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Comparative Strategy

ISSN: 0149-5933 (Print) 1521-0448 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucst20

Overcoming the intelligence-sharing paradox: Improving information sharing through change in organizational culture

Marie-Helen Maras

To cite this article: Marie-Helen Maras (2017) Overcoming the intelligence-sharing paradox: Improving information sharing through change in organizational culture, Comparative Strategy, 36:3, 187-197, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2017.1338477

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2017.1338477

Published online: 29 Aug 2017.

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COMPARATIVE STRATEGY , VOL. , NO. , – https://doi.org/./..

Overcoming the intelligence-sharing paradox: Improving information sharing through change in organizational culture

Marie-Helen Maras

Department of Security, Fire, and Emergency Management, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, NY, USA

ABSTRACT Existing organizational cultures among agencies in the intelligence commu- nity serve as barriers to information sharing. These cultures are characterized by secrecy and limited disclosure of information. Their practices of limited information distribution and existing extensive compartmentalization of infor- mation serve as impediments to information exchange between agencies in the intelligence community. To remedy this, changes in the organizational cul- tures of agencies in the intelligence community are required.Without a change in organizational culture, the culture of information sharing envisioned by the reforms that have occurred in the intelligence community post-9/11 will not be realized.

Introduction

All information is not intelligence. Information becomes intelligence when it is contextually analyzed in relation to other information in order to determine its substantive value. Intelligence can be thought of as a product that results from the gathering, processing, assimilating, examining, evaluating, and interpret- ing of information about entities gleaned from open-source and/or confidential methods and sources.1 It is collected and analyzed in order to better comprehend an entity whose actions may affect a gov- ernment’s interests.2 This intelligence gathering and analysis also enables a government to forecast an entity’s actions),3 thereby enabling preemptive action to be taken.

The sharing of intelligence depends on the policies of the agency within the intelligence commu- nity (IC), the security of the agency, and the attitude of the agency toward intelligence sharing. Legiti- mate reasons exist for safeguarding intelligence, such as “to ensure the quality of the data, operational security,…and the protection of sources and methods.”4 The sharing of information increases the risk that such information can be stolen or compromised. Moreover, unauthorized disclosures of intelli- gence can have detrimental effects; so too can the failure of making information available to agen- cies that require it to protect people, properties, and territories. The latter can have devastating con- sequences on society, especially if threats materialize as a result of this failure (e.g., a terrorist attack). Information sharing is thus needed to enable better prediction of and more effective responses to threats.

Intelligence should be shared horizontally and vertically. In the IC, horizontal sharing occurs across federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), theCentral IntelligenceAgency (CIA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Defense (DOD), to name a few. In 2014, former 9/11 Commission members reported on the progress of the implementation of the recom- mendations of the 9/11 Commission report (hereafter the 2014 report).5 The 2014 report revealed that

CONTACT Marie-Helen Maras [email protected]

©  Taylor & Francis

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horizontal intelligence sharing had improved. A 2015 declassified report by the 9/11 Review Commis- sion (hereafter the 2015 report) reaffirmed this; especially in regard to information sharing between the FBI and CIA.6 However, horizontal intelligence sharing had not become routine.7 This became evident in the failure to share critical information about one of the 2013 Boston marathon bombers, Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his brother, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, detonated bombs near the finish line of the Boston marathon on April 15, 2013, killing three and injuring at least 264 individuals.8 The 2014 report also indicated that vertical intelligence sharing had not improved since the publication of the 9/11 Commission report in 2004.9 Vertically, information is shared between “federal, state, local, and tribal officials, as well as the private sector.”10 The lack of improvement in vertical intelligence sharing was reiterated in the 2015 report.11

This article considers why information sharing has not improved following the publication of the 9/11 Commission report. The objectives of this article are two-fold. It first assesses the changes that have been made to improve intelligence sharing within the IC. It then explores existing obstacles to information sharing and the measures needed to improve information sharing within the IC.

9/11: The Harbinger of intelligence reform?

