Research Paper
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European Management Journal Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 189–198, 2002 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reservedPergamon
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Trends in Outsourcing: Contrasting USA and Europe ANDREW KAKABADSE, Cranfield School of Management NADA KAKABADSE, Cranfield School of Management
An international survey of outsourcing contrasts current practice between US and European compa- nies. US companies are identified as pursuing more value adding sourcing strategies while European companies are more focused on gaining economies of scale through outsourcing. Despite the com- modity orientation of outsourcing, both European and US companies consider outsourcing as critical to their organizational strategy. For both US and European companies the most preferred relation- ship between service purchaser and service pro- vider is that of a single provider who has an indus- try focused, proven track record. Overall, US and European companies report higher than expected levels of satisfaction with outsourcing. 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Outsourcing, Competitive advantage, Cost discipline, Added value, Sourcing satisfaction, Service purchaser, Service provider
Introduction
A critical consideration for the senior management of many organizations is differentiation (Quinn, 1999). Knowledge leadership, managing for value, cus- tomer service and care, as well as cost discipline and the pursuit of scale economies, have become critical considerations in the pursuit of competitive advan- tage (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999). Whether the organizational interest can stand apart and thereby gain advantage over the competition, or just survive the next budget cuts, managers are often balancing contrasting synergies, such as managing for value and customer service against pursuing cost reductions (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000a). How- ever, achieving greater advantage through enhanced differentiation is becoming an ever greater challenge
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as enterprises are considered near to optimum efficiency through the adoption of new technology and the application of improved management tech- niques (Porter, 1990). Thereby, in order to gain that extra advantage, many organizations are turning to outsourcing as the means to ensure far greater cost disciplines, whilst improving quality of service and service/product delivery capability (Domberger, 1998).
Outsourcing, or as previously termed, contracting out, is an historical well-established practice. As far back as the Romans, efficient and systematic con- tracting out was undertaken for the purposes of tax collection. Eighteenth and nineteenth century England contracted the private sector to provide for the maintenance and operation of street lights, the management of prisons, the maintenance of public highways, the collection of taxes and the collection of ordinary and industrial refuse (Industry Com- mission, 1996). Comparable practice was witnessed in the USA, Australia and France. Mail delivery was the responsibility of private enterprise in the USA and Australia for most of the nineteenth century. The construction and management of the railways and water storage and distribution was driven by com- petitive tender in France (Industry Commission, 1996). Hence, prior to and during the industrial rev- olution, contractual relationships for the provision of specific services was a fundamental element of econ- omic organization between government and private enterprise.
However, the introduction of volume production technology in the twentieth century altered the econ- omic landscape from a myriad of horizontal contrac- tually based relationships in favour of the large, ver- tically integrated enterprise. In effect, the management of transactional requirements became internalized to the host organization and, as a result,
TRENDS IN OUTSOURCING
contracting out declined (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000a). Yet, the economic reasoning that sponsored the self-sufficient large organization, has now led to the resurgence of outsourcing. The ever greater demand for effective cost management has nurtured the emergence of independent specialization. Prevail- ing wisdom dictates that those who can best do a job are specialists and are more able to function effec- tively when unhindered by the demands of bureau- cratic dictate (Finlay and King, 1999). Emerging evi- dence strongly suggests that in today’s market circumstances of narrowing economic life cycles, the large vertically structured corporation is not suf- ficiently efficient to meet ever greater cost discipline demands, and not sufficiently responsive to provide for prudent service quality to the satisfaction of an ever more discerning consumer (Takac, 1994; Willcocks and Choi, 1995). Hence, the emergence of various forms of hybrid organizations in the shape of partnerships, joint ventures and various manifes- tations of strategic alliances, all of which have given rise to alternative forms and features of outsourcing.
On the basis that outsourcing has become, and may continue to become, an ever more popular mech- anism for differentiation and the realizing of com- petitive advantage or even just ensuring survival, this paper explores differences of outsourcing practice between US and European companies. Reported are the results of a Cranfield School of Management study on developments in outsourcing. Particular attention is given to examining the reasons for out- sourcing, the business processes and functions being most popularly outsourced, the nature of the relationship between service purchaser and service provider, the profile of the preferred service pro- viders, the level of criticality of the outsourced activi- ties, the impact on employees as a result of outsourc- ing and the level of satisfaction with the outcomes of outsourcing. Comparison is also made between emerging trends in the literature and the results of the Cranfield survey.
The Cranfield Survey
The study was undertaken in two stages; initial inter- views with a sample of service purchasers and ser- vice providers in order to ascertain the key issues and trends in outsourcing.
The interviews were followed by an empirically based survey of European (including UK) and US based organizations, completed in June 2001, wher- eby 747 respondents returned fully completed ques- tionnaires. All of the respondents are senior man- agers, including those of senior general management status, main and subsidiary board directors, manag- ing directors (MDs), chief executive officers (CEOs) and chairmen.
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Reasons for outsourcing
The driver is … to achieve cost benefits. We can cut down our costs, whether that is operational costs or whether it’s the total cost of technology. Chairman, Global US based Leisure Group
The Chairman of the US based Leisure Group high- lights cost reduction as the critical reason for out- sourcing. The Chairman’s views are supported by an extensive body of literature that identifies achieving greater economies of scale as a prime reason for out- sourcing (Finlay and King, 1999; Currie and Willcocks, 1997; National Computing Centre, 1999a, b). For example, a study examining the outsourcing practices of more than 100 key organizations con- cluded that most western companies outsource prim- arily to save on overheads through short-term cost savings (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1999). This find- ing has been echoed by other studies, which show that until the 1990s, the major reason for IT outsourc- ing was cost-effective access to specialized comput- ing and system development skills, and to special external functional capabilities (Nairn, 1999). As the 1990s progressed, competitive forces pressurized large companies to continue to apply greater disci- pline over costs and over product to market time cycles, resulting in reducing the size of the product and services portfolio and a loosening of the vertical links in the production process. As a result, corpora- tions have divested what they have viewed as the peripheral elements to their business in order to focus upon their “core” business. For example, Unil- ever, the Anglo-Dutch group, with a portfolio of 1600 food, toiletries and household products, in Sep- tember 1999, announced that in order to enhance sales growth and profitability, it would focus on a smaller number of “power brands” (core products) which would have greater world-wide reach (Willman, 1999). The aim of their strategy is to reduce costs and exploit new channels of distribution, such as the Internet. The search for greater efficiency, lead- ing to increased specialization, coupled with attempting to achieve other value adding objectives, highlights a fundamental issue for businesses, that of determining what is core, whilst those processes and activities that are considered to be more peripheral can be passed over to an external service provider (Peisch, 1995; Mullin, 1996).
However, certain writers consider that what is core and what is peripheral is an academic debate, as out- sourcing decisions should be driven by the nature of the sourcing contracts, and the contractual and infor- mal relationships between the purchaser and sup- plier. The use of market opportunities to determine greater competitive advantage, and the successful management of contracts, in turn, lead to the devel- opment of a new cluster of core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). The view proposed is that administering outsourced relationships effec- tively becomes a core competence in itself. The rea-
TRENDS IN OUTSOURCING
son is that an inability to manage outsourced relationships could mean that competitive advantage is not gained as the poorly developed service purchaser/service provider relationship inhibits fully leveraging the competencies available from the ser- vice provider (Williamson, 1996).
Additional to the arguments of economies of scale versus strategic sourcing, is a third view which con- siders that outsourcing is now all embracing and not concentrated on one activity or function. A PriceWat- erhouseCoopers (1999) study established that out- sourcing has moved from efficiently attending to a single function process or activity, to reconfiguring whole processes in order to realize greater value across the enterprise. In effect, the current trend is from outsourcing parts, facilities and components, towards outsourcing value adding systems and activities, such as customer response handling, pro- curement and management. Daimler–Chrysler, for example, outsourced the management of its supplier relationship portfolio to Andersen Consulting, for the production of the “smart car” in France (Chalos and Sung, 1998).
Cranfield Survey
The survey identifies fourteen reasons for outsourc- ing, in which three distinct clusters of reasons are highlighted (Figure 1).
First, aiming to achieve best practice across the enterprise and to also enhance the cost discipline and control skills of managers, are closely clustered. Additionally, improving service quality and manage- ment focusing more on the core competencies of the organization, score closely. Further, gaining access to new technology and skills, reducing headcount, enhancing the organization’s capability to develop new products and services and reduce capital costs, are identified as the third cluster of reasons for out- sourcing.
However, within the emerging overall pattern, differ- ences of emphasis in terms of outsourcing are ident- ified between European and US companies. Cost discipline and reduction of costs are reported as important motives for outsourcing by European com- panies, whereas cost management and aiming to ach- ieve best practice are key drivers for US enterprises. The more developmental orientation displayed by US companies for pursuing outsourcing is reinforced, as senior US managers rate improving service quality, focusing on core competencies and accessing new technology and skills higher than do European senior managers. Equally, US managers report a greater inclination to reduce headcount. In terms of attending to other cost issues, such as capital costs, transaction costs and production costs, similar pat- terns are reported. Further, European companies highlight that greater attention is being given by
European Management Journal Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 189–198, April 2002 191
them to growing in-house expertise to manage a number of different processes, activities and func- tions.
Areas Outsourced
Particular emphasis has been given to IT outsourcing in the academic and more popular business press literature (Murray and Kotabe, 1999). Why? — because global competition, downsizing, the move to flatter organization, the search for greater flexibility, rapid changes in technology and the emphasis on concentrating on core competencies, are cited as the major drivers for the upsurge in IT outsourcing. In the IT industry, data storage capability has dramati- cally increased in quality and at the same time has undergone considerable price reduction, to the extent that data storage services are being charged on a cost- per-megabyte-per-month basis, in a similar way that clients pay for utilities such as electricity and water (Nairn, 1999). In effect, IT has adopted more of a “commodity” status. Consequently, companies in their pursuit of gaining competitive advantage have been increasing their reliance on external suppliers of information services. Thus, the outsourcing of IT has experienced phenomenal growth over the past decade in North America, the UK and Australia. Western Europe, South America, and parts of South East Asia, including Japan, are now positively responding, having previously resisted the trend. The IT market analysts, the Gartner Group (1999) project a 16.3% growth rate world-wide between 1997 and 2002, estimating a $120 billion IT outsourcing market by end 2002, although such claims today seem less likely.
Further, outsourcing suppliers are looking beyond running IT systems to business process management (BPM) and, as such, make themselves available to take over functions such as billing, cheque processing and accounting (Jones, 1994). Many of these contracts have elements of shared risk, in which the supplier’s remuneration depends on the increase in profit at the client company end or through the success of a joint venture enterprise. Again, according to the Gartner Group (1999), BPM has also been predicted as another fast emerging area of the outsourcing mar- ket, within an expected market size of US $14.7 billion by year end 2002. It is the move to outsourcing BPM that has equally provided a stimulus for the emergence of shared service centres (SSCs). SSCs pro- vide a range of IT services across particular sectors through the adoption of common technology systems and infrastructure, all to enhance economies of scale (Heikkila, 2000).
Cranfield Survey
In contrast to the emphasis given to IT outsourcing in the literature, our survey places basic services
TRENDS IN OUTSOURCING
Figure 1 Sourcing Reasons: International Comparison (Respondents Selected Multiple Options)
above IT services as the most popular area of out- sourcing activity (Figure 2).
Third are human resource (HR) activities and related processes. US companies pay greater attention to out- sourcing basic services (a variety of services ranging from canteen facilities to office services), whereas European companies give marginally greater atten- tion to IT, HR and manufacturing outsourcing. Lower in the rankings, but considered as being of substantial importance to US and European compa- nies is technology-based outsourcing, particularly in telecommunication services and e-commerce related activities, with the US companies displaying mar- ginally greater preference in this area. In-keeping with the theme of outsourcing basic services, US companies report they give greater attention to facili- ties management outsourcing than do European companies.
Criticality of Outsourcing
Whatever the motivation for outsourcing, be that realising greater economies of scale, achieving best practice, and or, the pursuit of a cluster of sourcing strategies, the PriceWaterhouseCooper (1999) study highlights the powerful and critical impact of out- sourcing on service purchasers.
Our survey emphasizes the importance of outsourc- ing in that the processes, activities and functions that are outsourced are seen as critical to the future sur- vival of the enterprise, particularly for European companies, (Figure 3).
Even those outsourced activities that are viewed as non-critical to the future functioning of the organiza-
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tion, and despite the fact that most of what is out- sourced, particularly amongst US firms, is considered as holding commodity status, the senior managers in the survey consider that alignment exists between those activities outsourced and the strategies being pursued by the organization. Our survey also high- lights that a substantial proportion of activities that are outsourced are supported by mature technology, emphasizing the commodity status perspective of the activities and processes outsourced. Differentiation for the purposes of competitive advantage through utilizing leading edge technology and knowledge management capabilities fall low on the list of out- sourcing priorities, but are more favoured by US companies.
Sourcing Relationships
A literature examination of the range of arrange- ments between purchasers/service providers high- lights a variety of configurational forms (Bensaou, 1999). At the one end, short-term contracts encour- aging flexibility, are matched at the other with full ownership of and, or, merger between, service pur- chasers and service providers. In between lie alterna- tive arrangements involving partial ownership, joint developments, retainers and other long-term con- tracts, single contracts, relationships with preferred and trusted suppliers, multiple vendor contracts, joint ventures, individual and joint venture spin-offs, consortia and shared service consortia (Miles and Snow, 1997).
The emergence of partnership or alliance arrange- ments as alternatives to the more popular transaction based contracts (usually shorter, single contracts, with a preferred, trusted supplier), has been inter-
TRENDS IN OUTSOURCING
Figure 2 Business Processes/Functions Outsourced: International Comparison (Respondents Selected Multiple Options)
Figure 3 Importance of Outsourced Activity: International Comparison (Respondents Selected Multiple Options)
preted as providing for a closer level of interaction between client and provider (Currie and Willcocks, 1997). Partnership arrangements are identified as varying considerably from flexibly defined formal contracts to loose strategic initiatives, with a con- siderable number providing for shared risk and bene- fit. The emerging assumption in the literature is that a single vendor does not possess world-class capabili- ties in all areas of business (Domberger, 1998). Thus the emerging view is that companies should embark on selective outsourcing to multiple vendors (Currie and Willcocks, 1997).
Additionally, joint ventures, spin offs, cross equities and franchises are considered as ‘viable-to-pursue’ sourcing arrangements. Spin offs, namely the expos- ing of internal cost based activities to market forces, thereby turning them into separately managed profit
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centres, have especially been viewed as a desired, alternative form of organization for the future (Chalos and Sung, 1998). General Motors spin off of EDS, and Mercedes–Daimler AG (now Daimler– Chrysler Group) entrance into the IT market with Debis (Daimler–Chrysler Services) have been hailed as turning IT expertise into profitable revenue streams (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997).
A further, but looser form of sourcing arrangement is provided by alliances, consortia and shared service agreements (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Strategic alliances have been described as a desired arrange- ment, often because they are seen as the most appro- priate mechanism to bring together partners who entertain various, sometimes asymmetric and poss- ibly conflicting objectives. Kodak, for example pion- eered outsourcing through strategic alliances by
TRENDS IN OUTSOURCING
awarding 5 and 10 year contracts in 1989 to IBM, Digital Equipment, now operating as Entex Infor- mation Services, with an estimated value of $US 1.5 billion (Lei and Slocum, 1992). The outsourcing agreements were structured to allow the suppliers to both achieve profit and also to encourage them to continuously improve the assets under their remit.
Organizations are also turning to consortia based sourcing, otherwise known as sourced service con- sortia, for the purposes of achieving greater econom- ies of scale (Nee, 1999). For example, Gothaer Cor- poration, one of Germany’s biggest insurance groups, first formed a joint venture with IBM Germany to handle all Gothaer’s data processing, internal and external networks and the development of their applications software. Then together with two other German insurance companies, Gothaer formed a joint venture company, or sourced service consortia arrangement called Allegemeine Versicherungs- software Gmbh (General Insurance Software). The new company’s mission was to create and market software based on standard architecture, such as IBM’s Insurance Application Architecture, to other insurance companies (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997).
Cranfield Survey
According to the opinions of both service purchasers and service providers, the two most preferred out- sourcing arrangements are single contracts, parti- cularly with trusted suppliers with whom there is a history of an ongoing relationship. This is the domi- nant preference of European companies (Figure 4).
The more widely discussed contractual relationships, such as strategic alliances, contracts with multiple suppliers who are required to provide an integrated high quality service, flexible pricing contracts and various forms of partnerships, fall a considerable way behind the preferred supplier/single contract mode of operating. Overall, however, US companies opt more for strategic alliances than European firms. Shared sourcing consortia type arrangements fell so far behind the list of preferences that they have been omitted from the presentation of results.
Outsourcing Providers
Continuously mentioned in the trade press are EDS, Accentia (formerly Anderson Consulting), IBM, Geddes, Science Application International Corpor- ation (SAIC) and KPN Quest as well utilized sup- pliers of outsourcing services (Nee, 1999). However, with technological advances and the emerging view of the substantial economies of scale that can be real- ized through outsourcing IT, a relatively new type of market entrant has emerged, namely enterprises that offer IT hosting. The service of IT hosting allows
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organizations to utilize the internet to eliminate the burden of running expensive and complex infor- mation systems. Microsoft, for example, outsources to an organization called Exodus Communications for a wide range of services, particularly in the areas of corporate accounting, human resources and pay- roll (Klein, 1999). Hence, new breeds of sourcing agents have emerged over the last four years, such as application service providers (ASPs), business service providers (BSPs) and computer service providers (CSPs). In fact, certain of these niche providers act as outsourcers to other niche providers. Exodus Com- munications, an example of a CSP, acts as a ‘server of warehouse’, housing equipment for ASPs and BSPs and those involved in e-commerce transactions, thus allowing customers to ‘plug into’ their software (Klein, 1999).
Cranfield Survey
The results indicate that the majority of respondents prefer suppliers with a proven track record (more US companies) and with particular industry sector experience (more European companies; Figure 5).
Niche providers and contracting with a relevant mix of providers form the third and fourth most preferred options, virtually equally weighted between by Euro- pean and US companies. The more established ser- vice providers, such as EDS, Debis, the big five con- sultants (Andersens, KPMG, PWC, etc.), ISPs and ASPs form the “tail-end” of preferred suppliers, with US companies displaying a greater propensity for uti- lizing the larger IT service providers, the big five con- sultancies and ASPs. Spin offs emerge as particularly low on the list of preferred service providers in con- trast to the attention they have been given in the literature.
Impact of Outsourcing on Human Resources Management (HRM)
The IT revolution and the ever growing requirement by companies to differentiate themselves against competitors through strategies which provide a var- iety of cost and service quality advantages, have impacted on the shape of jobs and triggered a rede- sign in the way work is structured (Tyson and York, 2000). Organizations in the USA, Canada, Northern Europe and Australia have increasingly adopted lim- ited term contracts, associate-like relationships and home based teleworking, as a standard form of con- tractual relationship with employees (Sparrow, 2000). One outcome of such developments has been the view that the individual has benefited from flexible employment arrangements, particularly in terms of allowing for greater time with the family. In 1998, in the European Union, there were 1.1 million people,
TRENDS IN OUTSOURCING
Figure 4 Nature of Sourcing Relationship: International Comparison (Respondents Selected Multiple Options)
Figure 5 Preferred Service Providers (Respondents Selected Multiple Options)
approximately 0.8% of the workforce, employed on such a basis. By year end 2000, this figure is estimated to have stood at 4.4 million, or 3.1% of the workforce (Tregaskis, 1999). The alternative perspective is that there no longer exists a supportive social contract between employer and employee, creating an environment of insecurity and limited commitment to the workplace (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000b).
Cranfield Survey
US and European companies report that the most preferred strategy is to transfer staff to suppliers (Figure 6).
European companies, in particular, highlight that no
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significant human resource implications are likely to arise from outsourcing, or where they do, redeploy- ment is likely to take place but with no change in employment conditions. In contrast, US companies more favour adopting a mix of HR strategies and indicate that they are more likely to opt for pursuing redundancies. The least utilized arrangement, mar- ginally more favoured by US companies, is redeploy- ment but with new terms and conditions. Although our survey results confirm that outsourcing leads to changes for employees, the overall trend emphasizes change of employer, but not necessarily change of contract. Other than redundancies, contractual obli- gations are identified as maintained but with a new host organization.
TRENDS IN OUTSOURCING
Figure 6 Outsourcing Impact on Employees: International Comparison (Respondents Selected Multiple Options)
Satisfaction with Outsourcing
Recently conducted surveys report high levels of dis- satisfaction with outsourcing. One study indicated that nearly 70% of companies who have undergone outsourcing are unhappy with one or more aspects of their relationships with suppliers (Lacity et al., 1995). Additional studies show that only about half of IT outsourcing contracts deliver the promised 20–30% cost savings (Kessler et al., 1999). The majority opi- nion in the academic literature and popular press is of a senior management that is increasingly recognis- ing that the disadvantages of outsourcing outweigh the advantages, even after agreements have been signed (Forst, 1999). The areas of complaint are that either the wrong provider has been contacted and, or the levels of service, the guarantees and the service purchaser/service provider relationship, have been ill-defined. Equally, numerous cases have been cited of too ambitious goals being agreed between the host organization and the suppliers or that service pur- chasers have expressed dissatisfaction with their con- tractual agreement(s) concerning the underestim- ation of time and the skills needed for effectively managing outsourcing contracts (Quinn, 1999). Additional complaints include unsatisfactory deliv- ery of services, unco-operative vendor behaviour, the cost of the service being too high, and/or, the com- petitive advantage to be gained from outsourcing no longer exists (Moran, 1999).
Cranfield Survey
In contrast to the trends reported by other studies, our survey highlights positive experiences of out- sourcing (Figure 7).
The majority of US and European respondents indi-
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cate that they are satisfied with their agreed out- sourcing arrangements. Thirty eight per cent and under indicate they have mixed feelings as to the value they have gained from outsourcing and less than 6% report dissatisfaction with their experience of outsourcing. Virtually identical results emerge for both European and US managers, whereby the Amer- icans marginally report greater satisfaction with out- sourcing, whilst senior managers of European com- panies emphasize slightly more negative experiences.
Discussion
The survey results emphasize that for most companies, outsourcing is not undertaken to solely satisfy the pressing need for cost discipline. US companies adopt a more strategically oriented approach to outsourcing through concurrently aiming to achieve best practice, improving service quality, focusing on the core com- petencies of the organization, attempting to better util- ize and leverage new technology throughout the organization’s processes and systems, whilst main- taining a discipline on costs. Even though European companies pay greater attention to achieving econom- ies of scale, the non-cost based benefit they gain through outsourcing is clearly reported.
Despite the fact that American companies are more likely to pursue value adding strategies, they do ident- ify outsourcing as more non-critical to the organization and those areas and activities outsourced as being of a more commodity status than do European companies. Such trends are accentuated further through an exam- ination of the location of outsourcing decisions.
For European organizations, a greater proportion of outsourcing decisions are made at board level, whilst
TRENDS IN OUTSOURCING
Figure 7 Outsourcing Satisfaction: International Comparison
for US companies, more decisions are made by senior line and, or, by senior functional managers (Figure 8).
These findings are in keeping with the results of other studies, namely that the sourcing debate is migrating up the organization to CIO (Chief Information Officer), CFO (Chief Finance Officer) or CEO (Chief Executive Officer) levels (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998). Our survey results emphasize that it will be more critical for the senior management of European companies to emerge with a cohesive view concerning the value out- sourcing can provide, as outsourcing is likely to be, for them, of substantially greater strategic significance. The more mature market position of North America and the greater experience of US management in tackling outsourcing challenges indicates that locating and real- izing value in the organization is an exercise more fam- iliar to senior US line managers. In contrast to Euro-
Figure 8 Initiation of Decision to Outsource
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pean companies, outsourcing amongst US companies is viewed as more of an operational tool, as the key strategic issues are likely to have been clarified and a way forward agreed and committed to by top manage- ment.
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ANDREW NADA KAKABADSE, KAKABADSE, Cranfield Cranfield School of Manage- School of Management, ment, Cranfield University, Cranfield University, Cran- Cranfield, Bedford MK43 field, Bedford MK43 0AL, 0AL, UK. E-mail: N.Korac- UK. E-mail: a.p.kakabad- [email protected] [email protected]
Nada Kakabadse is Senior Andrew Kakabadse is Pro- Research Fellow at Cranfield fessor of International Man- School of Management. She agement Development, Head has co-authored five books, of Human Resource Group, the most recent is Smart
and Deputy Director of Cranfield School of Manage- Sourcing (2001). She is Co-Editor of the Journal of ment. He is currently involved in consulting to govern- Management Development and European Editor of the ment bodies around the world as well as numerous International Journal of Corporate Governance. private organizations. He has published 20 books and more than 100 journal articles and is on the editorial boards of journals.
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Sparrow, P.R. (2000) New employee behaviours, work designs and forms of work organization: what is in store for the future of work? Journal of Managerial Psychology 15(3), 202–218.
Takac, P.F. (1994) Outsourcing: a key to controlling escalating IT costs? International Journal of Technology Management 9(2), 139–155.
Tregaskis, O. (1999) Telework in its national context. In Manag- ing Telework, eds K. Daniels, D. Lamond and P. Standen, pp. 97–115. ITP, London.
Tyson, S. and York, A. (2000) Essentials of HRM (4th edn). But- terworth Heinemann, Oxford.
Willcocks, L. and Choi, C. (1995) Co-operative partnership and total IT outsourcing: from contractual obligation to strategic advance? European Management Journal 13, 167–178.
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- Trends in Outsourcing:
- Introduction
- The Cranfield Survey
- Reasons for outsourcing
- Cranfield Survey
- Areas Outsourced
- Cranfield Survey
- Criticality of Outsourcing
- Sourcing Relationships
- Cranfield Survey
- Outsourcing Providers
- Cranfield Survey
- Impact of Outsourcing on Human Resources Management (HRM)
- Cranfield Survey
- Satisfaction with Outsourcing
- Cranfield Survey
- Discussion
- References
o6 ( dear of service outsourcing).pdf
Economic Policy April 2005 Printed in Great Britain © CEPR, CES, MSH, 2005.
Fear o f service
outsourcing
Is it justified?
Blackwell Publishing, Ltd.Oxford, UKECOPEconomic Policy0266-4658© CEPR, CES, MSH, 2005.April 200542Original ArticleSERVICE OUTSOURCINGMARY AMITI and SHANG-JIN WEIFear of service outsourcing Is it justified?
SUMMARY
The recent media and political attention on service outsourcing from developed to developing countries gives the impression that outsourcing is exploding. As a result, workers in industrial countries are anxious about job losses. This paper aims to establish what are the hypes and what are the facts. The results show that although service outsourcing has been steadily increasing it is still very low, and that in the United States and many other industrial countries ‘insourcing’ of services is greater than outsourcing. Using the United Kingdom as a case study, we find that job growth at a sectoral level is not negatively related to service outsourcing.
— Mary Amiti and Shang-Jin Wei
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SERVICE OUTSOURCING 309
Economic Policy April 2005 pp. 307–347 Printed in Great Britain © CEPR, CES, MSH, 2005.
Fear of service outsourcing: is it justified?
Mary Amiti and Shang-Jin Wei
Research Department, International Monetary Fund and CEPR; Research Department, International Monetary Fund, CEPR and NBER
1. INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing of services has received an enormous amount of attention in the media and political circles in recent times. In just five months, between January and May 2004, there were 2,634 reports in US newspapers on service outsourcing, mostly focusing on the fear of job losses.
1
In particular, there have been reports about jobs moving from industrial countries like the United States and the United Kingdom to developing countries such as India. These concerns are not limited to the United States. Similar reports appeared in newspapers in other industrial countries such as the United Kingdom, which had 380 reports on outsourcing in its newspapers during the same period. Newspapers in Australia have also published similar reports. Figure 1 plots a quarterly count of news stories and commentaries in major newspapers and
This paper was prepared for the October 2004 Panel Meeting of
Economic Policy
in Amsterdam. The authors wish to thank Emanuelle Auriol, Peter Clark, Tito Cordella, Caroline Freund, Jonathan Haskel, Aart Kraay, Raghuram G. Rajan, Paul Seabright (Editor) and
Economic Policy
panelists for helpful comments, and Piyush Chandra, Yuanyuan Chen, Autria Mazda and Li Zeng for excellent research assistance. The views in the paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the IMF or its policies.
The Managing Editor in charge of this paper was Paul Seabright.
1
During the two-week period, from 1 March to 5 March 2004, there were 270 such stories that simultaneously mentioned outsourcing and either job loss or unemployment in the same story.
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310 MARY AMITI AND SHANG-JIN WEI
newswire service reports on international service outsourcing from the first quarter of 1991 to the first quarter of 2004 in the United States and the United Kingdom, which we have constructed using an electronic database on newspaper articles (FACTIVA). Both indices show a clear upward trend in media interest in interna- tional outsourcing of services.
2
All this media hype would lead one to believe that service outsourcing is some new phenomenon that has exploded. What has stirred such an interest in outsourcing? Many people would argue that outsourcing is indeed just a normal part of interna- tional trade, whereas others see it as something different. To date, there is not even agreement on what the term outsourcing means. The American Heritage Dictionary
2
The index for the United States exhibits local peaks in 1996, 2000 and 2004, which are all presidential election years.
Figure 1. News count of outsourcing
Source: (1) US news sources: Dow Jones News Service, Financial Times, The New York Times (Abstracts), The Seattle Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post. (2) UK news sources: Daily Mail (UK), Financial Times, The Economist (UK), The Guardian (UK), The Observer (UK), The Sunday Times (London), The Times (London).
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SERVICE OUTSOURCING 311
defines it as ‘The procuring of services or products . . . from an outside supplier or manufacturer in order to cut costs.’ Some people interpret ‘outside’ to mean outside the firm, and others outside the country. Both usages are common. But since the main concerns in industrial countries are with ‘exporting jobs’ to developing countries, we will restrict our attention to international outsourcing. We delve further into the meaning and origins of outsourcing in the next section.
What is new about outsourcing today is that it is increasingly in services. Although international outsourcing of material inputs is still far more quantitatively important than services for a typical industrialized economy, as we show below, the current wave of anxiety in advanced economies is mostly about international outsourcing of services. There is a sense in which services outsourcing is qualitatively different from material outsourcing in terms of the ‘stress effect’. In the past, the service sector was largely considered impervious to international competition. Accountants did not fear that someone abroad would take their high-paying jobs, but they certainly benefited from the cheaper imported manufactured goods that open trade allowed. For this reason, service sector professionals were likely to have been staunch supporters of open trade. With the improvement in the communication technology such as the Internet, services can cross political borders via the airwaves.
3
Jobs in fields ranging from architecture to radiology seem much more at risk. While it was possible for firms to relocate abroad in the past, they had to give up something – their closeness to important markets, for example. With the new technologies they can retain these links while also obtaining access to cheap, but well-trained labour. The lack of control and the worry that outsourcing could spread contributes to the fears of job losses among white collar workers. A study conducted by the University of Maryland found that, in the United States, among those with incomes over $100,000, the percentage actively supporting free trade slid from 57% in 1999 to 28% in January 2004 (Rajan and Wei, 2004).
Whether there is any basis for this fear of job losses has not been carefully examined. Besides newspaper articles, which are largely based on management consultant reports, there is very little empirical research on service outsourcing. We present an overview of the literature in Section 3. The growth of service outsourcing and its effects on job losses deserve closer attention for a number of reasons. First, there does appear to be a backslide in support for free trade policies, particularly among white-collar workers. The fear of losing one’s job is of concern in itself, as it could lead to lobbying for protectionist type policies. For example, in Australia there were news reports of lobbies by Australian software companies to restrict (other) Australian firms’ ability to outsource software designs to India. In the United States, the Senate passed restrictions on foreign outsourcing for federal contracts in March 2004 (though they did not become law). Trade and Industry Secretary Patricia
3
Freund and Weinhold (2002) find that Internet penetration, measured by the number of Internet hosts in a country, has a positive and significant effect on services trade.
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312 MARY AMITI AND SHANG-JIN WEI
Hewitt stated that the United Kingdom would not pass protectionist legislation (see
Financial Times
, 5 March 2004, p. 6). If support for protectionist policies increases, this may not continue to be their stance. Second, even though we may expect service outsourcing to lead to long-run benefits, there may be adjustment costs in the form of job losses. Many theoretical trade models assume full employment and perfect factor mobility between sectors, but rigidities in the labour market can lead to short- term employment effects. It is important, therefore, to examine whether outsourcing does lead to job losses and if so, how large these effects are in order to inform the policy debate on possible relocation assistance programmes.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate and to establish what are the hypes and what are the facts about service outsourcing. We develop a set of stylized facts describing the trends in service outsourcing, which we present in Section 4. We focus on business services and computing and information service trade as these most closely reflect the service categories that are generally thought of as being outsourced. Some of our results correct some misleading impressions that one may derive from the news media, while others complement them. We examine the following questions: Has service outsourcing exploded in recent years? How does it compare with the level of material outsourcing? Who are the biggest outsourcers of services? Who are the biggest recipients of service outsourcing from the rest of the world (the ‘insourcers’)? And are there job losses arising from service outsourcing at a sectoral level? Our data serve to address on a factual basis some of the assertions made in the press coverage.
4
A number of interesting results emerge. We show that service outsourcing has been steadily increasing but is still at very low levels. For example, in the United States, imports of computing and business services as a share of GDP were only 0.4% in 2003. This share has roughly doubled each decade – from 0.1% in 1983 to 0.2% in 1993, and to 0.4% in 2003, based on IMF’s balance of payments trade data. A similar picture emerges from industry level outsourcing intensity ratios, which we constructed using input/output coefficients. These show that material outsourcing is at much higher levels than service outsourcing.
Interestingly, in the United States and in many other industrial countries, exports of these services are greater than imports. The United States has a net surplus in services and this surplus has been increasing in recent years. This highlights that trade in services, like trade in goods, is a two-way street. In value terms the United States is the largest importer and exporter of combined computing and business services. When scaled by GDP, however, the proportion of outsourcing-type trade in the United States is low compared with the rest of the world. Based on 2002 figures, its share of imports of business services as a proportion of its GDP ranks 117th in the world, with the United Kingdom ranking 85th. In comparison, China, which ranked 99th in the world, is ahead of the United States. The countries with the highest
4
Of course there may be other reasons why there is opposition to outsourcing, such as its potential effects on wages, income distribution and terms of trade. However, providing an overall welfare assessment is not possible with the available data.
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SERVICE OUTSOURCING 313
ratio of imports of business services to GDP are Angola, the Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Ireland.
The second main contribution of the paper is provided in Section 5, where we analyze the effects of service and material outsourcing on employment, using the United Kingdom as a case study. We do not find any evidence to suggest that outsourcing has led to employment losses in those sectors that increased their outsourcing intensity in the United Kingdom, during the period 1995 to 2001, in either the manufacturing or the services sectors. In Section 6 we present our conclusions.
2. WHAT’S IN A NAME?
The use of the term outsourcing has not been standardized. Outsourcing generally refers to the procuring of material inputs or services by a firm from outside the firm. Outsourcing can be domestic or international. Examples of domestic outsourcing would include a Detroit-based automobile company that contracts out the production of some of its parts to a firm in Cleveland, Ohio; or its employee food service to a local restaurant which in turn provides the service on the site of the auto firm. Issues relating to domestic outsourcing have not featured prominently in the media. The main concern in the public debate is mostly about international outsourcing, particularly the outsourcing by firms in advanced economies to firms located in low- wage countries.
In this paper, we focus on international outsourcing, defined as the procuring of service or material inputs by a firm from a source in a foreign country. This term includes both intra-firm international outsourcing (by which the foreign provider of the input is still owned by the firm) and arm’s-length international outsourcing (by which the foreign provider of the input is independent from the firm using the input). International outsourcing is part of a country’s imports (of goods and services).
Interestingly, the earliest use of the word ‘outsource’ that we have traced appears to refer to international outsourcing of services. According to the
Oxford English Dictionary
(http://dictionary.oed.com), the earliest use was about the British auto industry contracting out engineering design work to Germany and appeared in an article in 1979 in the
Journal of Royal Society of Arts
, Vol. CXXVII, 141/1.
5,6
For whatever reason, many other early uses of the terms ‘outsource’ and ‘outsourcing’ also tend to be related to the automobile industry, though they could refer to material inputs as well as services. The earliest use of the terms in the United States that can be traced electronically, according to FACTIVA, appeared in the
Harvard Business Review
in 1980, and in a major US newspaper in 1981.
5
The original sentence stated: ‘We are so short of professional engineers in the motor industry that we are having to outsource design work to Germany.’
6
There are interesting historical examples of outsourcing much earlier than 1979, for example when the British military used German mercenaries to fight US revolutionaries. Our focus here is on outsourcing services related to the production process.
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314 MARY AMITI AND SHANG-JIN WEI
Another commonly used term for international outsourcing is offshoring. The word ‘offshore’ has a long history and can be traced at least to 1895, according to the online version of the
Oxford English Dictionary
. It means ‘moving away from the shore’ or ‘foreign’. Using ‘offshoring’ to refer to international outsourcing in the way we have defined above has a much shorter history.
The word ‘insourcing’ was once used to refer to the production of something inside a company that it used to contract out.
7
In this paper, we define it as outsourcing in the opposite direction (from foreign-located firms to domestic firms). For example, the phrase US ‘insourcing’ refers to the outsourcing from the rest of the world to the United States.
3. RELATED LITERATURE
This section reviews the literature on outsourcing. It starts with a discussion of empirical studies on material and service outsourcing, and then moves on to the relevant theoretical models.
3.1. Empirical
In the empirical literature, while there is a large set of papers on material input outsourcing, there is very little on service outsourcing.
3.1.1. Material outsourcing.
A number of papers have studied the evolution of material outsourcing in the United States and other member countries of the Organ- ization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – for example, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Campa and Goldberg (1997), Hummels
et al.
(2001), Yeats (2001), Hanson
et al.
(2004), and Borga and Zeile (2004). Generally, these studies found a steady increase in the extent of international outsourcing of material inputs (measured in different ways by different authors) over time. For example, Yeats (2001) estimates that 30% of OECD exports of machinery and transport equipment comprised parts and components in 1995, and 26% in 1978. This share is the highest for the United States and increased from 36% in 1978 to 40% in 1995; in Europe it increased from 26% to 28%; and in Japan from 15% to 26%. However, when looking at the share of components imported in apparent consumption of transport and machinery for 1995, the EU shows the highest share at 16% (these being components imported from outside the EU) compared to 11% for North America and 8% in Japan.
7
The earliest use that we have traced (using FACTIVA) appeared in an article by Dale Buss in the 20 July 1984 issue of the
Wall Street Journal
, ‘Whether Ford, GM Keep Small-Car Output in U.S. May Hinge on Firms’ Labour Talks’. The original sentence reads, ‘. . . Ford’s Mr. Pestillo says that the company could eventually become efficient enough to “insource” production of such things as manual transmissions, which it currently purchases from the outside.’ Note that, as in the case of early uses of ‘outsourcing’, this term was also used in association with the auto industry.
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SERVICE OUTSOURCING 315
In addition to examining the magnitude and trends in material outsourcing, the literature has studied their effects on productivity and the wage skill premium. Egger and Egger (2001) find that there is a negative effect of international material outsourcing on the productivity of low-skilled workers in the short run, but a positive effect in the long run. They found that international outsourcing of materials contributed to 3.3% of real value added per low-skilled worker in the EU from 1993 to 1997. They attribute the negative short-run effect to imperfections in the EU labour and goods markets.
Several papers have studied the effect of international outsourcing of material inputs on the wage skill premium. By relocating the unskilled-intensive parts of the production process from relatively skill abundant countries to unskilled-abundant countries, outsourcing is expected to increase the relative demand for skilled labour in the skill-abundant country and hence increase the skill premium. Empirical evidence in the United States (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999) and the United Kingdom (Hijzen
et al.
, 2002) confirm this finding. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) show that outsourcing contributed between 17.5 to 40% of the increase in the non-production wage share over the period 1979 to 1990. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) also show that liberalized foreign investment and trade led to an increase in the skill premium in Mexico too. The foreign assembly plants located on the border were created by US firms outsourcing their less skill-intensive parts, which are more skill intensive relative to other industries in Mexico.
3.1.2. Service outsourcing.
The literature becomes much thinner when it comes to international outsourcing of services. Focusing on the information technology (IT) sector in the United States, Mann (2004) argues that international outsourcing of IT hardware led to a fall of 10 to 30% in prices of IT hardware, which translated into higher productivities in all sectors that use IT hardware. Mann then argues that IT software – a form of international outsourcing of services – should be expected to benefit the economy in the same way as IT hardware. Furthermore, if one assumes that IT software is more price elastic than IT hardware, then the expected produc- tivity gains could be even higher. Finally, Mann documented that IT industries had exhibited high job growth, so the international outsourcing did not appear to hurt job growth in that sector.
Amiti and Wei (2004), using data on all manufacturing industries in the United States, find that service outsourcing is positively correlated with labour productivity in the United States but material outsourcing is insignificant. Gorg and Hanley (2003) show that international outsourcing of services had a positive impact on productivity in the electronics industry in Ireland between 1990 and 1995. They also found that outsourcing of tangible inputs did not have a significant effect on productivity during this period. Girma and Gorg (2004) find positive evidence of service outsourcing on labour productivity and total factor productivity in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1992, but they are unable to distinguish between domestic and foreign outsourcing.
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316 MARY AMITI AND SHANG-JIN WEI
Studies on service outsourcing and employment effects have mainly been conducted by management consultants. For example, McKinsey Global Institute’s report (2003) is a widely quoted study on service outsourcing. It makes a prediction on the number of jobs likely to be lost due to outsourcing from 2003 to 2015 and computes the distribution of gains between the country that does the outsourcing and the one that receives the outsourcing. The underlying methodology used to make the calculations is not entirely transparent in the report, making it difficult to assign standard errors to the estimates. The McKinsey report also makes the point that the amount of job losses due to outsourcing is a relatively trivial share of overall job losses during the normal course of a business cycle. Brainard and Litan (2004) provide an overview of these studies, and focus on the distributional effects of outsourcing, pointing out that it is the low paid jobs that are being replaced with higher paid jobs. They also provide a number of policy prescriptions for the United States. Shultz (2004) provides some indirect evidence of job losses related to service outsourcing and concludes that the effect is very small.
A more rigorous study of the effects of service outsourcing on employment is provided in Amiti and Wei (2005) using US data. This study also concludes that there is a small negative effect of service outsourcing on employment when using highly disaggregated data. Some details of that study are provided in Section 5 of this paper.
3.2. Theoretical
Although there is a rich body of literature that models a firm’s decision on where to locate different parts of the production stage, all these models assume perfect inter-sectoral labour mobility so they do not make predictions of net job losses at the economy level. For example, Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 1991, and 2001), Dixit and Grossman (1984), Krugman and Venables (1995), Deardorff (1998a and b), Yi (2003) and Amiti (2005) develop models of where different parts of the production stage will be located. When trade costs or technological progress leads to international fragmentation of different parts of the production stage, firms engage in input trade, and this can be thought of as part of outsourcing. These are models of non-integrated firms, where different firms own different production stages, and hence the type of trade that takes place is referred to as arm’s-length trade. Outsourcing can also take place between vertically integrated firms, such as in Helpman’s (1984) model of vertical foreign direct investment, which is referred to as intra-firm trade.
8
Antras (2003) introduces incomplete contracts to study ownership decision (whether firms should own the plants producing intermediate inputs or not); and Antras and Helpman (2003) combine the ownership decision with the decision on whether intermediate
8
This slicing up of the production chain across different countries has also been referred to in the literature as international production sharing, globalized production, de-localization, fragmentation, intra-product specialization, intra-mediate trade, and offshoring. Intra-firm international outsourcing has also been related to vertical foreign direct investment, and vertical specialization.
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SERVICE OUTSOURCING 317
input producing plants should be located abroad or not. In all of these models, the focus is on the outsourcing of material inputs but these could, in principle, be re- interpreted as service inputs.
Trade economists generally assume full employment and perfect factor mobility between sectors within a country, for example, as in the Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O) model, so then all the action is on factor prices, that is, the net economy-wide employment effects are essentially assumed away. And in this kind of model you do not need to have a large amount of trade to affect factor prices. All you need is for goods prices to change, which then affect factor prices (i.e. Samuelson–Stolper theorem). These international price changes can arise for many reasons. For example, the threat of foreign competition in itself can drive down goods prices even if the trade does not take place.
The H–O model is generally considered to be a long-run model, that is, with factors perfectly mobile. So in this model trade can lead to sectoral employment changes as one sector contracts and another expands but no net economy-wide job losses. In the short run, there may be rigidities that prevent perfect factor mobility and hence give rise to net employment effects. For example, Sachs and Shatz (1994) argue that any of the following factors could give rise to net employment losses in manufacturing: ‘(i) low-wage workers have a positively sloped supply elasticity, so that a decline in their wage leads to a decline in labour force participation; (2) low-wage workers are unionized, and unions maintain wages above full-employment levels; or (3) low-wage workers have alternative employment opportunities in non-manufacturing (such as services), so that they leave the manufacturing sector entirely when interna- tional competition puts downward pressure on wages.’ Krugman (1995) presents an H–O model with rigid factor prices to show how trade can give rise to big employment effects. If one were to also introduce frictions in inter-sectoral labour mobility then these effects would be even larger.
9
4. GLOBAL PATTERNS OF SERVICE OUTSOURCING: THE UNTOLD STORIES IN THE MEDIA
In this section, we document a set of features about patterns of global service trade that have been under-reported or misreported by news media. Specifically, we aim to address the following questions. Is there a discrete and abrupt rise in service outsourc- ing in industrialized economies in recent years? What is the relative importance of service outsourcing versus material outsourcing? Who are the biggest outsourcers of services in the world? Who are the biggest recipients of service outsourcing from the rest of the world?
9
The McKinsey report indicated that more than 69% of workers who lost jobs due to imports in the United States between 1979 and 1999 were re-employed (this is based on US Bureau of Labour Statistics data). Of course, this means that 31% were not re-employed, highlighting that there may be some rigidities in the labour market.
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318 MARY AMITI AND SHANG-JIN WEI
We first provide a description of the data used to measure outsourcing before moving on to the results.
4.1. Measurement of outsourcing
Outsourcing is generally difficult to measure because information on which parts of the production stage are contracted out is not readily available, so we need to rely on indirect measures. We construct two different types of measures of outsourcing. The first is an economy-wide measure based on imports of computing (which includes computer software designs) and other business services (which include accounting and other back-office operations), using data from the IMF’s
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook
, which in turn is compiled from the reports to the IMF by the national authorities of member countries. This is the main data source we use to explore patterns of cross-border services trade.
We chose to focus on trade in computing and information and other business services because these are the categories that most likely encompass outsourcing activities. The other categories, such as travel and education, are less likely to include such activities so we excluded them from the study. We would expect that business services should predominantly comprise inputs used by firms, but the computing category is likely to include a higher component of final consumer purchases. However, it is impossible to specify exactly how much of the trade is in final consumer services. As a robustness check, at least for the US data, we compared the trends in the IMF statistics with those provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The BEA splits services trade by affiliates and non-affiliates. The affiliate trade is undertaken by multinational corporations, between parents and affiliates, so more closely reflects outsourcing trade. We found that the trends for affiliate trade are similar to those indicated by the IMF data.
The second measure of service outsourcing is calculated on an industry basis for the United Kingdom, as Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) do for material inputs for the United States. For a given industry
i
, its outsourced services as a share of total non-energy inputs,
OSS
i
, is calculated as follows:
(1)
The first square bracketed term is calculated using input/output tables. The denom- inator includes all non-energy material inputs, listed in Table A2 of the Appendix, plus the following five service industries: communication, financial, insurance, other business services, and computing and information.
10
10
These five service categories were chosen to match the IMF balance of payments trade in services data. The employment service data we use in the next section is more disaggregated. There we include nine service categories, which are also listed in Appendix 2.
OSS * =
−
Input purchaseof service by industry Total nonenergy inputs used by industry
Imports of service Production +Imports Exports
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SERVICE OUTSOURCING 319
The second square bracketed term is calculated using international trade data from the IMF’s
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbooks
. Unfortunately, imports of each input by industry are unavailable. As a proxy, an economy-wide import share is applied to each industry. To illustrate, the UK economy imported 6.6% of business services in 2001. We then assume that each industry (in the manufacturing and service sectors) imports 6.6% of the business services used in that year. On average, a UK industry uses 15.4% of business services as a proportion of total non-energy material inputs. So the outsourcing intensity of business services for a typical industry would be 0.15*0.066 = 1%. We then aggregate across the five service inputs to get the average service outsourcing intensity for each industry. The breakdown of the two components of the outsourcing intensity ratio for each service category is provided for 1992 and 2001 in Table 1. The first column shows the average intensity of each service category (the first term in Equation 1) and the last column gives the average import intensity of each service category (the second term in Equation 1). We see from column 1 that business services is the largest service category used across manufacturing and service industries, and this has grown from an average of 12.6% in 1991 to 15.4% in 2001. There is also much variation between industries. For example, in 2001, in the ‘basic precious and non-ferrous metals’ industry business services only accounted for 2% of total inputs whereas in the tobacco industry it was 48%. From Table 1, we see that the average share of computing and information services also increased over the period whereas the other three categories remained roughly constant. From the last column, we see that the import share of each service category increased over the period except communications, which remained roughly unchanged. The largest import share was in business services, at 6.6%.
Table 1. United Kingdom: Outsourcing of services
Services Share of service Import of service j
Mean Std Dev Min Max
1992 Communication 0.0153 0.0373 0.0012 0.2937 0.0587 Financial 0.0330 0.0247 0.0072 0.2000 0.0173 Insurance 0.0137 0.0103 0.0027 0.0758 0.0186 Other business service 0.1261 0.1615 0.0196 0.7226 0.0503 Computer and Information 0.0112 0.0185 0.0012 0.0916 0.0148
2001 Communication 0.0158 0.0393 0.0022 0.3175 0.0547 Financial 0.0306 0.0198 0.0055 0.1440 0.0420 Insurance 0.0123 0.0060 0.0018 0.0322 0.0230 Other business service 0.1536 0.1872 0.0228 0.8012 0.0659 Computer and Information 0.0211 0.0302 0.0027 0.1543 0.0283
Source: Input-Output Tables-United Kingdom National Accounts and IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
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320 MARY AMITI AND SHANG-JIN WEI
An analogous measure is constructed for material outsourcing for each industry
i
, denoted
OSM
i
. In total, our sample consists of 78 industries (69 manufacturing industries and 9 service industries).
A number of potential problems with our outsourcing measures should be noted. First, they are likely to underestimate the value of outsourcing because the cost of importing services is likely to be lower than the cost of purchasing them domestically. So it would be preferable to have quantity data rather than current values but this is unavailable for the United Kingdom. Second, applying the same import share to all industries is not ideal, but given the unavailability of imports by industry this is our ‘best guess’. The same strategy was used by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) to construct measures of material outsourcing. This approach apportions a higher value of imported inputs to the industries that are the biggest users of those inputs. Although this seems reasonable, without access to actual import data by industry it is impossible to say how accurate it is. Third, the total use of inputs by industry only includes those inputs purchased from a different industry so services produced within the industry are not included, hence the extent of outsourcing is unlikely to be precisely measured. Despite these limitations, we believe that combining the input use information with trade data provides a reasonable proxy of the proportion of services imported from abroad.
4.2. Outsourcing trends in developed countries
International outsourcing of services has increased in the United States but still remains low, based on our economy-wide measure using IMF international trade data. Imports of computer and information plus other business services as a share of GDP were only 0.4% in 2003. This share has roughly doubled in each decade – from 0.1% in 1983 to 0.2% in 1993, and to 0.4% in 2003. The United Kingdom has a higher outsourcing ratio than the United States – at 0.9% in 1983, 0.7% in 1993, and 1.2% in 2003.
A similar picture emerges from industry level outsourcing intensity ratios. Figure 2 presents the average outsourcing intensity ratios across manufacturing and service industries, weighted by output, from 1992 to 2001. These ratios indicate that on average the share of service imports in the United Kingdom increased from 1.4% in 1992 to 2.6% in 2001. These figures are higher than those for the United States, which increased from 0.6% to 0.9% over the same period (see Amiti and Wei, 2005). But in both cases there is clearly an upward trend.
Material outsourcing intensities are significantly higher than service outsourcing in both the United Kingdom and United States. Material outsourcing is around 27% in the United Kingdom and 11% in the United States. From Figure 2, we see that in the United Kingdom material outsourcing peaked in 1996 and has been on a downward trend since then. In the United States it has been steadily increasing but at a slower pace than service outsourcing.
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In sum, service outsourcing is much lower than material outsourcing, but it is increasing at a faster pace.
4.3. Which countries are the biggest outsourcers?
Media reports might give the impression that outsourcing is mostly about the United States and other industrialized countries contracting out services to India and a few other developing countries. This is not entirely correct.
To set the record straight, we look at the trade data in two categories of services that have been most intensely reported: computer and information services and other business services. In value terms, other business services (which we will refer to as just business services) are by far the larger of the two categories.
Figure 2. United Kingdom: Outsourcing intensity of intermediate inputs (weighted average across all industries by outputs)
Source: Input-Output Tables-United Kingdom National Accounts and IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
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322 MARY AMITI AND SHANG-JIN WEI
Using data for 2002, the latest year for which internationally comparable data were available, the top outsourcers of business services in dollar amounts are United States (US$41 billion), Germany (US$39 billion), followed by a group of countries with trade approximately of the same order of magnitude, Japan ($25 billion), the Netherlands (US$21 billion), Italy (US$20 billion), France (US$19 billion), and the United Kingdom (US$16 billion). Interestingly, India and China – two countries that have been portrayed as major recipients of outsourcing in the media – are themselves significant outsourcers of business services (with a value of US$11 billion for India and US$8 billion for China, and ranked 11th and 18th in the world, respectively). Table 2 lists the value of imports for these services for selected countries with their rankings in the world.
11
In the categories of computer and information services (which is quantitatively an order of magnitude smaller than business services), the top five importers are Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain. The United States is a close 6th. China is ranked at 10th place. Unfortunately, there is no data from the IMF’s
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook
for India on trade in computer and information services.
Of course, larger economies naturally trade more than smaller ones. Therefore, to get a sense of the importance of outsourcing for a local economy, it is important to scale the value of imports by the size of the economy. For example, if one scales imports of business services by local GDP, none of the countries mentioned above would appear in the top ten list. In fact, smaller economies like Angola, the Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Ireland and Vanuatu turn out to be much more outsourcing- intensive, with the ratio of imported business services to GDP exceeding 10%. In
11
An electronic Appendix with rankings of all countries is available on the
Economic Policy
website.
Table 2. Who are the biggest absolute outsourcers, 2002?a
Million US Dollars
Rank Country Business services Rank Country Computer and information services
1 United States 40,929 1 Germany 6,124 2 Germany 39,113 2 United Kingdom 2,602 3 Japan 24,714 3 Japan 2,148 4 Netherlands 21,038 4 Netherlands 1,586 5 Italy 20,370 5 Spain 1,572 6 France 19,111 6 United States 1,547 9 United Kingdom 16,184 9 France 1,150 11 India 11,817 10 China, P.R. 1,133 18 China, P.R. 7,957 14 Russia 592 20 Russia 4,583
Note: aFor India, information on computer and information services is not given in the IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook.
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
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contrast, the United States has an outsourcing ratio in business services less than half of a percent of its GDP (ranked 117th in the world), and the United Kingdom slightly over 1% of its GDP (ranked 85th). As a comparison, India imports a larger amount of business services as a share of GDP (2.4%) than the United States and the United Kingdom. Table 3A lists the share of imports of services as a proportion of local GDP and their ranks. The country rankings are almost the same if one scales the value of service imports by local total service value-added. See Table 3B.
In sum, the notion that large industrialized countries outsource more intensely than other economies is not supported by the trade data.
4.4. Who are the biggest ‘insourcers’?
Like trade in goods, trade in services is a two-way street. Most countries receive outsourcing of services from other countries as well as outsource to other countries.
Table 3. Who are the biggest relative outsourcers (2002)?a
Rank Country Business services Rank Country Computer and information services
A. Ratio to Local GDP (%) 1 Angola 35.01 1 Cyprus 2.06 2 Congo, Republic of 22.33 2 Luxembourg 1.25 3 Mozambique 17.41 3 Moldova 0.71 4 Ireland 15.44 4 Belgium 0.57 5 Vanuatu 14.22 5 Guyana 0.48 44 India 2.40 13 Germany 0.31 57 Germany 1.96 29 Russia 0.17 74 France 1.33 30 United Kingdom 0.17 75 Russia 1.33 43 China, P.R. 0.09 85 United Kingdom 1.03 48 France 0.08 99 China, P.R. 0.63 57 Japan 0.05 103 Japan 0.62 73 United States 0.01 117 United States 0.39
B. Ratio to Value-added of Local Service Sector (%) 1 Angola 138.67 1 Luxembourg 1.60 2 Congo, Republic of 79.81 2 Moldova 1.43 3 Papua New Guinea 35.12 3 Guyana 1.19 4 Mozambique 33.33 4 Ireland 0.81 5 Ireland 28.28 5 Belgium 0.79 37 India 4.96 12 Germany 0.45 59 Germany 2.90 26 Russia 0.31 70 Russia 2.37 29 China, P.R. 0.27 78 China, P.R. 1.87 33 United Kingdom 0.23 80 France 1.86 53 France 0.11 90 United Kingdom 1.44 59 Japan 0.08 104 Japan 0.93 74 United States 0.02 115 United States 0.53
Note: a There is no separate information on computer and information services in the balance of payments of India.
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
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324 MARY AMITI AND SHANG-JIN WEI
Given the high level of aggregation in the services data it is not clear whether countries are actually importing and exporting exactly the same service. These could in fact differ substantially in their factor intensities. For example, within the business services category you might have call centres that may only require high school training as well as accounting services that require tertiary training. But it is also quite likely that there is two-way trade in the same services due to the differentiated nature of the service, just as models of intra-industry trade in goods. For example, services traded could be in French and Indian translation.
In recent times, the word ‘insourcing’ has been used as a shorthand for the amount of outsourcing a country receives from the rest of the world. We use exports of business and computing services as a proxy for insourcing.
Who are the biggest insourcers or the recipients of global outsourcing? From Table 4, we see that the top five recipients in 2002 in dollar terms are the United States (US$59 billion), the United Kingdom (US$37 billion), Germany (US$28 billion), France (US$21 billion), and the Netherlands (US$20 billion). India, a country that has received the most media attention as a recipient of outsourcing, is ranked at 6th place (US$18.6 billion); and China is ranked at 14th place (US$10 billion). It is worth emphasizing that India is one of the biggest exporters of business services in the world but there are five industrialized countries ahead of it. The data show that the top recipients of global service outsourcing tend to be rich, industrialized countries, rather than poor developing countries.
However, if one scales the value of exports by the size of local GDP, smaller economies turn out to be more insourcing-intensive than the larger ones. For example, from Table 5 we see that the top three insource-intensive economies are Vanuatu, Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, each with exporting services as a share of local GDP exceeding 10%. By this metric, India is somewhat more insourcing-intensive
Table 4. Who are the biggest absolute insourcers (2002)?a
Million US Dollars
Rank Country Business services Rank Country Computer and information services
1 United States 58,794 1 Ireland 10,426 2 United Kingdom 36,740 2 United Kingdom 5,675 3 Germany 27,907 3 United States 5,431 4 France 20,864 4 Germany 5,185 5 Netherlands 20,074 5 Spain 2,487 6 India 18,630 10 France 1,191 8 Japan 17,401 11 Japan 1,140 14 China, P.R. 10,419 12 China, P.R. 638 29 Russia 2,012 25 Russia 137
Note: a There is no separate information on computer and information services in the balance of payments of India.
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
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than the United Kingdom (3.8% of GDP vs. 2.4%); and China is somewhat ahead of the United States (0.8% of GDP vs. 0.6%).
4.5. Who are the biggest surplus countries?
At this point, it is natural to consider the balance of payments implications of service outsourcing. Are industrialized economies more likely to run a deficit in services trade than developing countries? The answer is a resounding no. In fact, the largest surplus countries of combined computing and business services in the world are the United Kingdom and the United States.
Figure 3 plots the time series of the US imports, exports, and the net balance of business services. Table 6 ranks countries in terms of exports of business services and computing, and net balance, respectively. We note that the United States has been running a surplus in this service category every year since 1980, as does the United Kingdom. They are
Table 5. Who are the biggest relative insourcers, 2002?a
Rank Economy Business services Rank Economy Computer and information services
A. Ratio to Local GDP (%) 1 Vanuatu 17.13 1 Ireland 8.54 2 Singapore 14.98 2 Cyprus 2.19 3 Hong Kong SAR 11.53 3 Luxembourg 1.09 4 Papua New Guinea 10.55 4 Costa Rica 0.91 5 Luxembourg 9.78 5 Belgium 0.76 21 India 3.79 17 United Kingdom 0.36 33 United Kingdom 2.35 24 Germany 0.26 50 France 1.45 42 France 0.08 54 Germany 1.40 49 United States 0.05 79 China, P.R. 0.82 51 China, P.R. 0.05 88 Russia 0.58 54 Russia 0.04 90 United States 0.56 59 Japan 0.03 95 Japan 0.44
B. Ratio to Value-added of Local Service Sector (%) 1 Papua New Guinea 32.95 1 Ireland 15.64 2 Vanuatu 23.85 2 Guyana 1.50 3 Singapore 21.93 3 Costa Rica 1.46 4 Swaziland 16.06 4 Luxembourg 1.40 5 Hong Kong SAR 13.46 5 Armenia 1.09 13 India 7.82 18 United Kingdom 0.51 44 United Kingdom 3.28 24 Germany 0.38 53 China, P.R. 2.45 38 China, P.R. 0.15 64 Germany 2.07 42 France 0.12 66 France 2.03 51 Russia 0.07 87 Russia 1.04 52 United States 0.07 91 United States 0.76 60 Japan 0.04 94 Japan 0.66
Note: a There is no separate information on computer and information services in the balance of payments of India.
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
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in fact, the largest and the second largest surplus countries in the world, respectively. In other words, if every country reduced its overall service outsourcing, the United States and the United Kingdom would be the biggest two losers in terms of net dollars lost in service trade. The US current account deficit would become bigger, not smaller.
However, the patterns for other industrialized countries are more varied. For example, in business services, Germany has been running a small deficit every year throughout our sample, between 1980 and 2001. France had been consistently running a small surplus until the end of the sample when it switches to a mild deficit.
Figure 3. Insourcing and outsourcing of business services (billion dollars)
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and International Financial Statistics.
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There does not seem to be a consistent pattern of a country being in net surplus or deficit in business services solely based on the level of development. For example, in India, imports and exports of business services were fairly balanced in much of the early part of the sample. However, starting from 1996, exports have really taken off, surpassing imports by an ever widening margin, resulting in a reasonably large surplus position today. For China, the relative size of imports and exports of business services alternates between periods, though it ends the sample with a small surplus.
Figure 4 plots time series of imports, exports and the trade balance in computer and information services. The patterns are broadly similar to trade in business services, with both the United States and United Kingdom showing a net surplus, and China alternating between a surplus and deficit. The new feature in computing trends relative to business services is that Ireland is the largest surplus country in computing.
To sum up, the presumption that global service trade is dominated by lopsided one-way outsourcing from developed countries to developing countries is not supported by the data. If anything, several major industrialized countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, export more outsourcing type services than they import from the rest of the world. It is particularly important to note that the United States and United Kingdom are net exporters of services since the media seem to equate outsourcing with job losses (and insourcing with job gains). Of course,
Table 6. Who are the biggest surplus and deficit countries, 2002?a
Rank Economy Business services
Rank Economy Computer and information
services
Rank Economy Total
Surplus countries Surplus countries Surplus countries 1 United
Kingdom 20,555.96 1 Ireland 9,882.71 1 United
Kingdom 23,628.68
2 United States
17,864.30 2 United States
3,884.00 2 United States
21,748.30
3 Hong Kong SAR
15,424.54 3 United Kingdom
3,072.72 3 Hong Kong SAR
15,663.41
4 India 6,813.44 4 Canada 1,077.12 4 India 6,813.44 5 Singapore 3,826.12 5 Spain 914.65 5 Singapore 3,826.12 6 China,
P.R. 2,462.05 15 France 41.39 9 China,
P.R. 1,967.20
10 France 1,752.32 10 France 1,793.70
Deficit countries Deficit countries Deficit countries 135 Russia −2,570.90 95 Russia −454.30 137 Russia −3,025.20 139 Korea −4,450.90 96 China,
P.R. −494.85 139 Italy −4,001.71
140 Japan −7,313.51 97 Italy −674.85 140 Korea −4,555.30 141 Indonesia −7,985.71 98 Germany −939.29 141 Indonesia −7,985.71 142 Germany −11,205.43 99 Japan −1,007.74 142 Japan −8,321.25 143 Ireland −13,882.01 100 Brazil −1,118.10 143 Germany −12,144.72
Note: a Positive numbers in this table represent net insourcing of services (surplus), and negative numbers represent net outsourcing (deficit).
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
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to assess whether there are in fact any job losses arising from outsourcing we need a more rigorous analysis, which we turn to in the next section.
5. DOES SERVICE OUTSOURCING REDUCE JOBS?
A factor behind the recent anxiety in advanced economies over service outsourcing is the fear of losing jobs at home. If labour were perfectly mobile between sectors
Figure 4. Insourcing and outsourcing of computer and information services (billion dollars)
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and International Financial Statistics.
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then a job lost in one sector would be gained in another. However, if there are rigidities in the labour market then outsourcing could lead to net employment losses, at least in the short run. In this case, even a small amount of outsourcing could lead to large job losses. But outsourcing could also lead to job growth. On the one hand, every job lost is a job lost.12 On the other hand, firms that have outsourced may become more efficient and expand production, and expand employment in other lines of work. If firms relocate their relatively inefficient parts of the production process to another country, where they can be produced more cheaply, they can expand their output in production stages for which they have comparative advantage. These productivity benefits can translate into lower prices generating further demand and hence create more jobs. This job creation effect could in principle offset the direct job losses due to outsourcing.
As the predictions from the theory are ambiguous, we turn to the data to see if there are higher job losses in the industries that have increased outsourcing. We estimate the effects of outsourcing on employment using a common empirical specification of labour demand (see Hamermesh, 1993) as follows:13
ln Lit = α 0 + α1 ln wit + β ln ω it + γ ln yit (2)
where w is the wage rate, ω is a vector of other input prices, and y is the level of output. The source of identification of employment in these types of industry labour demand studies is the assumption that the wage is exogenous to the industry. This would be the case if labour were mobile across industries. However, if labour were not perfectly mobile and there were industry specific rents then wages would not be exogenous. Provided these rents are unchanged over time then they would be absorbed in the industry fixed effects and the results would be unbiased.
In general, an increase in output would be expected to have a positive effect on employment demand and an increase in the wage a negative effect, whereas an increase in the price of other inputs would lead firms to substitute away from the more expensive inputs towards labour. The question arises as to which input prices to use for outsourcing. If the firm is a multinational firm deciding on how much labour to employ at home and abroad then it should be the foreign wage. But not all of outsourcing takes place within multinational firms and also with outsourcing from many countries it is unclear which foreign wage to include, if any. Firms that import inputs at arm’s-length do not care about the foreign wage but instead are concerned about the price of the imported service. Since prices of imported services were unavailable we use the outsourcing intensity as an inverse proxy of the price of imported service inputs, that is, the lower the price of imported service inputs the
12 Note that this would also be true for domestic outsourcing. The main difference is that the job lost with domestic outsourcing is necessarily gained in another sector in the domestic economy. But with foreign outsourcing this job is lost to a foreign country, hence the focus on international outsourcing. 13 This is derived from a cost function using Shepard’s lemma.
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higher the outsourcing intensity. An increase in outsourcing intensity can be inter- preted as a fall in the price of outsourcing. For other input prices, such as the rental rate on capital, we assume that all firms face the same price, which we assume is some function of time, r = f(t).
So outsourcing can affect labour demand through two channels. First, there is a substitution effect through the input price of materials or services. For example, a fall in the price of services would lead to a fall in the demand for labour if labour and services are substitutes. Second, outsourcing can affect the demand for employment through output effects. An increase in outsourcing can make the firm more efficient and competitive, increasing demand for its output and hence labour – that is, increases in efficiency could lead to lower prices for a firm’s output that results in increased demand for output, which in turn increases derived demand for labour. Of course, if outsourcing leads to efficiency gains, this could also result in a reduction in demand for labour since the firm could produce the same amount of output with less inputs. The net effect depends on the size of the productivity gain and the increased demand for the final good. We will estimate the equation with and without output in order to allow for the possibility of scale effects.
We take first differences of Equation (2), denoted by ∆, giving the following estimating equation,
∆ ln Lit = α 0 + α1∆ ln wit + β1∆ ln OSSit + β2∆ ln OSMit + γ∆ ln yit + δDt + εit (3)
where ∆ ln OSSit is the log difference in service outsourcing intensity, and ∆ ln OSMit
is the log difference of material outsourcing intensity. This first difference specification controls for any time-invariant industry-specific effects such as industry technology differences. We also include year fixed effects, Dt, to control for any unobserved effect common across all industries, such as changes in the cost of capital, and in some specifications we also include industry fixed effects. Some industries may be pioneer- ing industries that are high growth industries and hence more likely to outsource; and some industries might be subject to higher technical progress than others. Adding industry fixed effects to a time differenced equation takes account of these factors, provided the growth or technical progress is fairly constant over time.
In our companion paper (Amiti and Wei, 2005), we estimate this equation using US data, where we found the effect on jobs depends crucially on the level of disaggrega- tion. When the US economy was decomposed into 450 sectors, a faster growth in outsourcing at a sector level was associated with a small negative growth in jobs in that sector (i.e., β1 < 0). However, when the US economy was decomposed into 96 sectors (still very disaggregated but less so than the 450-sector classification), there was no correlation between job growth and outsourcing growth at the sector level. These results seem sensible. At sufficiently disaggregated levels, every outsourced job is a job lost. Hence, job growth and outsourcing may be negatively related. At the other extreme, for the economy as a whole, outsourcing is likely to change only the sectoral composition of the jobs, but not necessarily the aggregate level of employment.
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The interesting finding is that one does not need to aggregate the sectors very much: even when the US economy is disaggregated into 96 sectors, one can already see enough creation of new jobs in the outsourcing-intensive sectors that can offset jobs lost due to outsourcing.
A nagging question is whether the results from the US case are applicable to European and other advanced economies. Therefore, it would be useful to re-examine this question for another economy. In this section of the paper, we turn to a case study of the United Kingdom, which makes an interesting comparison with the United States. First, as we have shown at the beginning of this paper, the anxiety over service outsourcing in the United Kingdom is likely to be as high as in the United States, as indicated by the intensity of news coverage if scaled by the size of the economy. Second, the United Kingdom actually engages in about three times as much service outsourcing as a share of its GDP (1.2% in 2001) as the United States (0.4% in 2001).
5.1. Statistical results
The data we use is for the United Kingdom from 1995 to 2001. It includes 69 manufacturing industries and 9 service industries. The employment data is for total employment. Ideally, we would distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers given that the concern over job losses appears to be predominantly among white- collar workers. Unfortunately, the ONS stopped collecting employment and wage data by skill in 1995, so all our results pertain to total employment by industry. The list of industries and details of the variables are provided in the Appendix.
To fix ideas, we first look at some examples of sectors with the fastest and the slowest employment growth and their associated growth in service outsourcing. The top five and bottom five industries ranked by total employment growth are presented in Table 7a; and the top five and bottom five industries ranked by service outsourcing growth are presented in Table 7b. From Tables 7a and 7b, we see that no uniform pattern emerges between service outsourcing and employment growth. For example, the ‘other transport equipment’ sector has the second highest growth in employment and one of the highest growth in service outsourcing, yet the ‘preparation and spinning of textile fibres’ sector experienced negative employment growth over the period and was ranked one of the biggest outsourcing sectors. In contrast, both the ‘man made fibre’ and the ‘footwear’ sectors experienced a large decline in employ- ment growth, yet the ‘man made fibre’ sector experienced high service outsourcing growth and the ‘footwear’ sector experienced a rapid decline in service outsourcing. A scatter plot of service outsourcing growth and employment growth for all 78 industries is presented in Figure 5. Summary statistics are presented in Table 8.
In Tables 9 and 10 we present our results using statistical analysis to relate job growth at a sectoral level to the change in service outsourcing at the same disaggre- gated level. Tables 9a and 9b present the results for the manufacturing industries and Tables 10a and 10b present the results for the service industries. In the first column
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Table 7a. United Kingdom: Top five and bottom five sectors of employment growth, 1995–2001a
Table 7b. United Kingdom: Top five and bottom five sectors of service outsourcing growth, 1995–2001a
Industry Total employment growth (%)
Rank of total employment growth
Service outsourcing intensity growth (%)
Rank of service outsourcing growth
Top Five Computer and related activities 144.0 1 23.6 53 Other transport equipment 73.9 2 110.0 7 Renting of machinery and equipment 52.9 3 37.0 36 Advertising 52.0 4 31.9 45 Television and radio transmitters 46.5 5 18.5 60 Bottom Five Preparation and spinning of textile fibers −47.0 74 144.5 4 Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles −48.2 75 19.9 57 Wearing apparel; dressing and dying of fur −53.4 76 47.6 28 Finishing of textiles −54.0 77 13.4 66 Footwear −69.0 78 −34.7 78
Industry Total employment growth (%)
Rank of total employment growth
Service outsourcing intensity growth (%)
Rank of service outsourcing growth
Top Five Man-made fibers −38.9 73 233.2 1 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 3.8 30 181.7 2 Production and distribution of electricity −8.4 48 149.9 3 Preparation and spinning of textile fibers −47.0 74 144.5 4 Cement, lime and plaster −31.3 71 117.5 5 Bottom Five Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 5.2 29 1.6 74 Cutlery, tools and general hardware −6.9 46 −5.4 75 Sports goods, games and toys −23.7 61 −13.9 76 Machine tools −28.2 67 −14.5 77 Footwear −69.0 78 −34.7 78
Note: a Industries in this study are aggregated into 84 sectors, which are based on SIC (92) 3-digit codes.
Source: Employment data are from the Annual Employment Survey (AES, 1995–1997) and Annual Business Inquiry (ABI, 1998–2001). Service outsourcing ratios are calculated from input-output tables.
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of Table 9a we present the results from estimating Equation (3) using employment for all manufacturing industries. We also add first period lags to allow for the fact that the effects may not be instantaneous. This is a conditional labour demand function, with output held constant. In this specification we see that service outsourcing appears to have a positive effect on employment. As hypothesized, the wage has a significant negative effect on employment, and output has a significant positive effect.
