applicable hazards are identified and assessed for prioritization. While it is true that modern emergency management philosophy proclaims plans are most effective when they address all hazards risks, it is important to be aware that all-hazards prepared- ness is most effective when it takes into account, and therefore places a general focus on, those hazards that are actually likely to occur. Each community makes the best of the limited funds they have, so their full spectrum of equipment, resources, and trained staff need to focus on what actually might happen. This is why, for instance, communities in North Dakota might dedicate significant funds for the capabilities and resources to man- age snow removal equipment, while communities in Florida spend the same effort and funding on conducting evacuation plans, even though both involve an “ all-hazards ” focus.

Planning also involves a scooping of community vulnerability. In the planning phase, vulnerability helps planners to understand why disasters occur, where they are most likely to have the greatest impact, and, thus, what the appropriate response should be. Vulnerability assessment for a jurisdiction, business, organization, or individual also includes an assessment of current preparedness levels to determine the capabilities and resources that may be counted on and therefore planned for. This always includes the outside resources that may be called upon in times of need, such as mutual aid partners (e.g., town to town, business to business), emergency management assistance compacts (e.g., state to state assistance), interjurisdictional assistance (e.g., federal assistance, state to local assistance), contracts with private businesses and resource suppliers (e.g., debris

Evaluation

Planning

PreparationPreparation Reassess Assess Threat

Assess Vulnerability

ID Shortfalls Requirements

Implement Enhancements

Exercise Train

Assessment

FIGURE 4-1 The preparedness planning cycle.

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removal companies, hazmat remediation businesses), and others. Statutory authorities — the foundation of emergency management actions — must be understood, since govern- ment practice and authority is always dictated by law, even (or especially) in times of emergency.

Emergency planning is what often fills the majority of time spent by emergency man- agement officials and those individuals tasked with the management of emergencies at businesses or in organizations. Luckily, as stated in Chapter 2, most events that occur on a daily basis fall within what is considered “ normal ” and are therefore managed with little or no problem. The product of planning is, of course, the plan, which is often called the emergency operations plan or the emergency plan.

Step 2: Organization and Equipment

Preparedness is limited by several factors, two of which include actual possession or access to the equipment needed to manage response requirements and the organization of people and agencies through which the necessary response and recovery tasks will take place. Emergency management is technical in practice, and its various functions rely more and more on the use of equipment. There are several categories of equipment in the emergency management profession, including (for example) personnel protective equip- ment (PPE), which protects responders from the effects of the hazards; communications equipment, which allows responders to talk to one another both within and between dif- ferent organizations; and special search and rescue equipment, which allows responders to enter compromised buildings, navigate hazardous waters, or detect signs of life.

Equipment is primarily dictated by the hazards that exist and the functions laid out in the emergency operations plan. The purchase and maintenance of emergency manage- ment equipment have always been a challenge for communities because of limited funds available. Clearly (though to a limited degree), the more equipment a jurisdiction can acquire in order to manage the consequences likely to befall that jurisdiction, the more prepared they will be to meet the needs of people and property when the time comes. However, as that ideal will likely never be reached, and so many competing demands exist in the community for those same funds, difficult decisions must be made. In recent years, however, a few solutions have emerged that help communities to better meet their equip- ment needs. These include a great expansion of federal funding for which equipment is eligible, expansion in mutual assistance practices wherein equipment that is rarely used is shared among several communities, and the development of cheaper and more effective technologies, wherein equipment that was once considered “ out of reach ” is now more realistically accessible.

Step 3: Training

Training of emergency response officials is paramount to their ability to conduct the tasks required of them. Contemporary practice recognizes that it is not only the officials involved with the traditional emergency services who must participate in emergency

Chapter 4 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Preparedness 101

management training but also the elected officials responsible for key disaster-specific decisions, the businesses and nongovernmental organizations operating in the commu- nity that will be called upon to provide products or services, and the individuals whose responsibility it is to decrease their own vulnerability and assist in the overall community response. This is a lofty goal but one that has expanded at a rate that rivals most other disciplines. Training is conducted both at technical institutes, such as fire and police academies at the national, state, and local levels, and at the various universities, colleges, and community colleges around the country and the world. Training is also conducted by nongovernmental organizations, like the American Red Cross, by private companies that specialize in training for profit, and in the communities themselves, as is the case with the ever-popular Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) courses that are offered in all U.S. states and territories. And finally, the goal of enabling a trained public is one that continues to grow in importance in the writings and words of practitioners and scholars alike.

Step 4: Exercise

The adage that “ practice makes perfect ” is certainly true with emergency management. Training is even more so a critical component of preparedness efforts because the rare nature of emergency events means that few officials have experienced them firsthand and thus have little applicable experience to rely on when these events do occur. Through a regimen of training, including drills, tabletop exercises, functional exercises, and full- scale exercises, a much better understanding of the realities of response is achieved, as well as the identification of shortfalls or failures in planning, training, organization, or equipment.

Step 5: Evaluation and Improvement

The final step in the preparedness cycle takes the lessons learned and applies them to future iterations. Evaluation and improvement are generally the product of two sources. The first is that of exercise. By examining how the plans, equipment, and trained staff respond to imagined scenarios, it is possible to identify where changes in planning, purchases of more or better equipment, and more comprehensive training should be applied. Evaluation and improvement are also the result of actual disaster experience. Disasters show us in bold fashion the full limits of an emergency management organi- zation’s capabilities and identify the highest benefit to cost ratio for future spending and dedication of time and staff resources. Through the use of after action reporting (AAR), disaster experiences become lessons learned and the foundation of future planning cycles.

Many of the topics described here are expanded upon in the remainder of this chapter. The cycle of preparedness is one that, as its cyclical nature dictates, is ongoing. Moreover, all steps are occurring at all times, in a constant state of evolution and improvement as information, budgets, staff, political will, and perceptions change.

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Mitigation versus Preparedness Despite their unique definitions and both being distinct emergency management func- tions, significant confusion often arises over what constitutes mitigation and prepared- ness (and to what extent these two functions overlap). At the federal level, mitigation and preparedness are highly defined, with FEMA maintaining two completely distinct direc- torates (mitigation and national preparedness) to manage these functions. However, at the state, local, organizational, and private levels, there is much less of a defined bound- ary between the two. The major distinction between these two functions at every level is best characterized by the mission of the actions themselves, which calls into play the definitions that have been provided for mitigation and preparedness. In most simple terms, mitigation attempts to eliminate hazard risk by reducing either the likelihood or the consequences of the risk associated with the particular hazard. Associated activities, devices, or actions try to prevent a hazard from ever manifesting into a disaster in the first place, or they try to make the disaster much less damaging to humans, property, or the environment if an emergency or disaster situation arises. Typically, these actions are taken prior to the instance of an emergency event. Preparedness , on the other hand, seeks to improve the abilities of agencies and individuals to respond to the consequences of a disaster event once the disaster event has occurred . Preparedness assumes the occurrence of an event, whereas mitigation attempts to prevent the event altogether.

Preparedness: The Emergency Operations Plan The emergency operations plan (EOP) is the playbook by which emergency management response operations are conducted. However, the development of an EOP is not just a documentation of what will be done and by whom, but rather it is the process by which these factors are determined. The planning process, like the preparedness process, is a cyclical one that is dependent on each of the subsequent steps on the preparedness cycle, and each determines how the other changes periodically. Planning must be dynamic to be effective to meet the changing character and needs of the jurisdiction or organization for which it is conducted.

The National Response Framework (which is discussed in Chapter 6) is but one exam- ple of an emergency plan. Emergency plans literally come in all shapes and sizes and in all manner of quality. These plans, however, are designed by a standard paradigm. Through an evolutionary process of lesson sharing, doctrine, and guidance, select components now appear in almost all emergency plans. These components have formed because they are the most logical presentation through which the response and recovery needs of juris- dictions and agencies may be represented and therefore relied upon in times of need. These components include the following:

● The Base Plan: Contains the most comprehensive information about the community, its risks, its statutory authorities, and the general concept by which emergency

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operations are conducted (including the officials responsible and the tasks they will be held accountable for). This section also includes the assumptions according to which the plans were created and the process by which the plans are updated and distributed.

● Functional Annexes: Describe in more detail the different types of assistance that the responsible agencies and officials will provide, assigning responsibility for more task- oriented information. The functional annexes tend to be more operational in nature than what is found in the base plan.

● Hazard or Situational Annexes: Hazard annexes recognize that despite the all- hazards nature of base plans, some of the factors are unique to specific hazards that must be described in detail and communicated to emergency management and related officials when the need arises. Using hazard annexes keeps situation-specific information out of the base plan, which can make the base plan more concise and more effective in the time-constrained period of disaster response.

The planning process and the emergency operations plan both depend heavily on all of the steps in the preparedness cycle. Planning both dictates and accounts for the equip- ment that must be purchased to treat the disaster consequences that are planned for and to carry out the tasks assigned. Planning also becomes the basis of training and exercise, and responders train to the capabilities laid out in the plan and rely upon the assump- tions captured by the plan to determine those core competencies that are sought. The exercises that are conducted test the jurisdiction’s or organization’s ability to carry out what is prescribed in the plan.

Nationwide planning efforts are currently guided by the FEMA-produced Comprehen- sive Planning Guide-101 (CPG-101) . This federal document was created to provide gen- eral yet standardized guidelines on developing emergency operations plans (EOPs) and the terminology used in planning efforts and emergency management in general. The purpose of this guide was to promote a common understanding of the fundamentals of planning and decision making, which in turn would foster a more coordinated response when multiple agencies responded in concert to large-scale, multijurisdictional events. Given the pressures on communities to adopt the National Incident Management System and the contingencies placed on federal grant programs, it is understandable that com- munities would require such guidance. CPG-101 is not the first instance of the federal government providing guidelines. In fact, as long as 50 years ago, the Federal Civil Defense Guide was released for the same purpose. The Civil Preparedness Guide 1-8, Guide for the Development of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans, and State and Local Guide (SLG) 101, Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning followed, and they were influential predecessors to CPG-101 . CPG-101 can be accessed at http://www.fema .gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/cpg_101_layout.pdf .

Many states guide EOP planning efforts through the release of standard planning guide- lines. Some states even provide templates for EOP development, which allow for stan- dardization of not only content but of structure as well. From a state-level coordination

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perspective this makes perfect sense because a unified command response will call upon some form of synchronization from the various agencies involved. Such templates ensure that responders are referring to the same functions and using the same terminology, among other needs. Virginia is one state that has such guidelines, which can be accessed at http://www.vaemergency.com/library/plans/local_eop.cfm .

Evacuation Planning

For many communities, one of their most important planning considerations is how they will evacuate citizens in the event of a major disaster. For disasters where advanced notice of a hazard event is possible (e.g., hurricanes or tsunamis) or for situations where it is essential that all citizens be removed from the affected area as soon as possible after an event has occurred (e.g., terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction), advanced planning is required in order to determine, among other things, activation pro- cedures, the determination of adequate and effective routes, methods of transportation, destinations for those evacuated, security precautions for homes and belongings, adher- ence by citizens to evacuation orders, and facilitation of the evacuation itself.

While many communities have conducted some form of evacuation planning as part of the basic emergency operations plan, few have been able to conduct a full-scale test that gives them an accurate idea of how the plan will work in a real-life situation. The difficulties that were experienced by local emergency managers in the evacuations from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 highlight both the need for evacuation planning and the shortfalls of existing plans. In the Katrina evacuation — the largest in U.S. his- tory, resulting in the displacement of over 1.3 million people — failure to consider how the evacuation would affect people of lower economic standing resulted in thousands refus- ing to or being unable to leave. In Hurricane Rita, as determined by a University of Texas study, a strong majority of the deaths (90 of the 113) associated with that storm were a result of the poorly planned evacuation itself.

After these events, the U.S. Department of Transportation conducted a study of the evacuation plans in the Gulf Coast region, where hurricanes are most likely to strike. The study looked at each of the five Gulf Coast states (Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas) and 58 of the counties and parishes in them to determine where the weaknesses lay in their evacuation plans and to learn from any best practices that existed. According to this study, seven key elements can be used to measure the compre- hensive nature of a plan:

● Decision making and management ● Planning ● Public communication and preparedness ● Evacuation of people with special needs ● Operations ● Sheltering considerations ● Mass evacuation training and exercises

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The study found that while most of the plans were effective in terms of creating stan- dard operating procedures, conducting exercises and drafting after-action reports, updat- ing plans, and defining evacuation direction and control, they were often weak in the following areas:

● Keeping evacuees informed during the evacuation ● Providing for evacuating individuals with various special needs ● Returning evacuees to their homes ● Using contraflow (reversed lane) operations ● Providing for the care and protection of animals

ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

Evacuation planning research has come to the forefront since the experiences in Texas and Louisiana exposed the challenges posed in any evacuation effort. Although many lessons were learned from the botched evacuation after Hurricane Katrina, it was obvious that little progress had been made before the evacuations during the lead-up to Hurricane Rita occurred. The following reports provide insight into the issues involved in evacuation planning and the difficulties in bringing about progress.

The Texas House Research Organization. Evacuation Planning in Texas: Before and After Hurricane Rita. http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/interim/int79-2.pdf

U .S. Department of Transportation. Report to Congress on Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Evaluation. http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/hurricanevacuation/

Emergency Planning for Special Needs Populations

Traditionally , emergency planning has looked at a homogenous population thought of collectively as the “ community. ” However, communities are made up of distinct individu- als and groups, each with unique conditions that define their lives, their interactions, and their abilities. Several of these individuals have special needs that emergency planners must consider when drafting emergency operations plans and other emergency proce- dures in the community. In the absence of such consideration, any plans are likely to fail these individuals, as their provisions will be irrelevant or inappropriate.

There is no set criteria that categorizes an individual as “ special needs. ” Likewise, there is no standard set of special needs populations that exist in all communities. Each community must assess its own population to determine what special needs exist and how those needs must be addressed in the emergency plan if it is to adequately protect all of the community’s citizens equally.

In considering special needs populations, planners must work with representatives from each group (or, in the case of children, the mentally ill, and other groups, they must work with experts who deal with those types of individuals). By including these key

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stakeholders, the planners are better able to adjust existing policies or to create new poli- cies that allow for the safety and security of these groups before, during, and after emer- gency events. Consideration of special needs groups is something that must be addressed in all four phases of emergency management. The following are examples of consider- ations that must be made:

● Foreign language training and materials ● Registry of special needs individuals ’ locations and emergency requirements ● Special emergency equipment and forms of transportation ● Special communications equipment or methods ● Alternate (nontraditional) warning media and procedures ● Special protection measures at shelters and during evacuations ● Inclusion of certain prescription drugs and physical support devices in shelters and

other emergency facilities ● Special education measures targeting newcomers and transient populations ● Special transportation and holding facilities for incarcerated evacuees or victims ● Training for emergency responders in special needs care

During many, if not all, of the recent U.S. disasters, it was apparent that certain special needs populations exhibited a greater degree of vulnerability and, as a result, experienced a proportionally greater impact than other groups affected by the same event. Two specific examples include the 1995 heat wave in Chicago, in which almost all of the 600 victims were elderly poor, and Hurricane Katrina, where most of the residents who failed to evac- uate (and died as a result) were the urban poor. In the recovery phase of Katrina (as well as many other recent major disasters), it was the illegal immigrant population, who had never registered for services out of fear of deportation, who suffered to a greater degree. To an increasing degree, however, campaigns advocating for increased consideration of spe- cial needs populations in emergency planning, initiated primarily by activist groups rep- resenting the individual groups, have accelerated the acceptance by emergency planners of the planning need throughout the United States.

CRITICAL THINKING

Why is evacuation planning so difficult? What kinds of things can go wrong during an actual evacuation? What do you think can be done to minimize these potential setbacks?

Preparedness Equipment

Emergency management organizations rely upon an incredibly diverse range of equipment categories with which they perform the response roles assigned to them. These categories of equipment, which include (among many others) personal protective equipment (PPE), firefighting apparatus, and communications systems, are described in detail throughout

Chapter 4 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Preparedness 107

this book. Equipment is very important in the preparedness phase because it is during this phase that equipment needs are identified, equipment is purchased, and staff are trained in the use of the equipment.

The federal government, through FEMA, facilitates the acquisition of significant amounts of emergency management equipment at the state and local levels through a number of emergency management grant vehicles with an equipment focus. In order to inform communities about the specific categories and specifications of equipment that are eligible under these grants, FEMA created the authorized equipment list (AEL). The AEL is a virtual catalog of the many different types of equipment that responders are likely to require in the course of their response and recovery efforts. This list indicates a continued federal focus on the terrorism hazard, even though most of these grant programs maintain all-hazards eligibility.

Education and Training Programs Education and training have always been integral to the emergency services. Firefighters receive their education at the fire academy, police officers get theirs at the police acad- emy, and EMS officials get medical and emergency first aid training from both public and private sources. However, a revolution of sorts has occurred in the provision of education and training in the emergency management profession. Only a few decades ago, emer- gency management was an outgrowth of the emergency services and a position for which little or no training was provided (nor was it felt that additional training was needed).

The advent of emergency management training and education coincided with the cre- ation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 1979, which touched off the devel- opment of the practice as a profession. At that time, few officials (both within and outside the traditional emergency services) had any background in emergency management, and few people were dedicated to the function even within major city governments. At the nation’s universities, few programs provided even minor degrees or certificates in the field, and only a handful of colleges offered such courses.

At first, it was FEMA that defined the profession as one that required specific aca- demic courses and training. FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute became the focus of these efforts. Working with practitioners at select colleges and universities that offered similar programs, FEMA defined the core competencies of emergency man- agement professionals and developed a definition for an “ emergency management curriculum. ”

It was the events of September 11, 2001, however, that truly transformed emergency management training and education. Since then, primarily due to an explosion in fund- ing available and jobs created in the growing emergency management marketplace (both public and private), scores of colleges and universities have begun to offer traditional emergency management degrees, and hundreds of schools offer emergency manage- ment classes. Many private training facilities have opened to meet the expanding training needs of the profession, and traditional emergency services academies have expanded

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their curriculums to accommodate the growing number of courses required by full-time emergency management professionals.

The FEMA Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and National Fire Academy (NFA)

Since its inception in 1979, FEMA has emerged as a leader in providing direction for the education and training of emergency management professionals through both the devel- opment and provision of actual training courses and the development of higher educa- tion courses and materials. The Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and the National Fire Academy (NFA), both in Emmitsburg, Maryland, serve the training and educational needs of hundreds of thousands of firefighters, fire officers, emergency managers, and others. These institutions offer training program courses whose primary objective is to enhance emergency management practice in the United States. At present, approximately 10,000 students are enrolled in EMI’s resident courses. Nonresident courses, which are administered by the states through their emergency management agencies (under a cooperative agreement with FEMA), accommodate an additional 100,000 students each year. Emergency management exercises that are supported by EMI draw over 150,000 participants annually, and through the range of independent study program courses administered through the Institute’s website, several hundred thousand other individuals receive training.

Three EMI programs of note are the Integrated Emergency Management Course (IEMC) curriculum, the Disaster-Resistant Jobs courses, and several Train-the-Trainer courses that are available in many different subject areas. The IEMC is a set of courses for public officials that cover all aspects of the community emergency management function. Community officials from Oklahoma City participated in the IEMC program just months before the Alfred P. Murrah building terrorist bombing in 1995, and they credit the lessons they learned through the program with helping them to respond quickly and effectively in the aftermath of that event. The Disaster-Resistant Jobs course was developed in coop- eration with the Economic Development Administration (EDA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce and is designed to “ help small and medium-sized communities protect the economy from the effects of catastrophic events. ” This course was developed in response to the devastating impact the 1997 floods had on the city of Grand Forks, North Dakota. The EDA and FEMA recognized that more economic development planning could be done to reduce the impacts of future disasters on local economies.

FEMA ’s EMI Higher Education Project works to establish and support emergency man- agement curriculum in junior colleges, colleges, and universities. The project has devel- oped a prototype curriculum for associate degrees in emergency management. Currently, for emergency management, FEMA lists 9 doctoral programs, 61 masters degree programs, 23 bachelors degree programs, 28 bachelors-level emergency management concentrations and minors, 38 associates-level programs, 63 standalone certificate programs, and 45 addi- tional programs offering one or more courses. For homeland security, EMI lists 3 doctoral

Chapter 4 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Preparedness 109

programs, 29 masters programs, 14 bachelors programs, 14 bachelors-level homeland secu- rity concentrations and minors, 14 associates degree programs, and 57 certificate programs.

The NFA proclaims that “ through its courses and programs, the National Fire Academy works to enhance the ability of fire and emergency services and allied professionals to deal more effectively with fire and related emergencies. ” The NFA was first created in 1975 to serve as the primary delivery mechanism for the fire training efforts of the congressio- nally mandated U.S. Fire Administration (USFA). Since that time, the NFA estimates it has trained more than 1.4 million students. Like EMI, the NFA delivers many of its courses in Emmitsburg, Maryland, and across the country in cooperation with state and local fire training organizations and local colleges and universities.

The NFA’s on-campus programs target middle- and top-level fire officers, fire service instructors, technical professionals, and representatives from allied professions. Any person with substantial involvement in fire prevention and control, emergency medi- cal services, or fire-related emergency management activities is eligible to apply for NFA courses. The NFA also delivers courses using CD-ROMs, their simulation laboratory, and the Internet.

Public Preparedness Education

Perhaps the most difficult component of emergency management preparedness train- ing is the one that focuses on the general public. Public preparedness education, also called risk communication, is a field that has seen vastly mixed success. One of the great- est emergency management public education efforts came out of the civil protection era when the government sought to protect its citizens from the assumed risk of aerial bomb- ing from enemy governments. This campaign focused on the notorious “ air raid drills ” that instructed children on how to protect themselves by crouching under their desks. Since that time, there has been a flurry of mass communication in the emergency man- agement and preparedness spectra, but very little has come close to achieving such wide- spread behavioral change. Public education efforts are not very successful for two reasons: First, most campaigns are conducted by emergency managers with understandably little training in the highly complex social marketing and public education disciplines. The field is just learning the value of a systematic or academic approach to the task, and improve- ments in efficacy can be expected as a result. Second, it is common knowledge that the public faces myriad risks on a daily basis beyond what is being communicated, and many of those daily hazards, as they are often called, take precedence over any major disaster that has little likelihood of ever occurring (as well as many other risk perception factors that prevented widespread success) to individuals. There are, of course, individual success stories, including the stop, cover, and roll fire safety drills and the stop, drop, and cover earthquake drills, but research has shown that most families still fail to take even the most basic preparations to protect themselves from major disasters even though a highly visible succession of disasters has befallen the nation.

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FEMA has expended much effort over the years to manage the public education reform. Before 9/11, FEMA’s training efforts consisted primarily of publishing educational materi- als for teachers, community centers, and other organizations. After the terrorist attacks, however, these efforts expanded greatly through the establishment of a well-publicized preparedness website developed by FEMA called Ready.gov. This website provided pre- paredness information on what FEMA considered the three important preparedness responsibilities of all citizens and businesses: get a kit, make a plan, and stay informed. Unfortunately, the site never caught on, and few people even looked at it.

FEMA also published the preparedness guide Are You Ready? This is a downloadable and printable step-by-step guide that discusses the risks people face today and how they can mitigate them. FEMA also published an instructor’s guide so the book can be used for a class instead of just being read (which can be much less effective). A video titled Getting Ready for Disaster also accompanies the guide, providing another alternative channel for preparedness learning. Each of these resources can be found and accessed on the FEMA Are You Ready website at http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/ .

Today , one of the greatest success stories in the public education domain is the growing network of Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) programs operat- ing around the country. CERT was developed with the belief that after a major disaster, first responders are likely to be quickly overwhelmed and therefore unable to meet the demand for certain services. Factors such as the presence of mass numbers of casualties, failures in infrastructure (such as communication systems), and other confounding vari- ables like road blockages will prevent equitable access to emergency assistance. In these situations, people will have to rely on one another for help to meet their immediate life- saving and life-sustaining needs. By training members of the general public to perform many of these functions that are normally assumed by the emergency services, the scope of preparedness within the community increases greatly, and vulnerability to hazard risk is reduced. Therefore, CERT’s goals are as follows:

1. Present citizens with the facts about what to expect following a major disaster in terms of immediate services.

2. Give the message about their responsibility for mitigation and preparedness.

ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

The nongovernmental organization Council for Excellence in Government developed a Public Readiness Index as part of a report it published on citizen disaster preparedness in the United States. This index rated people’s preparedness on a 1 to 10 scale based on answers to 10 questions. The questions ranged from whether people were aware of their community’s disaster plan and how to find the emergency broadcasting channel on the radio to whether they’d prepared a home disaster kit and established a meeting place for family members. The average score on this index was 3.31. This report can be found at http://www.citizencorps.gov/pdf/pri_ report.pdf .

Chapter 4 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Preparedness 111

3. Train them in needed lifesaving skills, with an emphasis on decision-making skills, rescuer safety, and doing the greatest good for the greatest number.

4. Organize teams so they are an extension of first-responder services, offering immediate help to victims until professional services arrive.

The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) concept was developed and imple- mented by the Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD) in 1985. The Whittier Narrows earthquake in 1987 underscored the areawide threat of a major disaster in California. Further, it confirmed the need for training civilians to meet their immediate needs. As a result, the LAFD created the Disaster Preparedness Division to train citizens and private and government employees.

The training program that the LAFD initiated was recognized for its ability to fur- ther the process through which citizens understand their responsibility in preparing for disaster. It also increased their ability to safely help themselves, their family, and their neighbors. FEMA recognizes the value of this program and helped to expand its reach nationwide. The EMI and the National Fire Academy adopted and expanded the CERT materials, believing them to be applicable to all hazards. Today, CERT training is con- ducted within easy reach of almost every community in the country.

CERT prepares unaffiliated citizens to respond to and cope with the aftermath of a disaster. CERT groups are provided with the skills and knowledge to provide immediate assistance to victims in their area, organize spontaneous volunteers who have not had any training, and collect disaster intelligence that will assist professional responders with pri- oritizing and allocating resources following a disaster. Since 1993, when FEMA made this training available nationally, communities in almost all states and territories have con- ducted CERT training. The CERT course is delivered in the community by a team of first responders who have the requisite knowledge and skills to instruct the sessions. The CERT training for community groups usually is delivered in two-and-a-half-hour sessions, one evening per week, over a seven-week period. CERT is maintained by the FEMA Community Preparedness Division, which also runs the Citizen Corps Program that oversees CERT.

Emergency Management Exercises Once a plan has been developed, equipment has been purchased, and personnel have been trained in the plan and the use of equipment, it is time to make sure that a criti- cal level of preparedness has been achieved. In actuality, the only true validation of pre- paredness efforts comes as the result of a response to an actual disaster event. However, it serves little good to wait until such an event occurs because at that point it is too late to identify weaknesses and make changes as necessary. In order to substitute for “ battle- field experience, ” emergency management agencies use programs of disaster exercises to simulate many of the situations that may arise.

Exercises provide an opportunity to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the plan and its components and to test the systems, facilities, and personnel involved in

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implementing the plan. Exercises are conducted at all levels of government, in the pri- vate sector, at educational facilities, and more. FEMA defines an exercise as “ a con- trolled, scenario-driven, simulated experience designed to demonstrate and evaluate an organization’s capability to execute one or more assigned or implicit operational tasks or procedures as outlined in its contingency plan. ” These are the common categories of emergency management exercises (Coppola, 2006):

● Drill. A controlled, supervised method by which a single disaster management operation or function is practiced or tested.