On September 11, 2001, 19 Islamic terrorists boarded four U.S. commercial airliners loaded with jet fuel. These planes were then crashed into the two towers of theWorld Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth plane never reached its intended target and crashed into a field in southwestern Pennsylvania. This was the most catastrophic terrorist attack in history, resulting in an estimated 3,000 deaths and over $17 billion in damages.12 Many have argued that this event served as a catalyst to intelligence reform.13 While it did serve as a catalyst to the current reforms, this was not the first time that a security failure led to the reform of the IC. A case in point was the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. In this incident,

over 300 Japanese planes launched from 6 aircraft carriers attacked the island of Oahu and the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the territory of Hawaii. Within a period of less than two hours…[U.S.] military and naval forces suffered a total of 3,435 casualties in personnel and the loss of or severe damage to: 188 planes of all types, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels.14

The inability to anticipate the Pearl Harbor attack was considered a great intelligence failure.15 In the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack, the National Security Act of 1947 was enacted. This act, among other actions, established the CIA, created a National Security Council (NSC), and created the DOD under whichmilitary sectors were unified. The first restructuring of the ICwas intended to create amore efficient intelligence process. However, what actually occurred was the creation of more organizations that claimed control over information. This further impeded information sharing within the IC.

Back to the basics: Reform, restructure, repeat

It was believed that the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been prevented if better information-sharing practices existed between the military and civilian agencies.16 The intelligence failure of Pearl Harbor resulted from inadequate intelligence gathering and sharing and, while the attack was devastating, the lessons from the attack were not entirely learned; this was made clear on 9/11. Concerning the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. intelligence community failed to connect the dots due to ineffec- tive information-sharing mechanisms. Indeed, before 9/11, there were several clues that pointed to the possibility of a terrorist attack; however, this information was disparate and in different files in different agencies. For example, a report by an agent of the FBI in Phoenix, which contained information about suspected Islamic radicals learning to fly planes in Arizona, “languished within the Bureau because it tallied with no agreed warning indicator.”17 The 9/11 Commission report drew attention to the inability of the U.S. intelligence community to effectively process and use the intelligence they already had in their possession.18

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Table . Intelligence organizations.

Air Force Intelligence Department of the Treasury Army Intelligence Drug Enforcement Administration Central Intelligence Agency Federal Bureau of Investigation Coast Guard Intelligence Marine Corps Intelligence Defense Intelligence Agency National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Department of Energy National Reconnaissance Office Department of Homeland Security National Security Agency Department of State Navy Intelligence

Source: Adapted from Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Members of the IC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic

The information at these agencies was not shared because of the existing bureaucratic inertia. Additionally, intelligence agencies were preoccupied with quantity rather than the quality of finished intelligence.19 However, in order to be useful, intelligence requires effective collection, processing, and analyzing of information. After 9/11, intelligence agencies worldwide understood that knowledge sharing was required both within and across domestic and foreign intelligence agencies.20 To rem- edy this, information-sharing reforms were proposed and implemented. These reforms involved the reorganization of the intelligence community.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 reorganized the IC. Prior to the IRTPA, the director of central intelligence of the CIA served as the head of the IC. Pursuant to the IRTPA, the new head of the IC was the director of national intelligence (DNI). The DNI serves as the head of sixteen intelligence organizations (see Table 1). The DNI is responsible for organizing and coordinating the efforts of these organizations. The DNI further serves as the chief intelligence advisor to the president.

In addition to restructuring the intelligence community, the IRTPA also implemented key provi- sions of Executive Order (EO) 13356 of August 27, 2004. EO 13356 specifically pertained to terrorism- related information. It called for the collection of this information and gave priority to the sharing of this information between agencies. EO 13356 was revoked and replaced with Executive Order 13388 of October 25, 2005. This order also emphasized the high priority placed on the exchange of information relating to terrorism. The IRTPA, as well as theHomeland Security Act of 2002 (Section 892), established a baseline for the sharing of information between federal, state, and local agencies. Reorganization alone, however, is not enough to improve information sharing. Despite the push toward greater information sharing, a “culture of sharing” has not been fully realized. This is largely due to the fact that existing organizational cultures within the IC have been resistant to change.