Figure 5. United Kingdom: Service outsourcing growth and employment growth, 1995–2001
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and International Financial Statistics.
Table 8. United Kingdom: Summary statistics (1995–2001)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Manufacturing industries Total employment (thousand) 483 78 147 2 1,340 Nominal output (million pound) 483 7,178 13,366 534 12,6715 Outsourcing intensity of manufacture input
483 0.503 0.144 0.074 0.978
Outsourcing intensity of service input 483 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.042 Price index (2000=100) 448 101 12 75 237 Real output (million pound) 448 5,499 5,509 502 33,040 Total wage (million pound) 483 1,810 2,826 68 25,900
Service industries Total employment (thousand) 63 531 512 68 1,715 Nominal output (million pound) 63 34,412 27,048 4,772 120,248 Outsourcing intensity of manufacture input
63 0.115 0.092 0.043 0.423
Outsourcing intensity of service input 63 0.042 0.009 0.021 0.057 Total wage (million pound) 63 8,571 5,097 1,578 20,407
Source: Refer to the Appendix.
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334 MARY AMITI AND SHANG-JIN WEI
In the second column we substitute in the final goods price for output in order to allow outsourcing to affect employment through the scale affect. We see that the coefficient on service outsourcing is still positive but only significant at the 10% level. Excluding output and price, from the equation in column 3, to allow for scale effects, gives the same results as in column 2 with prices. All of these specifications indicate a positive correlation between employment and service outsourcing.
However, there is some concern that taking first time differences might induce measurement error, particularly when the variables are aggregated at the industry level. To address this concern, we re-estimate the equations using long time differences over the whole period, which we present in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 9a.14 Now, we see that service outsourcing has an insignificant effect in all three specifications,
14 See Griliches and Hausman (1986).
Table 9a. United Kingdom: Manufacturing employment and service outsourcing (1995–2001)
Dependent variable ∆ln(employment)
Variable One period difference Long time difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ln(OSS )t 0.119** 0.113* 0.103* 0.148 0.094 0.083 (0.057) (0.062) (0.059) (0.182) (0.271) (0.249)
∆ln(OSS )t−1 0.045** 0.021 0.018 (0.022) (0.025) (0.024)
∆ln(OSM )t 0.069 −0.048 −0.074 0.143 −0.192 −0.061 (0.074) (0.099) (0.088) (0.306) (0.623) (0.504)
∆ln(OSM )t−1 0.036 −0.028 −0.026 (0.068) (0.088) (0.076)
∆ln(wage)t −0.704*** −0.739*** −0.733*** −0.466** −0.683** −0.654** (0.038) (0.041) (0.039) (0.203) (0.292) (0.287)
∆ln(wage)t−1 0.046 0.006 0.011 (0.032) (0.036) (0.033)
∆ln(real output )t 0.398*** 0.622*** (0.062) (0.177)
∆ln(real output )t−1 0.201*** (0.050)
∆ln( price)t 0.163 0.020 (0.221) (0.134)
∆ln( price)t−1 −0.162 (0.210)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No Industry fixed effects No No No No No No
N 320 320 345 64 64 69 R2 0.75 0.65 0.64 0.61 0.25 0.22
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; In columns (4) to (6), all variables are differenced over the whole period i.e., ∆x(t ) = x(T ) – x(t ) * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Refer to the Appendix.
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although the coefficient remains positive. The magnitudes of the coefficients on wages and output are a little different but their signs and significance are unchanged.
In Table 9b we conduct further sensitivity analysis to determine whether there is any effect from service outsourcing on manufacturing employment. There is some concern that there may be a third factor that could be affecting both labour demand and outsourcing, and hence causing an upward bias in the coefficient on outsourcing. Whether there is a potential problem depends on what is causing the change in outsourcing. If it is a fall in telephone prices then this would only affect employment through outsourcing so the estimates would be unbiased. However, if it is a technology shock in, say, computing that might affect labour demand directly, and the shock is
Table 9b. United Kingdom: Manufacturing employment and service outsourcing – sensitivity tests (1995–2001)
Dependent variable ∆ln(employment)
Variable One period difference
Industry fixed effects Lagged dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(OSS )t 0.090** 0.085** 0.118** 0.115** (0.036) (0.041) (0.056) (0.058)
∆ln(OSS )t−1 0.047** 0.025 0.033 0.004 (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024)
∆ln(OSM )t 0.037 −0.057 0.078 −0.001 (0.073) (0.092) (0.072) (0.088)
∆ln(OSM )t−1 0.027 −0.030 0.008 −0.054 (0.067) (0.087) (0.074) (0.081)
∆ln(wage)t −0.790*** −0.784*** −0.705*** −0.738*** (0.050) (0.055) (0.043) (0.047)
∆ln(wage)t−1 −0.020 −0.022 0.169* 0.269*** (0.041) (0.046) (0.086) (0.080)
∆ln(real output)t 0.382*** 0.385*** (0.067) (0.059)
∆ln(real output)t−1 0.246*** 0.131* (0.076) (0.072)
∆ln( price)t 0.116 0.127 (0.206) (0.208)
∆ln( price)t−1 −0.215 −0.149 (0.198) (0.197)
∆ln(employment)t−1 0.178* 0.374*** (0.102) (0.091)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No No
N 320 320 320 320 R2 0.85 0.81 0.76 0.69
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 Source: Refer to the Appendix.
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correlated with telecommunications, which alters outsourcing as well, then the estimates might be upwardly biased. Unfortunately, the available data do not allow us to pinpoint the cause of the changes in outsourcing. So, in order to address this potential concern we add industry fixed effects to the first differenced specification in column (1) where we control for output, and in column (2) where we control for price. These industry fixed effects take account of the differences in unobserved industry characteristics such as differences in technology that could be driving employment growth. Again, the service outsourcing coefficients are significant and positive but we see that the size of the coefficient on service outsourcing is a bit lower. For example, in column (2), where we allow for scale effects, the coefficient on service outsourcing falls from 0.11 in Table 9a to 0.085 in Table 9b.15 As a final check, we include a
15 This implies that a 1% increase in service outsourcing increases employment by 0.08%. Re-estimating the equations in columns (1) and (2) in Table 9b with the difference in outsourcing (not logged) we find that a one percentage point increase in outsourcing leads to a 12% increase in employment. Given that service outsourcing only increased by one-third of a percentage point over the sample period on average in the manufacturing industries, from 0.6% to 0.9%, this implies an average employ- ment increase of 0.6 of a percent per year. But note that the coefficient is not significant in the long difference estimations.
Table 10a. United Kingdom: Service sector employment and service outsourcing (1995–2001)
Dependent variable ∆ln(employment)
Variable One period difference Long time difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(OSS )t −0.027 −0.412** 1.633* −0.864 (0.161) (0.192) (0.591) (1.719)
∆ln(OSS )t−1 −0.312* −0.583** (0.181) (0.227)
∆ln(OSM )t −0.425*** −0.693*** −0.095 −0.836 (0.129) (0.166) (0.131) (0.653)
∆ln(OSM )t−1 −0.065 −0.101 (0.115) (0.179)
∆ln(wage)t −0.947*** −0.823*** −0.683*** −0.779 (0.057) (0.065) (0.070) (0.540)
∆ln(wage)t−1 0.126 0.113 (0.075) (0.114)
∆ln(nominal output)t 0.807*** 1.239*** (0.197) (0.106)
∆ln(nominal output)t−1 0.130 (0.155)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes No No Industry fixed effects No No No No
N 45 45 9 9 R2 0.89 0.75 0.97 0.47
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; In columns (4) to (6), all variables are differenced over the whole period, i.e. ∆x(t ) = x(T ) – x(t ) * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Refer to the Appendix.
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lagged dependent variable to take account of persistence. A similar picture emerges in this specification, with a positive coefficient on service outsourcing. Also note that the coefficient on material outsourcing is insignificant in all of the specifications for the manufacturing sectors, although it is sometimes negative.
The main message from Tables 9a and 9b is that outsourcing does not have a negative effect on manufacturing employment at the sectoral level. There is a positive significant coefficient on all of the first differenced specifications, although some only at the 10% level, but this finding is not robust in the long differenced specifications. Moreover, in none of the specifications did we see a negative coefficient on service outsourcing. The insignificant effect on employment may be explained by the level of industry aggregation. For example, a worker may lose her job due to outsourcing but then find a job in another firm within the same industry classification. So if there is sufficient job creation within the broadly defined sectors to offset any job loss, then the job loss effect of outsourcing would not show up in aggregate data.
Table 10b. United Kingdom: Service sector employment and service outsourcing – sensitivity tests (1995–2001)
Dependent variable ∆ln(employment)
Variable One period difference
Industry fixed effects Lagged dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ln(OSS )t −0.333*** −0.463*** −0.029 −0.264 (0.119) (0.121) (0.133) (0.170)
∆ln(OSS )t−1 −0.666*** −0.590*** −0.204 −0.142 (0.164) (0.187) (0.168) (0.188)
∆ln(OSM )t −0.741*** −0.758*** −0.249 −0.271 (0.156) (0.168) (0.153) (0.188)
∆ln(OSM )t−1 −0.182 −0.111 0.068 0.184 (0.135) (0.147) (0.105) (0.122)
∆ln(wage)t −0.878*** −0.849*** −0.892*** −0.804*** (0.065) (0.067) (0.063) (0.062)
∆ln(wage)t−1 0.222*** 0.182** 0.489*** 0.634*** (0.060) (0.070) (0.148) (0.128)
∆ln(nominal output)t 0.488*** 0.716*** (0.150) (0.187)
∆ln(nominal output)t−1 −0.237 −0.160 (0.144) (0.162)
∆ln(employment)t−1 0.455*** 0.698*** (0.163) (0.107)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No No
N 45 45 45 45 R2 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.85
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Source: Refer to the Appendix.
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In Tables 10a and 10b, we present the results for the services industries. All of the specifications are the same as for the manufacturing industries except we include nominal output instead of real output because service price indices were unavailable. Using the one period differenced data in the first two columns of Table 10a, we find a negative coefficient on service outsourcing. With nominal output the coefficient on the lagged outsourcing variable is only significant at the 10% level. In the second column, where we exclude output in order to allow for a scale effect, the coefficient on service outsourcing is negative and significant at the 5% level. But this effect is not robust across specifications. For example, in the long differenced time data in columns (3) and (4) the coefficient is either positive and significant (at the 10% level) or negative and insignificant. In the sensitivity tests in Table 10b, the effect is negative and significant in columns (1) and (2) with industry fixed effects, but insignificant when we include a lagged dependent variable in columns (3) and (4). Similarly, we see that material outsourcing is negative and significant only in some of the specifications. So there does not appear to be any robust significant negative effect from service outsourcing or material outsourcing in service industries, although the effect is negative and significant in some of the specifications.16
In sum, the statistical results would appear to suggest that jobs displaced by service outsourcing are likely to be offset by new jobs created in the same sector.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In developed countries, there is a tremendous amount of anxiety over international outsourcing of services. The anxiety comes in part from the perception one may obtain from the news media that global service trade is exploding and that it is dominated by lopsided, one-way outsourcing from developed countries to developing countries, and that this will lead to massive job losses in countries such as the United States and United Kingdom.
This paper presents a body of evidence that suggest neither aspect of the anxiety is well supported by the data. In particular, most developed countries are not generally more outsourcing-intensive (when adjusted for economic size) than many developing countries. In any case, many developed countries tend to run surpluses – i.e., the rest of the world outsources more to them than the reverse – in those categories most often featured in the news media, for example, business services and computer and information services. In fact, the United States and the United Kingdom have run the largest and second largest surpluses in services trade in the world in recent years.
Using data on 78 sectors in the United Kingdom, we found that job growth at the sectoral level is not negatively related to outsourcing. In our companion paper on the
16 Note that the service industry equations may be less reliable because we were unable to control for real output or prices and the sample size is much smaller, with only nine industries.
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US economy (Amiti and Wei, 2005), we find that a negative effect on employment can be detected if the economy is decomposed into 450 sectors, but the negative effect disappears when one looks at slightly broadly defined sectors (96 sectors in the US economy). These studies show that jobs are not being exported, on net, from industrial countries to developing countries as a result of outsourcing. In fact, the evidence suggests that workers who lose jobs in one industry manage to find jobs in other growing industries.
To conclude, the risk of service outsourcing dramatically reducing job growth in the advanced economies has been greatly exaggerated.
DISCUSSION
Jonathan Haskel Queen Mary, University of London and CEPR
The paper looks at international outsourcing, particularly of services, and tries to answer two questions: how much outsourcing is there and what are the effects on UK employment? The answer to the first question is that there is not too much outsourcing of services (in UK about 5% of non-energy inputs). Furthermore the UK and USA are net exporters of business services not importers, a fact that would surprise many people. As for the second question, the authors find small effects on employment that are not negative in any of their specifications.
As usual there are always problems and quibbles with methods. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the authors have written a timely and interesting paper that should be required reading for all those who only look at the extensive column inches of what journalists have to say on this matter.
Don Cook’s book, The Long Fuse: How England Lost the American Colonies, 1760–1785
Before looking at the recent evidence the authors mention some of the historical antecedents of modern day outsourcing. These are, I think, of some interest. Don Cook’s book The Long Fuse, about the US War of Independence, has some fascinating discussion of an early example of service sector outsourcing, namely the hiring of (mainly German) mercenaries by King George to fight rebels in the USA. Interestingly he argues that they won no battles, suggesting that the notion that outsourced labour may be of poor quality is not a new one.
The authors develop two measures of outsourcing. The first is country-specific and is taken from the IMF Balance of Payment Statistics on ‘imports of computing (including computer software designs) and other business services (which includes accounting and other back-office operations’ and is set out for many countries. The
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second is an industry specific measure for the UK and is an aggregation, for each industry i, of nine j services outsourced
The first measure has the problem, acknowledged by the authors, that it might include computer sales to consumers rather than firms and so might be biased. But both have a more over-riding problem, namely the original source of the data. To discover this involves penetrating the innards of the relevant statistics agency which is often hard to do. Fortunately the UK Office of National Statistics has a specific project on outsourcing and so we can get some idea of the data using Clayton (2004). The ‘International Trade in Services Survey’ is sent to around 20,000 firms who are asked about their exports and imports of business services, which such services split up into categories such as R&D, telecoms, accounting etc. These micro data, which are not available outside the ONS, are then used to calculate service-specific exports and imports, and this is the second bracket in the OSS formula used by the authors. Unfortunately, these data are not provided at an industry and service-specific level, whereas all services are so provided. This is why the authors are forced to use service- specific outsourcing ratios that are the same across all industries in the formula above. How much bias this imparts to the cross-industry variation in outsourcing awaits calculations using the micro data. At the moment, therefore, the economy-wide data are likely to be better in quality than the industry-wide data.
The economy-wide data are themselves very interesting. Two points are notable. First, the UK and USA are substantial receivers of outsourcing. Indeed they are so much so that they actually run a surplus in services trade. This would surprise many, I conjecture. Second, industries both outsource and insource at the same time. I would like to see some discussion of what this suggests for the trade theories that purport to explain trade in services.
The authors then use the industry specific data to run panel labour demand equations with employment regressed on wages, outsourcing ratios (a proxy for the price of outsourcing) and various other controls such as fixed effects, output and time dummies. Here the authors find that none of the effects of outsourcing are ever negative, as the prophets of doom might have us believe, and indeed that some are positive. This motivation for this part of the paper is set out neatly: one needs to assume that factor prices are exogenous and that there is no technological shock that both makes outsourcing more feasible and alters labour demand. Nonetheless I think it would be worth discussing at least two issues. First, what are the issues involved in trying to isolate a price effect of outsourcing when all that is available is the quantity of outsourcing (in fact the share of outsourced services in non-energy inputs)? Such a share is presumably a potentially endogenous variable, chosen by firms in a way that might reflect both the price of outsourcing but also other factor prices and technologies. Second, what are the issues involved in using industry data to try to
OSS
input purch of service j by ind i tot non energy inputs used by ind j
M of service j Sales M Xi
j j j j
–
=
+ −
∑
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estimate a production function that presumably refers to a company? Since changes in an industry refer to changes both on the intensive and extensive margin then the question of just what the regression coefficient returns is worth considering I think. If changes are mostly on the intensive margin then the coefficient is more likely to reflect movement along the isoquant concerned. But if firm opening and closing is important then the coefficient reflects this instead. We know from micro studies that opening and closing is a non-negligible part of productivity growth. Whether it is an important part of the response to outsourcing awaits more detailed micro data.
Emmanuelle Auriol IDEI, Université de Toulouse-1 and CEPR
The paper studies service outsourcing. It is very useful because the subject attracts a lot of media and political attention. The paper is one of the first empirical studies dealing seriously with this issue. With the help of descriptive statistics, it first estab- lishes that service outsourcing is at a very low level (e.g., less than half a percent of GDP in the USA in 2003) but it is growing. Moreover, until now it has mainly benefited the trade balance of developed economies. The paper studies next the impact of service outsourcing on employment in the UK. The authors conclude from their statistical analysis that service outsourcing has a weak positive effect on manufac- turing employment in the UK. The reader is hence induced to believe that workers in rich economies have nothing to fear from service outsourcing.
If service outsourcing remains at the current level there is indeed nothing to fear. However, if service outsourcing grows substantially in the future, we need to consider the possibility that some workers in services are going to get hurt. The paper is interesting because it is essentially descriptive. This is also a weakness because it does not analyse the consequence of an increase in service outsourcing. Yet service outsourcing is a normal part of international trade. Based on standard international trade theory we can predict that the relative prices of outsourced service are going to decline, which is good, but also that the relative wages of those who used to work in outsourced service are going to decline, which for them at least is not so good. If there are downward rigidities on wages, as it is the case for instance in many European countries, this might also give rise to unemployment. The experience we have on material outsourcing supports this view. People without qualifications, who previously would have held blue collar jobs in now vanished industries, are either unemployed (e.g., in France and in Germany) or belong to the class of the ‘working poor’ (e.g., in the UK and in the USA). By focusing exclusively on employment the authors are presumably missing a crucial aspect of the impact of outsourcing in the UK, namely the impact on real wages. Moreover the authors choose to stress the positive effect that service outsourcing has on manufacturing employment (Tables 9a and b). However, they find the opposite result, that is a negative effect, on service sector employment (Tables 10a and b). The authors dismiss the result on the ground that it is not robust. It is true that in 1 regression over 8 the sign is positive, but this regression is based
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on a sample of 9 observations. It is hard to trust such a result. In contrast the other regressions where the sign is negative and significant involve 45 observations.
Since we are at the early stage of the process it is hard to draw many conclusions on the future evolution of service outsourcing. The evidence presented in the paper is mixed. Service outsourcing seems to increase employment in manufacturing, and to decrease it in service sector. This result is worrisome because some 70% of jobs and of GDP value added in rich economies are in services. The emotion generated by service outsourcing, as negligible as it is right now, reflects the deep fear educated people have of falling from the middle-class to the working poor. The paper does not address this issue because it does not consider wages. I believe that it has to be addressed, along with the employment issue. Otherwise if service outsourcing rises substantially, protectionism among educated people will rise even more. In a democracy this would become a major political problem.
Panel discussion
Tullio Jappelli agreed with the discussants that outsourcing should not be dismissed merely because it is a small phenomenon. If the practice is in its infancy, then the levels seen in the data of the 1990s may not be indicative of the future impact of the practice. Hans-Werner Sinn agreed and argues that the analysis should look at wage stickiness, which if present will produce too much outsourcing. He cited data from Germany which indicated that 80% of the reduction in value added by German industry went to other countries, with only 20% going to other domestic sectors. Jaume Ventura was not surprised by the small amount because services are generally untraded. Georges de Ménil thought that the authors were using the wrong measure, and that with GDP as the denominator service imports will always seem tiny in any large economy. He suggested using service imports over total imports.
Jaume Ventura asked what was the shock that led to the growth of outsourcing, arguing that it was the fall in the cost of trade. He didn’t see this as a new phenom- enon, arguing that the British outsourced production of materials (cotton) during the industrial revolution, and thought that opening to trade would change comparative advantage symmetrically. Paul Seabright agreed that it was important to discuss the shock which leads to outsourcing as the fundamental event being evaluated. He proposed two possibilities: the fall in the cost of telecoms, which even though it might cost some jobs due to outsourcing greatly benefits the majority of people and thus could hardly be argued to have decreased welfare overall. The second possibility was the discovery on the part of countries such as India a new capacity to create services, thereby benefiting producers of complements and hurting producers of substitutes.
Philippe Martin objected that while the title suggested some welfare analysis, changes in labour are not directly related to welfare, and that terms of trade should
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be considered, as well as the change in productivity of the service sector in developing countries. More generally, he wondered how the small numbers found for labour restructuring could be reconciled with the big gains from outsourcing. The authors responded that their objective was to try to inform the decisions of policy makers by analysing what is reported in the press; it was never to address welfare issues which would involve not just trade issues but also consumer and producer surplus, for which they did not have adequate data.
Andrew Filardo objected to the idea that the ‘fear’ of the title and the anxiety it might produce was necessarily a bad thing. He thinks that the anxiety would be productive, inducing workers to acquire more human capital. The authors argued that the political economy effects of anxiety might be a bad thing if they led to protectionism.
Andrea Prat wondered what role, if any, language barriers play in outsourcing of services. He was surprised to find that the high outsourcers included countries with languages that were not widely spoken elsewhere, such as Italy and Japan.
Georges de Ménil questioned the use of the same equation to describe service imports for both service and manufacturing sectors, arguing that these are funda- mentally different in that for manufacturing service imports represent the cheaper supply of an input while they are a substitute, competition, for the service sector.
And finally, Michael Gasiorek wondered if there was anything to be learned by expanding the analysis to look at spillovers and linkages between countries and industries. He also recommended, for future research, that it would be interesting to look not at the effects but the determinants of outsourcing.
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APPENDIX Table A1. Data sources
Variable Source Description/Notes
Trade Data: imports and exports of computing and information services; and other business services
IMF Balance of Payments, International Financial Statistics
Newscount FACTIVA, Dow Jones & Reuters, www.factiva.com
Input/output tablesa National Statistics online, United Total compensation Kingdom, (www.statistics.gov.uk) Output in current values Employmentb Annual Employment survey (AES) Great Britain,
SIC92 3 digit, 1995–98 Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) United Kingdom,
SIC92 5 digit 1998–2001
Census of Employment, Northern Ireland Northern Ireland, 1995 and 1997
Price Indicesc National Statistics online, United Kingdom, (www.statistics.gov.uk)
Manufacturing industries only, SIC92.
Notes: a In order for the information from all sources to match, certain industries are aggregated together. The employment data from ABI are first aggregated into SIC92 3-digit level so as to match the categories of AES. A second stage of aggregation happens whenever there is a multiple-to-multiple correspondence between the I/O tables codes and the SIC92 3-digit codes. Finally, after dropping out industries which are either not of interest to this study, such as agriculture and mining sectors, or with incomplete information, we are left with 69 manufacturing industries, and 9 service industries, listed below. b The regional coverage of the two sources of employment information are different. In order to make the two data comparable, the following steps were taken. First, the data for employment from Northern Ireland were added to employment data from Great Britain to get employment figures for United Kingdom for 1995–1997. Note, for 1996 the employment in north Ireland is taken as a simple average of 1995 and 1997 employment. There still remain some industries for which there is no corresponding data in Northern Ireland. For these industries, the information of the overlapping year (1998) serves as a bridge to merge the whole series, with the employment of Great Britain industries assumed to be constant ratios of those of United Kingdom. c These price indices are available at different levels of disaggregation (SIC92 classification) and do not correspond to industries in our sample in a one-to-one fashion. Hence, we constructed a weighted average of these PPI (using average employment for the United Kingdom for the period 1998 to 2001 as weights – the only years available at the appropriate level of disaggregation) to get price indices at 3 digit SIC level.
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Table A2. List of industries in the UK sample
Manufacturing industries
IO Industry Name IO Industry Name
8 Meat processing 49 Glass and glass products 9 Fish and fruit processing 50 Ceramic goods 10 Oils and fats 51 Structural clay products 11 Dairy products 52 Cement, lime and plaster 12 Grain milling and starch 53 Articles of concrete, stone etc 13 Animal feed 54 Iron and steel 14 Bread, biscuits etc 55 Non-ferrous metals 15 Sugar 56 Metal castings 16 Confectionery 57 Structural metal products 17 Other food products 58 Metal boilers and radiators 18 Alcoholic beverages 59 Metal forging, pressing, etc 19 Soft drinks and mineral waters 60 Cutlery, tools etc 20 Tobacco products 61 Other metal products 21 Textile fibres 62 Mechanical power equipment 22 Textile weaving 63 General purpose machinery 23 Textile finishing 64 Agricultural machinery 24 Made-up textiles 65 Machine tools 25 Carpets and rugs 66 Special purpose machinery 26 Other textiles 67 Weapons and ammunition 27 Knitted goods 68 Domestic appliances nec 28 Wearing apparel and fur products 69 Office machinery & computers 29 Leather goods 70 Electric motors and generators etc 30 Footwear 71 Insulated wire and cable 31 Wood and wood products 72 Electrical equipment nec 32 Pulp, paper and paperboard 73 Electronic components 33 Paper and paperboard products 74 Transmitters for TV, radio and phone 34 Printing and publishing 75 Receivers for TV and radio 36 Industrial gases and dyes 76 Medical and precision instruments 37 Inorganic chemicals 77 Motor vehicles 38 Organic chemicals 78 Shipbuilding and repair 39 Fertilisers 79 Other transport equipment 40 Plastics & synthetic resins etc 80 Aircraft and spacecraft 41 Pesticides 81 Furniture 42 Paints, varnishes, printing ink etc 82 Jewellery and related products 43 Pharmaceuticals 83 Sports goods and toys 44 Soap and toilet preparations 84 Miscellaneous manufacturing nec & recycling 45 Other chemical products 85 Electricity production and distribution 46 Man-made fibres 88 Construction 47 Rubber products 48 Plastic products Total Manufacturing Industries = 69
Service industries IO Industry Name 108 Research and development 99 Telecommunications 109 Legal activities 100 Banking and finance 110 Accountancy services 101 Insurance and pension funds 111 Market research, management consultancy 102 Auxiliary financial services 112 Architectural activities and technical consultancy 106 Renting of machinery etc 113 Advertising 107 Computer services 114 Other business services
Total Service Industries = 9 Notes: Industries in the bold frames have been grouped together to match input/output classifications. Specifically, industries 14–17, 18–19, 25–26, 36–40, 100–102, and 109–111 are treated as 6 groups of industries.
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WEB APPENDIX
Available at: http://www.economic-policy.org
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o7 ( management control systems).pdf
Management Accounting Research 14 (2003) 281–307
Management control systems and trust in outsourcing relationships
Kim Langfield-Smith∗ , David Smith
Department of Accounting and Finance, Monash University, Vic. 3800, Australia
Received 16 June 2002; accepted 10 June 2003
Abstract
Outsourcing is a form of strategic alliance that has increased in popularity over the past decade. However, there has been limited research that studies the design of management control systems (MCS) and the role of trust in such inter-firm relationships. This paper draws on a model by van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman [Acc. Organ. Society 25 (2001) 51] to examine how control mechanisms and trust are used to achieve control in a single case study of an electricity company and its outsourced IT operations. An analysis of the characteristics of the transaction, environment and parties, indicated that the control strategy adopted appeared to be a trust based pattern of control, rather than a market based or bureaucratic based pattern. Control was achieved through outcome controls and social controls developing over time, and through the development of trust, particularly goodwill trust. This paper adds to the growing knowledge of the design of control systems and trust in outsourcing relationships. © 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Outsourcing; Strategic alliance; Management control systems; Transaction cost economics; Trust
1. Introduction
With the advent of globalisation and enhanced levels of competition, many organisations have acknowl- edged the difficulties of developing and maintaining the range of expertise and skills necessary to compete successfully. Various forms of cooperative ventures and strategic alliances provide ways of gaining access to the specialised skills and competencies that are needed to compete effectively in a globalised market place (Das and Teng, 2001a; Nooteboom et al., 1997). Strategic alliances are broad ranging relationships and can encompass joint ventures, franchises, joint research and development, joint marketing ventures, long-term supply arrangements, and outsourcing relationships. The outsourcing of core and non-core activities are a form of strategic alliance (Nooteboom et al., 1997; van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman,
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.:+61-3-9903-1472; fax:+61-3-9903-2577. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (K. Langfield-Smith), [email protected]
(D. Smith).
1044-5005/$ – see front matter © 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S1044-5005(03)00046-5
282 K. Langfield-Smith, D. Smith / Management Accounting Research 14 (2003) 281–307
2000; Das and Teng, 2001b), particularly when the outsourced activity is of key strategic importance to the organisation.
Over the past decade, there has been increasing interest in the opportunities provided by strategic alliances, and outsourcing in particular (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Das and Teng, 2001b). However, there is also a growing body of evidence of a high failure rate in such arrangements. One cause of this is the high level of risk associated with alliances, compared to ‘in-house’ activities (Das and Teng, 2001a). Aspects that cause high risk include the difficulties inherent in gaining cooperation with partners who have different objectives, and the potential for opportunistic exploitation of the dependence relationship that exists between partners. Appropriate governance structures, including management control systems (MCS) and the development of trust, may work to reduce risk and decrease failure (Das and Teng, 2001a; Speklé, 2001). However, there has been only limited attention to the form of management control systems that are suited to strategic alliances, and we have only limited knowledge of the role that trust plays in such relationships. There have been calls to extend the domain of MCS to cover inter-firm relationships (Otley, 1994; Hopwood, 1996; Speklé, 2001), and research that considers explicitly the design of MCS and trust in such situations has begun to appear (see, for example,Seal and Vincent-Jones, 1997; Seal et al., 1999; Das and Teng, 2001a,b). In particular, some research focuses on MCS design and outsourcing relationships (van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; Mouritsen et al., 2001; Chua and Mahama, 2002). The purpose of this paper is to build on this prior research, to add to our knowledge of the design of MCS in outsourcing relationships.
Outsourcing is the contracting of any service or activity to a third party (Drtina, 1994; McHugh et al., 1995). Since the early 1990s, there has been considerable growth in outsourcing, in both the public and private sectors, with outsourcing being increasingly applied, not only to manufacturing activities, but also to traditional in-house administrative and management functions. These include data processing and IT operations, human resource management services, accounting functions, internal audit and marketing (Chalos, 1995). The practice of outsourcing is an international phenomenon. In the USA, Digital has outsourced its entire labour force and much of its production management to a labour hire firm. The global clothing manufacturer Benetton is little more than a shell, having outsourced its product design, manufacturing, and merchandising to contractors. In Australia, the Commonwealth Bank has outsourced its information technology, printing, record centres, supply functions and mail operations (Long, 1998; Syvret, 1998).
Much has been written about the criteria that should guide decisions to outsource, and both successes and failures in outsourcing are reported in the media. The financial press, in particular, tends to focus on the size of the contract, and the identity of the successful bidder. Outsourcing success or failure is often judged by whether the outsourcer achieves cost savings, or experiences cost over-runs. Few reports, however, consider how the inter-firm MCS can be designed to suit the particular characteristics of the outsourcing relationship.
There are several, well-established models or frameworks for studying the design of MCS (see, for example,Ouchi, 1979; Flamholtz, 1983; Merchant, 1985; Simons, 1995). However, these frameworks typically focus on control systems within an organization. Only a few comprehensive models consider the design of MCS in outsourcing relationships. For example,Speklé (2001)developed a model of control archetypes, based on transaction cost economics (TCE), andDas and Teng (2001a)modelled the rela- tionships between MCS, trust and risk in various types of inter-firm relationships.van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000)developed a comprehensive model of management control, which was based on principles of TCE, but which integrated the role of trust. These models will be drawn on in this paper.
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The paper is organised as follows.Section 2provides a review of the literature on the design of MCS and the role of trust in outsourcing relationships. In particular, the models ofvan der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000), and to a lesser extentSpeklé (2001), are drawn on to develop expectations of the form of controls and trust that are suited in particular transactional situations.Section 3contains a case study of an electricity company that outsourced its information technology activities to a single specialist outsourcer. The fourth section analyses the case study to determine the form of control pattern in place, the nature of the control mechanisms and the role of trust in establishing close cooperative relationships. The final section concludes with a discussion of directions for further research.
2. Theoretical development
It is only recently that researchers have begun to consider the design of MCS, or governance structures, in situations that span traditional organisational boundaries, including strategic alliances with suppliers, or outsourcing. These alliances are usually characterised as partnerships or relationships and may involve the sharing of joint decision making in areas such as strategic planning, and new product and process development. They may also entail joint investments in relation-specific assets. Compared to arms-length relationships, which are often well defined and contractually based, outsourcing relationships may en- compass a great deal of uncertainty or risk for both parties. The nature of the contract between the two parties can be complex and cover many areas of interest that extend beyond the mere actions of supply and receipt of goods and services. It has been argued that the complexity of such arrangements may preclude the complete ex ante specification of detailed contracts (Heide, 1994). In addition, the need for flexibility and adaptation in those partnerships may imply that control systems rely less on formal mech- anisms (Gietzmann, 1996; Ittner et al., 1999). However, in some outsourcing situations the institution of a formal control system may enable greater control and transparency, which may not only impact on the interorganisational relationship, but may have implications for strengthening control and increasing insights within the outsourcing firm (Mouritsen et al., 2001).
A useful starting point in studying control systems in outsourcing relationships is to consider how control systems within a single firm have been conceptualised.
2.1. Within-firm control systems
Control systems have been conceptualised and categorised in various ways: formal versus informal controls, behaviour versus outcome controls; mechanistic versus organic controls; bureaucratic versus clan controls. However, these typifications are not distinct and there is some agreement that all organisational control systems consist of formal, explicitly designed controls, as well as the unwritten informal or social controls that cannot be designed directly. Within formal designed controls, some researchers distinguish between outcome controls and behaviour controls (Ouchi, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1985). Outcome controls measure and monitor the outputs of operations or behaviours, using techniques such as performance measurement. Behaviour controls, such as rules and standard operating procedures, specify and monitor individuals’ behaviours.
Clan or social controls are present in all organisations to varying degrees (Ouchi, 1979). Social controls may develop from shared norms, values and beliefs, and may rely on the internalisation of goals, which leads to organisationally desired behaviours. These controls cannot be designed explicitly, but can be
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shaped and influenced by activities such as frequent interactions, meetings, negotiation of disputes, codes of conduct, senior management attitudes and style, and rituals. There is some evidence that social controls are also relevant in inter-firm relationships (Gietzmann, 1996; Nooteboom et al., 1997).
Ouchi (1979)highlighted the relationships between the mode of control, and the information char- acteristics of the task: the degree of output measurability and task programmability. Outcome controls were said to be suitable in situations of high output measurability and low task programmability, whereas behaviour controls suit situations of low output measurability and high task programmability. Where both output measurability and task programmability are high, either behaviour or outcome controls may be used. Social controls emerge when both output measurability and task programmability are low.
2.2. Trust and control systems
Merchant (1985, p. 39) noted that ‘almost every control system involves some degree of trust that the individuals of concern will do what is best for the organization without any, or with only incomplete, monitoring of actions or results’. However, it is only relatively recently that researchers have begun to study the specific relationships between trust and the MCS design, but there are inconsistencies. Some researchers claim that control mechanisms and trust can be pursued simultaneously, or are complementary (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Goold and Campbell, 1987; Das and Teng, 1998), while others argue that control mechanisms are detrimental to trust (see, for example,Lorange and Roos, 1992). However, researchers have not always considered how specific forms of trust and specific types of controls relate or interact.
Several researchers have focused on the role of trust in governance relationships (see, for example, Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Gietzmann, 1996; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Seal and Vincent-Jones, 1997). Trust may develop over time through processes of learning and adaptation, which are essential to the strengthening of the relationship between partners, making the relationship more durable in the face of conflict and encouraging interactions between partners involving knowledge exchange and promotion of each other’s interests (Johanson and Mattsson, 1987). Close relationships with suppliers may involve the sharing of information, joint product and process development and joint cost improvement activities, and trust allows such alliances to flourish. It has been argued that certain minimum levels of trust are essential in inter-firm relationships, as trust reduces the possibility of opportunistic behaviour (Axelrod, 1984; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Birnberg, 1998). In addition, trust may increase the predictability of mutual behaviour through each party honouring commitments and allowing partners to deal with unforeseen contingencies in mutually acceptable ways (Sako, 1992, p. 37).
Trust is a difficult concept to study as it has been defined and classified in many ways. Most definitions of trust focus on exposing oneself to vulnerability. A simple definition is that trust is having confidence that one’s expectations will be realised (Luhmann, 1979). Other definitions suggest that trust entails positive expectations regarding the other in a risky situation (Gambetta, 1988), and includes adopting a belief, without having full information to confirm that belief (Tomkins, 2001). Several researchers have noted the link between trust and information requirements (see, for example,Luhmann, 1979; Creed and Miles, 1996; Wicks et al., 1999; Tomkins, 2001). Trust is characterised as an alternative uncertainty absorption mechanism to providing increased information. This has led some researchers to suggest that there is an inverse relationship between willingness to trust and the need for information (see, for example,Wicks et al., 1999), while others see the trade-off as more complex (see, for example,Seal and Vincent-Jones, 1997; Tomkins, 2001). The provision of information, such as cost reports or performance information,
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is a component of MCS, and is certainly important in outsourcing relationships, where the sharing of information and the generation of performance information is common.
It has been argued that trust is particularly relevant to inter-firm relationships, as trust is only important in situations where there is risk (Luhmann, 1979; Coleman, 1990; Sako, 1992), and risk management is a critical aspect of these relationships (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Das and Teng, 2001b). Three definitions of trust relevant to managing outsourcing are contractual trust, competence trust and goodwill trust (Sako, 1992). Contractual trust is based on the moral standard of honesty, and rests on an assumption that the other party will honour the agreement, whether the agreement is in writing or not (Sako, 1992; van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). The higher the level of contractual trust that a firm has in an outsourcer, the less need there is to gather information to prevent or reduce opportunistic behaviour. Competence trust focuses on perceptions of ability and expertise, and is the ‘expectation of technically competent role performance’ (Barber, 1983, p. 14). In inter-firm relationships, competence trust relates to a partner’s ability to perform according to the specified agreement or contract (Nooteboom, 1996). In contrast,goodwill trust can be defined as perceptions of a partner’s intention to perform in accordance with those agreements (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Nooteboom, 1996). Goodwill trust is associated with integrity, responsibility and dependability (Das and Teng, 2001a). While these forms of trust may be present to some extent in the early stages of an outsourcing relationship, they can also develop further over time.
2.3. Transaction cost economics and control
A common framework for viewing the choice of governance structures in inter-firm relationships is transaction cost economics (see, for example,Gietzmann, 1996; Seal et al., 1999; van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; Speklé, 2001). TCE is based on the notion that firms choose efficient organisational forms or governance structures based on transactional issues, such as firm-specific investments, and external or internal uncertainty (Ittner et al., 1999). Governance structures can be characterised as one of three forms: markets, hybrids (including strategic alliances) and hierarchies (Williamson, 1991). TCE is based on the idea that three aspects of transactions determine the appropriate mode of governance: the frequency of the transaction, theuncertainty encompassed in those transactions, and theasset specificity of the transactions (Williamson, 1979). Asset specificity, in particular, is said to be of particular significance in explaining the choice of governance structure.
Asset specificity is the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative use without sacrifice of productive value. It is the opportunity loss associated with the early termination of a relationship (Speklé, 2001). Asset specificity can arise in six ways: site specificity, physical assets specificity, human assets specificity, brand name capital, dedicated assets and temporal specificity (Williamson, 1991). Under TCE, it is assumed that a high level of asset specificity creates dependency between the parties in a relationship, increases switching costs and leads to difficult governance situations.
Markets, hybrids and hierarchies rely on different control mechanisms to enable successful contracting. Whereas markets rely on free competition to ensure control, and hierarchies rely on authority, hybrid forms of control generally entail long-term contracts. Hybrid governance structures are long-term contractual relations that preserve autonomy by providing added transaction-specific safeguards (Williamson, 1996, p. 378). The safeguards often include ‘hostage arrangements’ to correct market asymmetries. For example, parties to the relationship may transfer assets that can only be fully recovered if the contract is executed successfully. High levels of uncertainty associated with hybrids, may make it difficult to specify ex
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ante performance criteria within contracts, and in the face of high asset specificity, alternative control mechanisms such as specialised dispute resolution mechanisms may need to be put in place.
TCE models have been criticised for not considering adequately thesocial context within which trans- actions are embedded. It has been argued that social embeddedness not only influencesthe design of the control systems, it also influencesthe relationship and each party’s behaviour, including the level of opportunism (Granovetter, 1985; van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). A critical concern in all inter-firm relationships is the attitudes and personal relationships between the two parties (Faulkner, 1995). In particular, trust has emerged as an important way of reducing opportunism, and as a factor in the design and study of control systems (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Gietzmann, 1996; Nooteboom et al., 1997; van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). In the following section, two recent models that draw on TCE to depict control systems in outsourcing relationships will be outlined; one model integrates TCE and trust.
2.4. TCE-based models of management control
Speklé (2001)developed a TCE theory of management control to explain nine archetypes of control. These control archetypes vary depending on three dimensions: task programmability, ex post information impactedness (output measurability) and asset specificity.Speklé (2001)specified two control archetypes for outsourcing relationships:hybrid arms-length control andhybrid exploratory control. To date, Speklé’s model has not been used in empirical research.van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000)developed a model of control in inter-firm relationships that integrates TCE concepts and trust. They identified three management control patterns relevant to outsourcing relationships: themarket based pattern, bureaucracy based pattern and trust based pattern. In the market based pattern, market mechanisms dominate the relationship, and this is similar to Speklé’s archetype of market control. However, Speklé does not see market control as a suitable archetype for outsourcing relationships. The bureaucracy based pattern is analogous to Speklé’s hybrid arms-length control, while the trust based pattern bears some similarities to hybrid exploratory control. While Speklé’s (2001) model focuses on the characteristics of the transaction as a determinate of the control systems archetype,van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000)provide a more complete analysis by considering not only the transaction characteristics, but the transaction environment, the characteristic of the parties to the transaction, and the role of trust in achieving control.
The market based pattern suits transactions characterised by high task programmability, high mea- surability of output, low asset specificity and high task repetition. Many suppliers will compete for the contract, and market prices will be directly linked to the quality of the output of the outsourcer’s activi- ties. Detailed contracts are not required and the possibility of returning to the market for competing bids provides discipline for the current outsourcer to provide an efficient and effective output. In the face of effective market mechanisms, no specific control instruments are needed to manage the relationship. The institutional environment is not relevant, and nor is supplier reputation, prior history of cooperation, or risk attitude. If one party to the relationship behaves opportunistically, another party can be chosen without high switching costs, as there are no specific investments. The transaction environment is characterised by low uncertainty and many available alternative suppliers.
Thebureaucracy based pattern, or hybrid arms-length control, suits transactions that have high task programmability, high output measurability, moderate asset specificity and low to medium repetitiveness. The transaction environment has relatively low uncertainty and the future is fairly predictable. Controls will be prescriptive and include detailed rules of behaviour and rigid performance targets. These will
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be captured in detailed contracts, which are used to monitor performance. Comprehensive selection criteria are set up and formal bidding is used to select a partner. Hostage arrangements can be used to ensure compliance to contractual provisions, and arbitration may be used to resolve contract disputes and to counter opportunistic behaviour in an environment of moderate asset specificity (Speklé, 2001). Contracts are specific and long-term, and the autonomy of the two parties is preserved. In this situation, a combination of behaviour and outcome controls will be used, which is consistent with Ouchi’s prescription for control systems in the face of high task programmability and high output measurability. Trust plays a limited role in the bureaucracy based pattern, but is important in the early stages of a relationship. Where human knowledge and skills are critical to the quality of the work, the outsourcing firm must perceive that the outsourcer has high levels of competence trust and contractual trust in order to select the outsourcer and to proceed with the contract.
Thetrust based pattern of van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000)is characterised by low levels of task programmability, low levels of output measurability and high asset specificity. Transactions are not highly repetitive. The environment is highly uncertain and risky, so trust becomes the dominant mechanism for achieving control in this form of relationship, and this mitigates the risks associated with high asset specificity. The initial selection of the outsourcer is based on perceptions of competence trust, contractual trust and goodwill trust, which arise through friendships, former contractual relationships and reputation. Initially, contracts are merely broad frameworks, which then develop further over time. A series of control devices, such as personal consultations and intense communications, are put in place to develop competence trust and goodwill trust. In addition, the institutional environment can stimulate the development of competence trust and contractual trust, through certification of the firm’s activities and legal regulations. Goodwill trust becomes the solution to overcoming information asymmetry, and regular personal contacts and an attitude of commitment can lead to its development. Control systems, in general, are more informal under these forms of relationships, and often take the form of social controls. Consistent with Ouchi (1979), behaviour controls are not suited in these situations of low task programmability, and when controls are formalised they tend to emphasise outcome controls, and these develop over time through the sharing of private information and the alignment of the parties’ performance expectations. Trust is necessary to achieve control, as activities and output cannot be measured with any certainty.
The transaction characteristics ofhybrid exploratory control are similar to those of trust based control, except that asset specificity is moderate rather than high. Under the Speklé model (and under TCE in general) high asset specificity (as found under a trust based pattern) cannot be tolerated in an outsourcing situation as it increases the potential for opportunistic behaviour and information leakage, requiring the outsourced function to be taken back in-house. However, firms do continue to engage in outsourcing in situations of high asset specificity. The trust based pattern demonstrates that the development of goodwill trust and contractual trust can mitigate opportunistic behaviour and the abuse of unequal bargaining power (Sako, 1992, p. 39;van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). Similarly, under hybrid exploratory control, exclusive contacts with suppliers are considered unacceptable, as they increase asset specificity, dependence and risk, in the light of incomplete contracts. However, organisations do enter into exclu- sive contracts with outsourcers. Again, goodwill trust and contractual trust will counter the potential opportunistic behaviour.Table 1contains a summary of the characteristics of the transaction, transaction environment and parties for the three patterns of control, as well as the form of control mechanisms and the role of trust in achieving control.
Thus, depending on the characteristics of the transaction, the transaction environment and the parties, we would expect the MCS of outsourced operations to follow one of the three control patterns outlined
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Table 1 Control mechanisms and trust
Outsourcing control pattern
Characteristics of the transaction, transaction environment and parties
Control mechanisms The role of trust in achieving control
Market based pattern
Transaction • High task programmability • High output measurability • Low asset specificity • High repetition of transactions
No specific control instruments required as market mechanisms dominate
Not relevant—switching costs are low
• Competitive bidding at periodic intervals
• No detailed contracting • Market prices linked to
standardised activities and outputs
Transaction environment • Many potential parties • Market price contains all the market
information • Social embeddedness and
institutional factors not relevant Parties • Not important
Bureaucratic based pattern
Transaction • High task programmability • High output measurability • Moderate asset specificity • Low to medium repetition of
transactions
Outcome and behaviour controls, focused on direct intervention by outsourcing party
In selecting the outsourcer, when human knowledge and skills are important to the quality of the work, the outsourcing firm must perceive high levels of competence trust and contractual trust in the outsourcer
• Rigid performance targets • Detailed rules of behaviour • Detailed contracts • Comprehensive selection
criteria and formal bidding Transaction environment • Hostage arrangements • Future contingencies known • Medium to high market risks • Institutional factors influence
contractual rules Parties • Competence reputation • Medium risk sharing attitude • Asymmetry in bargaining power
Trust based pattern
Transaction • Low task programmability • Low output measurability, that tends
to increase over time • High asset specificity • Low repetition of transactions
Outcome and social controls develop over time • Broad non-specific contracts
that develop time • Performance assessed
through broad emergent standards
• High levels of information sharing and communications
• Perceptions of competence trust, contractual trust and goodwill trust may determine the selection of outsourcer, and must be assessed in advance
• The institutional environment can stimulate competence trust and contractual trust
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Table 1 (Continued )
Outsourcing control pattern
Characteristics of the transaction, transaction environment and parties
Control mechanisms The role of trust in achieving control
• Opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry will be overcome by developing goodwill trust and contractual trust
• Regular personal contacts, intense communications and an attitude of commitment can stimulate competence and goodwill trust
Transaction environment • Future contingencies unknown • High market risks • Social embeddedness • Institutional factors influence the
relation Parties • Competence reputation • Experience in networks • Experience with contracting parties • Risk sharing attitude • No asymmetry in bargaining power
above. In a market based pattern, there are no explicit control mechanisms and trust is not relevant in achieving control. Under a bureaucratic based pattern, outcome controls and behaviour controls are the prime control mechanisms, and trust plays a minor role in achieving control. Under a trust based pattern, outcome controls and social controls emerge over time, and trust plays a significant role in achieving control.
3. Case description—the outsourcing of IT&T at Central Energy (Central)
Central Energy is an Australian company operating in the electricity industry, which outsourced its information technology function. The company was selected as a research site, as it was known to have well-established outsourcing contracts.
Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with key managers in the electricity firm who were involved in the decision to outsource the operation, and in the ongoing management of the outsourced function. These managers worked in the areas of finance, information technology, shared services and contracting.1 Interviews lasted two to three hours each. Access was also gained to relevant company documents. Two researchers were present at each interview to enhance the reliability of the interpretation of interview material and conclusions drawn. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. The completed ‘write-up’ of the case study was sent to the interviewees for comment and to the company for final approval.2
The purpose of the interviews was to understand the nature of the relationship between the company and the outsourcer and type of control system used in the outsourcing relationship. To provide acon- text for the study, the following two issues were investigated: the motivation for the firm to consider outsourcing, and the criteria used to select the outsourcer. To investigate the form of MCS, the focus
1 Four different managers were interviewed (one was interviewed twice) at the end of the first two years of the outsourcing contact.
2 Even though all company names are disguised, as part of gaining access to the company the researchers agreed to allow the company final approval over any material published.
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was on understanding the nature of the formal contract entered into with the outsourcer, and the pro- cesses used to achieve control over the first two years of the relationship. To assess theappropriateness of the control activities and to obtain a perspective of the managers’perceived success or otherwise of the outsourcing venture, managers were asked to reflect on the benefits that they had gained from outsourcing.
3.1. Background
Central Energy was formed in 1995, through the merger of two electricity authorities, Hilton Energy (Hilton) and Woodside Electricity (Woodside). Central distributes and retails electricity and value-added energy services to more than a million people across a large, diverse area. Central also sells major electrical contracting services throughout Australia and retails energy services to major industrial and commercial clients across two states of Australia.
Deregulation of the Australian electricity industry led to considerable changes for organisations like Central. Increased competition occurred through the privatisation or corporatisation of state-owned mo- nopolies. In Central’s home state, the industry was broken up into a number of separate corporatised entities that manage electricity distribution, generation, and the electricity grid. Adding to the increased competitive pressure, all customers were able to buy power from any of the state’s electricity distribu- tors. Thus, distributors can seek customers from other states, making the customer base more vulnerable. Improved customer service and reduced costs have become prime considerations. To remain competitive in this environment, Central established four separate businesses and a holding company. Each business was required to make a profit. When services were provided from one business to another, they were supplied on a commercial arms-length basis.
During the merger, the executive steering committee decided to outsource the information technology and telecommunications (IT&T) function. This occurred within two months of the merger.
3.2. Motivation for outsourcing IT&T
Central’s stated policy was to ‘. . . ensure that all internal services are provided effectively and effi- ciently to the core Network and Energy Services businesses’. Where internal services did not meet the level of quality or cost of external suppliers, competitive tenders were sought and evaluated. Thus, cost effectiveness and strategic issues were primary considerations in outsourcing decisions. However, the specific factors that motivated the decision to outsource IT&T were broader and included the search for a solution to the problem of merging two very different IT cultures; the need to improve cost management of IT&T; greater access to technical knowledge and expertise; and the need to bring more discipline and control to IT&T.
The merger of the two electricity authorities brought together two IT&T functions that were very different in size and nature, as well as focus and direction. Developing a single, effective IT&T function was seen as a major managerial issue and an important determinant of Central’s ability to compete in the new contestable electricity environment. Hilton had 168 IT&T staff, compared with Woodside’s 33. Hilton was a mainframe environment with large-scale applications, and frequent cost over-runs. Woodside had a very low cost infrastructure: its systems were small, not run on mainframes, and there were limited funds for software development. Many of Woodside’s IT staff took voluntary redundancies with the merger.
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Before the merger, cost management of the IT&T function was poor, particularly at Hilton. Cost over-runs were common, and there was little control over the initiation of new projects. Hilton’s IT&T was strongly customer-focused so that a plethora of operating systems was supported and new applications were developed continually. There was limited accountability for spending on IT resources. A senior manager described the situation:
A business would ask IT&T for something to be done, but they were not being charged the true cost. There was no discipline in the management of costs. One of the drivers in the move to outsource the IT&T area was to introduce that discipline, so that if you do ask for something to be modified or changed, someone comes back to you and says ‘You know it’s going to cost you $20,000’.
The transfer pricing system used to charge users of IT&T services ‘sent the wrong signals’, and led to dysfunctional decision making. Favours and ‘funny prices’ led to a lack of accountability and an absence of commercial reality. Managers hoped that outsourcing of IT&T would help curb spending, as ‘real’ money would be seen to be leaving the organisation. An IT manager described past practices:
The IT cost was like a bottomless bucket. The projects were actually controlled by the IT people, not by the users. They might have been initiated by the users, but basically, the users lost control. So the IT people started to dominate the situation. Now that is the fault of the users, not a fault of the IT people. The organisation recognised that it did not manage that well.
The cost of in-house IT&T for the two electricity distributors before the merger was estimated at $42 million per year. Many managers, however, believed that this was overstated. Nevertheless, IT&T was clearly a significant cost to the business and so provided opportunities for cost improvement and achieving more control over IT developments.
Another reason for engaging in outsourcing was that the organisation would need to gain access to high levels of IT expertise to compete effectively. It was considered difficult and impractical to supply this in-house. One manager described the thinking:
I think that at the end of the day, you really have to understand what your core competencies are. That is, what are the things that you are good at, that you do have an edge on, and that you really know the ins and outs of it. No matter what business you are in, there are some things that you can do better than others. It is a matter of identifying and really understanding those things. If you go back a few years, we probably did not really have a feel for that—we continued to do things because we had always done them. It is a matter of sitting down and saying, ‘what are we good at? What do we do that adds value to our organisation?’ And if there is some lineball exercise or some clear-cut situation where we are not adding value, then we have to think seriously about doing something else.
Central understood that its core business was energy services. The environment in which it was op- erating placed greater demands on the business for ‘smarter systems’, which would involve high use of sophisticated IT. Thus, it was envisaged that there would be greater reliance on the IT&T function in the future, and it was of critical importance for survival. An external provider was believed to offer several advantages over the in-house department. A manager described this:
The market is changing very dramatically and we do not have the depth in the IT group to be able to provide IT solutions. We wanted to work with a partner whose core business was IT and therefore was in a better position to search the world, to provide us with the right solutions at the right time. Now I do not want to appear to be negative towards our IT groups, because they did carry us a long
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way forward. The question is, did they get too expensive? We lost control of the IT spend, but also the market had moved a lot quicker, and we don’t believe the IT groups were dynamic enough to provide the necessary solutions to go forward.
Thus, a strong motivation for outsourcing was managers’ perceptions that the use and development of IT within Hilton was out of control. One senior IT manager described the situation that had existed at Hilton:
In the past, utilities were fairly wealthy organisations—cash rich and managed predominantly by engineers who liked to build gold-plated systems. We now have redundant microwave links, multiple computer sites, you name it. It was technology gone mad. Whereas the old Woodside was managed by a man whose single focus in life was to build low cost solutions.
Some businesses within Central had started to develop their own IT groups and this hastened the need to engage a highly competent IT outsourcer to bring IT planning and operations under central control.
3.3. Criteria used in the outsourcing decision
In mid-1996, Central called for tenders for the IT&T function. Bids from two large global companies were considered, along with an in-house bid. All bidders needed to demonstrate that they could offer value within the dynamic electricity environment. The criteria for assessing the tenders included the following: the cost of providing the service; clear cost reduction paths; staff transition issues; the approach to strategic planning of IT; what the tenderer could offer in terms of their experience, skills base and competence; how they planned to manage the contract; and the nature of the billing arrangements. Each criterion was weighted in the final analysis, with the final decision being made by the implementation committee.
The successful tenderer, Global Systems (Global), was chosen for many reasons, including its reputation and company values, the quality of its proposal, the ability to respond speedily to changes in the market, leverage and wide international knowledge base. Other factors that favoured the tenderer were the time-line on cost reduction paths, and the way Global intended to deal with staffing issues. The in-house proposal was said to be ‘a clear third’, largely because the team were unable to provide convincing arguments that they were able to provide the necessary IT solutions for the future.
Interestingly, no IT staff were on the implementation committee as it was felt that they would have too much self-interest in the project’s outcome. However, they were consulted in the decision. Global was physically located on-site, in the same area as Hilton’s previous IT&T department. Central retained ownership of the IT equipment.
Once the decision was made to outsource IT&T to Global, a team was set up to work with staff on transition issues. Existing IT&T staff were given three choices: take a voluntary redundancy package, transfer their employment to Global, or continue at Central in a different role. About half of the IT&T staff left, with most of the remainder transferring to Global. Counselling and career transition training were provided for some staff. Many employees that transferred to Global saw better opportunities for career advancement in an organisation that had IT as its core business. Some initial problems were experienced, with specialised knowledge of the IT systems ‘walking out the door’. As in many companies, when redundancy packages are offered, it is often the most talented staff with best employment opportunities that choose to leave. Many of the IT applications at Central were custom-built and not well documented,
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so often only a few employees knew how particular software operated. In addition, over time some of Central’s IT staff who had transferred to Global moved to other Global sites.
3.4. Managing the outsourcing relationship
The first twelve months of the outsourcing relationship were described by one manager as ‘rocky’. Indeed, it took about eighteen months for positives to clearly emerge. The key issues to manage were: agreeing on the baseline level of service to be included in the contract; verifying the cost of the baseline services; managing false expectations of staff; managing differences between the cul- tures of Central and Global; the implementation of communication processes; developing trust; achie- ving cost reduction; and implementation of the risk-reward system. These issues are considered in turn below.
The contract contained an agreed price for baseline services and additional payments for discretionary projects that were above that baseline. Baseline services were defined as ‘. . . the cost of maintaining all infrastructure and systems in the organisation at the level at which they were at the point that the contract was signed’. This definition was difficult to interpret. The problem in establishing the baseline involved agreeing on which projects were discretionary (over and above baseline services and hence an extra cost to Central) and which projects were included in the baseline service. During the first year of the contract there were conflicts between Central and Global, as each had different ideas as to what constituted baseline services.
Some managers at Central believed that clear contract specifications were critical to ensuring a smooth relationship:
People have to be very clear about their service level requirements. Not say ‘95 per cent uptime’ or something like that. None of this arbitrary nonsense. Be very specific about what those ser- vice level requirements are—specify as much as you can get down. And people may say ‘Oh, it’s not necessary because you’re going to work these things out together’. You can, but that means there needs to be extreme trust and that only occurs when you are really partners. But you do not start as partners. You start with the specifications; you work to it and the supplier/customer rela- tionship. And that is where we came from. In the beginning it was an unhappy customer/supplier relationship.
Some managers believed that these problems could have been averted if more time had been spent negotiating the contract. However, at the time of the merger there was a great sense of urgency to solve the IT problem, and to get an outsourcer onboard.
Another issue that dominated the early days of the relationship was an extensive verification of the cost of baseline services, which had not been specified in the contract. A manager explains why this was the case:
With the merger of the organisation, redundancy programs were going on, and with uncertainty in IT staff, there was a need to do something to get some stability in the process. The cost of putting some trust in Global Systems during that six to nine months process was seen to be less than the cost of delaying the contract verification prior to final contract signing. This was the cost of provision of baseline services. We entered into a contract that basically said, ‘This is what we believe it is at the moment, but it will be subject to verification in this next six months’. That should not have occurred.
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We should have spent more time as a business, chapter and verse, detailing what our expectations of service were, what the limitations were, what they were really going to get out of it.
In the early days of the relationship many staff at Central were disappointed with Global’s performance. There was an expectation that Global would deliver massive improvements in service levels and costs immediately. There were also memories of ‘how good things were’ before the partnership.
Improvements were slow to emerge for a number of reasons. Some of the most valuable IT&T staff had left the company, so the remaining staff did not have the skills to run some systems. Conflicts emerged from the different objectives of the two parties: the outsourcer was clearly trying to make a good return from the account, while Central was trying to manage costs. It took some time before the two partners were able to work towards shared objectives and targets for various projects. Also, managers within the businesses were now being charged the full costs of their IT&T services, whereas they had previously had much greater direct access to IT&T services, which carried few charges.
The decision to outsource IT&T was made within two months of the merger. In itself, this was a difficult blending of two very different cultures, but Central and Global also had very different organisational cultures. Central was a merger of two traditional public sector organisations, but it was moving quickly to adopt commercial practices and principles. Global was highly commercial and controlled in its operations. One senior manager contrasted the two organisations:
The way Central works is to have the process in place, but to empower people to do what they need to do. The account is probably worth 40 to 45 million dollars a year to Global Systems. My equivalent, the number one person in Global Systems, has signing authority to only $5,000—everything else goes up the line into the bureaucracy. You can talk about bureaucracy in the public sector, but it is nothing to what you see in the way Global controls what you can and cannot do. That is the way they work. But having said that, they have introduced a rigour into this organisation, which was far too free with its IT spend. That is a difficult thing to do with an internal IT shop.
After the first eighteen months these differences became less important. One manager believed that this might have been due to Global ‘learning the Central way’.
The manner in which Central related to Global changed over the first two years of the contract. Ini- tially, Central’s IT&T Outsourcing Manager was the sole contact point for Central, handling all day-to-day problems and trying to build strong relationships. However, the four businesses of Central were distinct and had very different needs and foci. Over time, Global assigned different service managers with re- sponsibility for each business, to handle their own specific day-to-day issues. This allowed the IT&T Outsourcing Manager to focus more on broader relationship matters. A greater focus came to be placed on open communication channels and addressing issues up-front. Senior managers from both Central and Global met monthly as part of an IT steering group, to work through the strategic plan, to discuss major projects and to review spending to date. There was also a working group to handle applications for new IT capital projects.
The issue of developing trust between Global and Central was seen as important to managers at Central. Over time, the managers came to understand that Global was committed to the relationship and they respected to high levels of skills and experience that Global brought to the relationship. A manager outlined this viewpoint:
Central still wears by far the biggest risk in this relationship. If you assume the absolute worst, that Global Systems delivers a system late, over budget and with poor quality, sure it might lose out on
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a couple of million dollars profit, but the cost to Central would be significantly more. So there is an element of trust in this relationship, and Global Systems has a reputation to sustain in the marketplace. It cannot afford to walk away from something like this—and it will not. These large organisations will not and there is a good relationship between our CEO and their CEO to ensure that it simply would not happen. There is too much win-win potential to come out of this.
Both parties worked towards building high levels of trust between the two organisations. Where there were incompatibilities, Global replaced some of its staff who were directly involved with Central. Among some of the individual businesses within Central, one source of mistrust arose from businesses being charged for IT applications. Some managers felt that Global was ‘ripping them off’ and was engaging in point scoring. The source of this problem, however, was that, for the first time, the businesses were now being charged directly for using IT&T services.
The contract with Global was for the provision of management services, while Central continued to own the IT infrastructure. One of the reasons for not giving total control to Global was the risk that if the relationship were to fail with no control over IT assets, it would be difficult to recommence IT services in-house or with another outsourcer. A senior manager explained the relationship between trust and risk.
The more you trust, the more you are prepared to hand over. The more you feel ‘Hey things could break down. What recourse do we have? What backups do we have? How do we rebuild if there is a divorce?’ There is some hesitancy in relation to the ownership of assets—but there is a gradual move away from that thinking.
New management systems were implemented in Central to achieve greater cost control and management of IT developments. Each of the businesses was required to submit an annual plan for new projects. Each project needed to have strong business justifications, and was reviewed by a committee that prioritised the projects. An overall strategic plan for IT, formulated by Central and Global, was developed. This system is a clear contrast to the pre-merger practice of ad hoc project development.
Another aspect that encouraged cost management was the direct charging of IT&T costs to the busi- nesses. These costs were major overhead items that could run to many millions of dollars for each business. The new systems encouraged an environment of accountability and cost consciousness. Managers within the business units began to look for ways that they could break down the costs into manageable elements that people in the operational areas could influence.
There were no performance measures in the initial outsourcing contract. Eighteen months into the contract, a risk-reward scheme was devised to monitor Global’s performance. The first application of this was in relation to a new customer service system (CSS), a discretionary project. The system was developed after several weeks of negotiation between the two parties. When Global undertook a discretionary project, it would usually levy a charge that included direct costs, overhead and profit margin. Under the risk-reward system Global would charge only direct costs to Central. Bonuses would then be paid, based on performance in three areas: cost, quality and time.Table 2provides some examples of the types of measures that were used.
Thus, Central awarded Global a score out of 25 based on how prompt they were with delivering the project on time. Depending on how the new system affected business continuity (which might be tested over several months), Global would receive a score of up to 20. (Business continuity was concerned with whether the new system resulted in interruptions to business, such as computer downtime, interrupted access data, and external customer problems.) The targets that were set for each of the performance
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Table 2 Performance measures used in the risk-reward scheme
Criteria Performance measures Weightings (%)
Cost • Under- or over-budget 25
Quality • Performance to test plan 20 • Survey of end users 10 • Business continuity 20
Time • Delivery to schedule 25
Total 100
measures were very challenging. The score that Global received was then linked to a profit multiplier. An overall score of 70 would return a normal profit for the project to Global, whilst a score of 90–100 would give it up to 150% of the normal profit. Global also conducted its own customer satisfaction surveys and these data were shared with Central.
3.5. Benefits of outsourcing
Managers had high expectations of the improvements that would result from outsourcing the IT&T function. However, benefits were slow to materialise, and it was not until after the first eighteen months of the contract that improvements could be clearly identified by Central’s managers. These benefits included the benefits of access to Global’s expertise and enhanced services; increased accountability and cost consciousness within Central; and a greater discipline in IT planning.
The new competitive electricity environment placed increased demands on Central to gain access to high IT skills and technologies. There was a strong motivation for outsourcing IT&T and Global was able to provide those benefits to Central. A senior manager described the difference Global made in this area:
I would say that they have brought into the organisation, in key areas, skills that we could not have hoped to bring in. The year 2000 problem is a classic case. They have a big contract with a state government, and the skills that they built up there and that they have available to them worldwide are very, very good. They brought two specialists in. We paid big bucks for it, but we got it done in a fraction of the time that it would have taken us to do it internally—to do the reviews, and put the processes in place to allow us to then roll out our year 2000 plan. The ability to do that and put those processes in place in an internal shop and get the right people for short periods of time—almost impossible!
The association with Global provided Central with the creative IT solutions that it was looking for. Another manager confirmed the importance of Global’s international networks:
And that is the way Global Systems operates, they have a client here, and a client there and if we have a certain issue, what they do is bring someone in. They fly someone in from the States or locally to solve that specific problem because they have addressed it before in other organisations.
While IT&T was a major cost for the company, managers at Central were not overly concerned about reducing these costs. Instead, they were more focused on ensuring that the resources were not wasted. To that end, the company put in place new systems to help manage IT activities.
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To encourage responsible IT use, the cost of the baseline services needed to be redistributed to the businesses that were using the services. A manager explained the philosophy with relation to the ‘desktop project’, which was a project within the baseline.
What we have agreed to on the desktop project is based on actual charges per desktop per month for a total service. We are putting the incentive clearly back on the business to manage the number of PCs. Prior to this there’s been absolutely no incentive for them to do anything smarter about managing those costs because it was a lump sum. Now we can say ‘If you go from 500 PCs to 350 PCs, you will save yourself $200+ dollars per month per PC’. We have taken a chunk out of the baseline cost and substituted it with a variable cost. As long as the total number of PCs in the organisation does not fall below 1200, these costs will be valid.
The costs of discretionary projects were charged directly to the businesses to which they related. Central, however, was still attempting to develop equitable ways of charging the baseline cost to each business. This activity involved determining the drivers of the cost of discretionary projects. A senior finance manager outlined the difficulties:
We had a sub-committee look at it in several ways, because you are not sure what the cost drivers are. The helpdesk is one of the more expensive items. They decided to just divide the cost equally across the four businesses and holding company. Which means the holding company pays too much. We have 30 staff and the Contracting business has 1200 staff. We have tried to find a reasonable basis, and sometimes that was just dividing it equally across all businesses, and that will remain until we have a better understanding of what drives the costs.
As explained in a previous section, each business was required to submit plans of its IT requirements at the start of each year, for approval. This provided control over costs as well as over the ad hoc development of projects that had once existed. Having IT&T managed by an arms-length provider, which itself had strict, bureaucratic systems in place, made the implementation of spending controls simpler and supported Central’s attempts to control spending. Control over ongoing costs was also achieved through the monthly IT charges being managed by the IT&T Outsourcing Manager. All charges were reviewed and checked and only charges for the baseline and approved projects were paid.
Once Global was established as the IT&T provider, more systematic controls over new developments were implemented. Businesses were required to present justifications for all IT capital projects to the working group. A project would only be approved if there was a strong justification and if it met the needs across the business.
3.6. Summary and conclusion
The outsourcing of IT&T was seen by managers at Central as an effective response to the problems that existed within its IT&T function, and these were essentially problems related to cost control and control of IT planning and operations. It also provided a means for gaining access to world-class IT&T expertise, which was essential for competing in the new contestable electricity markets. These problems were essentially solved through the outsourcing of IT&T to Global. However, the relationship was considered to be very difficult in the first eighteen months. The initial contract provided only a broad framework, which developed over time to incorporate more specific provisions of specific responsibilities and performance targets, through processes of negotiation and communication with the outsourcer. While some managers
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saw the incomplete contract as a source of conflict that could have been avoided, this was not a universal view. A strategic alliance with a cable supplier was undertaken two years after commencement of the IT&T contract. This agreement was undertaken without a full written contract—simply a ‘heads of agreement’—as the managers negotiating the agreement had seen the problems that arose with the IT&T contract. There was also a belief among some managers that a contract could be a source of mistrust between parties. This new relationship was to be characterised by an open book approach to the sharing of information. Performance was to be tied to risk-return, and a steering committee consisting of managers from both firms was to develop performance indicators to support areas such as growth, delivery time and cost. A manager described how the new relationships would proceed, compared to the IT&T project.
It’s virtually the same selection process, but we’re going to implement it in a different way. We’re not going to tie it to a legal contract; we will try and build it on trust from day one. Now we could fall flat on our face but some experiences that I’ve had suggests the legal agreement does introduce a sense of mistrust from day one, because all the i’s have got to be dotted and the t’s have got to be crossed. I have to admit our lawyers are not exactly ecstatic about this direction but it have accepted it with a few clauses that we’ve had to put in to keep them happy. But what we’re saying is that we’re not going to be tied to a legal agreement. This thing we want to have is an arrangement and partnership built on trust.
4. Analysis and discussion
In this section, we consider the characteristics of the transaction (task programmability, output mea- surability, asset specificity and frequency of the transaction), the transaction environment and the parties, and assess whether the type of control mechanisms in place and the role of trust in achieving control matches any of the three control pattern presented inTable 1.
4.1. The inter-firm control model
4.1.1. Characteristics of the transaction In general, it was not easy to achieve a high level oftask programmability at Central. High levels of
uncertainty arose from the complexity of the technology, the range of the IT tasks, and the ambiguity of the IT market. While there were some routine IT tasks involved in the outsourcing contract, it was still difficult to specify ex ante procedures and processes needed to ensure success. The high levels of uncertainty made it difficult to develop specific contract provisions prior to engaging the outsourcer, and in the early days of the relationship.
The level ofoutput measurability was low initially, but increased over time as Central worked with Global to assess the quality of the delivered outcomes of the outsourcer. This was possible due to the high level of IT expertise that was retained within the electricity firm, which was developed further after the IT functions were outsourced, as well as through the mechanisms that were used to increase information sharing during the execution of the contract. In the case of more discrete IT projects (such as the customer service system), there was a lower level of uncertainty and output measures were pre-specified. Over time, both parties to the relationship gained some experience in specifying output measures and targets, as evidenced by the development of the risk-reward scheme.
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The level ofasset specificity is a complex issue to assess. Ownership of the physical IT assets and the software were retained by Central, which managers believed safeguarded them from being over-dependent on the outsourcers. However, the granting of exclusivity to Global created a high level of dependency on that one supplier. Global developed considerable levels of knowledge, skills and experience that were tailored to Central’s needs to allow them to execute their contract effectively (high human asset specificity). Also, the outsourcers were located on-site (high site specificity). The two parties to the relationship invested considerable time in establishing good working relationships with individuals and groups in either party. Switching costs were high—any withdrawal of service by the outsourcer would have had a devastating impact on the ongoing operations of either party. Thus, the relationship was characterised by high asset specificity. Under a bureaucratic pattern of control, dysfunctional behaviour arising from high asset specificity would be protected by contractual rules, while under a trust based pattern, high levels of trust would mitigate any opportunism or power plays resulting from high asset specificity.
Thetransactions included in the outsourcing relationship consisted of a mix of repetitive transactions, and one-off projects. Thismix of transactions increased the level of uncertainty and contributed to low task programmability and low output measurability.
Thus, in the early days of the relationship, the characteristics of the transaction indicate that the out- sourcing relationship between Central and Global largely following a trust based pattern; low task pro- grammability, low levels of output measurability that increased over time, high asset specificity, and a mix of low (and high) repetitiveness of transactions. However, as task programmability and output mea- surability were gradually becoming higher toward the end of the research period, this could signify a move towards a more bureaucratic pattern of control.
4.1.2. The characteristics of the environment The environment within which the outsourcing relationship operated was one of high risk and high
uncertainty, particular in the early days of the contract. Future developments in IT technology were dif- ficult to foresee and forecast with any accuracy, and a changing and uncertain competitive electricity environment made it difficult to predict competitor and customer actions. Deregulation of the electricity industry resulted in increased competition as well as increased opportunities for Central. However, the implications of these changes for the future business of Central were unclear. The high risk and un- certain setting also led to the relationship placing greater reliance on social embeddedness, through the development of competence trust and goodwill trust as means of control (this will be discussed further in a later section of this paper). In summary, the characteristics of the environment within which the outsourcing relationship developed are those associated with a trust based control pattern, as outlined in Table 1.
4.1.3. The characteristics of the parties A high level of competence, outstanding reputation and extensive experience as an outsourcer were
highly important characteristics that Central sought in their outsourcer. Due to the high level of risk and uncertainty in the outsourcing activity, Central could not risk engaging an outsourcer that did not have such qualities. While risk sharing and low information asymmetry did not seem to be evident in the earlier days of the relationship, as the relationship matured, Central came to share more information with Global, and through the risk-return system the sharing of risk was explicitly encouraged. Thus, theparties to the relationship came to display characteristics closely associated with those of a trust based pattern.