● Tabletop exercise. Designed to allow officials to practice components of or the full activation of the emergency response plan within the confines of a controlled, low- stress discussion scenario.

● Functional exercise. Tests and practices response capabilities by simulating an event to which responsible officials must respond. Unlike a drill, which tests one function or activity, the functional exercise tests a full range of associated activities that together fulfill a greater overall response purpose.

● Full-scale exercise. A scenario-based event that seeks to create an atmosphere closely mimicking an actual disaster. All players required to act during a real event, as outlined in the EOP, are involved in the full-scale exercise, working in real time and using all of the required equipment and procedures ( Figures 4-2 and 4-3 ).

FEMA supports exercises at all jurisdictional levels through the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP; pronounced “ hee-sep ” ). HSEEP was created to provide guidance and standardization to the exercise efforts of emergency management

FIGURE 4-2 Salinas, Puerto Rico, March 25, 2009. To test a swift response to an unexpected disaster in Salinas, FEMA joined the PR State Emergency Management Agency, the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Department of Defense Northern Command, and other federal, state, and local emergency managers in the “ Vigilant Guard exercise. ” The Vigilant Guard aims to assess the response capabilities of all of the participating agencies and organizations to a simulated 7.0 earthquake scenario in the southern region of the island. Ashley Andujar/FEMA.

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organizations and to develop a framework for evaluation. HSEEP has met both praise and complaint, since it is the most comprehensive tool of its kind, but many jurisdic- tions feel that it is just another way the federal government is trying to dictate actions at the local level. This, in part, is due to the fact that federally funded exercises must com- ply with HSEEP regulations and standards to be covered under emergency management grant programs, which are the only option for funding such exercises for the majority of departments. HSEEP also ties together other emergency management doctrines that have not met uniform acceptance across all jurisdictions, including that of NIMS and the NRF, which must be tested in the course of exercise conduct.

FEMA requires HSEEP compliance for grant eligibility. Compliance is defined as adher- ence to specific processes and practices for exercise program management and exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. Four specific per- formance requirements are established in the HSEEP policy and guidance documentation:

1. Conduct an annual training and exercise planning workshop, and maintain a multiyear training and exercise plan (TEP).

2. Plan and conduct exercises in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the HSEEP policy.

3. Develop and submit a properly formatted after-action report/improvement plan. 4. Track and implement corrective actions identified in the AAR/IP.

The penultimate emergency management exercise series is the DHS-supported National Level Exercise (NLE) program. The NLE program, formerly called TOPOFF (for Top Officials), is a full-scale exercise held once a year that tests the response to major disas- ter events spanning states, regions, and across international borders. Traditionally, NLE exercises have focused on terrorism hazards. However, in 2011, NLE will for the first time

FIGURE 4-3 Salinas, Puerto Rico, March 25, 2009. Alejandro De La Campa, the Caribbean area division director, at a press conference after the Salinas exercise. Ashley Andujar/FEMA.

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focus on a natural hazard: a major earthquake on the New Madrid Fault Zone in central United States. NLE is maintained by the DHS National Exercise Program, which provides the coordination and planning for federal, regional, and state exercise activities beyond what the states conduct themselves. NLE predates DHS because the first TOPOFF exercise was held in May 2000 to test a simultaneous biological attack in Colorado and a chemical attack in New Hampshire. Since that time, the following exercises have been conducted:

● TOPOFF 2: Conducted in May 2003, tested a simultaneous radiological attack in Washington State and a biological attack in Illinois.

● TOPOFF 3: Conducted in April 2005, tested a simultaneous chemical attack in Connecticut and a biological attack in New Jersey.

● TOPOFF 4: Conducted in October 2007, tested simultaneous radiological attacks in Oregon, Arizona, Guam, and Washington, D.C.

● NLE 2009: Conducted in July and August 2009, this exercise focused exclusively on the prevention of a terrorist attack around the country (but focused on Washington, D.C., Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas).

● NLE 2010: Conducted in May 2010, focused on the detonation of a nuclear device.

Evaluation and Improvement It is through evaluation and assessment that those responsible for response and recovery are best able to refine preparedness capabilities. While this chapter so far has discussed the processes by which preparedness capabilities are built up, including the drafting of plans, equipment acquisitions, and the conduct of exercises, it is through the evaluation process that capabilities are kept on track and improved over time. There are several pro- grams by which emergency management evaluation may be conducted. Here are a few of the more common ones:

● EMAP: Probably the most recognizable organizational preparedness evaluation effort, the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) evaluates state, territorial, and local emergency management agencies according to the peer-reviewed Emergency Management Standard. EMAP is funded by FEMA but maintained by an independent nonprofit organization. Agencies that are interested in accreditation pay a fee for evaluation by independent reviewers.

● SPR: The State Preparedness Report (SPR) was developed to satisfy the requirements for state-level emergency management disaster preparedness defined by the Post- Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA). Under this initiative, states and territories submit an annual SPR as a means to report on the progress, capabilities, and accomplishments of their all-hazards preparedness program. This report is designed to enable states to communicate to Congress current accomplishments in meeting the preparedness priorities and capabilities defined by DHS and how they will continue to increase statewide preparedness. States develop

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their individual SPRs using a standard template, wherein they address the actions they have taken to address the eight National Priorities (as identified in the National Preparedness Guidelines): a. Implement the NIMS and the NRF b. Expand regional collaboration c. Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) d. Strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities e. Strengthen interoperable and operable communications capabilities f. Strengthen CBRNE detection, response, and decontamination capabilities g. Strengthen medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities h. Strengthen planning and citizen capabilities

● TCL: The Target Capabilities List (TCL) is a FEMA-administered program that identifies and defines capabilities that may be needed to respond to the various hazard risks facing the country. Under TCL, capabilities need not be maintained by each individual agency but rather must be something that the agency is able to draw upon from within its own ranks or from any mutual aid, EMAC, or other partners. Under TCL, jurisdictions are expected to develop and maintain capability at levels that reflect the differing risk and needs throughout the country. The TCL identifies 37 distinct capabilities developed in consultation with representatives from all levels of government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations. Users refer to the TCL to design plans, procedures, training, exercises, and evaluations that develop and assess capacity and proficiency to perform their assigned missions and tasks in major events. The TCL is intended to serve as foundational reference document and planning guide to achieve national preparedness.

● NIMSCAST: The NIMS Compliance Assistance Support Tool (NIMSCAST), maintained by the FEMA National Preparedness Directorate, is a system that allows organizations in the emergency management community to self-report on their progress in implementing the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

● DEC Communications Project: The Disaster Emergency Communications (DEC) Communications Project is a FEMA-administered 28-state initiative that analyzes emergency communications. DEC’s mission focus is the provision of communications capabilities when landlines and cellular networks are damaged or congested, particularly during the first 96 hours of a disaster, for situational awareness and command and control, state and local first responders, and emergency responders performing disaster missions. At the conclusion of scheduled state assessments, an assessment team drafts a detailed report that encompasses communications requirements, proposed mitigation strategies, negotiated mission assignments, and acquisition strategies. The team also writes regional emergency communications plans and equipment specifications.

● CAS: The Comprehensive Assessment System (CAS) is a FEMA-administered emergency management assessment system that identifies issues and shortfalls across the spectrum of homeland security operations with respect to resource

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allocation and the performance of specific all-hazards capabilities at the federal, state, tribal, and local jurisdictional levels. Mandated by PKEMRA, CAS assesses compliance with the National Preparedness System, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and other related plans; assesses resource needs; and assesses the performance of training, exercises, and operations. FEMA hopes that CAS will one day function as a central repository for national preparedness data.

● CEM: Individual emergency management preparedness capabilities may be evaluated through the Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) program maintained by the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). This fee-based program ensures that individuals have received a requisite array of courses and experience that prepare them for the demands of an actual disaster response. Those passing certification are permitted to use the acronym CEM in their professional title.

Preparedness: A National Effort Emergency and disaster preparedness is conducted at all levels of government, but it is through the FEMA National Preparedness (NP) Directorate that a national-level strat- egy for preparedness is developed, communicated, and supported. Following the failed response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress determined, through the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Report Act of 2006, that there was a dire need for a national direction on emergency preparedness to ensure that the national government, states, counties, parishes, cities, towns, and communities were equipped with the knowledge, funding, and guidance to ensure proper response and recovery from major disaster events at all government and organizational levels. As a result, the National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) was estab- lished on April 1, 2007, in order to oversee coordination and development of the strategies necessary to achieve these goals. NPD was established to provide preparedness policy and planning guidance and to help build disaster response capabilities. As a FEMA directorate, NPD has wide leverage to develop and institute preparedness programs that include train- ing courses, national policy development and state/local policy guidance, and the plan- ning and conduct of exercises, including the National Level Exercises (NLEs) described previously.

The requirements of a national-level preparedness effort are guided by the National Response Framework (NRF), which superseded the National Response Plan (NRP) in January 2008. The NRF was released to establish a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response and to provide clear guidance over the inte- gration of community, state, tribal, and federal response efforts. In order to achieve the capability to conduct the necessary actions prescribed within this framework, FEMA has released a series of doctrines guiding preparedness at a strategic level. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) directed the secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal. As part of that effort, in March 2005, DHS released the Interim National Preparedness Goal. This goal was later adapted into

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what is now the National Preparedness Guidelines. These guidelines have the following four elements:

1. The National Preparedness Vision, which provides a concise statement of the core preparedness goal for the nation.

2. The National Planning Scenarios, which depict 15 high-consequence threat scenarios involving natural and (yet primarily) terrorist hazards according to which preparedness may be based. These scenarios have come under considerable scrutiny since their release, and their use has been extensively limited as a result.

3. The Universal Task List (UTL), which includes approximately 1,600 unique tasks identified as being key to preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from the major events represented by the national planning scenarios.

4. The Target Capabilities List (TCL), which was just described and that defines 37 specific capabilities that FEMA has determined to be essential to communities, the private sector, and all levels of government in order to respond effectively to disasters.

These two FEMA programs also help to guide national-level preparedness:

● The Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP): http://www.fema.gov/ about/divisions/thd_repp.shtm

● The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP): http://www.fema .gov/about/divisions/thd_csepp.shtm

These two programs provide preparedness guidance that is highly specific to two haz- ard threats (radiological and chemical hazards) for which significant understanding is beyond what is typically possessed by state and local emergency management officials. They also provide standards for the private, governmental, and military facilities that are the source of such hazards to ensure that these hazards are adequately contained and that the capabilities to respond to accidents or incidents that involve the release of chem- icals are in place.

The National Preparedness Directorate is comprised of several individual divisions that address different aspects of preparedness. In addition to EMI, these include the following:

● Preparedness Policy, Planning, and Analysis (PPPA): PPPA strengthens national preparedness through the development of national-level preparedness policy, including (for instance) maintenance of the Target Capabilities List and National Preparedness Guidelines; establishment and support of national planning systems (such as a catastrophic planning program targeting the nation’s major urban areas); and the development of assessment methodologies to analyze preparedness benchmarks (such as the Comprehensive Assessment System and the National Preparedness Report).

● Technological Hazards Division (THP): THP coordinates national efforts to enhance preparedness in communities around nuclear power plants and military chemical

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weapons sites. The two programs just described, including the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP) and the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), are part of this division’s efforts.

● National Integration Center (NIC): The NIC is responsible for developing, managing, and coordinating all national-level programs focused on training, education, exercise, and lessons learned. The NIC also maintains the Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS; pronounced “ ellis ” ), which is an online-accessible database of best practices designed to enhance preparedness efforts of local, state, and federal emergency management agencies, and the Responder Knowledge Base (RKB), a website designed to provide emergency managers with easy access to the preparedness background data they might need (and accessed at www.rkb.us ).

● The Community Preparedness Division: This division works to enhance public disaster preparedness, mainly by administering the Citizen Corps program. Community Preparedness also develops policies targeting public preparedness efforts and designs materials that may be accessed by those who provide disaster preparedness education to various stakeholder groups outside of the emergency services.

● The Preparedness Coordination Division: PCD provides support to federal, state, and local agencies through field-based methods, primarily under the management federal preparedness coordinators, who work out of the 10 FEMA regional offices.

Preparedness Grant Programs The FEMA National Preparedness Directorate currently administers a wide range of grant programs that target preparedness efforts at all government levels, though primarily those of states, territories, tribes, and local jurisdictions. These programs differ according to their goals, the agencies eligible to apply for them, and the activities and equipment eligible to be funded. Some of the grant programs that received funding in 2010 include the following.

Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG): $329.9 million available in 2010 The EMPG was created to assist state and local governments in enhancing and sustaining all-hazards emergency management capabilities. Eligible applicants include the states and territories. State administrative agencies or state emergency management agencies (EMAs) are eligible to apply directly to FEMA for EMPG funds on behalf of state and local emergency management agencies. This grant has a 50 percent federal and 50 percent state cost share, cash or in-kind match requirement. Grant information can be found at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/2010/fy10_empg_kit.pdf .

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Grant Program: $57.6 million available in 2010 The EOC Grant Program is created to improve emergency management and prepared- ness capabilities by supporting flexible, sustainable, secure, and interoperable emergency

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operations centers (EOCs), with a focus on addressing identified deficiencies and needs. This program provides funding for construction or renovation of a state, local, or tribal government’s principal EOC. Only the state can apply for this grant, though much of the funding is then passed to the local government. Grant information can be found at http:// www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/2010/fy10_eoc_kit.pdf .

The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP)

The HSGP is comprised of seven separate grant programs, each described here.

State Homeland Security Program (SHSP): $842 million available in 2010 The HSGP provides funds to build response capabilities at the state and local levels and to implement the goals and objectives included in state homeland security strategies and initiatives in each state preparedness report (see SPR earlier in this chapter). States are required to ensure that at least 25 percent of SHSP-appropriated funds are dedicated toward law enforcement terrorism prevention – oriented planning, organization, training, exercise, and equipment activities, including those activities that support the develop- ment and operation of fusion centers. Only the state government can apply to FEMA for SHSP funds. Each state will receive a minimum 0.36 percent of the total funds, and the remainder is based on several risk factors (four territories — American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands — receive a minimum allocation of 0.08 percent of the total funds).

Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI): $832.5 million available in 2010 The UASI program focuses on enhancing regional preparedness in major metropolitan areas in support of the National Preparedness Guidelines. The program assists selected jurisdictions in developing integrated regional systems for disaster mitigation, prepared- ness, response, and recovery. States are required to ensure that at least 25 percent of UASI-appropriated funds are dedicated toward law enforcement terrorism prevention – oriented planning, organization, training, exercise, and equipment activities, including those activities that support the development and operation of fusion centers. Only the state governments may apply for the UASI grant programs, though most of the money is passed directly to the urban areas.

The Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) Program: $39.36 million available in 2010 The MMRS program supports the integration of emergency management, health, and medical systems into a coordinated response to mass-casualty incidents. The grant pro- gram seeks to augment existing local operational response systems in the preparedness phase. Only state governments may apply to FEMA for MMRS funds, but most of the funding is passed through to 124 MMRS jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction receives $317,419 to establish or sustain local capabilities.

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Citizen Corps Program (CCP): $ 12.48 million available in 2010 The Citizen Corps mission is to bring community and government leaders together to coordinate community involvement in emergency preparedness, planning, mitigation, response, and recovery. Again, only the state and territorial governments can apply to FEMA for CCP funds. CCP allocations are distributed according to risk-based formulas that specify that all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico receive a minimum of 0.75 percent of the total available grant funding and that four territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) receive a minimum of 0.25 percent of total funding. The remainder is distributed on a population-share basis.

Operation Stonegarden (OPSG): $60 million available in 2010 OPSG was created to enhance cooperation and coordination among local, state, and fed- eral law enforcement agencies to secure international borders with Mexico and Canada, as well as states and territories with international water borders. Prospective recipients for OPSG include local units of government at the county level and federally recognized tribal governments in the states bordering Canada (including Alaska), southern states bordering Mexico, and states and territories with international water borders. Grant information can be found at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/2010/fy10_hsgp_kit.pdf .

FY 2010 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP): $288 million available in 2010 The PSGP seeks to protect critical port infrastructures from terrorism, particularly attacks using explosives and nonconventional threats that could cause major disruptions to com- merce. PSGP funds are used to increase port preparedness, primarily to assist ports in enhancing maritime domain awareness; enhancing risk management capabilities to pre- vent, detect, respond to, and recover from attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs), chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive (CBRNE), and other nonconven- tional weapons; as well as training and exercises and transportation worker identification credential (TWIC) implementation. Seven port areas have been selected as Group I (highest risk), and 48 port areas have been selected as Group II. Ports not identified in Group I or II are eligible to apply as a Group III or “ all other port areas ” applicant. Grant information can be found at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/2010/fy10_psgp_guidance.pdf .

Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP): $33.6 million available in 2010 RCPGP enhances catastrophic incident preparedness in selected high-risk, high- consequence urban areas and their surrounding regions. RCPGP is intended to sup- port coordination of regional all-hazards planning for catastrophic events, including the development of integrated planning communities, plans, protocols, and procedures to manage a catastrophic disaster. Eligible applicants include 11 predesignated high-risk, high-consequence urban areas. Grant information can be found at http://www.fema.gov/ pdf/government/grant/2010/fy10_rcp_kit.pdf .

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Business Continuity Planning and Emergency Management Business continuity planning (BCP) is the process by which businesses prepare for disas- ters by identifying the risks to their business processes, their facilities, their employees, and their information, and then take action to reduce that risk. BCP also includes identifi- cation and enactment of the processes by which businesses are able to continue to func- tion (even if at a reduced capacity) during periods of disaster such that they are able to remain viable for the long term and so the products and services they provide to the com- munity and country remain available. BCP is the most effective way for businesses to pre- pare for emergencies because the process initiates a much greater understanding of how community risk affects the businesses and what will be required of the business (rather than being provided by traditional emergency responders or other entities). BCP, like all preparedness efforts, increases community-wide resilience, since the sooner the business sector is able to get back up and running, the sooner the community is able to recover.

Business disaster planning first began with the information age, and preparedness focused primarily on information storage and retrieval. Since that time, the concept of con- tinuity has evolved in response to a changing environment. Major events have demanded that BCP encompass a growing number of concerns. The terrorist attacks of September 11 showed almost all businesses how a disaster can impact a country at a national level through the ripples of economic and psychological effects. Since 9/11, the following changes have occurred in the BCP sector:

1. Terrorism is given greater consideration as a threat by many businesses, regardless of the business focus or location.

2. BCP has expanded to include concern for the physical safety of employees. 3. BCP may involve the decentralization of business operations. 4. BCP may have to expand its sphere of concern to include the regional impacts of a

disaster (including economic) to the area where a business is located. 5. The human relationships that a business depends on for its survival has become a

more significant concern. 6. Businesses are striving for zero downtime during disasters by incorporating off-site

operations capabilities. 7. Novel approaches are being taken with regards to critical data backup and retrieval. 8. Physical security has become a BCP concern. 9. There is an increased professionalization of the BCP industry, and more and more

businesses are employing full-time emergency management and BCP staff.

CRITICAL THINKING

Why do you think the ODP focuses its preparedness efforts on terrorism? Should preparedness activities funded by ODP be all-hazards? Why or why not?

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The events of September 11 raised awareness of the fact that the survival of business depends on many external factors, such as critical infrastructure and transportation sys- tems. The federal government also recognized the importance of BCP because so much of the nation’s public infrastructure was privately owned and therefore independent of most government preparedness efforts. FEMA has begun to work more closely with busi- nesses to bring about preparedness, since businesses are not only the recipients of disas- ter assistance but are also the providers of many of the products and services needed in the lead-up to and aftermath of disaster events and therefore must be brought into the preparedness and planning process.

The FEMA Private Sector Division in the Office of External Affairs leads up the devel- opment of this partnership and initiates various working groups that aim to bring about business sector preparedness and recovery planning activities. For instance, in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza outbreak, the Private Sector Division developed an H1N1 pre- paredness guide for small businesses, which were particularly susceptible to business closure from the flu outbreak because they depend on such a limited workforce.

In November 2009, FEMA announced the Voluntary Private Sector Preparedness Accreditation and Certification Program (PS-Prep). This program was mandated by leg- islation that followed 9/11. The PS-Prep Program was created to enhance private sector preparedness by providing a mechanism by which private sector entities could become certified as adequately prepared for disasters. This process involves the development of preparedness standards, of course, that did not exist previously. Participation in the program is completely voluntary, and the government maintains no authority to require businesses to comply with any standard adopted under the program. The following stan- dards were developed and/or adopted:

● ASIS International SPC.1-2009. Organizational Resilience: Security Preparedness, and Continuity Management System

● British Standards Institution 25999. Business Continuity Management: Part 1 (2006) and Part 2 (2007)

● National Fire Protection Association 1600: 2007. Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Program

The ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board (ANAB) was selected to develop and oversee the certification process, manage the accreditation, and accredit qualified third parties to carry out the certification in accordance with the accepted procedures of the program. Private sector organizations, including businesses and critical infrastructure and key resource entities, may apply for certification to the applicable requirements of preparedness standards that have been developed or adopted. Certification, in the con- text of this program, is confirmation that an accredited third-party certification organi- zation has validated a private sector entity’s preparedness to a standard. DHS will then maintain and make public a listing of any private sector entity certified as being in com- pliance with PS-Prep if that private sector entity consents to such a listing, which would presumably instill greater public confidence in that company.

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Business continuity planning, however, is chiefly driven by the private sector itself. For instance, DRI International (DRII), a business continuity planning institute, provides significant guidance on higher education programs on BCP, supports BCP research, and maintains a capacity to enable businesses to self-assess their preparedness capabilities. DRII, like FEMA, has a certification process through which businesses can prove that they have met a minimum level of preparedness for various hazard risks, thereby instilling con- fidence among investors and/or shareholders. Other organizations that provide a similar service include Disaster Recovery World, Nonprofit Risk, Business Continuity World, and the Public Entity Risk Institute.

Conclusion Preparedness consists of four basic elements: preparing a plan, acquiring equipment, training to the plan, and exercising the plan. Preparedness planning at the commu- nity level is critical to reducing the effects of disaster events. FEMA sponsors numerous planning, training, and education activities designed to assist communities and states in developing effective preparedness plans and training personnel to implement these plans. Through its National Preparedness Directorate, FEMA helps provide national-level preparedness guidance and significant funding to support preparedness efforts.

Business continuity planning is a significant growth area for the emergency manage- ment community. The devastating impacts of September 11 have resulted in increased coordination and cooperation between business and emergency managers. The emer- gency management community has just begun to exploit this opportunity and more than ever before is encouraging businesses to become more active in supporting all phases of emergency management.

CASE STUDY: THE TSUNAMIREADY PROGRAM

TsunamiReady is an initiative that promotes tsunami hazard preparedness as an active collaboration among federal, state, and local emergency management agencies, the public, and the NWS tsunami warning system. This collaboration is dedicated to promoting better and more consistent tsunami awareness and mitigation efforts among communities at risk. Through the TsunamiReady program, NOAA’s National Weather Service gives communities the skills and education needed to survive a tsunami before, during, and after the event. TsunamiReady was designed to help community leaders and emergency managers strengthen their local tsunami operations (NOAA, N/D).

The TsunamiReady program is based on the NWS StormReady model (which can be viewed at http://www.stormready.noaa.gov/ ). The primary goal of TsunamiReady is the improvement of public safety during tsunami emergencies. As just stated, TsunamiReady is designed for those coastal communities that are at known risk of the tsunami hazard (tsunami hazard risk maps can be seen at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami/time/ ).

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Traditionally , tsunami hazard planning along the U.S. West Coast and Alaska has been widely neglected because of the statistically low incidence of tsunamis. As result of that perceived rarity, many individuals and communities have not worked to become as “ tsunami-aware ” as they could and should be. Among those communities that are considered to be prepared, that level of exhibited preparedness varies significantly (NWS, N/D).

However , as is true with the earthquakes and other rare events that generate tsunamis, avoidable casualties and property damage will only continue to rise unless these at-risk communities become better prepared for tsunamis. As previously mentioned, readiness involves two key components: awareness and mitigation. Awareness involves educating key decision makers, emergency managers, and the public about the nature (physical processes) and threat (frequency of occurrence, impact) of the tsunami hazard; mitigation involves taking steps before the tsunami occurs to lessen the impact (loss of life and property) of that event. As is true with earthquakes, there is no question that tsunamis will strike again.

The National Weather Service (NWS) TsunamiReady program was designed to meet both of the recognized elements of a useful readiness effort. It was designed to educate local emergency management officials and their public and to promote a well-designed tsunami emergency response plan for each community.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES TsunamiReady promotes tsunami hazard readiness as an active collaboration among federal, state, and local emergency management agencies; the public; and the NWS tsunami warning system. This collaboration supports better and more consistent tsunami awareness and mitigation efforts among communities at risk. The main goal is improvement of public safety during tsunami emergencies. To meet this goal, the following objectives must be met by the community:

● Create minimum standard guidelines for a community to follow for adequate tsunami readiness.

● Encourage consistency in educational materials and response among communities and states.

● Recognize communities that have adopted TsunamiReady guidelines. ● Increase public awareness and understanding of the tsunami hazard. ● Improve community preplanning for tsunami disasters.

Program Methodology The processes and guidelines used in the TsunamiReady program were modeled to resemble those of the National Weather Service “ StormReady ” program. TsunamiReady established minimum guidelines for a community to be awarded the TsunamiReady recognition, thus promoting minimum standards based on expert knowledge rather than subjective considerations. Communities that accept the challenge to become TsunamiReady and are deemed to have met these requirements set by the NWS TsunamiReady program are designated as “ TsunamiReady Communities. ” Guidelines to achieve TsunamiReady recognition are given in Table B-1 and discussed in detail in the sections that follow. Four community categories (based on the population of the community and provided in the table’s headings) are used to measure tsunami readiness.

Chapter 4 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Preparedness 125

Table B-1 Guidelines to Becoming a TsunamiReady Community Population

Guidelines < 2,500 2,500 – 14,999 15,000 – 40,000 > 40,000

1: Communications and Coordination

24-hour warning point (WP) X X X X Emergency Operations Center X X X

2: Tsunami Warning Reception

Number of ways for EOC/WP to receive NWS tsunami messages (if in range, one must be NWR with tone-alert; NWR-SAME is preferred)

3 4 4 4

3: Warning Dissemination

Number of ways for EOC/WP to disseminate warnings to public

1 2 3 4

NWR tone-alert receivers in public facilities (where available)

X X X X

For county/borough warning points, county/borough communication network ensuring information fl ow between communities

X X X X

4: Community Preparedness

Number of annual tsunami awareness programs

1 2 3 4

Designate/establish tsunami shelter/area in safe zone

X X X X

Designate tsunami evacuation areas and evacuation routes, and install evacuation route signs

X X X X

Provide written, locality-specifi c, tsunami hazard response material to public

X X X X

In schools, encourage tsunami hazard curriculum, practice evacuations, and provide safety material to staff and students

X X X X

5: Administrative

Develop formal tsunami hazard operations plan

X X X X

Yearly meeting/discussion by emergency manager with NWS

X X X X

Visits by NWS offi cial to community at least every other year

X X X X

126 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Note that Guideline 3 has been skipped because it refers exclusively to the StormReady program, which shares these guidelines with the TsunamiReady program. This is a key factor to consider, since it ensures by default that all communities that are StormReady will also be TsunamiReady (as of 2002) . As such, all communities being certified for TsunamiReady also must pass all StormReady criteria. StormReady requires access to local weather monitoring equipment (Guideline 2) and some further administrative requirements (Guideline 6). Other than that, the requirements are identical.