Mine, mine, all mine: Organizational culture of the intelligence community

The intelligence community follows a bureaucratic model. Bureaucracies are hierarchically structured and have rules and procedures in place that govern day-to-day activities. In this model, the informa- tion that flows within the agency is tightly controlled.21 These bureaucratic agencies, departments, and bureaus are often unwilling to cede control over the information they have obtained. Members within such agencies also typically donot share information among intra-agency communities.22 Such organiza- tions tend to overzealously protect their own interests to achieve their objectives.23 Their organizational culture reflects this. An organizational culture refers to the set of assumptions, values, and beliefs that members of an organization share, abide by, and utilize in their day-to-day work activities.24 The organi- zational culture thus influences the manner in which individuals act within an organization. Essentially, it influences the way in which decisions are made, the manner in which individuals are promoted, and the ways in which employees are recognized. Existing organizational cultures within the intelligence community are insular and distance themselves from other agencies within and outside the IC.

Historically, a primary goal of these agencies was to protect information. Max Weber had stated that a necessary characteristic of bureaucracies was secrecy because this reinforced the hierarchy of authority within an organization.25 Members of the IC perform several assigned objectives in a

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secretive manner. “The IC’s orientation towards secrecy is exemplified in…[National Security Coun- cil Intelligence Directive No. 12 of 1950], which advised ‘any publicity, factual or fictional, con- cerning intelligence is potentially detrimental to the effectiveness of an intelligence activity and to the national security.”’26 Existing organizational cultures in the IC require and encourage secrecy by stressing the necessity to protect their information and clandestine activities. Limited disclosure and secrecy are thus key aspects of IC processes and practices. This leads to limited information sharing.

Those agencies, departments, and bureaus that are part of the IC have unique organizational cultures and missions. Consider the missions of the CIA, FBI, and DNI. The mission of the CIA is as follows: to “[p]reempt threats and further US national security objectives by collecting intelligence that matters, producing objective all-source analysis, conducting effective covert action as directed by the President, and safeguarding the secrets that help keep our Nation safe.”27 The mission of the FBI is “to lead and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive actions to protect the United States.”28 The DNI’s mission is to “lead intelligence integration” and “forge an intelligence community that delivers the most insight- ful intelligence possible.”29 The missions of these agencies place them as primary agencies in protecting the United States by engaging in some form of intelligence function. The sharing of information is not explicit or implicit in theirmissions. It is no surprise, therefore, that post-9/11, the IC continues to show a general disinclination toward information sharing (with the exception of some improvement in horizon- tal information sharing between certain agencies); this is, in part, evident by the lack of routine vertical and horizontal information sharing between agencies. Why does the IC continue in its trend toward inadequate information sharing? The IC does not share because it acts according to the interests and objectives of the agency at the expense of the wider IC.

Barriers to information sharing

Certain practices of the IC exist that serve as impediments to information exchange, such as the practice of limited information distribution and existing extensive compartmentalization practices.30 A general culture of secrecy exists in the intelligence community.31 Amain goal of the IC is to keep the information outside of the hands of adversaries. In order to keep sources intact, the intelligence community’s sources and methods must be protected. The perceived risk of inadvertent disclosure of information serves as a barrier to better cooperation and sharing of intelligence.

The collecting agency, department, and bureau has ownership and control of access to the data. Data ownership and control of access to information serves as a basis for the existing “need to know” system in the IC. “Need to know” implies that the intelligence community can determine what other agen- cies need to know. “[A] system that requires a demonstrated ‘need-to-know’ before sharing…assumes it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the information. Such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing.”32 With its “need to know,” the intelligence community evaluates the data, interprets the importance of this informa- tion, and subsequently determines which individuals need to be informed (if any). This process limits information sharing between agencies, department, and bureaus in the IC as well as those outside of the IC.

Informationwithin the IC is viewed as an instrument of power.33 The value of intelligence is related to the exclusivity of information. This information is protected and hoarded. Too often, “law enforcement, defense and intelligence agencies…seemmore interested in defending their turf than coordinating their efforts and sharing intelligence.”34 In the IC, information is viewed as a commodity; specifically, as a private good. A private good is exclusive (i.e., is restricted to a limited number of a defined set of users) and rival (i.e., its consumption diminishes its value).35 However, intelligence should be viewed as a club good. A club good is only available to themembers of the club and its benefits do not diminish according to consumption.36 In regards to intelligence, its use by one agency in the IC does not interfere with its use by other agencies. In fact, information that is owned or controlled may be of significance to relevant others. Greater insight can also be gained by sharing information, as a wider variety of experts can access, analyze, and interpret the information. Because the value of intelligence is determined by its relevance

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and completeness, information must be made available to the appropriate parties to enable its use in a timely manner. As such, power lies in the sharing of information and not the hoarding of it.