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4.1.4. Summary Thus, the three contingent factors of the characteristics of the transaction, environment and the parties
point towards a trust based pattern of control. This is particularly the case in the early months of the relationship. However, as the relationship matured, the levels of task programmability and outcome measurability increased through joint activities and the increased knowledge that developed between the two parties. This is more characteristic of a bureaucracy based pattern.
4.2. Control mechanisms
Trust based patterns of control are characterised by outcome and social controls that develop over time. There is no reliance on behaviour controls, and trust forms the prime means for achieving control. Reliance on formal outcome controls is low at the start of the relationship, but increases over time. The relationship is characterised by relatively unspecific ‘general thrust’ contracts, performance assessment based on broad emergent standards, and information sharing due to the participatory, interactive nature of the process of contract execution. In this section, we examine these control mechanisms and the role of trust in achieving control in the case study.
4.2.1. The contract Poorly specified contracts have been cited as a major reason for the failure of some outsourcing rela-
tionships, particularly in the IT area (Robertson, 1998; Domberger, 1998). However, there are situations where high levels of uncertainty make complete contracts unattainable. Some managers at Central be- lieved that the lack of detail in the contract specifications was a barrier to establishing smooth relationships with the outsourcer, particularly at the start of the relationship. These problems related to the ambiguous specification of the baseline services that needed to be maintained to achieve the fixed payment, and the precise cost that the outsourcers would charge Central for those baseline services. There was also an absence of performance measures and targets, which were then negotiated over the first few years of the contract. Central prepared their contract in haste and this clearly led to dissatisfaction among managers with the lack of precision in the provisions of the contract.
Being risk adverse, it is understandable that managers may desire contracts to be tightly written, particularly given the critical nature of the function that was outsourced and the size of the contract. However, the complexity and uncertainty encompassed in the outsourced IT tasks made it unrealistic to expect thatall important aspects of the operation and relationship could be specified and incorporated into a contract (Speklé, 2001). In these cases, important aspects of the relationships can only evolve over time (Das and Teng, 2001b). As the relationship develops, partners may come to recognise specific needs and requirements, which were difficult to anticipate at the start of the relationship. In the first eighteen months of the relationship, Central was able to work with Global to resolve perceived inadequacies in the initial contracts, as both parties together improved their knowledge of the tasks and their execution. More sophisticated provisions were incorporated into the contract to cover areas such as performance measurement, occupational health and safety standards, better assigned responsibility for costs, and specifications for the sharing of cost improvements.
Some managers at Central saw the incomplete contract as a limitation and a source on conflict that impacted unfavourably on the relationship with Global. However, it could be argued that even if more time had been spent on formulating the contract, given the high levels of task uncertainty and low outcome measurability encompassed in the delivery of the base IT services, the contract may still have been
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incomplete. While the conflict and negotiations with Global may have been regarded as time consuming and dysfunctional, some managers acknowledged that this was an important way of developing shared understandings and objectives. The move towards the formulation of the new strategic alliance based on the ‘heads of agreement’ was recognition by some managers that in some situations contracts cannot be easily formulated and an attempt to do this may lead to initial mistrust.
4.2.2. Performance measurement It has been suggested that a firm may gain control over the function being outsourced through ongoing
monitoring of work performance, as well as monitoring aspects of the outsourcing relationship throughout the contract period (McFarlan and Nolan, 1995). This may be achieved using performance measures and benchmarks, which focus on areas such as customer satisfaction, delivery responsiveness, product quality and cost, and either included within the contract, or negotiated at a later date.
High levels of uncertainty in the specification of the outsourced function made initial performance standards difficult to specify. Through numerous discussions and meetings between managers at Central and Global, performance measures and targets were developed to provide the most appropriate incentives for the outsourcer to deliver quality services. A risk-reward scheme was introduced to encourage the outsourcer to achieve more profits when undertaking a new discretionary project, while also delivering cost savings to Central. The Central case emphasises the way in which incentive systems can be structured to benefit both parties in the relationship, effectively encouraging the developing of shared goals, and encouraged goodwill trust. Thus, the two parties were able to develop outcome controls as their shared knowledge of the processes increased over time.
4.2.3. Information sharing through participatory, interactive processes There were many activities undertaken by managers at Central and Global that involved participatory
processes and knowledge sharing. Key issues in establishing protocols for effective communications between the firm and its outsourcer
included the number of points of contact within the firm, and the regularity of formal meetings. An impor- tant issue for managers at Central was establishing the point of contact to manage the relationship. Initially the IT&T Outsourcing Manager handled day-to-day problems that emerged between the outsourcer and the various businesses of Central. One manager at Central suggested that in managing the transition, this manager should have focused solely on establishing the relationship, leaving the day-to-day running of the process to subordinates. Regular meetings were held between managers and the outsourcers to review performance and to discuss future plans.
Establishing formal communication protocols are important in the early days of the relationship with an outsourcer, when there are incomplete contracts, to establish the ground rules and expectations of each party. This may involve single or multiple contact points, depending on the characteristics of the function that is being delivered by the outsourcer and the complexity or critical nature of the service.
The mechanisms that Central and Global used to develop performance indicators also became an important part of the participatory information sharing processes. First, the processes provided a forum for interaction between the two parties, increasing the number of joint dealings and increasing familiarity. The performance indicators also provided an efficient form of communication of expectations between the two parties (Jarillo, 1988). Third, the design of the risk-reward system allowed both parties to share in the rewards when new discretionary IT&T projects met expectations of effectiveness and efficiency, thus, contributing to the strengthening of the relationship.
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4.2.4. Summary The means by which Central used outcome and social controls to manage the outsourcing relationship
are largely consistent with the requirements of a trust based pattern of control—relying on outcome and socials controls, broad non-specific contracts that develop time, performance assessed through broad emergent standards and high levels of information sharing and communications. This compares with a bureaucratic based pattern that relies on outcome and behaviour controls, which include comprehensive selection criteria and formal bidding, rigid performance targets, comprehensive rules of behaviour and detailed contracts. However, there was reliance on formal bidding procedures to award the outsourcing contract, and as the relationship progressed, there was a clearer specification of performance targets and of the contract itself.
4.3. Building high levels of trust
Trust is vital in achieving control in a trust based pattern of control, but is of lesser importance in a bureaucratic based pattern, and has no relevance in a market based pattern. In a trust based control pattern, key forms of trust that work with control systems to reduce risk in outsourcing relationships are contractual trust, competence trust and goodwill trust. Some levels of contractual trust and competence trust are essential for both bureaucratic and trust based patterns, to allow the initial selection of the outsourcer and for some form of contract to proceed. In a trust based pattern competence trust will develop further over time and form a part of the control framework. Goodwill trust is difficult to achieve in an outsourcing relationship (Das and Teng, 2001b), but is essential as it reduces the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour. We have argued that there was a high dependency between Central and Global, due to the exclusive nature of the supply contract, and the strategic nature of the information that was shared between Central and Global. Goodwill trust will work with outcome controls and social controls to reduce risk (Das and Teng, 2001a).
4.3.1. Building competence trust There are several mechanisms that increase competence trust in an outsourcing relationship, which in
combination with outcome controls and social controls will reduce risk. The major competence-building mechanism is proactive information collection (Das and Teng, 2001a). Central was careful to ensure that the outsourcing company that they engaged had a strong reputation in the IT industry and strong technical competence. Global was perceived by managers at Central as having high credibility, status and competence in the IT industry. On close examination of the interview transcripts it seems that the managers at Central made limited reference to the technical competence of the chosen outsourcer—competence trust was not considered a concern with Global. However, developing high levels of goodwill trust was a conscious strategy followed at Central.
4.3.2. Building goodwill trust It is clear from the quotations in the case studies that the outsourcing relationship commenced with a
low level of goodwill trust. Some managers at Central believed that this was a function of starting with an incomplete contract and conflicting priorities. It could also have be a function of the gap in knowledge, insights and control that can appear immediately following the outsourcing of a key function (Mouritsen et al., 2001). In addition, there were distinct differences in the cultures of the two organisations and this made initial communications difficult. Managers were also very conscious of the need to develop trust
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to make the relationship work, and implicit in the managers’ quotations in the case study is the need to develop goodwill trust. The high level of dependence between the organisation and the outsourcer, and the high risk for Central, led managers to work hard at resolving difficulties and issues during the first two years of the contract.
Trust arises through processes of learning and adaptation, and this is not a passive exercise.Das and Teng (2001a)argue that three sources of goodwill trust can assist in the reduction of risk in outsourcing relationships. These are establishing mutual interests, building individual and team-level trust and joint dispute resolution. Each of these activities is evident in the case study.
4.3.2.1. Establishing mutual interests. This is the primary means for building goodwill trust, and in- volves partners to the relationship arriving at an understanding of the common areas of interest (Das and Teng, 2001a). Central achieved this through a variety of mechanisms, including regular meetings and communications. This allowed the ground rules for the operation of the contract to be established, performance measures to be developed and the risk-reward system to be debated and implemented. The development of a series of performance indicators itself, played an important role in the development of goodwill trust. First, it provided a forum for interaction between the two parties, increasing the number of joint dealings and increasing familiarity. This may encourage trust (Browning et al., 1995; Chiles and McMackin, 1996). Also, the performance indicators may have provided an efficient way to communi- cate performance expectations for both parties. Third, the design of the risk-reward system allowed both parties to share in the rewards when new IT&T projects met expectations of effectiveness and efficiency, thus, contributing to a strengthening of the relationship of trust. While some studies have disputed the compatibility of performance targets and specified contract provisions, at Central, the key to the accep- tance of these outcome controls seemed to be the way in which the changes were introduced—in an atmosphere of communication and cooperation—and perhaps to there being a certain level of goodwill trust in place prior to their introduction.
4.3.2.2. Building individual and team-level trust. It has been argued that the development of trust between individuals or teams and the outsourcer is important in developing goodwill trust between firms. Many researchers have argued that trust between individuals is critical for cooperation to take place (see, for example,Smith et al., 1995); however, this trust may take time to emerge. In the initial months of the relationship, Central’s IT&T Outsourcing Manager was the sole contact point for Global, and he set about developing personal relationships with key Global staff. This manager had extensive technical knowledge and seemed to understand the sensitivities of establishing productive working relationships, negotiating ground rules and opening communication channels. Once these relationships strengthened, he set up communication points between Global and service staff in each business unit. At Central, some mistrust initially arose when managers within the four businesses units were charged by the outsourcer for their use of IT services. This action was met with suspicion and claims of overcharging. This reaction was a result of the transition towards ‘realistic’ charging for IT services, which had not been fully explained to managers. Clearly, effective communication may provide a way to encourage the development of goodwill trust, by clarifying expectations and encouraging repeated positive interactions.
4.3.2.3. Joint dispute resolution. Evidence from the case points to frequent meetings and communi- cations, particularly in the early stages of the relationship that worked to establish the ground rules and protocols. Joint dispute resolution allows partners to a relationship to develop a strong understanding
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of perspectives and approaches, and is of particular importance in situations where contracts are not precisely specified (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).
4.3.3. Summary Essential to achieving control in the relationship between Central and Global was the development of
trust. Unlike a bureaucratic based pattern or a market based pattern, control was difficult to achieve in this relationship as the difficulties in task programmability and output measurability meant that formal controls were difficult to implement, particular in the early stages of the relationship. Trust, particularly goodwill trust, played a role in working with control mechanisms to ensure control, and in allowing the operations to proceed in the absence of tightly specified rules. Interestingly, goodwill trust continued to exist, and may even have strengthened, in the face of the development of more rigid performance expectations and the developing contract specifications. This runs contrary to the arguments of some prior research, which has argued that formal accounting and contracting may conflict with the development of trust (see, for example,Seal and Vincent-Jones, 1997; Seal et al., 1999). The development of goodwill trust also allowed a relationship where there was high asset specificity, and hence high interdependencies and high risk of opportunism, to continue and to remain under control.
5. Conclusion
This paper focuses on a case study of an outsourcing relationship, and how control mechanisms and trust worked together to achieve control. The characteristics of the outsourcing transactions seemed to meet the requirements of a trust based pattern of control, and control was achieved through the development of outcome controls and social controls and through the development of trust, particularly goodwill trust.
This paper contributes to the literature in several different ways. First, this paper draws on the three pattern of control specified byvan der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000), to add to the growing knowledge of control systems in new organisational forms. Second, focusing on the three contingent factors—characteristics of the transaction, environment and the parties—to determine the form of control pattern highlighted how the control pattern may gradually change over the life of a relationship, as those contingent factors change. In the case study, as the performance standards became more specified and as the contract developed, the trust based pattern of control began to move towards a bureaucratic form of control. Finally, the paper provides some evidence that the development of trust may be compatible with the development of tighter accounting controls and contracts, if trust is already well-established and those controls develop in a supportive and cooperative manner, involving both parties.
The findings of this study are of interest to managers who enter outsourcing relationships, and to researchers who endeavour to understand the nature of control systems and trust associated with new organisational forms. However, the limitations of the study must be acknowledged, and future research directions considered. First, a key aspect associated with outsourcing is risk (Das and Teng, 2001a), and it has been claimed that combination of controls and trust building will contribute to reducing risk. Risk was not specifically investigated in this study, and there would be considerable benefits in investigating more explicitly the control–trust–risk relationship in future studies. Second, the interdependencies between the development of control in the inter-firm relationship and in Central’s own control system could have been investigated in greater depth. It is clear from the quotations in this case study that building of the relationship with Global led to changes in Central’s own internal control systems. For Central
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managers there were changes in accountabilities and responsibilities, charging and cost allocation systems, capital expenditure systems and planning systems. It seems that controls over IT operations, planning and spending improved following outsourcing, in a similar way to the changes described byMouritsen et al. (2001) in his outsourcing case studies. The interdependencies between internal and inter-firm control systems could form an interesting focus for future research.
Third, the model that was drawn on to shape the analysis was derived from TCE and, thus, could be criticised for taking an approach that is too fixed on transactions, at the expense of the relational aspects. However, the model ofvan der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000)builds on the basic transactional aspects of TCE, but goes beyond this to consider the contingent factors of the characteristics of the transaction, the transaction environment and the parties, as well as role of control mechanisms and trust in inter-firm relationships. Nevertheless, there are other frameworks that have been used to study inter-firm relationships. These include institutional theories (see, for example,Burns and Scapens, 2000) and actor network theory (Mouritsen et al., 2001; Chua and Mahama, 2002).
Fourth, the evidence presented in this study is based on only a single example of an outsourcing relationship, and access was gained only to one party to that relationship. Clearly, more extensive studies need to be undertaken to explore the issues that arose in this study, and the perspectives of both the outsourcer and outsourcing organisation should be investigated. Finally, the function that was outsourced was information technology, which was of key strategic importance to Central, and it may be questioned whether the control patterns extend to other outsourced functions, such as human resource management or production maintenance.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thanks the two anonymous referees and the Editor for their excellent reviews and suggestions that significantly improved this paper.
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- Management control systems and trust in outsourcing relationships
- Introduction
- Theoretical development
- Within-firm control systems
- Trust and control systems
- Transaction cost economics and control
- TCE-based models of management control
- Case description-the outsourcing of IT&T at Central Energy (Central)
- Background
- Motivation for outsourcing IT&T
- Criteria used in the outsourcing decision
- Managing the outsourcing relationship
- Benefits of outsourcing
- Summary and conclusion
- Analysis and discussion
- The inter-firm control model
- Characteristics of the transaction
- The characteristics of the environment
- The characteristics of the parties
- Summary
- Control mechanisms
- The contract
- Performance measurement
- Information sharing through participatory, interactive processes
- Summary
- Building high levels of trust
- Building competence trust
- Building goodwill trust
- Establishing mutual interests
- Building individual and team-level trust
- Joint dispute resolution
- Summary
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgements
- References
o8 (offshore outsourcing).pdf
Offshore Outsourcing: Implications for International Business and Strategic Management Theory and Practice
Jonathan P. Doh Villanova University
In this essay, I discuss the implications of the debate over offshoring for our collective understanding of international business and management theories. I review several core theories in international business expansion and management strategy to assess which elements of these theories may need to be re-specified in light of the offshoring phenomenon and which aspects remain relevant. I then present normative implications and recommendations for public policy and corporate strategy, drawing from emerging insights regarding the global responsibilities of corporations. I suggest that international labour and environmental standards and corporate codes of conduct could mitigate some of the most intense concerns raised about offshoring but conclude that offshoring is likely to present challenges to societies, corporations, and stakeholders for many decades.
INTRODUCTION
As the previous two essays illustrate, there is considerable divergence over the causes and consequences of offshoring (Farrell, 2005; Levy, 2005). Inherent in this debate are disagreements over basic assumptions in economic theory and man- agement decision-making. Indeed, although offshoring is not new, its acceleration – real or perceived – may challenge established theoretical orthodoxy regarding the operation of the global economy generally, and management practice, in par- ticular. In this essay, I explore the implications of the debate over offshoring for our collective understanding of some leading international business and strategic management theories.
Recent efforts to reconceptualize the IB field, especially as it relates to global strategic management, have stressed globalization, the changing strategy of MNEs
Journal of Management Studies 42:3 May 2005 0022-2380
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Address for reprints: Jonathan P. Doh, Villanova University 800 Lancaster Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085, USA ([email protected]).
and their impact on the world economy (Buckley and Ghauri, 2004), the factors that determine the success or failure of firms within this competitive environment (Peng, 2004), and the growing importance of Civil Society and NGOs to the theory and practice of IB (Teegen et al., 2004). These research directions capture the context (culture, geography, institutions), firm-level goals (performance), and societal impact (globalization and its challenges) that are critical to analysis of offshoring and its impacts. Ramamurti (2004) recently identified offshore out- sourcing of services as an emerging research theme in IB, however he notes that to date, the IB research community has paid limited attention to this important phenomenon.
In addition, the strategic management literature has grappled with the appli- cation of resource-based perspectives on strategy in environments charac- terized by turbulence and change. In particular, recent work in the area of dynamic, co-evolutionary processes in organizations (Lewin and Volberda, 2003) is directly relevant to the challenges for the firm of maintaining competitive advan- tage in the face of pressures to reduce costs and shift production brought about by shifting technology, markets, and competition, the principal forces at work in offshoring.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MACRO THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
Fundamentally, offshoring presents challenges to core theories which underpin many assumptions within IB research. For example, the ease by which corpora- tions shift operations and employment among countries has direct implications for the relevance of a traditional comparative advantage view of global competition (Maneschi, 1998). Although Porter (1990) and others have long criticized tradi- tional Ricardian comparative advantage theory as too narrowly focused on the role of factor endowments, offshoring provides further evidence that traditional factors of land and labour are not sufficient (and may not even be necessary) con- ditions for advancing economic development. At the same time, however, the com- bination of one critical endowment (labour) with an additional, more variable factor (education), does appear to provide a powerful inducement for firms to con- sider decoupling their core production and service activities. The explosive growth of offshoring in India attests to this reality. In addition, Porter’s (1990) require- ment of home market demand as a necessary condition for internationally com- petitive industries is anachronistic in an environment where new, efficient industries have rapidly developed in regions with little home market demand for their outputs.
Dependency theory emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s to counter the presumption that the growth patterns of developing and developed countries would converge, and that barriers to capital and technology flows prevented this
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convergence. Dependency theorists countered that the development of industrial- ized nations occurred at the cost of the developing nations who were the victims of uncontrollable global forces such as multinational corporations and interna- tional development institutions (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1967). In much of the world, the dependency and related Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model have been repudiated as research increasingly suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) may be as or more important to a country’s growth than domestic investment, since investment by MNCs brings improved technology and does contribute, eventually, to convergence (Taylor, 1999).
Although most of the concerns about offshoring have been directed to the devel- oped countries in which jobs and wages appear threatened, offshoring raises con- cerns about a new kind of dependency. Offshoring, when unrelated to domestic demand, may exacerbate reliance by developing countries on the capital and resources of industrialized nations. If so, developing countries become vulnerable to the vagaries of MNCs who may choose to shift production from developed to developing countries, or from one developing country to another.
On the other hand, there is some evidence of convergence between the wages of developed and developing countries in high-end service industries. The wages in Ireland, once a fraction of those in the EU, have now caused many firms to move call centres and other back office operations elsewhere. In India, wages in business services have been increasing steadily, suggesting the emergence of a global market (rather than a national one) for many of these positions (Scheiber, 2004).
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION
In 1966, Vernon described a theory of international competition known as the international product life cycle model (PLC). The PLC proposes that capital inten- sive and technologically sophisticated innovations are typically developed in the USA for the domestic market, and progress through various stages in which pro- duction shifts to other developed countries and finally to developing countries that become platforms for MNC exports to their home country and other developed markets. As a complement to Vernon’s macro orientation on cycles in international trade, Johanson and Vahlne (1990) developed a model of sequential internation- alization on a firm level that emphasizes incremental internationalization through acquisition, integration, and use of knowledge of foreign markets.
Recently, scholars have questioned the validity of the PLC model (Cantwell, 1995) and of the internationalization perspective (Anderson, 1993; Itaki, 1991) to contemporary IB phenomenon. Vernon himself suggested the PLC may lose utility in an increasingly complex and integrated international trade environment (Vernon, 1979), and other researchers argue that many international ventures do
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not follow the slow, sequential process anticipated by the PLC and international- ization perspectives, but rather may experience a more uneven or accelerated process of internationalization (McDougall et al., 1994).
Vernon (1966) emphasized the importance of local demand conditions as a cat- alyst for export abroad, and the subsequent commoditization of products as an impetus for FDI. Contrary to this slow, sequential internationalization, the inputs to final production of many services may be ‘de-coupled’ from intermediate inputs early in the internationalization process under offshoring schemes. Hence, the link- ages between production location and core knowledge-based activities may be weak. Examples include film production, programming, back office, and call centre functions in audio-visual, software, legal, and accounting services. For production of these services, local demand is less (or un-) important, while specific country factors – land, labour, and infrastructure – are proportionately more important. Moreover, as Levy (2005) notes, the development of communications technologies and the requisite mobility of labour have allowed for an accelerated internation- alization of production that accords neither with the product life-cycle nor the sequential internationalization perspective. Indeed, some have argued that many firms are now ‘born global’ (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004) and that the notion of sequential internationalization – whether on a country, industry, or firm scale – is outmoded and anachronistic.
A third perspective on international expansion, ‘internalization’ theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976), suggests that firms seek to develop and deploy their resources across international boundaries to take advantage of asymmetries in knowledge and capabilities. Internalization theory, when combined with constructs related to location and ownership, has provided a sophisticated and multi-dimensional ratio- nale for international production collectively known as the ‘OLI’ perspective on international investment. The OLI framework (Dunning, 1980, 1981) proposes that firms will choose investment locations, develop international strategic priori- ties, and select entry modes by considering three sets of variables: ownership advantages (control and the costs and benefits of inter-firm relationships and trans- actions), location advantages (resource commitments and requirements, and the availability and cost of resources), and internalization advantages (the ability to reduce transaction and coordination costs and prevent opportunistic exploitation of tacit knowledge).
The phenomenon of offshoring would appear to both reaffirm and to challenge the OLI framework. Location, an important variable for market-seeking, resource- seeking, and cost-minimization strategies, is prominent in the apparent motiva- tions for offshoring. The relevance of ownership and internalization advantages, on the other hand, is somewhat less evident. By disintegrating production stages along the supply chain and transferring them to other geographic locations, firms may create conditions for the erosion of ownership and internalization advantages. Indeed, recent concerns over the intellectual property protection in software pro-
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duction in India are an early indication of what could be a growing phenomenon. This could cause firms to reexamine which aspects of their production must remain close – both geographically and conceptually – to their core activities. For example, Dell was forced to repatriate some of its call centre staff from India to Texas due to quality control problems (Houston Chronicle, 2003). For a company that has little on-site service, the call centre capability is core to Dell’s competitive posi- tion. Contracting out – as opposed to simply changing production locations – could further undermine some of the advantages associated with both ownership and internalization.
For some firms, however, the service of offshoring is intrinsic to their business model. For these companies, capabilities in developing focused offshore outsourc- ing service requires specialized expertise in managing and coordinating disparate activities across geographic, sectoral, and functional boundaries. These strategies may reinforce the importance of the OLI framework, albeit with distinct compe- tencies not related to production and markets but rather efficiency in organizing and assembling work process, often as a service to other firms. Business process outsourcing specialists such as EDS and IBM, and contract manufacturers Flex- tronics and Solectron, are developing new ways of exploiting OLI-type advantages by combining low labour costs, specialized technical capabilities, and organiza- tional coordination expertise.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY: THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW AND DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES
Offshoring also has implications for strategic management. In particular, it poses challenges to collective understandings related to the development and deployment of firm-level capabilities. Offshoring potentially constitutes a firm-level capability and a resource to be developed and deployed as under internalization theory. It may also serve to undermine or reduce the value of firm-level advantages, espe- cially those that are immobile or tied to core activities.
Building on earlier work by Penrose (1959) and Nelson and Winter (1982), pro- ponents of the resource-based view (RBV) examined the economic returns to resources that a firm owns, acquires, or develops (Barney, 1991). In order for resources to be valuable in facilitating exploitation of an opportunity in the busi- ness environment or in neutralizing a threat, they must be scarce or must come together in a unique way as a result of how the firm packages or bundles them, immobile such as those that are idiosyncratic to the firm, those for which prop- erty rights are not well defined, or those that are co-specialized with other assets (Teece, 1986). In addition, they must be difficult to imitate so that the firm can maintain rent-earning status for a period of time. For a firm to be in a position to exploit a valuable and rare resource, it must have a resource position barrier pre- venting imitation by other firms.
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Offshoring, both as internal process and business strategy, could be an outcome of successful management of resources, and may itself represent a direct applica- tion of firm-level capabilities as envisioned by the RBV. At the same time, however, offshoring may reflect the commoditization of a production function and erode benefits derived from management of resources and capabilities if it becomes an activity that is widely imitable and not unique to a firm or confederation firms. The Dell example, and others unreported, may argue that there are real limits to the competitive benefits of offshoring, at least for some industries and companies.
The RBV has been criticized for lacking sufficient focus on how and why certain firms have competitive advantage in situations of rapid and unpredictable change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), and for overlooking the managerial coordinative processes by which firms assemble and leverage knowledge assets. In response, strategy researchers have offered an extension of the RBV and other strategy per- spectives in the form of a ‘dynamic capabilities’ view of competitive strategy (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece et al., 1997). Dynamic capabilities refer to capa- bilities by which managers ‘integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments’ (Teece et al., 1997). Kogut and Zander (1992) refer to ‘combinative capabilities’ as the ability to acquire and synthesize knowledge resources and build new applications from those resources, especially in a changing environment.
The focus of the dynamic capabilities perspectives on rapid change captures the environment in which firms consider – often under intense pressure from com- petitors and the external environment – how and where to deploy and redeploy assets across geographic space. As both Farrell and Levy acknowledge, this process is at the core of the motivations for outsourcing (Farrell, 2005; Levy, 2005). As is the case under the RBV framework, some firms’ combinative capabilities lie in their ability to arrange, organize, and coordinate offshore outsourcing for others.
The combinative contributions of offshore outsourcing may, in fact, be more important than the pure cost motivations. Microsoft recently revealed the company has been paying two Indian outsourcing companies, Infosys and Satyam, as much as $90 an hour for software architects to do work at its US facilities, or a yearly rate of more than $180,000 (Lohr, 2004). Although it paid only $23–36 an hour for software programmers in India, these rates were a multiple of the wages received by the workers themselves. This suggests that the added value was less in the skilled labour and more in the strategic deployment of that labour. This gap, however, also reinforces Levy’s concerns about the shifting balance of power in global strategy (Levy, 2005). And many Indian companies are beginning to develop these very capabilities globally, as evidenced by their investments in European and North American call centres and business processing outsourcers. The Indians ‘are looking to build a global model quickly’, according to a partner with WestBridge Capital Partners, a Silicon Valley venture-capital firm that invests in outsourcing companies (Kripalani, 2004). Hence, the dynamic process by which firms develop
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and preserve unique capabilities in offshoring may constitute a positive and vibrant contributor to global economic development. Others, however, are concerned that firms will become hollow, virtual organizations with little allegiance or responsi- bility to any of the disparate geographic regions in which they operate and unac- countable to regulators or the social impact of their activities.
A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE: GLOBAL CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
Despite these limitations, offshoring will remain an important tool for managing and deploying international human resources. If anything, the trend is accelerat- ing. Forrester Research recently estimated that 830,000 US service jobs will be moved abroad by 2005, a 40 per cent increase from a projection of 588,000 jobs it made in November 2002. Forrester also estimated that US companies will send 3.4 million service jobs offshore by 2015 (Geewax, 2004). A survey by UNCTAD showed that the offshoring trend is quickly catching on in Europe, with four out of 10 European firms already relocating service operations offshore (UNCTAD, 2004). Although subcontracting provides important flexibility in the human resource practices of MNCs operating globally, it also requires skilled international managers to coordinate and oversee the complex relationships that arise from it.
Hence, offshoring is a reality that is unlikely to recede, and quite likely to accel- erate. What can management scholars contribute to this debate, and more impor- tantly to government policy-makers and company managers who are grappling with how best to respond? Diana Farrell proposes an insurance scheme developed by Kletzer and Litan that would provide adjustment assistance to workers dis- placed by offshoring (Farrell, 2005; Kletzer and Litan, 2001). But the concerns about global sourcing and the transfer of jobs abroad go beyond the economic challenges facing those displaced by specific lay-offs. Instead, offshoring suggests a broader examination of the global responsibilities of corporations.
Corporate social responsibility refers, in part, to the activities of the firm to provide social contributions that include, but are not necessarily limited to, the economic returns to investors (Wood, 1991). In the global environment, many MNCs have come under pressure from civil society and nongovernmental orga- nizations (NGOs) to be more responsive to the range of social needs in develop- ing countries, including addressing concerns about the working conditions in factories or service centres, and attending to the environmental impacts of their activities. Dunning (2003) has recently argued for a more responsible global capitalism that incorporates the interests of individuals, corporations, NGOs, governments, and supranational agencies.
Criticisms have been especially sharp in relation to the activities of multina- tional companies – such as Nike, Levi’s, United Fruit, and others – whose sourc- ing practices in developing countries have been alleged to exploit low-wage
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workers, take advantage of lax environmental and workplace standards, and otherwise contribute to social and economic degradation. More recently, business process offshoring firms have been implicated as well. Many governments, inter- national organizations, and both local and multinational NGOs have criticized the low-cost labour seeking behaviour of MNEs in developing countries, suggesting such firms scan the globe for the cheapest, least regulated, and most exploitive sit- uations in which to source raw materials and semi-finished products (Singer, 2002).
Global corporate responsibility – the actions, practices, policies, and procedures governing the conduct of firms when doing business internationally – provides a useful heuristic for examination of possible proscriptions associated with the exter- nalities described in David Levy’s essay. MNCs, with prodding from governments, NGOs, and other representatives of civil society, are increasingly agreeing to agreements and codes of conduct under which they commit to maintain certain standards in their domestic and global operations (Doh and Guay, 2004). These agreements, which include, inter alia, the UN Global Compact, the Global Report- ing Initiative, the social accountability ‘SA8000’ standards, and the ISO 14000 environmental quality standards, provide limited assurances that when corpora- tions increase production in developing countries, they will maintain a minimum level of social and environmental standards in the workplace and community in which they are doing business. These codes help offset the real or perceived concern that companies move jobs to get around higher labour or environmental standards in their home market. They may also contribute to rising standards in the developing world by ‘exporting’ standards of developing countries and MNCs to host countries and local firms in those countries.
The application of these standards, however, becomes further complicated when offshoring also incorporates outsourcing via contracting out services that have previously been part of a firm’s activities. It is difficult – but not impossible – for firms to trace the standards of their contractors, subcontractors, etc. There are, however, several precedents that would suggest such efforts are not outside of the reach of MNCs. For example, the rules of origin under the North American Free Trade Agreement and other trade agreements require importers to verify the origin of the products they source using a very technical process that in many cases can only be met with the cooperation of producers, contractors, subcontractors, etc. In the area of anti-corruption, the Transparent Agents Against Contracting Entities
(TRACE) standard, which was developed after a review of the practices of 34 companies, applies to business intermediaries, including sales agents, consultants, suppliers, distributors, resellers, subcontractors, franchisees and joint venture part- ners, so that final producers, distributors, and customers can be confident that no party within a supply chain participated in corruption.
Individual companies have also taken steps to extend core standards to suppli- ers. Motorola is engaged in efforts to certify literally thousands of suppliers for meeting its global corporate responsibility standards. In some instances, it has
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accepted comparable standards of those suppliers as meeting or exceeding those of Motorola itself. Mattel’s Board independently contracts with the International Center for Corporate Accountability, an NGO, to provide unscheduled on-site audits of its factories and first and second-tier suppliers to determine compliance with the company’s Global Manufacturing Principles.
CONCLUSIONS
In the end, offshoring represents a natural continuation of a process that has been underway for centuries. Paradoxically, the apparent acceleration of offshoring reflects both the successes and failures of economic globalization. Labour – not just capital – has now become a mobile factor that can be deployed – and rede- ployed – at a moment’s notice.
Yet other institutional rules and norms that are designed to buffet the potential negative spillovers of capitalism are not so portable. While all human capital has, to some extent, become itinerant, the social fabric that envelops our collective pro- ductive capacities has not become uniform, creating an asymmetrical distribution that has had disruptive and dislocating impacts on some regions, firms, and workers, while providing added economic stimulus to others. The development of global cor- porate responsibility standards and adoption of agreements and codes of conduct governing labour and environmental practices regularize these norms. In so doing, these initiatives may help to mitigate – or at least reassure – those most concerned about some of the most extreme disruptions associated with offshoring.
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o9 ( the new wave of o).pdf
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=985741
Fisher Center for Real Estate & Urban Economics
(University of California, Berkeley)
Year Paper
Fisher Center Research Reports
The New Wave of Outsourcing
Ashok D. Bardhan∗ Cynthia Kroll†
∗Fisher Center for Real Estate & Urban Economics, University of California, Berkeley †Fisher Center for Real Estate & Urban Economics, University of California, Berkeley
This paper is posted at the eScholarship Repository, University of California.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/fcreue/reports/1103
Copyright c©2003 by the authors.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=985741
Research Report Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics · University of California, Berkeley · Fall 2003
The New Wave of Outsourcing
Ashok Deo Bardhan and Cynthia A. Kroll
There is growing apprehension among business leaders, economists, and ordinary Americans that we are witnessing what may well be the largest out-migration of nonmanufac- turing jobs in the history of the US economy. This concern has been fu- eled by newspaper reports and eco- nomic news highlighting the layoffs of thousands of people in high-tech, software and service sector compa- nies in the US, and the practically simultaneous, seemingly coordinated establishment of offices and devel- opment centers, most often in India, resulting in hiring of thousands of new employees in that country. For example, tabulation by the authors of reports in Indian newspapers and business journals for the month of July 2003 alone gave an estimate of 25,000 to 30,000 new outsourcing related jobs announced by US firms. In the same month, there were 2,087 mass layoff actions carried out by US employers resulting in a loss of 226,435 jobs.1 The jobs being created in India and elsewhere are in a wide range of services sectors such as geo- graphic information systems services for insurance companies, stock mar- ket research for financial firms, medical transcription services, legal online database research, and data analysis for consulting firms, in addi- tion to customer service call centers,
1 Bureau of Labor Statistics.
payroll and other back-office related activities. In this short overview we address the following questions: Have jobs been transplanted from the US? How sig- nificant is this phenomenon and how sustainable is it? What is the potential impact on future job creation and wage inequality in the US? How is it likely to impact the real estate sector?
The First Wave: Outsourcing of Manufacturing Between 1987 and 1997, the share of imports in inputs used in US manufac- turing increased from 10.5% to 16.2% and in high-tech manufacturing, such as computers and electronics, from 26
to 38% (See Figure 1). These data continue a long history of foreign out- sourcing in US manufacturing and the associated loss of blue-collar jobs in many industrial sectors. Indeed, one of the attributes of the modern stage of globalization for advanced indus- trialized countries is the offshore pro- duction of intermediate inputs, usually in low-cost developing countries. The motivation, on the part of US firms, has been driven by the low costs of manufacturing abroad, primarily in the East Asian countries, such as Tai- wan, China, South Korea, Malaysia and others, as well as the availability of skilled labor, the promotion of a business-friendly environment and the existence of production and supply
Figure 1 Imported Inputs as a Share of Total Inputs
Total Manufacturing and High-Tech Sectors
0% 5%
10% 15%
20% 25%
30%
35% 40%
1987 1992 1997
Im po
rt ed
I np
ut s
as %
o f T
ot al
In
pu ts
Total Manufacturing High-Tech Manufacturing
Source: Bardhan, Jaffee and Kroll, Globalization and a High-Tech Economy, forthcoming.
2
networks in those countries. At the same time, the higher value-added, better paying jobs in management, finance, marketing, research and de- velopment have been retained in the home country. Considerable research has been car- ried out on the phenomenon of out- sourcing in manufacturing and many of the economic insights and conclu- sions are applicable to Business Proc- ess/Services Outsourcing (BPO/BSO) as well. As pointed out by Bardhan, Jaffee and Kroll in their forthcoming book, Globalization and a High-Tech Economy, the outsourcing of parts of the supply chain of manufacturing has resulted in a shift of demand, and hence jobs, from blue-collar to white- collar and from manufacturing to ser- vices, increased wage inequality be- tween blue-collar and white-collar jobs, and increased profitability of US firms. They also note that recession- ary downturns seem to prod firms into making major restructuring moves, and that a recession might be the mother of innovation and dynamism.2 The New Wave: Outsourcing of White Collar Jobs The software sector was the first ser- vice sector to transfer significant ac- tivity to foreign locations, leading to the creation of a critical mass of ex- pertise and resources in concentrated locales, such as the city of Bangalore in India. The rapid dissemination of the Internet, the transnational net- works set up by immigrants in the US, and liberalization of emerging market
2 Most economists believe, however, that outsourcing should not lead to job loss in the long run but to a reshuffling of jobs and a new composition of occupations in the economy. This recovery of jobs lost to outsourcing still requires major changes in the industrial and employment structure of the economy.
economies created the conditions for a major burst of outsourcing in the 1990s, in hitherto primarily domestic segments of non-manufacturing sec- tors, such as telecommunications, re- tail trade, and finance (including banking and insurance). While the “push” factors for business process outsourcing (BPO) or business ser- vices outsourcing (BSO) are similar to those for manufacturing and are largely cost-driven, the “pull” factors and attributes of countries and economies providing outsourced ser- vices are somewhat different. In addi- tion to cost advantages similar to those offered by the manufacturing centers of East Asia, the ongoing out- sourcing of business services jobs to India, Malaysia, Philippines and South Africa among others is also due to the widespread acceptance of Eng- lish as a medium of education, busi- ness and communication in these countries; a common accounting and legal system (at least in some of the countries), the latter based on the common law structure of UK and US; general institutional compatibility and adaptability; the time-differential de- termined by geographical location leading to a 24/7 capability and over- night turnaround time; simpler logis- tics than in manufacturing, and a steady and copious supply of techni- cally savvy graduates. India’s information technology en- abled services (ITES) sector, the pri- mary destination of business services outsourcing from Western countries, now directly employs over 200,000 people with around $2.3 billion in exports, of which over 70% are to the US. While the sector is still small it is growing at a rate of 60% per annum. The software services sector overall has exports of approximately $9.5 billion, of which over $7 billion are to
the US3. India’s National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), the primary trade or- ganization of all IT related firms, forecasts that exports would hit the $50 billion mark in the next five years. By that time, the business proc- ess/ business services outsourcing segment would employ over 2 million people, and the total exports of the IT industry would support over 8 million jobs. The growth of the IT sector in general and the BPO segment in particular is not confined to India. Firms involved with software services outsourcing and BPO are rapidly gaining ground in the Philippines and Malaysia (call centers and other back-office BPO), China (embedded software, financial firm back-office BPO, some applica- tion development), Russia and Israel (high-end customized software and expert systems), and Ireland (pack- aged software and product develop- ment). While it is difficult to estimate the exact number of jobs created in these countries in these sectors, let alone those transplanted and created by US firms, tentative evidence col- lected by the authors suggests that business process outsourcing and software outsourcing have together generated, at the very least, over a million jobs in the 1990s and hun- dreds of thousands more since the turn of the century. BPO/BSO Impact on the US Economy The second half of the 1990s was a time of high employment and robust growth for the software-related sec- tors, as well as the services sector at large. The job creation from outsourc- ing in countries around the world dur-
3 National Association of Software and Service Companies, India, at www.nasscom.org .
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ing this period can be seen as spin- offs from the US because of tight la- bor markets, rather than job transfers out of the US in search of lower labor costs. However, the recent downturn and the continuing jobless recovery have legitimately given rise to the question whether services outsourcing involves the transfer of US jobs and occupations to other countries. Table 1 shows employment data for those
sectors of the economy that felt a dis- proportionate impact of outsourcing. These include the computers and elec- tronic products manufacturing sector (including its sub-sector, semiconduc- tors and electronic components); pro- fessional and business services sectors such as business support services, which include call centers, and com- puter systems design services; and information industries such as tele-
communications, software publishing, and Internet services providers. Be- tween first quarter 2001 and second quarter 2003, i.e. in the course of just over 2 years, the employment in these sectors has plummeted by 15.5% in the US as a whole, and 21% in the state of California, corresponding to a job loss of over 1 million and 200,000 respectively in these sectors alone.
Table 1 Employment Change in Industries At Risk to Outsourcing*
US Employment (Thousands) California Employment (Thou- sands)
Industry Name Q1-2001 Q2-2003 % Change 2001-2003
Q1-2001 Q2-2003 % Change 2001-2003
Nonmanufacturing Sectors Software Publishers (except Internet) 276.1 247.9 -10.2% 55.8 47.1 -15.6% Internet Publishing and Broadcasting 50.6 33.7 -33.4% Telecommunications 1323.4 1138.9 -13.9% 150.5 123.5 -18.0% ISPs, Search Portals, and Data Proc- essing 516.0 433.2 -16.0% 60.2 48.0 -20.2
Data Processing and Rel. Services 320.9 292.2 -8.9% 24.4 18.9 -22.8% Accounting, Bookkeeping & Payroll 976.3 875.7 -10.3% 108.8 103.1 -5.2% Payroll Services 158.9 124.6 -21.6% Computer Systems Design and Rel. 1341.2 1148.1 -14.4% 218.2 163.2 -25.2% Business Support Services 784.4 746.2 -4.9% 56.2 57.2 1.7% Telephone Call Centers 406.2 363.2 -10.6% Telephone Answering Services 54.8 50.9 -7.1% Telemarketing Bureaus 351.4 312.3 -11.1% Manufacturing Sectors Computer and Electronic Products 1862.1 1415.9 -24.0% 443.1 336.8 -24.0%
Semiconductors and Electronic Components 308.7 237.9 -22.9% 162.1 115.2 -29.0%
Subtotal: At-Risk Industries 6853.9 5791.8 -15.5% 980.8 774.6 -21.0% All Nonfarm 131,073.0 130,515.3 -0.4% 14,608.2 14,491.8 -0.8% Manufacturing 16,932.3 14,757.7 -12.8% 1,849.0 1,587.2 -14.2% Nonmanufacturing 114,141.3 115,757.7 1.4% 12,759.2 12,904.6 1.1% * The authors have chosen those industries which, in our judgment, have been most often noted as outsourcing to India and East Asia. These industries have a substantial share of the occupations discussed in the next section. Source: Authors from US Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
4
Figure 2 Attributes of Jobs Outsourced
• No Face-to-Face Customer Servicing Requirement • High Information Content • Work Process is Telecommutable and Internet Enabled • High Wage Differential with Similar Occupation in
Destination Country • Low Setup Barriers • Low Social Networking Requirement
Table 2 Average Salaries of Programmers
Country Salary Range Poland and Hungary $4,800 to $8,000 India $5,880 to $11,000 Philippines $6,564 Malaysia $7,200 Russian Federation $5,000 to $7,500 China $8,952 Canada $28,174 Ireland $23,000 to $34,000 Israel $15,000 to $38,000 USA $60,000 to $80,000 Source: CIO magazine, November 2002, Smart Access Survey, Merrill Lynch.
Indisputably, most of the job loss is due to the technology downturn, the dot-com bubble, and the cyclical downturn in the US economy. How- ever, outsourcing that began as a re- sponse to very tight labor markets in the US in 1999-2000 has continued, becoming a factor in the “jobless” or “job-loss” recovery of 2003. As in the last downturn in the early nineties, recession-based cost-cutting by firms may end up as the permanent loss of jobs that remain abroad even during the subsequent recovery. The laid-off US workers must then be absorbed either in new sub-sectors, brought about by innovation, or in other lesser-paying, non-tradable services jobs. Vulnerability to outsourcing extends well beyond the sectors shown in Ta- ble 1. The employment services sec- tor, for example, lost over 300,000 jobs between June 2000 and January 2001 and over 150,000 between Janu- ary 2001 and June 2003 (again a mix of recession-based losses and out- sourcing). Links to outsourcing in this sector come through temporary em- ployee agencies, which provided short-term employees to many of the industries listed in Table 1. Outsourc-
ing also has the potential to affect di- verse segments of retail and wholesale trade, utilities and healthcare, to the extent that record-keeping, account- ing, sales, and information aspects of these sectors can be performed sepa- rately from other functions. Outlook for Services Outsourcing The occupational mix of a sector may determine its vulnerability. In BPO/BSO circles it is said half- seriously that any job that involves mostly “…sitting at a desk, talking on the phone and working on a com- puter…” is a job under potential threat. Figure 2 summarizes the es- sential attributes and features of jobs and occupations that might find them- selves in jeopardy. While institutional and cultural com- patibility and proliferation of the Eng- lish language are key components of comparative advantage for countries that are destinations for BPO invest- ment and activity, it is the cost differ- ential, along with the availability of well-educated graduates, that provides the critical competitive edge. As Ta- ble 2 shows, the salaries of computer
programmers in the emerging market countries of Asia and Eastern Europe are a factor of ten less than corre- sponding salaries in the US. The cost- differentia l in BSO is more difficult to pin down, since the range of occupa- tions is so wide. Table 3 shows hourly wages for some sample occupations from the July 2002 National Compen- sation Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics matched with comparable occupations in India. The wage differ- ential varies widely by occupation, with differences particularly high for lower wage, nonprofessional occupa- tions and less extreme, although still quite significant, at the upper end of the wage spectrum. A lower wage scale is even more at- tractive if it comes with a well edu- cated labor force. The three major emerging market economies—China, India, and Russia—have a sizeable higher education sector. While Rus- sian expertise in many basic sciences and engineering subjects has been justly famous for decades, both the annual output and quality of science
5
and engineering graduates from India and China have been increasing rap- idly and are now comparable to the advanced countries4 (see Figure 3). These countries face some constraints in exploiting this ongoing opportunity. India’s inability to provide education at the basic school level could stifle further growth in highly trained graduates. Russia faces growth con- straints from a combination of institu-
4 The figure for the US includes graduates who are foreign citizens. However, the proportion of foreign citizens is consider- able only at the PhD and MS level, not so much at the basic undergraduate level of higher education.
tional underdevelopment, erratic re- forms and the gradual deterioration of the higher education system. The overpowering Chinese success in manufacturing may well be repli- cated later in the services sectors, but as yet business services outsourcing faces heavy language, institutional and cultural barriers. Rising wages and costs in these countries may spur secondary outsourcing to still less
developed countries, but from the point of view of the US labor markets that is no consolation. Despite these barriers, the phenome- non of services outsourcing is sustain- able for the foreseeable future, unless there is a major disruption of the in- ternational economy or a severe back- lash in the developed countries lead- ing to establishment of regulatory
Table 3 Hourly Wages for Selected
Occupations US and India, 2002/2003
Occupation Hourly Wage, US
Hourly Wage, India
Telephone Op- erator $12.57 Under
$1.00
Health Record Technologists/ Medical Tran- scriptionists
$13.17 $1.50- $2.00
Payroll Clerk $15.17 $1.50- $2.00
Legal Assistant/ Paralegal $17.86 $6.00-
$8.00
Accountant $23.35 $6.00- $15.00
Financial Re- searcher/Analyst
$33.00- $35.00
$6.00- $15.00
Source: US wages are from US Bu- reau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey, July 2002; In- dia wages are from interviews, busi- ness literature search and review of employment Want Ads by the authors.
Figure 3 Yearly Graduates with Natural Science
and Engineering Degrees 1998
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
Russ ia
Chin a
Ind ia
Jap an
Germ any
Sou th K
ore a US
D eg
re es
G ra
nt ed
Source: National Science Foundation (Science and Engineering Indicators, 1998). Note: Figures are by country where degree granted and may include foreign nationals.
Figure 4 US and California High-Tech Manufacturing Sectors
Annual Value-Addition Per Employee
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1987 1992 1997
T ho
us an
ds o
f d ol
la rs
p er
y ea
r
US California
Source: Bardhan, Jaffee and Kroll, Globalization and a High-Tech Economy, forthcoming.
6
hurdles. The benefits to US firms are the increased value addition and prof- itability resulting from savings due to low-cost outsourcing. Figure 4 shows the constant increase in value-addition per employee in high-tech manufac- turing from 1987 to 1997, a period of intense outsourcing activity in manu- facturing overall. The impact of the present cycle of BPO/BSO is perhaps reflected as well in the latest produc- tivity figures released by the US Bu- reau of Labor Statistics: Nonfarm business output per hour worked in- creased by 5.4% in 2002, and by a sizeable 6.8% in the second quarter of 2003.
Outlook for US Jobs and Occupations If both the supply and the demand side suggest a sustainable outlook for business services outsourcing, it is imperative to get at least a heuristic
sense of the potential size of the long term impact on jobs and occupations. The authors have tried to arrive at an estimate of the outer limit of jobs po- tentially at risk to outsourcing by adopting the following methodology: a) We focus not on economic and
industrial sectors, as in Table 1, but rather on the occupational make-up of the US economy, given by the detailed Occupa- tional Employment Statistics, 2001, published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
b) We are guided by the occupa- tional “outsourceability attributes” listed in Figure 2.
c) We only take into account those occupations where at least some outsourcing has already taken place or is being planned, accord- ing to business literature.
There are 22 broad occupational cla s- sifications listed by the Bureau of La- bor Statistics.5 Within these 22 broad categories there are 770 detailed oc- cupations. Table 4 shows the aggre- gate and detailed occupations which we judge to be consistent with the criteria a, b and c listed above. Of course not all jobs are under threat in any of these categories. Table 4 lists the outer limit of potential direct job loss in these occupations, without tak- ing into account many of the dynamic adjustments that may take place or changes that may occur in qualifica- tions, skill requirements and task de- scriptions. Data on these occupations are avail- able for 2001 and some earlier years. The data indicate that these jobs span a wide range of compensation levels, from salaries one-third below the av- erage to almost twice the average sal- ary. In some outsourceable occupa- tions, job growth was strong at least through 2000, but the occupations most vulnerable to outsourcing began losing jobs. For example, data entry positions dropped by 115,000, or 22%, between 1999 and 2001, even though employment in computer oc- cupations as a whole was increasing. As occurred earlier in manufacturing, it was the lower paying, more routine jobs that were being outsourced most rapidly. This is consistent with the particularly wide wage differentials found in the lower paying occupa- tions.
5 Many categories of these broad occupa- tional classifications, such as “personal care and service” occupations, “food preparation and serving related” occupa- tions, construction, repair and mainte- nance related occupations, community and social service occupations and others are obviously “non-outsourceable”.
Table 4 US Employment in Occupations at Risk to Outsourcing
Employment Average Annual
Salary Sectors 2001 2001
All Occupations (Total US Employment) 127,980,410 $ 34,020 Occupations at Risk of Outsourcing Office Support* 8,637,900 $ 29,791 Computer Operators 177,990 $ 30,780 Data Entry Keyers 405,000 $ 22,740 Business and Financial Support** 2,153,480 $ 52,559 Computer and Math Professionals 2,825,870 $ 60,350 Paralegals and Legal Assistants 183,550 $ 39,220 Diagnostic Support Services 168,240 $ 38,860 Medical Transcriptionists 94,090 $ 27,020 Total in Outsourcing Risk Occupations 14,063,130 $ 39,631 Percent of All Occupations 11.0% Source: Authors using data from Bureau of Labor Statistics web site. *Office support aggregates data from 22 detailed Office and Administrative Support categories. ** Business and financial support aggregates data from 10 detailed Business and Financial Occupations. Further details on sectors available from the authors.
7
There have been many different esti- mates of potential job losses in the US from future business services out- sourcing. A report by Forrester Re- search forecasts that by the year 2015, approximately 3.3 million jobs will have been irretrievably lost, almost one fourth of our estimate of total em- ployment in outsourcing occupations at risk in 2001. This translates to a little over 250,000 per year, a number which seems conservative, based on the rate of outsourcing over the last few years, the experience of outsourc- ing in manufacturing, the increasing ability of an increasing number of countries to compete for these jobs, the higher tradability of services due to better communications, increasing use of English and US standards in business and commerce, and the obvi- ous benefits to US firms and employ- ers, the primary decision-makers in this process. This outsourcing of jobs could result either in net job loss in some occupations and sectors or in a slower pace of job expansion than would otherwise occur. Outsourcing Has Regional Implications As with manufacturing outsourcing, the process of services outsourcing is likely to vary geographically, among different regions of the US and within metropolitan areas. Figure 5 shows occupations at risk for some of the largest metropolitan areas in the US, while Figure 6 shows wage levels by occupation, relative to the US, for the same metropolitan areas. Most of the nation's large metropolitan areas have a higher proportion of jobs in occupa- tions at risk than is found in the US as a whole, suggesting that many of these urban centers may share dispro- portionately in the wave of outsourc- ing. However, the occupational com- position of the at-risk jobs varies widely among these MSAs, as do wage levels, and the type of job re
shuffling is likely to reflect these dif- ferences. Detroit has lower than aver- age shares of services jobs at risk to outsourcing and may share less in the impacts of this round of outsourcing (but has no doubt suffered from manufacturing outsourcing in earlier years). Atlanta has a high share of
office support occupations, at average wage levels. Possibly an earlier re- cipient of jobs spun off from more costly metropolitan areas, places like Atlanta may be at risk of losing more of their lower-wage outsourceable jobs, although it could also continue to be the recipient of jobs outsourced
Figure 6 Salaries in Occupations at Risk of Outsourcing Relative to
Average US Salaries in At-Risk Occupations 2001, Selected MSAs
0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
Atlan ta
Bost on
Chic ago
Detr oit
Hous ton
New York
Los A nge
les
Sa n F
ran cisc
o San
Jo se
1 =
Sa la
ry a
t U S
A ve
ra ge
fo r
O cc
up at
io n
All Occupations Office Support Business & Finance Support Computer and Math Professions
Source: Authors from Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Figure 5 Occupations at Risk to Outsourcing as a Share of
Employment in All Occupations Selected US MSAs
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
US
Atla nta
Bost on
Chic ago
Detr oit
Hous ton
New York
Los A nge
les
Sa n F
ran cisc
o San
Jo se
P er
ce nt
o f E
m pl
oy m
en t i
n al
l O
cc up
at io
ns
Office Support Business & Finance Support Computer and Math Professions Legal and Medical
Source: Authors from Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
8
domestically from higher-wage areas. Within California, there is a wide variation among places. Los Angeles, with less than average shares of most services sectors at risk to outsourcing and close to average salaries within these sectors, may have less to lose from the next wave of outsourcing than high priced markets elsewhere in the state. High-tech markets such as San Jose, San Francisco and Boston are particu- larly at risk of services outsourcing over the next decade. San Jose, the heart of Silicon Valley, has below average shares of outsourceable office support and business and financial support occupations, but almost four times the average share of computer and math jobs (relative to its total share of US employment). At salary levels well above the US average, the region has already lost many of the lower-wage occupations to other parts of the country or abroad. Its vulner- ability now lies in the very high share of high-wage outsourceable profes- sional occupations, many of which are similar to the types of positions grow- ing in the lower cost foreign locations described earlier. Businesses that forged a relationship with an overseas supplier at the height of the dot-com boom may continue to take advantage of the cost savings, despite the dot- com collapse and easing of demand for these occupations in US locations. Outsourcing has intraregional implica- tions as well, especially in the more moderately priced urban areas. Some
of the largest overseas migrations of services jobs have been in occupa- tional categories that were once the core of suburban job development, such as data processing and call cen- ters. Suburban locations that built up an employment base of back office jobs could see these tenants shrink, or expansion opportunities evaporate, as these occupations shift overseas. Present and Future Impact on Office Markets The office building sector faces con- siderable uncertainty going forward. CB Richard Ellis reports that close to 17% of for-lease US office space is vacant. Rosen Consulting Group (RCG) figures show at least 700 mil- lion square feet are vacant in the of- fice-leasing market of major US met- ropolitan areas. Building activity in the late 1990s, although more con- strained than in the late 1980s, was
still the highest in a decade, as shown in Figure 7. Because office construction tends to involve years of preparatory planning, much of the new space came on line just as the dot-com bubble collapsed and employment in office-related sec- tors began to shrink. Employment in key office sectors, on a national level, has dropped by 6.5% in the US and by almost 10% in California since its peak in 2000, in both cases returning to between 1998 and 1999 levels, as illustrated in Figure 8. The most vul- nerable sectors have been computer- related industries, telecommunica- tions, and employment servicesthe temporary employment services that helped fuel the technology expansion. Many of these are the same sectors now undergoing extensive outsourc- ing.
Figure 7 Annual Value of Office Construction in Place
Constant Dollars, 1972-2002
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
19 72
19 74
19 76
19 78
19 80
19 82
19 84
19 86
19 88
19 90
19 92
19 94
19 96
19 98
20 00
20 02
M ill
io ns
o f D
ol la
rs , 1
99 6
ba se
Source: US Bureau of the Census.
9
Office vacancy rates responded quickly to the combination of declin- ing employment and new space com- ing on line. Nationwide, rates dou- bled, from below 8% in December 2000 to over 16% in June 2003, as shown in Figure 9. In California, va- cancies rose to an estimated 15.3%, ranging from below 10% in Sacra- mento to above 20% in Silicon Valley markets. Two factors are at work when va- cancy rates risechanges in the amount of space occupied and changes in the total amount of space available. Figure 10 shows occupied and vacant space nationwide since 1991, as distributed in downtown and suburban markets (the four segments of each bar add up to total square footage). Despite job losses due to a range of factors, the decrease in square footage under lease (i.e. occu- pied) in suburbs and downtown areas combined has been modestabout 4% since 2000. The rest of the rise in vacancy comes from a 6.6% increase in supply, which may come from new
construction or from existing build- ings entering the for-lease market (for example, owner occupied buildings made available for lease). This sec- ond element of supply increase may account for the difference between the percent change in office employment and the percent drop in space under lease. The new for-lease space added
to the total stock from owner- occupied buildings becoming for- lease buildings is actually a further sign of declining demand. Figures 9 and 10 also highlight a shift that is occurring between suburban and downtown areas. During the 1990s, suburban markets led in net absorption, and suburban vacancy rates dropped below downtown rates for most of the decade. By 1997, the amount of space vacant had shrunk to under 350 million square feet in the 73 markets tracked by RCG, with the vacant space almost evenly split be- tween suburban and downtown loca- tions. During the economic expansion in the late 1990s, close to 85% of new construction occurred in suburban areas, and downtown vacancies
dropped well below suburban rates. Suburban areas were hit much harder in the slowdown of 2001 and 2002. Several factors are likely at play. On the supply side, new suburban con- struction can proceed more readily than infill development in many mar- kets. On the demand side, the types of office occupations that have been
Figure 8 Employment Trends in Selected Information, Professional
and Business Services Sectors, US
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
199 0
199 2
199 4
199 6
199 8
200 0
200 2
T ho
us an
ds o
f E m
pl oy
ee s
Other Information Services
Telecommunications
Software+ISP/Web+Data Proc Employment Services
Consulting/Scientific R&D
Computer Systems Design
Arch/Design/Oth PST
Legal/Accounting/Advertising
Source: Authors from Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
Figure 9 US and California Office Vacancy Rates, 1996-2003
0% 2% 4% 6% 8%
10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Q2 03
P er
ce nt
o f S
pa ce
V ac
an t
US Metro US Suburban US Downtown CA Metro
Source: US data is from CB Richard Ellis. California data is from the authors, as compiled from data from CB Richard Ellis, Cushman and Wakefield, Grubb and Ellis, and Keegan and Coppin. Except for 2003, all years are for 4th quarter.
10
outsourcing most rapidly have been those that are historically located in suburban areas. Figures 9 and 10 may actually under- state the current vacancy situation in office space. Figure 10 includes both unleased space and space available for sublease in the vacant category, while some of the brokerage reports used for Figure 9 are less consistent and report only unleased space as vacant. Nei- ther chart takes into account buildings that have been taken off the market in the most impacted areas because of the lack of leasing opportunities, or vacancies in owner occupied space that has not yet been offered for lease. Growth in demand for office space in the US will be tempered by a number of factors of which services outsourc- ing is only one. Other factors include underutilized space currently under lease, the flexibility of square footage usage, and lessons in caution learned from the recent boom. These factors also are likely to interact with one another. In markets already glutted
with space, some space is being held off the market, either in whole build- ings “mothballed” for the short term, or as empty space being held in an- ticipation of future growth in demand. These spaces could accommodate a significant increase in demand with- out an apparent effect on vacancy rates. As demand grows, firms that have become more dependent on the bottom line may choose a more cau- tious route to space utilization than in the last expansion, making more effi- cient use of existing space before tak- ing on obligations for additional square footage. Outsourcing will further dampen the growth in demand for space, and could even lead to declining demand in some markets. The Forrester Re- search estimate of 3.3 million jobs is equivalent to between about 500 and 800 million square feet of office space (depending on the ratio of square feet per employee)6at the higher end 6 The ULI Office Development Handbook reports industry standards at 200 to 250
surpassing the amount of space cur- rently vacant in for-lease buildings nationwide. Not all of these jobs are in sectors heavily present in for-lease office space. Nevertheless, many types of office markets could feel the effects of outsourcing. Those most at risk may be back office suburban markets in slow growth or declining metropolitan areas, but the high-tech markets that are just beginning to re- cover from the dot-com bust may also feel the effects of the occupational restructuring that comes with services outsourcing. Concluding Remarks The US economy underwent a major wave of outsourcing in manufacturing industries, a process that gathered momentum in the 1980s and 1990s and continues today. The experience of that phenomenon provides a useful benchmark for evaluating the current wave of outsourcing in the services sectors. Business process and business services outsourcing will have a sig- nificant impact on the economic land- scape in the US. Several major differ- ences distinguish services outsourcing from the previous wave of outsourc- ing of manufacturing jobs. Services outsourcing is structurally simpler than manufacturing outsourcing in terms of resources, space and equip- ment requirements and thus may pro- ceed much more quickly. Services outsourcing affects overwhelmingly white-collar middle class jobs and occupations, unlike manufacturing outsourcing, which impacted primar- ily blue-collar workers. In addition, this time around it is a different set of countries that are in contention for these jobs. Figure 11 summarizes these differences and their implica- tions for the economy.
square feet per employee, but also notes that in some markets the ratio may be as low as 150 square feet per employee.
Figure 10 Occupied and Vacant Office Space
US Major Office Markets, 1991-2003
0 500
1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000
199 1
199 2
199 3
199 4
199 5
199 6
199 7
199 8
199 9
200 0
200 1
200 2
200 3f
M ill
io ns
s of
S qu
ar e
F ee
t
Suburban Occupied Downtown Occupied Suburban Vacant Downtown Vacant
Source: Authors from data supplied by various brokers to Rosen Consulting Group.
11
While our report has focused primar- ily on the US economy as a whole, the economy of California is equally vul- nerable. As seen in Table 1, the state’s sectors at-risk to outsourcing have fared more poorly in the last two and a half years, than the US average. In terms of future impact, bear in mind that while the state does not have too many of the call center and data entry level type jobs anymore, it has a heavy presence of the computer re- lated occupations, as well as office, legal and healthcare support jobs. Moreover, the cost differential with the rest of the world is higher, thus suggesting a higher incentive for job migration abroad. Finally, large num- bers of temporary foreign employees, such as computer engineers from In- dia in large California based firms, sensing the way the wind is blowing, have requested within-firm transfers to subsidiaries in their home coun- tries. While evidence from the recession of the early 1990s suggests that a major benefit of globalization has been the growth in high-tech services employ-
ment that accompanied the outsourc- ing of manufacturing production, it is not clear how the economy will adjust to the present burst of services out- sourcing. At least four different out- comes are possible. One possible scenario is that services job outsourcing proves more costly to the economy than the earlier round of manufacturing outsourcing. As cen- ters of skilled high-tech professionals build up in other parts of the world, the US and California may no longer dominate the next wave of innova- tions, and we would observe slower growth of high-wage jobs within the US and California. In this extreme situation, economic adjustment, in the absence of continuing innovation originating in the US, first might take the form of prolonged unemployment. Then, workers losing their jobs to out- sourcing would finally be absorbed in lesser-paying services jobs. Alterna- tively, there could be a downward adjustment of salaries and wages, making the outsourced occupations internationally competitive again. Un- der this worst-case scenario, the im-
pact on the demand for office space would initially be reflected in lower rents and prices, and higher vacancy rates. In the long run, with increasing employment in other jobs and occupa- tions, rents and prices would settle on a lower growth path trajectory with vacancy rates returning to their long- run equilibrium. As an alternative to this troubling sce- nario, a backlash against globalization could occur, both worldwide and within the US, slowing down the process of business services outsourc- ing. Opponents of globalization are already discussing protectionist meas- ures and regulatory roadblocks in the form of restricting the kind of jobs that can be outsourced. If successful, this kind of protectionism, although inefficient from the point of view of the economy, may result in the reten- tion of some of the outsourceable jobs. In the short run, this would moderate the negative impact on the real estate sector. A third possibility is that the industry shrinkage shown in Table 1 may come in part from domestic outsourcing, indicating a redistribution of jobs within the US rather than a net loss. This could involve vertical disintegra- tionthe shifting of jobs from large employers to smaller firms in support sectors--as well as the ongoing proc- ess of domestic outsourcing from high-cost regions such as California to relatively low-cost regions elsewhere in the United States.7 This process would mitigate the differences in prices and rents among different re- gions within the nation and would leave the nationwide vacancy and ab- sorption rates relatively unaffected.
7 To the extent that the outsourced work is done by start -up firms, employment num- bers may currently be undercounting the current employment situation.
Figure 11 Impact of Outsourcing
• Impacts blue-collar jobs • Affected individual industrial
sectors and some specialized occupations within them
• Job losses offset and even reversed by increases in services employment
• Led to increased inequality between blue-collar and white-collar occupations
• Impacts white-collar jobs • Affects individual occupations
in many industrial sectors across the economy
• May lead to different composition of occupations in the economy; unclear how the labor market adjustment will work.
• Will lead to increased inequality within white collar occupations
Manufacturing Services
12
Rents in some of the higher priced markets could continue to remain de- pressed, even with expanding em- ployment nationwide. Finally, the most positive scenario is that the US and California economies continue to fashion their outsourcing activities in light of the new produc- tion paradigm, keeping the “cream” of the new development at home, while
the more routine activities are out- sourced. Under this scenario, innova- tion would lead to a continuing stream of new service and manufacturing activities, and hence new jobs and occupations, while competition and the need for lower-cost supply would force more mature services operations overseas. Depending on their educa- tion and skills, individual workers might still find it difficult to find re-
placement employment at similar wages, but overall, the jobs lost to outsourcing would be replaced by higher-wage jobs in the new sub- sectors brought about by innovation. Increasing wages, incomes and com- pany profits would then impact the real estate sector positively through a recovery and eventual increases in prices, rents and occupancy rates.
Ashok Deo Bardhan is Senior Research Associate and Cynthia A. Kroll is Senior Regional Economist at the Fisher Cen- ter for Real Estate and Urban Economics. Further information on outsourcing trends in high-tech manufacturing and services sectors and more generally on globalization and the high-tech economy is available in their forthcoming book, Globalization and a High-Tech Economy, coauthored with Professor Dwight M. Jaffee, Willis Booth Professor of Banking, Finance and Real Estate at the Haas School of Business and Co-Chair of the Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics.
o10 (vendor selection).pdf
Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737 www.elsevier.com/locate/cor
Vendor selection in outsourcing Vijay Wadhwa, A. Ravi Ravindran∗
Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University, 310 Leonhard Building, University Park, PA 16802, USA
Available online 6 March 2006
Abstract
In any large organization, millions of dollars are spent on outsourcing. Most large organizations are outsourcing those activities that are either not cost efficient if done in-house or not core to their businesses. One of the most critical steps in outsourcing is vendor selection, which is a strategic decision. We model the vendor selection problem as a multi-objective optimization problem, where one or more buyers order multiple products from different vendors in a multiple sourcing network. Price, lead-time and rejects (quality) are explicitly considered as three conflicting criteria that have to be minimized simultaneously. A pricing model under quantity discounts is used to represent the purchasing cost. We present and compare several multi-objective optimization methods for solving the vendor selection problem. The methods include weighted objective, goal programming and compromise programming. The multicriteria models and the methods are illustrated using a realistic example. Value path approach is used to compare the results of different models. � 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Multi-criteria optimization; Outsourcing; Vendor selection
1. Introduction
Increasingly, companies are outsourcing portions of their business processes—from IT to raw material to after sales service to logistics and transportation. According to a recent survey carried out by Accenture, 80% of the companies’ surveyed use some form of outsourcing and a majority of these companies are spending close to 45% of their total budget on outsourcing [1]. Manufacturing outsourcing began in 1970s and the 1980s when US jobs in steel and textile moved from Northern states to Southern states. Outsourcing is defined as purchasing ongoing services and parts from an outside company that a company currently provides, or most organizations normally provide for themselves [2]. Traditionally outsourcing has been focused on overheads, IT systems and other activities that are either not cost efficient if done in-house or not core to the business. Many organizations are now evaluating supply chain procurement and logistic activities as candidates for outsourcing [3]. One of the prime examples of outsourcing is $1 trillion US freight transportation industry which includes third party logistics (3PL).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 814 865 7840; fax: +1 814 863 4745. E-mail address: [email protected] (A.R. Ravindran).
0305-0548/$ - see front matter � 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.cor.2006.01.009
3726 V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737
Identify Candidate activities to be outsourced.
Identify non-core competencies.
Establish goals and draft outsourcing agreements.
Identify and select outsourcing vendor.
Negotiate measures of outsourcing performance.
Monitor and control the outsourcing activity.
Evaluate vendor and provide feedback.
Fig. 1. Overview of outsourcing process [6].
In a survey carried out by Accenture, it was found that the primary reason for outsourcing is not cost-reduction; rather it is the ability to focus on the core competencies. There are various reasons for outsourcing, most notably [4]
1. In many cases the third party can provide procurement services more efficiently. Outsourcing can provide access to specialized technology and operational platforms;
2. Outsourcing can help reduce the staffing levels; 3. The advancement in technologies has made procurement a very specialized service.
A study carried out by the Aberdeen group found that more than 83% of the organizations engaged in outsourcing achieved significant reduction in purchasing cost, more than 73% achieved reduction in transaction cost and over 60% were able to shrink sourcing and procurement cycles [5]. Procurement activity can be divided into many steps; Fig. 1 gives an overview of the outsourcing process [6].
Once a decision is made to outsource, the next most critical activity is selecting the vendors. This is a key strategic decision in outsourcing which is prone to errors. The right vendor is one who will meet and complement the organiza- tion’s needs from its corporate culture to long-term future needs [7]. The most critical factors affecting the outsourcing process are vendor’s reliability, technical competence, financial stability and manufacturing capability. For outsourcing to be successful, a company must have strong relationship with its vendors. How an organization selects a vendor will have a significant impact on the success of the relationship. The selection of a good vendor is a difficult task. Some vendors that meet some selection criteria may fail in some other criteria. In this paper, we develop a multiple criteria optimization model for vendor selection which is most suited for procurement of raw materials. A similar model can be used for procurement of services, IT or logistics.
1.1. Vendor selection problem
For most manufacturing firms, the purchasing of raw material and component parts from vendors constitutes a major expense. Raw material cost accounts for 40–60% of production costs for most US manufacturers. In fact, for the automotive industry, the cost of components and parts from outside vendors may exceed 50% of sales. It is vital to the competitiveness of most firms to be able to keep the purchasing cost to a minimum. In today’s competitive operating environment it is impossible to successfully produce low-cost, high-quality products without good vendors. Thus, one of the most important purchasing decisions is the selection and maintenance of a competent group of vendors. With the arrival of time-based competition, vendor’s manufacturing processes and quality systems have been pre-qualified, and the OEM should receive 100% defect-free material when needed. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes buyers have to choose among a set of vendors by looking at some predetermined criteria such as, quality, reliability, technical capability, lead-times etc., even before building long-term relationships. To accomplish these goals, two basic and interrelated decisions must be made by a firm. The firm must decide which vendors to do business with and how much to order from each vendor. Weber and Current [8] refer to this pair of decisions as the vendor selection problem.
V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737 3727
1.2. Multi-objective vendor selection problem
In most large organizations vendor selection process is done empirically. In this paper, we deal with the problem of vendor selection where buyers order quantities from different vendors in a multiple sourcing network. The vendor selection problem, which inherently involves conflicting criteria, has not been dealt with as a multi-objective problem frequently. Multi-objective programming deals with optimization problems involving two or more conflicting criteria. In a survey carried out by supplier selection and management report (SSMR), price, lead-time and quality were the top three performance metrics for vendor selection [9]. The main motivation behind our work is to present to the decision maker (DM) a tool that would help the DM analyze the vendors and to choose which vendors to use and how much to order from each vendor, while minimizing cost, rejects and lead time.
We formulate the vendor selection problem with quality (represented by percentage of items rejected), lead-time and total cost of purchasing under quantity discounts as the three objective functions, to be simultaneously minimized. The multi-objective problem is solved using the techniques of weighted objective, goal programming and compromise programming. The results of these methods and that of a single objective formulation, where the objective is to minimize price, are then compared using the method of value path approach.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature review of multi-objective vendor selection and vendor selection models with quantity discounts. Section 3 presents the multi-objective vendor selection model and the different techniques used to solve the problem. In Section 4 an illustrative example is presented. It also introduces the concept of value path approach for comparing alternative models and methods. Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
2. Literature review
Multiple criterion decision-making (MCDM) is used to solve problem where there are several objectives that are conflicting. Objectives are said to be conflicting in nature, if the optimal value of all the objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously. The notion of optimality cannot be used in multi-objective problems, because a solution that max- imizes/minimizes one objective will not, in general maximize/minimize any other objective due to their conflicting nature. The notion of optimality is replaced by concept of non-inferiority, also called non-dominance, efficient and pareto-optimal [10]. Efficient solution has the property that it is not possible to improve any one objective without sacrificing on at least one other objective. In general, there can be an infinite number of efficient solutions for an MCDM problem. The objective is to find the best compromise solution, which is the efficient solution that is best with respect to the DMs preferences.