Guideline 1: Communications and Coordination Center It is well known that the key to any effective hazards management program is effective communication. This could not be more valid when considering tsunami-related emergencies, since the arrival of the giant waves can occur within minutes of the initial precipitating event. These so-called “ short-fused ” events, therefore, require an immediate but careful, systematic, and appropriate response. To ensure such a proper response, TsunamiReady requires that communities establish the following:

24-Hour Warning Point It is the NWS and not the community that determines a tsunami threat exists. Therefore, in order to receive recognition under the TsunamiReady program, an applying agency needs to establish a 24-hour warning point (WP) that can receive NWS tsunami information in addition to providing local reports and advice to constituents. Typically, the functions of this type of facility merely are incorporated into the existing daily operation of a law enforcement or fire department dispatching (ECC) point.

For cities or towns without a local dispatching point, a county agency could act in that capacity for them. In Alaska, where there may be communities that have populations of fewer than 2,500 residents and no county agency to act as a 24-hour warning point, the community is required to designate responsible members of the community who are able to receive warnings 24 hours per day and who have the authority to activate local warning systems. Specifically, the warning point is required to have the following:

● 24-hour operations ● Warning reception capability ● Warning dissemination capability ● Ability and authority to activate local warning system(s)

Emergency Operations Center Agencies serving jurisdictions larger than 2,500 people are required to have the ability to activate an emergency operations center (EOC). It must be staffed during tsunami events to execute the warning point’s tsunami warning functions. The following list summarizes the tsunami-related roles required of the EOC:

● Activate, based on predetermined guidelines related to NWS tsunami information and/or tsunami events.

● Staff with emergency management director or designee. ● Establish warning reception/dissemination capabilities equal to or better than the warning

point. ● Maintain the ability to communicate with adjacent EOCs/warning points. ● Maintain the ability to communicate with local NWS offi ce or Tsunami Warning Center.

Chapter 4 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Preparedness 127

Guideline 2: Tsunami Warning Reception Warning points and EOCs each need multiple ways to receive NWS tsunami warnings. TsunamiReady guidelines to receive NWS warnings in an EOC/WP require a combination of the following, based on population:

● NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) receiver with tone alert. Specifi c Area Message Encoding (SAME) is preferred. Required for recognition only if within range of transmitter.

● NOAA Weather Wire drop: satellite downlink data feed from NWS ● Emergency Managers Weather Information Network (EMWIN) receiver: satellite feed and/or

VHF radio transmission of NWS products ● Statewide telecommunications system: automatic relay of NWS products on statewide

emergency management or law enforcement system ● Statewide warning fan-out system: state-authorized system of passing messages throughout

the warning area ● NOAA weather wire via Internet NOAAport Lite: provides alarmed warning messages

through a dedicated Internet connection ● Direct link to NWS offi ce, such as amateur or VHF radio ● E-mail from Tsunami Warning Center: direct e-mail from Warning Center to emergency

manager ● Pager message from Tsunami Warning Center: page issued from Warning Center directly to

EOC/WP ● Radio/TV via emergency alert system: local radio/TV or cable TV ● U.S. Coast Guard broadcasts: WP/EOC monitoring of USCG marine channels ● National Warning System (NAWAS) drop: FEMA-controlled civil defense hotline

Guideline 3: Warning Dissemination Upon receipt of NWS warnings or other reliable information suggesting that a tsunami is imminent, local emergency officials must be able to communicate this threat information with as much of the population as possible. This is fundamental to making the preparedness program effective. As such, receiving TsunamiReady recognition requires that communities have one or more of the following means of ensuring timely warning dissemination to their citizens (based upon population, as described in Table B-1 ):

● A community program that subsidizes the purchase of NWR. (NWR receiver with tone alert. SAME is preferred. Required for recognition only if within range of transmitter.)

● Outdoor warning sirens ● Television audio/video overrides ● Other locally controlled methods, such as local broadcast system or emergency vehicles ● Phone messaging (dial-down) systems

It is required that at least one NWR that is equipped with a tone alert receiver be located in each critical public access and government-owned building and must include a 24-hour warning point, EOC, the school superintendent’s office, or equivalent. Critical public access buildings are defined by each community’s tsunami warning plan. Locations that are recommended for inclusion by the NWS include all schools, public libraries, hospitals,

128 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

fairgrounds, parks and recreational areas, public utilities, sports arenas, departments of transportation, and designated shelter areas. (SAME is preferred. This is required for recognition only if the community exists within range of a transmitter.)

For counties and boroughs only, a communications network that conveys information to all cities and towns within those administrative borders must be in place. This would include provision of a warning point for the smaller towns and fanning out of the message as required by state policy.

Guideline 4: Community Preparedness Public education is vital in preparing citizens to respond properly to tsunami threats. An educated public is more likely to take the steps required to receive tsunami warnings, recognize potentially threatening tsunami events when they exist, and respond appropriately to those events. Therefore, communities that are seeking recognition in the TsunamiReady program must be able to do the following:

● Conduct or sponsor tsunami awareness programs in schools, hospitals, fairs, workshops, and community meetings (the actual number of talks that must be given each year is based on the community’s population).

● Defi ne tsunami evacuation areas and evacuation routes and install evacuation route signs.

● Designate a tsunami shelter/area outside the hazard zone. ● Provide written tsunami hazard information to the populace, including the following:

● Hazard zone maps

● Evacuation routes

● Basic tsunami information ● These instructions can be distributed through mailings (utility bills, for example), in phone

books, and posted at common meeting points located throughout the community, such as libraries, supermarkets, and public buildings.

● Local schools must meet the following guidelines:

● Encourage the inclusion of tsunami information in primary and secondary school curriculums. NWS will help to identify curriculum support material.

● Provide an opportunity biennially for a tsunami awareness presentation.

● Schools within the defi ned hazard zone must have tsunami evacuation drills at least biannually.

● Provide written safety material to all staff and students.

● Have an earthquake plan.

Guideline 5: Administrative No program can be successful without formal planning and a proactive administration. The following administrative requirements are necessary for a community to be recognized in the TsunamiReady program:

● A tsunami warning plan must be in place and approved by the local governing body. This plan must address the following: ● Warning point procedures ● EOC activation guidelines and procedures

Chapter 4 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Preparedness 129

● Warning point and EOC personnel specifi cation ● Hazard zone map with evacuation routes ● Procedures for canceling an emergency for those less-than-destructive tsunamis ● Guidelines and procedures for activation of sirens, cable TV override, and/or local

system activation in accordance with state Emergency Alert System (EAS) plans, and warning fan-out procedures, if necessary

● Annual exercises ● Yearly visits or discussions with local NWS forecast office warning coordination

meteorologist or Tsunami Warning Center personnel must be conducted. This can include a visit to the NWS office, a phone discussion, or e-mail communication.

● NWS officials will commit to visit accredited communities, at least every other year, to tour EOCs/warning points and meet with key officials.

Benefits of the TsunamiReady Program The benefits of participating in the TsunamiReady community program include the following:

● The community is more prepared for the tsunami hazard. ● Regularly scheduled education forums increase public awareness of existing dangers. ● Contact with experts (emergency managers, researchers, NWS personnel) is increased and

enhanced. ● Community readiness resource needs are identifi ed. ● Positioning to receive state and federal funds is improved. ● Core infrastructure to support other community concerns is enhanced. ● The public is allowed the opportunity to see fi rsthand how their tax money is being spent in

hazard programs.

Conclusion Through the TsunamiReady program, NOAA’s National Weather Service gives communities the skills and education needed to survive a tsunami before, during, and after the event. TsunamiReady helps community leaders and emergency managers strengthen their local tsunami operations. Tsunami Ready communities are better prepared to save lives from the onslaught of a tsunami through better planning, education, and awareness. Communities have fewer fatalities and property damage if they plan before a tsunami arrives. No community is tsunami-proof, but TsunamiReady can help communities save lives.

Sources : FEMA. 2004. Fact Sheet: Tsunamis. http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1104/111804h1.htm . Folger , Tim. 1994. “ Waves of Destruction, ” Discover Magazine , May, 69 – 70. NOAA (National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration). N/D. The National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program Brochure. http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov/tsunamiready/trbrochure.pdf . NTHMP (National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program). 2003. Frequently Asked Questions. http://www .pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami-hazard/tsunami_faqs.htm . NWS . N/D. TsunamiReady; The Readiness Challenge. http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/tsunamiready/ tsunami_ready_full_document.pdf .

130 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Important Terms Business continuity planning Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) Drill Full-scale exercise Functional exercise Preparedness Tabletop exercise

Self-Check Questions 1. What kinds of organizations must consider disaster preparedness? 2. What is the difference between mitigation and preparedness? 3. What are the steps involved in the preparedness cycle? 4. According to Ready.Gov, what are the three basic steps people can take to prepare

for any type of disaster? 5. What are the seven key elements that can be used to measure the comprehensive

nature of an evacuation plan? 6. Name five special needs populations, and describe what makes their disaster

planning needs unique. 7. Why is it important to involve representatives from all stakeholders in the disaster

planning process? 8. What kinds of training opportunities are provided by the federal government?

What agencies provide these courses, workshops, and other programs? 9. What are the four types of disaster exercises? What does each involve? 10. Name the ways that the National Preparedness Directorate guides national

preparedness efforts.

Out-of-Class Exercises 1. Create an individual or family plan using the guidance provided in FEMA’s

Are You Ready publication ( http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/ ). Did you find any shortfalls in this program? What did you learn by using the publication?

2. Contact your local office of emergency management and find out if there is an evacuation plan for your local community. What must occur for an evacuation to be ordered? Who has the authority to issue that order?

3. Determine what special needs populations exist in your community. Select one, and find out whether special preparedness and emergency planning considerations have been made to accommodate their unique needs.

Chapter 4 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Preparedness 131

4. Assist a local small business or nonprofit organization in identifying their hazards and mitigating their risks (often called a Business Continuity Plan, or Continuity of Operations Plan). Several resources are available to help you carry out this exercise, including the following:

Ready.Gov Business: http://www.ready.gov/business/ Institute for Business and Home Safety “ Open for Business ” guide:

http://www.ibhs.org/publications/view.asp?cat � 84 & id � 556 Volunteer Florida Continuity of Operations Planning Guide:

http://www.floridadisaster.org/documents/COOP/COOP%20Implementation %20Guidance.pdf

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The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications

What You’ll Learn ● The mission and five assumptions of an effective disaster communications strategy ● Which audiences, or customers, receive disaster communications ● Communicating in the homeland security era ● Disaster communications in a changing media world ● Building an effective disaster communications capability

Introduction Communications has become an increasingly critical function in emergency manage- ment. The dissemination of timely and accurate information to the general public, elected and community officials, and the media plays a major role in the effective man- agement of disaster response and recovery activities. Communicating preparedness, prevention, and mitigation information promotes actions that reduce the risk of future disasters. Communicating policies, goals, and priorities to staff, partners, and partici- pants enhances support and promotes a more efficient disaster management operation.

Communications failures by government responders in Hurricane Katrina were noted in a report prepared by the House of Representatives that stated, “ The lack of a govern- ment public communications strategy and media hype of violence exacerbated public concerns and further delayed relief. ” The House report also asked “ why coordination and information sharing between local, state, and federal governments was so dismal, … why situational awareness was so foggy, for so long, … why unsubstantiated rumors and uncrit- ically repeated press reports — at times fueled by top officials — were able to delay, disrupt, and diminish the response ” (Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 2006). This chapter does the following:

● Defines the mission of an effective disaster communications strategy ● Examines communication in the era of homeland security ● Examines the various forms of media that emergency managers have historically

relied on and the new forms of media that are changing how disaster news and information are shared with the public

● Details the seven elements that comprise an effective disaster communications capability in the future

5

134 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The Mission The mission of an effective disaster communications strategy is to provide timely and accurate information to the public in all four phases of emergency management:

● Mitigation — to promote implementation of strategies, technologies, and actions that will reduce the loss of lives and property in future disasters

● Preparedness — to communicate preparedness messages that encourage and educate the public in anticipation of disaster events

● Response — to provide to the public notification, warning, evacuation, and situation reports on an ongoing disaster

● Recovery — to provide individuals and communities affected by a disaster with information on how to register for and receive disaster relief

The foundation of an effective disaster communications strategy is built on five critical assumptions:

● Customer focus ● Leadership commitment ● Inclusion of communications in planning and operations ● Good information ● Media partnership

THE FIVE CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

1. Customer focus: Understand what information your customers and your partners need, and build communications mechanisms that deliver this information in a timely and accurate fashion.

2. Leadership commitment: The leader of the emergency operations must be committed to effective communications and must participate fully in the communications process.

3. Inclusion of communications in planning and operations: Communications specialists must be involved in all emergency planning and operations to ensure that communicating timely and accurate information is considered when action decisions are being considered.

4. Situational awareness: Effective communications is based on the timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of information from the disaster area in accordance with basic principles of effective communications such as transparency and truthfulness.

5. Media partnership: The media (i.e., television, radio, Internet, newspapers, etc.) are the most effective means for communicating timely and accurate information to the public. A partnership with the media involves understanding the needs of the media and including trained staff who work directly with the media to get information to the public. And now that citizen journalists and new media technologies (cell phones, laptops, digital cameras) have become more vital and accepted sources of information and imaging from the front lines of a disaster, methods for incorporating this data and information must also be implemented.

Chapter 5 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications 135

Customer Focus

An essential element of any effective emergency management system is a focus on cus- tomers and customer service. This philosophy should guide communications with the public and with all partners in emergency management. A customer service approach includes placing the needs and interests of individuals and communities first, being responsive and informative, and managing expectations.

The customers for emergency management are diverse. They include internal custom- ers, such as staff, other federal agencies, states, and other disaster partners. External cus- tomers include the general public, elected officials at all levels of government, community and business leaders, and the media. Each of these customers has specific information needs, and a good communications strategy considers and reflects their requirements.

Leadership Commitment

Good communications starts with a commitment by the leadership of the emergency management organization to sharing and disseminating information both internally and externally. One of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina was “ We need public offi- cials to lead. Communicating confidence to citizens and delivering on promises are both critical in crises ” (Kettl, 2005).

The leader of any disaster response and recovery effort must openly endorse and pro- mote open lines of communications among the organization’s staff, partners, and public in order to effectively communicate. This leader must model this behavior to clearly illus- trate that communications is a valued function of the organization.

LEADERSHIP MODELING GOOD COMMUNICATIONS

In the 1990s, FEMA director James Lee Witt was a strong advocate for keeping FEMA staff informed of agency plans, priorities, and operations. Witt characterized a proactive approach in communicating with FEMA’s constituents. His accessibility to the media was a significant departure from previous FEMA leadership. Witt exhibited his commitment to effective communications in many ways:

• He held weekly staff meetings with FEMA’s senior managers and required that his senior managers hold regular staff meetings with their employees.

• He published an internal newsletter to employees entitled “ Director’s Weekly Update ” that was distributed to all FEMA employees in hard copy and on the agency electronic bulletin board that updated employees on agency activities.

• He made himself and his senior staff available to the media on a regular basis, especially during a disaster response, to answer questions and to provide information.

• During a disaster response, he held media briefi ngs daily and sometimes two to three times a day.

• He held special meetings with victims and their families.

136 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Including Communications in Planning and Operations

The most important part of leadership’s commitment to communications is including communications in all planning and operations. This means that a communications specialist is included in the senior management team of any emergency management organization and operation. It means that communications issues are considered in the decision-making processes and that a communications element is included in all organi- zational activities, plans, and operations.

In the past, communicating with external customers, and in many cases internal cus- tomers, was not valued or considered critical to a successful emergency management operation. Technology has changed that equation. In today’s world of 24-hour television and radio news and the Internet, the demand for information is never-ending, especially in an emergency response situation. Emergency managers must be able to communicate critical information in a timely manner to their staff, partners, the public, and the media.

To do so, the information needs of the various customers and how best to commu- nicate with these customers must be considered at the same time that planning and operational decisions are being made. For example, a decision process on how to remove debris from a disaster area must include discussion of how to communicate information on the debris removal operation to community officials, the public, and the media.

Again the response to Hurricane Katrina clearly illustrates the downside of failing to include consideration of communications issues in conducting a response operation. The “ Lessons Learned ” report prepared by White House Homeland Security Advisor Francis Townsend noted, “ The lack of communications and situational awareness had a debilitating effect on the federal response. The Department of Homeland Security should develop an integrated public communications plan to better inform, guide, and reassure the American public before, during, and after a catastrophe. The Department of Homeland Security should enable this plan with operational capabilities to deploy coordinated public affairs teams during a crisis ” (Townsend, 2006).

Situational Awareness

Situational awareness is key to an effective disaster response. Knowing the number of people killed and injured, the level of damage at the disaster site, the condition of homes

• He led the daily briefi ngs among FEMA partners during a disaster response. • He devoted considerable time to communicating with members of Congress, governors,

mayors, and other elected offi cials during both disaster and nondisaster times, at times holding joint press briefi ngs with these offi cials.

• He met four to fi ve times per year with the State Emergency Management Directors, FEMA’s principal emergency management partners.

• He gave speeches all over this country and around the world to promote better understanding of emergency management and disaster mitigation.

Chapter 5 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications 137

and community infrastructure, and current response efforts provide decision makers with the situational awareness needed to identify need and appropriately apply available resources. The collection, analysis, and dissemination of information from the disaster site are the basis for an effective communications operation in a disaster response.

This is also true during the disaster recovery phase, especially early in the recovery phase when the demand for information from the public, and therefore the media, is at its highest. Developing effective communications strategies to promote community pre- paredness and/or mitigation programs requires detailed information about the nature of the risk that impacts the community and how the planned preparedness programs will help individuals and communities to be ready for the next disaster, and the mitigation pro- grams will reduce the impacts of future disasters. A glaring lack of situational awareness was identified as a severe hindrance to the government response to Hurricane Katrina.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND MEDIA STORIES

“ Without sufficient working communications capability to get better situational awareness, the local, state, and federal officials directing the response in New Orleans had too little factual information to address — and, if need be, rebut — what the media were reporting. This allowed terrible situations — the evacuees ’ fear and anxiety in the Superdome and Convention Center — to continue longer than they should have and, as noted, delayed response efforts by, for example, causing the National Guard to wait to assemble enough force to deal with security problems at the Convention Center that turned out to be overstated. ”

Source : Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 2006, “ A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Special Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, ” Government Printing Office, February 15, 2006, http://www .gpoacess.gov/congress/index.hmtl .

CRITICAL THINKING

Why is the commitment of the executive and senior managers so important to having an effective communications capability? What parties must be involved in providing timely and accurate information to decision makers as they shape their communications priorities in a disaster?

FEMA ’s National Incident Management System (NIMS) includes a section on pub- lic information in its Incident Command System (ICS) component. One of the three top command staff reporting to the incident commander in ICS is the public informa- tion officer ( Figure 5-1 ). FEMA’s NIMS document (2007) states, “ Public Information con- sists of the processes, procedures, and systems to communicate timely, accurate, and accessible information on the incident’s cause, size, and current situation to the public, responders, and additional stakeholders (both directly affected and indirectly affected).

138 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Public information must be coordinated and integrated across jurisdictions and across agencies/organizations; among federal, state, tribal, and local governments; and with the private sector and NGOs. Well-developed public information, education strategies, and communications plans help to ensure that lifesaving measures, evacuation routes, threat and alert systems, and other public safety information is coordinated and communicated to numerous audiences in a timely, consistent manner. Public Information includes pro- cesses, procedures, and organizational structures required to gather, verify, coordinate, and disseminate information. ”

Media Partnership

The media plays a primary role in communicating with the public. No government emer- gency management organization could ever hope to develop a communications network comparable to those networks already established and maintained by television, radio, newspapers, and online news outlets across the country. To effectively provide timely disaster information to the public, emergency managers must establish a partnership with their local media outlets.

The goal of a media partnership is to provide accurate and timely information to the public in both disaster and nondisaster situations. The partnership requires a commit- ment by both the emergency manager and the media to work together, and it requires a level of trust between both parties. Traditionally, the relationship between emergency managers and the media has been strained. There is often a conflict between the need of the emergency manager to respond quickly and the need of the media to obtain informa- tion on the response so it can report it just as quickly. This conflict sometimes results in

FIGURE 5-1 Incident Command System: the command staff and the general staff. FEMA. National Incident Command System: FEMA 501/Draft August 2007.

Command staffIncident command

Operations section chief

General Staff

Planning section cheif

Logistics section chief

Finance/ Administration section chief

Public information officer

Safety officer

Liaison officer

Chapter 5 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications 139

inaccurate reporting and tension between the emergency manager and the media. The loser in this conflict is always the public, which relies on the media for its information.

It is important for emergency managers to understand the needs of the media and the value they bring to facilitating response operations. An effective media partnership provides the emergency manager with a communications network to reach the public with vital information and provides the media with access to the disaster site, access to emergency managers and their staff, and access to critical information for the public that informs and ensures the accuracy of their reporting.

CRITICAL THINKING

• As a private, nongovernmental organization, is the primary concern of the media their publicity ratings, or helping the public with disasters?

• Does the media have a responsibility to warn the public about disasters? • Should members of the media be required to have training in emergency management?

Why or why not?

Audiences/Customers In order to effectively communicate disaster information, emergency managers must clearly identify their various audiences and customers. Included in many of these audi- ences are both partners and stakeholders. Basic emergency management audiences include the following:

● General public . The largest audience, of which there are many subgroups, such as the elderly, those with disabilities, minorities, low income, youths, and so on, and all are potential customers

● Disaster victims . Those individuals affected by a specific disaster event ● Business community . Often ignored by emergency managers but critical to disaster

recovery, preparedness, and mitigation activities ● Media . An audience and a partner critical to effectively communicating with the

public ● Elected officials . Governors, mayors, county executives, state legislators, and members

of Congress ● Community officials . City/county managers, public works, department heads ● First responders . Police, fire, and emergency medical services ● Volunteer groups . American Red Cross, Salvation Army, the NVOADs, and so on, which

are critical to first response to an event

Communications with some of these customers, such as the first responders, is accomplished principally through radio and phone communications (see Chapter 6). Communicating with most of these other audiences is accomplished through briefings,

140 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

meetings, provision of background materials, and, in some instances, one-on-one inter- views. Communications strategies, plans, and operations should be developed to meet the information needs of each of these customers and staffed and funded accordingly.

Communicating in the Era of Homeland Security Communicating with the public is an area that needs to be improved if the nation is going to have a truly effective homeland security system. To date, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has shown little interest in communicating with the public, and when it has, the results have not always been positive — the “ duct tape and plastic ” fiasco and recent reports of former DHS Secretary Ridge questioning terror alert warnings are some classic examples. DHS and its state and local partners need to address three factors to improve its communications with the American people. First, there must be a commit- ment from the leadership, not only at DHS and its state and local partners but at all levels of government, including the executive level, to communicate timely and accurate infor- mation to the public. This is especially important in the response and recovery phases to a terrorist incident.

In a disaster scenario, the conventional wisdom that information is power and that hoarding information helps to retain such power is almost categorically reversed. With- holding information during disaster events generally has an overall negative impact on the well-being of the public, as well as on the impression the public forms about involved authorities. In practice, sharing information is what generates authority and power when that information is useful and relates to the hazard at hand. A good example of this is for- mer New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s actions after 9/11. Giuliani went to great lengths to get accurate and timely information to the public in a time of crisis, and his efforts both inspired the public and greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the response and recovery efforts he guided.

To date, DHS leadership and the political leadership have been reluctant to make this commitment to share information with the public. This is something that must change if they expect the American people to fully comprehend the homeland security threat and to become actively engaged in homeland security efforts. Few citizens have any idea of what actual terrorism risks they face, and fewer can actually relate those risks in any com- parable fashion to the risks they face every day.

Second , homeland security officials at all levels must resolve the conflict between shar- ing information with the public in advance and in the aftermath of a terrorist incident that has value for intelligence or criminal prosecution purposes. This is directly linked to the commitment issue discussed in the previous paragraphs and has been repeatedly cited by homeland security officials as reasons for not sharing more specific information with the public.

Also at issue is the question of when to release relevant information to the public with- out compromising intelligence sources and/or ongoing criminal investigations. This is an issue that rarely if ever confronts emergency management officials dealing with natural

Chapter 5 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications 141

and unintentional man-made disasters. Therefore, there is little precedent or experience for current homeland security officials to work with in crafting a communications strat- egy that balances the competing need for the public to have timely and accurate infor- mation with the need to protect intelligence sources and ongoing criminal investigations. To date, the needs of the intelligence and justice communities have clearly been judged to outweigh those of the public — but at a cost.

Withholding information leaves the public vulnerable and suspicious of the govern- ment. The Aspen Institute report, First Informers in the Disaster Zone: The Lessons of Katrina , noted that the task of journalists was to convince government officials that over the long run, transparency can build trust and save lives: “ The same information that a terrorist can use to do great damage can possibly give families information about which escape route to use to get away from a nuclear power plant. I think we’re going to find that if we have a flu pandemic, the information that can be used to terrorize and scare people can also be used to save their lives. I think what we have to do is work very hard at con- vincing people that access to information is ultimately going to be our friend ” (May, 2006).

The recent announcement by the Obama administration that the DHS had created a task force of outside experts to redesign the much maligned Homeland Security Advi- sory System (HSAS) is a critical first step in reestablishing trust with the public for the warning system ( “ Secretary Napolitano Announces 60-Day Review of Homeland Security Advisory System, ” http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1247586668272.shtm ). From this starting point, additional communications mechanisms can be developed to ensure that the public gets timely and accurate information both in advance of any terrorist incident and during the response and recovery phases in the aftermath of the next terrorist attack.

Third , more effort must be invested by federal departments and agencies to better understand the principal terrorist threats that our nation faces (i.e., biological, chemi- cal, radiological, nuclear, and explosives) and to develop communications strategies that educate and inform the public about these threats with more useful information. The 2001 Washington, D.C., anthrax incident is a perfect example of uninformed or misin- formed public officials sharing what is often conflicting and, in too many instances, just plain wrong information with the public.

The nation’s public officials must become better informed about these principal risks and be ready to explain complicated information to the public. As the anthrax incident made clear, this is not a luxury but a necessity if the response to similar incidents in the future is to be successful.

Decades of research and a new generation of technologies now inform emergency managers as they provide information about hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, and haz- ardous materials incidents to the public. A similar research effort must be undertaken for these five new terrorist risks and communications strategies that will ensure that home- land security officials at all levels are capable of clearly explaining to the public the hazards posed by these threats. These communications strategies must consider how to communi- cate to the public when incomplete information is all that is available to homeland secu- rity officials. In the vast majority of cases, this partiality of information is probable.

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A public health crisis will not wait for all the data to be collected and analyzed, nor will the public. Homeland security officials must develop strategies for informing the public effectively, as the crisis develops, by forming effective messages that are able to explain to the public how what is being said is the most accurate information available based on the information that, likewise, is available — despite its incomplete nature. Clearly, this is not an easy task, but it is not impossible. The public will increasingly expect such communi- cations efforts, so the sooner such a system is in place, the better the next incident will be managed.