The agency that collects the information is responsible for determining who should have access to it. Protocols for accessing this information exist through the compartmentalization of intelligence. Each agency classifies information according to its existing rules and regulations. The classification systems include the modes of access and rules for granting access to information. In the IC, information is com- partmentalized according to the following classifications: top secret, secret, and confidential.37 This com- partmentalization is a form of “need to know.” If there is no need for a person to know the facts on some issue, the data cannot be accessed by that person. Currently, the compartmentalization of information and the limited distribution of information makes the expansion of the pool of those who need to know about intelligence particularly challenging. Accordingly, this classification system serves as an obstacle to information sharing.

Ultimately, there is a general reluctance to share information between IC organizations, departments, and bureaus.38 A driving force behind the traditional intelligence community culture is to ensure that sources andmethods are not compromised. The “new” culture requires that intelligence is shared among relevant stakeholders. To foster information sharing, the intelligence community needs to find a way to overcome existing barriers to collaboration. To overcome these barriers, a change in the existing organi- zational culture of the intelligence community is required.

Changing organizational culture

In order for the organizational culture to change, the mission, vision, policies, and practices of an agency should align with the purported changes to the organizational culture. Change in an organization is difficult; this is largely due to the fact that culture and attitudes are deeply entrenched in the system. Kurt Lewin posited three stages of organizational change: unfreeze, change, and refreeze.39 The first stage, unfreeze, involves preparing the organization to accept the changes. Existing behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs need to be challenged.40 Each organization must critically evaluate its processes and determine what changes need to be made. Themanner in which change will occur will depend on the organization. The differences between the current organizational culture and the desired organizational culture should be identified. Each agencymust clearly set out cultural change as needed so that it can focus its efforts and resources in these areas. A new vision and mission should be developed that encompasses the needed changes to the organization and its functioning. The organizational culture can be changed by developing a clear set of actions and the manner in which they are to be accomplished. Goals must be clarified and measures must be put in place to measure progress. The necessity for change needs to be emphasized as well.

During the next stage, change, concerns may arise about how things can be accomplished.41 If such issues are not addressed, the necessary changes to the organizational culture cannot be effectively enforced or goals accomplished.42 This stage seeks to assist members in institutionalizing or internal- izing the changes. This requires incorporating the changes into day-to-day practices. Additionally, the processes that support change and those that serve as a barrier to change need to be identified. More- over, the “new” culture must be accepted by the members of the organization. This requires its thor- ough communication to its members and the training of members on new requirements and prac- tices.43 A compelling message must also be communicated that explains why the status quo will not suffice.44 The benefits of change should be communicated as well.45 Furthermore, training should be implemented to ensure understanding of the needed competencies to enforce the change in organiza- tional culture. Change does not occur quickly. “Employees…are expected to accept change immedi- ately. The fact is that building trust requires time and experience together.”46 Indeed, it requires time for individuals to embrace the new direction and participate proactively in the organizational culture change.

Not all members will view the change in a positive light. In fact, resistance to the change should be anticipated; resistance is inevitable when the status quo is threatened.47 This resistance must be addressed by identifying sources of opposition to the change and dealing with them accordingly. There

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are many forces within an organization that are against change that need to be taken into consider- ation.48 In particular, employees may lack specific information concerning the change. In this case, employees may not be aware of the reasons for the change, and how, when, and for whom these changes are occurring.49 Also, employees may fail to perceive the need for change. Here, employees may believe that the organization is operating effectively and productively as is; therefore, employees fail to perceive the reason for such a change to occur.50 In addition, “employees may demonstrate a “we-they” attitude and…[accordingly, they may] view the change agent as their enemy.”51 Furthermore, employees may perceive the change as a threat to their expertise, status, or security; that is, “employees may fear change, desire to maintain power, or act complacent towards the change.”52