2.1. General methods of vendor selection
Most commonly used methodologies for solving the vendor selection problem are as follows [11]:
• Total cost approach: In the total cost approach, the quoted price from each vendor is taken as the starting point and then each constraint being considered is replaced by a cost factor and the business is awarded to the vendor with the lowest unit total cost [12–14].
• Multiple attribute utility theory (MAUT): MAUT is a vendor selection technique most useful when dealing with international vendor selection, as it is capable of handling multiple conflicting attributes inherent in international vendor selection [15–17].
• Multi-objective programming: An additional flexibility of multi-objective approach is that it allows a varying number of vendors into the solution and provides suggested volume allocation by vendor. However, the process of obtaining solution through this method is complex [18–21].
• Total cost of ownership (TCO): TCO is a methodology and philosophy, which looks beyond the price of purchase to include many other purchase-related costs. The TCO models are further classified by usage: vendor selection and vendor evaluation [11,22,23].
• Analytic hierarchy process (AHP): AHP is a good approach that can be used in a multifactor decision-making environment, especially when subjective and/or qualitative considerations have to be incorporated. AHP provides a structured approach for determining the scores and weights for the different criteria used in decision making [24–27].
3728 V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737
Different mathematical, statistical and game theoretical models have also been proposed to solve the problem. Refer- ences [8,28,29] give a review of vendor selection methods. Several factors affect a vendor’s performance, for example, Stamm and Golhar [30], and Ellram [31] identified, respectively, 13 and 18 criteria for vendor selection. Price, quality, lead-time, technical service and delivery reliability are the five primary criteria used in the vendor selection problem. An important review of these criteria has been carried out by Weber et al. [8]. They provide a comprehensive review of the criteria that academicians and purchasing managers feel important in the vendor selection decision.
2.2. Multi-criteria vendor selection models
Vendor selection problem is basically a multi-criteria problem, but multicriteria techniques have not been used frequently to solve the problem. Instead the problem is converted to a single-objective problem by treating all but one objective as constraints and the resulting problem is solved to obtain an optimal solution. There are two problems with this approach: first the criteria, which are considered as constraints, are weighted equally, which rarely happens in practice, and second, they have significant problems in considering qualitative factors.
Among the few multi-criteria applications in vendor selection, lexicographic goal programming andAHP are the most commonly used techniques. Liu et al. [32] and Ghodsypour and O’Brien [24] developed a decision support system by integrating AHP with linear programming. Weber and Current [18] use multi-objective linear programming for vendor selection to systematically analyze the trade-off between conflicting criteria. In this model, aggregate price, quality and late delivery are considered as goals. Karpak and Kasuganti [20] have used visual interactive goal programming for vendor selection process. The objective is to identify and allocate order quantities among vendors while minimizing product acquisition cost and maximizing quality and reliability. Bhutta and Huq [11] have illustrated and compared the technique of total cost of ownership and AHP in vendor selection process.
Min [15] has used multi attribute utility approach for international vendor selection. The various criteria used in the model are financial terms, quality assurance, perceived risks, service performance, relationships, cultural and communications barriers and trade regulations. Chaudhry et al. [21] have used integer goal programming to solve the problem of allocating order quantities among vendors. Kumar et al. [19] have used fuzzy mixed integer goal programming for vendor selection problem where some of the parameters are fuzzy in nature.
2.3. Vendor selection under price-discounts
Often complicating the vendor selection problem for the buyer is the presence of volume discounts offered by vendors, which depend upon the size of the order placed. Common types of discounts are all-units and incremental price break schedule. As demonstrated in the literature, Chaudhry et al. [33], Guder et al. [34], Katz et al. [35], Pirkul and Aras [36] and Sadrian and Yoon [37] have shown that the vendor selection problems become difficult in the presence of price discounts. These problems are solved as mixed integer linear programming problems which minimize the purchasing cost, although these problems actually are multi-objective in nature.
3. Formulation of multi-objective vendor selection model
This paper presents a multicriteria formulation of the vendor selection problem with multiple buyers and multiple vendors under price discounts. Such a scenario is possible when different divisions of an organization buy through one central purchasing department. The number of buyers in this scenario will be equal to number of divisions buying through the central purchasing. The model is also applicable to the case when number of buyers is equal to one. This paper considers the least restrictive case where any of the buyers can acquire one or more products from any vendors. The potential set of vendors chosen by an organization is constrained by
• Quality level of the products from different vendors; • Lead time of the supplied products; • Production capacity of the vendors.
V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737 3729
In summary, this paper will help any organization make the following decisions:
• to choose a subset of most favorable vendors for various outsourced components; • determine what quantities to order from the chosen most favorable vendor(s) to meet production plan or demand.
Data used in the model:
Following are the indices, which are used in the model formulation:
I set of products to be purchased; J set of buyers who procure multiple units in order to fulfill some demand; K potential set of vendors; M set of incremental price breaks.
Parameters in the model:
pikm cost of acquiring one unit of product i from vendor k at price level m; bikm quantity at which incremental price breaks occurs for product i by vendor k; Fk fixed ordering cost associated with vendor k; dij demand of product i for buyer j; lijk lead time of vendor k to produce and supply product i to buyer j. The lead time of different buyers is not the
same because of geographical distance; qik quality that vendor k maintains for product i, which is measured as percent of defects; Lij lead time that buyer j requires for product i; Qj minimum quality level that buyer j requires for all vendors to maintain; CAPk production capacity for vendor k; N maximum number of vendors that can be selected.
Decision variables in the model:
Xijkm number of units of product i supplied by vendor k to buyer j at price level m; Zk denotes if a particular vendor is chosen or not. This is a binary variable which takes on value 1 if a vendor is
chosen to supply any product and is zero, if the vendor is not chosen; Yijkm this is binary variable which taken on a value 1 if price level m is used, 0 otherwise.
3.1. Mathematical formulation of the vendor selection problem
The objective is simultaneous minimization of price, lead-time and rejects. The mathematical form for these objectives is
1. Price (z1): total cost of purchasing has two components; fixed and the variable cost. Total variable cost: The total variable cost of buying goods from the vendors if given by∑
i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ m
pikm · Xijkm.
Fixed cost: If a vendor k is used then there is a fixed cost associated with it, which is given by∑ k
Fk · Zk .
Hence the total purchasing cost is∑ i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ m
pikm · Xijkm + ∑
k
Fk · Zk .
2. Lead-time (z2): ∑
i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ mlijk · Xijkm, i.e. summed over all the products, buyers and vendors, the product of
lead-time of each product and quantity supplied should be minimized. In our case lead-time is measured in days.
3730 V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737
3. Quality (z3): ∑
i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ mqik ·Xijkm, i.e. summed over all the products, buyers and vendors, the product of rejects
and quantity supplied should be minimized. Quality in our case is measured in terms of percent of rejections.
The constraints in the model are as follows:
1. Capacity constraint: Each vendor k has a maximum capacity CAPk . Total order placed with this vendor must be less than or equal to the maximum capacity. Hence the capacity constraint is given by∑
i
∑ j
∑ m
Xijkm �(CAPk)Zk ∀k. (3.1)
The binary variable on the right-hand side of the constraint implies that a vendor cannot supply any products if not chosen i.e. if Zk is 0.
2. Demand constraint: The demand of buyer j for product i has to be satisfied using a combination of the vendors. The demand constraint is given by∑
k
∑ m
Xijkm = dij ∀i, j . (3.2)
3. Maximum number of vendors: The maximum number of vendors chosen must be less than or equal to the number of specified vendors. Hence this constraint takes the following form:∑
k
Zk �N . (3.3)
4. Linearizing constraints: In the presence of incremental price discounts, objective function is non-linear. The fol- lowing set of constraints are used to linearize it:
Xijkm �(bikm − bikm−1) ∗ Yijkm ∀i, j, k, 1�m�mk , (3.4)
Xijkm �(bikm − bikm−1) ∗ Yijkm+1 ∀i, j, k, 1�m�mk − 1. (3.5)
0 = bi,k,0 < bi,k,1 < · · · < bi,k,m[k] is the sequence of quantities at which price break occurs. pikm is the unit price of ordering Xijkm units from vendor k at level m, if bi,k,m−1 < Xijkm �bi,k,m (1�m�m[k]). Constraints (3.4) and (3.5) force quantities in the discount range for a vendor to be incremental. Because the “quantity” is incremental, if the order quantity lies in discount interval m, namely, Yijkm = 1, then the quantities in interval 1 to m − 1, should be at the maximum of those ranges. Constraint (3.4) also assures that a quantity in any range is no greater than the width of the range.
5. Non-negativity and binary constraint: Xijkm �0; Zk, Yijkm ∈ (0, 1).
3.2. Solution approach
Multi-objective problems can be solved using different methods. A detailed description of multi-objective solution methods was carried out by Shin and Ravindran [38]. We used the following MCDM methods to compare the solutions.
1. Weighted Objective method. 2. Goal programming method. 3. Compromise programming.
3.2.1. Weighted objective method [39] Weighing the objectives to obtain an efficient or pareto-optimal solution is one of the oldest multi-objective solution
techniques. Geoffrion’s P� problem [40] is a simple procedure for determining efficient solutions of the MCDM problems. Under the weighted objective method, vendor selection problem is transformed to following single-objective
V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737 3731
optimization problem:
MIN w1
⎛ ⎝∑
i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ m
pikm · Xijkm + ∑
k
Fk · Zk
⎞ ⎠+ w2
⎛ ⎝∑
i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ m
lijk · Xijkm
⎞ ⎠
+ w3
⎛ ⎝∑
i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ m
qik · Xijkm
⎞ ⎠ ,
where w1, w2 and w3 are the weights on each of the objectives. The optimal solution to the weighted problem is a non- inferior solution to the multi-objective problem as long as all the weights are positive. The weights can be systematically varied to generate several efficient solutions. The weighing method is generally used to approximate the efficient set; it is not an good method for finding an exact representation of the efficient set.
3.2.2. Goal programming While linear multi-objective programming deals with the minimization or maximization of various objective func-
tions, goal programming is concerned with the conditions of achieving prespecified targets or goals [41] on the various objectives. Given a portfolio of properly established goals, one tries to achieve them as closely as possible. As originally conceived, goal programming attempts to minimize the set of deviations from prespecified multiple goals, which are considered simultaneously but are weighted according to their relative importance.
Goal programming is a three-step approach as follows [10]: Step 1: Get from the decision maker goals/target to achieve for each objective. The goals are not constraints. Hence
some of the goals may not be achievable. For example consider an objective fi whose target value is bi , then the goal constraint is written as
fi(x) + d− i − d+
i = bi ,
where, d− i = Underachievement of goal.
d+ i = Overachievement of goal.
Step 2: Get decision maker’s preference on achieving the goals. This can be done in three ways:
1. ordinal (preemptive rank order), 2. cardinal (weights), 3. hybrid.
Step 3: Find an optimal solution that will come as close as possible to the stated goals in the specified preference order.
The methodology used for the vendor selection problem in this paper is that of preemptive weights. Under this, a priority is assigned for each incommensurable goal and weights to goal at the same priority. Goals at higher priority have to be satisfied before lower priority goals are even considered. In this formulation price is the highest priority goal, followed by lead-time and quality in that order. Using goal programming, the vendor selection problem is formulated as follows:
Min Z = P1d + 1 + P2d
+ 2 + P3d
+ 3
s.t.
⎛ ⎝∑
i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ m
pikm · Xijkm + ∑
k
Fk · Zk
⎞ ⎠+ d−
1 − d+ 1 = Price goal,
∑ k
∑ m
qik · Xijkm + d− 2 − d+
2 = Quality goal ∀i, j ,
∑ k
∑ m
lijk · Xijkm + d− 3 − d+
3 = Leadtime goal ∀i, j ,
where P1, P2, P3 are the preemptive priorities assigned to each criterion.
3732 V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737
3.2.3. Compromise programming [42] Compromise is a major factor in collective decision-making, but it is also an important tool in individual decision
making with multiple objectives. In this context compromise programming can be thought of as an effort to approach the ideal solution as closely as possible. Ideal solution corresponds to the best value that can be achieved for each objective, ignoring all other objectives, subject to the constraints. Since the objectives conflict, ideal solution is not achievable. Hence compromise programming tries to find a solution that comes as “close as possible” to the ideal values. “Closeness” is defined by the Lp distance metric as follows:
Mathematically,
Lp = [
k∑ i=1
�p i [fi − f ∗
i ]p ]1/p
for p = 1, 2, . . . ,∞,
where f1, f2, . . . , fk are the different objectives and f ∗ i = min(fi) ignoring other criteria, called the ideal value for the
ith objective and �i are weights given to various criteria. In general, �i = wi/f ∗ i , where wi’s are the relative weights.
Any point that minimizes Lp for �i > 0, and ∑
�i =1 and 1�p�∞ is called a compromise solution, which are always non-dominated. As p increases larger deviations get more weight. For p = ∞, the largest of the deviations completely dominates the distance determination.
For the vendor selection, compromise-programming approach will proceed as follows: Step 1: Obtain the ideal solution by optimizing the problem separately for each objective. The ideal values for each
of three objectives price, lead-time and quality are denoted by p∗ i , l∗i and q∗
i , respectively. Step 2: Obtain compromise solution by using an appropriate distance measure. Thus, the vendor selection problem becomes
Min
⎛ ⎜⎜⎜⎝
w1
( ( ∑
i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ mpikm · Xijkm+∑kFk · Zk) − p∗
i
p∗ i
)p
+w2
( ( ∑
i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ mlijk · Xijkm)−l∗i l∗i
)p
+
w3
( ( ∑
i
∑ j
∑ k
∑ mqik · Xijkm) − q∗
i
q∗ i
)p
⎞ ⎟⎟⎟⎠
1/p
.
Different efficient solutions can be obtained by changing the value of parameter p. The most common values are p=1, 2 and ∞.
4. Illustrative example [43]
As outlined in Section 3, data regarding the prices, lead-time and quality from different vendors for different products are required to solve the problem. The data used in the model is as follows:
• bikm quantity at which price break occurs for product i (defined by vendor k for buyer j). Here each vendor offers two price breaks. The second break point for each of the two vendors is the maximum quantity that any vendor can supply. The break points used in the model are 85, 180, 95, 190, 120, 210, 125 and 205, respectively, for each product, buyer and vendor combination.
• Fk fixed cost associated with each vendor k is 3500 and 3600, respectively. • dij demand of product i by buyer j, is 150, 175, 200 and 180, respectively, for the four product buyer combinations. • qik quality that vendor k maintains for product i is 0.03, 0.09, 0.06 and 0.02, respectively. • Lij lead time that buyer j requires for product i is 18, 20, 26 and 13 days. • Qj minimum quality level that buyer j requires for all vendors to maintain is 0.095 and 0.09, respectively. • CAPk production capacity for vendor k for product i is 300, 350, 280 and 360, respectively. • lijk lead time for vendor k to produce and supply product i to buyer j for each of the combination is 15, 17, 19, 18,
24, 21, 11 and 12, respectively.
V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737 3733
Table 1 Tabulation of results from all models
Alternative Price Lead-time Quality
1 Ideal price 92 640 12 055 48.05 2 Ideal quality 93 540 11 890 19.65 3 Ideal lead 93 600 11 580 35.05 4 Equal weight 93 070 11 890 35.85 5 Goal program 93 040 12 155 33.55 6 p = 1 93 230 11 890 35.05 7 p = 2 92 664 12 180 35.05 8 p = ∞ 92 695 11 905 35.85
4.1. Analysis of results
The number of decision variables for the example problem is 34 of which 18 are binary variables. The total number of constraints for this model is 34. The vendor selection problem was solved using the three approaches as discussed in Section 3. For the purpose of illustration, we present 8 different efficient solutions or alternatives obtained by the three methods in Table 1. The first 4 alternatives are from the weighted objective method, alternative 5 is by goal programming and alternative 6, 7 and 8 are through compromise programming. All the problems were solved using LINGO 8.0.
The first 3 alternatives in Table 1 are the ideal solutions obtained just considering each of the objectives individually, i.e., the weights in the weighted objective problem are (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1), respectively. The “equal weight” solution is obtained by setting w1 = w2 = w3 = 1
3 . For the weighted objective method, initially 10 different weights were used to obtain solutions. Out of the 10 different weights used, five yielded different efficient solutions. Solution obtained by single-objective formulation of just minimizing purchasing cost is very close to the alternative 1, hence has not been presented. Alternative 5 is the solution obtained by the pre-emptive goal programming method by setting the targets at 90% of the ideal values. The target values for price, lead-time and quality are 10 2933, 12 867 and 21.8 respectively. The preemptive priorities are cost, lead-time and quality. Of the three goals only price and lead-time goals (the top two priorities) are met whereas the quality goal is not met. The last 3 alternatives are the solutions obtained using compromise programming with p = 1, 2, and ∞, respectively. Table 1 also illustrates that no solution dominates any other solution. Hence they are all efficient solutions. Some solutions are better with respect to some objectives but worse compared to other objectives. It is upto the decision maker to choose the “best compromise solution” which would maximize his subjective preferences or is inline with the business processes. To help the DM choose a solution from the set of solutions a value path approach is presented.
4.2. The value path approach
Value path approach is one of the most efficient ways to demonstrate the trade-offs among different criteria visually; this approach was developed by Schilling et al. [44]. The display consists of a set of parallel scales, one for each criterion, on which is drawn the value path for each of the alternatives. Value paths have proven to be an effective way to present the trade-offs in problems with more than two objectives.
The value assigned to each efficient solution on a particular axis is that solution value for the appropriate objective divided by the best solution for that objective. Therefore, the minimum value for each axis is 1. Following are some of the properties of the value path approach:
• If two value paths representing alternatives A and B intersect between two vertical scales then the line segment connecting A and B in objective space has a negative slope and neither objective dominates other.
• If three or more value paths intersect then their associated points in the objective space are collinear. • If two paths do not intersect then one path must lie entirely below the other and is therefore inferior. • Given, any intersecting pair of value paths, a third value path is inferior if it does not lie above the intersecting point.
3734 V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737
Table 2 Value path approach (Step 2 results)
Alternative Price Lead-time Quality
1 Ideal price 1.00000 1.04102 2.44529 2 Ideal quality 1.00972 1.02677 1.00000 3 Ideal lead 1.01036 1.00000 1.78372 4 Equal weight 1.00464 1.02677 1.82443 5 Goal program 1.00432 1.04965 1.70738 6 p = 1 1.00637 1.02677 1.78372 7 p = 2 1.00026 1.05181 1.78372 8 p = ∞ 1.00059 1.02807 1.82443
Fig. 2. Value path approach schematic.
V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737 3735
Table 3 Comparison of different methodologies
Criteria Single-objective method
Weighted objective Goal programming Compromise programming
Computational effort Easy to solve Easy to solve Hard Hard as p increases Scaling of objectives Not an issue Is a problem Not an issue Is a problem Trade-offs Not allowed Pre-specified Not allowed Allowed Weights/priority Not required for
solution Weights have to be assessed
Priorities have to be decided
The value of p has to be as- sessed
Non-dominated solution Not always As long as the weights are positive
Not always Always if some conditions satisfied
Involvement of DM Not involved Could be involved to specify weights
DM specifies priorities Could be involved
Steps used for the value path approach for the vendor selection problem: Step 1: Find the ideal solution for each criterion. The first three rows of Table 1 are the ideal solutions. For example
ideal price is the solution to the vendor selection problem considering only the cost of the purchased items i.e. by disregarding quality and lead-time.
Step 2: For each of the remaining alternatives, divide the criteria values by their respective ideal values. For example, for the equal weight alternative, the value of price, lead-time and quality are 93 070, 11 890 and 35.85. The ideal value for price, lead-time and quality are 92 640, 11 580 and 19.65, respectively. Therefore, the values corresponding to equal weight are obtained as (93 070/92 640), (11 890/11 580) and (35.85/19.65), respectively. Similar process is done for other alternatives. A summary of the results for step 2 are shown in the Table 2.
Step 3: Plot the results, with Price, lead-time and quality on x-axis and ratios on the y-axis. The next step is to plot them on graph for better visualization. The graph is shown in Fig. 2. Table 3 presents a comparison of the four different methodologies, namely, single-objective mixed integer method,
weighted objective, goal programming and compromise programming for solving the vendor selection problem.
5. Conclusion
Vendor selection is one of the most critical steps in the outsourcing process; the success of outsourcing activity is highly dependent on successful selection of vendors. In this paper, we have modeled the vendor selection problem as a multi-objective optimization problem assuming price, lead-time and quality to be the most important objectives. However, multi-objective optimization techniques are very flexible in their use; any criterion that can be quantified can be used in the process. An important characteristic of multi-objective techniques is that it does not provide one solution, but a number of solutions known as efficient solutions. Hence, the role of the decision maker (buyer) is more important than before. By involving the decision maker early in the process, the acceptance of the results by the top management becomes easier. Moreover, the ability to simultaneously view the results obtained by different techniques gives greater flexibility to the decision maker in choosing the best solution for the organization.
We believe preemptive goal programming is a more suitable method for vendor selection problem, under current set of constraints and criteria. Organizations will usually measure their performance on the basis of more than one criterion. In non-preemptive goal programming, the decision maker needs to supply the weights for each of the objectives, which may be difficult for the decision maker. In case of preemptive goal programming, the decision maker has to only specify the rank ordering of the priorities on the objective functions. Another advantage of preemptive method is that the utility function of the decision maker need not be linear and scaling of the criteria value is also not necessary.
In view of the supply chain disruptions over the last few years, risk quantification is becoming an important factor in the vendor selection. There is much empirical evidence to include risk as a criterion in the model. Another issue that is gaining importance is global vendor selection. The criteria involved in global vendor selection are not the same as we have used in this paper. Hence it is a valuable extension to our work.
3736 V. Wadhwa, A.R. Ravindran / Computers & Operations Research 34 (2007) 3725–3737
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- Vendor selection in outsourcing
- Introduction
- Vendor selection problem
- Multi-objective vendor selection problem
- Literature review
- General methods of vendor selection
- Multi-criteria vendor selection models
- Vendor selection under price-discounts
- Formulation of multi-objective vendor selection model
- Mathematical formulation of the vendor selection problem
- Solution approach
- Weighted objective method bib39[39]
- Goal programming
- Compromise programming bib42[42]
- Illustrative example bib43[43]
- Analysis of results
- The value path approach
- Conclusion
- References
o11 ( offshore).pdf
www.elsevier.com/locate/jom
Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163
Offshore outsourcing of professional services:
A transaction cost economics perspective
Lisa M. Ellram a,*, Wendy L. Tate b,1, Corey Billington c
a Colorado State University, Department of Management, 212 Rockwell Hall, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1275, United States b University of Tennessee, Department of Marketing and Logistics, 343 Stokely Management Center,
916 Volunteer Blvd., Knoxville, TN 37996-0001, United States c IMD, Ch. de Bellerive 23, P.O. Box 915, CH-1001 Lausanne, Switzerland
Available online 4 March 2007
Abstract
This research utilizes the framework of transaction cost economics (TCE) to develop an understanding of how firms manage the
costs and risks of offshore outsourcing of professional services. This research examines the perspectives of eight organizations
through interviews with 10 high-ranking supply management executives. The paper first explores the rationale for offshore
outsourcing among the organizations studied. Using the tenants of TCE, this paper postulates that fixed costs of establishing the
relationship dominate the variable costs of day-to-day transactions, and that organizations will not offshore outsource areas where
there is high perceived degree of unmanageable risk. The paper expands on themes provided by TCE and offers some lessons
learned, and guidelines for managing and controlling offshore outsourced services relationships.
# 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Business process outsourcing; Professional services; Transaction costs; Case studies; Service purchasing; Offshoring
1. Background/introduction
Outsourcing provides a potential path to price
reductions and increased flexibility, allowing firms to
convert fixed costs into variable expenses, and increase
their economies of scope. Studies indicate that short-
term price savings continues to be a predominant reason
for both offshore and domestic outsourcing (Corbett,
2005; Doig et al., 2001). Yet the ramifications of
outsourcing go well beyond immediate price reduction.
Outsourcing has implications for day-to-day manage-
ment and performance, as well as strategic implications.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 970 204 2719.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (L.M. Ellram),
[email protected] (W.L. Tate), [email protected]
(C. Billington). 1 Tel.: +1 865 974 1648.
0272-6963/$ – see front matter # 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jom.2007.02.008
Outsourcing decisions clearly affect a firm’s cost
structures, but may also affect the long-term compe-
titive situation and alter the nature of risks that the firm
must manage.
Offshore outsourcing presents many opportunities
that are not available domestically. For example, due to
low Indian labor rates, an airline was able to offshore
outsource its accounts payable auditing and recover $75
million in delinquent accounts that would not have been
cost-beneficial to pursue domestically (Farrell, 2004).
Outsourcing can also help a company get better, more
state of the art services than it could afford internally.
This is a commonly stated reason for outsourcing
information technology (McDougall, 2004).
Clearly, there is much more to outsourcing than
simply saving money. Offshore outsourcing creates
both new opportunities and often unrecognized hazards,
which may limit a firm’s prospects. The long-term costs
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163 149
of these unanticipated consequences can greatly over-
shadow the potential cost savings. As such, careful
consideration should be given to outsourcing decisions
including all of the potential long-term consequences. It
is no wonder that there has been a call for more research
on offshore outsourcing of services (Roth and Menor,
2003).
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it explores
why firms state that they choose to offshore outsource
professional services. The second issue, and primary
focus of the paper, is to use the framework of transaction
cost economics to develop an understanding of how
firms are managing the costs and the risks of offshore
outsourcing professional services. Professional services
offshore outsourcing is the focus because of its rapid
growth and the expectation that this trend will continue
(Apte et al., 1995; Bardhan and Kroll, 2003, 2006; Roth
and Menor, 2003). Professional services require unique
skills and independent work effort to satisfy the
organization’s temporary or ongoing needs. Included
are areas such as information technology, advertising,
customer service, accounting and payroll. Using
transaction cost economics (TCE) as the framework,
it is postulated that organizations will choose the
business alternative that yields the lowest total cost of
running their operations. TCE provides a rich frame-
work beyond cost, also hypothesizing that organizations
will not offshore outsource areas where there is high
potential risk of supplier opportunism. TCE proposes
that supplier opportunism is highest when the buying
firm cannot specify or does not know what it wants, and
when the buying firm cannot accurately assess whether
the supplier is actually keeping its commitments.
The perspectives of eight organizations were
explored through interviews with 10 high-ranking
supply management executives who were intimately
involved in the selection, relationship execution and on-
going management of offshored and outsourced
professional services suppliers. The themes provided
by TCE are expanded upon and some lessons learned
are presented, along with guidelines for effectively
managing and controlling offshore outsourced services
relationships.
2. Review of recent literature
Outsourcing is not a new topic. Often called the
‘‘make-or-buy’’ decision, organizations have been
grappling with what to perform internally versus what
to ‘‘buy’’ in the marketplace as long as business has
existed. Outsourcing is often seen as way for
organizations to reduce costs and investment, while
focusing on what they do well (Doig et al., 2001). For
two decades, organizations have been warned to tread
carefully into the outsourcing arena, not to outsource
items that are strategic, or part of their core competency
(Arnold, 2000; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Venkatesan,
1992; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994), and to manage
outsourced relationships judiciously (Williamson,
1985). More recently, authors have emphasized the
need to provide better controls and monitoring of
outsourced relationships (Amaral et al., 2004). Man-
agers have also been cautioned to understand the true,
long-term cost structure of what they are outsourcing;
realizing that a comparison to their internal cost
structure may not be valid (Doig et al., 2001). Despite
the increasing number of cautions, the pull to outsource
remains strong, and growing.
For purposes of this research, offshoring is defined
from a U.S.-Centric perspective to include sending work
to countries outside of North America. Nearshoring
includes sending work from the U.S. to Canada or
Mexico. Outsourcing is distinguished from retaining
work in-house in that work is performed by independent
parties who are not part of the firm’s employee base.
Here, offshore outsourcing refers specifically to using an
independent supplier outside of North America. Within
the realm of outsourcing, there is a range of degrees of
outsourcing, as will be further detailed in Table 4.
Much of the previous literature and studies have
focused on manufacturing outsourcing (e.g. McCarthy
and Anagnostou, 2004; Takeishi, 2001; Ulrich and
Ellison, 2005; Wu et al., 2005). Manufacturing
outsourcing has been more prevalent historically, and
received a great deal of attention in the late 1980s and
early 1990s when there was fear that industrialized
nations were compromising their long-term competi-
tiveness by ‘‘hollowing out’’ their manufacturing
through outsourcing. Today, the attention has shifted
towards the new move to outsource services, most
notably to outsource professional services to offshore
locations. Offshore services outsourcing is now possible
due to the advent of relatively cheap and reliable
information and telecommunication technologies. Most
of the discussion around professional services offshore
outsourcing has been around the impact on jobs and the
economy (Bardhan and Kroll, 2003; Garner, 2004;
Farrell and Agrawal, 2003). However, the operating
implications of professional services outsourcing may
be more subtle and insidious than manufacturing
outsourcing. This includes the loss of understanding
of the outsourced process that allows the firm to fairly
evaluate the price and performance of a supplier over
time (Amaral et al., 2006; Takeishi, 2001). On a more
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163150
strategic level, the firm may also lose the tacit
knowledge that allows it to have breakthrough thinking
in certain areas (Amaral et al., 2006; Fine, 1998).
People and organizations learn by doing; if someone
else is doing, they get the benefit of that learning which
is very difficult to imitate or anticipate (Fine, 1998).
With this context in mind, the next section introduces
transaction cost economics as a theoretical framework
for better understanding the outsourcing decision and its
implications.
3. Theoretical grounding
From an economic standpoint, there are certain
things that should or should not be outsourced based on
the relative cost and risk associated with internal versus
external operations. One well established theory used to
explain this phenomenon is TCE. TCE has several
important premises as it relates to outsourcing, each of
which is presented below. Several other studies have
used TCE to better understand outsourcing decisions,
lending support for the validity of TCE as a suitable lens
through which to view outsourcing (Arnold, 2000;
Auburt et al., 2004; Maltz, 1994; Murray and Kotabe,
1999; McCarthy and Anagnostou, 2004; Noordewier
et al., 1990; Odagiri, 2003; Ulrich and Ellison, 2005;
Walker and Weber, 1987). The following sections relate
the TCE elements of transaction frequency, asset
specificity and uncertainty to outsourcing situations.
The transactions themselves take place in an environ-
ment where the players are limited by their own
bounded rationality, and are subject to the possibility of
opportunism by other players in the marketplace
(Williamson, 1985, 1988).
3.1. Elements of TCE
The following section provides an explanation of
TCE as it relates to professional services outsourcing.
Based on the premises of TCE, propositions are
developed regarding the transaction characteristics
favorable to outsourcing.
Transaction frequency has historically been viewed
as the number of transactions, where the number of
transactions is a surrogate for the total cost of
transactions; more transactions means higher cost
(Maltz, 1994; Williamson, 1985). TCE suggests that
outsourcing becomes cost prohibitive as the number of
transactions increase. However, current information
technology (IT) and communications systems cause
the transaction costs for many services (relative to
performing the tasks internally) to be dominated by
the fixed set-up costs associated with the monitoring
and management systems rather than the variable
transaction costs associated with the ongoing manage-
ment itself. Thus, the cost curve has shifted, so that
fixed set-up costs outweigh the variable transaction
costs in offshore outsourced professional services.
Much of the transaction cost is for risk management
and business controls, government reporting for
Sarbanes Oxley and other requirements. This is
theoretically in line with Coase’s (1937) foundational
work in TCE in developing a theory of the firm, where
he notes that a key driver of the decision to use
markets (buy) versus hierarchies (make) is the set-up
and transaction cost of one alternative versus the other.
While this may seem contrary to TCE’s usual focus on
transaction frequency, it fits well with the founding
assumptions of TCE, which were simply ‘‘translated’’
to fit to the nature of industry cost structures at the
time. Thus, due to information technology and the
dominance of fixed rather than variable costs, the first
proposition follows:
Proposition 1. Firms will be more likely to offshore
outsource larger volume professional service categories
and find small volume categories ‘‘uneconomic’’.
This proposition assumes that the firm outsources
directly, not through an intermediate firm who might
provide systems and controls.
Level of asset specific investment assumption
presumes that the more specific assets required to
support an activity, the less likely that the firm is to
outsource that activity (Dyer, 1997; Masten et al., 1991;
Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1975, 1981, 1985).
Specific assets refer to assets that cannot be readily used
in another application or transferred to another
customer. Such activities are not good candidates for
outsourcing because the firm could develop a high level
of dependence on the supplier, and the supplier could
then become opportunistic, raising prices, reducing
service levels, or other such issues. In cases where the
supplier owns the specific assets, the supplier is
subjected to potentially significant risk associated with
accepting the activity. Thus:
Proposition 2. The higher the level of asset-specific
investment required, the less likely the professional
service category is to be offshore outsourced.
TCE deals directly with various types of risk that a
firm may encounter by classifying types of uncertainties
a firm may face. There are uncertainties that come from
the marketplace, and uncertainties that come from the
firm itself.
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163 151
Uncertainty in the external environment deals with
the degree of volatility and unpredictability in the
market place with regard to changes in availability,
technology, price, key players, and any other significant
disruptions to the market. Transaction cost economics
posits that in highly uncertain markets, firms prefer to
perform a task internally, believing that they can
favorably respond to the whims of the market more
readily than their suppliers (Kaufmann and Carter,
2006; Vidal and Goetschalckx, 2000; Williamson,
1985).
Proposition 3. The more volatile the supply market
environment, the less likely the professional services
category is to be offshore outsourced.
There are two types of internal uncertainty that firms
face: not knowing exactly what they want, and not being
able to verify whether a supplier has performed as
promised. Each is explained in more detail below.
Internal uncertainty in requirements implies that the
organization really does not know what it wants from
the process. Firms, like people, will set resources aside
to cope with unplanned contingencies. In economic
terms, this is bounded rationality—there are too many
issues for a human to comprehend and effectively
address. If a firm has a process with uncertain
requirements, a firm may choose to keep a process in
house because doing so retains control of unanticipated
benefits and costs (Kaufmann and Carter, 2006; Osborn
and Baughn, 1990; Williamson, 1975, 1985).
If a firm chooses to outsource a process that has
unclear requirements, it may be limiting its options or
flexibility (Amaral et al., 2006). Outsourcing requires
the firm to specify what is and is not part of the contract
and to accurately define levels of service. There is a risk
of being wrong, not getting what was required and of
limiting its future alternatives. In such situations, the
firm should prefer the flexibility of insourcing.
Proposition 4. The more uncertain the firm is about its
requirements, the less likely the professional services
category is to be offshore outsourced.
Uncertainty regarding performance of the contract
exists where the nature of the transaction is such that the
contracting parties have no assurance that the other
party has actually fulfilled its obligation and performed
as specified (Williamson, 1975, 1985). In such cases, a
firm may be paying for something and not actually
getting what it paid for. This is also referred to as a lack
of observability (Narayanan and Raman, 2000). Such a
situation is ripe for opportunistic supplier behavior
(Williamson, 1975, 1985), also referred to as moral
hazard (Narayanan and Raman, 2000; Amaral et al.,
2006). Again, in such cases, the firm should prefer to
reduce the non-performance risk by insourcing.
Proposition 5. The greater the difficulty in verifying
contractual performance, the less likely the professional
services category is to be offshore outsourced.
The next section briefly presents the research
methodology. This is followed by a discussion of the
case data.
4. Research method
The nature of this research was both exploratory and
confirmatory. From a confirmatory standpoint, the
researchers wanted to determine whether TCE applies
to the offshore outsourcing of services, and whether
TCE is still relevant, in situations where the information
technology greatly reduces the variable transaction
costs associated with offshore outsourcing. Second, the
researchers wanted to go beyond TCE to develop an
understanding of the risks associated with offshore
outsourcing of professional services, as well as provide
insight into how these risks are managed and should be
managed. There was a desire to leave open the
opportunity to explore and create new theory with
explanatory and managerial value related to outsourcing
professional services.
To this end, interviews were conducted with 10 high-
ranking procurement professionals (Chief Procurement
Officers, Directors and Managers) representing eight
Fortune 500 companies regarding the outsourcing and
offshoring of professional services. A set of questions
was designed to collect data on the phenomenon (see
Appendix A), guiding the data collection process
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). The primary questions
were unstructured to allow the interviewees to tell the
story of their experiences. There were also probes which
ensured that the insights that the researchers’ had
regarding this phenomenon were addressed, if they did
not arise during the unstructured part of the interview
(Perry, 1998). All of the interviews took place via
telephone or in person, with at least two members of the
research team present, and were transcribed. When
appropriate, company documentation was gathered and
also transcribed. The data were coded using QSR
NVivo. A system of categories was developed and then
the text were assigned to a particular category. The
interviews varied in length from 45 min to 2 h. A
summary of key characteristics of the cases is provided
in Table 1.
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163152
Table 1
Companies analyzed
Name Industry What services are offshore outsourced Approximate years
experience
Finance1 Financial services Call centers, IT maintenance, programming, more 15–20
Finance2 Financial services Call centers, IT maintenance and support, more 2–3
Software Commercial software Call centers, more 3–5
Computer Computer equipment A/P; A/R, travel reimbursement 5+
Packaging Packaging Limited IT development 2–3
Transport Transportation equipment
manufacturer
Engineering services, back office operations, more 10+
Consumer products Clothing and accessories Very limited (extensive mfg) >1
PC Hardware Computers and peripherals Contingent workforce, IT help desk, call centers, more 5+
5. The case data
This section explores the motivation for offshore
outsourcing of professional services, and examines the
support provided in the case data for the research
propositions provided above.
5.1. Motivation for offshore outsourcing
To gain more insight into how the desire for cost
savings interacts with other issues, the study partici-
pants were asked to explain why the decision was made
to offshore outsource professional services. The insights
from this question are provided in Table 2 below. The
benefits sought were the primary reasons that the
participants identified, and did not include any
additional benefits or costs that were discovered after
offshore outsourcing was underway.
Table 2
Offshore outsourcing drivers
Name Benefit(s) sought Why begin off
Finance1 Flexible capacity and variable
pricing based on usage
Had successfu
move to a mor
Finance2 Cost reduction Saw others bei
Software Cost reduction with comparable
quality of service
Waited for per
Computer Cost reduction Needed time to
at offshore out
Packaging Cost reduction Waited until it
outsourcing we
Transport Cost reduction, process
improvement
Technology wa
Consumer products Cost reduction Professional se
want to keep o
PC Hardware Cost reduction Had successfu
and outsourced
offshore outso
Consistent with the popular belief, a review of
Table 2 supports the strong emphasis on price savings as
the primary driver of offshore outsourcing. While two
firms noted that quality parity and process improve-
ments were required in conjunction with offshore
outsourcing, seven of the eight noted cost reduction as
the primary driver. Finance1 had already offshored its
operations to low cost countries; outsourcing these was
the next step to create a more variable cost structure.
Thus, given the strong cost emphasis, TCE is a logical
lens for viewing offshore outsourcing. The relationship
of the case data to TCE is presented in the next sections.
5.2. Transaction frequency and asset specificity
Based on the new transaction cost model presented
above, where fixed costs dominate, it is not surprising
that the organizations studied focused their professional
shore outsourcing when you did? Outsourcing style
lly offshored services; desire to
e variable cost structure
Leader
ng successful and saving money Fast follower
ceived ‘‘parity’’ in service quality Quality and service
parity a prerequisite
recover from first disastrous attempt
sourcing to integrate lessons learned
Fix processes before
outsourcing
seemed like many of risks of offshore
re mitigated
Use intermediary
s changing; could not keep up in house Improve while lowering
costs
rvices are too important to offshore;
utsource providers close
Don’t give up control
lly offshore outsourced manufacturing,
services, desire to combine benefits in
urcing
Analytically model for
optimal result
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163 153
services offshore outsourcing in areas with high
transaction volume. In order for them to enjoy the
economies of scale associated with their investment in
setting up linkages and creating the systems for
monitoring their offshore outsourcing suppliers, high
transaction volume is necessary. Thus, Proposition 1,
firms will be more likely to outsource larger volume
professional service categories and find small volume
categories ‘‘uneconomic’’, is supported.
Physical asset specificity was not an issue to initial
outsourcing of professional services among the orga-
nizations studied due to the perception that the physical
infrastructure was generic enough that it could be
redeployed with relative ease. The investment in human
assets was much more strategic and specific than the
investment in physical assets among the firms studied.
Still, the development of specific, difficult to replace
knowledge did not appear to receive significant
attention as a potential risk in most cases.
To illustrate the apparent disregard for specific
knowledge, Software spent over 4 weeks training its
offshore outsourced call center personnel to answer
very specific technical questions related to its product.
This specialized knowledge has a relatively high cost to
develop, and cannot be recovered if the firm changes
suppliers. Yet this was not a concern, or at least not a
deterrent to this organization’s outsourcing efforts.
Similarly, most of the organizations studied had
outsourced their information technology systems,
handing over their physical and human resources to a
third party to manage everything. Thus, Proposition 2,
the higher the level of asset-specific investment
required, the less likely the category is to be outsourced,
is partially supported. The firms studied here are careful
to avoid outsourcing of specific physical assets but do
not show the same level of concern for outsourcing
specific knowledge assets. This could simply be a
matter of bounded rationality, and our innate limitations
to deal fully with the implications complex decisions.
When asked about their anxiety over investing in
developing supplier’s employees and then losing the
knowledge through employee turnover or switching
suppliers, the case participants did not express concern.
There was a general belief that they were not sharing
anything so proprietary that it would compromise their
firm’s strategy or competitiveness. The pressure to
reduce costs was so great that there was a consensus that
they could afford the cost of retraining new employees,
and even switching suppliers or regions of the world, if
necessary.
On the other hand, six of the firms studied
specifically mentioned the growing level of competition
for qualified, experienced offshore suppliers. Finance1
mentioned that there were many companies newly
buying services specifically in India and the Philippines,
that were competing with them for assignment of
experienced personnel at their outsourced service
providers. Indeed, Finance2 had a stated strategy of
utilizing suppliers and supplier personnel that had
worked for its competitors, so that the supplier could
ramp up faster. Finance2 was willing to pay a little more
to have access to such assets, in the belief that the
shorter learning curve would actually save money and
improve supplier performance in the very near term.
Thus, the cases acknowledged that general, redeploy-
able knowledge was developed by the service suppliers
in the course of their business, and that experienced
suppliers were more desirable by incumbent and well as
new customers. There appeared to be a ‘‘leveling’’
affect regarding the perceived risk of losing knowledge.
Case participants noted that all other firms who offshore
outsourced were experiencing the same cost pressure
and increasing competition for the best offshore
suppliers. Because they were all experiencing the same
high levels of turnover at their offshore suppliers, they
perceived no competitive disadvantage due to the
potential loss of knowledge.
To further highlight the lack of awareness of
knowledge-based assets, Finance1 did not become
concerned with outsourcing some of its programming
because it believed it had excellent contracts in place to
protect its ownership and intellectual property. However,
when it decided that it wanted to switch suppliers due to
price and service issues, it realized that it was very
dependent on a particular programming supplier. Over
time, the organization had lost its internal knowledge to
understand the program code, and even the knowledge to
develop a clear statement of work to effectively re-bid the
item. That was a wake-up call for Finance1 regarding its
dependence on specific knowledge-based assets,
Finance1 is in the process of changing its policies so
that it does not simply outsource entire, complex
programming tasks, but remains involved in the
development of non-routine software code. Remaining
actively involved in the management and control of
outsourced activities is referred to as out-tasking,
partitioning knowledge and tasks (Fine, 1998; Takeishi,
2001). While out-tasking is more costly, the organization
has made a strategic decision that the risk of dependence
and losing control outweighs the benefit of the lower
price. This process of out-tasking is discussed in greater
detail below in conjunction with Proposition 4.
Thus, while Proposition 2 did not receive strong
support, there is some consensus from the case data and
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163154
the literature that the organizations should be concerned
about human resource asset specificity in offshore
outsourcing (Amaral et al., 2006; Coase, 1937;
Narayanan and Raman, 2000; Takeishi, 2002; William-
son, 1985). It is much easier to put a monetary value on
specific physical assets, and recognize dependency on
such assets because of the immediate, tangible nature of
these assets. It is easier, and perhaps riskier to ignore the
dependence upon intangible, human assets.
5.3. The risks associated with outsourcing
The researchers found that the risks associated with
offshore outsourcing were a concern for everyone. This
included the risk of volatility in the supply market, the
risk of incomplete specifications, and the risk that the
organization cannot effectively judge whether the
supplier is performing on the contract, as presented
below, in Table 3.
5.3.1. Market volatility risk
In regard to the risk of market volatility, all of the
organizations studied focused on outsourcing areas
where they perceived a low market risk. For example,
Finance2 characterized itself as a fast follower,
explaining, ‘‘We let other companies go in first and
see how it works. If they are successful, we follow
them quickly.’’ All of the firms studied were very
cognizant of market risk, such as political risk,
currency risk, and related factors. Thus, there is
support for Proposition 3, the more volatile the supply
market environment, the less likely the professional
Table 3
Risk associated with offshoring
Type of risk Description
Market volatility risk The firms in this research focused on outsourcing
services with low market risk
Risk of incomplete
specifications
The contracts between the partners are lacking
in specification, or specifications need constant
updating and changes
Inability to measure
performance
Geographic and cultural differences make
measurement of supplier performance difficult
however, total cost and the value proposition
is still being met
Other risks Considers risks specific to the offshore relationsh
over-commit, under-deliver; language barriers and
lack of understanding of U.S. customer needs
services category is to be offshore outsourced. This
was especially true when there is a higher than
desirable perceived business continuity risk associated
with outsourcing a purchase. For example, when
outsourcing its call centers, Finance2 kept half of its
outsourced call centers nearshore in Canada, rather
than putting them all offshore in India. It was not a
performance issue; it was a conscious decision to pay
more to buffer the business risk of an interruption in
service support due to the possibility of war between
India and Pakistan.
5.3.2. Risk of incomplete specifications
The risk of incomplete specifications or statements
of work was a risk that companies had some difficulty in
dealing with. The best solutions involved developing
more complete specifications when feasible. For
example, Software knew what it wanted in terms of
performance, but had not formalized its wants in
performance specifications in the past. The strategy has
been to add, and improve specifications in the call
center offshore outsourcing contract as needed.
In cases where the market was changing quickly, as
in IT, very long, complete contracts, combined with
long-term relationships (trust) was a technique to lower
the real or perceived transaction costs by organizations
such as Finance1, Software, PC Hardware and
Consumer. Packaging also used an intermediary to
buffer its risk in dealing with Indian IT outsourcing.
There was no way to determine whether these
formalized approaches yielded measurable results,
but it made the buying firms feel more secure.
How firms adapt to the risk
� Follow others that are considered leaders
� Be cognizant of market risk, political risk and currency risk
� Retain services both domestically and internally
� Develop more complete specifications, add and improve
existing contracts by integrating ‘‘lessons learned’’
� Complete long-term contracts
� Develop strategic, trusting and cooperative relationships
� Use out-tasking and/or retain management
� Develop measurable specifications
� Use random customer satisfaction surveys
� Use of internal consultants and benchmarking
� Develop trusting and cooperative relationships
ip: � Additional training, monitoring and evaluation
� Over-specification of contracts
� Ignore risk because the cost difference is so low the
organizations can absorb the additional risk
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163 155
Another approach to dealing with the risk of
incomplete specifications was to retain much more
hands-on control through using out-tasking rather than
complete business process outsourcing as the form of
governance. This reduces some of the savings and
represents a hybrid between market and hierarchy. This
type of approach took several forms among the
organizations studied. The first type, used extensively
by Consumer, and to some extent by PC Hardware, was
out-tasking specific activities where the person worked
along side internal employees almost like an employee
of the outsourcing firm. Most, but not all of the activity
by these companies in this arena was onshore, since
most of their professional staff was located in the United
States. The professional services managed this way
tended to be isolated activities that could easily be
parsed out, such as web page development, and contract
development. This approach was fairly seamless. In this
case, the firm is procuring contingent labor which has a
market price and normally much lower risk. The firm
keeps control of the work processes, is continually
inspecting, and retains the tacit knowledge of the
activity.
The second type of approach was out-tasking
processes, but retaining overall management and
knowledge of the work. This was done by Finance1
and Transport when there was a bigger project, like
software development. In this case the firm is procuring
a much higher ratio of contingent labor, as it has the
outsourcer perform most of the work, under the
supervision of firm employees, who are usually co-
located with the offshore provider. This allows the
organization to have oversight of the processes and
continual inspection, thereby retaining the tacit knowl-
edge. This is a hybrid approach. The organization uses
the market mechanism to establish pricing (Williamson,
1985), and its internal ‘‘authority’’ or hierarchy to
maintain control and mitigate risk. It is an attempt to get
the best of outsourcing and internal production.
Takeishi (2002) refers to this as partitioning knowledge.
His research found that successful automotive firms
retain knowledge of overall system architecture.
Component knowledge is also very important in
developing the best options for new products. Likewise,
it appears that that the firms studied here were in the
process of learning the importance of retaining overall
process knowledge.
The third type of approach was for the buying
organization to mitigate risk through building trusting
and cooperative relationships. This works best where
there is a mutual dependence. For example, when
Finance1 or Finance2 cannot determine the best
solution for outsourcing its internal IT operations, they
may rely upon the supplier to provide the right answer.
If, perchance, they later discover that the supplier did
not act in their best interest, the trust and relationship
may be damaged, and the governance structure
modified.
Finance1 began outsourcing its IT support services
very carefully, with an objective of outsourcing only
routine activities, such as maintenance and some very
basic coding. Over time, one of its suppliers, with whose
service it was very satisfied, began to complain that it
was having problems with employee turnover and job
satisfaction because its employees were not challenged.
The employees were educated professionals who
longed for more challenging tasks, such as writing
original code. Because of its good performance and very
low prices, Finance1 gave the supplier more basic
coding work, which eventually evolved into complex
work. After Finance1 became very dependent on the
supplier, the supplier began to raise prices, reduce its
service level, and behave opportunistically. Finance1
had a very difficult time changing suppliers, because the
supplier had developed some important software, which
Finance1 did not understand. Finance1 was eventually
able to move away from the supplier by developing
replacement software at substantial cost. It resolved that
it would not allow itself to become so dependent on a
supplier again. Future contracts of a similar nature
would either be out-tasked with active hands-on
management by Finance1 employees, or such tasks
would not be outsourced. Again, this was a knowledge
partitioning approach as used by some successful
manufacturing firms, retaining knowledge while allow-
ing the supplier to perform specific tasks (Takeishi,
2002).
Overall, Proposition 4, the more uncertain the firm is
about its requirements, the less likely the professional
services category is to be offshore outsourced, is
supported with some modification. More specifically,
organizations will endeavor to reduce the risk and
uncertainty in their requirements before engaging in
outsourcing, which may also lower the transaction costs
in terms of monitoring and day-to-day management.
While this approach might lower the risk that the
supplier behaves opportunistically, it will not lower the
risk that the organization may be unable to determine
whether the supplier is behaving opportunistically.
5.3.3. Risk of inability to measure performance
The third type of risk, the inability to determine
whether the supplier meets contractual expectations
was also dealt with in numerous ways. As noted above,
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163156
if the inability to measure performance is due to
incomplete or immeasurable specifications, or poor
measurement systems, this is resolved by developing
better specifications and measurements (Narayanan and
Raman, 2000; Amaral et al., 2006). This solution was
possible in cases like call centers, where companies
such as Finance1 and Software indicated that they
learned how to better specify and measure contractual
performance overtime. A first step in understanding the
potential value leakages for Software, PC Hardware and
Consumer was an audit of contract compliance in terms
of price actually paid for promised services items versus
prices charged for services rendered.
Most of the organizations studied here also noted that
they used customer satisfaction surveys as another way
to validate performance. For offshore outsourced
services such as IT provided internally to the firm,
Finance1, Finance2 and PC Hardware polled internal
customers, and in some cases tied supplier compensa-
tion to internal customer satisfaction ratings. In other
cases, results from such surveys became the basis for
discussion and improvements. The firms who out-
sourced call centers, such as Finance1, Finance2 and
Software, also used external customer satisfaction to
gauge call center operator performance, both through
random polling and monitoring calls. Verifying that
outsourcer performance meets expectations was found
to be critical for reducing opportunistic performance
behavior.
In information technology outsourcing, where
technology and services are changing constantly, it
was common for the organizations studied, such as
Finance1, Finance2, PC Hardware and Packaging to use
external consultants to benchmark services and testing.
Finance1 and Software also tested the market for call
center providers by investigating other suppliers,
perhaps even asking for proposals, if a market existed.
A different tactic mentioned in relation to software
development used by Finance1 was to bring an activity
back in-house, at least partially, to improve monitoring
and control (out-tasking). Of course, the longer some-
thing has been outsourced, the more difficult this will be
as much of the tacit and operational knowledge will be
lost. To reduce the risk further, some of the organiza-
tions studied such as Consumer, retained a large internal
management group to oversee and interface with the
third parties performing outsourced activities. This
approach was common in internal IT outsourcing, used
by Consumer, Finance1, Finance2, and PC Hardware.
Thus, if a firm invests enough, it can address many of
the risk and tacit knowledge issues. It is important for
firms to include these risk management costs in their
economic analysis of whether to outsource. In addition,
several firms such as Consumer, Finance1, and Software
noted the importance of maintaining good relationships,
and adding a dissolution or termination clause in the
contract.
Just as in Proposition 4, there is partial support for
Proposition 5, the greater the difficulty in verifying
contractual performance, the less likely that a profes-
sional service category is offshore outsourced. Orga-
nizations responded to performance uncertainty through
a variety of measures to reduce or better manage the
ambiguity.
In summary, firms’ that offshore outsource create
uncertainty and increase the risk to the firm. The firms in
this study recognized much of the uncertainty and tried
to manage and reduce it. In analyzing the viability of
outsourcing and offshore outsourcing, an organization
should always consider total cost, including the costs
associated with managing or reducing risk.
5.3.4. Other risks in offshore outsourcing
There are a number of other risks related to cultural
differences that arise when offshore outsourcing.
Several organizations noted an unwillingness of off-
shore suppliers to admit they cannot perform the
required tasks. For example, Computer noted that
suppliers may accept a contract knowing that they lack
capabilities to meet the specified needs, hoping they can
learn quickly. Likewise, firms may place a very initial
bid on jobs to gain experience in a particular category of
service. However, the supplier’s learning process can be
very painful for the buying firm. This may lead an
organization to in-source items because they were
offshore outsourced in error.
There are also additional costs incurred because of
the differences in cultures, especially with regard to
the customer-facing offshore tasks. Significant bar-
riers in language and slang usage, and lack of an
understanding of the organization’s values may
require extensive training and monitoring to ensure
that the needs of the customers and the buying firm are
being met. The monitoring must be in place on the
supplier’s side as part of the contractual agreement,
and on the buyer’s side to ensure that the supplier is
reporting accurately.
Further, because it is so inexpensive to do business in
offshore locations, there is a tendency to over-specify
the contracts as noted by Finance1, Software and
Computer. This gives the supplier limited opportunity to
use its expertise to improve processes. The organiza-
tions might have better success by establishing
expectations for performance and allowing the offshore
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163 157
company some flexibility in the way it meets those
expectations.
Several of the organizations studied, including
Finance1, Finance2, Computer and PC Hardware
expressed a belief that price in some countries is so
low that they can afford to absorb some extra risk.
However, these same firms noted that wage rates in
some popular regions for professional services out-
sourcing, such as India, are increasing at 15–20% per
year (Kher, 2005; Yamamoto, 2004). Once wage rates
have normalized globally, the risk issues will become
more apparent and unjustifiable. The focus today seems
to be more on performance risk and less on the long-
term risks resulting from losing tacit knowledge. These
long-term risks are likely much larger than estimated.
Today, the price of ignoring risk is perceived as low.
5.4. Summary: matching the characteristics of
outsourcing to the outsourcing type
Based on the case study data, Fig. 1 shows a
continuum of the range of governance structures
observed for offshore outsourcing professional services.
One end is anchored by ‘‘doing things internally,’’ while
the other is anchored by ‘‘complete business process
outsourcing.’’ Between these extremes, everything from
using temporary labor to managing the outsourced
provider’s supply base through buy-sell processes was
observed; Table 4 lists some of the characteristics that
define each of these methods of governing services.
This table uses data from the case studies to prescribe
which types of service characteristics are best suited for
which type of relationship. Notice that the character-
istics do not necessarily follow a continuum. For
example, the level of asset investment is very high with
in-house operations, then drops significantly if using
temporary labor. It then rises with out-tasking and drops
significantly with business process outsourcing.
Two scenarios are provided to illustrate the applica-
tion of Table 4. First, the design of core next-generation
technology for a leading-edge high technology firm
would probably be best suited for in-house control,
perhaps using limited, very specialized temporary labor
or contractors to perform specific tasks. This is
Fig. 1. Insource/outso
something over which the firm does not want to lose
control. Business process outsourcing would be the
worst choice for such a scenario. In the case of
programming for application software, the organization
would like to retain some control and knowledge so it is
not dependent on the supplier. Out-tasking might be a
good alternative, because the organization retains
management of the process and some of the knowledge,
while permitting the offshore outsourcer to perform
much of the actual code development. Because the
organization is involved in the day-to-day activity, it can
also monitor and measure progress closely, even though
it is a difficult task to measure.
If a firm is going to offshore outsource call centers,
the right type of outsourcing arrangement depends upon
how clearly the organization can specify and measure
outcomes. For example, if it is setting up a call center to
process incoming orders and is able to clearly define and
measure the performance of the call center, it might be
best to use business process outsourcing so it can turn
the whole process over to a third party while minimizing
its investment.
5.4.1. What happens if the company cannot or does
not properly control the risk?
Whenever a firm outsources services it should expect
to have significant potential for overpayment and under
servicing. Transference of responsibility for control to
the supplier, and reliance on investments made by
service providers have been shown to be insufficient to
control costs (Amaral et al., 2004, 2006). For example,
Finance1 used two offshore outsourced service provi-
ders for call centers. It had a policy of routing the calls
to the agent with the longest idle times. One of the
suppliers hired more agents to sit idle thereby receiving
all of the calls. The agent that was acting opportunis-
tically actually benefited more. This was not the way the
system was designed to work. This research suggests
that organizations must have their own controls, even if
they have outsourced the management of the offshore
supplier. The cost of relying on the service provider’s
controls is potentially quite high. Without a good initial
assessment of risk, and good management controls in
place, there are many problems that can and do occur
urce continuum.
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163158
Table 4
Ideal characteristics suited to outsourcing types
Characteristic In-house Temporary
labor
Out-tasking Outsourcing with
buy–sell
Outsourcing
with audits
BPO
Degree of control over process Highest High Med–High Medium Med–Low Lowest
Level of trust required High Med–Low Medium Med–Low Med–High Highest
Strategic importance of task Med–High Low–High Med–High Medium Medium Med–Low
Level of investment in assets
by buying firm
Highest Low Medium Medium Med–Low Lowest
Risk if unclear specifications Lowest Low Med–Low Medium Med–High Highest
Risk if unable to measure
performance
Lowest Low Med–Low Medium Med–High Highest
Risk if market is volatile Med–low Low Med–Low Medium Medium Highest
(Amaral et al., 2004, 2006; Narayanan and Raman,
2000). First, there is a risk that the organization will pay
too much. As shown above in the case studies, when
organizations do not pay close attention to provider’s
services and invoicing, they pay too much.
Second, by not fully recognizing the risk of loss of
tacit knowledge, the organization may become depen-
dent on a supplier (Fine, 1998; Venkatesan, 1992). It can
be held hostage because it cannot adequately assess
alternative sources of supply, as was the case with
Finance1. The organization has also lost the ability to
perform the task internally. The firm may over pay and
be underserved, or pay for a higher level of service than
is needed. In the most extreme case, because the
supplier now knows some aspects of the business better
than the original firm, the supplier may forward
integrate and become a competitor (Fine, 1998).
An internal risk that may occur is that the firm
becomes dependent on a supplier because the supplier
ingratiates itself with internal customers. When this
occurs, the item becomes a ‘‘protected category’’ and
the supplier is ‘‘protected’’ or ‘‘favored’’ by the
organization’s consumers of service. In such cases,
the supply management function may find itself outside
of the purchasing loop once again, not involved in key
decisions, because internal customers believe the item
or supplier relationship is too important. Finance1, PC
Hardware and Software all experienced this when SM
tried to become involved in professional services
purchasing initially. This is another way that the
organization may find itself overly dependent on its
service suppliers.
Another internally based risk is the risk of
inadvertently letting the supplier do more and more,
due to the organization’s lack of clarity regarding what
it wants and the outsourcing boundaries. Over time, the
supplier may step into strategic areas, and this self-
induced risk jumps dramatically. This is particularly
deleterious because of the gradual nature of increased
responsibility, such change often occurs without a
commensurate increase in controls. As explained above,
Finance1 had this type of experience with one of its
offshore, outsourced IT providers.
From a business perspective, there are also the
traditional types of risk that organizations face,
associated with changes in business cycles. If the
organization has not put controls in place to deal with
shortages, price increases, and other sources of supply
interruption, the cost of these occurrences will be very
high. Regardless, the costs of such contingency plans
should be considered as part of the total cost of
outsourcing and offshore outsourcing.
Yet another risk is the supplier making changes to
processes, technologies, and procedures without prop-
erly informing the buying firm. This creates problems
with tracking, monitoring and may actually have an
adverse affect on the results. Effective change controls
and processes to make changes have to be in place.
When making an outsourcing decision, the future is
not known with certainty. But by committing to a
specific path, for example outsourcing programming,
the firm has limited its future possibilities for
developing the code internally. Perhaps organizations
should be more concerned with SATISFICING versus
OPTIMIZING when making outsourcing decisions, or
any decision under uncertainty (Rosenhead et al., 1972).
The focus would then be on which decisions, if made
today, will leave open the greatest number of future
possibilities, while still reducing total costs, or
improving achievement of other outcomes. This is
particularly relevant if the organization has a number of
non-cost oriented goals. In an uncertain world, there are
advantages to keeping one’s options open.
6. Conclusions
This research has both managerial and theoretical
implications. From a managerial standpoint, the
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163 159
organizations studied had varying degrees of experience
in offshore outsourcing professional services. Some had
been doing this extensively for over 20 years, while
others had just begun to engage in such outsourcing
over the last several years. They all had lessons learned
along the way to improve their processes and decision
making and many of these lessons are mentioned above
and summarized below. The bottom line is that
organizations should carefully consider, understand,
and reduce the risk of offshore outsourcing of services,
and that offshore outsourcing of services creates a
different set of risks and a need for very different
business controls than offshore outsourcing direct
materials. From a theoretical standpoint, transaction
cost theory provides insights into the professional
services best suited for offshore outsourcing, the risks
associated with offshore outsourcing professional
services, and how to effectively mitigate the risk.
6.1. Managerial implications
First, clear specifications and performance measures
should be established before outsourcing, to reduce the
risks of non-performance and dependency. The repeated
message was ‘‘don’t offshore outsource something if
you don’t know what that service should cost.’’ To
determine this, clear specifications and statements of
work are required. Among the firms studied, most of the
initial dissatisfaction with offshore outsourcing services
had to do with the lack of clear requirements and
measurements. As these improved, so did the satisfac-
tion.
Related to this, when outsourcing risks are ade-
quately addressed, the cost and complexity of managing
outsourcing is high, and should not be underestimated.
Most of the companies studied admitted that they did
underestimate the cost and effort initially, but have
improved with experience. One of the costs that an
organization should recognize is that it must be able to
measure supplier performance versus expectations. The
cost of managing the complexity and buffering the risks
should be included in the outsourcing decision making
process. This is a transaction cost that firms tend to
ignore, because it is not visible until after the offshore
outsourced relationship has been established.
Without a good management/monitoring system, the
risk of losing control is high. While the costs of controls
are high, the perceived and realized savings were even
higher, so that several of the organizations studied were
not concerned about effectively managing the costs of
controlling their offshore outsourced suppliers. As a
result, in some cases, these companies put excessive
controls in place. For Finance1, Finance2 and to a lesser
extent Software, this included having dedicated
employees in completely separate facilities for employ-
ees who supported them, and purchasing separate
computer and telephone systems. These policies were
more stringent for offshore outsourcing than with
onshore or nearshore outsourcing. Higher costs trans-
late into lower savings. While cost savings is initially a
driver for offshore outsourcing in many cases,
performance is also important and will take on greater
weight over time as wages and risks normalize globally.
It is likely that organizations will revisit their excessive
control measures. Thus, while they appeared to have
good controls in terms of security and segregating their
operations, these firms did not necessarily have good
controls when it came to some of the value leakages
mentioned above. Interestingly, the companies studied
here expressed confidence that as costs rise in one area
of the world, other lower-cost producers will develop
elsewhere.
Two general patterns were observed in offshore
outsourcing. For example, Finance2, Consumer and
Packaging began slowly, and then accelerated with each
success. Companies with greater longevity in offshore
outsourcing followed a pattern of going a bit too far in
outsourcing, and pulling back some activities internally.
Finance1, Computer, Transport, Software and PC
Hardware all demonstrated this behavior. Most of the
organizations studied did not have advance plans to
mitigate risks when they discovered that they had
offshore outsourced some tasks in error, and needed to
pull tasks back in -house. Some, such as Finance1 and
Transport experienced costly and painful transitions
when moving from complete business process out-
sourcing to a more controlled, out-tasking environment.
However, the general lessons learned within a company
were applied to other outsourcing situations so that
mistakes did not have to be repeated.
6.2. Theoretical implications
From a theoretical standpoint, the transaction cost
lens does a reasonably good job of explaining when and
how firms offshore outsource services. This paper
makes a contribution to TCE theory by referring back to
Coase’s (1937) original work and restating the TCE
premise that high transaction volumes are associated
with insourcing. With the changing cost structures in
today’s economies, where non-physical, service-
oriented exchanges may have low transaction costs
due to information technology, the assumption that a
high level of transactions equates to a high level of costs
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163160
is not valid. The spirit of transaction cost theory is to
consider the factors that make something more
expensive to outsource or perform internally. Unlike
offshore outsourcing of materials, offshore outsourcing
of services does not have high variable transaction costs
such as transportation, handling and inventory charges.
Because the administrative and set-up costs for offshore
outsourcing of services, such as supplier selection,
training, monitoring systems, and other information
linkages have a high upfront fixed cost, low transaction
volumes are unattractive. Due to the fixed nature of
these costs, the per unit cost allocation actually goes
down and the number of transactions increases. Our
data confirm that this pattern holds true for offshore
services outsourcing.
The case findings also support Williamson’s (1985)
proposition that organizations avoid offshore outsour-
cing services in volatile environments. However, this
research found only partial support for the TCE premise
that organizations are less likely to offshore outsource
services with high asset specificity. While the firms
studied did not offshore outsource services with high
physical asset specificity, they did outsource services
where high levels of human asset specificity were
developed. Perhaps knowledge specificity was dis-
counted because the human knowledge and expertise
were being developed as workers gained knowledge of
the outsourced work. Firms did not seem to view this
learning as critical. The nature of the offshore
outsourced work involved proprietary data, but not
intellectual property. Williamson (1981) warns that
knowledge gained in a learning-by-doing mode ought to
fall under a governance structure that will protect the
beneficiary of that knowledge should the relationship
somehow become severed. It appears that more research
is needed to fully understand the factors at play here.
TCE also supports that firms are less likely to
offshore outsource items when they are unsure of the
requirements or when they cannot determine whether
the supplier actually performed as agreed to in the
contract. There was partial support for both of these
premises. While firms do offshore outsource profes-
sional services in both of those cases, they acknowledge
the risk and try to reduce it. In some cases, due to
bounded rationality, the buying organizations are not
aware of the potential risk until a problem arises, such as
they are overcharged, or they are treated opportunis-
tically by a supplier. In such cases, the firms tend to
react quickly to try to mitigate current and future risk.
However, by looking at potential offshore, outsourced
professional services through the lens of TCE, these
firms might be able to avoid risk altogether, by better
anticipating risk and using the proper governance
structure for the situation, as illustrated in Table 3.
6.3. Limitations and future research
This research is limited by the perspective of high-
ranking supply management professional. Even high-
ranking supply management personnel often do not
have the final say in the decision to offshore outsource
professional services. The perspective of supply
managers with direct responsibility for offshored
suppliers may provide a different perspective. It would
also be beneficial to gain the perspectives of general
managers or other key decision makers involved in
outsourcing services. However, the focus of this
research is on the ongoing management, success, and
failure of offshore outsourced relationships. In that
regard, supply management is often the most qualified
party to comment, because they generally have a high
degree of involvement and management responsibility
for offshore outsourced professional services relation-
ships.
An additional limitation of this study is that it
focused only on offshore outsourcing, without simulta-
neously comparing it to in-house offshoring or domestic
outsourcing. While the participants indicated that the
savings are greater and the risks higher with outsourced
offshoring, it would be interesting to compare the
specific adaptive behaviors used in domestic versus
offshore outsourcing, and offshoring versus outsourced
offshoring.
The adaptive risk behaviors demonstrated by the
firms studied indicates that there is much learning and
change that occurs in the process of outsourcing
services. There is substantial opportunity for future
research into these adaptive behavior patterns as well as
the implications of adaptive behavior for the applic-
ability of TCE to services outsourcing. Using a
knowledge-based theoretical lens to view services
may also be relevant here. The knowledge-based view
has been considered as a lens for the creation of services
(Grant, 1996; Linderman et al., 2004; Nonaka, 1994;
Ordonez de Pablos, 2004; Oliveira et al., 2003), as well
as for determining the segregation of tasks between the
buying and supplying firms (Takeishi, 2001, 2002). This
view may also apply to services offshore outsourcing in
a variety of ways. For example, the knowledge and
skills associated with the complex activity of determin-
ing which services to offshore outsource, where, to
whom and how to structure the relationship may be an
important source of competitive advantage that should
be properly managed within the firm. This may be one
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163 161
of those learn-by-doing skills identified by Williamson
and Ouchi (1981) that the firm should protect, just like
any type of intellectual property.
Similarly, the skills associated with managing
offshore outsourced services may be an important
learned asset. The case studies indicate that there is
much learning in this arena. The learning also seems to
apply in terms of the manner in which organizations
learn to manage and reduce the risks of offshore
services outsourcing. One of the issues here is how
much of this learning is tacit versus explicit knowledge.
As Grant (1996) found, it is not the loss or gain of
explicit knowledge that creates difficult competitive
issues for the firm, it is the loss of tacit knowledge.
Likewise, Takeishi (2002) notes that the effective
management of knowledge by the manufacturing firm in
its relationships with its suppliers may be a source of
competitive advantage.
Taking this one step farther, the organizations that
offshore outsource these professional services must ask
themselves: are we outsourcing tacit knowledge, which
is difficult to recreate and transfer, or are we outsourcing
explicit knowledge, or capacity? Initially, all the
organizations studied believed they were doing the
latter. As the relationship progressed, it became clear
that some were really outsourcing the former, paying
their suppliers to become more powerful and compe-
titive, often at their own expense.
Clearly, there are many interesting and exciting areas
of research opportunity in the offshore outsourcing of
professional services. This research contains a broad
perspective of offshore outsourcing. Future research is
needed that takes a more in-depth look at this
phenomenon. This globalization of professional ser-
vices is as a developing phenomenon not a passing
trend. Organizations need to be successful with their
offshoring efforts, both reducing costs and safeguarding
the company from risk. Organizational leaders have
both the possibility and the desire to learn and gain
experience in offshore outsourcing. Researchers have
the opportunity to be at the forefront of this developing
phenomenon and allowing their insights and experience
to help make the transition to a global services economy
a successful one.
Appendix A. Questionnaire
1. Do you outsource any professional services? If yes,
please describe. If not, go to Q13.
2. I
n what geographical region is the outsourced
service located/conducted?
3. W
hy was that location(s) chosen?
4. A
re you familiar with why the decision was made to
outsource each of these services? Could you please
explain?
5. F
or each of the outsourced services that we are
focusing on, please answer:
a. Do you have a relatively high volume of
transactions with this supplier? At what level
of transactions would you expect that it would no
longer be worth it to the supplier, or to you, to
outsource?
b. Are there unique assets or investments required
by the supplier to support your service? Please
consider both physical resources and training.
Are these significant versus the total cost of the
service?
c. Is the supplier developing intellectual property in
any way? If so, how do you manage the
ownership of that IP?
d. Is there a great deal of uncertainty in the market
place associated with the item that you are
purchasing, for example, is technology changing
rapidly, do the levels of supply and demand shift
rapidly with limited predictability, or are there
other types of market risks?
e. From a compliance perspective, how easy is it to
verify that the supply is doing what it says it is
doing in line with its contractual obligation to
you: can you measure performance inputs and
outcomes?
6. C
ould you please describe the extent of the
outsourcing:
a. Is this a turnkey operation?
b. How much internal control and management do
you retain?
c. Do you retain any of these capabilities in house?
Which capabilities, and why?
d. What are the benefits you seek by retaining some
capabilities in house?
7. H
ave you been satisfied with the results of your
outsourcing? Please explain the aspects that you
have been satisfied with and dissatisfied with.
8. I
f you have retained some operations internally,
how satisfied are you with the performance of the
internal versus the external function?
9. I
n addition to outsourcing, have you offshored any
professional services (where offshoring is defined
as moving an operation from your home country to
another country).
10. F
or these services, do you also retain some
capabilities domestically? Please explain.
11. D
o you know why the decision to offshore was
made versus:
L.M. Ellram et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 148–163162
a. Retaining all domestically.
b. Outsourcing overseas.
12. F
or each of the offshored services that we are
focusing on, please answer: (see Q5 a–e above).End
For organizations that do not outsource:
13. I
f you don’t outsource any professional services,
could you please explain to the best of your
knowledge, why not?
a. Is that decision revisited frequently?
b. Do you expect this to change? Why or why not?
14. A
s opposed to outsourcing, have you offshored any
professional services (where offshoring is defined
as moving an operation from your home country to
another country)? If no, go to Q18.
15. F
or these services, do you also retain some
capabilities domestically? Please explain.
16. D
o you know why the decision to offshore was
made versus:
a. Retaining all domestically.
b. Outsourcing overseas.
17. F
or each of the offshored services that we are
focusing on, please answer: (see Q5 a–e above).
For organizations that do not outsource OR
offshore:
18. I
f don’t offshore any professional services, could
you please explain to the best of your knowledge,
why not?
a. Is that decision revisited frequently?
b. Do you expect this to change? Why or why not?