Disaster Communications in a Changing Media World Working with the media before, during, and after a disaster is a fact of life for an emergency management official. The media remains the single most effective means for communi- cating timely and accurate information to the public. Historically, emergency managers have shied away from talking to the media, especially during a disaster response. That day is over. As we noted earlier, emergency managers or other government officials involved in disaster response can no longer ignore the media. Developing a partnership with the media should now be standard operating procedure for any and all emergency manage- ment operations in this country and around the world.

However , the media is constantly changing, and emergency managers must keep up with these changes to have an effective communications operation. Disaster prepared- ness information used to be exclusively published in brochures and pamphlets that were distributed in post offices and courthouses around the country. In the 1950s, Civil Defense workers went directly to communities to dispense information on nuclear pre- paredness in town hall meetings. Years later, representatives from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) held similar meetings in communities around the country to inform residents about flood mapping and flood insurance.

Over time, the radio has become an integral part of communicating warning messages to the public before the next tornado or hurricane strikes. In turn, radio has often been the sole source of information in the immediate aftermath of a massive disaster that cuts off electricity to the disaster area for days at a time because of the availability of transistor and crank radios that do not require electricity. Television has become a big part of disasters in the past 50 years. The pictures and stories that are generated by disaster events are a natural fit for television. It was the size of the satellite photo of Hurricane Floyd on television cou- pled with evacuation warnings from local, state, and federal officials transmitted by televi- sion that prompted 3 million residents in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina to evacuate their homes as the storm threatened the Eastern Seaboard. It is also television that graphi- cally communicated the sorry events that occurred in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.

Over time television has changed considerably. The three national networks and usu- ally three or four local stations in any given community have given way to hundreds of channels available nationwide along with 24/7 news channels and the Weather Channel, and they are available across the country.

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The rise of the Internet as a source for disaster and emergency-related information and news has been spectacular. A survey conducted in April 2008 by the Canadian Centre for Emergency Preparedness (CCEP) found that the Internet has surpassed newspapers on the list of emergency information sources used by the Canadian public. Television and radio are ranked number one and number two on this list, but it may not be long before the Internet grabs even more of the public’s attention, especially as older and low- to moderate-income individuals and families gain access to the Internet.

The media continues to change with the advent of “ first informers ” — ordinary citi- zens armed with a cell phone who can take pictures and/or video at the disaster site and add commentary and post their submissions on the Internet or provide them to CNN or MSNBC or other outlets. Some of the first photos and commentaries coming out of the Asian Tsunami disaster in 2004 were filed by these “ first informers, ” who were there when the tsunami struck and survived to provide information and images of the damage and destruction.

The Evolution of New Media Use in Disasters

The magnitude and frequency of natural disasters are increasing. According to the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, there were four times as many weather- related disasters in the last 20 years than in the previous 75 years. With this new “ Age of Extreme Weather ” has come the evolution and maturation of new media tools and tech- nologies, a dramatic rise in the number of citizen journalists, and an almost annual increase in their contribution to the flow of new information during disasters. “ Disasters have provided a unique trigger that has consolidated technological advances in concert with democratizing influences operating outside the traditional brokers of information and aid ” (Laituri and Kodrich, 2008).

Even though the 1990s was a time of transformation in communications technology, with the emergence of the World Wide Web, 24/7 cable television, and an array of digital tools from affordable and widely available wireless mobile devices to high-resolution satel- lite maps, new media were not a factor in natural disaster coverage or recovery until 2001.

UNITED NATIONS REPORT: NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN EMERGENCIES AND CONFLICTS — THE ROLE OF INFORMATION AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

There have been some dramatic advances in communications technology — in the number of new technologies, the mobility and range of functions available, and the spread of these technologies. Growth has been particularly strong in the penetration of mobile phones and more recently the uptake of social networking websites, including Facebook and Twitter. One important change is a shift from one-to-many forms of communication, such as television and radio, to many-to-many forms of communication, such as social networking and crowdsourcing websites, that is changing the way in which information is delivered and exchanged.

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In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, citizen-shot videos of the attacks on the Twin Towers dominated news coverage, and Americans turned to the Internet for information. But the sharp spike in traffic froze and crashed websites. In many ways, 9/11 was the last disaster covered under the old model of crisis communi- cations: Newspapers printed “ Extra ” editions, people turned to television for news, and “ the familiar anchors of the broadcast networks — Tom Brokaw, Peter Jennings, and Dan Rather — took on their avuncular roles of the past for a nation looking for comfort and reassurance ” (May, 2006).

Every disaster since 9/11 has involved more citizen journalists and expanded the use and utility of the new media tools and technologies. In 2003, during China’s SARs epi- demic, people used text messaging to exchange information that the government tried to suppress (Hattotuwa, 2007). Three major disasters within nine months — the Asian tsu- nami (2004), the London transit bombings (2005), and Hurricane Katrina (2005) — marked the coming of age of participatory media.

The December 26, 2004, Asian tsunami has been defined as “ the turning point — a before-and-after moment for citizen journalism. ” Blogs, websites, and message boards

Communications advances present an opportunity for humanitarian organizations to harness modern technology to communicate more effectively with communities affected by disasters and to allow members of those communities to communicate with one another and with the outside world. People in affected communities can recover faster if they can access and use information. A look at the use of communications technology during disasters in recent years shows that while it has played a positive role, its full potential has not yet been realized. Moreover, governments, humanitarian agencies, and local communities face challenges and risks associated with modern technological innovation, including the following:

• Information fl ows must be two-way to be effective — from the external world to the affected community but also from those affected to the agencies seeking to help them in useful ways.

• Information will not be used unless it is trusted. The utility of any technologies will depend on the social context. People are a vital part of the communication system.

• Information will be helpful only if it is accurate. There are risks in unregulated information fl ows, especially when these are spread rapidly online, and these risks need to be managed. Authentication is a key challenge.

This tension between the potential benefit to humanitarian efforts from harnessing these technologies and the risks they pose is a key theme of this report. The report examines how authorities and humanitarian and aid organizations can best balance the opportunities and challenges of exploiting different technologies at the key stages on the timeline of crisis — early warning and preparedness, immediate humanitarian relief, and reconstruction and long-term development.

Source : United Nations, 2009. New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts: The Role of Information and Social Networks . http://www.unfoundation.org/press-center/publications/new-technologies-emergencies- conflicts.html

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provided news and aid in real time. One blog, “ waveofdestruction.org, ” logged 682,366 unique visitors in four days (Cooper, 2007). Wikipedia — a group-created website that can be edited by any user — became the site for basic information, particularly for hot- lines that allowed people to search for missing loved ones and find housing, medical, and other assistance.

Minutes after four bombs rocked London’s transportation system, a definitive web page, “ July 7, 2005, London Bombings, ” was started with five sentences on Wikipedia. The page “ received more than a thousand edits in its first four hours of existence as addi- tional news came in. ” Users added links to traditional news sources, and information was posted about what public transportation was shut down, listing contacts to help track a missing person and offering directions to commuters trying to get home. “ What was con- ceived as an open encyclopedia in 2001 [became] a general purpose tool for gathering and distributing information quickly ” (Shirky, 2008).

A cell phone photo taken by a commuter in a smoked-clogged tunnel in the Tube became the iconic image of the disaster. Londoners pooled their digital photos on Flickr — a photo-sharing site and service that allows people to tag pictures with comments and labels. “ The photos that showed up after the bombings weren’t just amateur replacements for traditional photojournalism; people did more than provide evidence of the destruc- tion and its aftermath. They photographed official notices ( “ All Underground services are suspended ” ), notes posted in schools ( “ Please do not inform children of the explosions ” ), messages of support from the rest of the world ( “ We love you, London ” ), and within a day of the bombings, expressions of defiance addressed to the terrorists ( “ We are not afraid ” and “ You will fail ” ). Not only did Flickr host all of these images, but they made them available for reuse, and bloggers writing about the bombings were able to use the Flickr images almost immediately, creating a kind of symbiotic relationship among various social tools ” (Shirky, 2008). Police asked people to turn in cell phone photos or videos because they might contain clues about the terrorists (Shirky, 2008).

In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina, a Category 3 hurricane, tore through New Orleans, Louisiana; Mobile, Alabama; and Gulfport, Mississippi. Over 1,500 people were killed, and tens of thousands were left homeless. Blogs became the primary information- providing tool used by both traditional media and citizen journalists. Staff reporters for New Orleans’s daily newspaper, the Times-Picayune, created a blog that for a time became the front page of their news operation. It enabled members of the community isolated by floodwaters and debris to show and tell one another what they were experiencing (Gillmor, 2006).

Message boards provided critical information about shelter locations, family tracing, and missing persons. Internet expert Barbara Palser counted 60 separate online bulletin boards that were created to locate missing people within two weeks of the storm. “ These sites included major portals such as Yahoo! and Craigslist, an array of newspaper and television sites, websites hosted by government and relief organizations, and individual technologists, including a group of programmers who enlisted about 2,000 volunteers to create a database called the Katrina PeopleFinder Project. ” PeopleFinder was established

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“ to create a consolidated database of missing people built outside the traditional, cen- tralized institutions (i.e., FEMA, Red Cross) ” (May, 2006). Google Earth and Google Maps, which provide and use online satellite imagery, were used to illustrate damage assessments — particularly to the Gulf Coast and barrier islands (Laituri, 2005).

After the Java earthquake in 2006, mobile phones became mobile news services. Internews, an international media support group, worked with 180 Indonesian journal- ists to set up a text messaging service that helped local radio stations to report on the recovery (Hattotuwa, 2007). In October 2007, wildfires in Southern California resulted in the loss of nearly 2,200 homes and over $1 billion in damages and marked a major step forward in the integration of mainstream media and citizen journalists. “ Local media has been highlighting user-submitted photos and videos and embedding new technology in their prime coverage. San Diego’s public television station, KPBS, used Twitter to give its audience updates when its website went down, and the Twitter updates now have a prominent place on their home page ” (Glaser, 2007).

San Diego TV station News 8 responded to the crisis by taking down its entire regu- lar website and replacing it with a rolling news blog, linking to YouTube videos of its key reports, plus Google Maps showing the location of the fire (Stabe, 2007). Also on the site were links to practical information that viewers needed, including how to contact insur- ance companies, how to volunteer or donate to the relief efforts, evacuation information, and shelter locations. “ It’s an exemplary case study in how a local news operation can respond to a major rolling disaster story by using all the reporting tools available on the Internet ” (Catone, 2007).

Local and national television stations asked for submissions from wildfire witnesses and victims. The NBC affiliate in San Diego received over 2,000 submissions of pictures and video related to the wildfires. CNN’s I-Reports section reportedly received about the same number of fire-related submissions (Catone, 2007). The Google Maps (Internet GIS) tool was used to develop maps of shelter locations and fire updates (Wagner, 2007). Clearly, a symbiotic relationship is emerging between citizen journalists and the mainstream news media. With every new major disaster, the mainstream media’s use of Internet-facilitated reporting increases. Government, however, has been slow to appreciate the power or potential of the new media tools and Internet culture.

New Media: New World

When disasters happened in the past, we learned about them after the fact. That is no longer the case. New technologies — laptops, cell phones, text messaging systems, digital cameras, the Internet — have changed the way news is gathered and distributed. These tech- nologies have also profoundly altered the flow of information, undermining the traditional gatekeepers and replacing the centralized, top-down model used by the government and professional media with a more dynamic flow of information that empowered citizens and created ad hoc distributive information networks. In their essay “ Citizen Journalism and Humanitarian Aid: Boon or Bust? ” Dan Gillmor and Sanjana Hattotuwa (2007) explained, “ These technologies create new ways for citizens to be heard, governments to

Chapter 5 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications 147

be held accountable and the state to answer to failures of governance. Ordinary citizens … are increasingly using technology, through devices such as mobile phones, to support powerful frameworks of transparency and accountability that citizens can use to hold decision makers responsible for the action, and indeed, inaction. ” According to Gillmor (2006), the days of news as a “ lecture ” — when traditional media told the audience what was considered news — are done. Now news is more of a conversation, and the lines have blurred between producers and consumers: “ The communications network itself will be a medium for everyone’s voice, not just the few who can buy multimillion-dollar print- ing presses, launch satellites, or win the government’s permission to squat on the public’s airwaves. ” In their article “ We Media: How Audiences Are Shaping the Future of News and Information, ” Bowman and Willis (2003) state, “ The venerable profession of jour- nalism finds itself at a rare moment in history where, for the first time, its hegemony as gatekeeper of the news is threatened by not just new technology and competitors but, potentially, by the audience it serves. ” The once passive audience has become an active participant in the creation and dissemination of news, and the flow of information is no longer controlled by journalists and government agencies.

The increasing participation and power of ordinary citizens in emergency com- munications are starting to have more observable consequences. The Aspen Institute report, First Informers in the Disaster Zone: The Lessons of Katrina, noted in its conclu- sion, “ There was a difference in how the online environment changed the media mix and altered the flow of information during and after the disaster … At times the traditional flow of information from government to media to public reversed course. … As one pair of new media experts put it, Katrina ‘ “ revealed extraordinary changes taking place within a society increasingly connected by digital networks, a society at the cusp of a new era in human history in which individuals possess an unprecedented capacity to access, share, create, and apply information ’ ” (May, 2006).

One participant in the Aspen Institute’s assessment of lessons learned from Katrina was Jon Donley, the editor of NOLA.com — the Times-Picayune ’s online companion and the primary source of news when the daily could not print in the weeks following the hur- ricane. Donley explained that the new media had fostered a two-way flow of information, in contrast to the old paradigm in which information flows down from government and media to a passive audience. “ I would really encourage everybody to think about this new media age that we’re in, where the audience isn’t playing that game anymore. We have had a revolution ” (May, 2006).

In addition to forcing the traditional media to reconsider and redefine its role in disas- ter communications, the new participatory media enhanced the amount of information and number of sources and added to the problems that were endemic in times of disas- ter: the need to sort truth from rumor and the tension between media demanding trans- parency and accessibility and government officials charged with managing information during a disaster. The information available to citizens at times of crises is often inad- equate, incorrect, or dated. According to Gillmor and Hattotuwa, “ Studies show that the problem lies not with the technologies (or lack thereof ) but with the culture of informa- tion sharing. The access, dissemination, and archiving of information is often controlled

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by government’s agencies, institutions who have a parochial interest in controlling its flow — what gets out where, to whom, how, and when ” (Gillmor, 2006) .

“ If we waited for the government to release information during a disaster, it would be days before the public would know anything, ” complained one participant in the Aspen Katrina assessment. Chet Lunner, acting director of state and local government coordi- nation in DHS and a former national reporter for the Gannett News Service, spoke from the government’s perspective in the Aspen session. He disagreed with a comment from CNN’s David Borhman that the government instinct in a crisis was to hide. “ They are not hiding. They are sort of defensive, in a crouch … because [they] don’t trust the media ” (May, 2006).

Katrina , the Aspen report concludes, exacerbated the already burgeoning distrust between media and government . “ As rival proxies for the public, the two institutions clashed openly during and after the storm. … The first failure was caused by lack of good situational awareness by federal officials themselves, who painted a rosy scenario that clashed with the pictures and reports from the scene from journalists. ‘ Don’t you guys watch television? Don’t you guys listen to the radio? ’ ABC’s Ted Koppel famously asked Michael Brown, then FEMA director. Federal, state, and local officials gave contradictory messages to the public, creating confusion and feeding the perception that government sources lacked credibility, the White House report concluded ” (May, 2006).

The emergence and proliferation of citizen media complicated the information mix and increased the tension between the government and traditional media. Explained Sanjana Hattotuwa (2007) in “ Who is Afraid of Citizen Journalists? ” “ Information in the hands of cit- izens continues to instill fear and loathing in the minds of those who wish to manufacture public opinion to their benefit by the careful selection and publication of information. ”

Government official Chet Lunner explained his unease in the Aspen report: “ I get con- cerned when I see the term ‘ citizen journalists ’ and ‘ blogs ’ lumped in with everything else, as if that were journalism in the way that it is practiced by professionals. That is often the problem we have, which is that something that starts out as a blog does not necessarily meet the standards of most source-tested journalism that has been in practice for all these years. … We have enough trouble with things that do go through the [mainstream media] filter. The amount of time and energy and social unrest by readers and/or the people try- ing to practice in the field dealing with these things that are exaggerated rumors, etc., is a problem, particularly in the framework of these disaster times when people are depend- ing upon or relying on that ” (May, 2006).

“ On the other hand, ” the editor of NOLA.com explained, “ the very first reports [that] we had of life-threatening flooding in New Orleans came from citizens typing it into cell phones. The very first news we had of clear levee breaks, of looting, of a shooting death, or a suicide in the Superdome — every one of those things we heard first from citizens whom we were encouraging to have a two-way dialogue with us ” (May, 2006).

Participatory journalism and the generation of news and information from “ first informers ” — citizens on the scene when disaster happens — are not trends that are going to go away. In fact, as noted previously, the 2008 disasters in Burma and China may mark the coming of age of text messaging, blogging, and video sharing as tools that can bring

Chapter 5 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications 149

faster coverage of a news event than traditional media. The challenge now for traditional news sources and cautious governmental hierarchies is to plan for and maximize the use of an increased and accelerated flow of information, to seize the opportunity to share information and build community that online media creates.

User -generated content is here to stay, according the Lou Ferrara of the Associated Press. “ The landscape has changed, but we’re all about getting this information. What’s the best way to do it? Do we outsource, partner, do it ourselves? ” (Ferrara, 2007). Yahoo!’s Bill Gannon reflected on the Katrina communications experience: “ What we realized is that users wanted not just to read information, but they wanted to be empowered. What they wanted to do was get personally involved either through a message board or simply by making a donation ” (May, 2006). How to channel and sustain that empowerment is the challenge of the next crisis. All types of organizations and groups are getting involved with new media, as evidenced in the U.S. Pacific Command’s January 2010 blog entry, which appears in the box on page 150.

CASE STUDY IN NEW MEDIA: CYCLONE NARGIS, MYANMAR

On May 2, 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck the Irrawaddy Delta region of Myanmar (Burma). The cyclone, with winds of 120 mph, made landfall at the mouth of the Irrawaddy River — a low-lying, densely populated region — and pushed a 12-foot wall of water 25 miles inland, killing at least 80,000 people and leaving as many as 2.5 million homeless. Ten days later, on May 12, 2008, a 7.9 earthquake devastated China’s Sichuan province, toppling buildings, collapsing schools, killing more than 69,000, injuring over 367,000, and displacing between 5 and 11 million people.

Two disasters, one common link. These incidents demonstrated that new technologies — the Internet, text messaging systems, camera phones, Google Map mash-ups — and citizen journalists, especially bloggers, have irrevocably altered the nature of disaster reporting and replaced the top-down flow of information from the government and the traditional media in times of crisis with a dynamic and democratic two-way exchange.

In Myanmar, where Internet and cell phone access is limited, the military government refused to allow aid workers or journalists to reach disaster areas and moved fast to restrict communications. Ironically, it was a local online news source, the Burma News, that reported on the “ guidelines ” the junta had laid out for journalists ’ coverage, specifically prohibiting showing dead bodies or reporting about insufficient aid for victims (Burma News, 2008).

In spite of these restrictions, Burmese blogs and news sites were quick to react by posting eyewitness accounts of the disaster and mobilizing fundraising efforts. According to BBC News, “ People inside Burma have been giving their updates from the disaster zone. Burmese blogger Nyi Lynn Seck has a section of his blog devoted to daily updates from the Delta region. ‘ They are seeing dead bodies, ’ he writes. ‘ Nobody has cremated or buried these dead bodies. ’ He also carries a report of how one private donor in Bogalay was forced to give his donation to the local authorities rather than people in need ” (BBC News, 2008).

The BBC also noted that the Mizzima news site, based in India and run by Burmese exiles, used long-standing personal networks to gather compelling accounts of loss and survival. Other exile Burmese news sites such as Yoma3 reported on the spread of disease among the cyclone

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victims in Bogalay. Stories of monks and local residents pulling together and co-coordinating local cleanups and sharing water could be found on the Democratic Voice of Burma and other sites such as The Irrawaddy. The Rule of Lords blog reported that people were been turned away from hospitals because of the lack of electricity and water.

In addition to the news gathering done by citizen journalists online (bloggers), other new media technologies helped tell the story of the Burmese disaster and recovery:

● Twitter — a short messaging service (SMS) that uses cell phones and 140-character messages that are also posted online — emerged quickly as an important medium for coverage of the crisis. Aid agencies working in Burma, including AmeriCares and the Salvation Army, are also using Twitter to disseminate information and coordinate activities (Washkuch, May 20, 2008).

● YouTube hosted scores of videos recording the devastation and feeble response. User AfterNargisYgn uploaded a multipart series of videos featuring images of the effects of the cyclone in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city, previously known as Rangoon. His series also documents the growing anger and desperation of the storm victims. Burma4u uploaded a video of the aftermath in Latbutta, with Cyclone Nargis’s victims crowded in refugee shelters, trying to sleep. Videos depicting dozens of people who died in the cyclone, which are banned by the junta, are also posted on YouTube (Rincon, May 16, 2008, YouTube).

● Google Earth and the Associated Press produced interactive maps that tracked the cyclone’s passage through the country and illustrated the extent of the storm damage — especially the dramatic erosion of the shoreline and the degree of inundation.

● Global Voices Online and traditional media like the New York Times, BBC, and CNN featured, linked to, or aggregated coverage by bloggers and linked to videos and photos recorded by eyewitnesses.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (PACOM) AND SOCIAL MEDIA

This past year, a lot of things have happened within PACOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). In the last three months alone, we’ve seen the value of social media in connecting us with people around the world as we carry out our mission in the Asia-Pacific region. We are thankful for those who have helped us spread the word via retweeting/reposting our messages, primarily via Twitter and Facebook, most especially during our Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations in the Philippines, Indonesia, and American Samoa this past October. While it was good to see how much our daily Disaster Relief Fact sheets and Flickr photos were used and shared online, it was even more amazing to see how people came together in a time of crisis to help each other out. A picture is truly worth a thousand words, and it’s a great way to show the various activities of our Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy service members around the AOR, such as participating in local community projects and outreach programs, leading or participating in joint military exercises, building relationships, and collaborating with other countries to prepare for large-scale natural disasters, sharing best practices with local authorities to promote peace and security, and, more recently, spreading the holiday cheer. We are always moved by the comments that we receive, and we would like to thank our social media friends for amplifying our messages through the “ likes ” and reposts on Facebook, as well as via the mentions and retweets on Twitter, especially during #militarymonday and #followfriday. We get to hear of your support for our troops (#SOT on Twitter) not just on special occasions but every day! Social media has definitely helped PACOM in telling stories that are

Chapter 5 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications 151

Building an Effective Disaster Communications Capability in a Changing Media World The world of emergency management is changing rapidly. The onslaught of major cata- strophic disasters around the world and the projected impact of global climate change have forced the emergency management community to reexamine all of its processes, including communications. Managing information before, during, and after a disaster has changed significantly in recent years, and emergency operations at all levels — local, state, and national — must recognize and acknowledge this change and adapt accordingly.

As we have noted throughout this chapter, the biggest change in disaster communi- cations has come with the emergence of the “ first informers ” — citizen journalists — and their use of new, widely available online and digital technologies to gather and share information and images. No organization working in the emergency management field — government, nongovernmental groups, voluntary agency, or private sector — can ignore the role these “ first informers ” and their information networks will play in future disas- ters. In the future, emergency management organizations must establish partnerships with both the traditional media outlets and the new media in order to meet their primary communications mission of providing the public with timely and accurate information before, during, and after a disaster.

Creating Effective Disaster Communications Seven elements will be necessary in the future to comprise an effective disaster commu- nications capability:

● A communications plan ● Information coming in ● Information going out ● Messengers

often untold via traditional sources, but more importantly, it has helped us in connecting with you. We have certainly learned a lot, and we are looking forward to learning how we can further develop our social media efforts in 2010. What are ways in which we can better connect with you this New Year? What’s on your mind? We’d love to hear your thoughts!

Source : U.S. Pacific Command. http://us-pacific-command.blogspot.com/2009/01/how-social-media-helped- pacom-in-2009.html

CRITICAL THINKING

How has social media changed reporting by the media on disasters? How has social media changed the way information has been collected and analyzed by the government, the private sector, and voluntary agency responders? Will social media continue to change they way people receive information about a disaster and how to secure disaster assistance in the future?

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● Staffing ● Training and exercises ● Monitor, update, and adapt

A Communications Plan

Disaster communication plans can take several forms. Planning for communicating in disaster response focuses on collecting, analyzing, and disseminating timely and accurate information to the public. A disaster response communications plan will include pro- tocols for collecting information from a variety of sources, including citizen journalists, analyzing this data in order to identify resource needs and to match available resources to these needs, and then disseminating information concerning current conditions and actions to the public through both traditional and new media outlets. The plan will iden- tify trusted messengers who will deliver disaster response information to the public. The plan will identify how disaster communications will be delivered to special needs and non-English-speaking populations.

The disaster response communications plan will include a roster of local, state, and national media outlets; reporters; and first informers. This roster will be contacted to solicit information and to disseminate information back out to the public. Finally, the plan should include protocols for monitoring the media, identifying new sources of infor- mation collection or dissemination, and evaluating the effectiveness of the disaster com- munications. This information would be used to update the plan.

A communications plan for the recovery phase will look very similar. The recov- ery phase plan must also include protocols for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating timely and accurate information. During the recovery phase, much of the information to be disseminated to the public will come from government and other relief agencies and focus on available resources to help individuals and communities to rebuild.

The communications plan must place a premium on delivering this information to the targeted audiences and must identify the appropriate communications mechanisms to communicate these messages. Information collection from the field from a wide vari- ety of sources must be a priority in the communications plan for the recovery phase. Community relations staff, community leaders, and first informers are all good sources of information on the progress of recovery activities and can provide valuable perspectives of the mood of the individuals and communities impacted by the disaster. These sources are also effective in identifying communities, groups, and individuals who have been passed over by recovery programs. It is in the recovery phase that consensus is sought, since crucial long-term decisions have to be made at the state and community levels.

Information Coming In

Information is the basis of effective disaster communications. In disaster response, receiving and processing regular information concerning conditions at a disaster site and

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what is being done by agencies responding to the disaster help disaster communicators to provide timely and accurate information to the public. In collecting this information, no potential source should be ignored, and all possible sources should be encouraged to forward relevant information. To be successful in this task, you should identify all poten- tial sources of information and develop working relationships with these various sources before the next disaster strikes. You must also be prepared to identify and partner with new sources of information as they come on the scene in the aftermath of a disaster.

Potential disaster information sources include the following:

● Government damage assessment teams: Government disaster agencies at every level have staff responsible for assessing damages in the aftermath of a disaster. For a major disaster, a damage assessment team may include representatives from local, state, and federal response agencies. The information collected will include deaths and injuries and any damages to homes, infrastructure, and the environment.

● First responders: Among the first on the scene at any disaster, they are equipped with the necessary communications devices and trained to be observant.

● Voluntary agencies: These groups often have members or volunteers who are trained in damage assessment and can make first and ongoing assessments. For example, the Red Cross has extensive experience in reporting damage to homes and numbers of people evacuated and in shelters.

● Community leaders: Trusted leaders who have their own neighborhood network or work with community-based organizations with networks into the community can be a valuable source of on-the-ground information.

● First informers: These are the individuals in the disaster site with the wherewithal to collect information and images and to communicate that information and those images by cell phone, handheld device, or laptop.