When changes are in progress and individuals within an organization have embraced the “new” culture (to the extent possible), the organization is ready to refreeze (i.e., the third and final stage of organizational change). In the refreeze stage, the necessary changes are implemented and maintained.53 The refreezing process also requires emphasizing and celebrating change. If the benefits of change are not reinforced, the organization will quickly return to its old working habits. Leaders play a promi- nent role in the success of organizational change.54 A champion should also exist who accepts own- ership for the successful implementation of organizational culture change.55 Apart from communicating the change, incentives for change must be created. Indeed, to institutionalize and sustain the change, an incentive program is required with rewards and promotions being contingent on cooperation and sharing.56

Finally,motivation is critical to effect change. “Motivation concerns getting the desired outcomes from employees that help attain goals.”57 According to AbrahamMaslow, individuals are motivated to achieve certain needs.58 Maslow indicated five types of needs and they are as follows (they are indicated from the most basic need at the lowest level to the highest need at the greatest level): physiological (e.g., hunger and thirst); safety and security (e.g., stability, protection, and need for structure); belongingness (e.g., fit- ting in with groups); esteem (i.e., esteem for oneself and the respect one receives from others; e.g., status, competence, prestige, and recognition); and self-actualization (i.e., one’s desire to reach his or her full potential).59 Tomotivate employees to accept change in the organizational culture, the needs of employ- ees should be targeted and satisfied through the use of incentives. Without motivation, meaningful and lasting change will not occur.

Fostering a culture of information sharing

The organizational culture of the IC includes the compartmentalization of information, “need to know” access to this information, and restrained information sharing. The “need to know” practices run con- trary to the IC’s mission of information sharing. To accomplish knowledge sharing, a change in orga- nizational culture is required. The change should be from “need to know” to “need to share.” Such a change is needed across the IC, and not just within one agency. To ensure lasting change, members of the IC need to be compliant with the existing reform process that seeks to enable better information sharing.

To accomplish this, a behavioral approach to the change in organizational culture is required. The behavioral approach (also known as organizational development) “improves communication, group behavior, intergroup behavior, leadership skills, and power relations by changing employee’s knowledge, skills, interactions, and attitudes as well as the organizational culture.”60 The scope of the change must be reorientation. Reorientation is the “radical or discontinuous change that anticipates a change in the industry, often involving a fundamental redefinition of the organization, such as a significant change in identity, visions, strategy, or values.”61

To facilitate the acceptance of this change within the IC, all employees must participate in the change process; theremust be an existing open communication system inwhich theywill participate in decision- making procedures; upper management must openly support the change; and training must be pre- scribed to indicate the benefits of change. In order to implement and sustain these changes, the following recommendations are made:

COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 193

(1) Extensive communication with employees. Specifically, constant communication should occur concerning the change process and its benefits, to a point where the process itself becomes ingrained in employees and becomes a part of their work life. This implies scheduling regular informational meetings for all employees affected by the change in order to involve employees in the process.62 However, this is not limited to meetings alone; information can be distributed in terms of memos or emails, or be posted on a bulletin board (among other areas both online and offline).

(2) Employee involvement in decision making.63 This will instill a sense of belongingness and impor- tance in the employee. It will make the employee think of the organization in terms of “us” rather than “them.” In this case, weekly ormonthlymeetings should be held inwhich employees can pro- pose new ideas. Monthly meetings should be held to determine the effectiveness of the changes. During these meetings, employees are welcome to share their opinions on the change process and provide feedback on things that are working and are not working with the change process. Furthermore, employees are welcome to make any suggestions on how to improve the process, by providing their own ideas on how to better facilitate the change process or on things that are missing—the latter is to be looked at in the future.

(3) Educational and/or training programs. Educational and/or training programs should be imple- mented to identify the positive outcomes of change, both to the organization within the IC and to the employees. Also, these programs should indicate the benefits of the implementation of this change. In addition, these programs can prepare employees for the organizational require- ments after the change. Here, employees should be trained on new processes involved in the reforms. This will enable members to behave in a manner that is conducive to the change pro- cess and enable such participants to behave in a manner conducive to the intelligence commu- nity’s mission. Furthermore, the IC should also develop information-sharing materials, provide information-sharing training, and share best practices across the intelligence community in infor- mation sharing.64 These training programs can be held once a week or month (depending on the needs and resources of the organization).