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- Offshore outsourcing of professional services: �A transaction cost economics perspective
- Background/introduction
- Review of recent literature
- Theoretical grounding
- Elements of TCE
- Research method
- The case data
- Motivation for offshore outsourcing
- Transaction frequency and asset specificity
- The risks associated with outsourcing
- Market volatility risk
- Risk of incomplete specifications
- Risk of inability to measure performance
- Other risks in offshore outsourcing
- Summary: matching the characteristics of outsourcing to the outsourcing type
- What happens if the company cannot or does not properly control the risk?
- Conclusions
- Managerial implications
- Theoretical implications
- Limitations and future research
- Questionnaire
- References
o12 ( reconceptualizing...).pdf
Reconceptualizing the Firm in a World of Outsourcing and Offshoring: The Organizational and Geographical Relocation of High-Value Company Functionsjoms_945 1417..1433
Farok J. Contractor, Vikas Kumar, Sumit K. Kundu and Torben Pedersen Rutgers Business School, Rutgers University; Discipline of International Business, University of Sydney;
Florida International University; Center for Strategic Management and Globalization, Copenhagen Business
School
abstract In the largest sense, global strategy amounts to (1) the optimal disaggregation or slicing of the firm’s value chain into as many constituent pieces as organizationally and economically feasible, followed by (2) decisions as how each slice should be allocated geographically (‘offshoring’) and organizationally (‘outsourcing’). Offshoring and outsourcing are treated as strategies that need to be simultaneously analysed, where just ‘core’ segments of the value chain are retained in-house, while others are optimally dispersed geographically, as well as dispersed over allies and contractors. This amounts to a reconsideration of the nature of the firm that captures the dynamic changes in global configuration and a reconsideration of what constitutes ‘core’ activities that need to be retained internally. The article proposes a new research agenda that searches for each firm’s optimal degree of disaggregation and global dispersion given that further scattering of value chain activities entail benefits as well as increased complexity and costs.
INTRODUCTION
The relentless forces of competition and globalization are forcing firms to disaggregate themselves and reach for foreign inputs, markets, and partners. By disaggregating their value chain into discrete pieces – some to be performed in-house, others to be out- sourced to external vendors – a company hopes to reduce overall costs and risks, while possibly also reaping the benefits of ideas from their contractors or alliance partners worldwide. Outsourcing can, of course, be both (1) in the home nation of the firm, as well as (2) abroad, and entails an organizational restructuring of some activities. Out- sourcing is a conscious abdication of selected value chain activities to external provid- ers. Offshoring, on the other hand, is restructuring the firm along another dimension,
Address for reprints: Torben Pedersen, Center for Strategic Management and Globalization, Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 24B, DK-2000, Copenhagen F. Denmark ([email protected]).
© 2010 The Authors Journal of Management Studies © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
Journal of Management Studies 47:8 December 2010 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00945.x
namely geography. It entails the relocation of operations from the home nation to a foreign location where the same company activities are performed under either (1) the multinational company’s (MNC’s) own subsidiary or (2) allocated to a foreign contract vendor. At stake are not only low-end manufacturing and service activities, but increasingly, high-value company functions like R&D, design, and engineering that are being increasingly relocated to foreign locations (Manning et al., 2008; Pyndt and Pedersen, 2006).
The boundaries of many firms have therefore simultaneously shrunk organizationally and expanded geographically, while also becoming more permeable. We treat outsourc- ing and offshoring as two outcomes of the same strategic drivers that force companies to reconsider the configuration of their activities. A cursory examination of outsourcing and offshoring would suggest cost reduction as a main driver. However, especially in recent years, two other strategy motivators have gained significance. First, the knowledge- accessing motive: with growing complexity of products and services, even the largest companies no longer have all the diverse components of knowledge within their own organization, or personnel, to be competitive in research, production, and marketing. Hence the need for external knowledge inputs and expertise. Organizationally and geographically distant knowledge can often be more valuable than internal or related- party knowledge (Bierly et al., 2009). Second, relocation of operations abroad helps the MNC to better understand and exploit foreign markets. Local value-added builds legiti- macy with local customers and governments. Thus outsourcing and offshoring simulta- neously help the firm in three strategic needs: (1) ‘efficiency’ or cost reduction; (2) ‘exploration’ or access to knowledge and talented people; and (3) ‘exploitation’ or development of foreign markets (Dunning, 1993).
Despite the increasing interest in offshoring and outsourcing only in the recent past, neither of them is a very new phenomenon. Apparently, offshoring would appear to have much in common with the geographical relocation under foreign direct investment (FDI), and expansion of foreign subsidiaries. Outsourcing follows external purchasing decisions, joint ventures, and strategic alliances that focus on organizational relocation. But traditional theory lenses – such as transaction costs, or resource based theory, or Dunning’s (1993) OLI (ownership, location, and internalization) paradigm for FDI – are inadequate to fully explain, or capture the nuances of recent strategic thinking with regards to offshoring and outsourcing decisions (as also emphasized by Doh, 2005 among others). What is needed is a reconsideration of the nature of the firm that captures the more dynamic configurational aspects of the firm. This article hopes to further advance the reconceptualization of the firm based on these recent trends and in so doing stimulate much needed theoretical development.
Offshoring when undertaken in foreign subsidiaries (as opposed to foreign arm’s length vendors) is a subset of FDI. But the study of offshoring goes beyond traditional FDI theory, or exploiting country-specific advantages. Offshoring, in a fuller sense, is the building of a global network whose strategic objectives go well beyond serving a local market, to a focus on global network efficiency and coherence. The same dis- tinction can be made between outsourcing and traditional views of organizational reconfiguration such as external purchasing. Outsourcing strategy goes beyond the ‘make versus buy’ decision, to encompass technology accessing, risk sharing, joint
F. J. Contractor et al.1418
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development, comparative economies of scale in the focal firm and in vendor organi- zations, and the help that a local vendor may sometimes provide in marketing related activities.
Outsourcing and offshoring have grown, not only in terms of the number of compa- nies involved, not just in the number of foreign nations involved, and not just in terms of macro-economic statistics. An OECD study (Miroudot et al., 2009) finds that ‘Trade in intermediate inputs among developed countries represents, respectively, 56% and 73% of overall trade flows in goods and services’. While their methodology overstates the role of intermediate services and goods in world trade, the statistics leave little doubt that disaggregation of company value chains, and their dispersal internationally, is progress- ing rapidly.
At the firm level, there are two salient changes in strategy – first, the division of the firm’s value chain into ever smaller pieces, and second, the willingness to outsource and offshore even activities close to the ‘core’ competencies of the firm. Companies are engaged in a micro-analysis and dissection of their value chains into finer slices than ever before. The value chain is no longer divided into large groupings such as R&D, Pro- duction, or Marketing. The functions and operations within each category can be sliced into dozens or hundreds of sub-activities. For each sub-activity or operation the question then asked is where to perform it and whether to perform it within the firm, or outsource it. Even within R&D (still considered by many companies as a ‘core’ activity not to be outsourced) one can disaggregate various functions, keeping sensitive aspects in-house, while outsourcing others.
For instance, software companies can offshore or outsource the actual programming of new software programs that might be essential for their competitive advantage, while keeping the architectural and design knowledge close to their headquarters. Similarly in pharmaceuticals, the preparation of test batches can be outsourced, while the science or genetics behind the experiments are closely guarded. In some testing, hundreds or thousands of different ingredient combinations may need to be tested. The same compound can be prepared with different mixes, or proportions of ingre- dients, with different granular sizes and properties, which can radically change the rate of absorption of the drug into the body. The molecular properties and how the ingre- dients interact, is kept as a proprietary secret. But the actual preparation and mixing of the ingredients into different test batches is a function that can be outsourced, to reduce R&D costs. The recent willingness to dissect or fine-slice all pieces of the value chain increases – for the firm as a whole – the proportion of value added externally and the percentage of operations abroad, while decreasing the (global) total costs. It also gives new meanings to the demarcation between a ‘core’ and a ‘non-core’ activity of a firm.
ALLOCATIONAL CHOICES WITHIN THE FIRM
From an integrated strategic perspective, outsourcing and offshoring are separate dimen- sions or aspects of the same goals of firm reconfiguration. The firm analyses the division and reconfiguration of its activities over:
Relocation of High-Value Functions 1419
© 2010 The Authors Journal of Management Studies © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and
Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
• Function: Deciding how far to slice its value chain activities into dozens or hun- dreds of discrete pieces. For each slice of the value chain, the subsequent decision is about its – organization mode (outsourcing): in-house, vs. contract provider, vs.
alliance; – geography (offshoring): foreign location decisions driven by comparative
advantage, local market size, cultural distance and institutional environment. • Time: The coordination and integration of the firm’s activities into a chronologi-
cally coherent global system (and assessing the cost thereof ).
For each sub-activity, or slice of the firm’s value chain, Figure 1 presents six allocation choices and some of the strategies that follow from changes in the configuration of the value chain activities. The dimension on organizational restructuring (the vertical axis in Figure 1) is the focus of the article by Mudambi and Tallman (2010). They provide a similar scale of market, alliances, and hierarchy for this dimension and discuss thor- oughly how characteristics of the activity, and the level of integration with other activi- ties, might affect the allocation choice. Yuan et al. (2010) also investigate the dimension of organizational restructuring. However, they do so from the perspective of the vendor (in China). The other dimension (the horizontal axis in Figure 1), geographical reloca- tion, is the key focus in the article by Demirbag and Glaister (2010) as they investigate the factors determining offshore location of R&D projects.
Along the vertical (organizational) dimension, the progression from cell 1 to cell 5 entails a progressive externalization of that activity within the home nation of the firm (with cell
Domestic country Foreign country
In-house (conducting activity
inside the firm)
1 2
Cooperative (conducting
activity cooperatively with
partner)
3 4
Market transaction
(conducted by arms-length
provider)
5 6
Figure 1. Six allocation choices for each value chain activity Note: The figure lists a subset of the strategy changes involved in reconfiguring the global firm. Source: Some concepts in this figure are adopted from Miroudot et al. (2009).
F. J. Contractor et al.1420
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3 as an intermediate step often called ‘relational contracting’ (Kale et al., 2000) or an ‘alliance’ (Contractor and Lorange, 2002)). A similar set of organizational choices exist abroad, in going from cell 2, for a fully-owned subsidiary to cell 6 with foreign arm’s length vendors. Along the horizontal or geographical dimension, the choice is between perform- ing the particular function (or value chain activity) in the home nation, or abroad.
A priori, one cannot say which of the six cells is necessarily better, or cheaper, or more fruitful. That depends on the function or activity in question, its transactions costs (Murray and Kotabe, 1999), its value contribution, rarity and imitability (Barney and Hesterly, 2006), risk associated with knowledge leakage (Sampson, 2004), and its con- tribution to overall global coordination overheads borne by the company. For example, in some cases domestic outsourcing, despite being in high-wage nations, can be better than outsourcing the activity to an emerging country (and sometimes no more expensive) when flexibility and speed to market are more important than saving every penny. Wage rates alone have little explanatory significance in comparing countries as attractive loca- tions, as demonstrated in studies such as Contractor and Mudambi (2008) and Demirbag and Glaister (2010). One cannot generalize as to which of the six cells in Figure 1 are best for each operation. For example, in clinical trials in the pharmaceutical industry, Thakur (2010) shows that trials conducted in foreign subsidiaries are more expensive than those performed by foreign contract organizations. The choice between the six alternatives in Figure 1 and the determinants of the different choices is further discussed in the articles in this issue. Organizational restructuring is the main focus in the three articles by Grimpe and Kaiser (2010), Mudambi and Tallman (2010), and Yuan et al. (2010), while the two articles by Demirbag and Glaister (2010) and Mudambi and Venzin (2010) have a stronger focus on the dimension of geographical relocation.
The choice between the six cells of Figure 1 is also determined by the institutional and environmental characteristics, human resources, and infrastructure of the nation being considered. In the broadest sense, for each function the company needs to perform, it can choose between its foreign subsidiaries which compete with each other to earn a ‘global mandate’ (Frost et al., 2002) for that particular operation or task as well as external outsource vendors in various nations who also compete to earn the same ‘mandate’ (Luo, 2005; Sturgeon et al., 2008). Indeed, in many cases, the optimal choice is to perform a certain piece of the value chain in the home nation and within the company itself. That decision is more likely when the activity in question involves the ‘core competence’ of the firm – although as we see in a later section, the finer disaggregation, or slicing of the value chain, has forced firms to reevaluate their core activity.
The disaggregation of the value chain enables companies to make finer allocation choices, for each slice of their value chain. But disaggregation and dispersion of the firm – beyond an optimal degree – also entails more complexity and more costs in terms of added management and communication efforts. Alternatively, in economic terms the incremental search, coordination and transactions cost may at some point exceed the benefits of incremental disaggregation and dispersion. The task of global strategy then is to determine the optimal level of disaggregation of the firm’s operations over its entire value chain, to then determine the optimal global allocation of each piece over the six cells in Figure 1, in light of the overall benefits, costs, and risk of such allocations for the firm as a whole.
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The rest of this article surveys trends that have accelerated the outsourcing and offshoring phenomena in the past decade, discusses what the fine-slicing of the value chain entails, core versus non-core classifications, and concludes with implications for the theory of the firm. A brief overview of this special themed section is presented in the final section.
THE STRATEGY DRIVERS OF OFFSHORING AND OUTSOURCING
The recent wave of offshoring and outsourcing has been fuelled by changes in the business and regulatory environment worldwide, as well as by shifts in corporate thinking. With phenomenal improvements in communication infrastructure and significant cost reduc- tion in global telecommunication, offshoring and outsourcing have reached new heights (Blinder, 2006; Levy, 2005). Government policy changes, such as the liberalization of FDI regimes have reduced the barriers to foreign entry (UNCTAD, 2009). The tighter enforcement of intellectual property rights in many nations has reduced the fears of technology misappropriation and, at the margin, increased the propensity to outsource or share knowledge with alliance partners (Contractor and Lorange, 2002).
The intensification of competition in many sectors has forced companies to reach beyond the more familiar strategies to reduce costs (Dossani and Kenney, 2007). Scien- tific infrastructure and equipment needed for research and sophisticated skills and operations have been added in emerging nations (see, e.g. the article by Yuan et al., 2010, that explores the knowledge upgrading of vendor firms). The new wave of offshor- ing and outsourcing includes not only standardized activities driven by cost savings and involving lower-skilled labour, but as highlighted in many studies (e.g. Baden-Fuller et al., 2000; Lewin and Cuoto, 2006) it also includes more sophisticated and advanced activities like research, design, engineering, and product development. The number of scientists and engineers abroad, as well as their sophistication and technology absorptive capacity, has dramatically escalated (Florida, 2005). The article by Demirbag and Glaister (2010) discusses how the pattern of location of R&D units abroad has signifi- cantly changed with the recent wave of offshoring. By locating a critical function in an important foreign market (and especially by designating it as a ‘global competence centre’ or giving it a ‘global mandate’) the firm earns legitimacy and reputation with local customers, opinion makers, and government. For example, several location decisions and ‘mandates’ in the biochemical sector have been driven by the realization that regulators and consumers in China, India, or Brazil will respond more favourably when the global firm is seen to perform a critical operation within their country (Farrell, 2006; Flores and Aguilera, 2007).
Finally, as a socioeconomic trend, advanced nations have seen emerging shortages in engineering and scientific talent in their own country which is forcing some companies to relocate technical operations and R&D abroad (McKinsey Global Institute, 2009). It has been described as ‘the emerging global race for talent’ and as such shown to be an important explanatory factor for offshoring of high-value company activities (Lewin et al., 2009).
At the firm level, the dauntingly higher costs and risk of R&D, and the competitive need to shorten commercialization times have made companies more willing to disag- gregate at least some safer and discrete portions of their R&D and allocate those pieces
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to contract providers at home and abroad. For instance, in pharmaceutical R&D, key company secrets are kept in-house while the clinical trial portion of research (comprising around 40 per cent of overall R&D budgets) is increasingly being offshored and out- sourced (Azoulay, 2004; Cockburn, 2004). This strategy rethinking first requires com- panies to closely examine their research procedures to see how the whole process can be divided and modularized into separable bits. Second, the firm identifies those portions of R&D that can be standardized, routinized, and codified. Third comes the decision, for a particular R&D operation, as to which R&D activity may be safely externalized or offshored and allocated over the six cells in Figure 1.
This disaggregation and routinization, in R&D, production, and marketing, has been aided by the increased codification of corporate knowledge. Procedures that used to be just in the minds of engineers or managers are now put down in written routines, software, or expert systems (Balconi et al., 2007). Once codified, the manuals or software can be read, absorbed, and implemented even outside the firm by contracted outsource providers. Ceteris paribus, codification of knowledge increases the likelihood of outsourcing and offshoring. However, it might also increase the likelihood of technology leakage, but if only a discrete bit of the entire process or routine is shared with a contract provider or alliance partner, then the latter is unable to put the whole system together to become a competitor. Thus judicious outsourcing of safer, selected bits of a larger R&D or pro- duction process may not greatly increase the threat of opportunism. Dossani and Kenney (2007, p. 779) recognize this notable attitudinal change and conclude that ‘offshoring of services have evolved from an exotic and risky strategy to a routine business decision’.
Companies are also recognizing that the growing complexity of products and services today require ever-broadening knowledge inputs, many outside the range of the firm’s internal capability. Hence such inputs can only be accessed by contract, or by alliance (Alcacer and Chung, 2002), or from foreign knowledge clusters (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). In short, the new strategic thinking accepts the notion that even a large firm can no longer always rely on its own internal resources, even for critical or core functions. Large firms are now content to be part of global networks of expertise.
Offshoring and outsourcing activities have shifted from being seen as an operational tool with a focus on cost savings to becoming activities with strategic importance, closer to the heart of the firm. Therefore, the current wave has significant implications for how companies organize their global network of activities. Many firms must rethink their organizational structures and processes as a consequence, not just abroad but also at home, in order to reap the full benefits of an optimized global value-added network (Ernst and Kim, 2002).
FINE-SLICING THE FIRM: SEEKING THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF DISAGGREGATION AND DISPERSION
With increasing offshoring and outsourcing comes the necessity of splitting up the value chain in finer and finer modules (set of activities) that are internally coherent, and with standardized interfaces to other modules that limit the need for extensive communication and coordination – i.e. the incremental costs associated with the disaggregation and dispersion of the value chain. To give an example, many pharmaceutical companies
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continue to perform R&D in-house in the headquarters country, for fear of technology and data leakage. But many have analysed and sliced their R&D operations into discrete pieces and relocated several of them. Fundamental research may continue to be done at headquarters. But the grinding, mixing, and preparation of test batch compounds may be outsourced to contract providers in the home nation. Different batches are then delivered back to the pharmaceutical company’s central laboratories for Phase I and II screening. For field tests, the firm may use its home office as well as affiliates, but selected portions of field test administration are outsourced. The pharmaceutical company may appoint an outside (home country) IT vendor for worldwide data management of clinical trial data, working with it to prepare data reporting templates for patients, doctors, and hospitals worldwide. Sometimes, these data templates are customized – for each nation depending on local regulations and language – with suggestions from foreign affiliate staff. Once the clinical trials begin, the (home country) IT outsource vendor, in turn, outsources the data reporting and data entry work to yet other contract call centres in each foreign nation, who gather and transmit individual patient or foreign hospital data back to the (home nation) IT vendor. Thus even the R&D portion of the value chain can be divided in many slices over home office, foreign affiliates, home country contract providers, and foreign contractors.
The prerequisite to gaining the benefits of disaggregation, of course, is that companies must first analyse and learn about their own operations and processes in-depth – to assess which of them can be standardized, bundled in new ways, as well as to identify activities where the frequency of occurrence, or scale, of the operation is too small to justify keeping in-house. Next, the firm must specify interfaces and coordination mechanisms among the activities (Ernst and Kim, 2002; Sturgeon et al., 2008). Very often such analysis is carried out under the heading of Lean Production or Six Sigma, where the goal is to reorganize, standardize, and specify interfaces among different activities. A major advantage of the more modularized and fine-sliced structure is that it facilitates dissemination of information to decision-makers that are best placed to use it. It identifies activities which for reasons of trade secrecy or sufficient scale may well be retained in-house, while other activities or functions – that are not so sensitive, or which are done infrequently, or where internal demand does not add up to a large enough scale within the firm – can be outsourced. In fact, one of the drivers of outsourcing lies in the simple fact that outsource vendors, by aggregating similar work over their many contract customers can achieve economies, of large scale and experience, for a particular task, that their individual clients cannot.
The precondition to reconfiguring the firm is a thorough internal analysis that divides all its activities into small, discrete pieces. But how far should a company go in its disaggregation? If one divides the value chain too finely, that may be suboptimal. First, the interfaces between the modularized activities or slices have to be managed. The interface or coordination costs increase with geographical and organizational distance if two sequential (or concurrent) activities are separated in different departments, or in an outsource company, or located abroad. Second, each relocation entails additional search costs – searching for external vendors, and searching in unfamiliar foreign locations (Grossman and Helpman, 2001). The contracting environment, culture, work habits, and institutional environment in each foreign nation need to be learned. The costs of
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data transmission may have reduced substantially, but cultural and institutional distance between nations remains an obstacle and a significant cost (Zaheer and Manrakhan, 2001).
Finally, the greater the number of discrete slices into which the firm’s value chain is divided, the greater the complexity and overall coordination overheads. After all, someone or a large staff has to then manage the entire globally-distributed enterprise, achieve efficient coordination across various sub-units, internal and external actors, both chronologically and in terms of quality and production efficiency. In the broadest sense, such a reconfiguration will also dilute firm-specific resources and competencies, deterio- rate integrative capacities, place high demands on managerial attention, and blur the identity of the company in negative ways (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005).
While disaggregation, reconfiguration, and dispersion of the firm yields benefits, as a function of the level of restructuring this may be at a diminishing rate. Overall costs of managing greater complexity, disaggregation, dispersion, relocation, and coordination may however escalate more quickly after a certain point. In fact, the strategy question is highly complex as it entails the optimization of the degree of disaggregation as well as the degree of geographical and organizational dispersion. (We us the term ‘dispersion’ in both organizational as well as geographical meanings – that is to say, the spreading out of the company over internal and external vendors, as well as the spread of activities over various nations.) However, the two variables – degree of disaggregation and degree of dispersion – are not independent but interrelated. Figure 2 shows the performance effects as a function of degree of disaggregation and dispersion. The hypothesis is that the benefits of fine-slicing and organizational and geographical dispersion come at a cost in terms of increased complexity and coordination. At some point in time the increased manage- ment and coordination costs might exceed the benefits. Stringfellow et al. (2007) have argued along the same line and proposed that offshoring and outsourcing entails invisible or hidden costs that only becomes visible when firms start to manage and operate their more complex global value chain configuration. However, firms might very well be able to find ways to organize their activities in such a way as to reduce the costs of complexity and coordination below the benefits of reconfiguration – for example, by specifying
Figure 2. The optimal degree of disaggregation and dispersion
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up-front a clear division of labour, modularization of activities, and applying modern information technology (e.g. virtual communication). As firms gain experience in man- aging and operating their global network of value chain activities they might be able to apply more sophisticated techniques and management tools, allowing them to keep benefits of expanding their global network higher than the costs. In a dynamic sense, the building of a global network of disaggregated and dispersed value chain activities is also a learning process, which is the focus of the article by Mudambi and Venzin (2010) as they unfold the dynamics of offshoring and outsourcing in the mobile handset and financial services industries. The article by Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) provides further support for the trade-off between incremental benefits and incremental costs, as they emphasize that R&D outsourcing involves ‘pains’ as well as ‘gains’. The ‘pains’ stem from dilution of resources, deterioration of integrative capabilities, and high demands on management attention. Accordingly, they find evidence for an inverted U-shaped rela- tionship between R&D outsourcing and innovation performance.
Thus Figure 2 hypothesizes that for each firm there is an optimal level of disaggregation and dispersion. The value of the global firm is maximized at some intermediate points on both the disaggregation and the dispersal axes, resulting in a three-dimensional map which is bell shaped. As a hypothesis for further research scholars may fruitfully investigate what constitutes an optimal level of disaggregation and dispersion of the firm and what can be done in terms of reducing the increased costs of complexity and coordination.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ‘CORE’ VS. ‘NON-CORE’ CLASSIFICATIONS
If even R&D can be sliced into many constituent pieces, and distributed both organiza- tionally and geographically, what are the implications for ‘core’ versus ‘non-core’ clas- sifications? Conventional theoretical wisdom based on transaction cost theory and the resource based view is that companies should keep their core activities very close to the heart, i.e. at headquarters in the home nation, to protect the core competences. Off- shoring or outsourcing core activities might imply a risk, and loss of control.
Current literature typically divides the spectrum of activities across a ‘non-core’ and ‘core’ distinction (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Levy, 2005). But is the scale really dichoto- mous? And does it imply that when companies are offshoring high-end activities (e.g. product development and R&D) they are really offshoring core activities? In the auto industry (one of the earliest in offshoring) it is not uncommon to offshore activities that were previously conducted close to the headquarters – for example, when an entire sub-system of a car, such as the power-train, is offshored to a subsidiary which is given the global mandate to develop this part of the car. However, the architectural core activities will typically still be conducted close to the heart of the company where the headquarters can exercise full control (Harland et al., 2005). In the pharmaceutical industry, ‘contract research organizations’ (CROs) today offer services like product development, clinical trial management, and preclinical, toxicology, and clinical labo- ratory services for processing trial samples. Some pharmaceutical firms have sliced and narrowed the scope of their core activities to high-technology functions at the very beginning of the innovation process (the architecture of new discoveries), while the operational part of the research process is outsourced to CROs. Pharmaceutical com-
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panies were outsourcing approximately $15 billion to CROs in 2007 (Frost & Sullivan, 2007). These examples show how companies have begun to redefine their core activities, and focus on a more narrow set of high value added activities that constitute the architecture of the system, and manage the interfaces among the elements in the system, while the more operational parts of the value chain are outsourced or offshored.
This is a call for a more fine grained distinction, where the ‘core’ is grouped into the true core activities, i.e. those that are distinctive and crucial for the competitive advantage and often of more architectural nature, and essential activities, i.e. advanced activities that are complementary and important for the competitive advantage. Quinn (1999) makes a similar distinction and defines three types of activities: (1) core activities, those that the firm performs better than any other company (best-in-world capability); (2) essential activities, those that are needed for sustaining its profitable operations; and (3) non-core activities, those that can easily be outsourced.
A finer distinction between core activities and essential activities is in line with the finer slicing of value chain activities (as shown in Figure 3). The implication of fine-slicing and development of more sophisticated techniques and management tools for handling disaggregation and dispersion is that essential activities can be offshored and outsourced to a larger extent. Thus essential activities that used to be classified as high-value activities will to a greater extent be treated in the same way as the true non-core activities. Gottfredson et al. (2005) describe this as keeping the ‘core of the core’ inside the firm, while ‘outsourcing is becoming so sophisticated that even core functions like engineering, R&D, manufacturing, and marketing can – and often should – be moved outside’ (p. 132).
Another strong argument for narrowing the scope of ‘core’ functions performed within the firm is that after shedding essential and non-core activities, the company is better able to allocate more resources, both human and capital, and time and effort towards creating and maintaining their true core activities (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). In addition, a narrower focus builds on the advantages of specialization, and a
Figure 3. A finer distinction between core and non-core activities Source: Adapted from Quinn (1999).
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leaner organization increases the flexibility of the firm to better respond to changes in the external environment.
RETHINKING THE NATURE OF THE FIRM IN A WORLD OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL RECONFIGURATION
Since Coase’s (1937) classic article on the nature of the firm, management scholars have grappled with defining this entity and sought theories to explain its workings. It was easier to define the boundary of a firm in days when the entire organization physically resided under one roof, as in Adam Smith’s baker or butcher shop (Smith, 1776). Even before Smith’s day, internal division of labour, specialization of skills embedded in each worker, and the sequencing of production processes, was commonplace. This was fol- lowed by specialization in different divisions of large companies, with each division (located within the same precinct or nation) concentrating on one portion of the value chain. Today, the fragmentation of production has progressed to an unprecedented level, with the value chain sliced finely into dozens or hundreds of discrete steps in each firm, with each slice being subject to an evaluation as to its best or optimal geographical location (for possible offshoring), and optimal organizational mode (for possible out- sourcing) either in the firm’s own nation or abroad. Figure 1 presents six allocation choices where a particular piece of a firm’s value chain may be placed. Large companies have their own internal operations and employees spread over 40 or more nations, and may boast of thousands of supply chain and strategic ‘partners’ worldwide from whom they receive inputs, co-develop services and products, and with whom the firm also competes in certain arenas (Palmisano, 2006). So fragmented, or dislocated are some firms that it is hard for an outside observer and sometimes hard even for the company’s own management, to tell who is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ and who is local or foreign. With the acceleration of outsourcing and offshoring, the percentage of value added internally (as a fraction of output value) in most companies has shrunk. At the same time, the firm’s boundaries have become more permeable while its geographical scope has increased.
The traditional theoretical lenses of the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1993) or the resource based view (Barney and Hesterly, 2006) mainly treat situations where firms have already created ownership advantages. The firm’s main challenge is to exploit these advantages on a global scale. This is a rather static focus on protection and exploitation of ownership or resource advantages, whereas the new offshoring and outsourcing agenda highlights the need to learn and operate in a dynamic world, where advantages are created in the global network and where boundaries of the firm become more permeable. The focus shifts from static protection to dynamic creation of new advantages in collaboration with external counterparts where competitive advantage is created and developed by sourcing the necessary pieces and knowledge in many parts of the world and not just in the local pond at home. Similarly, transaction cost theory, while useful for analysing each ‘internalization versus externalization’ decision, or analysing each market entry mode choice, does not approach the puzzle of the firm as a global whole. It does not provide much help in answering the larger question posed in Figures 1 and 2, namely determining the optimal configuration of a firm’s activities worldwide. Similarly, the resource based view explains why some firms obtain sustainable competitive advantages
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based on the pool of resources and activities existing within the boundaries of the firm. However, it provides few answers to the question of the optimal disaggregation and dispersion of the resources and activities of the firm.
In this introduction, we present the firm in a larger and different light, as an organi- zation that performs some core activities in-house, while simultaneously offshoring and outsourcing selected segments of its value chain, after an internal (ongoing) analysis of how far the company’s operations may be optimally disaggregated or ‘fine-sliced’. We represent offshoring (geographical dispersal) and outsourcing (organizational dispersal) as two distinct dimensions (or variables) that are neither correlated nor independent.
What then is the 21st century firm’s core competence? Besides its internalized tech- nological strength, we argue that a firm’s core competence or competitive advantage is its ability to analyse, coordinate and optimize along four related dimensions:
• degree of value chain disaggregation • organization form (the mix of internal, alliance-based, and contractual modes) • space or geography (spread of activities over nations) • time (chronological coordination of distributed tasks).
The firm is simultaneously an exploiter, a knowledge seeker, and cost reducer (Nicholls-Nixon and Woo, 2003). It is a codifier of its internal knowledge that previously was tacit (Balconi et al., 2007). It is an arbitrageur (based on market imperfections which create price differences across geographically separated factor markets) and a seeker of comparative advantage (Ghemawat, 2007). It is skilled at contracting (while understand- ing the limitations of contracts and the theory of ‘incomplete contracts’; Hart, 1988). It develops alliance negotiation and management skills, so as to increase the value of its quasi-externalized relationships with partners worldwide (Contractor and Lorange, 2002). The firm is also a global supply chain and innovation network manager (Ernst and Kim, 2002).
All of the above multi-faceted managerial tasks point towards the firm’s main goal, which is to improve its allocation and coordination efficiencies. This might be done by a high level of modularization, development of standardized interfaces, greater clarity in the division of labour within the firm as well as between the firm and its external network partners and contractors worldwide, development of centres of excellence (which are then given a global mandate for specifically defined activities), and a reduction of coordination and communication costs with continued investments in information and communication technology that allow for richer communication at a distance. The competitiveness of the global firm in the 21st century will be determined not just by its technological competencies, but equally by its strategic management competencies, along multiple dimensions, in a world of outsourcing and offshoring.
OVERVIEW OF THE SPECIAL THEMED SECTION
This special themed section was developed with the objective of shedding light on the growing phenomenon of outsourcing and offshoring of high-value added company functions. The articles in this special themed section, individually and collectively, further
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our understanding of this relatively recent phenomenon, by adopting a variety of theo- retical and methodological approaches. We would like to thank all the authors who have responded to the ‘call for submissions’ for this special themed section. The response was quite overwhelming, illustrating that many scholars and researchers are already studying this phenomenon. A total of 65 manuscripts were submitted to this special themed section and many of these manuscripts were of very high quality, so 26 manuscripts were invited for further revision. We would also like to thank all the (more than 75) reviewers and the JMS editors for their careful and thorough evaluation of all the submissions that guided us in the selection of papers and for providing invaluable feedback.
The first article, by Mudambi and Tallman (2010), proposes a new theoretical con- ceptualization of the ‘make-or-buy’ decision in the context of knowledge process out- sourcing. They argue, rightfully, that outsourcing of high value added company functions can more appropriately be examined through a ‘make-or-ally’ decision, where ‘ally’ covers a range of cooperative alliances. Key to their argument, based in the resource-based and transaction cost theories, is the fact that knowledge is often the basis of sustainable competitive advantage for firms and that its transfer is complex. Given such inherent characteristics of knowledge-intensive activities, the new integrative frame- work of outsourcing proposed in this article substantially helps in enhancing our under- standing of this phenomenon.
The second article, by Yuan et al. (2010), examines the effects of entrepreneurial orientation and market orientation on emerging country based local vendors’ knowledge acquisition from foreign outsourcers. Their finding, based on an analysis of primary data collected from 140 Chinese firms spread across the country, is indicative of some interesting relationships between entrepreneurial orientation, market orientation, and knowledge acquisition with unique insights about emerging country firm strategic endeavours. Most interestingly, they suggest that the two orientations work best in tandem with regard to acquiring knowledge from partners in cross-border outsourcing activities. Their theoretical framework and empirical evidence advances our understand- ing of the benefits of offshore outsourcing from the perspective of the vendor, a perspec- tive hitherto underrepresented in the outsourcing and offshoring literature.
The third article, by Grimpe and Kaiser (2010), analyses primary data containing 3966 different German firms over the 2001–09 time period pertaining to their innova- tion activities (internal and external R&D) and market success of their products. Their panel dataset provides evidence of the existence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between R&D outsourcing (innovation activity through external agents) and perfor- mance – a partial validation of the hypothesis in Figure 2. More interestingly, the effectiveness of such outsourcing is dependent on the amount of internal R&D and R&D collaborations the firm engages in. This article highlights the importance of understanding the limits to gains from outsourcing by focusing on the negative effects of ‘over-outsourcing’.
The fourth article, by Mudambi and Venzin (2010), through case illustrations from the mobile handset and financial services industries, explores linkages between offshoring and outsourcing strategies. Relying on transaction cost theory, they contend that firms disaggregate their value chain across geographies maintaining control over their most valuable processes in an attempt to maximize overall competitive advantage. Specifi-
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cally, they address the magnitude, sequence, and the dynamics of offshoring and out- sourcing, and their inter-linkages for achieving optimal decisions.
The final article in this special themed section, by Demirbag and Glaister (2010), examines the determinants of offshore location choice between country clusters. Their analysis of 1722 offshore R&D projects undertaken from 2002 to 2005 by multinational enterprises, based in developed and emerging countries, demonstrates the impact of host and home country related factors on the choice of offshore location. As per their findings the EU15 region is the least attractive for offshore R&D projects, while India and China emerge as the most attractive. Their findings have significant implications for location choices of multinational enterprise, the non-regional nature of R&D expansion, as well as the capability building internationalization strategy of emerging country firms.
Together, the articles in this special themed section highlight the unique challenges and opportunities for future research on the outsourcing and offshoring of high value company functions. Existing theories and concepts have explained outsourcing and offshoring of typically low value company functions; but these may be insufficient for explaining the unique motives, processes, and consequences associated with high value activities. Similarly, new theoretical perspectives are needed to better explain the orga- nizational and spatial dispersion of the global firm A more thorough understanding of the phenomenon, touched upon in this special issue, will help to refine and develop new theories, as well as provide better guidance to practising international executives engaged in outsourcing and offshoring.
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Relocation of High-Value Functions 1433
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Journal of Management Information Systems
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Just Right Outsourcing: Understanding and Managing Risk
RAVI ARON , ERIC K. CLEMONS & SASHI REDDI
To cite this article: RAVI ARON , ERIC K. CLEMONS & SASHI REDDI (2005) Just Right Outsourcing: Understanding and Managing Risk, Journal of Management Information Systems, 22:2, 37-55, DOI: 10.1080/07421222.2005.11045852
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Just Right Outsourcing: Understanding and Managing Risk
RAVI ARON, ERIC K. CLEMONS, AND SASHI REDDI
RAVI ARON is an Assistant Professor of Operations and Information Management (OPIM) at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. in Information Systems from the Stern School of Business (NYU) in 1999 and an MBA (PGDIM) in Finance from the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore in 1990. He is currently a member of the Information Systems, Strategy and Economics Group (ISSE) at The Wharton School. His current research spans strategic outsourcing and the global sourcing of services, the pricing of information-rich services, the gover- nance of BPO contracts, and the impact of B2B markets on industry verticals. He has taught undergraduate, MBA, and Ph.D. courses on IS strategy and IS economics. His research and teaching have earned him several awards, including the Herman E. Kross Best Dissertation Award in 1999 at the New York University, and the David Hauck award for Teaching Excellence at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
ERIC K. CLEMONS is a Professor of Operations and Information Management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He has an S.B. in Physics from MIT and an M.S. and Ph.D. in Operations Research from Cornell University. He has been a pioneer in the systematic study of the transformational effects of information on the strategy and practice of business. His research and teaching interests include strategic uses of information systems, information economics, and the effect of infor- mation technology on the risks and benefits of outsourcing and strategic alliances. Industries of focus include international securities markets and financial services firms, consumer packaged goods retailing, and travel. Dr. Clemons is the founder and Project Director for the Reginald H. Jones Center’s Sponsored Research Project on Informa- tion: Strategy and Economics, founder and area coordinator of the School’s new ma- jor in Information: Strategy, and Economics, director of the School’s new eCommerce major and member of the Wharton eBusiness Initiative Curriculum Oversight Com- mittee, an active participant in the School’s eCommerce Forum research program, and member of the Faculty Council of the SEI Center for Advanced Studies in Man- agement. Dr. Clemons has 28 years experience on the faculties of Wharton, Cornell, and Harvard, and consulting experience in the private and public sectors both domes- tically and abroad.
SASHI REDDI founded AppLabs in 1998 to provide high-end IT services to customers by leveraging the Internet to tap into India’s large talent pool of software engineers. Reddi has a Ph.D. from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in tech- nology and strategy. He also has an M.S. from New York University and a B.Tech. from IIT Delhi in Computer Science. Prior to AppLabs, Reddi was a Senior Vice Presi- dent at DocuCorp International, a leading provider of software to the insurance indus- try, with revenues of $70 million. Reddi was previously Founder and CEO of EZPower Systems, a developer of products for building and maintaining large Web applications. EZPower was sold three and a half years later to DocuCorp International, a Safeguard
38 ARON, CLEMONS, AND REDDI
Scientifics Inc. company. Prior to EZPower, Reddi consulted for Fortune 2000 compa- nies on technology and strategy in the travel, financial services, automobile, and con- sumer packaged goods industries.
ABSTRACT: The risks associated with outsourcing have been the principal limitation on the growth of business process outsourcing, especially cross-border outsourcing. In addition to technological improvements in risk management, it is possible to re- duce the risk of opportunistic behavior faced by the buyer by redesigning work flows and dividing work among multiple vendors, increasing the range of tasks that are now appropriate candidates for outsourcing. We provide a taxonomy of risks associated with the outsourcing of business processes. We focus on strategic risks and identify the components of this risk and the means by which it can be mitigated.
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES: holdup problem, interorganizational work flows, outsourc- ing, process design, strategic risks, transaction-cost economics.
THIS PAPER IS ABOUT JUST RIGHT OUTSOURCING—that is, about knowing what activi- ties to outsource and how to structure these activities so they can be outsourced most effectively. Proper outsourcing is not outsourcing as much as possible, or doing so at the lowest possible first-year price; proper outsourcing is about achieving the very best long-term risk-adjusted rate of return. In that sense, of course, proper outsourcing is like proper investment management or proper strategic planning. Unfortunately, outsourcing of complex business processes is so new that the risks are seldom under- stood either by clients or by their outsourcing consultants, many of whom judge their performance solely by how much of a first-year discount they are able to force the vendor to accept. In this paper, we will explain the risk profile created by any outsourcing relationship and will then describe actions that the client can to take to improve this risk profile.
Previous research has identified—correctly—that it is important to get the scope of outsourcing correct, and has advocated a balanced approach, outsourcing neither too much nor too little [8]. Although the idea that getting outsourcing just right is impor- tant, until now little guidance was available for formally making the decision for just right outsourcing. The technique we will use to improve the risk profile associated with outsourcing any process is strategic chunkification—dividing any process into separate component activities, or chunks, that can be outsourced, and in a manner that reduces the risk relative to that of outsourcing the entire original process. To accomplish this, and to guide the exposition of the chunkification technique, we find it helpful to start with a review of why offshore business process outsourcing has suddenly grown so quickly, which reinforces the importance of risk in driving outsourcing decisions.
JUST RIGHT OUTSOURCING: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK 39
Reasons for the Growth of Outsourcing
THE GROWTH OF OFFSHORE BUSINESS PROCESS OUTSOURCING in India has been dra- matic, as the industry has gone from its infancy to the second largest and the single fastest growing industry in India in less than half a decade. Software and services exports grew by 20 percent in 2004 to $12.2 billion [9], while the ITES/BPO (IT- enabled services/business process outsourcing) industry grew at 52.3 percent during 2003–4. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the services sector in India have increased by roughly 100-fold from 1990 to 2004.1
Clearly, India has not acquired a huge labor force only in the past five years, nor has its labor force suddenly learned to speak English fluently. The supply of skilled labor for telephone-based call centers or for technological help desks has not suddenly increased. Likewise, Indian labor has not recently suffered an enormous decrease in wages in dollar terms, making the subcontinent economically attractive for the first time. In brief, inexpensive labor, highly skilled and in adequate supply, is not a recent development in India. Thus, these factors alone cannot be the cause of the recent dramatic increase in offshore BPO. Since the ability to get the work done more cheaply, the reward portion of the risk–reward trade-off, has not changed, we must look to the risk side to understand the sudden increase in outsourcing.
The reduction of risk in BPO initiatives is the result in part of cheap and ubiquitous bandwidth now available in India. Indeed, it is easy to see that there is a close rela- tionship between the improved telecommunications infrastructure now available in India and the emergence of a vibrant private sector, which itself is due to the eco- nomic reforms undertaken by successive governments since 1991.2 Clearly, some risks occur because vendors can intentionally take actions that are contrary to the best interests of their clients, without fear of detection because of their remote location. With remote monitoring supported by telecommunications, it is much easier to ob- serve the behavior of parties or to observe the effects of these behaviors much more rapidly, reducing at least some of the risks that are created by previously unobserv- able activities. Just as clearly, some risks occur despite the best intentions and despite the most ethical behavior of the vendors, simply because the vendors lack the neces- sary information or the necessary experience and expertise to take the best possible actions for their clients. With telecommunications and technology-intensive platforms for sharing data and for prompting the actions of the vendor’s personnel, many of these operational risks are reduced as well. Indeed, it now appears obvious that recent changes in telecommunications and other forms of technology have improved the risk side of the risk–reward trade-off associated with outsourcing, and that this reduc- tion in risk is the principal driver behind the increase in offshore BPO.
It is useful to next examine the forms that risk can take in outsourcing relationships and the mechanisms available for clients and vendors to control them. In particular, this paper will draw upon the recent experience of numerous firms in the United States and Europe with outsourcing in India to show how processes can explicitly be redesigned to reduce risk and thus to facilitate outsourcing. The insights and findings of this paper are grounded by a collection of rich data points, drawn from a credit card
40 ARON, CLEMONS, AND REDDI
issuer and a large switch manufacturer in the computer networks industry. Finally, although our examples are drawn from offshore outsourcing, the techniques discussed here will work just as well for same-shore outsourcing of processes.
Review of Literature
THE PREVAILING VIEW THAT THE NATURAL BOUNDARIES of the firm were determined by technology, technological nonseparabilities, and economies of scale was first chal- lenged by Coase, who held that the firm and the market were alternatives for organiz- ing the same set of transactions [5]. Indeed, Coase’s work established that transactions costs—the costs associated with arranging to have work done rather than the cost of doing the work itself—offered the best explanation for the existence of separate firms rather than the universal reliance upon market transactions. Transactions-cost eco- nomics (TCE) was developed to justify the firm as economizing on transaction cost— that is, to identify the most economically efficient governance structure and to show the conditions under which the firm and not the market provided the ideal governance structure. The essential role of risk as a large component of transactions cost created by leaving the internal hierarchy of the firm was first explained by Klein et al. [7] and Williamson [11]. Central to TCE is the role played by transaction frequency, invest- ment idiosyncrasy, and uncertainty. Furthermore, TCE emphasizes the role of invest- ment idiosyncrasy as the key reason for vertical integration—that is, the strategic vulnerability created by contracting is taken to be the principal explanation for firms’ retaining control of some processes internally. Williamson [10, 12, 13] and Alchian and Demsetz [1] also explain the role of principal-agent problems, and deliberate underperformance of contractual tasks, under conditions of imperfect observability of alignment of incentives between client and vendor.
TCE has been readily used by researchers (see [3]) in the field of information sys- tems (IS) to explain the effect of information technology (IT) on the boundaries of the firm. Clemons et al. [4] classify the principal components of risk associated with interfirm contracting, and then show how improved use of IT systematically affects these components; this study will be the basis for much of the work in this current paper. The Clemons et al. study also led the authors to predict that, although the amount of outsourcing would increase, it would take the form of stable bilateral working relationships rather than extensive use of the spot market, which they termed the move-to-the-middle hypothesis [4].
There is considerable empirical evidence in support of the theoretical hypothesis offered by IS researchers. Bakos and Brynjolfsson [2] show that the optimal number of suppliers is relatively small, which is consistent with the move-to-the-middle hy- pothesis. The work of Clemons et al. [4] reflects the trade-offs that firms face: relying on too few suppliers amplifies the threat of opportunistic behavior by one (or more) supplier, whereas too many suppliers can result in significant coordination costs and greater risk of operational errors. IT’s effect on firm size was studied by Hitt [6], who used an eight-year panel data set of firms’ structure(s), capital stock of technology,
JUST RIGHT OUTSOURCING: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK 41
and tangible and intangible assets, and found that the use of IT is associated with significant decreases in vertical integration and a weak increase in the diversification of firms’ scope of activities.
Forms of Risk
WE BEGIN THIS SECTION WITH A SHORT TAXONOMY of the forms of risk that are cre- ated by outsourcing. We will return to this taxonomy in more detail later. The risks associated with outsourcing take the following four forms.
There are strategic risks, caused by deliberate activities of vendors to exploit cli- ents. We call these risks strategic because they are caused by actions that vendors may take deliberately as part of a profit-maximizing strategy. These are the risks that are treated in the greatest detail in the earlier work by Clemons et al. [4].
There are additional forms of risk that, while important to note, are not analyzed further in this paper. (1) There are operational risks, caused by the breakdown in operations at the vendor location. These risks are not caused by deliberate actions by the vendor or by unethical behavior of the vendor. Rather, they are a by-product of the complexity of operations, the geographic separation between client and vendor, the cultural gap between the environments of the client and the vendor, or the limitations of the communications and transmission systems between the two. (2) There are long- term intrinsic risks of atrophy. These are not caused by anything that the vendor does but are an inevitable by-product of the process of outsourcing. Over time, if a com- pany outsources an activity completely, it loses the core group of people who were familiar with it. They retire, they leave for employment where their skills are more valued, or they simply become less technically competent and become progressively more out of date. (3) Finally, there are intrinsic risks of location, caused simply by moving activities to remote locations. Some of these are geopolitical risks; moving activities to India creates an exposure to the potential of violent escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan. The other forms of intrinsic risk of location are equally familiar, such as sovereign risk or exchange-rate risk (see Table 1).
This paper is principally about dealing with strategic risk—which arises from op- portunistic behavior of a supplier—and the techniques that clients can adopt to re- duce this form of risk. The risks caused by intentionally exploitive behavior can be further subdivided as follows.
Shirking or the Principal-Agent Problem
Shirking is deliberate underperformance while claiming full payment, and comes in a variety of forms. Essentially, it entails having the vendor, or your agent, do less work than you require, less work than you have contracted for, and less work than you are paying for. It always occurs for the same two reasons: the agent’s incentives for hard work are not the same as yours (your agent can shirk without detection), and the lack of information available to you makes it difficult or impossible to detect shirking by agents.
42 ARON, CLEMONS, AND REDDI
Poaching or the Misuse of Information Originally Provided for a Legitimate Contract
Unlike shirking, which involves making an insufficient effort while claiming full pay- ment, poaching entails a second, parallel effort that results in a second, unauthorized revenue stream derived from data provided as a legitimate part of the contract, often one that can significantly damage the party that originally provided the data. It can be something as simple as front-running a customer order,3 or it can entail reverse engi- neering critical proprietary business processes, stealing them, and reselling them or using them as a direct competitor of the client. Poaching as a phenomenon has be- come more significant as information has become a more valuable asset in our high- tech economy, as information is more easily codified, and as outsourcing has increased. Like shirking, poaching occurs because the incentives of the client and vendor di- verge (the vendor wants the additional income that poaching can provide) and be- cause the action is hidden from the client and difficult to detect (the vendor can successfully avoid detection).
Opportunistic Renegotiation
Opportunistic renegotiation, or unilaterally changing the terms of a contract after its inception, occurs when the client discovers that it has no alternative source of sup- port, goods, or services, and thus must pay its current supplier whatever price the supplier demands in the future. This loss of bargaining power, and the associated escalation of pricing, has occurred so frequently that this form of opportunistic rene- gotiation has its own name—vendor holdup—in the outsourcing literature [7, 13].
Table 1. A Taxonomy of Risks
Type of risk Elements that constitute the risk type
Strategic risks Risks that result from opportunistic behavior of one or both parties (buyer and supplier).
Operational risks Risk of suboptimal output that results from a variety of cases, including complexity of operations, geographic separation between client and vendor, and the limitations of the communications and transmission systems between the two.
Intrinsic risks of atrophy Over time, as a company outsources an activity completely, it loses the core group of people who were familiar with the activity and have the expertise to execute the activity in-house.
Intrinsic risks of location Caused by moving activities to remote locations. These include geopolitical risks, sovereign risk, or exchange rate risk. These are risks associated with different regions with their different sociopolitical systems and different historical contexts.
JUST RIGHT OUTSOURCING: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK 43
Obviously, this form of strategic risk, like the others, occurs because the vendor wants to behave this way and feels that it can. However, with the other forms of strategic risk, what enabled opportunistic behavior was the difficulty of detection; what en- ables it in this case is the client’s lack of recourse. If the client has no alternative, then the client must accept the terms that the vendor offers.
Thus, all three strategic risks occur because the incentives of client and vendor differ. Moreover, shirking and poaching require that the action of the vendor be hid- den and unobservable, whereas (in contrast) opportunistic renegotiation requires that the threat be made clear and visible; the client has so little power that it has little choice but to accept the new terms as dictated by the vendor.
Redesigning a Process to Reduce Risk: Dealing with Loss of Control over Expertise
AMONG MONOLINE CREDIT CARD ISSUERS, one has been especially successful and has enjoyed sustained profitability. Using its proprietary expertise in identifying and re- taining the most profitable credit card customers, it has leapt from a new entrant to its current position as the third-largest bank credit card issuer in the United States. The task that the bank chose to outsource entailed addressing an area of critical vulnerabil- ity. As other banks learned at least the basics of the bank’s strategy, competitors began to target this bank’s best customers. The bank needed a way to identify a subset of its existing best customers, those who were in the processes of being courted away by offers from competitors, and then convincing these customers to stay with the bank.
There are two problems associated with attempting to outsource any part of this activity. The first is that these customers represent the bulk of the company’s profits and must be retained. It is critical to perform this process well, and outsourcing this process may create unacceptable operational risk. The second problem is that the expertise needed to identify these profitable accounts and to retain them represents the principal source of value for the bank as a whole. Transferring the expertise needed to perform this task may create unacceptable strategic risk. An unscrupulous vendor could then transfer this expertise to a competitor.
Task Decomposition of the Process
The specific process that the bank wanted to outsource had three component tasks (see Figure 1).
Identification
The identification task entails determining which critical customers were in danger of defecting to another bank. The critical accounts were customers who historically maintained high credit card balances but who recently appeared to be changing their purchasing behavior. Since finance charges are paid by revolvers, customers who
44 ARON, CLEMONS, AND REDDI
keep a revolving loan balance with the bank represent the largest single source of the bank’s revenues and profits, and any loss of these accounts would severely damage profitability.
Formulation of a Strategy for Retention
The strategy formulation phase entails determining how to deal with each customer, which principally requires negotiating an annual percentage interest rate (or APR) that the customer will accept and that will retain the customer’s business for the bank. In part, a lowest possible interest rate needs to be determined for each individual customer, based on the rate at which the customer’s expected risk-adjusted rate of return (or expected long-term profitability) becomes zero. And a strategy needs to be developed for negotiating with each customer in order to get each customer to accept an interest rate that is both profitable for the bank and extremely competitive in the current credit card environment.
Retention
The bank employs retention specialists in the United States, whose job is to negotiate with customers who appear ready to leave the bank. They have computer support, which guides them in their negotiations with each customer, based on their assess- ment of the customer’s feelings about his or her card and about the bank.
Risk Assessment of the Process: Strategic Risks
Outsourcing a process this critical will be risky, and risk analysis begins by attempt- ing to understand the risk profile, or specific risks associated with outsourcing this process. We begin the study of the risk profile by examining the strategic risk of each of the three activities identified above.
Figure 1. Work Flow Sequence: Identification, Formulation of Retention Strategy, and Retention
JUST RIGHT OUTSOURCING: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK 45
Identification
Shirking does not appear to be a problem; if the vendor does not provide an adequate number of names, comparable to those that we would expect based on the statistical makeup of the group they are screening, this will immediately be obvious. Likewise, if they do not do an adequate job screening the names to identify those of greatest interest to the bank, this will be evident later, in the retention activities that follow. Shirking will be detected and, consequently, will be an unprofitable strategy for any vendor. Poaching remains problematic, and there are two elements of concern. The vendor could learn how the bank identifies accounts at risk of defecting, and then transfer this expertise to one of the bank’s competitors. Alternatively, the vendor could learn which accounts are at risk of defecting, and sell that list to one of the bank’s competitors. Either activity would, of course, be damaging to the bank. Opportunistic renegotiation does not appear to be a problem, since the bank has retained at least some portion of this activity within the firm in the United States, and it could rapidly gear up to reinternalize the process if a vendor should try to reprice the contract under terms unfavorable to the bank. Because of the risk of poaching, irrespective of the low level of other components of strategic risk, the strategic risk associated with outsourcing this process appears to be high.
Formulation for Retention
This process entails encoding rules into a computer program that can coach each retention specialist in working with each customer identified as a target in the previ- ous process, and that can lead the retention specialist to propose interest rates that are both attractive to the customer and profitable for the bank. Shirking is not an issue; the software will either perform well or it will not, and this will be visible shortly after the software is made available. Poaching is the critical concern here. Once a vendor knows how the bank performs this operation, it is ideally suited to work with any of the bank’s competitors and to transfer this most valuable expertise to them. Opportu- nistic renegotiation does not appear to be a concern; once the software has been writ- ten, the work is done. However, because of the risk of poaching, the strategic risk associated with outsourcing this process appears to be extremely high.
Retention
This process entails the actual negotiation with each individual cardholder. Shirking appears unlikely to be a problem because performance can easily be measured and compensation of retention specialists is based upon their performance. Poaching could be a problem if the retention specialists develop expertise that can be transferred to the bank’s competitors. Opportunistic renegotiation does not appear to be a problem, because, as with identification, the bank maintains at least some portion of this activ- ity within the United States and could reinternalize it if necessary. Because of the risk of poaching, the strategic risk associated with outsourcing this process appears to be high.
46 ARON, CLEMONS, AND REDDI
Risk Assessment of the Process: Operational Risks
We continue the study of the risk profile by examining the operational risk of each of the three activities identified above.
Identification
The operational risk of the process appears to be low because the statistical processes used to determine whether an account has begun to transfer its recent charge activities to a competitor’s card are reasonably simple to understand and to implement.
Strategy Formulation for Retention
As long as all necessary information on calculating the value of a customer account is transferred to the authors of the coaching system, operational risk should be quite low. Of course, a great deal of information must be transferred. Some has to do with the probability of retaining a customer at each interest rate. Some has to do with the charge behavior of different customer segments over time. And some information may have to do with the efficacy of different negotiating strategies. All of these can, and indeed should, affect the prompts provided to the retention specialist as well as the information that the retention specialist should be requesting during the negotia- tions process.
Retention
The operational risk of outsourcing retention specialists is clearly higher than the operational risk of maintaining this activity domestically with U.S.-based retention specialists, if only because an employee familiar with American customs and with American styles and mannerisms is likely to be more comfortable and more effective during sensitive negotiations. That said, as long as the training of retention specialists is at the vendor location as it has been within the bank, and as long as the coaching software performs adequately, the operational risk of this task should be no worse than moderate.
We now need to combine these individual risk assessments into a composite risk assessment for the entire process. Having identified the various components of risk, it is clear that the strategic risk of outsourcing the three activities associated with the retention process is extremely high, simply because of the risk associated with outsourcing the software development. The operational risk is, at worst, only moder- ate. We combine these risks in a simple but intuitive fashion: the risk assessment of a process is the greater of the two individual assessments for strategic or operational risk. The justification for this heuristic is quite simple; it does not matter how safe the client is from operational breakdown if the vendor steals, and it does not matter how safe the client is from strategic abuse if the client cannot perform. A bad risk rating on either dimension is enough reason not to outsource the process.
JUST RIGHT OUTSOURCING: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK 47
Redesign of the Process Through Chunkification
While it would appear that the process of identifying and retaining these critical ac- counts is too risky to outsource, the bank achieved it safely through chunkification. The process was divided into three separate activities, as we described above, and each activity was allocated to one of three separate firms. No vendor could communi- cate with another; all communications were through the bank itself.
The identification activity was outsourced to one vendor. Moreover, the risk of this activity was greatly reduced by allowing the vendor access only to information needed for the successful execution of this activity. The vendor was not told what they were doing or why. They were identifying customers who satisfied some set of conditions, but they did not use this information in any way nor were they told how this informa- tion was going to be used by the bank. They knew that they were doing something, but they did not know what or why; although this may increase operational risk slightly, it virtually eliminated the risks of poaching described above. The risk of outsourcing this activity as delimited here was seen as only moderate. The customer-by-customer strategy formulation activity was considered too risky to outsource. The risk of poach- ing was seen as extremely high, because expertise would need to be transferred to a vendor completely and unambiguously in order for the vendor to be able to complete software development and testing. Thus, the bank kept this activity internal to the company and did not outsource it.
The account retention activity was outsourced to a second vendor, but this vendor was unaware of which firm had performed the identification activity and could not communicate with it; thus there was little danger of the first firm learning how their list of names was used or what the nature and importance of their activities were. Likewise, while retention specialists had access to the results of the strategy formula- tion activity through use of a coaching support system, they used the system essen- tially as a sealed black box. While the coaching system enabled retention specialists to perform surprisingly well, given the cultural gap between them and the clients with whom they spoke, the sealed nature of the box reduces or even eliminates the transfer of expertise to retention specialists. Once again, the risk of outsourcing this activity as delimited here was seen as only moderate.
The risk of each activity outsourced is now no worse than moderate, thus making each of these activities suitable for outsourcing. We summarize the key ideas of this section thus: by dividing the process into three activities, determining the risk profile of each, and developing a risk mitigation strategy for each, the risk of each activity is reduced. More importantly, the most labor-intensive activities can all be outsourced, while preserving a very low-risk profile for the process as a whole.
Redesigning the Task to Reduce Risk: Dealing with Misuse of Financial Information
A MAJOR SWITCH MANUFACTURER HAS OUTSOURCED its customers’ order entry ac- tivities to India. This process, like the retention process that the bank outsourced, has
48 ARON, CLEMONS, AND REDDI
multiple activities, and they interact in subtle ways to determine the risk profile of the process as a whole:
• Order capture: The customer places an order for telecommunications equipment. • Order communication: The order is communicated to an operational unit for
production scheduling and to a financial unit for billing the customer and for disbursing some cash to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) if this was a third-party sale.
• Financial processing: The client is billed and some preliminary and partial com- mission payment is authorized to be disbursed to the OEM vendor.
As with the treatment of the credit card issuer’s outsourcing decision described earlier, we begin by describing the risk profile of the entire process. The strategic risk of the order capture task appears to be low. Shirking is minimized because clients will be enraged if their orders are not captured and confirmed properly, and thus shirking would readily be detected. One element of poaching is minimized by controlling the vendor’s employees’ ability to communicate with employees not working on the switch manufacturer contract or indeed to communicate with anyone not working on the contract or for the switch manufacturer itself.4 Vendor employees working on the switch manufacturer contract cannot pass along the list of sales prospects to other vendor employees working for the switch manufacturer’s competitors, nor can they send e-mail or use technology to communicate with the employees of these competi- tors. The switch manufacturer controls the risk of opportunistic renegotiation by re- taining a core group of order entry personnel in the United States, and could readily reinternalize the activity if it became financially desirable to do so if the vendor at- tempted to change the terms of the contract. Operational risks are limited due to the simple nature of the tasks being performed.
However, one possible means of poaching remains, associated not with the order capture activity but with financial processing and cash disbursement. The outsourcing vendor, if allowed to make the decisions on cash disbursements for commissions, could front-load commissions to the OEM at a higher level than authorized, allowing the OEM to have access to more of their commissions sooner than authorized by the switch manufacturer; the vendor could then reduce later payments by the same amount, leaving the switch manufacturer unaware that they were losing vast amounts of float. Thus the strategic risk associated with the entire process appears to be high.
The switch manufacturer uses two separate vendors, who do not communicate with each other in any way, to manage the two separate activities. One vendor does only order capture and communication, passing along key order details to the switch manu- facturer. The switch manufacturer then gives the second vendor only enough infor- mation to do financial processing, and not quite enough to complete cash disbursement authorization. The vendor can determine how much money is to be disbursed to each OEM, using a proprietary switch manufacturer OEM identification code. Only the switch manufacturer can translate from the code to a specific vendor, and thus only the switch manufacturer can complete the transfer. Since the first vendor does no cash disbursement and the second vendor does not know the identity of cash disbursement
JUST RIGHT OUTSOURCING: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK 49
recipients, neither can engage in activities that entail manipulation of the cash dis- bursement process. Chunkification has reduced the risk of each activity, and of the process as a whole.
Managing Strategic Risk
STRATEGIC RISKS ARE THE RESULT OF ACTIONS taken by a vendor directly aimed at obtaining benefit at the client’s expense. Shirking is deliberate underperformance while claiming full payment. It allows the vendor to work less hard for a client, to dedicate fewer resources or lower-quality resources, and, in general, to earn more by diverting resources to other engagements. It can take many forms, but all have the following in common: reduced effort without offsetting reductions in compensation, motivated by differences between client and vendor incentives, and enabled by the client’s inability to detect it.
Shirking
The simplest forms of shirking all involve lack of effort simply because the vendor has alternative uses for the same resources. These are the easiest to anticipate. (1) Ven- dor personnel can provide low levels of effort, either in the performance of the pri- mary task or in subsequent quality assurance activities. It can take the form of lower effort levels, or indeed, not actually working at all during what appear to be billable hours. (2) The vendor can shift staff assignments and use more junior, or more poorly trained and less qualified, staff than the client was promised. (3) The vendor may underinvest, either in training or in software, equipment, and other facilities needed to support the vendor’s activities.
These three forms of risk are created simply because the vendor may have other uses for critical resources required to perform optimally. There are other occasions in which the vendor’s incentives may be so opposed to those of the client that even stronger conflicts of interest occur.
Commission-Related Incentives
The vendor may not get the best possible price for the client when negotiating on the client’s behalf, because he earns a commission directly related to the price that he is able to obtain for the client. A real estate agent or a travel agent earns a commission based on the price that the client pays for the real estate or for the ticket. In some instances, a real estate agent or travel agent may be tempted to get a purchase price for the client that is higher than necessary, simply because this will increase the vendor’s commission.
Vendor Competing with Client
The vendor may be a direct competitor of the client, with incentives to underperform, even to sabotage, the vendor operations. An online travel agent operated by one airline
50 ARON, CLEMONS, AND REDDI
can keep (and indeed at least one has kept) full-fare passengers for its own airline while loading its closest competitors with deep-discount leisure travelers on the routes that it considers to be the worst competitive threats. The online travel agent is delivering low- quality reservations to its competitors, and doing so for obvious reasons.
Poaching
Poaching, like shirking, requires that the client be unable to detect the vendor’s be- havior, but, unlike shirking, it does not entail insufficient effort. Rather, it entails the vendor’s taking actions unrelated to the contract, with resources provided for the contract. It does not damage the client by resulting in inadequate deliverables but by activities that are directly in competition in some way with the client’s own opera- tions. It does not reward the vendor for undetected underperformance; it rewards the vendor through a parallel revenue stream. Shirking can be reduced by attempting to align the incentives of the vendor more completely with those of the client, for ex- ample, by compensating the vendor better as performance increases; this is often more effective than attempting to compensate the vendor for things that cannot truly be observed, such as effort. Poaching cannot be reduced this way—no matter how well you pay the client for his performance, the possibility for gain through parallel and unauthorized activities will often remain. Poaching can take the following forms.
Opportunities for Resale
A vendor can resell software developed for a client, or the expertise that enabled the software to be developed; innovations developed for one player in an industry are often of value to competitors. A vendor can resell engineering designs, or the re- search that led to their development. A vendor can resell a list of attractive and prof- itable customers being targeted for cross-selling and up-selling activities, or the expertise that led to the development of the target list.
Opportunities for Reuse as a Direct Competitor
A vendor may, over time, become a competitor of its client. This is more frequently observed in manufacturing outsourcing, where a vendor reverse-engineers designs and begins to act as a direct competitor. Numerous examples are well known, from stereo production to chip manufacturing.
Opportunities for Misuse
There are numerous ways in which a vendor can use information obtained from a client for competitive advantage. Perhaps the most publicized is front-running a cus- tomer order in a range of industries, starting with securities trading. Misuse may be more subtle and may involve encroachment into related activities. American Express, as a charge card processor, obtains enough information on corporate travel patterns to
JUST RIGHT OUTSOURCING: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK 51
enable it to pitch proposals to corporate travel coordinators, in direct competition with their existing travel agents. Likewise, a computerized reservations systems ven- dor can access reservations for full-fare passengers and divert at least some of them from competitors’ flights to its own.
Opportunistic Renegotiation
Opportunistic renegotiation, or vendor holdup, occurs when the client has no alterna- tive service provider readily available. This form of strategic vulnerability occurs as a result of “post-contractual small numbers bargaining situations.” That is, it occurs when the client can no longer reinternalize a process, and no firm other than the current vendor is prepared to step in quickly. It can be encountered in facilities man- agement outsourcing contracts. It can be encountered in a range of other settings as well; when a client outsources software development it often finds that only the origi- nal development firm is well positioned to bid on ongoing maintenance and testing, or on 24-7 tech support. Thus, even if the original vendor appeared attractively low- price before the initial contract, when it was bidding against a large number of com- peting development firms, in the small-numbers negotiating situation where no other firm can directly compete, its prices may be much higher.
As we have seen by example, vertical chunkification—dividing a process into se- quential nonoverlapping activities—can greatly reduce the knowledge transfer asso- ciated with outsourcing and can reduce the risk of poaching. Similarly, horizontal chunkification—dividing the volume of a process or a set of subtasks among alterna- tive vendors—can greatly reduce the risks of shirking and opportunistic renegotia- tion, especially if some of the volume is retained internally. Internal operations provide a wonderful mechanism for calibrating the performance of vendors and detecting shirking. Likewise, maintaining some internal competence, or using multiple ven- dors, reduces strategic dependence on one vendor and reduces opportunistic renego- tiation because there will always be an alternative service provider. It is important to note that horizontal chunkification should never be used to reduce the risk of poach- ing, since it creates multiple vendors with an incentive to poach, with concerns that a competitor may poach if they do not, and with plausible deniability of responsibility if poaching should occur.
Indeed, the difference in techniques used to mitigate risk serves to underscore the differences among shirking, poaching, and opportunistic renegotiation.
Dimensions of Risk
We find the following three dimensions useful when comparing these three forms of risk.
Nature or Role of Information Asymmetry
Shirking and poaching both involve hidden actions, actions taken by the vendor that are unobservable by the client. In the case of shirking, the vendor simply does not
52 ARON, CLEMONS, AND REDDI
work very hard, or does not invest in systems or training, or does not assign appropri- ately trained personnel while claiming full payment. In the case of poaching, the vendor may do all of these things perfectly in order to learn as much as possible. The vendor benefits come from learning how to do a good job, from staying on the con- tract long enough to learn to do a good job, and sometimes even from the external credibility that comes with having been seen as doing a good job. However, the vendor’s hidden action in poaching occurs at a later time, when the vendor uses this expertise for his or her own gain in a way that damages the client. In contrast, the actions that occur during opportunistic renegotiation are clearly visible when they occur and noth- ing about opportunistic renegotiation is hidden: when the vendor determines that the time is right and that the client is suitably dependent, the vendor then openly and explicitly changes the terms of the contract going forward.
Time Frame for the Action
Shirking occurs during the contract, and any detection can occur during the contract. Poaching is more likely to occur after the contract, and opportunistic renegotiation more frequently occurs during contract renewal, since this is the time when price is discussed.
Mechanisms for Mitigating the Risk
Because the nature of the three risks is so different, the mechanisms for controlling and mitigating them will be different as well. Shirking depends upon hidden action— that is, upon the client’s not being able to observe closely and accurately what the vendor is doing during the course of the contract. One mechanism available is closer monitoring; this may be expensive for the client, but can produce good results. A second is to maintain two or more competing vendors through horizontal chunkification, compare their performance, and to discipline, fine, or drop the worst-performing ven- dor. This is less expensive to execute. Poaching also depends upon hidden action by the vendor, but most frequently, action is taken after the contract has been completed; therefore, neither of the actions that can be taken to reduce shirking is likely to be effective against poaching. Indeed, these actions may actually exacerbate poaching. Any action that reduces shirking, in essence, enables the vendor to do a better job and to demonstrate the ability to do a better job; in essence, these actions make the vendor more dangerous as a competitor. Worse yet, using multiple vendors through vertical chunkification creates plausible deniability, because if poaching occurs, it will not be immediately evident which of several vendors might have been responsible, and even the guilty party can plausibly deny its actions. The actions that are effective when dealing with poaching, such as dividing a process into nonoverlapping tasks that are assigned to different vendors to limit knowledge transfer (vertical chunkification), really have little effect on shirking or opportunistic renegotiation.
Opportunistic renegotiation is a result not of hidden action but of power shifts. Therefore, monitoring, coaching, and division of processes into tasks are unlikely to
JUST RIGHT OUTSOURCING: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK 53
be effective. However, dividing a task among competing vendors, so effective in deal- ing with shirking, reduces dependence upon any single vendor and thus mitigates the risk of opportunistic renegotiation.
In summary, the risk mitigation actions have decidedly different effects on the dif- ferent risks.
Quality Assurance: The Role of Horizontal and Vertical Chunkification
QUALITY ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES PROVIDE an opportunity for both horizontal and vertical chunkification. Vertical chunkification describes which activities will be allo- cated to the client and which will be allocated to the vendor. Horizontal chunkification describes what portion or fraction of each activity will be allocated to the client and what portion will be allocated to the vendor.
A Western European national telephone company outsources the preparation and maintenance of all of its network mapping to InfoTech in Hyderabad. First- and sec- ond-level quality assurance activities are performed by the vendor as well. There is a single employee of the telephone company on location in Hyderabad and he or she spot-checks a fraction of the work after the vendor has certified it as “fully tested.” If the client employee finds even a single mistake, the week’s work is rejected and the vendor pays to redo the work at its own expense. Although this may seem excessively harsh, in practice, it has worked out quite well. The vendor can inspect the work more cheaply than the client, and it is better to have the work inspected before it is shipped to Europe. There is no benefit to be gained by having both client and vendor inspect all of the work, and all of factors listed above argue for having the vendor perform the inspection. That said, the client wants to ensure that the vendor does inspection quite carefully, and the harsh penalty for poor-quality inspection has, in practice, worked out well for both parties, and better than having the client perform the inspection and reduce the price of the contract by the cost of doing this task internally.
A major computer manufacturer’s telephone order operations are outsourced to India, and much of the real-time quality assurance work is outsourced to India as well. The manufacturer has chosen to rely upon a combination of horizontal and vertical chunkification. The vendor has been given the bulk of the customer order support task and the bulk of the quality assurance task, but a small portion of each has been retained internally at the manufacturer. At any given time, one of the Indian call centers will not be taking customer orders but will instead be monitoring the perfor- mance of other operators at other Indian call centers, as they service customers call- ing in from the United States. As with the telephone company example above, it is cheaper to have the Indian call center operator monitor the performance of its opera- tions, and thus this arrangement appears ideal. Unfortunately, shirking can occur, both in the call center operations and in the quality assurance activities related to them; each of the Indian vendor’s call centers that acts as a quality assurance agent one day knows that one of its peer institutions will be serving as a quality assurance
54 ARON, CLEMONS, AND REDDI
agent for it another day. Even though none of the centers knows which has been monitoring it, informal collaboration can arise in which no center gives a poor perfor- mance evaluation to another. To prevent this, the computer company has maintained a call center in the United States, internal to the company and under its own manage- ment. At any given time, that call center may be online taking customer orders. Alter- natively, it may be monitoring the Indian call centers, or monitoring the Indian call center monitor. Any deviation between the quality assurance assessment that the com- pany monitors give the vendor and the quality assurance assessment that the vendor gave its operations at the same time can be dealt with as harshly as necessary. Cur- rently, the presence of internal monitoring capability has been quite sufficient to en- sure quality operations at the vendor, and penalties are seldom required.