● New media: These include blogs (weblogs), Google Earth, Google Maps, wikis (Wikipedia), SMS (text messaging postings like Twitter), Flickr, Picasa (photo survey sites), and YouTube (video sharing sites).

● Online news sites: These are aggregates of community news, information, and opinions.

● Traditional media: Television, radio, and newspaper reporters, editors, and news producers can be good sources of information, especially if they have deployed news crews to the disaster area before or just after a disaster strikes.

Having identified the potential information sources in your area, you must reach out to these sources to develop a working partnership and to put in place whatever protocols and technologies are needed to accept information from these sources. It is important that all potential sources of information understand what types of information you need from any situation so they are looking for the specific information you need to make decisions. Government response agencies and voluntary agencies practicing NIMS and ICS will know what information to collect. You must reach out to the nongovernmental,

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nontraditional information sources before the next disaster to let them know what infor- mation you need and how to communicate that information to you.

Here are some ideas for developing these working partnerships with nongovernmen- tal, nontraditional information sources:

● Build neighborhood communications networks. Partner with community-based organizations, churches, and neighborhood associations to build neighborhood communications networks. Local residents can be trained in information collection, maybe as part of Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) training, and local community leaders can be entrusted to collect this information and forward it to emergency officials. These networks could also be used to send messages from emergency officials to neighborhood residents through trusted community leaders.

● Create and distribute a disaster information protocol for first informers. List what information you will be seeking over the course of a disaster response, and get this list out to the public. Make sure they know where to e-mail or post the information and images they collect.

● Establish a point of contact within your organization for information sources. Designate staff who will work with information sources during a disaster and are accessible.

● Create an electronic portal for information from the field. Wikis and weblogs (blogs) can accept and aggregate comments from users; set up a Twitter website that can be updated via text messages, and create a homepage on YouTube and Flickr.

● Include first informers and traditional and new media outlets in disaster response training and exercises. Incorporate these information sources into your disaster exercises to identify issues and gaps and to update plans accordingly. Media are not always included in exercises, and neither are first informers, but by including these groups in your exercises, you make the exercise more authentic and you create an opportunity to identify difficult issues prior to facing them in the next disasters so you can make appropriate adjustments. It is also a chance to get to know one another.

● Meet with traditional and new media types on a regular basis, which is another way to create personal relationships with these critical partners in any disaster response.

● Include information sources in your after-action debriefs. Their perspectives and experiences can be used to update plans and operations.

Many of these information sources can be identified as part of hazard mitigation and preparedness campaigns. Working relationships can be developed during these nondi- saster periods that will facilitate information collection and flow in disaster response.

Information Going Out

If information coming in is the basis for disaster communication, then information going out is the goal. Timely and accurate information can save lives in disaster response and

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in hazard mitigation and preparedness programs. In getting information to the public, you must use all available communications mechanisms, including the following:

● Traditional media: television, radio, newspapers, and the Internet ● New media: post new information on community websites, blogs, wikis, and bulletin

boards; share timely photos and video online, and tell traditional media that online outlets are being updated routinely

● Neighborhood communications networks: trusted community leaders who go door to door

Historically , emergency officials have disseminated disaster information to the tradi- tional media by means of press conferences, briefings, tours of the disaster site, one-on- one interviews with disaster officials, press releases, situation reports, and postings on the Internet. Radio actualities, photographs, and videotapes have also been provided to traditional media. In major disasters, emergency management agencies have used sat- ellite uplinks and video and audio press conferences to reach traditional media outlets across large sections of the country.

Disseminating information through new media outlets is something new for emer- gency officials and will require patience and understanding of how these new media function with their audiences. Most of this work can occur during nondisaster periods. This is the time to learn more about Wikipedia, Twitter, blogs, Flickr, Facebook, YouTube, and social networking sites and to discover how you as an emergency manager can best use these new media to deliver preparedness and hazard mitigation messages as well as communicate with their target audiences in the disaster response and recovery phases.

Prior to the next disaster you might consider the following:

● Start a blog. Get your message out there about the risks your community faces; how community members can take action to reduce those risks and protect their families, homes, and businesses; how to prepare for the next disaster; when to evacuate and how; what will happen when your organization responds; and how members of your community can become first informers.

● Create a bulletin board. This could serve as a link to community leaders involved in hazard mitigation and preparedness programs in the neighborhoods and could be accessed by all community members before, during, and after a disaster.

● Get on Wikipedia. Load preparedness and hazard mitigation information and links for more information on the site. Understand that this site will grow with information added by readers.

● Start a YouTube site. Include “ how-to ” videos on how to disaster-proof your home, office, and business. Post videos that explain how to survive the next disaster (how much water and food to have on hand, where to go for information).

● Create a Google Map. Include the locations of designated shelters and evacuation routes.

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In August 2009, FEMA announced that its Public Affairs Office would be aggressively engaging in the use of new media in its response and recovery communications. See the FEMA press release at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id � 49302 .

USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA TOOLS AT FEMA

Social media tools are increasingly more engaged and important in crisis management informatics. These Internet and mobile-based tools offer like-minded (and mutually interested) social communities a locality-based, sector-based, incident-based platform for exchange of potentially lifesaving information.

WHY FEMA IS INVOLVED IN SOCIAL MEDIA FEMA is engaged in the expanding world of Web 2.0 communications specifically through its use of existing social media tools and through incorporating compatibility into its website and communications strategies. These tools provide opportunities to communicate directly with stakeholders, partners, the general public, and the media officially and rapidly as part of the next generation of online communications. FEMA’s venture into social media is being coordinated through its office of External Affairs and provides supplemental products to enhance current outreach objectives.

FEMA ’s goals with social media are to provide timely and accurate information related to disaster preparedness response and recovery; to present a human, public face to the agency; to provide the public with transparency into the agency’s operations; and to engage in a public dialogue that provides the appropriate forum for internal and external voices. External Affairs ’ social media ventures function as a supplemental outreach and appropriate channels for unofficial input.

FEMA External Affairs has been pragmatically adapting its communications efforts to include social media since June 2008. FEMA External Affairs, in coordination with the FEMA Office of Chief Counsel, was one of the first federal agencies to achieve a modified user agreement with Google in May 2008, providing a working example for other federal agencies. It also broke new ground for a federal agency through its use of Twitter to host the first all- access “ press conference ” through the tool. For the Twitter event, FEMA set new ground rules for federal engagement and provided its results online in a move to usher in full transparency ( http://www.fema.gov/media/2009/010909.shtm ) behind federal social media exchanges.

HOW FEMA IS INVOLVED FEMA is expanding its use of Web 2.0 tools to distribute external products by adapting existing information to current standards and applications. This includes direct text-based communications as well as broad-scope visual products that can be shared across platforms.

All off-network accounts (outside of the FEMA.gov domain) for FEMA social media carry the femainfocus look and feel. This provides consistency and accountability for nonnetwork content in that the public and our partners can rest assured it is the authorized FEMA account and that the information is accurate.

Starting with YouTube as a platform to host and share videos, FEMA began capturing stories from disaster response and recovery efforts to explain the scope of its mission. Videos have ranged in subject from preparedness, response, and recovery to mitigation and explanations

Chapter 5 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications 157

of how specific federal aid programs operate. The subjects, or voices, have been FEMA staff, state and local authorities, and individuals who have been affected by disasters. The approach to these Web videos is to capture the voice and perspective of the community involved in a disaster and present it as an opportunity to help educate others on FEMA’s mission and programs.

FEMA has been using Twitter ( www.twitter.com/femainfocus ) since October 2008 as a means of providing information about the agency’s mission, efforts, and perspective. The agency also launched its YouTube page ( www.youtube.com/fema ) in October 2008 to provide stories about how its programs work in communities nationwide as they prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters.

SPECIFIC SOCIAL MEDIA TOOLS Apart from efforts on third-party social networking sites, FEMA continues to grow its use of Web 2.0 tools to improve content on the agency’s website. The official FEMA website ( www .FEMA.gov ) is currently undergoing a redesign of its multimedia site to enable better graphic display and end-user functionality. The new multimedia site replaces the agency’s online “ Radio Network ” with Podcast capabilities, video sharing, and other standard social media functions being integrated as part of this redesign. This builds on the mission to provide timely and accurate information in a format that can be easily transferred among public and private networks. By doing so, FEMA will have a greater opportunity to prepare the nation for disasters and provide information during disaster response and recoveries.

FEMA also promotes transparent communication and collaboration using e-mail and Web 2.0 technologies that allow any visitor to the FEMA website to register to receive updates across 86 important topic areas. Sign-up options are promoted on the homepage and across the website with “ subscribe ” links functioning like “ add to cart ” links might in the private sector. The site also provides robust collaboration with 15-plus other agencies using a Web 2.0 mash-up.

FEMA has also engaged in beta-tests , monitored, developed, and activated multiple third- party tools, including the following:

• YouTube: This is a video service that gives FEMA the opportunity to tell timely and accurate stories about its mission. Recently, the FEMA channel ( www.youtube.com/fema ) was used to help state partners host and share public service announcements and explain federal reimbursement processes and mitigation efforts local to specifi c communities. These short videos provide access to the overall operation and offer an opportunity for the voices within the community to explain how programs affect, or don’t affect, their lives.

• Twitter: This microblog gives FEMA the opportunity to direct followers and users of the tool to specifi c information in a timely manner, such as during emergencies and disasters. Current followers of FEMA’s account ( www.twitter.com/femainfocus ) are from the emergency management community, the media, and the general public. Twitter provides SMS capability for instant texting during disasters, and FEMA also uses Twitter to supplement the efforts of state and local responders by rebroadcasting, or “ retweeting, ” posts from these partners. FEMA uses Twitter to engage the general public in discussions on disaster preparedness, recovery processes, and mitigation tools.

• Widgets: Widgets provide data feeds through transportable well-defi ned Web-based graphical interfaces. This is akin to a “ box score ” anyone can put on a website they use that

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is fed data from sources we defi ne. Earlier this year, DHS launched a widget on its site that provided a feed of FEMA’s response and recovery information related to Hurricane Gustav ( http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/programs/gc_1220128923561.shtm ). FEMA External Affairs has developed widgets for similar data. Current widgets can be found at http://www .fema.gov/help/widgets/ike_index.shtm . The real value of a widget is to provide specifi c, localized data in a specifi c reporting cycle for non-FEMA.gov sites to incorporate into their informational products. One example would be a “ box score ” of public assistance applicants for infrastructure projects and money disbursed related to a specifi c disaster that is updated automatically through validated internal sources and presented through a widget on a local newspaper or TV station’s website.

• RSS: FEMA currently offers national-level RSS feeds that provide subscribers with automated updated information ( http://www.fema.gov/help/rss.shtm ). Apart from press release and disaster declaration information, subscribers can receive notifi cations on the issuance of new situation reports and photographs added to the offi cial FEMA photolibrary.

• Google Books: FEMA has been working with Google Books to provide its published content in a free, easy-to-access format online. FEMA currently offers publications on preparedness, mitigation, and its recovery programs in hard copy through its distribution warehouse. FEMA will be able to provide this content and future content on a broader scale by leveraging the technology and networking platform that Google provides.

RECENT EXAMPLES FEMA has recently been using its social media tools to tell the complex story of its mission and to personalize the delivery of aid it provides to American communities. One topic of focus has been the debris removal issue along the Texas Gulf Coast following Hurricane Ike. Media reports slammed the agency for a perceived sluggish response. In truth, debris removal can be a fairly complex issue involving many factors and levels of government and private sector involvement, which means it takes time, money, and a lot of planning.

FEMA External Affairs captured some of these stories on video and played the vignettes online to help demystify the process. One vignette, “ Working Dog Searches for Missing in Bolivar Debris, ” focused on the Texas-based fire and rescue team performing searches for human remains among the debris. Told honestly and with dignity by the local team lead, the short video achieved several important goals: It explained FEMA’s commitment to the families affected by the storm, depicted how we work with state and local partners, and showed the complexity of debris removal following major disasters.

Since its upload to the FEMA YouTube channel on December 19, more than 879 individuals have watched the “ Working Dog ” video. Overall, FEMA’s YouTube site counts new subscribers every day, and currently 17,644 individuals have logged on to view the 60 videos currently playing. These individuals can further play the videos by embedding them on their websites.

On Twitter, another social media tool that we use, comments have been positive to the videos in general. In fact, other users are promoting their presence from time to time as the subject matter relates to their interest. In regards to the specific video, one user not affiliated with the agency promoted it among his own network, saying, “ A grave and serious video about missing people from Hurricane Ike: http://is.gd/cOrC . FEMA is important. ”

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When the next disaster strikes, consider the following:

● Regular updates on your blog give you the opportunity to provide a direct link to members of your community. Include time in your schedule to get interactive and answer questions and inquiries.

● Regular updates on your bulletin board also give you the opportunity to talk directly to members of the community and another chance to get interactive.

● Review and update Wikipedia . Place your information in the Wikipedia file on the disaster, and keep it regularly updated. Update disaster aid and shelter information, links to missing persons sites, correct inaccurate information, and confront rumors.

● Post on YouTube videos from informational briefings from affected neighborhoods and appeals for help.

● Update Google Maps to show locations of open shelters and hospitals. ● Display on Google Earth the locations of affected areas.

Maintain and regularly update all of these sites during the recovery phase.

Messengers

The person who delivers the messages plays a critical role in disaster communications. The messenger puts a human face on disaster response and is critical to building confi- dence in the public that people will be helped and their community will recover. Public information officers (PIOs) regularly deliver information and messages to the media and the public. However, the primary face of the disaster response should be an elected or appointed official (i.e., mayor, governor, county administrator, city manager) or the direc- tor of the emergency management agency or both. These individuals bring a measure

THE WAY AHEAD More collaborative tools and deeper integration of social networking practices into FEMA’s communications plan will help it achieve its mission to help the nation prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters. FEMA is also looking toward integrating new media or Web 2.0 practices into its public communications through such functions as online GIS data and automated feeds for disaster-specific information.

Concurrently , FEMA is working to implement social media tools to enhance internal collaboration. Organizational plans for internal communications focus on awareness and education for employees as well as facilitating dialogue. As FEMA continues to develop its capabilities to communicate in new methods that leverage social networks, the focus of these messages will continue to be in line with the agency’s mission of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation for all hazards.

Source : FEMA social media Fact Sheet, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/hazard/hurricane/2009/social_media_ factsheet.pdf

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of authority to their role as messenger and, in the case of the emergency management director, someone who is in charge of response and recovery operations.

The public wants to hear from an authority figure, and the media wants to know that the person they are talking to is the one making the decisions. Elected officials who served as successful messengers in recent disasters include California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger during the 2007 Southern California wildfires, New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani during the September 11 attacks, Florida governor Jeb Bush during the four hurricanes that struck Florida in 2004, and Oklahoma governor Frank Keating during the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.

Successful emergency managers who served as messengers include former FEMA director James Lee Witt and California Office of Emergency Services director Dick Andrews in the 1994 Northridge Earthquake and Craig Fugate with the Florida Division of Emergency Management during recent hurricanes, tornadoes, and wildfires in Florida. Witt and former president Clinton worked very well together in delivering messages con- cerning federal relief programs in numerous disasters in the 1990s.

Prior to the next disaster, each emergency management agency should determine if an elected or appointed official will serve as the primary messenger alone or in tandem with the emergency agency director. It is best to work out in advance what types of infor- mation will be delivered by which messenger. Protocols for briefing books and situational updates should be developed. A determination should be made as to who will lead press briefings and news conferences, who will be available to the media for one-on-one inter- views, and who will be involved in communicating with the new media outlets. Again, all of these activities can be shared by the elected/appointed official and the emergency agency director.

Emergency management agencies should also designate appropriate senior manag- ers who will be made available to both the traditional and new media to provide specific information on their activities and perspective. This is helpful in even the smallest disas- ter when persons with expertise in specific facets of the response can be very helpful in delivering disaster response information and messages.

Staffing

Not many emergency management agencies have a single communications special- ist, much less a communications staff. Federal agencies such as FEMA, DHS, HHS, and others involved in disasters have extensive communications staff. Most state emergency management operations have at least a communications director. The depth of staff sup- port for communications varies widely. Emergency management agencies in major cities in the United States often have communications directors and in some cases extensive communications staff. Small to midsize cities and communities are unlikely to have a communications director or staff.

The time has come for all organizations involved in emergency management to establish an ongoing communications staff capability. For agencies in small to midsized

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communities, this may require enlisting help from the local government’s communica- tions staff. One way to do this is to provide funding for a percentage of this individual’s time each month. In this way communications activities required during nondisaster periods could be acquired on a consistent basis. This will also allow for the local govern- ment communications staff and director to become better informed of the emergency management agency’s activities and be better prepared to work with the emergency agency director during disaster response and recovery.

For large cities and federal and voluntary agencies with existing communications staff, it is now a matter of reordering priorities to meet the demands of working with the new media. Staff will be required to establish and maintain working relationships with new media outlets and to interact with the various blogs, bulletin boards, social networking sites, and other new media outlets that serve their community. At a minimum, there should be one designated staff person on the communications staff who is responsible for the day- to-day interactions with new media. Additional staff should be made available in a major disaster to work with these groups.

The new media designated staff would also work with new media outlets in promot- ing hazard mitigation and preparedness campaigns in the community and serve as the staff support for the establishment and maintenance of neighborhood communications networks working with trusted leaders in the community.

Training and Exercises

An effective disaster communications operation requires well-trained messengers and staff and should be a vital part of all disaster exercises. Elected/appointed officials, agency directors, and public information officers should all receive formal media training in order to become comfortable working with the media to communicate disaster messages to the public. Media training provides methods for communicating a message effectively, tech- niques for fielding difficult questions, and the opportunity to practice delivery outside the crucible of a crisis. If possible, media training should be provided to senior staff who may appear in the media.

Staff training should come in several forms, including the following:

● Media relations — learning how to work with traditional and new media, including meeting deadlines, responding to inquiries, scheduling interviews, understanding what types of information each media outlet requires, and learning how a news operation works.

● New media — learning what a blog is, how social networking works, and how to establish and maintain a neighborhood communications network.

● Marketing — learning how to pitch a story idea for a preparedness program or hazard mitigation project to all forms of media, how to develop supporting materials for preparedness and hazard mitigation campaigns, and how to evaluate the effectiveness of such efforts.

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Communications operations must always be included in future disaster exercises. It is highly recommended that these exercises include reporters from traditional media out- lets and representatives from the new media, including bloggers and online news sites. Working with new media and online news sites should be included in the exercise, such as updating and correcting a Wikipedia site and posting information on a community bulletin board. Community leaders involved in neighborhood communications networks should also be included in the exercise.

Monitor, Update, and Adapt

Staff should be assigned to regularly monitor all media outlets. Summaries of news sto- ries in the traditional media should be compiled regularly. Staff should routinely monitor new media outlets and provide regular summaries of news on these sites. This activity is especially important during a disaster response. Through monitoring, the media staff is capable of identifying problems and issues early in the process and can shape commu- nications strategies to address these issues before they become big problems. This is also an opportunity to identify trends in how information flows through the media to the pub- lic and to identify areas for improvement in message development and delivery. Regular monitoring will identify rumors and misinformation and speed corrections.

The information collected as part of monitoring activities can be used to update com- munications plans, strategies, and tactics. This data can be used to determine how to allocate staff resources and to update training and exercise programs. Emergency man- agement agencies must be constantly on the lookout for emerging communications tech- nologies and opportunities.

Conclusion Whether dealing with the media, the public, or partners, effective communication is a critical element of emergency management. Media relations should be open and coop- erative; the information stream must be managed to provide a consistent, accurate mes- sage; and officials need to be proactive about telling their own story before it is done for them.

A customer service approach is essential to communicating with the public, a collab- orative approach should be taken to promoting programs, and great care should be given as to how and when risk is communicated to citizens. Multiple agencies and unclear lines of responsibility make communications among partners a challenge; political skill and acumen are needed to overcome such hurdles.

The changing shape of emergency management in the coming years will demand that communications take a larger role in all emergency operations and programming. Incorporating new media forms and functions into communications plans and strategies and adapting to new technologies will be the order of the day for all emergency manage- ment agencies. Emergency officials can no longer avoid communicating with the media

Chapter 5 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Communications 163

and the public. Emergency agencies must accept the expanded role of communications in all four phases of emergency management and embrace it as a valuable tool in meet- ing the needs of the public.

Important Terms

Disaster communications strategy Joint Information Center New media Situation report

Self-Check Questions

1. What is the mission of an effective disaster communications strategy? 2. What are the five critical assumptions of an effective disaster communications

strategy? 3. What are some of the ways FEMA director James Lee Witt exhibited his commitment

to effective communications? 4. What is the goal of a media partnership? 5. Name and describe six basic emergency management audiences. 6. What three factors do DHS and its state and local partners need to address to

improve its communications with the American people? 7. What communications media have traditionally been used to communicate disaster

information? 8. Name several types of new media, and describe how they have been used in recent

years in communicating disaster information. 9. What role have “ first informers ” come to play in disaster communications? 10. List and summarize the seven elements of an effective disaster communications

capability.

Out-of-Class Exercises

1. Using the Internet, the library, or another information source, print out three different articles that describe the same disaster event. Compare the three articles to determine which provides the most useful information to the reader in terms of immediate response and recovery information.

2. Go to your state office of emergency management’s website. Print out disaster preparedness and mitigation guidance provided on that site. Critique this information with regards to how useful it is to you personally and to the members of your community.

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The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response

What You’ll Learn ● The roles and responsibilities of local first responders and emergency managers ● How states are involved in emergency management ● The contribution of volunteer organizations to disaster response efforts ● What the Incident Command System (ICS) is, and how it functions ● The presidential disaster declaration process ● How the federal government provides assistance in the aftermath of a declared

disaster ● The National Response Framework, its affiliated agencies, and how it functions

Introduction When a disaster event such as a flood, earthquake, or hurricane occurs, the first respond- ers to this event are always local police, fire, and emergency medical personnel. Their job is to rescue and attend to those injured, suppress fires, secure and police the disaster area, and begin the process of restoring order. They are supported in this effort by local emergency management personnel and community government officials.

If the size of the disaster event is so large that the capabilities of local responders are overwhelmed and the costs of the damage inflicted exceeds the capacity of the local gov- ernment, the mayor or county executive will turn to the governor and state government for assistance in responding to the event and in helping the community to recover. The gover- nor will turn to the state’s emergency management agency and possibly the state National Guard and other state resources to provide this assistance to the stricken community.

If the governor decides that, based on information generated by community and state officials, the size of the disaster event exceeds the state’s capacity to respond, the gover- nor will make a formal request to the president for a presidential major disaster decla- ration. This request is prepared by state officials in cooperation with regional staff from FEMA. The governor’s request is analyzed first by the FEMA regional office and then for- warded to FEMA headquarters in Washington, D.C. FEMA headquarters staff review and evaluate the governor’s request and forward their analysis and recommendation to the president. The president considers FEMA’s recommendation and then makes a decision to grant the declaration or turn it down.

6

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In January 2008, FEMA introduced the National Response Framework (NRF) “ to ensure that government executives, private sector and nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, and emergency management practitioners across the nation understand the domestic incident response roles, responsibilities and relationships in order to respond more effectively to any type of incident ” (FEMA, 2008). The NRF superseded the National Response Plan that had been adopted by FEMA in December 2004 and amended in May 2006. The National Response Plan (NRP) was developed in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorists attacks and superseded the Federal Response Plan (FRP) that had guided the federal government’s response to disaster since the early 1990s.

If the president grants a major disaster declaration, federal government departments and agencies involved in the response effort would follow the guidance provided in the National Response Framework in working with state and local officials, emergency man- agers, nongovernmental groups, and the private sector. The presidential declaration also makes available several disaster assistance programs through FEMA and other federal agencies designed to assist individuals and communities to begin the process of rebuild- ing their homes, their community infrastructure, and their lives (see the Columbia Space Shuttle case study).

CASE STUDY: THE SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA DISASTER

On February 1, 2003, as the space shuttle Columbia reentered the earth’s atmosphere following a successful space mission, it suddenly began to break apart, showering debris over an area of hundreds of square miles in east Texas and western Louisiana. President Bush issued emergency declarations for Texas and Louisiana in the absence of requests for assistance from either governor, as the shuttle craft was considered federal property. Within hours, federal and state agencies had deployed teams to the disaster area to assist local fire, law enforcement, and emergency management authorities already on-site. More than 60 agencies, including public and private groups, responded with personnel, supplies, and equipment. Disaster field offices (DFOs) were opened at Barksdale Air Force Base in Los Angeles, California, and in Lufkin, Texas, and a satellite DFO was established in Fort Worth, Texas. The Lufkin DFO was the regional center of all search-related operations. This was the first major response performed by the newly created Department of Homeland Security.

As this was a federally declared disaster, FEMA was in charge of FRP coordination, and it also coordinated the response and recovery operations. NASA, with the assistance of the Texas Forest Service (TFS), the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and many other groups, supervised the search for shuttle material. The EPA’s role was to assist FEMA and NASA by conducting environmental monitoring and assisting in the cleanup of hazardous materials from Columbia . EPA experts from across the country were mobilized to help local, county, and state officials protect public health and the environment, as well as to assist officials in recovering materials from communities and providing for safe transport of these materials to secure locations.

From the onset, the agencies ’ priorities were threefold: ensure public safety, retrieve evidence — pieces of the shuttle that ultimately could determine the cause of the tragedy —

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 167

and reimburse expenses of state and local governments and private citizens who may have sustained property damage as a result of the accident and search. NASA quickly identified potential hazardous materials, such as tanks containing toxic substances or unexploded pyrotechnic devices, and once found, the material was secured by the EPA. The EPA also worked with state and local authorities to clear school campuses and public access areas, and it tested air and water samples taken along the flight path for shuttle contaminates. Using the resources of the Emergency Response and Removal Service (ERRS) contractors and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Gulf Strike Team, the EPA found no evidence of hazardous material in the atmosphere or drinking water supplies. Early in the recovery effort, teams from NASA, the FBI, the National Guard, Urban Search and Rescue (US & R) organizations, the Department of Public Safety, and others conducted a successful search in Texas to recover and bring home the bodies of Columbia ’s crew.

Three days after the accident, local fire and police departments, volunteers, Texas Department of Public Safety officers (DPS), Louisiana State Police, and EPA, USFS, TFS, and National Guard units from Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and New Mexico began clearing shuttle debris in high-traffic areas. A one-page set of guidelines prepared by the state of Texas, NASA, and the EPA enabled the teams to collect, document, tag, and transport nonhazardous debris without prior EPA or NASA clearance. These initial teams ended their search operations on February 17. The TFS, under the direction of NASA, now assumed responsibility for search activities in the field, which involved extensive air and ground searches in a 10-mile by 240- mile corridor along the projected shuttle flight path. The TFS — through the Texas Interagency Coordination Center — called upon experienced management and firefighting crews from across the nation and Puerto Rico. The air operations, managed by TFS, included up to 36 helicopters and 10 fixed-wing aircraft. Also involved in the air search but not managed by TFS were motorized paragliders, an ER-2 (similar to the U-2), a specially equipped DC-3, and the Civil Air Patrol (CAP), among others. Volunteers put in more than 800 search-days of flying in the weeks just after the accident and covered the flight corridor area west of Fort Worth to the New Mexico border. The USFS, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, along with state forestry organizations and contractors, provided the greatest number of crews, drawing from their expertise in wildland firefighting. More than 4,000 people at a time searched 12 hours a day, seven days a week. Camp crews were stationed at sites near Hemphill, Nacogdoches, Palestine, and Corsicana, with a goal of finding as much material as possible before spring vegetation growth made the search more difficult.