(4) Chain of command support for changes.Most importantly, higher-level staffwithin an organization should support the change and openly communicate their support of the change to theworkforce. They should not only support it but constantly stress the benefits of the change and the long-term positive outcomes that the change will bring to the workforce and to the organization as well.

(5) Change of mission statement. Tomake information sharing a part of daily activities within organi- zations in the IC amission statement change is required. Thismission statement should reflect the “DNI’s stated priority of creating a ‘responsibility to provide”’ culture (or culture of information sharing) in the IC.65

(6) Incentives for information sharing. Incentives in the form of rewards can be used to motivate employees to work together to achieve a specific goal and they can also be used to motivate the individual to achieve a certain goal. Rewards that promote teamwork and healthy competition should be implemented. Here, employees that excel in information-sharing endeavors within and, wherever warranted, outside of the IC should be recognized and rewarded. Furthermore, divisions as a whole could be recognized in terms of achievements in horizontal and vertical information sharing. The criteria for the allocation of rewards should be clearly delineated. They should provide clear and concise details onwhat constitutes outstanding performance andwhat standardsmust bemet before an individual is eligible for an award. Intrinsic and extrinsic rewards should both be used to improve employee performance and motivate them66 by targeting their “esteem” needs. Intrinsic rewards focus on personal competence, sense of achievement, and self-determination.67 On the other hand, extrinsic rewards are awarded according to achievement and tasks. In the end, to develop an information-sharing environment within the IC, monetary and nonmonetary awards should be given for achievements in horizontal and vertical information sharing; agency-wide recognition should be given to those who develop and enforce information-sharing practices; individual information-sharing accomplishments, through emails, newsletters, and other online

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and offline means, should be distributed throughout the IC; and an annual federal award for information sharing should be established.68

(7) Revision of existing performance appraisals within the IC. Performance appraisals reinforce orga- nizational values.69 Additionally, performance appraisals aim at confirming the progress of an individual and highlighting the strengths and development areas of the individual against pre- viously agreed objectives. They are used to provide feedback in order to motivate employ- ees to improve performance “by linking [performance] appraisals to performance-contingent rewards.”70 Annual performance appraisals in the IC should be altered to include the new respon- sibility of members to engage in horizontal and vertical information sharing. The IC should require the implementation of a performance evaluation system in each agency that “develops, reinforces, and rewards individual competencies such as collaboration, information sharing, tech- nical excellence and contribution to mission.”71

Conclusion

The most damaging of failures in the intelligence process is the inability to make use of the available data in order to give adequate warning to prevent a threat from materializing. This occurred on 9/11. Relevant threat informationwas not shared between agencies, preventing them from connecting the dots from available intelligence that pointed to a terrorist plot to attack the United States.

Despite structural reforms in the IC, vertical and (to a lesser extent) horizontal information sharing has not adequately improved. Existing organizational cultures within the IC seek to protect the secrecy of their operations and information. Particularly, these organizational cultures include the compartmen- talization of information, “need to know” access to this information, and restrained information sharing. In spite of the calls for greater information sharing, a culture of information sharing within the IC does not exist.

To accomplish this, a change in organizational culture is required. This change must include exten- sive communication of the change in organizational culture to the employees of the agencies in the IC, involvement of IC employees in the decision-making process, educational and/or training programs cov- ering organizational change and new requirements of employees in pursuit of implementing this change and making it a part of daily operations, the support of the chain of command in the IC for the change in organizational culture, a change of the mission statements of agencies within the IC, creating incen- tives for information sharing, and modifying existing performance appraisals within the IC to include the responsibility of members to engage in horizontal and vertical information sharing. A key driver in sustaining the change is motivation of employees within an organization. In order tomotivate employees within the IC to accept the change in their organizational culture, the belongingness and esteem needs of individuals should be satisfied through the use of incentives. The change in organizational culture cannot be effectively accepted, implemented, and maintained without these incentives.