Conclusions
AS WE HAVE EXPLORED ABOVE, OUTSOURCING any activity has various components of risk. Some are strategic and are caused by explicit actions that might be taken by vendors. Others are operational and are caused simply by the complexity of processes and the difficulties created by outsourcing them and removing operations from local oversight and control by the client firm. It is well understood that it is important to make outsourcing decisions correctly in order to reduce risk. The techniques described above for strategic chunkification go a long way toward guiding correct decisions on outsourcing, what to outsource and what to keep within the firm. They should indeed help firms right source their production and procurement decisions.
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank the executives at the following BPO ser- vice provider firms: Allsec Tech Ltd., First BPO, HCL technologies, InfoTech, I-OneSource, MphasiS Ltd., Office Tiger, Wipro Technologies, and the executives at the following firms: American Express, CapitalOne, CitiBank, General Electric and Morgan Stanley for their time, insights, and participation in our research. We would like to thank the appropriate parties in the governments of Karnataka and APFirst of Hyderabad and the Infocom Development Authority of Singapore (iDA), the National Computer Board and the Ministry of IT and Telecom of Mauritius for their generous assistance during our numerous site visits. The Fishman Davidson Center at the Wharton School, the Wharton Electronic Business Initiative (WeBI) and The Wharton-SMU Research Center at Singapore Management University provided financial and logistical support.
NOTES
1. Financial Times (June 4, 2004). 2. The economy witnessed wide-ranging deregulation after the 1991 economic reforms
even as some South Indian state governments aggressively sought FDI in the services industry and made policies accordingly. The reader is referred to “The Plot Thickens” (www.economist .com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=637817).
3. In front-running, a firm that could be acting as the client’s agent in some form of trans- action first engages in a parallel transaction, then does the client’s transaction at a worse price, then unwinds its own transaction at a profit.
4. A variety of mechanisms are employed for this purpose, including physical separation, disabling of electronic channels of communication, and so on. The objective is to reduce this
JUST RIGHT OUTSOURCING: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING RISK 55
risk to levels better than (or no worse than) the client’s business environment (in the United States, United Kingdom, etc.).
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3. Brynjolfsson, E.; Malone, T.; Gurbaxani, V.; and Kambil, A. Does information technol- ogy lead to smaller firms. Management Science, 40, 12 (1994), 1628–1644.
4. Clemons, E.; Reddi, S.; and Row, S. The impact of information technology on the orga- nization of economic activity: The “move to the middle” hypothesis. Journal of Management Information Systems, 10, 2 (Fall 1993), 9–35.
5. Coase, R. The nature of the firm. Economica, 4, 16 (November 1937), 386–405. 6. Hitt, L. Information technology and firm boundaries: Evidence from panel data. Infor-
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o14( strategic restructure...).pdf
Journal of Management 1995, Vol. 21, No. 5,835-859
Strategic Res true turing and Ou tsourcing: The Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions
and LBOs on Building Firm Skills and Capabilities
David Lei Southern Methodist University
Michael A. Hitt Texas A&M University
A conceptual framework examining the relationship between corporate restructuring and outsourcing of key value-adding activities to external suppliers and partners is presented. The model proposes that the restructuring process serves as a catalyst to a series of complex changes within thejirm that make outsourcing an attractive alternative to internal investments in the development of new skills and capabilities. High levels of merger and acquisition activity, as well as leveraged buy-outs (LBOs), are expected to produce a diminished resource base for organizational learning and technology develop- ment. Continued reliance on outsourcing, in turn, can potentially “lock out” the firm from participating in future technologies and new industries.
During the 1980s and early 199Os, corporate restructuring was a popular strategy. Some of the more popular types of restructuring included mergers and acquisitions and leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) that substitute large amounts of debt for equity financing. Although corporate restructurings have been hailed as innovative and necessary for corporate renewal (Jensen, 1988; Lubatkin, 1987) others have expressed concern about the potential tradeoffs resulting from excessive focus on asset redeployment and leverage as opposed to asset creation (Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 1990; Porter, 1987; Smart & Hitt, 1994). The issue of whether certain types of corporate restructuring enhance or mitigate the development of new products, technologies, skills and capabilities is highly relevant because a number of U.S. firms have ceded market share and industry initiative to global competitors (Franko, 1989; Hamel & Prahalad, 1989). However, merger and acquisition and LB0 activity continues.
Direct all correspondence to: David Lei, Southern Methodist University, Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Dallas. TX 75275.
Copyright @ 1995 by JAI Press Inc. 0149-2063
835
836 DAVID LEI AND MICHAEL A. HITT
The empirical evidence regarding the effects of corporate restructurings on competitive advantage and development of new skills and capabilities is mixed. Although acquisitions and portfolio restructurings, in particular, may increase financial returns and shareholder value (Jensen, 1988; Lubatkin, 1987; Lubatkin & Rogers, 1989; Salter & Weinhold, 1979; Singh & Montgomery, 1987), even highly related acquisitions often encounter difficulties in building synergy and integration (Hill, Hitt & Hoskisson, 1988; Hopkins, 1987). Other researchers have argued that extensive acquisitions gradually blunt the firm’s sources of innovation and the strength of its core businesses (Franko, 1989; Hitt et al., 1990; Roll, 1986), by directing management’s focus away from building core skills and capabilities and towards integrating assets. Similarly, Zahra and Fescina (1991) note the conflicting evidence concerning the relationship between LBOs and the firm’s commitment to R&D spending and its core business. While several studies have noted the benefits of LBOs in enhancing efficiency (Bull, 1989; Hall, 1988; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Magowan, 1989), others have noted the negative effects of LBOs on innovation, R&D and human capital, by limiting the amount of capital available for investing in new technologies and developing new skills (Graves, 1988; Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). Porter (1987) argued that firms engaging in extensive restructurings and acquisitions are not well-positioned to build future sources of internal competitive strengths.
The purpose of this work is to build a conceptual framework depicting the relationship between certain restructuring activities (acquisitions, LBOs) and outsourcing. In general, outsourcing refers to the reliance on external sources for manufacturing components and other value-adding activities (often capital- intensive). Therefore, outsourcing involves reliance on external skills and capabilities. Unfortunately, outsourcing can erode the firm’s potential for organizational learning and development of new technologies, particularly those skills necessary for the development of new business and core capabilities. Bettis, Bradley and Hamel (1992) argued cogently that improper use of outsourcing is contributing to the decline of many U.S. and West European firms. They refer to a hollowing of firms created by outsourcing. Restructurings through acquisitions or LBOs may accentuate the tradeoff between internal development of new skills to foreign partners or suppliers in particular. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) termed core competencies as the “collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple teams of technologies” (p. 85). Acquisitions and LBOs create conditions within the firm that make outsourcing core skills more attractive than building those skills and capabilities internally.
Unfortunately, while there has been an increasing amount of outsourcing activity among U.S. firms, there has been little attention given to this activity in the academic literature. However, outsourcing has a number of unintended consequences that deserve scrutiny. While outsourcing often produces an increase in short-term returns, it also results in lower investments in the development of new technologies and new skills (e.g., continued maintenance and updating of firms’ core competencies). Although many firms that have
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 21, NO. 5, 1995
STRATEGIC RESTRUCTURING AND OUTSOURCING 837
begun to outsource their non-core or supporting activities (e.g., accounting, payroll, MIS) have reported satisfying results, an excessive managerial focus on outsourcing as a “panacea” for problems in building or renewing core skills and capabilities is likely to denigrate the firm’s potential to learn new technologies and to develop new capabilities. Careful outsourcing of supporting or tangential activities may help firms concentrate resources to build core skills. In addition, outsourcing of operational activities reduces a firm’s risk during economic downturns. Alternatively, it also may deter a firm’s ability to take advantage of opportunities during economic upturns. However, corporate-wide restructuring efforts may blur the distinction between core and non-core activities. Furthermore, popular types of corporate restructuring often promote stronger tendencies to outsource core skills. Our purpose is to build a conceptual framework that explains the relationships between corporate restructuring (acquisitions and LBOs) and outsourcing of core skills and capabilities. Theoretical propositions are derived from the framework to promote and facilitate future research.
Conceptual Framework
Figure 1 portrays the proposed relationships between corporate acquisitions, LBOs and outsourcing. Such strategic actions have a direct effect on the decision to outsource skills by limiting the amount of resources available for both human capital development and R&D investment, especially for critical manufacturing processes, skills and capabilities that demand long time horizons. These skills and capabilities are often human-embodied and contribute to tacit knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The high costs of restructuring, particularly through debt-financing of both acquisitions and LBOs, often make R&D and human capital development investments a target for reductions (Hitt, Hoskisson & Harrison, 1991). In effect, overreliance on outsourcing becomes a substitute for creating and nurturing core skills and capabilities within the firm because of overhead costs, the difficulty of sustaining learning, and other costs associated with internal development. Management’s ability to differentiate skills or products that are core versus commodity (or noncore) becomes secondary to debt reduction or short-term return on investment. The cumulative effect of outsourcing limits the firm’s initiative to capture economic rents and knowledge from future products.
What is particularly telling about Figure 1 is that acquisitions and LBOs are generally considered to be opposite types of restructuring activities, yet the proposed effects on outsourcing are similar. On a more intuitive level, the focus of acquisitions is designed to internalize certain economic activities and assets that are deemed important to the firm’s strategy and performance (rather than causing them to be externalized through outsourcing). On the other hand, LBOs represent a dramatic and deliberate downscoping of the firm’s breadth of activities that greatly reduce the firm’s capital expenditures and investment to enhance efficiency (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). Yet, extensive acquisition activity may paradoxically result in the gradual externalization of many of the
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 21, NO. 5, 1995
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STRATEGIC RESTRUCTURING AND OUTSOURCING 839
firm’s value-adding activities over time, because managerial attention, focus and industry knowledge are correspondingly diluted over a wider span of businesses that are brought into the organization. Porter (1987) notes that corporate strategies relying heavily on merger and acquisition activity tend to focus on industry position and market attractiveness as the key determinants of competitive advantage, as opposed to identifying and creating new forms of horizontal interrelationships among business units to take advantage of internal sharing, joint SBU investments and innovation. Hoskisson, Hitt and Hill (1991) noted that multidivisional structures accompanying corporate diversification often resulted in a shorter-term, lower-risk managerial focus. The cumulative effect and cost of relying on mergers and acquisitions and LBOs to build competitive advantage are that they may deter future investment in new products and processes, and thus undermine the core competences and strengths of the firm. Thus, Figure 1 proposes that both forms of restructuring activities will lead to greater outsourcing, although the internal process will differ somewhat according to the type of restructuring.
Additionally, a number of important managerial characteristics begin to change after restructuring. Some acquisitions and LBOs involve major changes in the top management team (of the focal organization in LBOs and of the acquired firm in acquisitions). New managers may become more risk averse and avoid major investments in new technologies or skills when their budgets come under scrutiny. In fact, they are more likely to retain existing commodity- like technologies instead of seeking to learn untested skills and technologies. Moreover, turnover in the acquired firm’s top management team dilutes the firm’s focus on identifying and investing in core skills and capabilities. Additionally, a new management team in LBOs is likely to proceed cautiously because of the need to cover high debt costs and thus to build short-term cash flow and efficiency. Outsourcing core skills becomes an attractive alternative to capital investment expenditures that may take years to provide desired returns.
Restructuring firms may introduce strong financial controls to manage cash flow because of high debt costs (in the case of LBOs) and/or to monitor diversified operations (in mergers and acquisitions) in businesses with which senior managers have less operational knowledge. Strong financial controls, in turn, produce managerial risk aversion (Hitt et al., 1990) and investing in more mature businesses (often with little opportunity or incentive to develop new skills) that can generate the cash flow needed to pay interest costs and reduce debt resulting from the transaction. Consequently, managers are likely to impose cost controls within these mature businesses and focus on securing low-cost inputs. Finally, restructuring firms may seek formal alliances or long-term supply arrangements with partners/competitors to share risks in developing new products and technologies that require long lead times and large capital expenditures. However, joint development of key value-adding activities, skills and technologies can produce skill deterioration, internalization by the partner, and eventual dependence. The cumulative effect of these series of changes that promote outsourcing is to erode the firm’s internal learning potential to develop
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new skills and competences for future competitive advantage. These complex series of effects, shown in Figure 1, are analyzed in detail in the following sections.
Outsourcing and Firm Competitiveness
Our central premise is that excessive dependence on outsourcing core products or technologies has deleterious effects on the firm’s knowledge base as well as its ability to learn new skills, technologies and capabilities. A firm’s competitive advantage is driven by its embedded knowledge and skills (Barney, 1991). In addition, competitive advantage built through the accumulation of knowledge and skills is often path-dependent (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Firms that rely on outsourcing often assume that design, manufacturing and marketing skills and tasks are separable and allow for delegation across suppliers. This assumption is less valid as the development of technology-intensive products often depend upon concurrent integration of all three tasks (Hamel, 1991; Hitt, Hoskisson & Nixon, 1993).
Because knowledge and skill accumulation is a path-dependent process (Barney, 1991; Itami, 1987), development of core competences and new skills requires sustained internal investment. When investment is curtailed, the firm’s ability to learn decays and it can lose strategic initiative to shape the evolution of new products and processes. Cohen and Levinthal(l990) noted that internal development of a firm’s “absorptive capacity” (or ability to learn from a multitude of sources) is a more effective mechanism to develop new skills and capabilities than relying on external agents or sources. They assert that many critical aspects of organizational learning and absorption of new skills and capabilities depend heavily on firm-specific characteristics and embedded knowledge that cannot be bought and integrated into the firm. Badaracco (1991) notes that strategic alliances designed solely to serve as long-term supply agreements for products and components often left the recipient firm in a poor position to learn new skills and capabilities necessary for long-term competitiveness. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) argued that the development of core competences based on the integration of diverse production and technological-based skills requires sustained internal invesment in organizational learning to create new firm-specific knowledge and capabilities. Outsourcing core skills or critical parts of core products often leaves the firm unable to learn and exploit changes in future technologies.
The notion that sustained outsourcing denigrates the firm’s existing skill set, and thereby its long-term competitiveness, is reflected in Lee and Allen’s (1982) research. They found that a firm needed its own set of scientists and technical staff to understand changes in technologies and processes. That is because they are most familiar with the firm’s idiosyncratic routines, procedures and complex social phenomenon (Itami, 1987). Bringing scientists into the firm from external sources often complicates learning because of the large time lags associated with integration. Nelson and Winter (1982) suggested that the firm’s ability to perform R&D is derived from a tacit knowledge base that requires continued investment and internal development.
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Internal cross-functional integration to achieve process and product innovation enriches communication and coordination among design, manufacturing and marketing, thus enhancing organizational learning that is not possible when one or more such tasks are performed outside the firm (Clark & Fujimoto, 1990). Cross-functional integration, organizational routines and differentiated technological know-how are dependent on the firm’s capacity to learn and to nurture the new skills and knowledge (Itami, 1987). Hamel, Doz and Prahalad (1989) noted that many Western firms outsourced important value-adding activities to Far Eastern competitors because of their inability to develop competitive low cost manufacturing accompanied by cross-functional integration and dynamic organizational routines. Once the firm limits or ceases investment in a critical competence (because of outsourcing), it may be difficult to renew that competence. The path dependent nature of skill accumulation also can prevent firms from developing new technologies or taking advantage of opportunities once they cease to develop and nurture internal skills and capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). A low rate of investment in the firm’s core competences and skills diminishes learning potential and, therefore, the attractiveness of future investments related to the firm’s technology. As a result, the tacit knowledge embedded in human capital can decay over time. This becomes a self-reinforcing pattern. Consequently, firm “inertia,” described by Nelson and Winter (1982) reinforces continued outsourcing, loss of learning potential and eventual skill decay.
Acquisitions, LBOs and Outsourcing
Several studies have noted that resources available for R&D, manufacturing improvements and human capital development often decline after acquisitions or LBOs (Biggadike, 1979; Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland & Harrison, 1991a; Long & Ravenscraft, 1993; Porter, 1987). Other studies have suggested that, although acquisitions and LBOs do, in some cases, boost shareholder value and returns (Jensen, 1988; Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 1987), a financial asset-based perspective of the firm substitutes for a technology, competence or product-based view of the firm (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989). The asset-based perspective encourages both corporate and SBU managers to formulate strategies to achieve financial outcomes (often short-term), as opposed to organizational learning, technology development and/or building core competences (Hitt et al., 1990). In turn, senior management may not be able to identify and internally develop those core skills necessary to build future technologies. Particularly for LBOs, a financial asset perspective often results in sharp reductions in capital investments for R&D, manufacturing and other expenditures to meet interest payments from the increased leverage (Hall, 1988, 1989; Long & Ravenscraft, 1993; Opler, 1992; Smith, 1990).
Frank0 (1989) states that the ultimate measure of firm-level competitive- ness in global markets is the degree to which firms invest in new technologies, processes and skills that become the basis for future competitive advantage.
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Yet, many firms underinvest in these areas partly because managerial time and effort is focused on pursuing and integrating new acquisitions (Hitt et al., 1991 a), and/ or because these activities are undertaken outside the firm (Porter, 1985). Building core competences necessary to develop and produce successive generations of new and related products requires not only R&D investment, but also a focused “strategic intent” driven by learning and experience (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989). Such strategic intent can be displaced when excessive managerial attention is devoted to mergers or debt management. Yet, outsourcing of core activities reduces the risk of investing in unproven processes and technologies but still allows the delivery of new and current products to markets. Although eventual dependency and absorption of the firm’s knowledge and skills associated with outsourcing arrangements represent significant risk (Hamel, 1991), they enable managers to better control short-term costs and to reduce capital expenditures, often important objectives under conditions of scarce resources and high leverage. Internal development of new processes and skills is often perceived as requiring large amounts of capital and time with low probabilities of achieving a return on the investment, especially when external costs of capital result in a gradual deemphasis on building organization- embedded skills and capabilities and a growing reliance on outsourcing.
These actions have also taken a major toll on the employees, with a record number of permanent layoffs in firms once thought to provide secure, long- term employment. As an increasing range of technologies become human- embodied (Badaracco, 1991; Barney, 1991; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990), losses of skilled managers and technicians may eventually inflict a toll on the firm’s skill and technology base and lessen its overall embedded knowledge. Porter (1987) points out that firms engaging in frequent portfolio changes often are unable to develop firm-specific skills and capabilities internally, partially because they underinvest in new technologies and skills. Hitt et al. (1990) noted that acquisitions often supplant innovation in large, diversified firms. Hill and Snell (1989) explain that spending on R&D and development of technologies often represents a risky alternative for managers because they bear the risk of failure; as such, other investments (such as joint ventures) represent less risk (Bogue & Buffa, 1986; Hamel, 1991; Harrigan, 1985).
The problem of sustaining investment in LB0 firms becomes more significant because of high leverage. Several preliminary studies have demonstrated that LB0 firms reduce the amount of funds available for technology or human capital development (Zahra & Fescina, 1991). In fact, Long and Ravenscraft (1993) found that firms reduce their investment in R&D after undergoing leveraged buyouts. Outsourcing of many key activities then becomes an attractive option for LB0 firms. The high debt obligations force managers to channel much of the available resources into payments on the principal and interest. Myers (1984) notes that high debt levels significantly increase managerial risk avoidance. Thus, outsourcing helps LB0 managers to avoid investments that may have long gestation periods to produce returns. Internal development of new skills increases costs whereas outsourcing activities to external suppliers often lowers costs (thus, higher reported short-term
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income). Opler (1992) showed that capital expenditures declined significantly in many firms undergoing LBOs while R&D expenditures also declined (but only slightly). Smith (1990) also found reduced capital expenditures and funds allocated for R&D spending among LB0 firms two to three years after the transaction, suggesting that the full impact of the restructuring occurs a few years after the change in ownership and control structure.
LB0 managers, searching to lower their firm’s break-even point, may have to downsize by laying off skilled employees who possess organization-embedded knowledge and skills. Zahra and Fescina (1991) point to several studies that show significant reductions in the employment of highly paid scientists and engineers after an LBO. The lack of skilled personnel, in turn, causes LB0 managers to search for alternative sources of low-cost products, components and other skills. Although some studies have shown that R&D spending did not decrease with LBOs, the nature of the R&D may have changed from searching for breakthrough innovations to incremental improvements in the existing processes and product line (Smith, 1990; Zahra & Fescina, 1991).
Consequently, we posit that extensive merger and acquisition activity and LBOs have similar outcomes of reducing the amount of resources available for capital expenditures, R&D spending and development of human capital. In the search for cost containment and risk reduction, managers perceive outsourcing as a viable low-financial risk option to secure lower costs. In summary, reductions in R&D and capital expenditures to improve short-term financial results cause firms to increasingly rely on external suppliers and partners for key value-adding activities and products.
Proposition 1: Acquisitions and LBOs result in reduced allocations for R&D and capital spending (e.g., on new manufacturing technologies) and increases in outsourcing to external suppliers and partners.
Proposition 2: Acquisitions and LBOs result in reductions in the base of human capital and skills leading to the outsourcing of human- embodied skills and technologies to external suppliers and partners.
Changes in Characteristics of Restructured Firms
The management and operation of restructured firms may change (sometimes significantly) with the consummation of restructuring. With mergers and acquisitions, firms often become larger and more diverse. As a result, their corporate management teams may be less knowledgeable of the industry and market characteristics unique to each business unit. As the acquiring firm becomes more diversified, the dominant core business becomes less salient in future strategies. Over time, high diversification through acquisitions often produces the unintended effect of reducing the innovativeness of the firm (Hitt et al., 1990). Alternatively, LBOs often lead to downscoping which can improve firm innovativeness (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994); however, huge debt also serves to redefine the strategic direction of the firm. In essence, the substitution of
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debt for equity may limit the degree of investment in the core business and its associated value-adding activities. Thus, while the content of both modes of restructuring may involve opposite changes in terms of the composition of the firm’s assets, they paradoxically accelerate the disincentives to learn and apply new skills in the original core business, while fostering growing dependence on outsourcing.
The three pronounced managerial characteristics most likely to change after restructuring include:
1. the nature of the top management team, 2. greater use of financial controls to manage the firm, and 3. the propensity to use alliances or other supply arrangements to share
the operational risks of competing within a particular business.
Changes in these characteristics are likely to result in a subtle, but gradual, de-emphasis on the core business and value-adding activities with outsourcing, in effect, becoming a default option.
Top Management Team A growing body of research examines the relationship between the top
management team and corporate strategy and emphasizes the importance of a strategy-management team fit (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 1987; Miller, Kets de Vries &Toulouse, 1982; Murray, 1989; Singh & Harantio, 1989). Corporate restructuring may have significant effects on the composition of the top management team in the acquired firm, particularly in highly competitive industries (Hambrick, 1987; Walsh, 1989).
Unrelated acquisitions have the greatest effect on the nature of top management teams. Within the acquiring firm, the expansion of the portfolio of different businesses increases information-processing demands on corporate executives (Egelhoff, 1982), thereby generating a high degree of risk aversion (Hoskisson, Hitt & Hill, 1991). Often there is considerable turnover in the top management team of the acquired firm (Walsh, 1989) that creates difficulty in investment planning and decisions. Moreover, the newly acquired business units demand considerable effort to achieve integration into the acquiring firm (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).
Within acquiring firms, senior managers can manage a set of newly acquired or unrelated businesses through implementation of an M-form structure. Although the use of the M-form structure can mitigate, to some extent, the information processing requirements on the acquiring firm’s top management (Williamson, 1985), restructuring of the composition of the firm’s businesses may result in significant changes in the priorities of the acquiring firm’s top management team (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Prior to restructuring, the dominant coalition that often comprises the top management team tended to perceive the environment through its own unique lenses (Hambrick & Fukotomi, 1991), particularly if the team comes from a similar industry background. After restructuring, the
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focus of the top management team turns toward integration and the financial costs associated with the transaction (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). This change in focus often makes internal investment in future core skills and capabilities a secondary objective (Hitt et al., 1990). Moreover, successful assimilation of the newly acquired business unit may demand industry-specific or unit-specific knowledge and skills that are often not present in the acquiring firm’s top management team (Murray, 1989).
There also may be associated changes in the composition of the top management team as well. Pitts (1977) noted that retaining the acquired firm’s management team was a critical ingredient to successful integration of unrelated businesses. Although there is little formal evidence to suggest that major changes occur in the composition of the acquiring firm’s top management team after completing acquisitions, multiple acquisitions over time are likely to introduce a greater degree of group heterogeneity (because of additions from the acquired firm executives), until the firm implements an H-form structure and largely reduces the size of its corporate management team.
The managerial changes in the acquired firm may be more dramatic. Walsh (1988, 1989) noted a significantly higher rate of turnover in the acquired firm’s top management team upon completion of the acquisition. High levels of managerial turnover may diminish the capacity for organizational learning. Because the acquired firm’s management must spend considerable time adjusting to the acquiring firm’s control systems and resource allocation processes, they are less likely to continue environmental scanning with the same effectiveness. As a result they may not learn of new skills and capabilities developed by external competitors on a timely basis. Thus, both acquiring and acquired firms management teams’ energy is absorbed immediately before and after mergers (acquisition negotiations, integrating acquired firm, learning new processes and changes in management team).
Moreover, acquisitions often produce changes in SBU-level management teams that may introduce high levels of team heterogeneity (Walsh, 1988). Changes or replacements of general managers in SBUs may result in slower consensus-building on investment priorities and the relative importance of different unit-based skills and capabilities. Decision-making may be less efficient in heterogeneous groups (Katz, 1982). The impact of turnover and management changes within the acquired firm’s SBUs may be significant, particularly for embedded knowledge and skills. Efforts to coordinate horizontal sharing to gain greater economies of scale and learning curve effects may be limited because SBU managers become defensive and risk averse (Porter, 1985). Therefore, more heterogeneity among SBU managers may make joint efforts to invest in core competences more difficult (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), because of greater debate and conflict regarding the allocation of resources for investment. The context for future investment decisions becomes more complex as managerial consensus is difficult to achieve; thus, outsourcing becomes an attractive option because it results in fewer fixed costs, greater unit flexibility and reduced managerial stress associated with horizontal sharing (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986). From a corporate perspective, a growing dependency on the utilization
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of external sources of knowledge and skills results in a decreased capacity for system-wide organizational learning and poor coordination (Itami, 1987).
LBOs also create the potential for changes in the top management team after restructuring. Research suggests that institutional investors, LB0 managers, representatives of banks and other financial interests often compose a significant portion of the restructured firm’s board (Graves, 1988; Singh, 1990). In many cases, the new board of directors is likely to supplant the firm’s original top management team with a group that is less concerned about building long-term competitive advantage and more focused on repayment of debt and interest and in building short-term efficiency. Studies have shown that capital expenditures and R&D investment are reduced after LB0 transactions (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993; Opler, 1992). Composition of the LB0 management team is likely to include investors, or their representatives, who closely monitor debt repayment in addition to technology developments, industry changes and other variables. Therefore, new management teams in LBOs are likely to be less heterogeneous than in acquisition-strategy firms.
In cases of both mergers and acquisitions and LBOs, the changes in the top management team increase the tendency to outsource key value-adding activities to external suppliers and partners but for different reasons. Acquisitions introduce the potential for dissonance and conflict induced by the addition of new management team members from different industries and backgrounds. Reduced consensus over definition of the firm’s core business, skills and technologies encourages members to search for alternatives to the internal prioritization of investment allocation for different industries and technologies. In the case of LBOs, the restructuring firm interjects a different form of management team-one that is focused on managing high levels of debt in a downscoped business, where an increasingly dominant group of investors (with shorter-term horizons) often wield strong influence in allocating investment resources.
Proposition 3: There is a positive relationship between acquisitions and heterogeneity in the TMT. A more heterogeneous TMTproduces less consensus on core competences and allocation of resources, leading to increased outsourcing as an alternative to investments in internal development of skills.
Proposition 4: There is a positive relationship between LBOs and changes in the TMT. The new TMTafter LBOs is more homogeneous but focused on ensuring efficiency, paying debt costs and maximizing short-term accounting returns. As a result outsourcing increases after LBOs.
Financial Controls and Tools
Corporate restructurings involving acquisitions or LBOs often increase the use of financial controls to manage the restructured firm. The use of financial controls in both highly diversified and leveraged firms has been the subject of
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recent research (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Hitt et al., 1990; Hoskisson, Hitt & Hill, 199 1; Zahra & Fescina, 199 l), with findings suggesting that an emphasis on financial controls (rather than strategic controls) often induces managerial risk aversion. Nevertheless, both mergers and acquisitions as well as LBOs are likely to result in substantially greater use of financial controls to manage businesses and to determine investment criteria.
Several researchers have pointed to the gradual deterioration and disinvestment that occurred in U.S. industry (Hayes & Abernathy, 1980; Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland & Harrison, 1991b). Although part of the problem can be attributed to inflation, higher taxes or mandated expenditures by the government that redirected the focus of corporate investment, Porter (1987) and Rappaport (1978) both noted that excessive use of discounted cash flow and other financial tools resulted in a reduced commitment by managers to invest in key businesses and new skills and technologies. Disinvestment could lead to slow deterioration of the business, and/or greater reliance on outsourcing arrangements in which the high fixed costs of initial development and manufacture are borne by another partner or supplier. Discounting often produces managerial risk aversion because of the inability to quantify strategic objectives such as market growth, technology development and the creation of new forms of tacit knowledge. Managerial risk aversion and an overemphasis on achieving short-term financial goals can lead to outsourcing which can create dependence on a limited number of suppliers, often foreign.
Financial, as opposed to strategic controls, often become the preferred instrument to manage both highly diversified and leveraged operations because management does not have effective knowledge of specific industry, market or technology factors in diversified firms (Hitt et al., 1990). In LBOs, financial controls are used to ensure payment of debt costs and short-term efficiency. On the other hand, foreign firms often face significantly lower costs of capital to invest in new technologies and products than do U.S. firms and thus become attractive outlets for outsourcing. However, outsourcing often exacerbates deterioration of the domestic industrial base.
To deal with the greater span of control resulting from acquisitions, managers depend on financial controls, as opposed to strategic controls, to evaluate and reward performance and to allocate investment funds (Hoskisson et al., 1991; Williamson, 1985). Therefore, managers in many diversified M- form firms are rewarded by return on investment or cash flow criteria that provide disincentives for investments in new and untested (risky) technologies. More specifically, Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) noted that a multidivisional structure (often associated with high product diversification) produces an emphasis on strong financial controls with a resulting focus on shorter-term, lower-risk investments. As the number of newly acquired businesses grows within a corporate portfolio, the use of simple financial controls will increase. Financial controls in diversified firms also allow broader spans of managerial control, because they provide a standardized approach to measuring performance (Thompson, 1967; Williamson, 1985). A standardized approach to measuring performance based largely on financial controls also creates a
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potential chasm between corporate management (focused on return criteria) and divisional management, whose decisions often involve issues of investment and use of core skills and technologies. Because simple financial controls are closely associated with output control as opposed to behavioral control, managers in highly diversified firms are more likely to seek lower-cost options of outsourcing and avoidance of potentially high-risk internal process investments. Thus, the use of financial controls encourages managers to outsource high-expense value- adding activities in order to meet standardized performance evaluation criteria.
Overuse of financial controls to manage the firm’s businesses can damage its core competence in two ways. First, standardized performance criteria may produce a disincentive to share resources across separate businesses, Strict output control becomes difficult to implement in situations where activities are closely shared or coordinated internally. This is likely to be more salient in firms that become more diversified over time. However, in related diversified firms, sharing of resources is necessary to achieve the required synergy. Second, not sharing resources may disallow the continued development of important skills (core competences) because of the loss of economies of scale. As a result the cost of developing or maintaining those skills is higher for each business. Managers are hesitant to participate in programs with high reciprocal interdependence when they have little direct control over the cost of inputs and their own SBU’s contribution. Consequently, outsourcing becomes an attractive alternative.
The path dependent nature of organizational learning and skill accumulation suggests that firms must continue to develop and nurture their core competences independent of current performance. Financial controls do not adequately capture the value of sustained learning; rather they focus on current performance levels, as opposed to the future option value and opportunities from the development of new skills and capabilities. These controls also deter managers from adequately assessing the damage to the firm’s skills from outsourcing (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
In LB0 firms, despite the downscoped set of activities, financial controls are also likely to be emphasized. Faced with high levels of debt and repayment at pre-set time intervals, LB0 managers often reduce investments and capital spending because the debt and interest payments often absorb most, if not all, of the slack cash flows (Graves, 1988; Long & Ravenscraft, 1993; Singh, 1990). Thus, few slack resources are available for development of new skills, products or technologies. LB0 ~nancing often pressures management to generate cash flows. Thus, even though LB0 firms have structures that are markedly different from those of highly diversified firms, both types of restructured firms frequently rely on stringent financial controls to manage their operations.
Deterioration of the firm’s existing infrastructure and development activities occurs as managerial attention is focused on debt repayment (Zahra & Fescina, 199 I), Likewise, outsour~ing becomes a default option for managers in highly leveraged firms because it avoids the necessity of large capital investments required for future new products and businesses (Easterwood & Singer, 1989). Furthermore, business level managers may outsource to reduce
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costs and thus become more “competitive” (Bettis et al., 1992). However, such actions may have only short-term positive effects on competitive position (Bettis et al., 1992). To the extent that LB0 firms continue investing in R&D, it is likely that the nature of the R&D will change from an emphasis on developing new products and processes towards incrementally improving current processes and products for existing markets (Zahra & Fescina, 1991).
The net effect of relying on financial controls to manage operations in both forms of restructuring is to encourage an allocation of resources to “safe” and often mature investments (Haspeslagh, 1982; Porter, 1987). To preserve the cash-flow in mature businesses, outsourcing becomes a practical alternative to internal investment and development, because most of the fixed costs of developing new technologies would be performed externally to the firm. Mature businesses often comprise the majority of total corporate revenues for firms that rely extensively on mergers and acquisitions (Porter, 1987). Similarly, the high levels of debt financing in LBOs often require mature businesses that can produce the cash flow necessary for meeting debt costs (Smith, 1990).
Consequently, the use of financial controls found in both forms of corporate restructurings encourage managers to adopt a risk-averse, defensive posture in the management of their businesses. This type of managerial response leads to disinvestment in and deterioration of core assets, skills and technologies that make entry into new businesses difficult. Financial controls encourage managers to allocate increasingly scarce resources to cashflow rich, safe investments (Bogue & Buffa, 1986). On a global basis, Haspeslagh (1982) noted that extensive use of financial controls in diversified firms limits the opportunity to share resources and transfer learning across SBUs. Moreover, these same firms often engage in frequent cost-cutting and searches for alternative sources of low-cost production. In effect, financial controls that encourage cost efficiencies lead firms not to search for internal sources of greater economies of scale, scope and learning, but rather to focus on securing low cost inputs and components externally. To maintain and possibly increase cash generation in these mature businesses, outsourcing of risky and expensive development activities becomes an attractive avenue to preserve the performance on which managers are rewarded.
Proposition 5: There is a positive relationship between corporate restructurings (acquisitions and LBOs) and the use of Jinancial controls to manage operations, allocate future investment resources, and to reward managers. A reliance on financial controls encourages managers to outsource key value-adding activities while investing in cash rich, mature businesses.
The Role of Strategic Alliances
In recent years there has been an increasing use of strategic alliances to learn new skills to help build competitive advantage (Badaracco, 1990; Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Hamel, 1991; Hamel et al., 1989; Harrigan, 1985; Kogut, 1988; Thorelli, 1988). Yet, managers’ reliance on alliances to substitute
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for internal development and manufacturing activities in their own firms have resulted in many firms becoming increasingly dependent upon an external (often foreign) partner for knowledge, skills and capabilities (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989; Reich & Mankin, 1986). This issue becomes especially important because alliances may unintendedly lead to knowledge acquisition, skill absorption and internalization by a firm’s partner in the alliance (Hamel, 1991; Hitt, Tyler, Hardee & Park, 1995). Nevertheless, because alliances enable firms to share quantifiable risks that are often beyond the scope and resources of any single firm (Kogut, 1988), both highly diversified as well as highly leveraged firms are likely to approach alliance formation in similar ways.
Hamel (1991) and Reich and Mankin (1986) noted that firms often seek to utilize alliances as a means to improve the competitiveness of their products by sharing the development and production costs associated with them. Many firms initially enter into alliances to jointly develop and learn new technologies and skills with their partners. Over time, however, the alliance often changes from joint development to a position of dependence on the partner, particularly if one partner has little capacity for learning or is distracted from it. The alliance becomes a convenient and readily accessible platform for outsourcing many of the firm’s high cost (and skill-embedded) activities to further reduce risk. Thus, strategic alliances can be a defacto means of outsourcing. Excessive reliance on a partner or supplier introduces a dependency on an external entity for sources of new skills and capabilities, particularly when senior management does not use the alliance to enhance organizational learning. Firms employing alliances as a rationalization or substitution mechanism, as opposed to learning, often find tacit skills being absorbed by their partner (Badaracco, 1991; Hamel, 1991; Hitt et al., 1995). The problem of understanding and managing multiple businesses, skill sets and technologies in highly diversified firms could make outsourcing and dependence via alliances and long-term supply arrangements an important issue. Because corporate management’s knowledge of critical industry, market or technological characteristics is likely to be limited (Hitt et al., 1990; Williamson, 1985), measures of performance will be based largely on standardized financial outcomes. These outcomes often are short-term in nature and may not accurately represent the investments or skills necessary to compete in particular industries (Bogue & Buffa, 1986; Haspeslagh, 1982; Itami, 1987; Porter, 1987). Price-performance characteristics based on financial controls are subject to distortions because of foreign exchange fluctuations (Bogue & Buffa, 1986). However, because these outcomes represent the basis for current and future managerial incentives, entry into long-term supply arrangements or alliances may accelerate outsourcing because the fixed costs of manufacturing and development can be shared with a partner.
A major complication associated with alliance-based collaboration is that it potentially renders the firm’s unique set of skills and tacit knowledge “transparent” to the other partner (Hamel, 1991), especially to foreign firms with different strategic orientations and negotiation styles (Hitt et al., 1995). The problem is aggravated when the critical value-adding and manufacturing activities occur outside the United States and are difficult for the U.S. firm to
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learn and absorb (because of lack of access and different cultures and mindsets) (Hamel, 1991; Reich & Mankin, 1986). To the extent that an alliance partner is able to “outlearn” the other, the asymmetries in skills and capabilities can produce reductions in competitiveness. Yet, both corporate and SBU (or LBO) management may discount the problems of organizational transparency, as long as the alliance is able to provide low-cost capital or a stable supply of low- cost components and products that enhance the firm’s price/performance characteristics (even if such outsourcing accelerates the deterioration of the technology and skill base). In the case of highly leveraged firms, large debt precludes the capital and development expenditures necessary for continued nurturing of distinctive skills and capabilities thus making such alliances attractive alternatives.
In effect, alliances represent another means by which diversified and leveraged firms can share the risks involved with developing new products, processes and other technologies. A supply of high-quality and low-cost components encourages diversified and leveraged firms to utilize the alliance to defer future investments in core technologies and skills. The unintended effect of alliances is the possibility that the partner will internalize, learn and co-opt the distinctive skills and technologies of the restructured firm. For example, both General Electric and Westinghouse underwent extensive restructurings during the 1980’s in which numerous businesses were bought and sold. During this time, however, these firms also entered into a series of joint ventures with foreign partners that later became strong competitors in industries ranging from consumer electronics to components to power generation equipment (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989; Lei & Slocum, 1992). Thus, a likely outcome of both forms of corporate restructuring is that senior management will initially perceive alliances to be a useful risk-sharing mechanism that enables the firm to avoid investing the large sums necessary for internal development of new products, processes and skills. However, the strategic alliance may not only help the partner build skills and eventually become a competitor, it can eventually force the firm to outsource. If the firm uses a strategic alliance to avoid investing in the development of new technologies and skills, it may be forced to outsource if the strategic alliance is dissolved. It becomes dependent on the alliance partner’s skills. Therefore, strategic alliances may be a defacto means of outsourcing and eventually force the firm to outsource.
Proposition 6: There is a positive relationship between corporate restructurings (acquisitions and LBOs) and the use of alliances as a risk-reduction mechanism to secure low-cost sources of products and processes. Alliances in highly diversified and highly leveraged firms increase dependency and accelerate the decision to outsource.
Outsourcing and Future Learning
Regardless of the form of corporate restructuring, the cumulative effects of continued outsourcing steadily reduce the firm’s potential to learn new skills
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and to develop future core competences. Organizational learning and skill development is a path-dependent process (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) whereby investment in one time period often generates growth options for new products and technologies in later time periods (Bettis et al., 1992.; Itami, 1987). The creation of dynamic routines that foster skill development and knowledge transfer among the firm’s subunits represents a significant source of a firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). In effect, firms that excessively rely on external sources for new skills, technological developments, or new products are likely to lose their initiative to shape future industry evolution, particularly as more core competences and technologically-intensive components are shared across different industries (e.g., semiconductors, memory chips, lasers, advanced materials). High levels of debt (in the case of LBOs), or widely diversified businesses (in mergers and acquisitions) are likely to distract managerial attention away from concentrating sufficient resources on learning and developing new skills required for competing in the future. Thus, senior managers in LB0 and acquiring firms may significantly underestimate the path- dependent nature of organizational learning and skill development for future time periods.
Excessive outsourcing of core skills can further complicate the firm’s efforts to develop new competences, particularly as many value-adding activities are organized along a concurrent, as opposed to strictly functional, format. In many growth industries (e.g., communications equipment and advanced semiconduc- tors) and even mature industries (e.g., automobiles, consumer electronics, power supplies), highly competitive firms are beginning to tightly integrate and organize their R&D, engineering, manufacturing and marketing activities along a concurrent format to pursue a faster, and more “seamless” approach to new product development (Hitt et al., 1993). Cross-functional teams are often composed of highly skilled personnel from many different functions, thus accelerating learning, shared insights and commercialization of potential new products (Clark & Fujimoto, 1990). These teams are often the repository of tacit knowledge and dynamic routines that contribute to building firm-specific sources of competitive advantage. Systemwide learning, skill development and knowledge transfer among the firm’s subunits are less difficult to achieve in a concurrent, as opposed to a sequential approach (whereby each function carries out its own set of activities independently of others). The use of cross- functional teams makes it increasingly difficult to assess precisely where one function or task ends and another begins. Identifying and nurturing deeply- embedded tacit skills and dynamic routines becomes integral to building new core competences. Thus, a decision to outsource one set of core activities or skills may unintentionally lead to the firm’s outsourcing of a wider array of other closely related skills or activities or to a deterioration of the retained activities, particularly if the technologies or competences are shared among a large number of subunits. The impact of outsourcing path-dependent skills and technologies that promote organizational learning becomes particularly salient for firms engaging in extensive restructuring. In the case of LBOs, drastic downscoping of the firm’s activities strongly suggests that these firms may
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outsource several key functions and activities, because it is difficult to use output controls where there is a high reciprocal interdependence among different functions. Within acquiring firms, high levels of top management heterogeneity and standardized financial controls associated with high diversification hinder horizontal sharing of firm-specific skills and internal sources of economies of scope. Consequently, it is difficult to cultivate the dynamic routines necessary to learn and build new sets of skills and competences in both LB0 and acquiring firms. Senior managers in both types of restructuring firms are likely to pay little attention to or deemphasize the learning of new competences and skills.
Proposition 7: There is a negative relationship between outsourcing and the development of new skills, competences and organizational learning potential in acquiring and LBOfirms. Continued outsourcing steadily delimits thefirm from learning and applying new competences that are increasingly path-dependent.
Discussion
The research literature suggests that certain types of corporate restructurings may have negative effects on the firm’s core competences and technologies that have important implications for competitiveness. Although recent works have acknowledged the problems of outsourcing, there has been little research regarding its effects on competitiveness (based on deterioration in the firm’s knowledge base and skill set). Anecdotal evidence (e.g., General Electric, Westinghouse, Eastman Kodak) suggests that extensive acquisition activity and LBOs (e.g., Revlon, RJR Nabisco, Houdaille) may prompt an overly risk-averse management to outsource key value-adding activities to external partners and suppliers, particularly foreign firms. Acquisitions and LBOs serve to accelerate the decision to outsource because it appears to produce less risk in developing or securing needed products and components required for their respective markets. Yet, an overreliance on outsourcing may trap the firm into growing dependence in which it loses its knowledge and skill base to the outsourcing partner. The path dependent nature of organizational learning to build organization-embedded knowledge, skills and capabilities also works in reverse; failure to invest in building these skills in the current period seriously hampers the firm’s future learning potential. With increasing emphasis on an asset-based, as opposed to a technology or competence-based, view of the firm, such pressures to outsource can only intensify with continued scarce resources and rapidly changing technology.
Changes in the top management team because of multiple acquisitions may increase its heterogeneity. While TMT heterogeneity has its benefits (Michel & Hambrick, 1992), it can produce less efficiency in decision-making processes (e.g., investment allocation) and redefinition of the firm’s core business or competences. There are multiple industry experiences and less shared perspectives, thereby providing a complex context for resource investment decisions. Moreover, if the top management team lacks deep knowledge of the
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firm’s core business(es), outsourcing may become an attractive means to control costs and avoid risky investments. This alternative may be particularly attractive to new management teams in LBOs that are focused on achieving operating efficiency and paying debt costs.
Restructurings based on extensive acquisitions or LBOs often lead to the implementation of financial controls to manage business activities to increase cash flows (for debt repayment) or simply because the TMT must manage its information processing (e.g., in diversifying acquisitions). However, financial controls often induce SBU managers to focus on short-term, defensive actions. Corporate resources are often allocated to stable, cash-rich and mature businesses. In order to preserve the cash flow of these mature businesses, managers will seek to lower costs of operation, to include outsourcing value- adding activities. Overemphasis on financial (performance) controls can also reduce the incentive to build interrelationships among SBUs or to learn and acquire new skills internally.
Higher risk brought about by restructuring activities (e.g., increased debt) encourage managers to seek risk-reduction through such mechanisms as alliances and long-term supply arrangements. These arrangements often lead to lower investments in the development of new technologies and skills. Alliances, however, can become a potent weapon by a partner to learn and internalize the unique skills and capabilities of the restructured firm. Internalization of skills by the partner can leave the outsourcing firm dependent on it. Outsourcing reduces the development of new core competences, skills and knowledge that often come from experimentation and experience with new manufacturing processes (Badaracco, 1991; Hamel, 1991; Reich & Mankin, 1986). Although the central argument of this paper has examined the relationship between corporate restructurings and outsourcing, empirical examination of the hypothesized relationships is needed. Several studies (Opler, 1992; Smith, 1990) suggest that capital expenditures decrease significantly in the years following the transaction. Additionally, Long and Ravenscraft (1993) found investments in R&D to decrease following LBOs. However, more research is necessary to determine the relationship between restructurings and outsourcing.
The phenomenon of outsourcing in the U.S. (Bettis et al., 1992; Hamel, 1991) continues as firms in such industries as semiconductors, computers, automobiles, industrial equipment and telecommunications become more reliant on overseas partners for critical manufacturing skills, process technologies, components and even complete end-products (Badaracco, 1991; Hamel, 1991; Lei & Slocum, 1992). These products may be designed in the U.S., but manufactured by a supplier firm (Reich & Mankin, 1986). Separation of design and manufacturing limits the potential for sustained learning. Consequently, financial markets may not be fully aware of the path-dependent nature of technological skill accumulation and learning (Barney, 1991; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Itami, 1987).
The tendency by SBU managers to search for low-cost inputs outside the firm (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986; Porter, 1985), is more common when
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standardized financial controls are used for performance evaluation. This managerial practice is prevalent in firms with a tradition of decentralization, such as General Electric, Westinghouse and Allied-Signal (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). SBU managers are known to face elevated levels of job-related stress when engaging in high levels of resource sharing and coordination across business units (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986) that facilitate the use of internal firm-specific skills and capabilities (Badaracco, 1991; Hamel, 1991; Itami, 1987). The uncertainty introduced by merger and acquisition or LB0 activity (with higher managerial turnover and control system complexity) provides a disincentive for SBU managers to focus on internal skill development. Thus, the degree of outsourcing practiced in many U.S. firms may result from complex dynamics at both corporate and SBU levels and may not be well understood by financial markets.
Financial markets may not be able to fully recognize or assess the value of building organization-embedded, technologies and skills that become the basis for future learning and market/ technology entry opportunities. These skills are most directly nurtured in complex manufacturing environments, particularly for those industries nearing maturity, characterized by patterns of incremental innovation (e.g., aerospace), or a steady evolution in manufacturing process technologies. Current financial markets may not perceive existing process technologies as critical for developing future technological opportunities. Itami (1987) noted that the creation and mobilization of “invisible” assets, (e.g., internal organizational sharing, technological skills and marketing finesse) require sustained investment in current and new process technologies to foster the learning process. Furthermore, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) stated that successful organizational learning and “absorptive capacity” required developing firm-specific skills and capabilities independent of current levels of performance; otherwise, the firm may be “locked out” from future opportunities. Our premise is that in certain industries (e.g., consumer electronics, microprocessor-based tools), firms have been unable to “demature” their products and processes when new opportunities arise, because high levels of outsourcing (exacerbated by mergers, acquisitions and LBOs) have stunted internal skill and knowledge creation that allows firms to learn new technologies and processes. Yet, financial markets may not “penalize” outsourcing, because there is no reliable measure of the relative worth of continuous investment in idiosyncratic, organization-embedded sources of knowledge and skills.
Empirical research is needed to test the propositions set forth herein. Of course, the types of data required makes the task more difficult. For example, use of some archival data is possible to measure restructuring activity, top management team composition, capital and development expenditures, alliance formation and outsourcing activities. However, assessment of other internal processes such as financial controls, risk aversion, integration between units, competence and learning will require first-hand information from the firms (e.g., surveys, structured interviews, qualitative case studies). Furthermore, empirical research should assess whether the degree of relatedness of the acquisition, its hostile or friendly nature, mode of financing and/ or synergy affect the amount
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of outsourcing. In addition, research should determine if there are differences in the effects of LBOs, MBOs (management buyouts) and EBOs (employee buyouts) on outsourcing, given the potentially different agency relationships. Finally, outcomes of different types of restructuring (e.g., downsizing, downscoping) should be examined (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994).
We have focused primarily on extensive restructurings. Related acquisitions may improve shareholder value and help build the critical skills necessary to meet foreign competition. Yet, even certain types of related acquisitions may not help in building core competences and skills if senior management uses an asset-based philosophy that deters learning and skill absorption/application. For example, the deals between GE and RCA and Philip Morris and Kraft may help consolidate businesses in mature industries, but do little to engender a greater risk-taking attitude among managers accustomed to financial controls and the use of alliances to secure low-cost products or components from abroad. Thus, even mergers and acquisitions among related firms, while increasing the possibility of shared learning and investment in new technologies, still may provide incentives for managers to search outside the firm for ways to rejuvenate existing and acquired businesses. Yet, long-term sustained competitiveness comes from nurturing internal knowledge and skill sets that form the basis of continuous learning and core competencies. Overreliance on outsourcing of key value-adding activities to external parties may render the firm more permeable to knowledge and skill internalization from outside.
Acknowledgment: We gratefully acknowledge the comments of Rita Kosnik, Tim Opler, Richard Osborn, Dennis Smart and Ken Smith on earlier versions of this manuscript. Support for this research has been provided by the Corrigan Junior Faculty Research Grant at the Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas 75275.
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o15 (balancing vertical...).pdf
Strategic Management Journal Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006)
Published online 13 September 2006 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/smj.559
Received 2 November 2001; Final revision received 4 April 2006
BALANCING VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING: EFFECTS ON PRODUCT PORTFOLIO, PRODUCT SUCCESS, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
FRANK T. ROTHAERMEL,1* MICHAEL A. HITT2 and LLOYD A. JOBE3
1 College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A. 2 Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, U.S.A. 3 VizX Labs, LLC, San Diego, California, U.S.A.
Most prior research has focused on vertical integration or strategic outsourcing in isolation to examine their effects on important performance outcomes. In contrast, we focus on the simultaneous pursuit of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing. Our baseline proposition is that balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing in the pursuit of taper integration enriches a firm’s product portfolio and product success, and in turn contributes to competitive advantage and thus to overall firm performance. We derive a set of detailed hypotheses, and test them on a unique and fine-grained panel of longitudinal data documenting over 3,500 product introductions in the global microcomputer industry. The results provide strong support for the notion that carefully balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing when organizing for innovation helps firms to achieve superior performance. Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
A long and venerable tradition of cross-disciplinary scholarship is concerned with the boundaries of the firm (e.g., Coase, 1937; Thompson, 1967; Williamson, 1975; Galbraith, 1977). Determining the boundaries of the firm appears to be critical for firm performance, especially in high-technology industries (Teece, 1986, 1992; Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). Most of the extant research, however, examines the trade-offs between internalizing activities vs. sourcing them externally through market transactions (Walker and Weber, 1984; Jones and Hill, 1988; Leiblein, Reuer, and Dalsace, 2002) or through strategic alliances (Pisano, 1990; Folta, 1998; Steensma and
Keywords: boundaries of the firm; vertical integration; strategic outsourcing; innovation; dynamic capabilities ∗ Correspondence to: Frank T. Rothaermel, College of Manage- ment, Georgia Institute of Technology, 800 West Peachtree Street, NW, Atlanta, GA 30308-1149, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected]
Corley, 2001). While firms often trade off econo- mizing on transaction costs vs. access to dispersed knowledge stocks and enhanced flexibility in mak- ing these important governance decisions, many firms are partially integrated and simultaneously outsource some activities (Harrigan, 1984; Afuah, 2001). We argue that these firms seek to identify the most effective balance in both organizing alter- natives to leverage their benefits and mitigate their costs.
Following Harrigan’s theoretical contribution, we label this organizing approach taper integra- tion, which occurs ‘when firms are backward or forward integrated but rely on outsiders for a por- tion of their supplies or distribution’ (Harrigan 1984: 643). Thus, taper integration arises when a firm sources inputs externally from independent suppliers as well as internally within the bound- aries of the firm, or disposes of its outputs through independent outlets in addition to company-owned distribution channels. Taper integration implies
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1034 F. T. Rothaermel, M. A. Hitt and L. A. Jobe
that some activities are pursued in a parallel man- ner, both in-house and through outsourcing. We argue that taper integration enhances a firm’s prod- uct portfolio, new product success, and firm per- formance, in particular, if a firm effectively bal- ances the two strategic components of taper inte- gration, i.e., vertical integration and strategic out- sourcing.
The benefits of pursuing either vertical integra- tion or strategic alliances have been highlighted in numerous prior studies (e.g., Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Jones and Hill, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Hage- doorn, 1993; Dyer, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Stuart, 2000; Rothaermel, 2001; Ire- land, Hitt, and Vaidyanath, 2002). In contrast, while the use of taper integration has been grow- ing in prominence in a number of industries, little empirical research has examined the effects of this practice on firm outcomes. The dearth of empir- ical research is likely due to the methodological difficulty of capturing taper integration in a theo- retically proximal fashion.
We undertake herein a first step towards closing the gap in our knowledge of the effects of taper integration. Our overarching hypothesis is that bal- ancing vertical integration and strategic outsourc- ing in a prudent manner helps to optimize a firm’s product portfolio and achieve product success. In so doing, it contributes to a firm’s competitive advantage and thereby increases firm performance. To test this hypothesis, we examine the joint effects of simultaneously pursuing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing on a firm’s product portfolio, new product success, and firm performance.
First, we suggest that vertical integration and strategic outsourcing interact to synergistically increase a firm’s product portfolio. Building a port- folio of related products can contribute to a com- petitive advantage, particularly in highly dynamic markets (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). Next, we assess the individual effects of vertical integration and of strategic outsourcing on a firm’s product portfolio, product success, and performance. Here, we suggest that these relationships resemble an inverted U-shape, reflecting the theoretical notion that vertical integration and strategic outsourcing should be balanced to achieve the desired firm- level outcomes.
To the extent that the products in the portfolio are at the cutting edge of technology and serve customer needs, they are likely to enjoy success in the marketplace. It is unlikely, however, that
all products in a firm’s portfolio will be success- ful, especially when there are a large number of them (Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1995). Firms must have the capability to manage a large number of products to target them for the appropriate mar- ket segments and to ensure their differentiation as perceived by the consumers. The difficulty of successfully accomplishing these tasks increases as the number of related products in the firm’s portfolio grows, thereby enhancing the manage- rial challenges. This effect is likely to be particu- larly pronounced when firms face a high level of uncertainty, common in high-technology industries (Bettis and Hitt, 1995). We propose a synergistic interaction effect of vertical integration and strate- gic outsourcing on the size of a firm’s product portfolio, while also suggesting that a moderate product portfolio size will have the strongest effect on subsequent new product success and firm per- formance.
The theoretical model presented herein makes a contribution by highlighting the performance- enhancing consequences of balancing two differ- ent organizational forms, vertical integration and strategic outsourcing, constituting taper integra- tion. We draw on a longitudinal sample of firms in the global microcomputer industry to test the hypothesized relationships on an original panel dataset. In this research, we also make a method- ological contribution by developing a unique and theoretically proximate measure of individual new product success, derived from a detailed analysis of over 3,500 product introductions. We conclude that successfully organizing for innovation can be accomplished through taper integration that bal- ances the costs and benefits inherent in this hybrid organizational form to create product portfolios that enhance new product success and overall firm performance.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Taper integration and product portfolios
Firms must continuously develop and introduce new products to the marketplace to achieve and maintain a competitive advantage. New product introductions have the potential to create transi- tory advantages for firms, because they enable the firms to capture returns to innovation (Schumpeter,
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Balancing Vertical Integration and Strategic Outsourcing 1035
1942). These advantages, however, are frequently short lived in dynamic industries (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Bayus, Erickson, and Jacobson, 2003). As a result, firms often build portfolios of related prod- ucts to deter entry through product proliferation, increasing their customer base, better serving cus- tomer needs, and maintaining strategic flexibility (Brander and Eaton, 1985; Hill, 1997). This in turn allows firms to respond rapidly to changes in the marketplace initiated by, for example, a competitor’s introduction of new products (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). To build competitive prod- uct portfolios, firms increasingly attempt to com- bine the benefits from economizing on transac- tion costs through vertical integration (Williamson, 1975) with those derived through strategic out- sourcing such as enhanced flexibility and access to a broader stock of knowledge external to the focal firm (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996).
Firms vertically integrate to build entry barriers, facilitate investments in specialized assets, pro- tect product quality, and improve scheduling and coordination (Williamson, 1975; Chandler, 1977; Harrigan, 1984). Vertical integration has the poten- tial to enrich a firm’s new product development because it provides the opportunity to integrate tacit knowledge with complementary assets across different value chain activities (Teece, 1986). In technologically advanced industries, where suppli- ers often control vitally important new technol- ogy, internalizing these technological capabilities affords control and assures access to the knowl- edge necessary to build a portfolio of products based on cutting-edge technology (Afuah, 2001).
While the determination of firm boundaries appears to be mediated by industry structure and firm capabilities (Argyres, 1996), a fundamental assumption of transaction cost economics is that firms can alter their boundaries based on man- agerial discretion (Williamson, 1975, 1985). One could argue, however, that this assumption may not hold in some industries. For example, in the micro- computer industry, the setting for this study, it may be considered an unlikely option for microcom- puter manufacturers to integrate backwards into chips or forward into operating systems, because these value chain activities have been basically monopolized by Intel and Microsoft, respectively. While this example provides some evidence that the determination of firm boundaries is mediated by the existing industry structure, recent devel- opments in microcomputing suggest that some
firms have successfully integrated backwards into designing their own chips and are beginning to develop proprietary operating systems (Engardio and Einhorn, 2005). Nonetheless, backward and forward integration along the value chain clearly pose significantly differential strategic challenges. While integration into some value chain activities seems to be fairly effortless, integration into other activities can be quite difficult, the latter depending on the industry structure and the capabilities held by the integrating firm. Nonetheless, Leiblein and Miller (2003) found that internalization is likely under conditions of uncertainty regardless of the level of asset specificity. Therefore, vertical inte- gration should facilitate new product development and thereby contribute to expanding the firm’s product portfolio.
Because cutting-edge knowledge necessary for innovation tends to be widely dispersed across different firms, continual innovation in highly dynamic industries appears only possible if a firm reaches beyond its boundaries. This observation has prompted some to suggest that the locus of innovation might be found in a network of alliances rather than within individual firms, espe- cially in high-technology industries (Powell et al., 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Access to knowledge external to the firm, in addition to internal knowledge, enriches a firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), and enables firms to avoid path dependence in the development of internal technological knowledge stocks (Collis, 1991; Lei, Hitt, and Bettis, 1996). Nicholls-Nixon and Woo (2003), for example, show that the ability to produce product innovations requires both inter- nal and external R&D investments, leading firms to engage in a variety of strategic alliances. Integrat- ing internal and external technological knowledge stocks allows a firm to build a larger and broader portfolio of related products in order to gain and maintain a competitive advantage or to achieve at least competitive parity.
These arguments suggest that under conditions of uncertainty prevalent in high-technology indus- tries (Bettis and Hitt, 1995), firms tend to source some of the knowledge necessary for new prod- uct development through strategic alliances. In their inductive study of innovation in the computer industry, Brown and Eisenhardt (1997), found that firms using strategic alliances to probe and access cutting-edge knowledge external to the
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focal firm were more successful in their new prod- uct introductions. Similarly, others established that the sharing of knowledge across firm boundaries improves firm-level innovation when studying flat panel displays (Spencer, 2003), an important com- ponent in the microcomputer industry. Thus, when considering vertical integration and strategic out- sourcing in isolation, prior research provides con- vincing evidence that each organizational form has the potential to expand a firm’s product portfolio.
Herein, we argue that the simultaneous pursuit of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing allows for the integration of internal and exter- nal knowledge stocks to increase the number of products in the firm’s product portfolio. Under conditions of uncertainty, firms can enrich their product portfolios by internalizing current valu- able technological knowledge. At the same time, they must develop and maintain external sourc- ing relationships to gain access to new technical knowledge developed beyond the firm’s bound- aries (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kotabe, Martin, and Domoto, 2003). Furthermore, the integration of currently valuable internal technical knowledge and new external technical knowledge can pro- duce spillover effects that enable firms to profitably improve current products as well as to introduce additional related products in order to gain and maintain a competitive advantage.
Taper integration is thus a unique organizational form in which the simultaneous pursuit of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing has the poten- tial to create synergy that facilitates development of new products to increase a firm’s product portfo- lio. Taper integration enables a firm to economize on transaction costs, to obtain access to diverse sources of knowledge, to integrate tacit knowledge and complementary assets, and thereby to enhance its strategic flexibility. While this organizational form clearly increases the complexity of manage- rial tasks such as coordinating and scheduling, and also has non-trivial bureaucratic costs (Jones and Hill, 1988), a larger product portfolio is neverthe- less a significant benefit. Thus, all else being equal, we suggest that firms with greater taper integration tend to have more products in their portfolio.
Hypothesis 1: The interaction between a firm’s degree of vertical integration and level of strate- gic outsourcing has a positive effect on the num- ber of related products in the firm’s portfolio.
Balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing
The overarching hypothesis in this study is that balancing vertical integration and strategic out- sourcing helps to optimize a firm’s product portfo- lio and to improve product success, thereby con- tributing to a firm’s competitive advantage and firm performance. Achieving balance implies that taper integration should be based on a some- what equal emphasis on vertical integration and on strategic outsourcing. A balance in taper inte- gration is achieved when a firm neither focuses too much on vertical integration nor on strategic out- sourcing. This in turn implies that each organizing form in isolation should exhibit a curvilinear rela- tionship on valuable firm-level outcomes. Thus, we hypothesize that the direct effects of each vertical integration and strategic outsourcing on a firm’s product portfolio, product success, and firm per- formance are characterized by diminishing returns with the relationships resembling an inverted U- shaped function.
Extensive vertical integration can produce diminishing effects on firm-level outcomes for a number of reasons. Harrigan (1984), for example, highlights the disadvantages of extensive vertical integration such as increased managerial costs in coordinating integration over multiple stages of the value chain, the potential for either excess capacity or underutilization of resources because of unevenly balanced productivity across different value chain activities, technological obsolescence, strategic inflexibility, increased mobility and exit barriers, tight coupling to poor performing business units, lack of information and feedback from suppliers and distributors, among other problems. Thus, the greater the extent of vertical integration, the lower the degrees of strategic freedom and the greater the bureaucratic costs associated with it. When the loss in strategic flexibility and the increase in bureaucratic costs outweigh the benefits gained through vertical integration (Jones and Hill, 1988), diminishing returns result. These arguments suggest that the relationship between the degree of vertical integration and the firm-level outcomes of product portfolio, product success, and performance is inverted U-shaped.
Hypothesis 2: The effects of a firm’s degree of vertical integration on the size of its prod- uct portfolio (2a), new product success (2b),
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Balancing Vertical Integration and Strategic Outsourcing 1037
and firm performance (2c) are characterized by diminishing returns such that the relationships resemble an inverted U-shape.
In a similar fashion, the extensive pursuit of strategic outsourcing through alliances can also exhibit diminishing returns on firm-level outcomes (Rothaermel, 2001). Several theoretical arguments support this relationship. First, firms frequently compete for the most promising outsourcing options, and thus enter them first. Based on the classical Ricardian rent model, this leaves only less productive alliance options as firms engage more intensively in strategic outsourcing. Second, increasing reliance on strategic outsourcing implies that firms engage in multiple outsourcing agreements simultaneously at any given point in time, and thus managerial attention, frequently a constrained resource, may become overloaded and thus inadequate to oversee a firm’s alliance activities. Increasing demands on managerial attention in turn accentuates the cognitive limitations of managers. Third, as firms enter an increasing number of outsourcing alliances, their commensurate transaction and bureaucratic costs increase, beyond a point where gains to additional alliances are outweighed by their marginal costs (Jones and Hill, 1988), thus producing diminishing returns.
Hypothesis 3: The effects of a firm’s degree of strategic outsourcing on the size of its prod- uct portfolio (3a), new product success (3b), and firm performance (3c) are characterized by diminishing returns such that the relationships resemble an inverted U-shape.
Product portfolio, product success, and firm performance
Firms tend to add new products to their portfo- lios as they acquire new knowledge and integrate it with their existing knowledge base, in particular in highly dynamic industries. The new knowledge often builds upon the existing knowledge, allow- ing for improvements in existing products such as higher quality and greater ability to satisfy con- sumer needs. As a result, this process of knowledge creation and integration often improves the success of the related products in the portfolio. The mix of different knowledge stocks enriches the firm’s capability to expand its product portfolio and to
offer a greater variety of related products; in so doing, the firm can better satisfy customer needs in a manner superior to competitors’ product offer- ings (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007).
In a highly dynamic industry, a larger product portfolio often is important to gain and maintain a competitive advantage. Technological and market uncertainties provide entrepreneurial opportunities (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000), which firms can exploit by developing new technologies and prod- ucts that satisfy market requirements. Firms with rich product portfolios are also in a position to gain first mover advantages as opportunities arise (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). In addition to knowledge spillovers, a large portfolio of related products also helps to achieve economies of scale and scope in production as well as marketing and distribution, thus reducing unit production costs while simultaneously increasing product variety (Kotha, 1995). Furthermore, firms that regularly develop and introduce new products to the market tend to improve their innovation processes over time, and are thus in a better position to affect market change that favors their new product intro- ductions (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997).
Product portfolios, however, must also be managed. While larger product portfolios provide multiple benefits, they also produce non-trivial managerial costs. Even related products engen- der coordination costs. As a result, managers may experience information overload, as has been demonstrated by firms with more diversified prod- uct portfolios (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994). In fact, to create synergy and to gain the greatest value from related products, substantial coordination is often required, particularly with a large portfo- lio of related products. A large portfolio requires managers to carefully coordinate a diverse set of activities along the value chain to meet market demand; the managerial attention that can be given to any one product is thus limited. In addition, mar- keting budgets can also be diluted in firms with overly large product portfolios. As a result, over- all product success is likely to be lower if product portfolios are increased indiscriminately. Without efficient managerial coordination to compensate for increasing production complexities, new prod- uct introductions can suffer from poor product quality, lack of necessary differentiation, and other shortcomings, directly reducing firm performance.
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1038 F. T. Rothaermel, M. A. Hitt and L. A. Jobe
When striving to optimize new product success and firm performance, it is necessary for firms to achieve a close match between the size of their product portfolios and external market demand, otherwise negative performance implications are likely to exist. For example, the technology-based firm, Texas Instruments (TI), experienced a drastic erosion of its market share because of its single- minded focus on the experience curve concept, which required product portfolios with large scale and low variety. Over time, TI had developed a strong core competence in high-volume, low-cost manufacturing (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). As market demand shifted, however, towards calcu- lators with more features, TI was surpassed by competitors, Casio and Hewlett-Packard, because its strong core competence became a core rigidity (Leonard-Barton, 1992). In contrast, Sony attempts to maintain an innovative product portfolio that provides a variety of high-quality products while simultaneously maintaining its product portfolio at a reasonable size. Sony holds the actual number of its Walkman models on the market more or less constant at any given time. It maintains this balance by continuously introducing new models while retiring older ones (Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1995). Integrating the set of arguments suggests that the effects of the size of the firm’s product portfolio on product success and firm performance are curvilinear, such that they are positive for small and medium size product portfolios, but turn neg- ative for large product portfolios.
Hypothesis 4: The effects of the size of a firm’s product portfolio on new product success (4a) and firm performance (4b) are characterized by diminishing returns such that the relationships resemble an inverted U-shape.
METHODS
Research setting
The research setting for this study is the global microcomputer industry. This industry is com- posed of firms manufacturing a variety of smaller computers such as desktops, laptops/notebooks, servers/workstations, and handhelds. We chose the microcomputer industry for several reasons.
First, this industry exhibited considerable growth in the past two decades, largely due to continuous
technological innovations that resulted in greater computing power and simultaneously lower prices. For example, Moore’s law predicting an expo- nential growth in the number of transistors per integrated circuit every 12–18 months became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Second, a large number of firms compete in this industry, thereby enabling meaningful firm-level statistical analysis over a number of years. The microcomputer industry’s Herfindahl–Hirschman index, for example, was 811 during the mid-1990s, indicating a fairly low level of concentration in the industry. Third, firms in this industry tend to introduce many new prod- ucts. As a result, the random factors that might affect the success of any single new product devel- opment effort can be balanced over time, resulting in more reliable measures of a firm’s product port- folio and product success. Moreover, the micro- computer industry is generally not characterized by blockbuster successes based on a single product introduction, unlike the pharmaceutical industry, which attenuates a potential skewness in proxies for product success. Finally, while many micro- computer firms tend to pursue some degree of taper integration, they differ significantly in the extent to which they emphasize vertical integration and strategic outsourcing, respectively. For example, IBM maintained a relatively high level of verti- cal integration over time, while Dell outsources a large number of its components.
These characteristics explain why the microcom- puter industry is viewed as a hypercompetitive, high-velocity environment (D’Aveni, 1994; Bet- tis and Hitt, 1995; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). Overall, the microcomputer industry presents a suitable research setting to test our theoretical model of the relationships among vertical integra- tion, strategic outsourcing, product portfolio, prod- uct success, and firm performance.
To test the hypotheses advanced, we created a longitudinal panel dataset covering the 4-year time period between 1994 and 1997. We focused on this particular time period for several rea- sons. First, this period was characterized by incre- mental product innovations in the microcomputer industry within a given dominant design (Teece, 1986; Anderson and Tushman, 1990), thus allow- ing us to control for more radical innovations. Second, the microcomputer industry is a standards- driven industry to ensure that all components work together reasonably well. The microcomput- ing standard was established in the early 1980s
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Balancing Vertical Integration and Strategic Outsourcing 1039
with the introduction of the IBM PC built on an open architecture with a Microsoft operating sys- tem (MS-DOS) and Intel’s X86 microprocessor architecture (Hill, 1997). Finally, the time period under investigation witnessed the rise of multime- dia applications and the Internet, in addition to the continued convergence with the telecommunica- tions and consumer electronics industries. These factors placed a premium on continuously intro- ducing successful new products. A similar time frame was used by Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) in their study of continuous organizational change and product innovations in the computer industry.
Sample and data
We gathered the data for this study from the Computer Select and Computer Company Profiles databases, numerous computer industry and com- pany publications, Security Data Company (SDC Platinum), Lexis/Nexis, Compustat, Mergent FIS, SEC 10-K reports, and the U.S. Patent and Trade- mark Office. While several of the sources have been used in strategic management research, oth- ers are unique. The latter category includes the Computer Select and Computer Company Profiles databases published by Ziff Communications of New York. These databases are publicly available and contain abstracts, full text, and graphics from over 150 computer and general publications. They are published monthly, and each issue contains a rolling year of data. The Computer Company Pro- files database is factual and objective in nature and does not include any comparative or evaluative analyses. This database lists qualitative informa- tion about each firm such as its participation in the industry value chain, product portfolio, year of founding, whether the firm is public or pri- vate, whether the firm is a U.S. or an international firm, etc.
This sampling approach required us to address censoring issues. Some firms in the sample did not offer applicable products at the beginning of the study, and other firms withdrew from the mar- ket within the time frame of the study. Ignoring data from these firms creates a potential bias, so we included all firms that received at least four qualifying product reviews, which equates, on the average, to one product review per year for each firm during the study period. The purpose for choosing this cut-off point was to ensure that an
adequate number of data points would be avail- able for each firm. Moreover, including multiple product reviews for a single firm enhanced the reliability and validity of the new product success measure.
The worldwide population of microcomputer companies as listed in the Computer Company Profiles database consisted of 224 firms as of December 1997. Applying the sampling frame described above, we were able to obtain com- plete data on 123 microcomputer manufactures (55% of the population), for a sample size of 492 firm years over the 4-year study period. The sam- ple is quite diverse with small and large, public and private, U.S. and non-U.S. firms. Comparing the means of the sample with those of the pop- ulation reveals, however, that the sample is not significantly different statistically (annual revenues p < 0.63; number of employees p < 0.40; public vs. private ownership p < 0.56; U.S. vs. non-U.S. firms p < 0.53), which further enhances our con- fidence in the representativeness of the sample drawn.
A second issue in the sample construction involved methods of treating subsidiaries of a larger parent firm. We aggregated data from subsidiaries to obtain a composite score for a single parent firm. For example, this was done in the case of AT&T and NCR. NCR was acquired by AT&T in 1991 and subsequently spun-off in the fall 1996 trivestiture of AT&T, the new NCR, and Lucent Technologies. All of the NCR products that qualified for product reviews were pre-trivestiture products and hence classified as AT&T products. Similarly, all of the qualifying Packard-Bell product reviews occurred after the July 1996 merger of Packard-Bell and NEC. Finally, all of the qualifying Zenith Data Systems reviews occurred prior to NEC’s February 1996 acquisition of Zenith Data Systems. A detailed review of the Lexis/Nexis Computing and Telecommunications database revealed no other changes in ownership status that affected the measurement of the variables.