The U.S. Navy supervised the water search activities in Lake Nacogdoches and Toledo Bend Reservoir, located at the eastern end of the 2,400-square-mile search area. Beginning on February 22, 60 divers from the Navy, USCG, EPA, DPS, Houston and Galveston police and fire departments, and Jasper County Sheriff’s department combed the lakes using sophisticated sonar-equipped boats to help identify shuttle material. As in any operation of this magnitude, the hazards for all the searchers were challenging. Ground crews slogged through mud, dense vegetation, and rocky areas; faced wild hogs, snakes, and other wild animals; and dealt with the ever-changing weather. Divers reckoned with the murky waters of the Texas lakes, along with underwater forests and various submerged hazards.

Ground and air operations covered over 1.5 million acres, mostly in Texas, with searches also conducted in Louisiana, California, Utah, Nevada, and New Mexico. Over 82,500 shuttle

168 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

In the 1990s, the emergency management system in the United States was tested repeatedly by major disaster events such as the 1993 Midwest floods; the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake; and a series of devastating hurricanes and tornadoes. In each instance, the system worked to bring the full resources of the federal, state, and local governments to produce the most comprehensive and effective response possible. The system also leveraged the capabilities and resources of America’s cadre of volunteer orga- nizations to provide immediate food and shelter. In recent years, government officials and agencies at all levels have begun to reach out to the business community to both leverage their response capabilities and to work closer with them in the recovery effort ( Figure 6-1 ).

The September 11 terrorist attacks have caused all levels of government to reevalu- ate response procedures and protocols. The unusual loss of so many first responders to this disaster event has resulted in numerous after-action evaluations that have led to

FIGURE 6-1 Eagle, Alaska, July 27, 2009. Don and Judy Mann’s house in Eagle, Alaska, was pushed 300 feet off its foundation by ice and floodwaters this past spring. They are rebuilding through the assistance of FEMA and volunteers. Ben Brennan/FEMA.

items were recovered and processed by the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, weighing 84,800 pounds and amounting almost 40 percent of the total weight of Columbia . The total cost of the search and recovery operation amounted to $161,945,000. These funds include costs associated with the ground, air, and water search operations; equipment; and personnel. FEMA Public Assistance, working through Texas and Louisiana, reimbursed the two states approximately $4.5 million for their efforts. FEMA turned over control of the recovery operation to NASA on April 30. The same day, NASA opened the Columbia Recovery Operation (CRO) office at the Johnson Space Center in Houston. FEMA closed the Disaster Field Office in Lufkin, Texas, on May 10.

Source : www.fema.gov .

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 169

changes in the procedures and protocols for first responders in the future. Additionally, the possibility of future terrorist attacks has focused attention on how best to protect first responders from harm in future attacks. These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 9.

The botched response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 resulted in a reexamination of how all parties should work together when responding to a catastrophic disaster. Numerous after- action reports were prepared by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the White House, resulting in FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security crafting the National Response Framework and embracing the national Incident Management System (NIMS) as the backbone for coordinating the response to major disasters by federal, state, and local government;, voluntary and nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector.

CASE STUDY: THE RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

By all accounts, the response to Hurricane Katrina was a failure on all levels. According to the White House Report, “ The response to Hurricane Katrina fell far short of the seamless, coordinated effort that had been envisioned by President Bush when he ordered the creation of the National Response Plan in February 2003 ” (Townsend, 2006). The Senate report found that “ the suffering … continued longer than it should have because of — and in some cases exacerbated by — the failure of government at all levels to plan, prepare for, and respond aggressively to the storm. These failures were not just conspicuous; they were pervasive ” (Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006). The report concludes that “ among the many factors that contributed to these failures, the Committee found that there were four overarching ones:

1. Long-term warnings went unheeded, and government officials neglected their duties to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe.

2. Government officials took insufficient actions or made poor decisions in the days immediately before and after landfall.

3. Systems on which officials relied on to support their response efforts failed. 4. Government officials at all levels failed to provide effective leadership ” (Senate Committee

on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006).

The report prepared by the House of Representatives crafted 13 findings based on their review of the response:

• “ The accuracy and timeliness of National Weather Service and National Hurricane Center forecasts prevented further loss of life.

• The Hurricane Pam exercise refl ected recognition by all levels of government of the dangers of a Category 4 or 5 hurricane striking New Orleans.

• Levees protecting New Orleans were not built for the most severe hurricanes. • The failure of complete evacuations led to preventable deaths, great suffering, and further

delays in relief. • Critical elements of the National Response Plan were executed late, ineffectively, or not at all. • DHS and the states were not prepared for this catastrophic event. • Massive communications damage and a failure to adequately plan for alternatives impaired

response efforts, command and control, and situational awareness.

170 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

• Command and control was impaired at all levels, delaying relief. • The military played an invaluable role, but coordination was lacking. • The collapse of local law enforcement and lack of effective public communications led to

civil unrest and further delayed relief. • Medical care and evacuations suffered from a lack of advance preparations, inadequate

communications, and diffi culties coordinating efforts. • Long-standing weaknesses and the magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed FEMA’s ability to

provide emergency shelter and temporary housing. • FEMA logistics and contracting systems did not support a targeted, massive, and sustained

provision of commodities. • Contributions by charitable organizations assisted many in need, but the American Red

Cross and others faced challenges due to the size of the mission, inadequate logistics capacity, and a disorganized shelter process ” (Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 2006).

In summary, these reports found that the government response lacked leadership at the top, was unprepared, operated on poor information and situational awareness, was poorly coordinated, and was incapable of communicating among the various responding agencies and with the general public. All of these factors added up to the confusion, violence, and suffering documented in the first weeks by the media and witnessed by billions across the globe.

FIGURE 6-2 New Orleans, LA, February 24, 2006. FEMA contractors remove debris created by Hurricane Katrina from the lower 9th ward. Crews continue collecting wreckage throughout the neighborhood as more people return to rebuild New Orleans. Robert Kaufmann/FEMA.

This chapter describes how local, state, and federal government officials and their part- ners respond to disasters in this country. The chapter includes sections discussing local response, state response, volunteer group response, the Incident Command System and the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Framework, and communications among responding agencies.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 171

Local Response Minor disasters occur daily in communities around the United States. Local fire, police, and emergency medical personnel respond to these events usually in a systematic and well-planned course of action. Firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical techni- cians respond to the scene. Their job is to secure the scene and maintain order, rescue and treat the injured, contain and suppress fire or hazardous conditions, and retrieve the dead.

The types of minor disasters responded to at the community level include hazardous materials transportation and storage incidents, fires, and localized flooding. Local offi- cials are also the first responders to major disaster events such as large floods, hurricanes, and major earthquakes, but in these instances, their efforts are supported, upon request by community leaders, by state government and, by request of the governor and approval of the president, by the federal government.

The actions of local first responders are driven by procedures and protocols developed by the responding agency (i.e., fire, police, and emergency medical). Most communities in the United States have developed communitywide emergency plans that incorporate these procedures and protocols. These community emergency plans also identify roles and responsibilities for all responding agencies and personnel for a wide range of disas- ter scenarios. The plans include copies of the statutory authorities that provide the legal backing for emergency operations in the community.

In the aftermath of 9/11, many communities reviewed and reworked their community emergency plans to include procedures and protocols for responding to all forms of ter- rorist attacks, including bioterrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA has required that all state and local emergency responders be trained in the Incident Command System (ICS) and become NIMS compliant. In March 2009, FEMA published “ Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Operations Plans ” ( Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 ). This is the latest in a series of preparedness guides authored by the federal govern- ment in the past 50 years. According to FEMA, “ The FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide, CPG 101, provides general guidelines on developing emergency operations plans (EOPs). It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of planning and decision making to help emergency planners examine a hazard and produce integrated, coordinated, and synchronized plans. This guide helps emergency managers in state, ter- ritorial, local, and tribal governments in their efforts to develop and maintain a viable all- hazard EOP ” (FEMA, 2009).

Local Emergency Managers

It is usually the responsibility of the designated local emergency manager to develop and maintain the community emergency plans. This individual often holds one or more other positions in local government, such as fire or police chief, and serves only part-time as the community’s emergency manager. The profession of local emergency management has been maturing since the 1980s. There are now more opportunities for individuals to receive

172 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

formal training in emergency management in the United States. Currently, more than 170 junior college, undergraduate, and graduate programs offer courses and degrees in emer- gency management and related fields. Additionally, FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute (EMI) located in Emmitsburg, Maryland, offers emergency management courses on campus and through distance learning programs. EMI has also worked closely with junior colleges, colleges and universities, and graduate schools to develop coursework and curriculums in emergency management. More information on EMI and other emergency management education programs can be found in Chapter 4.

More and more communities have designated emergency managers responsible for guiding response and recovery operations. Training and education programs in emer- gency management are expanding dramatically, resulting in a growing number of profes- sionally trained and certified local emergency managers. The maturing of this profession can only lead to more effective and efficient local responses to future disaster events.

State Response Each of the 50 states and six territories that constitute the United States maintains a state government office of emergency management. Funding for state emergency management offices comes principally from FEMA and state budgets. For years, FEMA has provided up to $175 million annually to states to fund state and local government emergency manage- ment activities. This money is used by state emergency management agencies to hire staff, conduct training and exercises, and purchase equipment. A segment of this funding is tar- geted for local emergency management operations as designated by the state. State budgets also provide funding for emergency management operations, but this funding historically has been inconsistent, especially in those states with minimal annual disaster activity.

The principal resource available to governors in responding to a disaster event in their state is the National Guard. The resources of the National Guard that can be used in disaster response include personnel, communications systems and equipment, air and road transport, heavy construction and earth-moving equipment, mass care and feeding equipment, and emergency supplies such as beds, blankets, and medical supplies.

In early 2007, with the passing of the John Warner National Defense Reauthorization Act (PL 109-364), the authority of governors to deploy the National Guard was severely eroded. In section 1076 of this Act, the president was given the authority to effectively commandeer total control of this invaluable response resource. It is believed that the pro- vision was a reaction to sentiments that the federal government should have taken over the response to the Katrina disaster and that the military would have been best suited to manage in that case. The NGA, an organization representing the interests of the leader- ship of all 50 states, immediately voiced their opposition to the inclusion of such a provi- sion in the legislation, as they felt it undermined their authority over the National Guard and therefore further limited their ability to ensure the safety of their constituents. The governors wrote, “ By granting the president specific authority to usurp the Guard during a natural disaster or emergency without the consent of a governor, Section 1076 could

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 173

result in confusion and an inability to respond to residents ’ needs because it calls into question whether a governor or the president has primary responsibility during a domes- tic emergency ” (NGA, 2007).

Response capabilities and capacities are strongest in those states and territories that experience high levels of annual disaster activity. North Carolina is one of those states with high risk of hurricanes and floods. How the North Carolina Department of Emergency Management describes its response process on its website provides an exam- ple of state response functions.

Volunteer Group Response Volunteer groups are on the front line of any disaster response. National groups such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army roster and maintain local chapters of volunteers who are trained in emergency response. These organizations work with local, state, and federal authorities to address the immediate needs of disaster victims. These organizations provide shelter, food, and clothing to disaster victims who have lost their homes to disasters large and small.

In addition to the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, numerous volunteer groups across the country provide aid and comfort to disaster victims. The National Volunteer Organizations Against Disasters (NVOAD) consists of 49 national member organizations, 52 state and territorial VOADs, and a growing number of local VOADs involved in disas- ter response and recovery operations around the country and abroad. Formed in 1970, NVOAD helps member groups at a disaster location to coordinate and communicate in order to provide the most efficient and effective response. A list of the NVOAD member organizations is provided.

Hurricane Katrina has changed the landscape in terms of the involvement of volun- tary agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector in disas- ter response. The size of Katrina required resources and capabilities beyond the usual government programs. The massive evacuation in advance of the hurricane created an extraordinary demand for shelters, medicine, food, and temporary housing ( Figure 6-3 ). NGOs and the private sector provided many of the support services to help Katrina vic- tims to get back on their feet. Over 5,000 children were separated from their parents in the evacuations, and the NGO National Center for Missing and Exploited Children helped to successfully reunite every one of them. The private sector helped to raise over $1 billion for the response and supported a number of activities not covered by government relief programs. For example, Chevron worked with the Early Childhood Institute at Mississippi State University and Save the Children to rebuild and resupply child care centers across the three Mississippi coastal counties.

Here is a list of NVOAD member organizations:

● Adventist Community Services ● American Baptist Men USA

174 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

● American Disaster Reserve ● American Radio Relay League ● American Red Cross ● America’s Second Harvest ● Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team ● Catholic Charities USA ● Center for International Disaster Information ● Christian Disaster Response ● Christian Reformed World Relief Committee ● Church of the Brethren Emergency Response ● Church World Service ● Churches of Scientology Disaster Response ● Convoy of Hope ● Disaster Psychiatry Outreach ● Episcopal Relief and Development ● Feed the Children ● Friends Disaster Service ● Hope Coalition America (Operation Hope) ● Humane Society of the United States ● International Aid ● International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (ICISF) ● International Relief and Development, Inc. (IRD) ● International Relief Friendship Foundation

FIGURE 6-3 New Orleans, LA, Sunday, August 28, 2005. People inside the Superdome, which is being used as a shelter during Hurricane Katrina. Marty Bahamonde/FEMA.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 175

● Lutheran Disaster Response ● Mennonite Disaster Services ● Mercy Medical Airlift ● National Association of Jewish Chaplains (NAJC) ● National Emergency Response Team ● National Organization for Victim Assistance ● Nazarene Disaster Response ● Northwest Medical Teams International Operation Blessing ● Operation Blessing ● The Phoenix Society for Burn Survivors ● Points of Light Foundation & National Volunteer Center Network ● The Presbyterian Church (USA) ● REACT International ● Salvation Army ● Samaritan’s Purse ● Save the Children ● Society of St. Vincent De Paul ● Southern Baptist Convention ● Tzu Chi Foundation ● United Church of Christ ● United Jewish Communities ● United Methodist Committee on Relief ● United Way of America ● Volunteers of America ● World Vision

Incident Command System A difficult issue in any response operation is determining who is in charge of the overall response effort. The Incident Command System (ICS) was developed after the 1970 fires in Southern California. Duplication of efforts, lack of coordination, and communication problems hindered all agencies responding to the expanding fires. The main function of ICS is to establish a set of planning and management systems that would help the agen- cies responding to a disaster to work together in a coordinated and systematic approach. The step-by-step process enables the numerous responding agencies to effectively use resources and personnel to respond to those in need ( Figure 6-4 ).

There are multiple functions in the ICS system. They include common use of terminol- ogy, integrated communications, a unified command structure, resource management, and action planning. A planned set of directives includes assigning one coordinator to manage the infrastructure of the response, assigning personnel, deploying equipment, obtaining resources, and working with the numerous agencies that respond to the disaster scene. In most instances the local fire chief or fire commissioner is the Incident Commander.

176 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

For the ICS to be effective, it must provide for effective operations at three levels of incident character: (1) single jurisdiction and/or single agency, (2) single jurisdiction with multiple agency support, and (3) multijurisdictional and/or multiagency support. The organizational structure must be adaptable to a wide variety of emergencies (i.e., fire, flood, earthquake, and rescue). The ICS includes agency autonomy, management by objec- tives, unity integrity, functional clarity, and effective span of control. The logistics, coor- dination, and ability of the multiple agencies to work together must adhere to the ICS so efficient leadership is maintained during the disaster. One of the most significant problems before the ICS was that agencies who would respond to major disasters would assign their own commander and there would be power struggles, miscommunication, and duplica- tion of efforts (Irwin, 1980).

There are five major management systems within the ICS: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance.

● The command section includes developing, directing, and maintaining communication and collaboration with the multiple agencies on site, working with the local officials, the public, and the media to provide up-to-date information regarding the disaster.

● The operations section handles the tactical operations, coordinates the command objectives, and organizes and directs all resources to the disaster site.

● The planning section provides the necessary information to the command center to develop the action plan to accomplish the objectives. This section also collects and evaluates information as it is made available.

● The logistics section provides personnel, equipment, and support for the Command Center. They handle the coordination of all services that are involved in the response,

FIGURE 6-4 Warren Grove, New Jersey, May 16, 2007. Firefighters being briefed at the Warren Park Incident Command Post. A fire management assistance declaration from FEMA was granted for the Warren Grove Fire burning in Burlington and Ocean Counties. The declaration triggers a way for federal funding to reimburse state and locals for firefighting efforts. It will allow firefighters to do what they need to do to protect people and property, and FEMA will help to cover the costs. Andrea Booher/FEMA.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 177

from locating rescue equipment to coordinating the response for volunteer organizations such as the Salvation Army and the Red Cross.

● The finance section is responsible for accounting for funds used during the response and recovery aspect of the disaster. This section monitors costs related to the incident and provides accounting procurement time recording cost analyses.

In today’s world, the public, private, and political values at risk in major emergen- cies demand the most efficient methods of response and management. Meeting this demand when multiple and diverse agencies are involved becomes a difficult task. The Unified Command concept of ICS offers a process that all participating agencies can use to improve overall management, whether their jurisdiction is of a geographical or func- tional nature (Irwin, 1980).

The Unified Command is best used when there is a multiagency response. Because of the nature of the disaster, multiple government agencies need to work together to moni- tor the response and manage the large number of personnel who respond to the scene ( Figure 6-5 ). It allows for the integration of the agencies to operate under one overall response management system.

FIGURE 6-5 Greensburg, Kansas, May 19, 2007. Twice-daily incident command briefings in the FEMA Emergency Operations Center keep relief organizations and government officials updated on progress. Representatives of 16 agencies are cooperating in the recovery effort from the May 4 tornado. Photo by Greg Henshall/FEMA.

PROCEDURES FOR AN INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

For an ICS to be effective, these procedures must be followed closely:

• A command post needs to be established. • Proper equipment, such as computers, radios, and telephone lines, need to be installed and

in working order.

178 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The Incident Commander (IC) prepares to delegate responsibilities as needed, to maintain focus on the overall situation. The IC needs to assign positions, such as debrief- ers, coordinators, and unit leaders, to manage the command center. As the response and recovery process proceeds, the IC needs to have an ongoing dialogue with staff and offi- cials to monitor and manage the response. The IC needs to evaluate the continuing needs of the responders and determine if additional resources are needed. In the after-action reports, discussion and evaluation of the disaster determines the success based on the initial competence and effectiveness of the Incident Commander and the Center.

The Federal Response Once the governor has determined that a disaster event has overwhelmed the capac- ity of state and local governments to effectively respond and to subsequently fund the recovery effort, the governor forwards a letter to the president requesting a presidential disaster declaration. This is the first step toward involving federal officials, agencies and departments, and resources in a disaster event. If the president declares a major disaster, 32 federal departments and agencies, including the American Red Cross, work together to support the efforts of state and local officials.

The Department of Homeland Security, through FEMA, is responsible for coordinating all federal activities in support of state and local response and recovery efforts in a presi- dentially declared disaster. In such an instance, FEMA activates the National Response Plan (NRP) ( Figure 6-6 ). FEMA also manages several programs that provide disaster assis- tance to individuals and affected communities. These programs are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

• A media/press area needs to be established. • Topographic maps need to be located and posted. After tornados, street signs or other

identifying landmarks are destroyed, and rescue personnel are unable to use traditional road maps.

• Locate/prepare a missing persons list. • Monitor the movement and location of triage areas and transportation of victims. • Have the ability to maintain continuous communication with local hospitals to monitor the

number of victims received. • Establish and grid the search area. • Based on the type of disaster, such as fl ooding, responders may have to use boats to search

for and rescue victims. • Determine what resources are available within the local area and what resources are being

deployed. • As the response system expands, reevaluate tasks that need to be performed and develop

new tasks.

Source : Irwin, 2002.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 179

Presidential Disaster Declaration Process

The presidential disaster declaration makes available the resources of the federal govern- ment to the disaster area. Although a formal declaration does not have to be signed for the federal government to respond, the governor must make a formal request for assis- tance and specify in the request the specific needs of the disaster area. In the presiden- tial major disaster declaration process, federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations report threats, incidents, and potential incidents, using established communications and reporting channels. The HSOC receives threat and operational information regarding incidents or potential incidents and makes an initial determination to initiate the coordination of federal information-sharing and incident management activities. The decision to make a disaster declaration is completely at the discretion of the president. There are no set criteria to follow and no government regu- lations to guide which events are declared by the president and which events are not. FEMA has developed several factors it considers in making its recommendation to the president, including individual property losses per capita, level of damage to existing community infrastructures, and insurance coverage. In the end, however, the decision to make the declaration is the president’s alone.

A presidential disaster declaration can be made in as short a time as a few hours, as was the case in the 1994 Northridge earthquake and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.

FIGURE 6-6 The National Response Plan.

Federal Resources

Incident Occurs

May deploy in advance of the incident

Local First Responders

Notify

Arrive on scene

Response Teams & Other Resources

Deploy

Joint Field Office

Provides unified coordination of response resources

Elected/Appointed Official

Governor

Requests mutual aid & state assistance

• Assesses damage • Requests EMAC or other interstate mutual aid • Requests presidential declaration

Activates local EOC

Activates state EOC

FEMA Region

Recommends

Evaluates situation & governor’s request

Recommends Through

DHS Secretary

FEMA Administrator Assesses situation & governor’s request

President Declares emergency or

major disaster

180 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Sometimes, however, it takes weeks for damages to be assessed and the capability of state and local jurisdictions to fund response and recovery efforts to be evaluated. If the presi- dent turns down the governor’s request, the governor has the right to appeal and can be successful, especially if new damage data become available and are included in the appeal.

CASE STUDY: THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING

On April 19, 1995, an explosion rocked the federal plaza in Oklahoma City. Within 45 minutes after notification from the Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, FEMA deployed staff to Oklahoma City. FEMA coordinated the federal response to the Oklahoma City bombing and later worked closely with state and local officials on recovery efforts. The president signed an Emergency Declaration within eight hours of the occurrence. This was the first time that section 501(b) of the Stafford Act, granting FEMA the primary federal responsibility for responding to a domestic consequence management incident, was ever used. The president subsequently declared a major disaster on April 26, 1995. Because the disaster site was also a federal crime scene, FEMA appointed a liaison to the FBI to coordinate site access, support requirements, control public information, and other issues. The coordinated work among federal agencies in Oklahoma City led to the further clarification of agency and department roles in crisis and consequence management.

Harsh lessons were learned in Oklahoma City. A situation arose when local radio stations requested that all medical personnel should respond to the disaster area. A nurse who answered the call was killed by falling debris while trying to rescue victims in the building. A term constantly used after the bombing was the Oklahoma Standard . Oklahoma had personnel on the scene within 30 minutes. Federal officials were notified within minutes of the disaster. Volunteer services were immediate, and because this was a local disaster, everyone took responsibility to do whatever they could to help. Hospital personnel established an effective and efficient triage system. Phone numbers, Internet sites, and briefings were launched within hours of the disaster. The American Red Cross, as in all disasters, was quick to respond with personnel and supplies to help family members of those who were injured or killed in the bombing. The Salvation Army responded within hours with food and supplies. By the end of the day, the Salvation Army had deployed seven units to provide services to the workers and the victims. Law enforcement and EMS personnel had up-to-date training. Oklahoma had excellent coordination with the Public Works Department, the National Weather Service, and the National Guard. The Department of Public Safety also had a predetermined disaster plan in place.

Presidential declarations are routinely sought for such events as large floods, hur- ricanes, earthquakes, and big tornadoes. In recent years, governors have become more inventive and have requested presidential disaster declarations for snow removal, drought, the West Nile virus, and economic losses caused by failing industries such as the Northwest salmon spawning decline. Since 1979, there have been 1,292 presidential major disaster declarations, averaging 42 declarations per year. As an example of disaster declaration activity in a single year, in 2009 there were 52 major disaster declarations in 29 states and American Samoa.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 181

DECLARATION PROCESS FACT SHEET

THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCESS Local emergency and public works personnel, volunteers, humanitarian organizations, and other private interest groups provide emergency assistance required to protect the public’s health and safety and to meet immediate human needs. If necessary, a governor can declare a state of emergency and invoke the state’s emergency plan to augment individual and public resources as required.

A governor may determine, after consulting with local government officials, that the recovery appears to be beyond the combined resources of both the state and local governments and that federal assistance may be needed. In requesting supplemental federal assistance, under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), the governor must certify that the severity and magnitude of the disaster exceed state and local capabilities; certify that federal assistance is necessary to supplement the efforts and available resources of the state and local governments, disaster relief organizations, and compensation by insurance for disaster-related losses; confirm execution of the state’s emergency plan; and certify adherence to cost-sharing requirements.

Under the declaration process and to assist a governor to determine if a request for assistance should be made, a preliminary damage assessment is conducted. These assessments are conducted in counties affected by the disaster event. FEMA works with the state’s emergency management agency to accomplish these assessments.

THE PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT This preliminary damage assessment team is comprised of personnel from FEMA, the state’s emergency management agency, county and local officials and the U.S. Small Business Administration. The team’s work begins with reviewing the types of damage or emergency costs incurred by the units of government and the impact to critical facilities, such as public utilities, hospitals, schools, and fire and police departments. They will also look at the effect on individuals and businesses, including the number damaged, the number of people displaced, and the threat to health and safety caused by the storm event. Additional data from the Red Cross or other local voluntary agencies may also be reviewed. During the assessment, the team will collect estimates of the expenses and damages.

The governor can then use this information to support a declaration request — showing that the cost of response efforts, such as emergency personnel overtime, other emergency services, and damage to citizens, is beyond state and local recovery capabilities. The information gathered during the assessment will help the governor certify that the damage exceeds state and local resources.

THE DECLARATION PROCESS As set forth in the Stafford Act, a governor seeks a presidential declaration by submitting a written request to the president through the FEMA regional office. In this request the governor certifies that the combined local, county, and state resources are insufficient and that the situation is beyond their recovery capabilities. Following a FEMA regional and national office review of the request and the findings of the preliminary damage assessment, FEMA provides the president with an analysis of the situation and a recommended course of action.

182 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The Federal Response Plan (FRP), the National Response Plan (NRP), and the National Response Framework (NRF)

In 1992 FEMA created the Federal Response Plan (FRP). FEMA defined the FRP as a signed agreement among 27 federal departments and agencies, including the American Red Cross that does the following: provides the mechanism for coordinating delivery of federal assistance and resources to augment efforts of state and local gov- ernments overwhelmed by a major disaster or emergency, supports implementation of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq.), as well as individual agency statutory authorities, and supple- ments other federal emergency operations plans developed to address specific hazards.

The fundamental goal of the FRP was to maximize available federal resources in sup- port of response and recovery actions taken by state and local emergency officials.