Notes

1. Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006). 2. Alan Breakspear, “A NewDefinition of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security, vol. 28, no. 5 (2013): 678–693. 3. Ibid. 4. James Burch, The Domestic Intelligence Gap: Progress Since 9/11?Homeland Security Affairs, Supplement: Proceed-

ings of the 2008 Center for Homeland Defense and Security Annual Conference (April 2008), 27. 5. Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Today’s Rising Terrorist Threat and the Danger to the United States: Reflec-

tions on the Tenth Anniversary of The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, National Security Program, Homeland Security Project, 2014).

6. Bruce Hoffman, EdwinMeese III, and Timothy J. Roemer, The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century. 9/11 Review Commission (unclassified report, Washington, DC, 2015), 84.

7. Kean and Hamilton, Today’s Rising Terrorist Threat. 8. Josh Levs andMonte Plott, “Boy, 8, One of 3 Killed in Bombings at BostonMarathon; ScoresWounded,” CNN, April

18, 2013 http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/15/us/boston-marathon-explosions/index.html; CNN, “Boston Marathon

COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 195

Terror Attack Fast Facts,” July 11, 2013, available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror- attack-fast-facts/index.html

9. Kean and Hamilton, Today’s Rising Terrorist Threat. 10. Ibid., 28. 11. Hoffman, Meese III, and Roemer, The FBI. 12. Maras, Marie-Helen, Counterterrorism (Burlington, MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2012). 13. E.g., John Rollins, “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (CRS)

Report for Congress, RL34070, 2008, available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf; Agnes Gereben Schae- fer, “The History of Domestic Intelligence in the United States: Lessons for Assessing the Creation of a New Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency,” in Brian A. Jackson, ed. The Challenge of Domestic Intel- ligence in a Free Society: A Multidisciplinary Look at the Creation of a U.S. Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 13–47; James R. Clapper, Jr., “Effective Intelligence Must Remain a Top Priority: From the Director,” The Police Chief, vol. 79 (2012): 12; Robert A. Smith, “The Pursuit of Law Enforcement Intelligence Training and Education,” The Police Chief, vol. 81 (2014): 30–35.

14. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, “Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,” 79th Congress, Second Session, Document No. 244 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), xi.

15. David Kahn, “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 5 (1991), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/47442/david-kahn/the-intelligence-failure-of-pearl-harbor

16. Frederick P. Hitz, “The Future of American Espionage,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 13, no. 1 (2000): 1–20.

17. Paul Maddrell, “Failing Intelligence: U.S. Intelligence in the Age of Transnational Threats,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 22, no. 2 (2009): 213.

18. Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004).

19. Alex Tyakoff, “Counter Terrorism and Systems Dynamics: Modeling Organizational Learning in Postmodern Ter- rorist Groups,” in Klint Alexander, ed., Terrorism and Global Insecurity: A Multidisciplinary Perspective (Chicago, IL: Linton Atlantic, 2009), pp. 179–192.

20. William J. Lahneman, “Knowledge-Sharing in the Intelligence Community after 9/11,” International Journal of Intel- ligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 17, no. 4 (2004): 614–633.

21. Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science: Discovering Order in a Chaotic World (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2006).

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COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 197

Notes on contributor

Dr. Marie-Helen Maras ( [email protected]) is an associate professor at the Department of Security, Fire, and Emer- gency Management at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. She is also part of the faculty of the MS program in Digital Forensics and Cybersecurity and PhD program in Criminal Justice at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Dr. Maras has a DPhil in law and an MPhil in criminology and criminal justice from the University of Oxford. In addition, she holds a graduate degree in industrial and organizational psychology from the University of NewHaven and undergraduate degrees in computer and information science and psychology from UMUC. She is the author of Cybercriminology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016);Computer Forensics: Cybercriminals, Laws, and Evidence (now in its second edition; Burlington, MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2014); Counterterrorism (Burlington, MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2012); CRC Press Ter- rorism Reader (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013); and Transnational Security (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2014), among other publications. Furthermore, Dr. Maras is the creator and co-editor for a monograph and edited volume series, Pal- grave Studies in Cybercrime and Cybersecurity, at Palgrave-Macmillan. Prior to her academic post, she served in the U.S. Navy for approximately seven years, gaining significant experience in security and law enforcement from her posts as a Navy law enforcement specialist and command investigator. During the early stages of her military career, she worked as an electronics and calibration technician.