Variables and measures
Product portfolio
We proxied the size of a firm’s product portfolio by the number of microcomputer products that a firm offered in each year between 1994 and
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1040 F. T. Rothaermel, M. A. Hitt and L. A. Jobe
1997. During this time period, all sample firms combined had a total of 13,125 products in their portfolios, which equates to an average of 27 products per year for each firm. This measure includes all microcomputer products that the firms sold during each year, rather than limiting it to the products that were newly introduced and reviewed in computer publications.
Product success
Measuring the performance of individual new products across a different range of products and a diverse set of companies is challenging, because firms generally do not reveal revenues for individual products. Therefore, any attempt to measure the success of newly introduced products entails significant ambiguity. One of the goals for this research, however, is to develop and contribute a theoretically proximal and fine- grained measure of the performance of newly introduced products. Here, Godfrey and Hill (1995) suggest that researchers should track the observable consequences of otherwise illusive constructs.
Thus, to assess the success of individual product introductions in the microcomputer industry, we relied on experts’ ratings in industry publications. Expert evaluations have been used in prior research, for instance, in the assessment of the performance of strategic alliances (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). To proxy a firm’s new product success, we gathered individual new product evaluations from microcomputer product reviews contained in the Computer Select publications database. We limited the searches to the top- ten computer industry publications as measured by computer industry advertising revenues.1 We employed two primary criteria in selecting new product reviews. First, we required that a minimum of four products be included in the review. This procedure allowed for a more effective comparison of products because product reviews with fewer than four products tended to rate all products highly, and thus were more akin to advertisements.
1 The top-ten industry publications by computer advertising revenues (in millions) in 1995 were: (1) PC Magazine ($213.9); (2) Wall Street Journal ($129.4); (3) PC Week ($118.0); (4) Computer Shopper ($103.3); (5) Computer World ($87.3); (6) PC World ($86.1); (7) Computer Reseller News ($80.0); (8) Info World ($79.6); (9) Business Week ($74.8); (10) PC Computing ($70.2) (Computer Industry Almanac, 1996).
Second, the new product reviews had to provide a competitive evaluation indicating that one or more of the products were favored over the others. Based on these criteria, we calculated and recorded the individual evaluations for 3,559 newly introduced microcomputer products during the study period.
We classified each of the 3,559 products reviewed into one of four coding categories: clear winners = 4; runners-up = 3; neutral = 2; losers = 1.2 Next, we calculated an aggregated measure of new product success at the firm level of analysis. The development of this measure was complicated by a high variance in the selectivity of the different product reviews. For example, a product review article with 5 winners out of 100 is much more selective than one with 5 winners out of 10. We corrected for this selectivity in the development of the product review scores. We calculated an adjusted review score to account for the variance in difficulty inherent in the product reviews. Here, we set the adjusted review score (ARS ) equal to the assigned review score (RS ) multiplied by one minus the ex ante probability of any single product in that review receiving a winning rating (p). We set the value of p equal to the number of winning products divided by the total number of products in each review. By definition, the adjusted review scores [ARS = RS × (1 − p)] varied between zero and four. Finally, we calculated the annual adjusted review scores for each firm. To accomplish this, we set the denominator k equal to the number of products that were reviewed per firm in each year t . The following formula summarizes this procedure and depicts the measure to proxy a firm’s new product success in year t :
New product successt =
kt∑
1
[RS × (1 − p)]
kt
(1).
While the sample firms may compete in differ- ent segments of the microcomputer industry (desk- tops, laptops/notebooks, servers/workstations, and handhelds), the vast majority of microcomputer
2 Assessment of inter-rater reliability was necessary for the Computer Shopper articles due to the lack of an objective scheme underlying the review. A random sub-sample of 10 Computer Shopper reviews was independently coded by a second researcher. The inter-rater reliability for these ten articles was equal to 1.0 (i.e., perfect inter-rater agreement).
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products offered in this industry were desktops and laptops/notebooks (hereafter referred to as lap- tops). The microcomputer industry largely con- sisted of two primary segments—desktops and laptops—during the study period covering the mid-1990s. This skewed distribution between dif- ferent types of microcomputer products is mir- rored in the frequency of product evaluations. Accordingly, the majority of products reviewed were desktops (66.5% or 2,368 product evalua- tions) and laptops (29.3% or 1,043 product evalu- ations), together composing almost 96 percent (or 3,411 product evaluations) of the 3,559 product evaluations. Servers/workstations composed only 3.9 percent (138 product evaluations), and hand- helds made up merely 0.3 percent (10 product evaluations) of all products evaluated. To ensure a more homogeneous sample, we eliminated the 148 product evaluations for servers/workstations and handhelds, thereby focusing on the dominant segments of desktops and laptops (this did not, however, affect the robustness of the results; see the Appendix for more details). Thus, we used a total 3,411 product evaluations in the final anal- yses. The average product reviewed received a neutral evaluation in terms of its adjusted review score (2 out of 4), regardless of market segment.
To account, however, for the variation in the frequency of product evaluations and to assess potential idiosyncrasies of different market seg- ments, we developed three different measures to assess a firm’s new product success: (1) a com- posite new product performance score for the full sample containing both desktop and laptop computers; (2) a new product performance score for desktop computers only; and (3) a new prod- uct performance score for laptop computers only. While the sample comprises 123 firms, 108 firms competed in desktops, and 69 firms competed in laptops, with 54 firms competing in both seg- ments. All firms in the sample competed in desk- tops and/or laptops, and no single firm competed in either servers/workstations or handhelds exclu- sively. Thus, all firms were retained in the sample.
Firm performance
We proxied overall firm performance using total annual revenues. If a firm’s products succeed in the marketplace, they capture higher revenues regard- less of whether a firm pursues a low-cost lead- ership or a differentiation strategy (Porter, 1985).
Further support for revenues as a performance met- ric is shown by the fact that the large majority of the sample firms (92%) focus on computers as their dominant business. In addition, revenue data were more readily available than alternative per- formance measures such as net income or return on assets, because the majority of the firms in the sample were privately held (71%), and some were international firms (10%). All revenue data were converted into U.S. dollars corresponding to the historic dollar value. Due to skewness in the revenue data, we applied a logarithmic transforma- tion. Further, we lagged firm revenues by one time period (Lagged firm performance), and included it in the regression model to control for a potential specification bias arising from unobserved hetero- geneity (Jacobson, 1990).
Vertical integration
We based the measure of vertical integration on each firm’s participation in different activities of the industry value chain. In particular, we assessed whether a certain value chain activity was pursued within the boundaries of the firm. To construct the vertical integration measure, we combined a deductive approach to the value chain (Porter, 1985) with detailed industry descriptions of the microcomputer industry (e.g., Grove, 1996; Rivkin and Porter, 1999). The microcomputer industry value chain consists of five distinct activities depicting a product’s progression from upstream to downstream stages in the value chain (Grove 1996: 39-45): (1) chips; (2) computers (desktops and lap- tops); (3) software: operating system; (4) software: applications; (5) sales and service. Drawing on data from the Computer Select database, we devel- oped a matrix of indicator variables to code each firm’s participation/non-participation in the differ- ent activities of the microcomputer industry value chain (1 = activity pursued in-house). To obtain a vertical integration score at the firm level, we summed the scores from the five different value chain activities to obtain an aggregate measure to proxy each firm’s degree of vertical integration.
To assess the validity and reliability of the Computer Select data, a second researcher inde- pendently coded business press coverage during the study period drawn from Lexis/Nexis. These sources, such as the Wall Street Journal and Busi- ness Week, frequently provide information on the
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
1042 F. T. Rothaermel, M. A. Hitt and L. A. Jobe
value chain activities of microcomputer compa- nies. We found the intersource reliability to be r = 0.68 (p < 0.001), and thus providing evidence of acceptable reliability (Cohen et al., 2003). Given the variance in the sample with respect to firm size, level of vertical integration, public and pri- vate ownership, U.S. and international firms, the similarity of these relatively coarse-grained data is heartening. Furthermore, the results reported below are consistent regardless of the data source employed, providing further evidence of accept- able reliability.
Based on the sample construction, all firms in this study were involved in the second value chain stage, in-house manufacturing of microcomputers. Thus, the minimum score of vertical integration is 1, while the maximum score is 5, implying full vertical integration. Indeed, the full range of vertical integration is represented in the sample.3
Strategic outsourcing
Firms generally structure their outsourcing activ- ities through strategic alliances, defined as ‘vol- untary arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, co-development of products, technologies, or services’ (Gulati, 1998: 293). We focused on contractual relationships between firms because such inter-firm cooperation reflect formal collaboration between independent firms, and thus are more likely to capture the theoretical construct of strategic outsourcing.
To develop fine-grained and theoretically proxi- mate strategic outsourcing measures required sev- eral steps. First, we proxied each firm’s degree of strategic outsourcing by the total number of strate- gic alliances in which a firm engaged for each year t during the study period. To enhance the accuracy and reliability of the strategic outsourcing data, one researcher obtained alliance data from the strategic
3 It is important to note that a value of 1 for vertical integra- tion merely captures microcomputer manufacturing, and thus, one could argue, does not represent vertical integration. Apply- ing ranges of 1 to 5 for a firm’s value chain activities rather than ranges of 0 to 4, where one would only focus on vertical integration beyond microcomputer manufacturing was neces- sary, however, to construct fine-grained measures of strategic outsourcing discussed directly below. Moreover, given that all firms participate at least in the same one value chain activity (in-house manufacturing), results are affected only when there is one or more additional value chain activities in which the firm participates, producing the necessary variance.
alliance database published by Security Data Com- pany (SDC Platinum),4 while a second researcher independently coded press coverage documenting the sample firms’ alliance activity drawn from the Lexis/Nexis database. The intersource reliability was r = 0.86 (p < 0.001), suggesting high reli- ability (Cohen et al., 2003).
In a second step, to closely tie the strategic out- sourcing measure to the theory advanced above, we developed two fine-grained measures of strate- gic outsourcing based on a detailed content anal- ysis of each alliance. Overall, the firms in the sample entered a total of 1,205 alliances during the study period. Central to our theoretical arguments is the concept of taper integration, which occurs when a firm pursues the same value chain activity in-house as well as through strategic outsourcing with external partners. Thus, to develop two dis- tinct strategic outsourcing measures, we compared the content description of each alliance to a firm’s value chain activities pursued in-house, the proxy for vertical integration. We coded alliances that mapped to a value chain activity that a firm pur- sued in-house as strategic outsourcing taper , while alliances that did not map onto a firm’s value-chain activities pursued in-house were coded as strategic outsourcing quasi . The latter construct captures the theoretical notion of quasi integration (Harrigan, 1984), because one part of the value chain is inter- nalized, while another part is conducted through outsourcing with external partners.
The 1,205 alliances represented 852 taper alliances (71%) and 353 quasi alliances (29%), and are count measures based on whether an alliance mapped onto a value chain activity of the firm (strategic outsourcing taper) or not (strategic outsourcing quasi ). Moreover, the discriminant validity of the two strategic outsourcing proxies is highlighted in their low bivariate correlation of r = 0.29 (8.4% common variance), well below the common variance necessary to be considered a single construct (Cohen et al., 2003). About 41 percent of the sample firms pursued taper integration, and approximately 36 percent of the firms engaged in quasi integration. Additionally, about 22 percent of the sample firms simultaneously pursued both taper and quasi integration.
4 For a recent application of the SDC alliance database in strategic management research see Anand and Khanna (2000).
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
Balancing Vertical Integration and Strategic Outsourcing 1043
Control variables
We included a diverse set of control variables to account for other potential effects on a firm’s product portfolio, product success, and firm performance, and thus to reduce the threat of a potential specification bias due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Firm age
Research suggests that older firms tend to introduce more innovations, albeit incremental ones (Sørensen and Stuart, 2000). Over time, firms also establish routines and overcome the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), which should enhance their performance and likelihood of survival. We calculated firm age as the difference between the current year and the firm’s founding date for each year t during the study period. The average microcomputer firm in the sample was 14 years old.
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
A firm’s market power, frequently reflective of its size, changes over time as firms merge, pursue vertical integration, or exit certain industries, all of which affect firm performance. We controlled for this potential effect when estimating the impact of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing on product portfolio and product success by including in the analyses firm-level Herfindahl–Hirschman indexes (HHI) for each year t , which were proxied by each firm’s annual squared market share (Carlton and Perloff, 1994).
Employees
When estimating firm performance, a firm-level Herfindahl–Hirschman index was not a suitable measure for firm size, because the construction of the index directly depends on firm revenues, our proxy for performance. We thus used the number of employees as a control for firm size when estimating firm performance, commonly used to control for firm size in high-technology industries (Sørenson and Stuart, 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). The average firm in the sample employed about 14,000 people. Because the employee data were only available for about 60 percent of the sample, we needed to impute the
missing data, which did not affect the robustness of the results (see Appendix for more detail). It is noteworthy that other control variables such as firm age, number of patents, and lagged firm performance are highly correlated with firm size, and thus we are reasonably confident of our ability to isolate the effects of vertical integration, strategic outsourcing, and product portfolio on firm performance beyond firm size effects.
Patents
Firm patents are a potentially important input into the new product development process (Griliches, 1990). We proxied each firm’s patenting activity using a count of the total number of patents received in each year t during the study period. Prior research has established the reliability of patent count data because it has shown that patent count data are highly correlated with citation- weighted patent measures, thus proxying the same underlying theoretical construct (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Stuart, 2000). For example, the bivariate correlation between patent counts and citation-weighted patents has been shown to be above 0.77 (p < 0.001) in the pharmaceutical industry (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003), and above 0.80 (p < 0.001) in the semiconductor industry (Stuart, 2000), indicating some generalizability of this assertion. The average microcomputer firm in the sample obtained about 75 patents per year.
U.S. firm
We controlled for institutional differences (Hen- nart, Roehl, and Zietlow, 1999) by including in the analyses a dummy variable distinguishing U.S. and non-U.S. based microcomputer companies (1 = U.S. firm) using the firm’s headquarters location; 90 percent of the sample firms were headquartered in the United States.
Public firm
We controlled for the ownership status of the firm by including a dummy variable with 1 = public firm and 0 = private firm. Only about 29 percent of the sample firms were public.
Dominant microcomputers
It is critical to control for the degree of overall firm diversification when assessing the effect of
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
1044 F. T. Rothaermel, M. A. Hitt and L. A. Jobe
different organizing forms on product portfolio, product success, and firm performance in a single industry. We assessed each firm’s level of diversification based on Rumelt’s (1974) seminal work. He classified a firm’s business as dominant if the firm obtains 70 percent or more of its revenues from a single business activity, which is indicative of a low level of diversification. Building on this definition, we created a dummy variable indicating that a firm’s dominant business is in microcomputers if the firm obtained 70 percent or more of its revenues from microcomputers (1 = dominant business is in microcomputers, 0 = all others). The vast majority of firms in the sample exhibited little unrelated diversification; as 92 percent of the firms’ dominant business was microcomputers.
Mergers and Acquisitions
A third alternative to structure innovation—in addition to vertical integration and strategic outsourcing—is to engage in mergers and acquisitions (Nicholls-Nixon and Woo, 2003). We controlled for this option by including a count variable indicating the number of mergers and acquisitions in which the focal firm was engaged in year t during the study period (Mergers & Acquisitions). To assess the validity and reliability of the SDC data, a second researcher independently coded business press coverage pertaining to M&A activity in the microcomputer industry during the study period drawn from Lexis/Nexis. We found the intersource reliability to be r = 0.72 (p < 0.001), and thus above the recommended criterion (Cohen et al., 2003). The average sample firm engaged in one merger or acquisition every 2 years.
Estimation procedure
The data used in this study are longitudinal, and thus represent a panel dataset. Panel data follow a given set of companies over time, and thus provide multiple observations on each firm. In this sample, we followed 123 firms over 4 years, which equals 492 firm years. It is important to note that a majority of empirical work in strategic management relies on cross-sectional data, and does therefore not allow for causal inferences (Hitt, Gimeno, and Hoskisson, 1998). Panel data are considered a superior alternative due to distinct
advantages over cross-sectional data (Hsiao, 2003). Panel data allow the researcher to control for the initial values of the dependent variable and to recognize time lag effects. Panel data also enable the researcher to draw on a larger sample, and thereby increase statistical power and reduce the threat of multicollinearity among independent variables, which in turn enhance the efficiency of the econometric estimates (Boyd, Gove, and Hitt, 2005).
We used generalized least square (GLS) regres- sion analysis to test the hypotheses advanced (Greene, 2003).5 The GLS procedure produces more efficient estimates than a general linear regression model, because it minimizes a weighted sum of squared residuals. GLS estimates are cor- rected for autocorrelation and cross-section het- eroscedasticity, while estimating weighted aver- ages of the within and between firm effects. We applied a more conservative approach by esti- mating the GLS regression models with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. This estimation procedure produces covariances that are robust to general heteroscedas- ticity, because variances within a cross-section are allowed to differ across time.
All hypotheses advanced in the theoretical model above indicate the inclusion of interaction terms, either as linear cross-products of two different vari- ables (Hypothesis 1) or as cross-products of the same variable to create squared terms to assess the potential for diminishing returns (Hypothe- ses 2–4). Testing moderated regression models requires the inclusion of the direct effects as well as the interaction effects. This approach is a rel- atively conservative method for examining inter- action effects, because the statistical significance of the interaction term is evaluated after all lower- order effects have been controlled (Jaccard, Wan, and Turrisi, 1990).
To enhance the interpretability of the regression results and to reduce potential multicollinearity, we standardized all independent variables (Cohen et al., 2003). While neither degrading the qual- ity of the data nor affecting the statistical signif- icance levels, this procedure allows us to directly compare beta coefficients across different variables with different scales. The variables for the interac- tion terms were standardized prior to creating the
5 For a recent application of GLS regression analysis in strategic management research, see Kotha and Nair (1995).
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
Balancing Vertical Integration and Strategic Outsourcing 1045
respective cross products. To assess the threat of multicollinearity, we calculated the variance infla- tion factors (VIFs) for each coefficient. The maxi- mum estimated VIF for all direct effects across the three different dependent variables was 3.7, and thus well below the recommended ceiling of 10 (Cohen et al., 2003).
As expected, the VIFs for the interaction terms, however, were somewhat elevated. This is because these interaction terms are either linear cross prod- ucts of two different variables or cross products of the same variable to construct squared terms. One undesirable consequence of potential mul- ticollinearity is inflated standard errors that can result in overall statistically significant regres- sion models, while failing to identify statisti- cally significant coefficients for individual vari- ables. Thus, multicollinearity can lead to Type II errors. The results presented below, however, are not materially influenced by potential multi- collinearity, because most of the individual cross products and squared terms are statistically signif- icant. Moreover, the coefficients behave appropri- ately and consistently across different regression models. It is also important to note that potential multicollinearity does not bias the coefficient esti- mates or influence the overall model fit (Kennedy, 1996: 177).
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for and bivariate correlation among the variables, while Tables 2–4 contain the regression results. We first estimated a respective baseline model for each dependent variable, containing the control vari- ables only (Models 1, 5, 7, 9, and 11). All models used to assess the hypotheses represent a statisti- cally significant improvement over their respective baseline models (p < 0.001 in all cases).
In Hypothesis 1, we postulated that the inter- action between a firm’s degree of vertical inte- gration and level of strategic outsourcing has a positive effect on the number of related prod- ucts in the firm’s portfolio. Because the results of direct effects cannot be interpreted in a mean- ingful way when the regression contains both direct and interaction effects, based on the cross- products of the direct effects of interest (Cohen et al., 2003: 259–260), we first inserted the direct effects for strategic outsourcing quasi, strategic
outsourcing taper, and vertical integration to pre- dict a firm’s product portfolio (Model 2). This allows us to isolate the effect of each organiz- ing form individually, while controlling for the other organizing forms. The results in Model 2 indicate that each organizing form has a positive and statistically significant effect (at p < 0.01 or smaller) on the size of a firm’s product portfo- lio. In Model 3, we inserted the interaction terms to assess the simultaneous effect of vertical inte- gration and strategic outsourcing on the size of a firm’s product portfolio. The statistically signifi- cant positive interaction terms between strategic outsourcing quasi and vertical integration (p <
0.001) and between strategic outsourcing taper and vertical integration (p < 0.05) indicate that firms pursuing quasi integration or taper integration tend to have larger product portfolios. Thus, the individ- ual effects of strategic outsourcing are enhanced synergistically in the presence of vertical integra- tion, above and beyond each organizing forms’ direct effects. These results provide support for Hypothesis 1.
In Hypothesis 2, we stated that the effects of a firm’s degree of vertical integration on the size of its product portfolio (Hypothesis 2a), new product success (Hypothesis 2b), and firm per- formance (Hypothesis 2c) are characterized by diminishing returns such that the relationships are inverted U-shaped. Model 4 contains the linear terms for strategic outsourcing quasi, strategic outsourcing taper, and vertical integration along with the squared terms for each organizing form to assess the diminishing returns hypothesis for the product portfolio (Hypothesis 2a). Model 4 does not contain the interaction effects that were included in Model 3, because an inclusion of the interaction terms would cause the direct effects, necessary to analyze Hypotheses 2 and 3, to be uninterpretable (Cohen et al., 2003: 259–260). If interaction terms are included, the direct effects of each organizational form can only be under- stood contingent upon the moderating variable, as in Model 3. Based on the results obtained in Model 4, we find support for Hypothesis 2a, because the linear term of vertical integration is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001), while the squared term is negative, and also statistically sig- nificant (p < 0.001).
We assessed Hypothesis 2b in Models 6, 8, and 10. When relating vertical integration to prod- uct success in the combined desktop and laptop
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
1046 F. T. Rothaermel, M. A. Hitt and L. A. Jobe
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Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
Balancing Vertical Integration and Strategic Outsourcing 1047
Table 2. Regression results estimating the effects of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing on a firm’s product portfolio
Model 1 Product portfolio
Model 2 Product portfolio
Model 3 Product portfolio
Model 4 Product portfolio
Constant 25.8400∗∗∗ 25.4988∗∗∗ 25.2716∗∗∗ 31.0313∗∗∗
(0.3038) (0.4465) (0.3803) (0.9175) Firm age 7.3412∗∗∗ 2.7037∗∗∗ 2.4779∗∗∗ 3.6585∗∗∗
(0.5645) (0.4216) (0.4634) (0.4443) Herfindahl–Hirschman index −0.8096 −1.5008∗ 0.4258 −2.8676∗∗∗
(1.2741) (0.7239) (0.4767) (0.8691) Patents 4.4980∗∗∗ 0.0537 4.1861∗∗∗ −0.9984
(0.3336) (0.9925) (0.3064) (1.3565) U.S. firm 1.6933∗∗∗ −0.7690† −0.0800 −1.5760∗∗∗
(0.5204) (0.4753) (0.5148) (0.4591) Public firm 3.6929∗∗∗ 0.9657∗∗∗ 0.8915∗∗∗ 1.9851∗∗∗
(0.4565) (0.2238) (0.1657) (0.3375) Dominant microcomputers 8.6366∗∗∗ 4.3545∗∗∗ 4.9466∗∗∗ 5.5537∗∗∗
(0.7605) (0.6847) (0.5606) (0.6175) Mergers & Acquisitions 10.7128∗∗∗ 4.6616∗∗ 0.3959 6.1638∗∗∗
(1.2346) (1.9680) (1.3676) (1.6369) Strategic outsourcing quasi 5.1958∗∗ 5.0253∗∗∗ 0.8534
(2.0644) (0.8762) (2.1289) (Strategic outsourcing quasi)2 0.1112
(0.2049) Strategic outsourcing taper 8.4980∗∗∗ 4.5643∗∗ 34.0091∗∗∗
(2.1589) (1.7964) (5.1525) (Strategic outsourcing taper)2 −2.1005∗∗∗
(0.3674) Vertical integration 8.0046∗∗∗ 7.3485∗∗∗ 8.7234∗∗∗
(0.2220) (0.3256) (0.4060) (Vertical integration)2 −4.1693∗∗∗
(0.9685) Strategic outsourcing quasi × Vertical integration 4.3557∗∗∗
(1.0310) Strategic outsourcing taper × Vertical integration 1.1831∗
(0.5808)
R2 0.39 0.50 0.54 0.52 Improvement over base (�R2) 0.11∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
N 486 486 486 486
†p < 0.10; ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Models are GLS, estimated with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) and covariances (corrected for degrees of freedom).
sample (Model 6) and in the desktop market only (Model 8), we find that both the linear and squared terms are each negative and statistically signifi- cant (p < 0.001). This implies that the relationship between vertical integration and new product suc- cess is non-linearly negative rather than inverted U-shaped. We thus fail to find support for Hypoth- esis 2b in the combined desktop and laptop seg- ments, and in the desktop market. We do find sup- port, however, for a diminishing returns hypothesis between vertical integration and product success in the laptop market (Model 10). Here, the linear
term for vertical integration is, as expected, posi- tive and statistically significant (p < 0.001), while the squared term for vertical integration is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.001).
We evaluated Hypothesis 2c, indicating dimin- ishing returns between vertical integration and firm performance, in Model 12 presented in Table 4. We find that the squared term for vertical integration is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001). Thus, we fail to find support for Hypothesis 2c. Rather this result implies a non-linear positive effect of vertical integration on firm performance.
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
1048 F. T. Rothaermel, M. A. Hitt and L. A. Jobe
Table 3. Regression results estimating the effects of vertical integration, strategic outsourcing, and product portfolio on a firm’s product success across different microcomputer segments
Model 5 Product success
Full sample
Model 6 Product success
Full sample
Model 7 Product success Desktop
Model 8 Product success Desktop
Model 9 Product success Laptop
Model 10 Product success Laptop
Constant 1.8828∗∗∗ 1.9277∗∗∗ 1.9173∗∗∗ 1.9407∗∗∗ 1.8741∗∗∗ 1.9368∗∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0097) (0.0031) (0.0338) Firm age 0.0454∗∗∗ 0.0095 0.0190∗∗ 0.0125 0.0563∗∗∗ 0.0415∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0101) (0.0066) (0.0121) (0.0009) (0.0142) Herfindahl–Hirschman index −0.0805∗∗∗ −0.0493∗∗∗ 0.0332† 0.0566 −0.0778∗∗∗ −0.0729∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0119) (0.0211) (0.0456) (0.0084) (0.0133) Patents 0.0043 0.0150 −0.0108 −0.0212 −0.0219∗∗ −0.0445∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0180) (0.0146) (0.0256) (0.0096) (0.0164) U.S. firm 0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0641∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0042) (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0067) (0.0101) Public firm −0.0123∗∗∗ −0.0193∗∗∗ −0.0295∗∗∗ −0.0269∗∗∗ 0.0552∗∗∗ 0.0611∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0034) (0.0014) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0066) Dominant microcomputers 0.0101 −0.0066 0.0104† −0.0080 0.0029 0.0014
(0.0149) (0.0127) (0.0066) (0.0090) (0.0118) (0.0154) Mergers & Acquisitions 0.0742∗∗∗ 0.0255∗ 0.0088 −0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗ 0.0754∗∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0130) (0.0097) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0214) Strategic outsourcing quasi 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.0793∗∗∗ −0.1115∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0076) (0.0410) (Strategic outsourcing quasi)2 −0.0689∗∗∗ −0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0165†
(0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0124) Strategic outsourcing taper 0.0393∗∗∗ 0.0857∗∗∗ 0.2033∗
(0.0129) (0.0170) (0.1231) (Strategic outsourcing taper)2 −0.0017† −0.0044∗∗ −0.0163∗
(0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0087) Vertical integration −0.0221∗∗∗ −0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0683∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0119) (Vertical integration)2 −0.0128∗∗∗ −0.0145∗∗∗ −0.0507∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0110) Product portfolio 0.0982∗∗∗ 0.0569∗∗∗ 0.0830∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0088) (0.0078) (Product portfolio)2 −0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0002 −0.0161∗
(0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0095)
R2 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.09 Improvement over base (�R2) 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
N 312 312 246 246 146 146
†p < 0.10; ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Models are GLS, estimated with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) and covariances (corrected for degrees of freedom).
Taken together, we find support for a diminishing returns hypothesis between vertical integration and product portfolio (Hypothesis 2a) and between ver- tical integration and product success in the laptop market (Hypothesis 2b).
In parallel to the vertical integration hypothe- sis (Hypothesis 2), in Hypothesis 3 we suggested that the effects of a firm’s degree of strategic outsourcing on the size of its product portfolio (Hypothesis 3a), new product success (Hypothe- sis 3b), and firm performance (Hypothesis 3c) are characterized by diminishing returns such that the
relationships are inverted U-shaped. Because the theoretical focus of this study is on taper integra- tion, we consider quasi integration to be a control variable. Thus, we are able to assess the effect of strategic outsourcing taper above and beyond a firm’s level of strategic outsourcing quasi and vertical integration. We assessed Hypothesis 3a in Model 4, Hypothesis 3b in Models 6, 8, and 10, and Hypothesis 3c in Model 12.
The results in Model 4 provide support for a diminishing returns to the effects of strategic outsourcing taper and the size of a firm’s product
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
Balancing Vertical Integration and Strategic Outsourcing 1049
portfolio, because the linear term for this variable is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001), while the squared term is negative and also statisti- cally significant (p < 0.001). The results presented in Models 6, 8, and 10 offer support for Hypoth- esis 3b, because in each model the linear term of strategic outsourcing taper is positive and statis- tically significant (at p < 0.05 or lower), while the squared term is negative and statistically sig- nificant (at p < 0.10 or lower). Thus, the results suggest that the relationship between strategic out- sourcing taper and new product success is inverted U-shaped, across the product categories of the combined desktop and laptop sample, the desk- top segment alone and the laptop segment alone. The results presented in Model 12 lend support for Hypothesis 3c, because the linear term of strategic outsourcing taper is positive and statistically sig- nificant (p < 0.01), while the squared term is neg- ative and also statistically significant (p < 0.01). Taken together, the results provide support for a diminishing returns effect of strategic outsourcing taper on the size of the firm’s product portfolio (Hypothesis 3a), new product success (Hypothesis 3b), and firm performance (Hypothesis 3c). The observed curvilinear relationship between strategic outsourcing taper and new product success appears to be quite robust because it holds regardless of the underlying microcomputer market segment.
In Hypothesis 4, we postulated that the effects of the size of a firm’s product portfolio on new prod- uct success (Hypothesis 4a) and firm performance (Hypothesis 4b) are characterized by diminishing returns such that the relationships are inverted U- shaped. We tested Hypothesis 4a in Models 6, 8, and 10. We find support for a diminishing returns hypothesis of product portfolio size on new product success in the combined desktop and lap- top sample (Model 6) and in the laptop segment (Model 10), because in both cases the linear term of product portfolio is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001), while the squared term is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.05 or lower). We fail to find support, however, for the diminishing returns hypothesis of product port- folio size on new product success in the desk- top segment (Model 8). While the linear term is, as predicted, positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001), the squared term does not reach sta- tistical significance.
We assessed Hypothesis 4b in Model 12. The diminishing returns hypothesis between product
Table 4. Regression results estimating the effects of ver- tical integration, strategic outsourcing, product portfolio, and product success on firm performance
Model 11 Firm
performance
Model 12 Firm
performance
Constant 18.6950∗∗∗ 18.4007∗∗∗
(0.2229) (0.2422) Firm age 0.6067∗∗∗ 0.5213∗∗∗
(0.0269) (0.0400) Employees 0.9088∗∗∗ 1.0076∗∗∗
(0.2086) (0.2501) Patents 0.1893∗∗∗ 0.0928∗
(0.0266) (0.0477) U.S. firm −0.1366∗∗∗ −0.1650∗∗∗
(0.0291) (0.0409) Public firm 0.8972∗∗∗ 0.7074∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0198) Dominant microcomputers −0.0899∗∗∗ −0.2035∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0245) Mergers & Acquisitions 0.0392 0.0070
(0.0536) (0.1269) Lagged firm performance 0.3804∗ 0.1127
(0.2131) (0.2218) Strategic outsourcing quasi 0.5163∗∗
(0.1670) (Strategic outsourcing −0.0363∗∗
quasi)2 (0.0152) Strategic outsourcing taper 0.5183∗∗
(0.2031) (Strategic outsourcing −0.0875∗∗
taper)2 (0.0248) Vertical integration 0.0176
(0.0209) (Vertical integration)2 0.1811∗∗∗
(0.0247) Product portfolio 0.2890∗∗∗
(0.0337) (Product portfolio)2 −0.1271∗∗∗
(0.0217)
R2 0.59 0.64 Improvement over base
(�R2) 0.05∗∗∗
N 486 486
†p < 0.10; ∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Models are GLS, estimated with White heteroscedasticity-consistent stan- dard errors (in parentheses) and covariances (corrected for degrees of freedom).
portfolio size and firm performance is supported, because the linear term for product portfolio is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001), while the squared term is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.001). To determine the theoreti- cally optimal size of a firm’s product portfolio that maximizes its revenues, we calculated the absolute
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
1050 F. T. Rothaermel, M. A. Hitt and L. A. Jobe
value of the partial derivative with respect to prod- uct portfolio size (0.2890/[2 × 0.1271] = 1.1369). We know that this is a maximum in the function relating product portfolio size to revenues because the second partial derivative with respect to prod- uct portfolio is negative. Because we standardized all independent variables prior to entering them in the regression equations to enhance their inter- pretability and comparability, we had to transform the standardized optimum into a non-standardized solution for accurate interpretation. Note that the standardized optimum is a z-score; thus the non- standardized solution is obtained as follows:
X = mean + (standardized z-score
× standard deviation), or
X = 26.70 + (1.1369 × 31.29) = 62.27
Therefore, the average firm reaches its optimum product portfolio size when attempting to maxi- mize revenues at about 62 products in its portfolio. We need to be mindful, however, that this num- ber is more suggestive than normative because it is context dependent in terms of the underlying sample and time period studied. In sum, we find support for Hypothesis 4a (except in the desktop segment) and Hypothesis 4b, indicating that the relationship between the size of a firm’s product portfolio and new product success (Hypothesis 4a) and firm performance (Hypothesis 4b) is inverted U-shaped.6
DISCUSSION
Scholars in multiple disciplines have focused sus- tained attention on the boundaries of the firm. This emphasis has been particularly evident in the prolific literature on vertical integration and strategic alliances (cf. Gulati, 1998; Leiblein and Miller, 2003). Yet, these two significant streams of research have not been integrated to under- stand the benefits and costs of internalizing some value chain activities and simultaneously outsourc- ing other value chain activities. This practice, however, has become increasingly common since Harrigan (1984) identified it over 20 years ago. Simultaneous internalization and outsourcing of
6 We conducted a number of robustness checks which we report in the Appendix.
value chain activities are referred to as taper inte- gration and quasi integration; taper integration is of special importance for this study. We add value to our knowledge of vertical integration and strate- gic outsourcing, because we relate the theoretical arguments explaining the underlying benefits and costs of taper integration to the development of the firm’s product portfolio, the success of new prod- ucts introduced to the market, and ultimately to firm financial performance.
The totality of the results provides strong evi- dence for the value of balancing vertical integra- tion and outsourcing of value chain activities, and especially of engaging in taper integration. Taper integration was found to have a positive effect on both development of related products for the firm’s product portfolio and on the success of those new products upon introduction to the market- place. Taper integration provides several potential benefits.
In particular, taper integration, more than most other forms of outsourcing, provides a significant potential to access new external knowledge and to internalize it. By performing some activities in a particular stage of the value chain internally and some externally, a firm keeps its pulse on external technology and new knowledge devel- oped outside the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Importantly, the firm also has the absorptive capac- ity to learn the new knowledge and to quickly apply it within the firm. In this way, the firm can develop more effectively new products that are technologically current. Because taper integra- tion allows a firm to be at the cutting edge of technology by internalizing it quickly, the firm is more likely to enjoy success with its new prod- ucts introduced to the market. Additionally, taper integration provides the benefits from the synergy created by integrating complementary resources from the external partner with the firm’s inter- nal resources (Teece, 1986), and thus enables the firm to develop new advantage-creating capabili- ties (Sirmon et al., 2007). Finally, taper integration affords more strategic flexibility to the firm. Oper- ating in dynamic environments common in high- technology industries, the use of taper integration allows a firm to internalize a complete value chain stage or to outsource it. It can also more easily change to use a new technology without signif- icant losses of current assets. For example, Dell often outsources design activities to firms such as Flextronics, while maintaining in-house R&D
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Balancing Vertical Integration and Strategic Outsourcing 1051
capabilities to develop many of the product com- ponents. Today, Flextronics can develop superior designs at a lower cost than many of its primary customers. For example, Flextronics reported that it can design a high-end cell phone for about $10 million when the average cost to design such a phone by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is $30–50 million (BusinessWeek Online, 2005).
The benefits from taper integration are critical, but our research strongly suggests the importance of balance. There are limits to the benefits of taper integration, thus, increasing taper integration beyond some point begins to produce decreasing returns. Overuse of external sources to complete value chain activities could lead to opportunism and excessive transaction costs. It also reduces the firm’s ability to absorb external knowledge thereby decreasing the learning opportunities. While exter- nal sourcing is likely to increase a firm’s flexibility in the short term, it also increases its path depen- dence in the use of external sources. As the firm loses its internal capability to perform certain value chain activities, it becomes increasingly dependent on its external partners to perform those activi- ties (Bettis, Bradley, and Hamel, 1992; Lei et al., 1996). Firms in which design is a core competence should not outsource the activity (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). For example, Steve Jobs claims that Apple is able to design ‘insanely great’ new prod- ucts that contribute to a competitive advantage. While Apple may design products with high mar- ket demand, it also engages in outsourcing (quasi) by having its products manufactured by outsourced design manufacturers (ODMs) (Burrows, 2005).
Other results in this study also support the importance of balance. For example, while ver- tical integration was found to have an increasingly positive effect on firm performance, it also had an increasingly negative effect on new product success (except in the laptop segment, where the relationship was inverted U-shaped). The positive effect on performance is likely due to the reduc- tion in transaction costs by internalizing the value chain activities. Yet, vertical integration reduces access to new knowledge that can be used to develop successful new products. Full vertical inte- gration, for example, could create an environment in which the firm operates almost like a closed system because all value chain activities are inter- nalized with few external linkages. This in turn reduces a firm’s strategic flexibility to respond to
changing technologies and other contingencies in its environment, for example, and thus commen- surately enhances the probability of firm obso- lescence. Thus, while vertical integration reduces transaction costs, it also creates opportunity costs with potential negative performance implications for the firm in the long term. The difference in the effects of vertical integration on new product success in the desktop market (non-linear negative effect) and the laptop market (diminishing returns effect) could possibly be attributed to a differential level of maturity in these two industry segments, with the desktop segment being more mature than the laptop segment.
The results also suggest that increases to a firm’s product portfolios generally improve new product success and lead to higher firm perfor- mance. Firms that increase their product portfo- lios too much, however, also experience diminish- ing returns. Larger product portfolios allow firms to gain synergy from related products. This syn- ergy can materialize in the form of economies of scale and scope, and thus result in lower unit product costs and higher sales through comple- mentary products that enhance customer demand. Alternatively, a large portfolio requires coordina- tion among the various products to achieve these economies (Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1995). An overly large product portfolio can increase man- agerial costs to the point where they overcome the benefits.
Limitations and future research
This study has limitations, which in turn pro- vide opportunities for future research. One limi- tation is the way we proxied some of our mea- sures. For example, while the results concerning new product success are intuitive and fit well with the theoretical arguments advanced, the out- come could partly be due to the measure of new product success. The ratings of newly intro- duced products are conducted by individuals who often have a technological lens. As a result, prod- ucts with cutting-edge technology might be rated highly but the advance in technology may be greater than desired by the customers to sat- isfy their needs or the costs are too high to generate profits from the sales. This resonates with Christensen and Bower’s (1996) observation that, over time, the rate of technological progress
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1052 F. T. Rothaermel, M. A. Hitt and L. A. Jobe
frequently exceeds the performance improvements demanded in a market.
While the possibility of a technology bias by industry experts exists, careful steps were taken in this study to ensure the construct validity of the measures employed. In designing and exe- cuting this study, we followed many of the rec- ommendations made by Boyd et al. (2005). In sum, while this study is one of very few that has measured the success of individual new prod- uct introductions, more research is needed to examine the performance of newly introduced products.
Because we had to rely on firm revenues as a proxy for firm performance (due to the fact that the large majority of firms in this sam- ple were privately held), using more fine-grained measures of firm performance in future research may help to validate the findings of this study. Additionally, more fine-grained measures of ver- tical integration might contribute to our knowl- edge of appropriate levels of internalization and especially identifying which activities should be maintained in-house and which ones should be out- sourced. This knowledge would provide the base for future research to determine the appropriate balance between vertical integration and strategic outsourcing. This question is particularly interest- ing because firm boundaries are dynamic, and thus change over time (Afuah, 2001). In particular, the effects of taper integration on product portfolio, product success, and firm performance are likely to vary depending on the stage of the industry evolution and the dynamism inherent in the indus- try (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).
While the sample is representative of the popu- lation of microcomputer manufacturers, there is a need to test the theoretical model in other industry settings to establish the generalizability of our find- ings. In addition, future research should study time periods characterized by both incremental and rad- ical innovations, because the emergence of a new dominant design is likely to demand a more contin- gent approach to organizing for innovation (Ander- son and Tushman, 1990; Afuah, 2001). These efforts would help in strengthening the external validity of the theoretical model developed and tested herein. In sum, the measures for strategic outsourcing (taper and quasi) provide a method- ological contribution. More importantly, we hope
that this contribution spurs future research on this important phenomenon.
Conclusion
This study contributes to our understanding of the boundaries of the firm. Prior research focused primarily on vertical integration (internalization) or on external strategic alliances and networks. Thus, the results obtained in prior research may have been an artifact of unobserved heterogene- ity when specifying that outcomes were due to one specific organizing form, unless alternative organizing forms were controlled in the analyses, which was rare. By contrast, we simultaneously investigate the effect of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing, while controlling for mergers and acquisitions. The new findings presented pro- vide broad support regarding the need for balance between internalization and outsourcing of value chain activities. In particular, we show the value of taper integration in developing new products and their success in the marketplace.
This study also provides some relevant manage- rial implications. Our results sound a cautionary note that pursuing either vertical integration or strategic outsourcing in isolation appears to be sub- optimal. While this is clearly an important question at the transaction level of analysis, a manager gen- erally faces questions pertaining to boundaries of the firm at a more aggregate level. In particu- lar, a manager frequently needs to determine the degree of vertical integration and the extent of strategic outsourcing simultaneously. Here, balanc- ing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing to achieve a prudent level of taper integration seems to be a valuable strategy in striving for superior performance.
When discussing options of dynamic firm boundaries within the context of the microcom- puter industry, we noted that integration into some value chain activities appears to be fairly effort- less, while integration into other parts of the value chain seems to be rather difficult. If managers identify value chain activities in which the firm should participate, but are not able to vertically integrate into them, quasi integration provides a potentially valuable option. In this case, the needed value chain activities are accessed through strate- gic outsourcing.
Taken together, managers should strive to iden- tify the appropriate level of taper integration to
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Balancing Vertical Integration and Strategic Outsourcing 1053
generate a product portfolio that contributes to the ‘optimum’ levels of new product success and firm performance. While finding the appropriate bal- ance between internalizing value chain activities and strategic external sourcing can be difficult, maintaining the right balance over time can prove even more challenging because the competitive landscape is often highly dynamic (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). We thus sug- gest that matching the appropriate level of taper integration with a firm’s resources and with the industry environment is a firm dynamic capabil- ity, which has been described as a ‘firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments’ (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997: 516). In conclusion, taper integration seems to be beneficial in organizing for innovation, but an intricate balance appears to exist that optimizes a firm’s product portfolio, product successes, and overall performance. Discovering and maintaining this balance between vertical integration and strate- gic outsourcing is a critical and challenging, but potentially rewarding, task for managers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2004 Strategic Management Society (SMS) Conference, and awarded the SMS Conference Best Paper Prize. We thank Associate Editor Richard Bettis, the anonymous reviewers, Sharon Alvarez, Nathan Bennett, Terry Blum, Warren Boeker, John Butler, John Hollenbeck, Tom Lee, Leonard Parsons, Susan Sanderson, Robert Wise- man, and the seminar participants at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Texas Tech University, Uni- versity of California at Irvine, and the University of North Carolina for helpful comments and sug- gestions on earlier drafts of this paper. We also thank Shanti Agung, Jay Cheng, Stephen Hin- man, Swastika Mukherjee, and Xiaoguang Yang for research assistance, and Karyn Lu for edito- rial assistance. All errors and omissions remain entirely our own. Rothaermel is an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Industry Studies Fellow, and gratefully acknowledges financial support from this fellow- ship. Rothaermel also acknowledges financial sup- port from the E. M. Kauffman Foundation.
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APPENDIX: RELIABILITY, VALIDITY, AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In designing this study, we took several actions to ensure unbiased and objective coding of the data proxying different organizational forms (ver- tical integration, strategic outsourcing, and M&A activity), because they pertain to a firm’s array of sourcing options. Moreover, vertical integration and strategic outsourcing are the key theoretical constructs of this study. In total, we employed a team of five research assistants (all graduate students) to code the qualitative data. First, the research assistants were not aware of the theory or hypotheses to be tested. Second, we used two independent data sources for each of the key inde- pendent variables. Third, the physical coding of the data from the two independent sources used for each measure was conducted at two different institutions, and the research assistants were nei- ther in direct contact with one another nor did they know of each other.
In addition, we explored the robustness of the results described above in several unreported analyses:
• We employed structural equation modeling (SEM). The results of SEM indicated statistical support for most of the individual hypotheses (in the expected direction), but the overall fit of the structural equation model was not satisfactory because of the small cross-sectional sample size (N = 123 firms). SEM draws on
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
1056 F. T. Rothaermel, M. A. Hitt and L. A. Jobe
the bivariate correlation matrix; therefore, it does not leverage the econometric advantages of longitudinal panel data (Hsaio, 2003). Tabachnick and Fidell (2001:659) describe the problem of estimating structural equation models based on a relatively small sample as follows: ‘Covariances, like correlations, are less stable when estimated from small samples. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is based on covariances. Parameter estimates and chi-square tests of fit are also very sensitive to sample size. SEM, then, like factor analysis, is a large-sample technique . . ..’ Thus, applying GLS regression analysis is the preferred method here because it enables us to draw on a much larger sample (N = 492), and to access the advantages of panel data.
• To assess if the results were biased by M&A activity, we eliminated all cases where mergers or acquisitions occurred in which the research and development for new microcomputer prod- ucts may have been conducted prior to the merger in the firm that did not survive, and thus may bias the surviving firm’s post-merger new product portfolios and performance scores. We reran the analysis on the revised sample.
• Because the equity acquired in a partner can span the entire spectrum from minority to major- ity investments all the way to outright purchase or merger, we also constructed the variable Mergers & Acquisitions (majority), where the acquired firm purchased more than 50% of the target company. This variable captures the qual- itatively somewhat stronger M&A activity. We reran the analysis using the revised variable.
• We eliminated all firms that either entered or exited the microcomputer industry during our
study period and reran the analysis on the revised sample.
• We added the 148 product reviews evaluating servers/workstations and handhelds to the 3,441 product evaluations for desktops and laptops, and reran the analysis including all 3,559 prod- uct evaluations.
• We varied the time window of the study period by shortening it 1 year, and conducted new analyses using the different time windows. Thus, we were able to assess the robustness of the results on a moving 3-year window.
• We assessed the validity of revenues as a proxy of firm performance by applying return on assets on the sub-sample of firms for which this mea- sure was available.
• We reran the regression models on the sub- sample of firms for which employee data were directly available.
In all these additional analyses, the results were consistent with the ones presented above.
In a post hoc analysis, we assessed the inter- action effects of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing quasi as well as those between verti- cal integration and strategic outsourcing taper on new product success and firm performance. We found that the interactions were generally negative and statistically significant. Recall that the inter- actions between vertical integration and strategic outsourcing (quasi and taper) were positive. Taken together, these results further highlight the impor- tance of balancing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing in the pursuit of new product success and firm performance.
Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 27: 1033–1056 (2006) DOI: 10.1002/smj
o1 ( O in a global economy).pdf
Review of Economic Studies (2005)72, 135–159 0034-6527/05/00070135$02.00 c© 2005 The Review of Economic Studies Limited
Outsourcing in a Global Economy GENE M. GROSSMAN
Princeton University
and
ELHANAN HELPMAN Harvard University, Tel Aviv University and CIAR
First version received August2002; final version accepted November2003(Eds.)
We study the determinants of the location of subcontracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade. We model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship-specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts. The extent of international outsourcing dependsinter alia on the thickness of the domestic and foreign market for input suppliers, the relative cost of searching in each market, the relative cost of customizing inputs and the nature of the contracting environment in each country.
“Subcontracting as many non-core activities as possible is a central element of the new economy”.Financial Times, 31 July 2001, p. 10.
1. INTRODUCTION
We live in an age of outsourcing. Firms seem to be subcontracting an ever expanding set of activities, ranging from product design to assembly, from research and development to marketing, distribution and after-sales service. Some firms have gone so far as to become “virtual” manufacturers, owning designs for many products but making almost nothing themselves.1
Vertical disintegration is especially evident in international trade. A recent annual report of the World Trade Organization(1998) details, for example, the production of a particular “American” car:
Thirty per cent of the car’s value goes to Korea for assembly, 17·5% to Japan for components and advanced technology, 7·5% to Germany for design, 4% to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2·5% to the United Kingdom for advertising and marketing services and 1·5% to Ireland and Barbados for data processing. This means that only 37% of the production value . . . is generated in the United States (p. 36).
Feenstra(1998), citing Tempest(1996), describes similarly the production of a Barbie doll. According to Feenstra, Mattel procures raw materials (plastic and hair) from Taiwan and Japan, conducts assembly in Indonesia and Malaysia, buys the moulds in the U.S., the doll clothing in China and the paints used in decorating the dolls in the U.S. Indeed, when many observers use the term “globalization”, they have in mind a manufacturing process similar to what Feenstra and the WTO have described.
1. SeeThe Economist(1991) for an overview of trends toward greater outsourcing in manufacturing.Bardi and Tracey(1991), Gardner(1991), Helper(1991), Bamford(1994) andAbraham and Taylor(1996) document increased subcontracting in particular industries or for particular activities.
135
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136 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
To us, outsourcing means more than just the purchase of raw materials and standardized intermediate goods. It means finding a partner with which a firm can establish a bilateral relationship and having the partner undertake relationship-specific investments so that it becomes able to produce goods or services that fit the firm’s particular needs. Often, but not always, the bilateral relationship is governed by a contract, but even in those cases the legal document does not ensure that the partners will conduct the promised activities with the same care that the firm would use itself if it were to perform the tasks.2
Because outsourcing involves more than just the purchase of a particular type of good or service, it has been difficult to measure the growth in international outsourcing.Audet (1996), Campa and Goldberg(1997), Hummels, Rapoport and Yi(2001) andYeats(2001) have used trade in intermediate inputs or in parts and components to proxy for what they have variously termed “vertical specialization”, “intra-product specialization” and “global production sharing”. While these are all imperfect measures of outsourcing as we would define it, the authors do show that there has been rapid expansion in international specialization for a varied group of industries that includes textiles, apparel, footwear, industrial machinery, electrical equipment, transportation equipment and chemicals and allied products. It seems safe to tentatively conclude that the outsourcing of intermediate goods and business services is one of the most rapidly growing components of international trade.
In this paper, we develop a framework that can be used to study firms’ decisions about where to outsource. We consider a general equilibrium model of production and trade in which firms in one industry must outsource a particular activity. These firms can seek partners in the technologically and legally advanced north or they can look in the low-wage south. Our model of a firm’s decision incorporates what we consider to be the three essential features of a modern outsourcing strategy. First, firms mustsearchfor partners with the expertise that allows them to perform the particular activities that are required. Second, they must convince the potential suppliers tocustomizeproducts for their own specific needs. Finally, they must induce the necessary relationship-specific investments in an environment withincomplete contracting.
Using the framework developed inSections2 and3, we are able to examine inSections4 and5 several possible determinants of the location of outsourcing. First, the size of a country can affect the “thickness” of its markets. All else equal, a firm prefers to search in a thicker market, because it is more likely to be able to find a partner there with the appropriate skills that would make it able and willing to tailor a component or service for the final producer’s needs. Second, the technology for search affects the cost and likelihood of finding a suitable partner. Search will be less costly and more likely successful in a country with good infrastructure for communication and transportation. Third, the technology for specializing components determines the willingness of a partner to undertake the needed investment in a prototype. Finally, the contracting environments can impinge on a firm’s ability to induce a partner to invest in the relationship. We study the contracting environment by introducing parameters that represent the extent to which relationship-specific investments are verifiable by outside parties in each country.
While our model is rich in its description of the outsourcing relationship, we focus here only on the location of outsourcing activity, without allowing firms a choice of whether to produce components themselves as an alternative to outsourcing. Our analysis thus complements that in Grossman and Helpman(2002a), where we studied the make-or-buy decision but did not allow firms any choice of where to produce or source their components.3 The next step
2. Marsh(2001, p. 10) notes some of the pitfalls in outsourcing: “Outsourcers depend on others caring as much about the product as they do. If you ask someone else to make a vital component, you may lose control over the way it evolves”.
3. There are other important differences between this model and that given inGrossman and Helpman(2002a). There we allowed for variable search and assumed imperfect contracts governing the production and sale of customized
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 137
in our progression would be for us to construct a model in which firms have a four-way choice of whether to undertake an activity in-house or to subcontract, and whether at home or abroad. Such a model would come closer to describing the central decisions facing modern, multinational firms. But the current paper takes an important intermediate step, because it highlights considerations that are bound to be important in a more complete analysis.
2. THE MODEL
Consider a world economy with two countries, north and south, and two industries. Firms in either country can produce a homogeneous consumer goodzwith one unit of local labour per unit of output. Firms in the north also can design and assemble varieties of a differentiated consumer goody. The south lacks the know-how needed to perform these activities. Both countries are able to produce intermediate goods, which we henceforth call “components” but might also represent business services. The components are vital inputs into the production of goody.
The varieties of goody are differentiated in two respects. First, as is usual in models of intra-industry trade, consumers regard the different products as imperfect substitutes. Second, the varieties require different components in their production. We capture product differentiation in the eyes of consumers with the now-familiar formulation of a CES sub-utility function. On the supply side, we associate each final good with a point on the circumference of a unit circle, so that the “location” of a good represents the specifications of the input needed for its assembly.
Consumers in both countries share identical preferences. The typical consumer seeks to maximize
u = z1−β
[∫ 1
0
∫ n̂(l )
0 y( j, l )αd j dl
] β α
, 0 < α, β < 1, (1)
wherez is consumption of the homogeneous final good andy( j, l ) is consumption of thej -th variety located at pointl on the unit circle (relative to some arbitrary zero point). We assume that there is a continuum of goods located at each point on the circle, but (1) implies that consumers regard the various goods at the same location on the circle as differentiated. In the limit to the integral,n̂(l ) is the measure of varieties available to consumers that require an intermediate input at locationl . Note that, as usual,β gives the spending share that consumers optimally devote to the homogeneous good andε = 1/(1 − α) is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties of goody.
Production of any variety of goody requires a fixed investment in product design plus one unit of the customized input per unit of output. Potential final producers enter in the north by devoting fn units of northern labour to product development.4 The location of the requisite intermediate input on the unit circle is a random element in the design process, with all locations being equally likely. The designers-cum-final-producers cannot manufacture the intermediate inputs themselves; rather they mustoutsourcethis activity to specialized suppliers in one country or the other. If a final producer finds a partner who is willing and able to manufacture the requisite components, the firm can assemble final goods without additional inputs.5 If a final producer fails to identify a suitable supplier, the firm must exit the industry.
components. Here we introduce partial contracting over investments so that we can study the implications of differences in the legal environments across countries. Also, our other paper featured a closed economy, whereas here we incorporate international trade.
4. Since there is a continuum of differentiated final goods, the fixed cost of designing a single product is infinitesimally small. Of course, the total resources used in designing a positive measure of such goods is finite.
5. This is an inessential simplification. We could as well assume that production of final goods requires labour and components in fixed proportions.
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138 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Component suppliers may enter in either market. Such entry requires an investment in expertise and equipment, the cost of which iswi f i
m in countryi , wherewi is the wage rate andf i m
is the (fixed) labour requirement, fori = S, N. A supplier’s expertise is represented by a point on the unit circle. The investment in developing expertise is large relative to the cost of designing a single final product, so there are relatively few suppliers of components in each market and each supplier serves multiple final producers in equilibrium. The suppliers who enter a given market space themselves equally around the circle. For simplicity, we neglect the integer “problem”, and treat the finite number of input suppliers in countryi , mi , as a continuous variable.
After the entry stage, the northern firms that have developed product designs seek suppliers for their specialized inputs. The search process is specific to a geographic region, so each firm must decide whether to hunt for a supplier in the north or in the south. The search and associated research activities requirefs units of northern labour at a cost ofwN fs. We assume that by bearing this cost, a firm can ascertain the expertise of all suppliers active in the selected country and, in particular, identify the one whose expertise is closest to its own needs.6 For reasons that will become clear, this closest supplier is the one with whom the final producer enters into any subsequent discussions.
At the time when a final producer must choose where to conduct its search, it does not know the expertise of all of the various potential suppliers in the two markets (i.e. their locations on the circle), but only the total numbers of such suppliers and the fact that the suppliers in each market are equally spaced around the circle. A final producer regards all equi-spaced configurations of suppliers in a market as equally likely. Accordingly, when choosing to search in a market withmi
suppliers, a final producer knows that the nearest supplier will be at a random distancex, wherex is a draw from a uniform distribution with range from 0 to 1/2mi . We will refer to the number of suppliers in a country as the “thickness” of the market and will find that market thickness plays an important role in the search decision.
Any supplier must develop a prototype before it can produce the customized inputs needed by a particular final producer. The cost of this investment varies directly with the distance between the location of the supplier’s expertise and that of the final producer’s input requirements. In particular, if a supplier in countryi wishes to provide components to a final producer whose location in input space is at a distancex from its own expertise, then it must pay a fixed cost ofwi µi x to develop the prototype. Thereafter, it can produce customized components for its partner at constant marginal cost, with one unit of local labour needed per unit of output.
To summarize, the production of varieties of goody entails a number of fixed and variable costs. A final producer of any variety must bear a fixed cost of product design(wN fn) and a fixed cost of searching for a component supplier(wN fs). Such a firm needs one unit of a specialized input per unit of output. A component supplier in countryi , in turn, bears a fixed cost of investment in expertise and equipment(wi f i
m) and a fixed cost of customizing a component for each of its customers(wi µi x) that depends on the distance between its own expertise and the customer’s needs. Component producers employ one unit of local labour per unit of output.
2.1. Bargaining and contracting
Once a final producer has identified the supplier whose expertise is most suitable to its needs, the two firms can begin to explore a bilateral relationship in the light of the local legal environment.
6. In our working paper,Grossman and Helpman(2002b), we treat the case in which the final producers have variable search costs and choose the intensity of their search effort. There we assume that final producers are not guaranteed to find all suppliers in a given market, unless their search efforts are sufficiently intense. The specification that we have employed here (with only a fixed cost of search) substantially simplifies the analysis without sacrificing essential insights.
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 139
For such a relationship to develop, the supplier must be willing to invest in a prototype that is specific to the particular differentiated product.7 And whereas the supplier’s investment (or its result) can be perfectly observed by the final producer, it is not fully verifiable to outside parties. The lack of verifiability constrains the contracting possibilities, as is familiar from the work of Williamson(1985), Hart and Moore(1990) and others. Later, we shall assume that some aspects of the investment are verifiable, while others are not. This permits partial (imperfect) contracts. But for now we take the extreme view that none of the up-front investment is contractible. The supplier must be willing to undertake the investment itself in anticipation of anorder contract that will be negotiated and fulfilled only after a suitable prototype has been built.8
Let Si denote the profits that the parties will share if the supplier develops a component that fits the buyer’s needs and if the two parties subsequently reach agreement on an order contract. The parties anticipate that if they reach a stage at which a suitable prototype exists, their negotiation will lead to an equal sharing ofSi . So the supplier expects to earnSi /2 if it chooses to investwi µi x in the prototype, wherex is the distance between the final producer’s needs and the (closest) supplier’s expertise. The supplier willingly undertakes the investment if and only if its share of the prospective profits exceeds the investment cost; that is, if and only if wi µi x ≤ Si /2.
A final producer that finds a (nearest) supplier in the chosen market at a distance greater thanSi /2wi µi cannot acquire components and thus has no choice but to exit the industry. One that finds a supplier at a closer distance than this can expect the investment to be made and the relationship to proceed. We definer i as the greatest distance in input space between any producer that remains active after having searched for a partner in countryi and its supplier. Considering that the suppliers in marketi are separated by a distance 1/mi , it follows that
r i = min
{ Si
2wi µi ,
1
2mi
} . (2)
Once the input supplier has invested in the prototype, the partners have coincident interests concerning the production and marketing of the final good. We assume that they reach an efficient agreement to govern the manufacture of components. The preferences in (1) imply that the producer of thej -th variety of goody at locationl faces a demand given by
y( j, l ) = Ap( j, l )−ε (3)
when it charges the pricep( j, l ), where
A = β
∑ i Ei[ ∫ 1
0
∫ n̂(l ) 0 p( j, l )1−εd j dl
] (4)
and Ei denotes spending on consumer goods in countryi , for i = N, S. This is a constant- elasticity demand function, which means that profits are maximized by fixed mark-up pricing. Any partnership in which the supplier resides in countryi faces a marginal cost of output of wi . Thus, joint profits are maximized by a pricepi
= wi /α of final output. Maximal joint
7. In other words, we assume that a firm’s input requirements are unique, and in particular different from those of other firms located at the same point on the unit circle. Also, final producers may not use components that nearly fit but not precisely so. These assumptions simplify the analysis without significantly affecting the nature of the hold-up problem.
8. Segal(1999) andHart and Moore(1999) have developed detailed models that provide the microeconomic underpinnings of contractual incompleteness. Applying their reasoning to our setting, it will be impossible for the parties to negotiate an order contract before the prototype exists if some details about the components are revealed to the supplier only after the prototype has been built and if the parties cannot commit to refrain from renegotiating any initial order contract.
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140 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
profits are
Si = (1 − α)A
( wi
α
)1−ε
, (5)
which are independent of the distance between the supplier’s expertise and the final producer’s input type. The order contract that generates the maximal joint profits dictates a quantity of inputs
yi = A
( wi
α
)−ε
(6)
and a total payment by the final producer to the input supplier of9
1 + α
2 A
( wi
α
)1−ε
.
2.2. Search
We consider now the search problem facing a typical final producer. The firm must decide whether to search for a supplier in the north or in the south.10 Suppose the firm searches in country i . Recall that the firm finds a partner at a random distancex, wherex is uniformly distributed on the interval[0, 1/2mi
]. If the firm finds a nearest potential supplier at distance greater thanr i , wherer i is given by (2), then the supplier will be unwilling to undertake the investment in customizing the intermediates. In the event, both the final producer and the supplier firm derive no profits from the relationship. If, however, the final producer finds a supplier at a distance closer thanr i , the supplier will be prepared to invest in customization and the final producer earnsSi /2 from the relationship. It follows that by searching in marketi the final producer expects to earn operating profits ofSi /2 with probability 2r i mi and operating profits of zero with probability 1− 2r i mi . Its expected profits from searching in countryi are
π i n = r i mi Si . (7)
Now we can identify the market or markets in which the northern firms will choose to conduct their searches. Ifπ N
n > π S n , all search is conducted in the north and all outsourcing
takes place there. Similarly, ifπ S n > π N
n , all search focuses on the south and there is no domestic outsourcing. Mostly, we will study equilibria in which outsourcing occurs in both regions. This requiresπ S
n = π N n .
2.3. Free entry and market clearing
The remaining equilibrium conditions comprise a set of free-entry conditions for producers of components and final goods and a pair of market-clearing conditions for the two labour markets.
9. The payment is such that the input supplier’s reward net of manufacturing costs is half of the joint profits. Thus, the payment isSi /2 + wi yi , which, with (5) and (6), implies the expression given in the text.
10. We assume that final producers search for an outsourcing partner in only one country. This can be justified by assuming that the search costfs is large enough. Note that the equilibria described in what follows with outsourcing in both countries would remain equilibria even if we were to allow firms to search in both markets. In these equilibria, some firms break even by searching only in the north and others by searching only in the south, so a firm that searched in both places would suffer an expected loss. However, if firms were free to search in both markets, there might be additional equilibria in which all firms search in both countries and firms chooseex postwhere to outsource. This choice would be based on the distance between their input requirement and the expertise of the two potential partners and on the profit opportunities that would ensue from production of intermediates in the alternative locations.
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 141
Final-good producers must enter in positive numbers, since consumers spend a positive fraction of their income on differentiated products. All entrants earn zero expected profits in equilibrium. The expected operating profits for a typical firm that enters industryy is πn =
max{π N n , π S
n }, and the free-entry condition is
πn = wN f, (8)
where f = fn + fs represents the sum of the fixed entry and search costs. Positive numbers of component producers may enter in one or both countries.11 A firm
that enters in countryi will serve a measure 2ni r i of final-good producers, whereni is the total measure of final-good producers that searches in countryi . A firm’s customers are spread uniformly at distances ranging from 0 tor i in each direction from the point representing the firm’s expertise. A component producer earns profits ofSi /2− wi µi x from its relationship with a final-good producer whose input requirement is at a distancex from its own expertise. Thus, operating profits for an input producer that enters in countryi are
π i m = 2ni
∫ r i
0
(1 2 Si
− wi µi x ) dx = r i ni (Si
− wi µi r i ). (9)
We assume that the number of entrants is sufficiently large so that, in making its entry decision, each firm ignores the small effect of its own choice onr i andSi . Then free entry implies
π i m ≤ wi f i
m and (π i m − wi f i
m)mi = 0 for i = N, S. (10)
We turn next to the labour-market clearing condition in the south. We examine equilibria in which the wage rate in the north is higher than that in the south, so thatω ≡ wN/wS > 1. In such equilibria, the entire world output of the homogeneous goodz is produced in the south. Since aggregate profits are zero in both countries, all income is labour income. Aggregate spending equals aggregate income in countryi , which impliesEi
= wi L i , whereL i is the labour supply there. A fraction 1−β of spending is devoted to homogeneous goods, which carry a price ofwS. This means that in equilibrium the south employs(1 − β)(ωL N
+ LS) units of labour in the production of goodz.
The south also devotes labour to entry by input producers, to investment in customization, and to the manufacture of components. Entry absorbsmS f S
m units of labour. Customization requiresµSx units of labour for a final-good producer whose needs are a distancex from the expertise of the input producer. Each of themS producers of intermediates undertakes such an investment for all final-good producers that search in the south and that are located withinr S to its right or to its left. Since a constant densitynS of final-good producers searches in the south,
the southern labour needed for developing prototypes is 2µSmSnS ∫ r S
0 xdx = µSmSnS(r S)2. Finally, the densitynS of northern firms searching in the south results in a measure 2mSr SnS
of viable bilateral relationships. Each such partnership generates a demand foryS units of southern labour to manufacture components. Therefore, manufacturing absorbs 2mSr SnSyS
units of southern labour. Summing the components of labour demand, and equating this to the fixed labour supply, we have
(1 − β)(ωL N + LS) + mS f S
m + µSmSnS(r S)2 + 2mSr SnSyS
= LS. (11)
In the north, labour is used in the design of final goods, in searching for outsourcing partners, and in entry, investment and manufacturing by producers of intermediate goods. Entry and search
11. The intermediate producers also choose their expertise (i.e. location). We assume that this choice is made with rational expectations about the choices of others. It is a dominant strategy for each firm to locate at a point mid-way between the expected locations of the two most-distantly-spaced adjacent producers of intermediates. This strategy gives rise to a symmetric equilibrium with equi-spaced input producers.
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142 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
by final-good producers requiresf (nN + nS) units of labour. The components of labour demand
by intermediate-good producers in the north are analogous to those in the south. Therefore, the labour-market clearing condition in the north is given by
f ∑
i ni
+ mN f N m + µNmNnN(r N)2
+ 2mNr NnN yN = L N . (12)
This completes the description of the model.
3. OUTSOURCING WITH UNVERIFIABLE INVESTMENT
To gain an understanding of the workings of the model, we focus in this section on the key general equilibrium interactions. It is possible that the market for components will be sufficiently thick in country i that all final-good producers who search there are able to find willing suppliers. This will be true ifmi
≥ wi µi /Si , which may hold in equilibrium fori = S, i = N, or both. Also, there may exist equilibria in which suppliers enter in only one country, so thatmS
= 0 or mN
= 0. We discuss all of these possibilities in some detail in our working paper,Grossman and Helpman(2002b).12 Here, we focus on one type of equilibrium, namely that which arises when outsourcing takes place in both countries and some final-good producers who search in each market are unable to find suppliers with expertise sufficiently close to their needs for a supply relationship to be consummated. We refer to this regime as one with a “binding investment constraint” in both countries. In such a setting, the limitations on contracting have real effects.
In the case of interest, (2) implies that the greatest distance between an active final producer who outsources in countryi and its supplier is given by
r i =
Si
2wi µi for i = N, S. (13)
Assuming that outsourcing takes place in both countries, the free-entry conditions (10) together with (9) imply
r i ni (Si − wi µi r i ) = wi f i
m for i = N, S. (14)
Substituting (13) and (14) into the south’s labour-market clearing condition (11) gives13
(1 − β)(ωL N + LS) + 2
1 + α
1 − α mS f S
m = LS. (15)
In (15), the first term on the L.H.S. represents the labour used in the south in producing the homogeneous good while the second term reflects that used in all activities by component suppliers.
Next, we use (7) and (8), together with the fact thatπ N n = π S
n when outsourcing takes place in both countries, to write
r i mi Si = wN f for i = N, S. (16)
Using this equation together with (4) and (5), we derive14
f ∑
i ni
= 1
2 (1 − α)β
( L N
+ 1
ω LS
) ;
12. There we discuss a more general case in which final producers choose also the intensity of their search. In this more general setting, either market may fall into one of three regimes, depending upon whether the intensity of search is limited by the marginal cost of search, by the limitations on investment contracts, or by each firm being assured of finding a suitable partner.
13. We also useyi = αSi /(1 − α)wi , which follows from (5) and (6).
14. The derivation uses the fact thatpi = wi /α for all differentiated products assembled using intermediate
inputs from countryi , and that the number of varieties of goody that are actually produced using intermediate inputs
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 143
that is, the value of labour used by final-good producers for product design and search amounts to a fraction(1 − α)β/2 of world income.15 Finally, we substitute this equation together with (13) and (14) into the north’s labour-market clearing condition (12) to derive
1
2 (1 − α)β
( L N
+ 1
ω LS
) + 2
1 + α
1 − α mN f N
m = L N . (17)
The second term on the L.H.S. of (17) represents the labour used in all activities by component suppliers in the north.
The two equations, (15) and (17), involvemS, mN and the relative wage,ω. But the relative wage can be solved as a function ofmS andmN using the requirement that, ifmS andmN are both positive, search for input suppliers must be equally profitable in the two countries. Substituting (13) into (16) and noting that (5) implies SN
= ω1−εSS, we obtain another statement of the equal-profit condition,
ω =
( µSmN
µNmS
) 1−α 1+α
. (18)
This equation indicates that for search to be equally profitable in the two countries, the relative wage must be aligned with the relative costs of customization and the relative number of suppliers. The relatively more costly it is to customize components in the south, the more profitable it will be to search for a supplier in the north. To offset this advantage, the relative wage must be higher in the north. On the other hand, the “thicker” is the market for components in the south relative to that in the north, the more profitable it will be to search for a supplier in the south, and therefore the lower must be the relative wage of the north if search in either country is to be equally profitable.
Combining (15) with (18) yields the reduced-formSScurve,
mN =
µN
µS mS
[ βLS
− 21+α 1−α
mS f S m
(1 − β)L N
] 1+α 1−α
, (19)
which gives combinations ofmN andmS that are consistent with labour-market clearing in the south and equal profitability of search in the two countries. Similarly, combining (17) with (18) yields the reduced-formN N curve,
mS =
µS
µN mN
{[ 1 −
1 2(1 − α)β
] L N
− 21+α 1−α
mN f N m
1 2(1 − α)βLS
} 1+α 1−α
, (20)
which has a similar interpretation in regard to the northern labour market. TypicalSSandN N curves are depicted inFigure1.16
from countryi is 2mi r i ni . Together, these considerations and (4) imply
A = β
∑ i wi L i∑
i 2mi r i ni (
wi α
)1−ε .
15. The reason for this result is as follows. A fractionβ of world income is spent on differentiated products while the total surplus (operating profits) from sales of these products is a fraction 1− α of revenue. Therefore, total surplus equals the fraction(1 − α)β of world income. Half of this surplus is earned by final-good producers. Since they break even on average, the fraction(1 − α)β/2 of world income has to equal their entry and search costs.
16. The curves in this figure and inFigure 2 were drawn with the following parameters:α = 0·5, β = 0·8, µS
= µN , f S m = f N
m = 1, LS = 1000 andL N
= 1500. Note that these curves do not depend onf , i.e. the fixed cost of entry and search for final-good producers.
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144 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
200
150
100
50
0 0 25 50 75 100 mS
max 0 1250 2500 3750
SS curve NN curve
mN mN
mS mS
FIGURE 1
Equilibrium curves: binding investment regimes
Consider theSScurve. It is evident from (19) that the origin lies on the curve, as does the point(mS
max, 0), wheremS max = βLS(1−α)/2(1+α) f S
m. The R.H.S. of (19) is rising inmS when the number of component suppliers in the south is small and declining inmS when this number is close tomS
max. It follows that theSScurve reaches a peak somewhere betweenmS = 0 and
mS = mS
max. It also can be shown that the R.H.S. of (19) is a concave function ofmS to the left of this peak and that the slope of the curve approaches zero asmS approachesmS
max. To understand the economics behind the shape of theSScurve, note from (15) that as the
numbermS of component suppliers in the south rises, so too does their demand for labour at a given relative wage, and thusω must fall in order to preserve equilibrium in the southern labour market. From (18), a decline in the relative wage requires a decline in therelative number of component producers in the north;i.e. mN/mS must fall to preserve the equal profitability of search in each market. IfmS is small, the indicated decline inmN/mS is achieved by a rise in mN that is proportionately smaller than the rise inmS; thus, theSScurves slopes upward formS
small. If mS is large, on the other hand, the indicated drop inmN/mS requires an absolute fall in the number of northern component producers; thusSSslopes downward formS close tomS
max andmN close to zero.
Observe from (15) that the relative wage of the north consistent with labour-market clearing in the south declines as the number of component produces in the south rises. Thus, along the SScurve,ω attains its maximum value ofβLS/(1 − β)L N for mS
= 0. But recall that the existence of an equilibrium with production of homogeneous goods concentrated in the south requiresω > 1. It follows thatβLS/(1− β)L N > 1 is a necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium of the sort we are describing.17
Analogous arguments explain the shape of theN N curve inFigure1. We omit the details for the sake of brevity. Note only that the relative wageω rises along theN N curve as we move away from the origin. As theN N curve approaches the vertical axis, the relative wageω tends to infinity.