CRITERIA USED BY FEMA The federal disaster law restricts the use of arithmetical formulas or other objective standards as the sole basis for determining the need for federal supplemental aid. As a result, FEMA assesses a number of factors to determine the severity, magnitude, and impact of a disaster event. In evaluating a governor’s request for a major disaster declaration, a number of primary factors, along with other relevant information, are considered in developing a recommendation to the president for supplemental disaster assistance:

• Amount and type of damage (number of homes destroyed or with major damage) • Impact on the infrastructure of affected areas or critical facilities • Imminent threats to public health and safety • Impacts to essential government services and functions • Unique capability of the federal government • Dispersion or concentration of damage • Level of insurance coverage in place for homeowners and public facilities • Assistance available from other sources (federal, state, local, voluntary organizations) • State and local resource commitments from previous, undeclared events • Frequency of disaster events over recent time period

The very nature of disasters — their unique circumstances, the unexpected timing, and varied impacts — precludes a complete listing of factors considered when evaluating disaster declaration requests, but the preceding list covers many of them.

Source : FEMA. http://www.fema.gov/media/fact_sheets/declaration_process.shtm .

CRITICAL THINKING

Should there be more strict guidelines about what events the president can declare a disaster? Why or why not?

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 183

Following the absorption of FEMA into the Department of Homeland Security on February 18, 2003, President Bush signed Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) “ to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system. ” This action authorized the design and development of a National Response Plan (NRP) to “ align federal coordination struc- tures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. ”

The NRP was designed according to the template of the National Incident Management System (NIMS; released March 1, 2004) to ensure that a consistent doctrinal framework existed for the management of incidents at all jurisdictional levels, regardless of the inci- dent cause, size, or complexity. NIMS was created to integrate effective practices in emer- gency preparedness and response into a comprehensive national framework for incident management. NIMS enables responders at all levels to work together more effectively and efficiently to manage domestic incidents no matter what the cause, size, or complexity, including catastrophic acts of terrorism and disasters.

In January 2008, DHS published the National Response Framework (NRF) that replaced the National Response Plan (NRP) and currently serves as the guide for response to major disaster events in the United States. According to FEMA:

The National Response Framework (NRF) presents the guiding principles that enable all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disas- ters and emergencies — from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe. The Framework defines the key principles, roles, and structures that organize the way we respond as a nation. It describes how communities, tribes, states, the federal govern- ment, and private sector and nongovernmental partners apply these principles for a coordinated, effective national response. The national response framework is always in effect, and elements can be implemented at any level at any time. (FEMA, http:// www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf )

According to FEMA, the NRF is based on the following five key principles that are the basis of the NRF’s response doctrine:

● Engaged partnership ● Tiered response ● Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities ● Unity of effort through unified command ● Readiness to act

The NRF is comprised of the following five components:

● Roles and responsibilities ● Response actions ● Response organization

184 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

● Planning ● Additional resources

The NRF identifies the key players and their roles in the NRF.

KEY PLAYERS — THE NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Local governments (counties, cities, or towns) respond to emergencies daily using their own resources. They also rely on mutual aid and assistance agreements with neighboring jurisdictions when they need additional resources. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides information on mutual aid and assistance agreements. When local jurisdictions cannot meet incident response resource needs with their own resources or with help available from other local jurisdictions, they may ask the state for assistance.

TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS Tribal governments respond to the same range of emergencies and disasters that other jurisdictions face. They may require assistance from neighboring jurisdictions under mutual aid and assistance agreements and may provide assistance as well. The United States has a trust relationship with American Indian tribes and recognizes their right to self-government. As such, tribal governments are responsible for coordinating resources to address actual or potential incidents. When local resources are not adequate, tribal leaders seek assistance from states or the federal government.

For certain types of federal assistance, tribal governments work with the state, but as sovereign entities, they can also elect to deal directly with the federal government for other types of assistance. To obtain federal assistance via the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), the state governor must request a presidential declaration on behalf of a tribe.

STATE GOVERNMENTS The state helps local governments if they need assistance. States have significant resources of their own, including emergency management and homeland security agencies, state police, health agencies, transportation agencies, incident management teams, specialized teams, and the National Guard.

If additional resources are required, the state may request assistance from other states through interstate mutual aid and assistance agreements such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Administered by the National Emergency Management Association, EMAC is a congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to the interstate mutual aid and assistance process.

If an incident is beyond the local and state capabilities, the governor can seek federal assistance. The state will collaborate with the impacted communities and the federal government to provide the help needed.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT The federal government maintains a wide array of capabilities and resources that can assist state governments in responding to incidents. Federal departments and agencies provide this

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 185

Federal Assistance According to FEMA, “ Federal disaster assistance is often thought of as synonymous with presidential declarations and the Stafford Act. The fact is that federal assistance can be provided to state, tribal, and local jurisdictions, and to other federal departments and agencies, in a number of different ways through various mechanisms and authorities. Federal assistance does not always require coordination by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and may be provided without a presidential major disaster or emergency declaration. Federal assistance for incidents that do not require DHS coordination may be led by other federal departments and agencies consistent with their authorities. The secretary of Homeland Security may monitor such incidents and may activate Framework mechanisms to provide support to departments and agencies without assuming over- all leadership for the federal response to the incident ” (FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/ emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf ).

FEMA ’s description of how the federal government supports states during a major disaster is included in the NRF and in the box on page 186.

assistance using processes outlined later in this document. In addition, federal departments and agencies may also request and receive help from other federal departments and agencies.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS Nongovernmental and voluntary organizations are essential partners in responding to incidents. Working through emergency operations centers and other structures, nongovernmental and voluntary organizations assist local, tribal, state, and federal governments in providing sheltering, emergency food supplies, counseling services, and other vital support services to support response and promote the recovery of disaster victims. These groups often provide specialized services that help individuals with special needs, including those with disabilities.

To engage these key partners most effectively, local, tribal, state, and federal governments coordinate with voluntary agencies, existing Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOADs), community and faith-based organizations, and other entities to develop plans to manage volunteer services and donated goods, establish appropriate roles and responsibilities, and train and exercise plans and procedures before an incident occurs.

PRIVATE SECTOR Forming the foundation for the health of the nation’s economy, the private sector is a key partner in local, tribal, state, and federal incident management activities. The private sector is responsible for most of the critical infrastructure and key resources in the nation and thus may require assistance in the wake of a disaster or emergency. They also provide goods and services critical to the response and recovery process, either on a paid basis or through donations.

Source : FEMA. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf

186 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

FEDERAL SUPPORT TO STATES

STAFFORD ACT Federal support to states and local jurisdictions takes many forms. The most widely known authority under which assistance is provided for major incidents is the Stafford Act. When an incident occurs that exceeds or is anticipated to exceed local, tribal, or state resources, the governor can request federal assistance under the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act authorizes the president to provide financial and other assistance to state and local governments, certain private nonprofit organizations, and individuals to support response, recovery, and mitigation efforts following presidential emergency or major disaster declarations.

Most incidents are not of sufficient magnitude to warrant a presidential declaration. However, if state and local resources are insufficient, a governor may ask the president to make such a declaration. Before making a declaration request, the governor must activate the state’s emergency plan and ensure that all appropriate state and local actions have been taken or initiated, including but not limited to:

• Surveying the affected areas to determine the extent of private and public damage. • Conducting joint preliminary damage assessments with Federal Emergency Management

Agency offi cials to estimate the types and extent of federal disaster assistance required.

Ordinarily , only the governor can initiate a request for a presidential emergency or major disaster declaration. In extraordinary circumstances, the president may unilaterally make such a declaration. The governor’s request is made through the FEMA regional administrator and based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and affected local governments and that federal assistance is necessary.

The governor’s request includes the following:

• Information on the extent and nature of state resources that have been or will be used to address the consequences of the disaster.

• A certifi cation by the governor that state and local governments will assume all applicable nonfederal costs required by the Stafford Act.

• An estimate of the types and amounts of supplementary federal assistance required. • Designation of the state coordinating offi cer.

The FEMA regional administrator evaluates the damage and requirements for federal assistance and makes a recommendation to the FEMA administrator, who, acting through the secretary of Homeland Security, then recommends a course of action to the president. The governor, appropriate members of Congress, and federal departments and agencies are immediately notified of a presidential declaration.

NON – STAFFORD ACT FEDERAL SUPPORT TO STATE AND LOCAL JURISDICTIONS While the Stafford Act is the most familiar mechanism by which the federal government may provide support to state, tribal, and local governments, it is not the only one. Often, federal assistance does not require coordination by DHS and can be provided without a presidential major disaster or emergency declaration.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 187

The NRF includes 15 emergency support functions (ESFs) that provide an organizing function for response activities by federal departments and agencies, state and local gov- ernments, tribal organizations, voluntary agencies, and the private sector. The function of the ESFs and the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder are presented in the box below.

In these instances, federal departments and agencies provide assistance to states, as well as directly to tribes and local jurisdictions, consistent with their own authorities. For example, under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, local and tribal governments can request assistance directly from the Environmental Protection Agency and/or the U.S. Coast Guard.

This support is typically coordinated by the federal agency that has primary jurisdiction rather than DHS. The secretary of Homeland Security may monitor such incidents and may, as requested, activate Framework mechanisms to support federal departments and agencies without assuming overall leadership for the incident.

Source : FEMA. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION ANNEXES: INTRODUCTION

The federal government and many state governments organize much of their resources and capabilities — as well as those of certain private sector and nongovernmental organizations — under 15 emergency support functions (ESFs). ESFs align categories of resources and provide strategic objectives for their use.

During a response, ESFs are a critical mechanism to coordinate functional capabilities and resources provided by federal departments and agencies, along with certain private sector and nongovernmental organizations. ESFs may be selectively activated for both Stafford Act and non – Stafford Act incidents where federal departments or agencies request DHS assistance or under other circumstances as defined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). Not all incidents result in the activation of ESFs.

ESFs may be activated to support headquarters, regional, and/or field activities ( Figure 6-7 ). The Incident Command System provides for the flexibility to assign ESF and other stakeholder resources according to their capabilities, tasking, and requirements to augment and support the other sections of the Joint Field Office ( JFO)/Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) or National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) in order to respond to incidents in a more collaborative and crosscutting manner.

While ESFs are typically assigned to a specific section at the NRCC or in the JFO/RRCC for management purposes, resources may be assigned anywhere within the unified coordination structure. Regardless of the section in which an ESF may reside, that entity works in conjunction with other JFO sections to ensure that appropriate planning and execution of missions occur. For example, if a state requests assistance with a mass evacuation, the JFO would request personnel from ESF #1 (transportation), ESF #6 (mass care, emergency

188 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

assistance, housing, and human services), and ESF #8 (public health and medical services). These would then be integrated into a single branch or group within the operations section to ensure effective coordination of evacuation services.

ESF MEMBER ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Each ESF Annex identifies the coordinator and the primary and support agencies pertinent to the ESF. Several ESFs incorporate multiple components, with primary agencies designated for each component to ensure seamless integration of and transition between preparedness, response, and recovery activities.

• ESF Coordinator. The ESF coordinator is the entity with management oversight for that particular ESF. The coordinator has ongoing responsibilities throughout the preparedness, response, and recovery phases of incident management. The role of the ESF coordinator is carried out through a “ unifi ed command ” approach as agreed upon collectively by the designated primary agencies and, as appropriate, support agencies.

• ESF Primary Agency(ies). An ESF primary agency is a federal agency with signifi cant authorities, roles, resources, or capabilities for a particular function within an ESF. ESFs may have multiple primary agencies, and the specifi c responsibilities of those agencies are articulated within the relevant ESF Annex. A federal agency designated as an ESF primary agency serves as a federal executive agent under the federal coordinating offi cer (or federal resource coordinator for non – Stafford Act incidents) to accomplish the ESF mission.

• ESF Support Agencies. Support agencies are those entities with specifi c capabilities or resources that support the primary agency(ies) in executing the mission of the ESF.

Source : FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf .

FIGURE 6-7 Clanton, Alabama, August 29, 2005. The Alabama Emergency Response Team work at the Alabama Emergency Operations Center (EOC). FEMA and the state of Alabama are monitoring Hurricane Katrina as it makes landfall on the Gulf Coast. FEMA/Mark Wolfe.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 189

A typical ESF Annex in the National Response Framework (NRF) includes a purpose statement, a description of capabilities, an overview of the concept of operations within the ESF, and the designation of ESF members identifying the ESF coordinator and pri- mary and support agencies.

ESF #5 — EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

PURPOSE Emergency Support Function (ESF) #5 — Emergency Management is responsible for supporting the overall activities of the federal government for domestic incident management. ESF #5 provides the core management and administrative functions in support of the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC), and Joint Field Office ( JFO) operations.

CAPABILITIES ESF #5 serves as the coordination ESF for all federal departments and agencies across the spectrum of domestic incident management from hazard mitigation and preparedness to response and recovery. ESF #5 preparedness activities include the following:

• Identifying resources for alert, activation, and subsequent deployment • Ensuring that there are trained and experienced staff to fi ll appropriate positions in the

NRCC, RRCC, Initial Operating Facility, and JFO, when activated or established

During the postincident response phase, ESF #5 is responsible for support and planning functions. ESF #5 activities include those functions that are critical to support and facilitate multiagency planning and coordination, including the following:

• Alerts and notifi cations • Staffi ng and deploying of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DHS/FEMA

response teams, as well as response teams from other federal departments and agencies • Incident action planning • Coordination of operations, direction, and control • Logistics management • Information collection, analysis, and management • Facilitation of requests for federal assistance • Resource acquisition and management • Federal worker safety and health • Facilities management • Financial management

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OVERVIEW The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), staffed by ESF #5 and other ESFs when activated, monitors potential or developing incidents and supports the efforts of regional and field operations. In the event of a no-notice event, the secretary of Homeland Security or his or her designee may direct execution of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, depending on the size of the incident.

190 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The NRF currently has 15 ESFs:

ESF #1 — Transportation ESF #2 — Communications ESF #3 — Public Works and Engineering ESF #4 — Firefighting ESF #5 — Emergency Management ESF #6 — Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services ESF #7 — Logistics Management and Resource Support ESF #8 — Public Health and Medical Services ESF #9 — Search and Rescue ESF #10 — Oil and Hazardous Materials Response ESF #11 — Agriculture and Natural Resources ESF #12 — Energy ESF #13 — Public Safety and Security ESF #14 — Long-Term Community Recovery ESF #15 — External Affairs

The NRF also includes the following support annexes that “ describe how federal depart- ments and agencies; state, tribal, and local entities; the private sector; volunteer organiza- tions; and nongovernmental organizations coordinate and execute the common functional processes and administrative requirements necessary to ensure efficient and effective inci- dent management. During an incident, numerous procedures and administrative functions are required to support incident management ” (NRF, http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/ index.htm# ):

● Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources ● Financial Management ● International Coordination ● Private Sector Coordination ● Public Affairs ● Tribal Relations

The Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC), staffed by ESF #5 and other ESFs as required, coordinates operations and situational reporting to the NRCC until the Joint Field Office ( JFO) is operational. Once the JFO is operational, the RRCC assumes a monitoring role. ESF #5 operations transition from the RRCC to the JFO when the JFO is established. When the JFO begins to stand-down operations, ESF #5 operations transition back to the RRCC, as required. To see the complete annex, as well as other pertinent information, refer to the NRF Resource Center at www.fema.gov/NRF .

Source : FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 191

● Volunteer and Donations Management ● Worker Safety and Health

Roles and Responsibilities

The NRF defines the roles and responsibilities of public, private, and nonprofit parties involved in incident management at the local, state, and national levels.

Governor As a state’s chief executive, the governor is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people of that state or territory and does the following:

● Is responsible for coordinating state resources to address the full spectrum of actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents in an all-hazards context to include terrorism, natural disasters, accidents, and other contingencies.

● Under certain emergency conditions, typically has police powers to make, amend, and rescind orders and regulations.

● Provides leadership and plays a key role in communicating to the public and in helping people, businesses, and organizations cope with the consequences of any type of declared emergency within state jurisdiction.

● Encourages participation in mutual aid and implements authorities for the state to enter into mutual aid agreements with other states, tribes, and territories to facilitate resource-sharing.

● Is the commander in chief of state military forces (National Guard when in state active duty or Title 32 status and the authorized state militias).

● Requests federal assistance when it becomes clear that state or tribal capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or exhausted.

Local Chief Executive Officer A mayor or city or county manager, as a jurisdiction’s chief executive, is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people of that jurisdiction. The local chief executive officer does the following:

● Is responsible for coordinating local resources to address the full spectrum of actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents involving all hazards including terrorism, natural disasters, accidents, and other contingencies.

● Dependent on state and local law, has extraordinary powers to suspend local laws and ordinances, such as to establish a curfew, direct evacuations, and, in coordination with the local health authority, to order a quarantine.

● Provides leadership and plays a key role in communicating to the public, and in helping people, businesses, and organizations cope with the consequences of any type of domestic incident within the jurisdiction.

192 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

● Negotiates and enters into mutual aid agreements with other jurisdictions to facilitate resource-sharing. Requests state and, if necessary, federal assistance through the governor of the state when the jurisdiction’s capabilities have been exceeded or exhausted.

Tribal Chief Executive Officer The tribal chief executive officer is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people of that tribe and does the following as authorized by tribal government:

● Is responsible for coordinating tribal resources to address the full spectrum of actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents involving all hazards, including terrorism, natural disasters, accidents, and other contingencies.

● Has extraordinary powers to suspend tribal laws and ordinances, such as to establish a curfew, direct evacuations, and order a quarantine.

● Provides leadership and plays a key role in communicating to the tribal nation, and in helping people, businesses, and organizations cope with the consequences of any type of domestic incident within the jurisdiction.

● Negotiates and enters into mutual aid agreements with other tribes/jurisdictions to facilitate resource-sharing. Can request state and federal assistance through the governor of the state when the tribe’s capabilities have been exceeded or exhausted.

● Can elect to deal directly with the federal government. (Although a state governor must request a presidential disaster declaration on behalf of a tribe under the Stafford Act, federal agencies can work directly with the tribe within existing authorities and resources.)

Secretary of Homeland Security Pursuant to HSPD-5, the secretary of Homeland Security does the following:

● Is responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

● Serves as the “ principal federal official ” for domestic incident management. The secretary is also responsible for coordinating federal resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any of the following four conditions applies: ● A federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested DHS

assistance. ● The resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and federal

assistance has been requested. ● More than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in

responding to the incident. ● The secretary has been directed to assume incident management responsibilities

by the president.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 193

Attorney General The attorney general is the chief law enforcement officer in the United States. In accor- dance with HSPD-5 and other relevant statutes and directives, the attorney general has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats:

● By individuals or groups inside the United States ● Directed at U.S. citizens or institutions abroad

Generally acting through the FBI, the attorney general — in cooperation with other federal departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect national security — coordinates the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community. Nothing in the NRP derogates the attorney general’s status or responsibilities.

Secretary of Defense The DOD has significant resources that may be available to support the federal response to an Incident of National Significance. The secretary of defense authorizes Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for domestic incidents as directed by the president or when consistent with military readiness operations and appropriate under the circum- stances and the law. The secretary of defense retains command of military forces under DSCA, as with all other situations and operations. Nothing in the NRP impairs or other- wise affects the authority of the secretary of defense over the DOD.

Secretary of State The secretary of state is responsible for coordinating international prevention, prepared- ness, response, and recovery activities relating to domestic incidents, and for the protec- tion of U.S. citizens and U.S. interests overseas.

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) NGOs collaborate with first responders, governments at all levels, and other agencies and organizations providing relief services to sustain life, reduce physical and emotional distress, and promote recovery of disaster victims when assistance is not available from other sources.

Private Sector DHS and NRP primary and support agencies coordinate with the private sector to effec- tively share information, form courses of action, and incorporate available resources to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from Incidents of National Significance. The roles, responsibilities, and participation of the private sector during Incidents of National Significance vary based on the nature of the organization and the type and impact of the incident. Private sector organizations may be involved as:

● An impacted organization or infrastructure. Private sector organizations may be affected by direct or indirect consequences of the incident. Examples of privately

194 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

owned infrastructure include transportation, telecommunications, private utilities, financial institutions, and hospitals.

● A response resource. Private sector organizations may provide response resources (donated or compensated) during an incident, including specialized teams, equipment, and advanced technologies.

● A regulated and/or responsible party. Owners/operators of certain regulated facilities or hazardous operations may bear responsibilities under the law for preparing for and preventing incidents from occurring, and responding to an incident once it occurs. For example, federal regulations require owners/operators of nuclear facilities that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to maintain emergency (incident) preparedness plans, procedures, and facilities and to perform assessments, prompt notifications, and training for a response to an incident.

● A member of state/local emergency organizations. Private sector organizations may serve as an active partner in local and state emergency preparedness and response organizations and activities.

Citizen Involvement Strong partnerships with citizen groups and organizations provide support for incident management prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. The U.S. Citizen Corps brings these groups together and focuses efforts of individuals through education, training, and volunteer service to help make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to address the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues, and disas- ters of all kinds.

THE NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

Incident Command Post (ICP) This is the field location at which the primary tactical-level, on-scene incident command functions are performed. The ICP may be collocated with the incident base or other incident facilities and is normally identified by a green rotating or flashing light.

Area Command (Unified Area Command) This organization was established to (1) oversee the management of multiple incidents that are each being handled by an ICS organization or (2) oversee the management of large or multiple incidents to which several incident management teams have been assigned. Area Command has the responsibility to set overall strategy and priorities, allocate critical resources according to priorities, ensure that incidents are properly managed, and ensure that objectives are met and strategies followed. Area Command becomes Unified Area Command when incidents are multijurisdictional. Area Command may be established at an EOC facility or at some location other than an ICP.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 195

Local Emergency Operations Center (EOC) This is the physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support local incident management activities normally takes place.

State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) This is the physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support state incident management activities normally takes place.

State Coordinating Officer (SCO) The SCO plays a critical role in managing the state response and recovery operations following Stafford Act declarations. The governor of the affected state appoints the SCO, and lines of authority flow from the governor to the SCO, following the state’s policies and laws. For certain anticipated events in which a Stafford Act declaration is expected, such as an approaching hurricane, the secretary of Homeland Security or the FEMA administrator may predesignate one or more federal officials to coordinate with the SCO to determine resources and actions that will likely be required and begin deployment of assets. The specific roles and responsibilities of the SCO include serving as the primary representative of the governor for the affected state or locality with the RRCC or within the JFO once it is established; working with the federal coordinating officer to formulate state requirements, including those that are beyond state capability, and set priorities for employment of federal resources provided to the state; ensuring coordination of resources provided to the state via mutual aid and assistance compacts; providing a linkage to local government; and serving in the Unified Coordination Group in the JFO.

National Operations Center (NOC) The NOC is the primary national hub for situational awareness and operations coordination across the federal government for incident management. It provides the secretary of Homeland Security and other principals with the information necessary to make critical national-level incident management decisions. The NOC is a continuously operating multiagency operations center. The NOC’s staff monitors many sources of threat and hazard information from across the United States and abroad. It is supported by a 24/7 watch officer contingent, including (1) NOC managers; (2) selected federal interagency, state, and local law enforcement representatives; (3) intelligence community liaison officers provided by the DHS chief intelligence officer; (4) analysts from the Operations Division’s interagency planning element; and (5) watch standers representing dozens of organizations and disciplines from the federal government and others from the private sector. The NOC facilitates homeland security information sharing and operations coordination with other federal, state, tribal, local, and nongovernmental partners. During a response to a significant incident, the NOC meets its information-fusion and information-sharing responsibilities by providing spot reports, situation reports, and other information-sharing tools, all supported by and distributed through its common operating picture. The continued development and rapid integration at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels of electronic reporting and information-sharing tools supporting the NOC’s common operating picture is a very high priority of the Framework.

National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) The NRCC is FEMA’s primary operations management center, as well as the focal point for national resource coordination. As a 24/7 operations center, the NRCC monitors potential or

196 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

developing incidents and supports the efforts of regional and field components. The NRCC also has the capacity to increase staffing immediately in anticipation of or in response to an incident by activating the full range of ESFs and other personnel as needed to provide resources and policy guidance to a JFO or other local incident management structures. The NRCC provides overall emergency management coordination, conducts operational planning, deploys national-level entities, and collects and disseminates incident information as it builds and maintains a common operating picture. Representatives of nonprofit organizations within the private sector may participate in the NRCC to enhance information exchange and cooperation between these entities and the federal government.

National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) The NICC monitors the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources on an ongoing basis. During an incident, the NICC provides a coordinating forum to share information across infrastructure and key resources sectors through appropriate information-sharing entities such as the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers and the Sector Coordinating Councils.

National Military Command Center (NMCC) The NMCC is the nation’s focal point for continuous monitoring and coordination of worldwide military operations. It directly supports combatant commanders, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of defense, and the president in the command of U.S. Armed Forces in peacetime contingencies and war. Structured to support the president and secretary of defense effectively and efficiently, the center participates in a wide variety of activities, ranging from missile warning and attack assessment to management of peacetime contingencies such as Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) activities. In conjunction with monitoring the current worldwide situation, the center alerts the Joint Staff and other national agencies to developing crises and will initially coordinate any military response required.

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) The NCTC serves as the primary federal organization for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism and for conducting strategic operational planning by integrating all instruments of national power.

Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) The FBI SIOC is the focal point and operational control center for all federal intelligence, law enforcement, and investigative law enforcement activities related to domestic terrorist incidents or credible threats, including leading attribution investigations. The SIOC serves as an information clearinghouse to help collect, process, vet, and disseminate information relevant to law enforcement and criminal investigation efforts in a timely manner. The SIOC maintains direct connectivity with the NOC. The SIOC, which is located at FBI headquarters, supports the FBI’s mission in leading efforts of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States. The SIOC maintains liaison with the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF). The mission of the NJTTF is to enhance communications, coordination, and cooperation among federal, state, tribal, and local agencies representing the intelligence, law enforcement, defense, diplomatic, public safety, and

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 197

homeland security communities by providing a point of fusion for terrorism intelligence and by supporting Joint Terrorism Task Forces throughout the United States.

Other DHS Operations Centers Depending on the type of incident (e.g., National Special Security Events), the operations centers of other DHS operating components may serve as the primary operations management center in support of the secretary. These are the U.S. Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Secret Service, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection operations centers.

Joint Field Office (JFO) The JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally to coordinate operational federal assistance activities to the affected jurisdiction(s) during Incidents of National Significance. The JFO is a multiagency center that provides a central location for coordination of federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and private sector organizations with primary responsibility for threat response and incident support. The JFO enables the effective and efficient coordination of federal incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions. The JFO utilizes the scalable organizational structure of the NIMS Incident Command System (ICS). The JFO organization adapts to the magnitude and complexity of the situation at hand and incorporates the NIMS principles regarding span of control and organizational structure: management, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. Although the JFO uses an ICS structure, the JFO does not manage on-scene operations. Instead, the JFO focuses on providing support to on-scene efforts and conducting broader support operations that may extend beyond the incident site.

Joint Operations Center (JOC) The JOC branch is established by the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officer (SFLEO) (e.g., the FBI SAC during terrorist incidents) to coordinate and direct law enforcement and criminal investigation activities related to the incident. The JOC branch ensures management and coordination of federal, state, local, and tribal investigative/law enforcement activities. The emphasis of the JOC is on prevention as well as intelligence collection, investigation, and prosecution of a criminal act. This emphasis includes managing unique tactical issues inherent to a crisis situation (e.g., a hostage situation or terrorist threat). When this branch is included as part of the Joint Field Office ( JFO), it is responsible for coordinating the intelligence and information function (as described in NIMS), which includes information and operational security, and the collection, analysis, and distribution of all incident-related intelligence. Accordingly, the Intelligence Unit within the JOC branch serves as the interagency fusion center for all intelligence related to an incident.

The Joint Information Center ( JIC) is also a valuable tool for getting emergency management partners on the same page. In disasters of catastrophic or nationally significant proportions, a JIC is established to coordinate the dissemination of information about all disaster response and recovery programs. Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) who represent all of the federal, state, local, and voluntary agencies providing response or recovery services are invited to collocate and be a part of JIC operations. Interagency coordination is one of the central functions of the JIC, and teamwork is a key to implementing successful public information and media affairs

198 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

programs. JICs involve coordination among the FCO, the lead state PAO, the congressional liaison, community relations and disaster assistance program managers, and other public agency PAOs.

Source : FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf .

FIELD-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES: JFO SECTIONS

The role of each JFO section is as follows: Operations Section. The Operations Section coordinates operational support to on-scene

incident management efforts. Branches may be added or deleted as required, depending on the nature of the incident. The Operations Section also is responsible for coordination with other federal command posts that may be established to support incident management activities. The Operations Section may include the following elements:

• The Response and Recovery Operations Branch coordinates the request and delivery of federal assistance and support from various special teams. This branch is composed of four groups: Emergency Services, Human Services, Infrastructure Support, and Community Recovery and Mitigation.

• The Law Enforcement Investigative Operations Branch/Joint Operations Center (JOC) is established by the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Offi cial (SFLEO) (e.g., the FBI SAC during terrorist incidents) to coordinate and direct law enforcement and criminal investigation activities related to a terrorist incident. The JOC branch ensures management and coordination of federal, state, local, and tribal investigative/law enforcement activities. The emphasis of the JOC is on prevention as well as intelligence collection, investigation, and prosecution of a criminal act. This emphasis includes managing unique tactical issues inherent to a crisis situation (e.g., a hostage situation or terrorist threat).

• For National Special Security Events (NSSEs), a third branch, the Security Operations Branch, or Multi-agency Command Center (MACC) , may be added to coordinate protection and site security efforts. In these situations, the Operations Section Chief is designated by mutual agreement of the JFO Coordination Group based on the agency with greatest jurisdictional involvement and statutory authority for the current incident priorities. The agency providing the Operations Section Chief may change over time as incident priorities change.

Planning Section. The Planning Section provides current information to the JFO Coordination Group to ensure situational awareness, determine cascading effects, identify national implications, and determine specific areas of interest requiring long-term attention. The Planning Section also provides technical and scientific expertise. The Planning Section is composed of the following units: Situation, Resources, Documentation, Technical Specialists, and Demobilization. The Planning Section may also include an Information and Intelligence Unit (if not assigned elsewhere) and an HSOC representative who aids in the development of reports for the HSOC and IIMG.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 199

FEMA maintains several response teams that can be deployed to assist in response to major disasters including the Emergency Response Team National (ERT-N), the Regional Emergency Response Team (ERT-A), and Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs). Brief descriptions of each of these teams are presented in the box below.

Logistics Section. The Logistics Section coordinates logistics support that includes the following:

• Control and accountability for federal supplies and equipment • Resource ordering • Delivery of equipment, supplies, and services to the JFO and other fi eld locations • Facility location, setup, space management, building services, and general facility

operations • Transportation coordination and fl eet management services • Information and technology systems services, administrative services such as mail

management and reproduction, and customer assistance

The Logistics Section may include Coordination and Planning, Resource Management, Supply, and Information Services Branches.

Finance and Administration Section (Comptroller). The Finance and Administration Section is responsible for the financial management, monitoring, and tracking of all federal costs relating to the incident and the functioning of the JFO while adhering to all federal laws, acts, and regulations. The position of the financial and administration chief will be held exclusively by a comptroller who serves as the senior financial advisor to the team leader (e.g., FCO) and represents the coordinating agency’s chief financial officer (CFO) as prescribed by the CFO Act of 1990.

Source : FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf

FINAL RESPONSE TEAMS

The ERT-N is composed of a small number of highly qualified and experienced professionals who serve as the initial disaster management team providing assistance to an impacted region to coordinate the full range of federal response and recovery operations in large, complex events, WMD/terrorist events, or incidents of national significance. Currently there are two ERT-Ns that are deployed at the discretion of the response division director in coordination with the regional director of the impacted region. Each ERT-N team consists of 32 members.

The ERT-N establishes operations at the Joint Field Office ( JFO). Regional personnel are integrated with the ERT-N to form one unified ERT. ERT-As are disaster response teams located in each of FEMA’s ten regions that can be deployed in the early phases of an incident to work directly with states to assess disaster impact, gain situational awareness, help coordinate the disaster response, and respond to specific requests for state and local assistance. The ERT- As consist of approximately 25 individuals from the FEMA regions who also have day-to-day

200 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

responsibilities beyond their team assignments and representatives from the Emergency Support Function departments and agencies. The ERT-A initially establishes its presence in a state Emergency Operations Center and later helps to staff the Joint Field Office ( JFO) to support the disaster response. The ERT-As deploy with basic communications capabilities, including cell phones, wireless laptop computers, and a limited number of satellite cell phones. As needed, they can also be supported by FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments and their emergency communications capabilities.

FEMA has also developed a next generation of rapidly deployable emergency response teams called Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs). The IMATs are full-time, rapid- response teams with dedicated staff able to deploy within two hours and arrive at an incident within 12 hours to support the local incident commander. The teams support the initial establishment of a unified command and provide situational awareness for federal and state decision makers crucial to determining the level and type of immediate federal support that may be required.

IMATs were developed from an expanded concept of the former Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) at the national and regional levels (see the Hurricane Floyd case study for an understanding of how the former ERTs were utilized). The plan is to eventually have three National IMATs with 26 full-time staff each, and 10 regional IMATs staffed with 15 full-time personnel each. Currently two national IMATs and three regional IMATs are operational; a fourth, the region VII IMAT, will be operational later this year.

IMATs provide a forward federal presence to facilitate the management of the national response to catastrophic incidents. The primary mission of a FEMA IMAT is to rapidly deploy to an incident or incident-threatened venue, provide leadership in the identification and provision of federal assistance, and coordinate and integrate interjurisdictional response in support of an affected state or territory.

IMATs are led by experienced, senior-level emergency managers and staffed with a core of permanent full-time employees, unlike FEMA’s Emergency Response Teams (ERTs), which were staffed on a collateral duty basis. When not deployed, the teams are responsible for building and maintaining a close working relationship with regional, state, tribal, and local emergency management officials, federal partners, and the private sector to support planning, training, exercising, and other activities in preparation for disaster response.

Source : FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/hazard/hurricane/2008/gustav/regional_ert_factsheet2008.pdf ; http://www.fema.gov/media/fact_sheets/ert-n.shtm ; http://www.fema.gov/pdf/hazard/hurricane/2009/imat_ factsheet.pdf .

CASE STUDY: HURRICANE FLOYD

On September 14, 1999, FEMA began mobilizing federal resources in preparation for possible landfall by Hurricane Floyd. Although, in previous years, states had to wait for the disaster to strike before obtaining FEMA assistance, in the case of Hurricane Floyd, FEMA took a proactive stance by activating Emergency Response Teams, allocating funds to local communities for law

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 201

enforcement, and working with the Tropical Predication Center to monitor Hurricane Floyd’s track. The ROC was put into action three days before the actual landfall of Hurricane Floyd.

On September 16, 1999, Hurricane Floyd made landfall near Cape Fear, North Carolina. The Category 2 hurricane had sustained winds of 110 miles per hour, but unlike Hurricane Andrew, the local first responders in coordination with FEMA were better prepared to handle this disaster. Emergency materials, generators, sheeting, tarps, bottled water, blankets, and clothing were identified and available for immediate delivery. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) had been placed on alert to provide medical services. Public works, including engineers, electricians, phone company employees, and public work personnel also were prepared for deployment to the area. Although forecasters thought that Floyd would hit Florida or Georgia, FEMA officials were mobile as the hurricane continued to track farther north. On September 15, 1999, President Clinton signed emergency declarations for North and South Carolina to fund law enforcement officials to help evacuate the areas. More than 2,100 employees were prepared to respond to the disaster. FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Teams from Indiana, Maryland, and Pennsylvania were activated. Upon the hurricane reaching land, FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response System (MERS) provided communication support to the affected communities.

FEMA ’s proactive response before landfall ensured that those affected by the hurricane would have the needed materials and services to help in the recovery phase. While the rain was still falling, FEMA established their toll-free service line. Within days, people were receiving financial aid to help them through the disaster. Although FEMA took some flack from certain areas of North Carolina and Virginia because of the long-lasting flooding, lives were saved and damage was reduced because of FEMA’s and the 27 agencies ’ responses to the hurricane.

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT ACTIONS

NOTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT Federal , state, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations report threats, incidents, and potential incidents using established communications and reporting channels. The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) receives threat and operational information regarding incidents or potential incidents and makes an initial determination to initiate the coordination of federal information-sharing and incident management activities. When notified of a threat or an incident with possible national-level implications, the HSOC assesses the situation and notifies the secretary of Homeland Security accordingly.

REPORTING Federal , state, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) report incident information to the HSOC. In most situations, incident information will be reported using existing mechanisms to state or federal operations centers, which in turn will report the information to the HSOC. Information regarding potential terrorist threats normally is reported initially to a local or regional Joint Terrorism Task Force ( JTTF) and, subsequently, from the FBI Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) to the HSOC if the FBI deems the threat to be credible.

202 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

ACTIVATION For actual or potential Incidents of National Significance, the HSOC reports the situation to the secretary of Homeland Security and/or senior staff as delegated by the secretary, who then determines the need to activate components of the NRP to conduct further assessment of the situation, initiate interagency coordination, share information with affected jurisdictions, and/or initiate deployment of resources. Concurrently, the secretary also makes a determination of whether or not an event meets the criteria established for a potential or actual Incident of National Significance as defined in the NRP. When the secretary declares an Incident of National Significance, federal departments and agencies are notified by the HSOC (as operational security considerations permit) and may be called upon to staff the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) and National Response Coordination Center (NRCC). The affected state(s) and tribes also are notified by the HSOC using appropriate operational security protocols. In the preincident mode, such notification may be conducted discreetly, on a need-to-know basis, to preserve the operational security and confidentiality of certain law enforcement and investigative operations. The NRCC and RRCC deploy, track, and provide incident-related information until the JFO is established.

RESPONSE Once an incident occurs, the priority shifts to immediate and short-term response activities to preserve life, property, the environment, and the social, economic, and political structure of the community. Actions also are taken to prevent and protect against other potential threats. Examples of response actions include immediate law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical service actions; mass care, public health, and medical services; emergency restoration of critical infrastructure; control of environmental contamination; and responder health and safety protection. During the response to a terrorist event, law enforcement actions to collect and preserve evidence and to apprehend perpetrators are critical. These actions take place simultaneously with the response operations necessary to save lives and protect property.

RECOVERY Recovery involves actions needed to help individuals and communities return to normal when feasible. The JFO is the central coordination point among federal, state, local, and tribal agencies and voluntary organizations for delivering recovery assistance programs. Long-term environmental recovery may include cleanup and restoration of public facilities, businesses, and residences; reestablishment of habitats and prevention of subsequent damage to natural resources; protection of cultural or archeological sites; and protection of natural, cultural, and historical resources from intentional damage during other recovery operations.

MITIGATION Hazard mitigation involves reducing or eliminating long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their side effects. The JFO’s Community Recovery and Mitigation Branch is responsible for coordinating the delivery of all mitigation programs within the affected area, including hazard mitigation for:

• Grant programs for loss reduction measures (if available) • Delivery of loss-reduction building-science expertise

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 203

Key Federal Response Officials Key senior federal officials that typically may be deployed with a federal incident man- agement team include the following.

Principal Federal Official (PFO)

By law and by presidential directive, the secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official responsible for coordination of all domestic incidents requiring multiagency federal response. The secretary may elect to designate a single individual to serve as his or her primary representative to ensure consistency of federal support as well as the overall effectiveness of the Federal incident management. When appointed, such an individual serves in the field as the PFO for the incident. Congress has provided that, notwithstand- ing the general prohibition on appointing a PFO for Stafford Act incidents, “ there may be instances in which FEMA should not be the lead agency in charge of the response, such as a pandemic outbreak or an Olympic event. ” In such cases, the secretary may assign a PFO. Congress also recognized that there may be “ major non – Stafford Act responses that may include a Stafford Act component. ” In such cases, also, the secretary may assign a PFO. The secretary will only appoint a PFO for catastrophic or unusually complex incidents that

• Coordination of federal fl ood insurance operations • Community education and outreach necessary to foster loss reduction

DEMOBILIZATION When a centralized federal coordination presence is no longer required in the affected area, the JFO Coordination Group implements the demobilization plan to transfer responsibilities and close out the JFO. After the JFO closes, long-term recovery program management and monitoring transition to individual agencies ’ regional offices and/or headquarters, as appropriate.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS AND AFTER-ACTION REPORTS DHS formally convenes interagency meetings called hotwashes to identify critical issues requiring headquarters-level attention, lessons learned, and best practices associated with the federal response to Incidents of National Significance. Hotwashes typically are conducted at major transition points over the course of incident management operations and should include state, local, and tribal participation. Identified issues are validated and promptly assigned to appropriate organizations for remediation. Following an incident, the JFO Coordination Group submits an after-action report to DHS headquarters detailing operational successes, problems, and key issues affecting incident management. The report includes appropriate feedback from all federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and private sector partners participating in the incident.

Source : FEMA Emergency Management Institute.

204 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

require extraordinary coordination. When appointed, the PFO interfaces with federal, state, tribal, and local jurisdictional officials regarding the overall federal incident management strategy and acts as the primary federal spokesperson for coordinated media and public communications. The PFO serves as a member of the Unified Coordination Group and provides a primary point of contact and situational awareness locally for the secretary of Homeland Security. A PFO is a senior federal official with proven management experience and strong leadership capabilities. The PFO deploys with a small, highly trained mobile support staff. Both the PFO and support staff undergo specific training prior to appoint- ment to their respective positions. Once formally designated for an ongoing incident, a PFO relinquishes the conduct of all previous duties to focus exclusively on his or her incident management responsibilities. The same individual will not serve as the principal federal official and the federal coordinating officer (see following) at the same time for the same incident. When both positions are assigned, the FCO will have responsibility for adminis- tering Stafford Act authorities, as described below. The secretary is not restricted to DHS officials when selecting a PFO.

The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command structure established at the incident, nor does the PFO have directive authority over a federal coordinating officer, a senior federal law enforcement official, a DOD Joint Task Force commander, or any other federal or state official. Other federal incident management officials retain their authori- ties as defined in existing statutes and directives. Rather, the PFO promotes collaboration and, as possible, resolves any federal interagency conflict that may arise. The PFO iden- tifies and presents to the secretary of Homeland Security any policy issues that require resolution.

Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)

For Stafford Act incidents (i.e., emergencies or major disasters), upon the recommenda- tion of the FEMA administrator and the secretary of Homeland Security, the president appoints an FCO. The FCO is a senior FEMA official trained, certified, and well experi- enced in emergency management, and specifically appointed to coordinate federal sup- port in the response to and recovery from emergencies and major disasters. The FCO executes Stafford Act authorities, including commitment of FEMA resources and the mis- sion assignment of other federal departments or agencies. If a major disaster or emer- gency declaration covers a geographic area that spans all or parts of more than one state, the president may decide to appoint a single FCO for the entire incident, with other indi- viduals as needed serving as deputy FCOs.

In all cases, the FCO represents the FEMA administrator in the field to discharge all FEMA responsibilities for the response and recovery efforts under way. For Stafford Act events, the FCO is the primary federal representative with whom the SCO and other state, tribal, and local response officials interface to determine the most urgent needs and set objectives for an effective response in collaboration with the Unified Coordination Group.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 205

In Stafford Act incidents, the FCO is the focal point of coordination within the Unified Coordination Group, ensuring overall integration of federal emergency management, resource allocation, and seamless integration of federal activities in support of, and in coordination with, state, tribal, and local requirements. Some FCOs are given additional, specialized training regarding unusually complex incidents. For example, one may be further trained for catastrophic earthquake response, whereas another might cultivate unique skills for response related to weapons of mass destruction or pandemic influenza.

Predesignated PFOs and FCOs In certain scenarios, the secretary of Homeland Security may predesignate a PFO and/or an FCO. Such predesignation can focus on specified geographic areas or be based on spe- cific potential threats, or a combination of both. For example, beginning in 2007, the secre- tary predesignated a national PFO and five regional PFOs together with a national FCO and regional FCOs, who will serve in the event of a nationwide outbreak of pandemic influenza or other similar nationwide biological event. Predesignation of these leadership teams is allowing for sustained advance planning conducted with state, tribal, and local leaders.

Federal Resource Coordinator (FRC)

In non – Stafford Act situations, when a federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the secretary of Homeland Security to obtain support from other federal departments and agencies, DHS may designate an FRC. In these situations, the FRC coordinates support through interagency agreements and mem- orandums of understanding. Relying on the same skill set, DHS may select the FRC from the FCO cadre or other personnel with equivalent knowledge, skills, and abilities. The FRC is responsible for coordinating timely delivery of resources to the requesting agency.

Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)

The DOD has appointed ten DCOs and assigned one to each FEMA region. If requested and approved, the DCO serves as the DOD’s single point of contact at the JFO for request- ing assistance from the DOD. With few exceptions, requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) originating at the JFO are coordinated with and processed through the DCO. The DCO may have a Defense Coordinating Element consisting of a staff and military liaison officers to facilitate coordination and support to activated ESFs.

Specific responsibilities of the DCO (subject to modification based on the situation) include processing requirements for military support, forwarding mission assignments to the appropriate military organizations through DOD-designated channels, and assigning military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated ESFs.

Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO)

The SFLEO is an official appointed by the attorney general during an incident requir- ing a coordinated federal response to coordinate all law enforcement, public safety, and

206 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

security operations with intelligence or investigative law enforcement operations directly related to the incident. The SFLEO is a member of the Unified Coordination Group and, as such, is responsible to ensure that allocation of law enforcement requirements and resource allocations are coordinated as appropriate with all other members of the Group. In the event of a terrorist incident, the SFLEO will normally be a senior FBI official who has coordinating authority over all law enforcement activities related to the incident, both those falling within the attorney general’s explicit authority as recognized in HSPD-5 and those otherwise directly related to the incident itself.

Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander

Based on the complexity and type of incident, and the anticipated level of DOD resource involvement, the DOD may elect to designate a JTF to command federal (Title 10) mili- tary activities in support of the incident objectives. If a JTF is established, consistent with operational requirements, its command and control element will be colocated with the senior on-scene leadership at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of effort. The colocation of the JTF command and control element does not replace the requirement for a DCO/Defense Coordinating Element as part of the JFO Unified Coordination staff. The DCO remains the DOD single point of contact in the JFO for requesting assistance from the DOD. The JTF commander exercises operational control of federal military per- sonnel and most defense resources in a federal response. Some DOD entities, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, may respond under separate established authorities and do not provide support under the operational control of a JTF commander. Unless federalized, National Guard forces remain under the control of a state governor. Close coordination among federal military, other DOD entities, and National Guard forces in a response is critical.

Other Senior Officials

Based on the scope and nature of an incident, senior officials from other federal depart- ments and agencies, state, tribal, or local governments, and the private sector or NGOs may participate in a Unified Coordination Group. Usually, the larger and more complex the incident, the greater the number of entities represented.

Other FEMA Response Resources FEMA manages a cadre of nearly 4,000 temporary Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs), who support FEMA response and recovery activities in the field in areas such as logistics, facility management, public affairs, community relations, and customer service ( Figures 6-8 and 6-9 ). FEMA manages a mobile operations capability that provides communica- tions and logistical support to state and local emergency officials.

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 207

FIGURE 6-8 San Diego, California, October 26, 2007. Northern California fire crews set fire backburn to stop the Poomacha fire from advancing westward. Currently the fires in Southern California have burned more than 355,000 acres. FEMA photo/Andrea Booher.

FIGURE 6-9 Baytown, Texas, September 28, 2008. Members of the American Red Cross working side by side with the North Carolina Baptist Men Convention (in yellow shirts) to distribute meals to local residents recovering from Hurricane Ike. These mobile kitchens are capable of serving 70,000 meals per day. Mike Moore/FEMA.

CRITICAL THINKING

• What are the strengths and weaknesses of the National Response Plan? • Would disaster response be more effi cient if the federal government had the authority

to assume power over any disaster response, regardless of the ability of local response agencies? Why or why not?

208 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

FEMA’S MOBILE OPERATIONS CAPABILITY

Disasters may require resources beyond the capabilities of the local or state authorities. In response to regional requests for support, FEMA provides mobile telecommunications, operational support, life support, and power generation assets for the on-site management of disaster and all-hazard activities. This support is managed by the Response and Recovery Directorate’s Mobile Operations Division (RR-MO).

The Mobile Operations Division has a small headquarters staff and five geographically dispersed Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) Detachments and the Mobile Air Transportable Telecommunications System (MATTS) to:

• Meet the needs of the government emergency managers in their efforts to save lives, protect property, and coordinate disaster and all-hazard operations.

• Provide prompt and rapid multimedia communications, information processing, logistics, and operational support to federal, state, and local agencies during catastrophic emergencies and disasters for government response and recovery operations.

The MERS and MATTS support the Disaster Field Facilities. They support the federal, state, and local responders — not the disaster victims.

AVAILABLE SUPPORT Each of the MERS Detachments can concurrently support a large Disaster Field Office and multiple field operating sites within the disaster area. MERS is equipped with self-sustaining telecommunications, logistics, and operations support elements that can be driven or airlifted to the disaster location. MATTS and some of the MERS assets can be airlifted by C-130 military cargo aircraft.

The MERS and MATTS are available for immediate deployment. As required, equipment and personnel will deploy promptly and provide:

• Multimedia communications and information processing support, especially for the Communications Section, Emergency Support Function (ESF) #2 of the Federal Response Plan (FRP)

• Operational support, especially for the Information and Planning Section, ESF #5 of the FRP

• Liaison to the Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) • Logistics and life support for emergency responders • Automated information and decision support capability • Security (facility, equipment, and personnel) management and consultation

Most equipment is preloaded or installed on heavy-duty, multiwheel drive trucks. Some equipment is installed in transit cases.

Source : FEMA, www.fema.gov .

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 209

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) was established in 1996 ( Figure 6-10 ). According to the EMAC website:

EMAC is the first national disaster – relief compact since the Civil Defense and Disaster Compact of 1950 to be ratified by Congress. Since its ratification and sign- ing into law in 1996 (Public Law 104-321), 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to become EMAC members. The strength of EMAC and the quality that distinguishes it from other plans and compacts lie in its governance structure; its relationship with federal orga- nizations, states, counties, territories, and regions; and the ability to move just about any resource one state has to assist another state, including medical resources.

EMAC offers the following benefits:

● EMAC assistance may be more readily available than other resources. ● EMAC allows for a quick response to disasters using the unique human resources and

expertise possessed by member states.

FIGURE 6-10 The EMAC process flow. Reprinted courtesy of www.emacweb.org.

1. Governor issues a state of emergency.

3. Affected state requests A-Team deployment.

8. Responding state requests reimbursement.

9. Affected state reimburses responding state.

4. A-Team works with affected state; determines needs and

sends EMAC broadcast.

7. Resources are sent to affected state.

6. States complete requisitions and

negotiation of costs.

5. A-Team helps affected state determine costs and availability of resources.

2. Authorized representative from affected state

alerts EMAC National Coordination Group (NCG).

210 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

● EMAC offers state-to-state assistance during governor-declared states of emergency and a responsive and straightforward system for states to send personnel and equipment to help disaster relief efforts in other states. When resources are overwhelmed, EMAC helps to fill the shortfalls.

● EMAC establishes a firm legal foundation: Once the conditions for providing assistance to a requesting state have been set, the terms constitute a legally binding contractual agreement that makes affected states responsible for reimbursement. Responding states can rest assured that sending aid will not be a financial or legal burden, and personnel sent are protected under workers ’ compensation and liability provisions. The EMAC legislation solves the problems of liability and responsibilities of cost and allows for credentials to be honored across state lines.

● EMAC provides fast and flexible assistance: EMAC allows states to ask for whatever assistance they need for any type of emergency, from earthquakes to acts of terrorism. EMAC’s simple procedures help states dispense with bureaucratic wrangling.

● EMAC can move resources such as medical provisions that other compacts cannot.

Conclusion Responding to disaster events is the most visible activity that any federal, state, or local emergency management agency conducts. The politicians, the media, and the general public rate the success of an emergency management organization by how well it func- tions in the response phase of a disaster. A successful disaster response at any level of government requires a strong command and control system, clear lines of communi- cation, and coordination of numerous agencies from multiple jurisdictions. Local first responders — fire, police, and emergency medical technicians — are on the scene first. Local and state emergency managers coordinate resources and assess the damage and the capacity of their jurisdictions to respond effectively. For major disaster events, a pres- idential disaster declaration activates the NRP that delivers the full resources of the fed- eral government in support of local and state authorities.

Currently , the nation’s response to major disasters is guided by the National Response Framework (NRF), which defines the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local government, voluntary agencies, and the private sector and provides guidance on how these groups plan and work together in a disaster response. One element that is currently missing in the nation’s response capability is an agreement similar to the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the National Response Plan (NRP) that preceded the NRF that identifies and empowers a single federal agency responsible for coordinating the efforts of fed- eral government in responding to a major disaster in support of state and local partners. FEMA was created in 1979 in response to the demand made by state emergency manage- ment directors and their governors that the federal government establish a single agency to coordinate the federal response. The NRF does not designate a single federal agency that has the authority to coordinate the activities of all federal departments and agencies

Chapter 6 ● The Disciplines of Emergency Management: Response 211

as FEMA did as part of the FRP and the NRP. This missing piece in the current federal response is of concern to its state and local partners and must be addressed if the federal response is to be timely and effective in the future.

Important Terms Emergency management/response personnel Emergency Operations Plan Emergency Support Function First responders Incident Command System Incident commander National Incident Management System National Response Framework Unified command

Self-Check Questions 1. How is the National Guard deployed to assist in response to a disaster? 2. What is the role of first responders when a routine “ minor disaster ” occurs in a local

community? 3. What drives the actions of local first responders? 4. Where can you find a detailed description of the roles and responsibilities of first

responders in your community? 5. Who is usually in charge of developing and maintaining the community emergency

plan? 6. Where does the emergency management office reside at the state level? Give three

examples. 7. What is the principal source of funding for state emergency management offices? 8. What kinds of things do volunteer organizations provide for victims in the aftermath

of a disaster? 9. What is the Incident Command System, and why was it originally developed? 10. What are the five major management systems within the Incident Command System? 11. What is the role of the incident commander? 12. At whose discretion is the decision to make a disaster declaration? 13. What is the National Response Framework? 14. How does the National Response Framework compare to its predecessors, the

National Response Plan and the Federal Response Plan? 15. What are some of the reasons why communications among responding agencies is

crucial?

212 INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Out-of-Class Exercises 1. Contact your state National Guard office. Find out what kinds of resources they can

offer to assist local communities in the event of a disaster and what kind of training and exercises they conduct to prepare their members for disaster response.

2. Make a list of the primary differences between the command and control, and the coordination response models.

3. Contact your local ham radio organization and take a certification course. Use your certification to get involved in local response. You can get more information from the Amateur Radio Relay League (ARES; http://www.arrl.org/ ).

4. Take a Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) course. To find a course near you, visit the Citizen Corps CERT website at https://www.citizencorps.gov/cert/ .