17. The conditionβLS/(1 − β)L N > 1 is required for an equilibrium withω > 1 no matter what final producers decide about their search for components inasmuch asω > 1 implies that the the entire demand for the homogeneous good must be satisfied by producers in the south. In the event, the demand for southern labour by thez sector equals (1 − β)(ωL N
+ LS). This exceeds the south’s labour supply whenω > 1 andβLS/(1 − β)L N < 1.
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 145
300
250
200
150
100
50
0 0 50 100 150 200
mN
mS
N
N
S
S
E1 E2
E3
FIGURE 2
Equilibria with binding investment constraints in north and south
Now considerFigure2, where we have depicted portions of theSSand N N curves from Figure1 on a common scale. The ray through the origin represents combinations ofmS andmN
for which ω = 1. Only points above and to the left of this line (which haveω > 1) are of interest to us. The figure shows two equilibria, labelledE1 andE2, each characterized by active outsourcing in both countries. Recall that theSSand N N curves were constructed under the assumption that the equilibrium number of supplier firms is not so large as to allow every final producer to find a partner willing to incur the relationship-specific investment. It can be shown that this is indeed the case when the fixed costf for final-good producers is sufficiently small. We do not draw the boundaries of the region in which this condition is satisfied, but do assume that f is small enough forE1 andE2 to fall in the relevant region.18
The possibility of multiple equilibria—as illustrated in the figure—reflects an important positive feedback mechanism that is present in our model. The greater is the number of input suppliers active in a country, the more profitable it is for a final producer to search there for a partner. With more component producers, the suppliers are more closely packed in input space, and a final producer is more likely to find a partner willing to undertake the necessary investment in customization. At the same time, the greater is the number of final producers that search for partners in a given country, the more profitable it is for an input producer to operate there.19
The positive feedback associated with the thick-market externality is, however, limited by a wage response. As more intermediate producers enter into a country, their demand for labour bids
18. According to (2), the investment constraint binds in the north whenmN < wNµN/SN . But (13) and (16) imply that this inequality holds if and only if
mN < µN
2 f .
Similarly, the investment constraint binds in the south whenmS < wSµS/SS. Equations (13) and (16) imply, however, that this is satisfied if and only ifmS < µS/2ω f . Together with the equal profit condition (18) this inequality becomes
(mN ) 1−α 1+α (mS)
1− 1−α 1+α <
(µN ) 1−α 1+α (µS)
1− 1−α 1+α
2 f .
The equilibrium pointsE1 andE2 satisfy these conditions whenf is small enough. InGrossman and Helpman(2002b) we describe equilibria for world economies that do not satisfy these conditions.
19. McLaren(2000) was the first to study the thick-market externality in international trade. He pointed out that this externality can give rise to multiple equilibria when firms can choose between outsourcing and in-house production.
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146 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
up the country’s relative wage. This tends to dampen the incentive for final producers to search there. In our model, the general-equilibrium wage response creates the possibility of multiple equilibria with production of components in both countries and different patterns of outsourcing.
When several equilibria exist, it is natural to ask which ones are stable. We have performed a stability analysis and report the results in an appendix available at the journal’s website.20 In the analysis, we take the numbers of each type of firm (final producers, component producers in the north, and component producers in the south) as the state variables and assume that entry and exit respond to profit opportunities. When profits net of entry costs are positive for a typical firm of a given type, more firms of that type enter. When profits are negative, firms exit. For simplicity, we assume that small final-good producers react to profit opportunities more quickly than the larger, component producers. With this adjustment process, stability requires that the N N andSScurves both be downward sloping and that theSScurve be the steeper of the two at the point of intersection.
To understand these stability conditions, consider a point on theSScurve inFigure1. Now suppose that the number of northern component producersmN were to fall slightly. As is evident from equation (15), a decline in the number of component suppliers in the north has no direct effect on labour-market conditions in the south. That is, as long as the number of component producers in the south and the relative wage do not change, the southern labour market will continue to clear. But note that the fall in the number of suppliers in the north reduces the relative profitability of search in that country (see (18)). As a result, final-good producers will switch their search from north to south, thereby raising the net profits of suppliers in the south above zero. We indicate the profit opportunity, which induces entry by component producers in the south, by a rightward horizontal arrow for points below theSScurve inFigure1. A similar argument establishes that net profits of component producers in the south are negative above theSScurve. This triggers exit and explains the leftward arrows we have drawn for such points.
By similar reasoning, the number of northern component producers will grow in response to positive profit opportunities for points to the left of theN N curve and will shrink in response to losses for points to the right of this curve. The arrows inFigure1 describe these adjustments in the number of such producers.
Using the entry and exit dynamics described by the arrows inFigure 1, we obtain the combined dynamics depicted by the arrows inFigure2. Thus, the equilibrium labelledE1 is stable, whereas that labelledE2 is unstable. Note that for a stable equilibrium such asE1 to exist, we need two conditions: theSScurve must be downward sloping at its intersection with the rayω = 1; and theN N curve must intersect the rayω = 1 to the right of its intersection with SS. These two conditions can be represented by
βLS
(1 − β)L N >
2
1 + α (21)
and [ 1 −
1 2(1 − α)βL N
] −
1 2(1 − α)βLS
βLS − (1 − β)L N >
µN f N m
µS f S m
, (22)
respectively. They are satisfied by the parameters that we used to constructFigures1 and2. In what follows, we focus on economies that satisfy these conditions.
There also may be equilibria with outsourcing concentrated in one country. For example, an equilibrium with all outsourcing in the north (andω > 1) always exists whenβLS > (1−β)L N .
20. InGrossman and Helpman(2002b) we provide a stability analysis for the more general case in which search costs vary with the intensity of search. The findings are similar to those reported here.
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 147
In such an equilibrium,ω = βLS/(1−β)L N , and the fact that there are no input suppliers in the south(mS
= 0) discourages final producers from searching there. Given that no final producers search for partners in the south, no input suppliers have an incentive to enter there. PointE3 in Figure2 represents such an equilibrium. When an equilibrium exists with all outsourcing activity concentrated in the north, that equilibrium always is stable. We do not consider such equilibria further in this paper.
Note that the stable equilibriumE1 in Figure 2 will not exist when the fixed costs of developing expertise for producing intermediate goods are very low in the south or very high in the north (see the inequality in (22)). A decline in f S
m shifts theSScurve upward (see (19)) moving the intersection pointE1 to the right along theN N curve. The intersection point does not lie above the equal wage ray whenf S
m is small. Similarly, a rise inf N m shifts theN N curve
to the left (see (20)), moving the intersection pointE1 to the right along theSScurve. Again, this intersection point falls outside the region withω > 1 when f N
m is large enough. In both cases, there remains an unstable equilibrium such asE2 with outsourcing in both countries and production of the homogeneous good in the south and a stable equilibrium such asE3 with all components produced in the north and all homogeneous goods produced in the south.
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
In this section, we study how the pattern of outsourcing and world trade are affected by the sizes of the two countries and by the technologies for customization. We begin with country size, because this allows us to illustrate some important properties of the model.
4.1. Country size
Consider growth in the resource endowment of the south, as would be reflected in an increase in LS. An initial stable equilibrium with outsourcing in both countries is depicted by pointE in Fig- ure3. An increase inLS shifts theSScurve upward, because for givenmS the added labour in the south more than suffices to serve the country’s increased demand for homogeneous goods. The relative wageω must rise in order to eliminate the incipient excess supply of labour. But a higher relative wage in the north makes search in the south relatively more profitable, somN must rise to restore equal profitability. The newSScurve is represented by the broken curve in the figure.
In the north, the growth in southern income means additional demand for differentiated products, and thus a greater demand for labour by final-good producers. This generates a leftward shift of theN N curve, as can be seen from (20). This is because, for givenmN , the relative wage ω must rise to curtail the excess demand for northern labour that results from the income growth in the south. As a result, search becomes more profitable in the south, and the number of suppliers must decline there to restore equal profitability. The leftward shift in theN N curve is represented in the figure by a broken curve. The new equilibrium is at pointE′.
As the figure shows, an expansion of resources in the south induces entry by local producers of components and exit by such producers in the north. This has immediate implications for the composition of world outsourcing activity. We define the volume of outsourcing asvi
=
2mi r i ni yi ; that is, the number of units of intermediate goods manufactured by input suppliers in countryi . In a regime with a binding investment constraint, (5), (6), (13) and (14) imply that
vi =
4α
1 − α mi f i
m. (23)
In this setting, the volume of outsourcing in a country is proportional to the number of compo- nent producers active there. Evidently, an increase inLS boosts outsourcing activity in the south while curtailing such activity in the north.
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148 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
It is interesting to note the effect on the relative wage.Figure3 shows the combinations of mN andmS that imply the same relative wage as at pointE. These points satisfy the equal-profit condition (18) for ω = ωE, whereωE is the relative wage atE. Points above the ray correspond to a higher relative wage in the north thanωE, while points below it correspond to a higher relative wage in the south. We see that, as long as outsourcing continues to take place in both countries, an increase inLS must boost the relative wage of the south. The direct effect of an increase inLS is to generate excess supply for labour in the south and excess demand in the north. But the shift in outsourcing activity has the opposite effects. Moreover, the thick-market externality implies that outsourcing is an increasing returns activity at the industry level. Only when the wage of the north falls relative to that of the south will the final producers find it to be equally profitable to search in either region in view of the now thinner market in the north and the thicker market in the south.21
An increase inLS also increases the value of world trade, the share of trade in world income, and the fraction of world trade that is intra-industry trade. The value of world trade is the sum of the value of northern imports of homogeneous goods, the value of southern imports of final goods, and the value of northern imports of components. But trade balance implies that the total value of southern imports,βwSLS, equals the value of its exports of homogeneous goods and of components. Therefore, the value of world trade is
T = 2βwSLS, (24)
which rises withLS when measured either in terms of the numeraire good (so thatwS = 1) or in
terms of northern labour. The ratio of trade volume to world income is
T
G DP =
2βLS
ωL N + LS (25)
while the fraction of trade that is intra-industry trade is22
Tintra
T = 1 −
1 − β
β
ωL N
LS . (26)
It is clear that both of these ratios rise withLS, because the direct effect and the indirect effect that derives from the change in the relative wage both point in the same direction.
We will not repeat the analysis for the case of an increase inL N . The reader may confirm that the qualitative effects on the number of component producers in each country, the location of outsourcing activity, the relative wage, the ratio of trade to world income, and the share of intra-industry trade are just the opposite of those for an increase inLS.
4.2. Outsourcing technology
The technology for outsourcing is reflected in the parameters that describe the cost of customizing a prototype for a particular producer of final goods(µi ). Arguably, changes in production methods associated with computer-aided design have reduced the cost of customizing
21. That the rise in the supply of an input can lead to a rise in its relative reward has been pointed out in other circumstances as well. For example,Grossman and Helpman(1991, Chapter 11) show that in a world in which the north innovates and the south imitates an increase in the size of the south raises its relative wage, andAcemoglu(1998) shows that an increase in the supply of skilled workers can induce skill-biased technical change that leads to an increase in their relative wage.
22. The volume of intra-industry trade is defined as twice the smaller of the north’s exports of differentiated final goods and the south’s exports of intermediates. In this case, the latter quantity is smaller. Since the volume of these exports equalsβLS
− (1 − β)ωL N (the difference between the south’s imports of differentiated goods and the south’s exports of homogeneous goods), the expression in (26) follows from (24).
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 149
mN
mS
N
N
S
S
E
E
E′
FIGURE 3
Labour supply growth in the south
components. We investigate how improvements in the investment technologies affect the location of outsourcing activity.23
First, consider equi-proportionate improvements in the investment technologies;i.e. µN
andµS fall by similar percentage amounts. From the equal-profit condition (18), we see that such technological change has no effect on the relative profitability of searching in the north vs. the south. Moreover, the investment parameters have no direct effect on labour demand in neither the north nor the south (see (15) and (17)). As a result, only the ratio of these parameters appears in the reduced-formSSandN N equations (see (19) and (20)). It follows that a uniform improvement in investment technologies leaves theSSandN N curves in their initial locations. There is no effect on the number of component producers in either country, on the relative wage, on the levels of outsourcing activity, or on the level and composition of international trade.
Now we consider improvements in the technology for customizing components in the south alone. When onlyµS falls, it becomes more profitable for final producers to search for partners in the south at the initial relative wage. The relative wage of the north must fall to restore equal profitability of search (see (18)). But then theSScurve shifts up and theN N curve shifts to the left, as illustrated inFigure4. The equilibrium moves fromE to E′, implying an increase in the number of input suppliers in the south and a fall in their number in the north. Outsourcing activity shifts from north to south (see (23)).
The fall in µS implies, by (18), that the relative wageω can be realized with a smaller number of input suppliers in the south (givenmN) than was true before the technological change. Thus, theω = ωE ray rotates as drawn. AtE′, the relative wage of the north is lower thanωE. It follows, from (25) and (26), that an improvement in the investment technology in the south results in an increased ratio of trade to world income and an increased share of intra-industry trade.
To summarize, a rise in international outsourcing with concomitant growth in the importance of trade and of intra-industry trade can be explained by improvements in the technologies for customization, but only if these improvements have occurred to a
23. InGrossman and Helpman(2002b), we analyse as well the effects of reductions in the marginal cost of search due, for example, to improvements in transportation and communications technologies.
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150 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
N
N
S
S
E
E′
mN
mS
E
FIGURE 4
Technological improvement in the south
disproportionate extent in the south. It is certainly plausible that such technological catch-up has occurred in recent years.24
5. CONTRACTING WITH PARTIAL VERIFIABILITY
We would like to examine how differences in the contracting environment across countries affect equilibrium patterns of outsourcing. To this end, we proceed now to extend our model to incorporate intermediate cases between the familiar extremes of “no contracts” and “perfect contracts”. Specifically, we assume that, in countryi , an outside party can verify a fraction γ i < 1/2 of the investment in customization undertaken by an input supplier for a potential downstream customer.25 The parameterγ i may be given a literal interpretation: the development of a prototype requires a number of stages or sub-investments, some of which are verifiable and others are not. More figuratively, we imagine thatγ i captures the quality of the legal system in country i ; the greater isγ i , the more complete are the contracts that can be written there. When investments are partially verifiable, potential business partners are able to write (limited) contracts governing the supplier’s investment in customization.
We assume now that bargaining occurs in two stages. When a final producer approaches a potential supplier in a given market, the two firms first negotiate over the extent of the supplier’s investment in customization and the amount of compensation that the customer will pay for the prototype. Later, the parties negotiate over the quantity and price of components. We will refer to the contract that governs the supplier’s investment in the prototype as aninvestment contract, to distinguish it from the subsequentorder contract.
Consider the negotiation of an investment contract between an input producer in countryi and a final-good producer whose required component is at a distancex from the supplier’s exper- tise. The contract can require a level of investment up to but not exceedingγ i wi µi x, because
24. InGrossman and Helpman(2002b) we show that similar results obtain when the search technology improves disproportionately in favour of the south, when search costs rise with the intensity of search.
25. Since the component producer garners one-half of the returns to any investment in the Nash bargain, full efficiency can be achieved whenever it is feasible for the parties to write a contract that calls for an equal sharing of costs. Accordingly, our assumption thatγ i < 1/2 corresponds to an assumption that full efficiency is not attainable.
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 151
only verifiable investments can be covered by contract. The contract also can specify a payment Pi for which the final-good producer will be liable if the supplier carries out the stipulated invest- ment. We assume Nash bargaining wherein the parties share equally in the surplus that accrues from any such contract. The parties anticipate that if they reach a stage where a suitable prototype exists, their negotiation will lead to an equal sharing ofSi under an efficient order contract. So each party expects to earnSi /2 if a first-stage bargain is reached and if the supplier chooses to invest the full amountwi µi x needed for the development of a suitable prototype.
Suppose first that the distancex between the supplier and potential downstream customer is such thatSi /2 < (1 − γ i )wi µi x. Then the supplier’s share of the prospective profits is not large enough to cover the cost of the discretionary investment (i.e. the part of the investment that cannot be governed by any contract). In the event, the supplier will not make the full investment in customization. Foreseeing this outcome, the final producer will not be willing to pay anything for a partial investment ofγ i wi µi x, and the producer will not make any relationship-specific investment. In short, there is no investment contract and no investment under these conditions.
Next suppose thatSi /2 ≥ wi µi x. In such circumstances, the supplier’s share of the prospective profits covers the full cost of the requisite investment in the prototype. Then the supplier is willing to proceed with the full investment even if there is no contract requiring a partial investment and no initial payment whatsoever. In this case, an investment contract creates no surplus relative to the joint profits that would result without it. It follows that the investment contract can be a null contract, or (what amounts to the same) it can require an investment of γ i wi µi x with a payment by the final-good producer ofPi
= 0. Finally, suppose that(1 − γ i )wi µi x ≤ Si /2 < wi µi x. In this situation, the component
producer would not be willing to bear the full cost of customizing the component absent an investment contract, but it would be willing to undertake the marginal investment of(1 −
γ i )wi µi x if an investment ofγ i wi µi x were stipulated by an enforceable contract and justified by a sufficiently large paymentPi . Therefore, the parties can share a positive surplus if they manage to agree on an investment contract in the first stage of negotiations. The Nash bargain calls for an equal sharing of the potential surplus relative to their outside options of zero, which means that an initial payment by the final-good producer must equalize the net rewards to the two parties. The final producer’s reward net of the payment isSi /2 − Pi , while the input producer’s reward including the payment but net of the investment cost isSi /2+ Pi
− wi µi x. Equating the two, we havePi
= wi µi x/2. In other words, when(1 − γ i )wi µi x ≤ Si /2 < wi µi x, the two sides share the investment cost equally.
To summarize, the investment contract and the induced investment behaviour depend upon the contracting environment in the supplier’s home country, on the distance between the supplier’s expertise and the final producer’s input requirement, and on the size of the potential profits that would be generated by an efficient order contract. LetPi (x) be the payment that is dictated by an investment contract between a final producer in the north and an input supplier in countryi when the supplier’s expertise differs from the buyer’s input needs byx, and letI i (x)
be the induced investment level. Then26
Pi (x) =
{ 1 2wi µi x for Si
2wi µi < x ≤ Si
2wi µi (1−γ i )
0 otherwise (27)
26. We have also examined what happens when the bargaining shares are unequal at one or both stages. The greater is the bargaining power of the component supplier at the first stage, the larger is the paymentPi that this firm collects from the customer in situations wherePi > 0. But the division of surplus in the first stage does not affect the range of distances between supplier and customer for which the investment takes place. In contrast, the greater is the bargaining share of the component supplier in the second stage, the larger will be the maximum distance between supplier and customer for whichI i > 0, unless it is anyway the case that all final producers are served.
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152 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
and
I i (x) =
{ wi µi x for x ≤
Si
2wi µi (1−γ i )
0 otherwise. (28)
Now recall that the distance in input space between a final-good producer who searches in country i and its nearest supplier is a random variable uniformly distributed on[0, 1/2mi
]. Together with the investment equation (28), this means that the greatest distance between an active final-good producer and its supplier of components in countryi is given by
r i = min
{ Si
2wi µi (1 − γ i ) ,
1
2mi
} . (29)
Once a component supplier has borne the cost of investment in the prototype, the partners share similar interests regarding the production and marketing of the final good. As in the case with γ i
= 0, they write an efficient order contract to govern the manufacture and sale of the intermediate inputs, sharing equally the surplusSi given by (5).
A final-good producer who searches for a supplier in countryi finds a partner willing to invest in customization with probability 2r i mi . The prospective supplier may be at any distance between zero andr i with equal probability. It follows that the expected profits of a final-good producer who searches in countryi are
π i n = 2mi
∫ r i
0
[ Si
2 − Pi (x)
] dx. (30)
As before, final-good producers search in the country offering the higher expected profits. Therefore, the expected operating profits of a final-good producer areπn = max{π N
n , π S n }, and
the free-entry condition remains (8). A component producer that enters in countryi will serve a measure 2ni r i of buyers. The
firm’s customers will be spread uniformly at distances ranging from zero tor i . A supplier earns profits of Pi (x) + Si /2 − wi µi x from its relationship with a final-good producer whose input requirement is at a distancex from its own expertise. Thus, potential operating profits for an input producer that enters in countryi are
π i m = 2ni
∫ r i
0 [Pi (x) +
1 2 Si
− wi µi x]dx. (31)
Changes in the contracting environment, as measured by changes in theγi ’s, can affect the outsourcing equilibrium only when they alter either the probability that a typical firm will find a willing partner or the payments made by final producers to their suppliers. But every final producer is sure to be supplied with components whenr i
= 1/2mi and Pi does not depend onγ i . Therefore, a change inγ i does not affect the equilibrium unless the investment constraint binds in countryi . We henceforth focus on equilibria in which the investment constraint binds in both countries.
When the investment constraints bind, (29) implies that
r i =
Si
2wi µi (1 − γ i ) for i = N, S. (32)
Expected operating profits for a final producer searching in countryi can be calculated using (27) and (30). Substituting these expected profits into the free-entry condition (8) yields
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 153
r i [mi Si
− 1 2mi wi µi r i γ i (2 − γ i )] = wN f for i = N, S. (33)
The difference between this equation and (16)—which applies whenγ i = 0—is the second term
in the square brackets. When multiplied byr i , this term reflects the expected first-stage payment by a final producer to its prospective parts supplier.
Similarly, we can use (27) and (31) to calculate the operating profits for a component producer in countryi . Equating these to the fixed cost of entry (and thereby assuming thatmi > 0 for i = N, S), we have
r i ni [Si
+ 1 2wi µi r i γ i (2 − γ i ) − wi µi r i
] = wi f i m for i = N, S. (34)
The product of the second term in the square brackets andr i ni is the total amount of up-front payments received by the typical input supplier from its various customers.
We now are ready to derive the reduced-form labour-market clearing conditions that apply whenγ i > 0 and the investment constraint binds in both countries. Substituting (5), (6), (32) and (34) into (11), we find that
(1 − β)(ωL N + LS) +
[ 21+α
1−α −
1+3α 1−α
γ S −
1 2(γ S)2
1 − γ S − 1 2(γ S)2
] mS f S
m = LS. (35)
The first term on the L.H.S. represents labour demand by producers of the homogeneous product, while the second term represents labour demand by southern producers of intermediate inputs for entry, investment and production.
Similarly, we use (4)–(6), (32)–(34) to substitute for the terms in (12). This yields
1
2 (1 − α)β
( L N
+ 1
ω LS
)
−
γ N ( 1 −
1 2γ N
) 1 − γ N −
1 2(γ N)2
mN f N m −
γ S ( 1 −
1 2γ S
) 1 − γ S −
1 2(γ S)2
1
ω mS f S
m
+
[ 21+α
1−α −
1+3α 1−α
γ N −
1 2(γ N)2
1 − γ N − 1 2(γ N)2
] mN f N
m = L N . (36)
The first three terms on the L.H.S. represent the total demand for labour by final-good producers for entry and search, while the last term represents the labour used by component producers in the north for entry, investment, and production.
To complete the construction of the reduced-formSSand N N curves, we need an equal- profit condition. We substitute (5) and (32) into the free-entry condition for final producers (33), and equate the expected operating profits from search in either country, to derive
ω =
( µSmN
µNmS
) 1−α 1+α
[ (1 − γ S)2
(1 − γ N)2
2 − 3γ N +
1 2(γ N)2
2 − 3γ S + 1 2(γ S)2
] 1−α 1+α
. (37)
As before, a relatively thicker market for components in the north raises the profitability of search in the north relative to search in the south. To offset this imbalance withmN and mS
fixed, the relative wage of the north must rise. Similarly, an improvement in technology for customization in a country mandates a rise in the country’s relative wage if equal profitability is to be preserved. These relationships are the same as before. Now, in addition, the degree of contract incompleteness affects the profitability of search in a given country. Whenγ N < 1/2,
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154 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
an increaseγ N raises the expected profits from searching in the north relative to the south. To restore equal profitability with the same number of firms, the relative wage of the north must rise. Similarly, for γ S < 1/2, a riseγ S requires a fall inω for equal profitability at the initialmN and mS. In short, an improvement in the contracting environment in a country raises the probability that a given match will result in a viable bilateral relationship and so enhances the attractiveness of searching for a supplier in that country. In equilibrium,ω, mN or mS must adjust if outsourcing is to persist in both locations.
The new SS curve is obtained by substituting the relative wage from the equal-profit condition (37) into (35), while the newN N curve is obtained by substituting this relative wage into (36). When γ S
= γ N = 0, the formulas for these curves collapse to (19) and (20),
respectively.
5.1. Improvements in contracting in the north
We begin by examining improvements in the contracting environment in the north. Suppose that, initially, γ N
= γ S = 0. Figure5 depicts the initial equilibrium point atE.
Now consider a marginal increase inγ N . As we have just noted, this raises the relative profitability of search in the north. The relative wageω must rise at givenmS andmN to equalize the expected profits from search in either market. As a result, theSScurve shifts downward.27
This shift reflects the greater amount of southern labour needed to produce homogeneous goods for the now better-paid northern consumers.
In the northern labour market, there are several effects that must be taken into account. First, the fall in the relative wage of the south spells a reduction in southern demand for differentiated products, which tends to reduce employment by final producers. The demand for labour by final producers at givenmN also falls for another reason: the improvement in the contracting environment means that viable outsourcing relationships will develop between final producers and suppliers who are not able to consummate such a relationship without any investment contracts. Since each final producer ultimately has a better chance of finding a suitable partner, there are more final goods produced for any given number of entrants. But the implied intensification of competition in the market for differentiated products means that fewer such producers are willing to bear the fixed cost of entry. This effect is reflected in the second term on the L.H.S. of (36), which is zero whenγ N
= 0 but becomes negative whenγ N turns positive.
The fall in labour demand by final-good producers is offset by an increase in demand by component producers. Component producers need more labour to make additional investments in customization and to serve their greater numbers of customers. The demand for labour by component producers is captured by the fourth term on the L.H.S. of (36), and it unambiguously grows asγ N increases. It is easy to verify that the fall in labour demand by final producers at given mN andmS exactly offsets the increase in labour demand by final producers whenγ N
increases slightly from zero. This leaves only the effect of the rise inω that is needed to maintain
27. Forγ S = 0, (37) and (35) yield the following formulae for theSScurve:
mN =
µN
µS mS
[ βLS
− 21+α 1−α
mS f S m
(1 − β)L N
] 1+α 1−α
(1 − γ N )2
2 − 3γ N + 1 2(γ N )2
.
The R.H.S. of this equation declines inγ N for γ N < 1/2. It follows that an increase inγ N shifts theSScurve downward.
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 155
N
N
S
S
E
E′
mN
mS
E
FIGURE 5
Contracting improves in the north: low initialγ N
equal expected profits from searching in either country. It follows that theN N curve shifts to the right for a small increase inγ N , as illustrated in the figure.28
The net result is an increase in the number of component producers in the north, a decline in the number of such producers in the south, and a hike in the north’s relative wage. This can be seen inFigure5, which shows the new equilibrium atE′, above and to the left ofE. Note that this equilibrium lies above the broken ray, which shows the combinations ofmS andmN
that give the same relative wage as atE in view of the new, higher value ofγ N . It is also easy to show that the volume of domestic outsourcing rises while the volume of outsourcing in the south falls.29 It follows further from equations (25) and (26) that the ratio of trade to world income and the share of intra-industry trade in total trade both fall.
While an initial improvement in contracting conditions in the north causes outsourcing to relocate from south to north, further improvements in the contract environment need not have this effect. In fact, onceγ N is positive, the boost in labour demand by component producers at given ω andmN induced by further growth inγ N outweighs the fall in such demand by final-good producers (i.e. the fourth term in (36) grows by more than the second term shrinks). Still, there is an additional fall in demand by final-good producers owing to the decline in southern income
28. We obtain from (37) and (36) the following equation for theN N curve whenγ S = 0:
mS =
µS
µN mN
[ 1 −
1 2(1 − α)β
] L N
− 21+α 1−α
1−γ N
1−γ N− 1 2 (γ N )2
mN f N m
1 2(1 − α)βLS
1+α 1−α
2 − 3γ N +
1 2(γ N )2
(1 − γ N )2 ·
The R.H.S. of this equation is rising inγ N whenγ N is small. Therefore, an increase inγ N from γ N = 0 shifts theN N
curve to the right. 29. The volume of outsourcing now is given by
vi =
4α
1 − α
1 − γ i
1 − γ i − 1 2(γ i )2
mi f i m.
SodvN/dγ N > 0 atγ N = γ S
= 0, because there are an increased number of northern component producers and each produces a larger volume of components. In the south, a fall in outsourcing results from the exit of southern component suppliers.
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156 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
(and reflected in the shift inω from (37)). On net, theN N curve may shift in either direction. It is easy to find situations in which an increase inγ N from an initially high level causes exit by component producers in the north, entry by component producers in the south, and an expansion in international outsourcing and trade.30
We have solved the model numerically for a wide range of parameter values. Holding γ S
= 0, we variedγ N gradually from zero to 0·4 and found a recurring pattern. Namely, the volume of outsourcing in the north rises then falls asγ N increases, but always remains above the level for γ N
= 0. Meanwhile, the volume of outsourcing in the south falls and then rises, while remaining below the level forγ N
= 0. The relative wage of the north rises, then falls, which implies that the ratio of world trade to world income and the share of intra-industry trade in total trade do just the opposite.31
5.2. Improvements in contracting worldwide
Before we turn to the contracting environment of the south, it is helpful to discuss the effects of worldwide gains in contracting possibilities. We again take an initial situation in which all investment is unverifiable in both countries(γ N
= γ S = γ = 0), but now consider a change in
the legal environment that makes some investment tasks contractible in both countries(dγ > 0). We will show that, perhaps surprisingly, such a development would not be neutral with respect to the siting of outsourcing activity.
From the equal-profit condition (37) we see that as long asγ S = γ N
= γ , the degree of contract incompleteness has no direct effect on the relative profitability of search in the two countries. As can be seen from (35), an increase inγ S increases the demand for labour (at given mS andω) by southern component producers who need more labour, because each undertakes a greater number of investments and serves a larger number of customers. The demand for the homogeneous product must decline worldwide in order for the southern labour market to clear at the initialmS, which means thatω would have to be lower than before. But a decline in the relative wage makes search more profitable in the north, which requires a decline inmN in order to restore the equal-profit condition. Therefore, an increase inγ from an initial situation with γ = 0 causes theSScurve to shift downward, as depicted inFigure6.
The N N curve, in contrast, shifts to the right. While it is true that northern component producers demand more labour (at givenmN andω) for much the same reason as their southern counterparts, this is more than offset by a decline in employment by final producers. As we noted previously, atγ N
= 0, the second term on the L.H.S. of (36) decreases withγ N by the same amount as the fourth term increases. But now we also have a decline in the third term of (36) due to the growth inγ S. The additional bilateral relationships that are consummated by final producers with input suppliers in the south are an added source of intensified competition in the product market. In response, final producers exit in even greater number than they do when contracting improves only in the north. The result is an overall decline in labour demand in the
30. This occurs whenγ N > γ̄ N , whereγ̄ N < 1/2 is the unique solution to
γ̄ N ( 1 −
1 2 γ̄ N
) 1 − γ̄ N −
1 2(γ̄ N )2
= 1 − 2γ̄ N
2 − 3γ̄ N + 1 2(γ̄ N )2
.
The value ofγ̄ N has been calculated so that the downward shift inSSat the initialmS exactly matches the downward shift in N N. With this initial value ofγ N , an improvement in the contracting environment in the north results in a fall in mN and no change inmS or the relative wage. For still larger initial values ofγ N thanγ̄ N , the N N curve shifts down by more than theSScurve, somS rises andmN falls.
31. Such a pattern obtains, for example, whenµN = µS
= 50,α = 0·5, β = 0·75, f N m = f S
m = 0·01, L N = 40
andLS = 32.
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 157
N
N
S
S
E
E′
mN
mS
E
FIGURE 6
Contracting improves worldwide
north at given wages and given numbers of component producers. To restore the labour-market equilibrium in the north, the relative wage in the north must decline, givenmN . Such a decline in the relative wage would make search in the north more profitable. To restore equal profitability, more component producers would have to enter in the south. That is,mS must increase for given mN in order for the northern labour market to clear afterγ rises.
As the figure shows, a worldwide improvement in contracting possibilities is not neutral with respect to the location of outsourcing; the equilibrium point shifts fromE to E′. In the new equilibrium, there are more component producers in the north and fewer such producers in the south. The improvement in the legal environment induces a shift in outsourcing activity from south to north.32 The asymmetric effects of the change inγ come about because the improved prospects for investment by input suppliers mitigates the need for entry by final-good producers. With the resources freed from the activity of designing differentiated products, the north can expand its input supply activities. Meanwhile, the improvements in contracting possibilities raise world income (evaluated in terms of the numeraire good), and with it the demand for homogeneous goods. More labour must be devoted by the south to producing these goods, which means that less is available for serving the needs of final producers.33
5.3. Improvements in contracting in the south
We are now ready to explain why improvements in the contracting environment in the south, even if achieved from a very low initial level, need not result in an expansion of outsourcing activity there. We take an initial situation withγ N > γ S
= 0 and consider a marginal increase inγ S.
32. Recall that the volume of outsourcing from countryi is given by
vi =
4α
1 − α
1 − γ i
1 − γ i − 1 2(γ i )2
mi f i m.
Outsourcing activity falls in the south, despite the increase inγ S, becausemS falls by a greater percentage than output per firm rises.
33. It can readily be shown that an increase inγ has no effect on the volume of outsourcing in a closed economy. The aggregate effects described here reflect the general equilibrium interactions between two asymmetric economies with segmented markets for components.
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158 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
For reasons that are familiar by now, an increase inγ S raises (at givenω, mS andmN) the relative profitability of search in the south. To restore the equal-profit relationship, the relative wageω must decline. The movement in the relative wage (or the terms of trade) expands the demand for differentiated goods by the south and reduces the demand for homogeneous goods by the north. Thus, the shift inω exerts upward pressure on theSScurve and leftward pressure on theN N curve, both of which tend to generate an expansion of outsourcing activity in the south and a contraction of such activity in the north.
But the effects of the change in relative profitability are offset by impacts on labour demand at the initial pattern of search activity. In the south, component producers are able to serve more customers, and so their demand for labour grows for both investment and production purposes. This alone would shift theSScurve down. At the same time, the intensified competition in the product market that results from the broader search efforts of firms seeking partners in the south spells the exit of some final producers in the north. This alone reduces labour demand, tending to push theN N curve to the right. On net, theSScurve can shift in either direction, as can the N N curve.
Again, we resort to numerical computations to explore possible outcomes. Holdingγ N fixed atγ N
= 0·4, we variedγ S from 0 to 0·4 for a wide range of values of the remaining parameters. Repeatedly, we find that the volume of outsourcing in the north rises monotonically withγ S, while the volume of outsourcing in the south rises at first, but then falls to a level below that for γ S
= 0. So too does the ratio of world trade to world income, the share of intra-industry trade in total trade, and the relative wage of the south (i.e. 1/ω). In other words, the volume of international outsourcing, the share of world trade in world income, and the relative wage of the south typically are largest when the legal environment allows somewhat less complete contracts in the south than in the north.34
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a model that can be used to study outsourcing decisions in a global economy. In our model, producers of differentiated final goods must go outside the firm for an essential service or component. Search is costly and specific to a market. Each final producer decides where to conduct its search for a supplier. If a firm finds a potential partner with suitable expertise, the supplier can customize an input for the final producer’s use. Such relationship- specific investments are governed by incomplete contracts, and the contracting environment may differ in the two countries.
Our model features a thick-market externality: search in a market is more profitable the more suppliers are present there, while input producers fare best when they have many customers to serve. This externality creates the possibility for multiple equilibria, some of which may involve a concentration of outsourcing activity in one location. But stable equilibria need not involve complete specialization of input production in a single country. In this paper, we focused our attention on stable equilibria in which some firms outsource at home while others do so abroad.
First, we studied how labour supplies and the investment technologies affect the equilibrium location of outsourcing activity. As the south expands, its share of world outsourcing grows, as does the ratio of trade to world income and the share of intra-industry trade in total world trade. Uniform worldwide improvements in investment technologies, as might result from advances in computer-aided design, have no effect on the volume of outsourcing or its international
34. These patterns obtain, for example, whenµN = µS
= 50,α = 0·5, β = 0·75, f N m = f S
m = 0·01, L N = 40
andLS = 32.
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GROSSMAN & HELPMAN OUTSOURCING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 159
composition. But disproportionate improvements in the technology for customization in the south generates shifts in outsourcing activity from the north to south.
Next, we investigated the role of the contracting environment. We characterized the legal setting in a country by the fraction of a relationship-specific investment that is verifiable to a third party. An improvement in the contracting possibilities in a country raises the relative profitability of outsourcing there, given the number of component producers in each country and the relative wage. But changes in the contracting environment also affect the demand for labour by component producers and final-good producers at a given wage. A global increase in the fraction of contractible investment tends to favour outsourcing in the north, whereas an improvement in the legal environment of the south can raise or lower the volume of outsourcing there while raising outsourcing from the north.
Acknowledgements. We thank Patrick Bolton, Oliver Hart, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Ariel Rubinstein, Fabrizio Zilibotti and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions and Yossi Hadar and Taeyoon Sung for developing our simulation programs. We are also grateful to the National Science Foundation and the US–Israel Binational Science Foundation for financial support.
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- Introduction
- The Model
- Bargaining and contracting
- Search
- Free entry and market clearing
- Outsourcing with Unverifiable Investment
- Comparative Statics
- Country size
- Outsourcing technology
- Contracting with Partial Verifiability
- Improvements in contracting in the north
- Improvements in contracting worldwide
- Improvements in contracting in the south
- Conclusions
o2 ( making more by doing less).pdf
Making More by Doing Less: An Analysis of Outsourcing and its Effects on Firm
Performance K. Matthew Gilley
Oklahoma State University
Abdul Rasheed The University of Texas at Arlington
This study empirically examined the extent to which outsourcing of both peripheral and near-core tasks influences firms’ financial and nonfinancial performance. In addition, the potential moderating effects of firm strategy and the environment on the outsourcing-performance relationship were examined. Results indicate that, whereas there was no significant direct effect of outsourcing on firm performance, both firm strategy and environmental dynamism moderated the relationship be- tween outsourcing and performance. © 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Organizations are increasingly turning to outsourcing in an attempt to enhance their competitiveness. Chrysler, for example, outsources 100% of the manufacture of half of its minicompact and subcompact cars. Furthermore, Chrysler and Ford currently produce less than one-half of the value of all their vehicles in-house. Similarly, Boeing has begun to rely more heavily on outsourcing partners to manufacture its aircraft. For example, the manufacture of a large portion of the Boeing 767, Boeing’s third largest commercial aircraft, is outsourced to a con- sortium of Japanese manufacturers including Fuji, Kawasaki, and Mitsubishi (Hill & Jones, 1995). As a result, only 10% of the value of the 767 is produced in-house.
Despite the dramatic rise in outsourcing in recent years, few empirical investigations of the subject have been conducted. Previous work on outsourcing has been primarily theoretical in nature and has relied mostly on anecdotal evidence to support assertions. Furthermore, the conclusions of these works are inconsistent. Many intuitively appealing arguments have been offered both for and against outsourcing as a means of achieving sustainable competitive advan- tage. For example, Quinn (1992) proposes that, by allowing outside specialist organizations to concentrate on certain tasks, firms may increase their perfor- mance by focusing more narrowly on the things they do best. However, Bettis, Bradley, and Hamel (1992) argue that outsourcing may reduce organizational innovation, may shift knowledge to supplier organizations, and may reduce
Journal of Management 2000, Vol. 26, No. 4, 763–790
Copyright © 2000 by Elsevier Science Inc. 0149-2063
763
control over a firm’s activities. In this way, outsourcing may destroy long-run competitive advantage.
This study empirically investigates the influence of outsourcing on organi- zational performance. To date, little is known about the firm-level outcomes of outsourcing decisions. Many authors have discussed the issue and have supported their positions with anecdotal evidence. However, little systematic empirical work has been conducted to determine the influence of outsourcing decisions on firms’ financial and nonfinancial performance. Therefore, this study seeks to advance understanding about the relationship between organizational reliance on outsourc- ing strategies and firm performance.
Literature Review
In this section, the definitions of outsourcing used in prior research are examined. In addition, a definition of outsourcing is developed that is based on a comprehensive review of the outsourcing literature. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing that have been identified in prior studies are inves- tigated.
Definitions of Outsourcing There seems to be confusion in the management literature about what is
meant by the term “outsourcing.” In their study of information technology (IT) outsourcing, Loh and Venkatraman defined outsourcing as “the significant con- tribution by external vendors in the physical and/or human resources associated with the entire or specific components of the IT infrastructure in the user organization” (1992: 9). Alternatively, outsourcing has been defined as “products supplied to the multinational firm by independent suppliers from around the world” and “the extent of components and finished products supplied to the firm by independent suppliers” (Kotabe, 1992: 103). In addition, outsourcing has been defined as “the reliance on external sources for manufacturing components and other value-adding activities” (Lei & Hitt, 1995: 836). Generally, the definition of outsourcing used in studies of the subject is so broad that it includes virtually any good or service that an organization procures from outside firms.
However, defining outsourcing simply in terms of procurement activities does not capture the true strategic nature of the issue. Outsourcing is not simply a purchasing decision;all firms purchase elements of their operations. On the contrary, we suggest that outsourcing is less common and represents the funda- mental decision to reject the internalization of an activity. In this way, outsourcing is a highly strategic decision that has the potential to cause ripple effects through- out the entire organization. Further, we propose that outsourcing may arise in two ways. First, outsourcing may arise through thesubstitutionof external purchases for internal activities. In this way, it can be viewed as a discontinuation of internal production (whether it be production of goods or services) and an initiation of procurement from outside suppliers. To the extent that this type of outsourcing reduces a firm’s involvement in successive stages of production, substitution- based outsourcing may be viewed as verticaldisintegration. This seems to be the most commonly understood type of outsourcing.
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However, outsourcing may also occur throughabstention. Outsourcing need not be limited to those activities that are shifted to external suppliers. On the contrary, outsourcing may also arise when a firm purchases goods or services from outside organizations even when those goods or services have not been completed in-house in the past. However, we believe that abstention-based outsourcing is unique from basic procurement, because the former only occurs when the internalization of the good or service outsourced was within the acquiring firm’s managerial and/or financial capabilities. In other words, as with substitution-based outsourcing, abstention-based outsourcing also reflects a deci- sion to reject internalization. Therefore, we suggest that organizations having no choice but to acquire a particular good or service from an external source (because of a lack of capital or expertise, for example) are not outsourcing, because the internalization of the activity in question is not an option. In other words, rejecting the internalization of the focal activity was never a choice, and the firm is simply engaging in procurement. Whether virtual or network organizations, as well as other types of firms founded with the intention of performing only a narrow range of activities in-house from inception, are considered to be outsourcing must be determined on a firm-by-firm (or even activity-by-activity) basis. Indeed, this definition of outsourcing may exclude many types of activities that have been considered outsourced in prior research. Previous definitions of outsourcing have not made the substitution/abstention distinction and, therefore, have not allowed researchers to approach the subject of outsourcing from a common starting point.
The Advantages of Outsourcing
Although the definition of outsourcing has been somewhat uncertain, many potential benefits of outsourcing have been identified in the literature. Those most often discussed are improved financial performance (attributable, in part, to almost immediate cost improvements) and various nonfinancial performance effects, such as a heightened focus on core competencies. These and other proposed advantages of outsourcing are discussed below.
Outsourcing firms often achieve cost advantages relative to vertically inte- grated firms (Bettis, Bradley, & Hamel, 1992; D’Aveni & Ravenscraft, 1994; Kotabe, 1989; Lei & Hitt, 1995; Quinn, 1992). Through outsourcing, manufac- turing costs decline and investment in plant and equipment can be reduced (Bettis et al., 1992). This reduced investment in manufacturing capacity lowers fixed costs and leads to a lower break-even point. The short-run cost improvement swiftly reinforces the outsourcing decision. Thus, outsourcing may be an attrac- tive method of improving a firm’s financial performance, especially in the short run.
Outsourcing may contribute to other advantages as well. In-house production increases organizational commitment to a specific type of technology and may constrain flexibility in the long run (Harrigan, 1985). However, firms focusing on outsourcing can switch suppliers as new, more cost effective technologies become available. In addition, outsourcing allows for quick response to changes in the environment (Dess, Rasheed, McLaughlin, & Priem, 1995) in ways that do not increase costs associated with bureaucracy (D’Aveni & Ravenscraft, 1994). Thus,
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firms that outsource may achieve long-run advantages compared to firms relying on internal production. As noted by Quinn, “virtually all staff and value chain activities are activities that an outside entity, by concentrating specialists and technologies in the area, can perform better than all but a few companies for whom that activity is only one of many” (1992: 37).
An increased focus on an organization’s core competencies is another important benefit associated with outsourcing (Dess et al., 1995; Kotabe & Murray, 1990; Quinn, 1992; Venkatraman, 1989). Outsourcing noncore activities allows the firm to increase managerial attention and resource allocation to those tasks that it does best and to rely on management teams in other organizations to oversee tasks at which the outsourcing firm is at a relative disadvantage.
The importance of defining and developing the core competence of the firm has attained great popularity among management researchers and practitioners (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). This has increasingly led to a move away from market-based definitions of businesses toward more competence-based defini- tions. For example Honda’s core competence is in small engine production and, therefore, the domain of Honda’s activities can be seen as any business in which this core competence finds an application. Nike’s core competencies are in the design and marketing of shoes rather than in their manufacture. Therefore, Nike has focused on these aspects of the athletic shoe industry and has relied on outside firms for virtually all manufacturing activities. Quinn, Doorley, and Paquette (1990) and Quinn (1992) also make a strong case for outsourcing activities in which a firm cannot excel to provide the firm with heightened focus on its core competencies.
Other nonfinancial benefits of outsourcing have received less attention in research. One additional advantage is that it tends to promote competition among outside suppliers, thereby ensuring availability of higher-quality goods and ser- vices in the future (Kotabe & Murray, 1990). Quality improvements may also be realized by outsourcers, because they can oftentimes choose suppliers whose products or services are considered to be among the best in the world (Dess et al., 1995; Quinn, 1992). Outsourcing also spreads risk (Quinn, 1992). By using outside suppliers for products or services, an outsourcer is able to take advantage of emerging technology without investing significant amounts of capital in that technology. Thus, the outsourcer is able to switch suppliers when market condi- tions demand.
The Disadvantages of Outsourcing
Although outsourcing’s potential benefits are many, some argue that reliance on outside suppliers is likely to lead to a loss of overall market performance (Bettis et al., 1992; Kotabe, 1992). One of the most serious threats resulting from a reliance on outsourcing is declining innovation by the outsourcer. Outsourcing can lead to a loss of long-run research and development (R&D) competitiveness (Teece, 1987) because it is often used as a substitute for innovation. As a result, firms that outsource are likely to lose touch with new technological breakthroughs that offer opportunities for product and process innovations (Kotabe, 1992).
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In addition, as suppliers gain knowledge of the product being manufactured, they may use that knowledge to begin marketing the product on their own (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). In fact, firms from the Pacific Rim have a well- established pattern of market entry based on outsourcing partnerships (Willard & Savara, 1988). Many Asian firms have made their initial entrance into U.S. markets by first entering supplier arrangements with U.S. manufacturers, and subsequently marketing their own brands aggressively. In this way, many Asian firms have achieved market dominance.
There are several other dangers associated with outsourcing. First, the cost savings associated with outsourcing may not be as great as they seem, especially with respect to foreign suppliers. The transaction costs associated with repeated market-based transactions, especially overseas, can be significant. In addition, as long as foreign wages remain relatively low and the dollar remains relatively strong, foreign outsourcing is attractive (Markides & Berg, 1988). However, success attributable to low foreign wages and a strong dollar is fleeting advantage. Also, outsourcing requires a shift in overhead allocation to those products or activities that remain in-house. This reallocation of overhead degrades the appar- ent financial performance of the remaining products or activities and raises their vulnerability to subsequent outsourcing (Bettis et al., 1992), perhaps leading to an outsourcing spiral. Thus, those remaining products or activities that were per- forming satisfactorily before the onset of outsourcing may erroneously be targets for future outsourcing. In addition, longer lead times resulting from spatial dispersion cause several problems, such as larger inventories, communication and coordination difficulties, lower demand fulfillment, and unexpected transportation and expediting costs (Levy, 1995). Tariffs are another danger associated with outsourcing, as are increases in the difficulty of bringing back into the firm activities that may now add value because of market shifts (Dess et al., 1995).
The preceding discussion of the benefits and dangers of outsourcing make it clear that reliance on outsourcing is not necessarily a viable competitive strategy. On the contrary, continuously switching from one supplier to another may merely postpone the “day of reckoning” when firms must fix what is wrong with their organizations (Markides & Berg, 1988).
Theory Development
Characteristics of Outsourcing Strategies
Two generic types of outsourcing are proposed here: peripheral outsourcing and core outsourcing. The first type occurs when firms acquire less strategically relevant, peripheral activities from external suppliers. The second type occurs when firms acquire activities that are considered highly important to long-run success. What constitutes a core or peripheral activity is essentially a judgment by each individual firm, based on what it considers as its core competency and the strategy it intends to pursue. Thus, although it is possible that some similarities may exist within the industry, there is considerable scope for variation among firms within the industry.
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In addition, it is proposed here that each of these outsourcing strategies is not a unidimensional concept. Instead, outsourcing strategies can be conceptualized as having two fundamental properties, breadth and depth. Breadth is defined here as the number of activities (i.e., accounting, maintenance, machining) outsourced as a percentage of the total number of activities in which the firm could be engaged. This is similar to Harrigan’s (1984) conceptualization of breadth of vertical integration.
Outsourcing strategies vary greatly in their breadth. On the one hand, many firms choose to maintain internalization of most of their activities and, therefore, have relatively narrow outsourcing strategies. Such firms may decide to outsource only a few activities while maintaining tight control over most others. In contrast, other firms choose to take a much broader approach to their outsourcing strategies by farming-out many peripheral activities, and even some activities much closer to their core capabilities.
The second dimension of outsourcing strategies is “depth.” Whereas firms outsourcing some portion of many activities are considered to have higher levels of breadth, those firms farming-out a higher portion of the value ofeach out- sourced activityare considered to have deeper outsourcing strategies. Thus, given that an activity is outsourced, depth is the extent to which a firm outsources a higher portion of that activityon average. For example, all else being equal, a firm farming-out an average of, say, 80% of each outsourced activity is considered to have a deeper outsourcing strategy than an identical firm farming-out an average of only 10% of each outsourced activity.
It is proposed here that the breadth and depth dimensions combine to form an organization’s overall outsourcing strategy. Attempting to determine a firm’s reliance on outsourcing strategies by examining breadth or depth in isolation is much less meaningful than examining them in tandem. A firm’s dependence on outsourcing cannot be measured simply by the number of activities that the firm (partially) outsources. Examining a firm’s level of outsourcing only in terms of breadth misses an important aspect of the phenomenon: the extent to which each activity is provided by an outside supplier. Only when a firm’s breadth and depth of outsourcing are combined does an accurate picture of the firm’s reliance on outsourcing emerge. In the current study, breadth and depth are multiplied together to form a single indicator of the level of outsourcing. This combined construct is called “outsourcing intensity,” and reflects the firm’s overall reliance on outsourcing.
Performance Implications of Outsourcing Intensity
The organizational effects of outsourcing decisions have been discussed widely in previous work. However, the current level of understanding of these outcomes is based primarily on anecdotal evidence. Potential performance en- hancements that may result from a carefully formulated outsourcing strategy are suggested by the competency-based and resource-based perspectives on strategic management. As mentioned previously, the competency-based view suggests that a firm should continuously invest in those activities that constitute its core competence while outsourcing the rest (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Quinn, 1992).
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The core competencies provide both the basis and the direction for the growth of the firm (Peteraf, 1993). Similarly, the resource-based view suggests that sus- tained competitive advantage is possible only through developing resources and capabilities that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and nonsubstitutable (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). Thus, the resource-based view suggests that inputs that are traded should be procured from the market, because investments in their creation are unlikely to lead to any sustainable competitive advantage.
Potential benefits of outsourcing, such as cost improvements and a more narrow focus on core competencies, make outsourcing an attractive option. On the other hand, potential disadvantages, such as declining innovation by outsourcing firms and eventual competition from suppliers, make the benefits of outsourcing suspect. Thus, the performance implications of varying levels of outsourcing intensity appear uncertain. To clarify some of the misunderstandings that underlie this debate, and to proceed toward resolving the issue of performance conse- quences of outsourcing, we propose firm performance to be influenced by the two types of outsourcing (peripheral and core) in unique ways. Figure 1 shows the proposed effects of peripheral and core outsourcing intensity on firm performance. In addition, it highlights the proposed moderating influence of firm strategy and environmental dynamism on outsourcing-performance relationships.
Peripheral Outsourcing. By peeling off layers of peripheral tasks and shifting their production to highly focused, specialist organizations, firms can see enhanced performance (Bettis et al., 1992; D’Aveni & Ravenscraft, 1994; Kotabe, 1989; Lei & Hitt, 1995; Quinn, 1992). This performance improvement relative to nonoutsourcing firms manifests itself in three ways. First, reducing peripheral activities allows firms to focus on those activities they do best. This heightened focus on core competencies may greatly enhance firm performance by allowing the firm to become more innovative and agile in its core domain. Second, outsourcing peripheral activities may greatly improve the quality of those activ- ities (Dess et al., 1995). Specialist organizations, by focusing their attention on a very narrow set of functions, perform them much more successfully than could the
Figure 1
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outsourcing firm, to which a given peripheral activity is only one of many (Quinn, 1992). Finally, outsourcing peripheral activities to the lowest-cost suppliers may lead to incremental improvements in a firm’s overall cost position. Therefore, it is proposed that, by pursuing intense peripheral outsourcing strategies, firms can achieve higher levels of performance relative to firms that do not outsource their peripheral activities.
H1: Peripheral outsourcing intensity has a positive effect on firm performance.
Core Outsourcing. Firm performance may also be influenced by the intensity with which a firm outsources its near-core, strategically relevant activ- ities. Several authors have noted that this “core outsourcing” may lead to declin- ing innovation (Kotabe, 1990; Teece, 1987) and eventual competition from suppliers (Bettis et al., 1992; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Quinn, 1992), resulting in reduced firm performance. In addition, the transfer of specialized knowledge necessary when firms outsource near-core activities may also place the firm’s future performance in jeopardy. The decline of industries such as televisions, bicycles, and automobiles in the U.S. has consistently been used as examples of the dangers of outsourcing near-core activities (Bettis et al., 1992). Therefore, it is proposed that firms outsourcing activities very near their strategic core will achieve lower levels of performance relative to firms that retain tight control over these activities.
H2: Core outsourcing intensity has a negative effect on firm perfor- mance.
Moderating Relationships. The relationships between the two types of outsourcing and firm performance may be more complex than they first appear. When certain conditions exist, the positive effects of peripheral outsourcing and the negative effects of core outsourcing may be increased or reduced. Below, the potential moderating effects of firm strategy and environmental dynamism are discussed.
Generic Firm Strategy. The relationship between outsourcing intensity and firm performance may be contingent on a firm’s generic strategy. By using peripheral outsourcing, cost leaders may not only heighten their focus on their core competencies and improve the quality of their nonstrategic activities (Dess et al., 1995), but they may also incrementally lower their total costs. This improved cost position may greatly enhance their competitiveness relative to industry rivals, thereby leading to superior performance. Therefore, it is proposed that a cost leadership strategy strengthens the positive effect (or reduces any negative effect) of peripheral outsourcing on firm performance.
On the contrary, firms pursuing a differentiation strategy, while also bene- fiting from a heightened focus on core competencies and improved peripheral activity quality, stand to gain less (relative to cost leaders) by outsourcing peripheral activities. The incremental cost improvements that may be achieved
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through peripheral outsourcing are less significant to differentiators, because these cost improvements may have little direct effect on the differentiation of their outputs. Although there may be an indirect effect of cost reductions for differen- tiators (i.e., they may have more resources with which to pursue differentiation- enhancing actitivies), we believe that differentiators have less to gain relative to cost leaders. Thus, a differentiation strategy is proposed to weaken the positive effect (or strengthen the negative effect) of peripheral outsourcing on firm performance.
With respect to core outsourcing, the situation is different. Although firms outsourcing activities near their core skills are proposed to have lower levels of performance, the negative performance effects are likely to be different for cost leaders than they are for differentiators. For cost leaders, the drawbacks of near-core outsourcing may be partially offset by the improvement in their cost competitiveness that results from their actively seeking out the lowest-cost pro- vider of each near-core activity. In this way, a cost leadership strategy is proposed to reduce the negative effect (or increase the positive effect) of core outsourcing on firm performance.
The opposite relationship may occur for differentiators. Harrigan (1984) noted that it is critical for differentiators to determine which activities drive their differentiation (i.e., their core activities) and keep them in-house. Differentiators that outsource higher levels of their unique, differentiation-enhancing internal transfers (Barney, 1997) will likely find that their control over these activities has been sacrificed. This, in turn, may lead to erosion of the differentiator’s compet- itive position. Thus, any negative effect of core outsourcing on firm performance is likely increased for firms pursuing a differentiation strategy.
In summary, anybenefitsof outsourcing are more likely to be realized by cost leaders than by differentiators, and anycostsare more likely to be borne by differentiators than by cost leaders.
H3: A firm’s business-level strategy moderates the relationship be- tween outsourcing intensity and firm performance such that, for a cost leader, any positive effect of outsourcing on performance is strength- ened, and any negative effect is weakened; and, for a differentiator, any positive effect weakened and any negative effect is strengthened.
Environmental Dynamism. Dynamism of the organization’s external en- vironment may also moderate the relationships between the two types of out- sourcing intensity and firm performance. Because environments represent one of the major sources of contingency faced by firms, outsourcing intensity may not affect the performance of firms in different environments equally. Rather, the influence of outsourcing on firm performance may be contingent on the level of environmental dynamism.
The effect of outsourcing may increase with increasing levels of environ- mental dynamism. By relying on outsiders for peripheral and near-core activities in more dynamic environments, firms are able to take advantage of emerging technologies without investing large amounts of capital in them (Quinn, 1992).
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Furthermore, when new technologies emerge, outsourcing firms may switch suppliers, when contractually allowable, to exploit any cost or quality improve- ments that may then be available (Dess et al., 1995). Therefore, environmental dynamism increases an important benefit of outsourcing (technology-related flexibility), thereby increasing the positive effects of outsourcing on firm perfor- mance and partially offsetting the negative effects.
On the contrary, the performance effects of outsourcing intensity may decline in stable environments. There are two reasons for this. First, an important advantage of outsourcing is that it allows firms to switch suppliers as technolog- ical considerations demand. In more stable environments, the outsourcing-related benefits associated with changes in technology are much less pronounced than they are in more dynamic environments, because production and service technol- ogies are changing much less rapidly. Thus, environmental stability reduces an important benefit of outsourcing. Second, firms in more stable environments may find it more difficult to avoid the transfer of knowledge associated with shifting activities to external organizations. A firm’s competitive advantage is largely based on its ability to obscure the connection between its resources and skills and its success in the industry. This causal ambiguity (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) may be much less pronounced in stable environments, leading outsourcing firms to inadvertently divulge their source of competitive advantage to their suppliers. Thus, environmental stability likely increases the negative effect of outsourcing on firm performance.
It is proposed, therefore, that the benefits of outsourcing increase with increasing levels of environmental dynamism, and the costs associated with outsourcing decrease with increasing levels of environmental dynamism. Con- versely, in more stable environments, the benefits of outsourcing decline and the costs of outsourcing increase.
H4: Environmental dynamism moderates the relationship between outsourcing intensity and firm performance such that any positive effect of outsourcing on firm performance is strengthened, and any negative effect of outsourcing on firm performance is weakened, as dynamism increases.
Research Method
Sample and Sampling Procedures A double-respondent, survey methodology was used to test the propositions.
The top executive of each firm was contacted by letter and asked to complete a survey. The top executive was then asked to give a second survey to another executive within the firm who would be familiar with the firm’s strategic issues. The sample included top executives from independent, nondiversified manufac- turing firms employing more than 50 people. Manufacturing firms were chosen as the sample for this study to allow insight not only into the outsourcing of service-related activities (such as accounting, payroll, and customer service), but also to allow for an investigation of the dynamics of outsourcing manufacturing-
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related activities (such as assembly and machining operations). Firms were sent follow-up letters 7 days after the initial mailing. These follow-up letters served as a “thank you” to participants and as a reminder to those who had not yet returned their completed surveys (Dillman, 1978). Twenty-one days after the initial mail- ing, nonresponding firms were contacted by telephone. Of 558 firms contacted, 94 (17%) returned usable surveys in time to be included in this study. Multiple responses were received from 31 of these firms. To test for nonresponse bias, differences in total number of employees and industry representation (Greer & Ireland, 1992) for responding and nonresponding firms were examined. Testing for nonresponse by industry reputation indirectly results in our checking a variety of industry-level issues, such as dynamism within the industry, levels of outsourc- ing within the industry, and industry profitability. No significant differences were detected in either firm size (x2
df.54 5 6.13,p . .05) or industry representation (x2
df.515 5 18.71, p . .05). The firms in the sample include many industrial sectors, such as electronic equipment, chemicals, textiles, and others. Descriptive data for respondents and their firms are found in Table 1.
We followed the recommendations of Kumar, Stern, and Anderson (1993) for dealing with differences across multiple respondents. They propose that, if differences occur because one respondent is less knowledgeable about the issues under investigation, that respondent should be dropped. In the current study, we assumed that those in more senior positions within these firms would be more knowledgeable of their firms’ outsourcing, strategies, environment, and perfor- mance. As a result, one response from all multiple-respondent firms was dis- carded. Responses were chosen for deletion in the following manner. Two
Table 1. Company and Respondent Information
Mean respondent age 50 years Mean respondent tenure with firm 14 years Mean firm size 259 employees Industry types (and percent of sample)
Food and kindred products 5.2% Textile mill products 1.3% Apparel 3.9% Lumber and wood products 5.2% Furniture and fixtures 5.2% Paper and allied products 2.6% Printing, publishing, and allied industries 9.1% Chemicals and allied products 6.5% Rubber and misc. plastics 7.8% Stone, clay, glass, and concrete 3.9% Primary metal industries 2.6% Fabricated metal products 14.3% Industrial machinery and computers 14.3% Electronic equipment 10.4% Transportation equipment 2.6% Measuring instruments 5.2%
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individuals familiar with this research project (one associate professor and one doctoral student) were given a list of eleven organizational titles (i.e., president, general manager, purchasing manager) and asked to rank them in order of decreasing knowledge of their firm’s strategies. The correlation between the two raters’ assessments (determined with a Spearman’s Rho) was 0.95. Both raters agreed that the president or CEO was the most informed respondent, followed by the vice president, and then the general manager. For all multiple-respondent firms, the respondent rated higher by the two raters was the only one used in the analyses. Information from the other respondent was used to calculate inter-rater reliabilities but was not used in the other analyses. In one case, both respondents were vice presidents. Organizational tenure was used to determine the most informed respondent in this case, as suggested by Kumar and colleagues (1993).
Measures Outsourcing Intensity. To determine a firm’s overall reliance on outsourc-
ing, a measure of “outsourcing intensity” was developed. A firm’s outsourcing intensity was derived by multiplying its breadth of outsourcing by its depth of outsourcing. Breadth and depth are discussed below. The larger a firm’s value of outsourcing intensity, the greater is the role that outsourcing plays in its strategy making. Outsourcing intensity was calculated separately for peripheral and core activities.
Similar to Harrigan’s (1984) operationalization of breadth of vertical inte- gration, breadth of outsourcing was measured as the number of activities out- sourced (such as accounting, human resources, and manufacturing), divided by the maximum number of activities that could be outsourced by the firm. After in-depth interviews with three executives of firms meeting the criteria mentioned previously, a comprehensive list of value-creating activities was developed. This list was subsequently enhanced with several items discussed by Porter (1985). The list of activities provided to respondents can be found in Table 2. Respondents were given this list of 14 activities and were asked to indicate the percentage of the value of each activity that is currently being performed by outside suppliers. Our survey instrument did not specifically encourage respondents to add any activities to the list; nor did any of the respondents write in any additional activities, and rarely did a respondent suggest that any were missing. Therefore, we are confident that our list, though not inclusive ofall activities in which organizations are engaged, does an adequate job of capturing the phenomenon
Table 2. List of Activities Provided to Respondents
Accounting Product repair Advertising Purchasing Assembly Research & development Customer service Sales Force Information systems Shipping Machining/manufacturing Training Payroll Warehousing
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under study. We would have preferred to give respondents a larger set of activities or even a free format; however, we were concerned about problems of a potential deleterious influence on the response rate as well as lack of consistency in the terms they choose. Our effort, despite its limitations, represents a reasonable trade-off.
Outsourcing of an activity was considered to have occurred if two conditions were met. First, 25% or more of the value of that activity must have been provided by an outside supplier. Second, to be consistent with the definition of outsourcing provided earlier, the activity must be within the firm’s capability to internalize. A floor of 25% was chosen so that only those firms making a significant commit- ment to outsourcing a given activity were counted as having outsourced. Thus, firms outsourcing only a small fraction of an activity to maintain a secondary source of supply, for example, were not considered to have outsourced that activity. Outsourcing is less likely to influence the performance of these firms. Subsequent analyses supported the use of this 25% threshold. Reducing the threshold below 25% reduced our ability to predict firm performance with outsourcing (and its interactions with firm strategy and environmental dynamism). In other words, including in our analyses the outsourcing of relatively small portions of certain tasks confounds our results. At thresholds of 25%, 50%, and 75%, the same general conclusions about the relationships among outsourcing, environmental dynamism, and strategy were reached.
Breadth of outsourcing was measured as the ratio of outsourced activities to total activities performed. Thus, the higher the ratio, the broader the firm’s outsourcing strategy. Because some activities are not applicable to all firms (the respondents were allowed to select “not applicable” in response to the activities given on the survey), the denominator in the calculation was different across firms in the sample. Breadth was calculated for peripheral and core activities (see section on Strategic Significance of Activity).
As with breadth of outsourcing, depth was calculated from data obtained from the list of activities given in Table 2. Depth may be viewed as the average percentage of each outsourced activity that is being provided by external suppli- ers. Thus, the percentages of each activity being outsourced were summed and averaged, yielding a firm-level measure of depth of outsourcing. Depth was calculated separately for peripheral and core activities.
To determine whether a particular activity being providedentirely by an outside firm is within the focal firm’s ability to internalize (consistent with the definition of outsourcing given earlier), respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which that activity is within their firm’s financial or managerial capa- bilities. Responses were coded on a 5-point scale (15 activity is not at all within our capabilities to 55 activity is well within our capabilities). Those activities receiving scores of three or higher (35 activity is somewhat within our capa- bilities) were considered to be within the firm’s abilities.
Inter-rater reliabilities were 0.36 for core outsourcing and 0.42 for peripheral outsourcing. We believe that these relatively low levels of inter-rater agreement resulted from the different perceptions and understanding of individuals holding different positions in the firm, rather than from an inappropriate measure (see
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McDougall & Robinson, 1990). Our measure of outsourcing required the broadest possible knowledge of the organization, because we asked the respondent to indicate levels of outsourcing across a very broad spectrum of organizational tasks. In most cases, one respondent was the CEO/President and one was another manager within the firm. It is highly likely that the CEO/President has a different (and more accurate) understanding of outsourcing-related issues than the other individuals in the organization. Given that our respondents may have had very different levels of knowledge of the organization, we believe that the inter-rater reliabilities are acceptable.
Strategic Significance of Activity. To differentiate between peripheral and core activities, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which each activity listed in Table 2 is important to superior performance in their industry. Respondents indicated the significance of each activity to sales growth and profitability on separate 5-point scales (15 not at all important to 55 extremely important). These two scores were summed to give an overall measure of each activity’s importance. Activities receiving scores above the median were catego- rized as core activities. Thus, core and peripheral activities were not predeter- mined; rather, they were allowed to vary according to each firm’s industry. This is especially important given the wide variety of industries represented in our sample (16). Although all the firms in our sample were in manufacturing indus- tries, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine which of the activities given were more strategicin general. Nevertheless, we analyzed our data after determining core and peripheral activities a priori, using Porter’s (1985) Value Chain as a guide. As we had expected, our ability to predict firm performance with outsourcing (and its interactions with environmental dynamism and strategy) was greatly reduced, thus highlighting the need for customized definitions of core versus peripheral activities across the industries represented in our sample.
Firm Performance. Because smaller, privately held firms are unlikely to provide objective financial data, subjective financial performance data were collected as described by Dess and Robinson (1984), Pearce, Robbins, and Robinson (1987), and Priem, Rasheed, and Kotulic (1995). Respondents were asked to indicate how their firm’s return on assets, return on sales, and overall financial performance compared with similar firms in their industry for two periods: the last 12 months and 5 years ago (the latter being used as a control variable). Following Venkatraman and Ramanujam’s (1986) suggestion, broader measures of firm performance were examined to determine the effects of out- sourcing on overall organizational effectiveness. Cameron (1978) and Chakra- varthy (1986) have both emphasized the multidimensionality of the performance construct. To determine each firm’s nonfinancial performance, respondents were asked to rate their firm’s R&D outlays, stability/growth of employment, process innovations, product innovations, employee compensation, employee morale/job satisfaction, customer relations, and supplier relations relative to their competi- tors. For both financial and nonfinancial performance, responses were coded on a 5-point scale (15 at the bottom of similar firms in the industry to 55 at the top of similar firms in the industry). Comparisons of firm performance relative to similar firms in the same industry were requested to minimize industry effects
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(Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990) and strategic group effects (Hatten, Schendel, & Cooper, 1978). Firm performance data from 5 years ago were used to minimize the effects of annual fluctuations (Roth, 1992).
Exploratory factor analyses, using principal axis extraction techniques and an oblique rotation (Ford, MacCallum, & Tait, 1986), revealed that past performance and current performance each had three distinct factors. The final rotated factor solutions are given in Table 3. For both past and current performance, the financial performance items comprise one factor. However, the nonfinancial performance items created two separate factors. One nonfinancial performance factor deals with innovation performance, whereas the second factor concerns stakeholders. As a result of these exploratory factor analyses, the current and past performance measures were split into financial performance (three items), inno- vation performance (three items), and stakeholder performance (four items). Advertising outlays and employee compensation were removed because of their significant cross-loadings and adverse effect on reliabilities.
Dess and Robinson (1984) provide strong evidence of the validity and reliability of this type of subjective measure of performance. In addition, Pearce et al. (1987) indicate a high correlation between subjective and objective measures of performance in their sample, which consisted of firms and survey items that were quite similar to those found in the current study. The results of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using our own data also suggest that our measures of performance are valid. For performance over the last 12 months, our CFA revealed that both the confirmatory fit index (CFI) and the goodness of fit index (GFI) were acceptable (0.93 and 0.86, respectively). For performance over the prior 5 years, the CFI was 0.89 and the GFI was 0.86, indicating a reasonable fit (Moorman, Blakely, & Niehoff, 1998). The internal reliability coefficients (Cron- bach, 1951) for performance over the last 12 months were 0.93 (financial), 0.80 (innovation), and 0.76 (stakeholder). For historical performance, reliabilities were 0.89 (financial), 0.72 (innovation), and 0.67 (stakeholder). Inter-rater reliabilities for performance over the last 12 months were 0.70 (financial), 0.85 (innovation), and 0.71 (stakeholder). For historical performance, inter-rater reliabilities were 0.18 (financial), 0.71 (innovation), and 0.49 (stakeholder).
Environmental Dynamism. Environmental dynamism was measured us- ing a scale developed by Miller and Friesen (1982). Responses were coded on a 7-point scale (15 strongly disagree to 75 strongly agree). Miller (1988) reported a reliability of this measure of 0.59. To increase reliability, two additional dynamism items were included, increasing the number of items in this scale to 7. As shown in Table 3, exploratory factor analyses reveal that the seven dynamism items comprise one distinct factor. The internal reliability coefficient of this measure was 0.79, and the inter-rater reliability of the dynamism measure was 0.74. CFA suggests an excellent fit (CFI5 0.95, GFI5 0.94).
Firm Strategy. Firm strategy was measured using an amended form of Miller’s (1988) scale, which consisted of three subscales: innovative differentia- tion, marketing differentiation, and cost leadership. Miller (1988) reported Cron- bach alphas (Cronbach, 1951) of these subscales as 0.64, 0.47, and 0.50, respec- tively. Several items were added to Miller’s (1988) subscales in an attempt to
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Table 3. Results of Exploratory Factor Analyses
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
A. Current performance items 1. Return on assets .91 2. Return on sales .92 3. Overall financial performance .80 .28 4. R&D outlays .64 5. Process innovations .71 .32 6. Product innovations .85 7. Employment growth/stability .28 .39 .45 8. Employee morale .33 .59 9. Customer relations .71
10. Supplier relations .60 Eigenvalue 2.58 1.95 1.64
B. Past Performance Items 1. Return on assets .84 2. Return on sales .84 .29 3. Overall financial performance .71 .41 4. R&D outlays .71 5. Process innovations .64 6. Product innovations .77 7. Employment growth/stability .31 .32 .46 8. Employee morale .62 9. Customer relations .27 .66
10. Supplier relations .61 Eigenvalue 2.25 1.80 1.77
C. Environmental dynamism items 1. Little need to change marketing practices .42 2. Slow product obsolescence .69 3. Competitors’ actions easy to predict .62 4. Consumer demand easy to predict .74 5. Production technology changes slowly .73 6. Technological changes easy to predict .60 7. Consumer demand is stable .51
Eigenvalue 2.73
D. Strategy items 1. We differentiate our products .85 2. We distinguish our products .83 3. We have major/frequent product innovations .77 4. We add features to our products .76 5. We use prestige pricing .56 6. We advertise extensively .50 7. We use market segmentation .47 8. Our focus is on cost minimization .68 9. We standardize products to lower costs 2.34 .72
10. We lengthen production runs to lower costs .51 11. We cut prices often .50 12. We analyze cost variances to determine cause 2.32 .49 13. We minimize advertising expenses .26
Eigenvalue 3.74 1.74
Values less than .25 have been omitted.
improve their reliability. As a result, reliabilities were 0.86, 0.52, and 0.46 for innovative differentiation, marketing differentiation, and cost leadership, respec- tively. Inter-rater reliabilities were 0.77, 0.56, and 0.57 for innovative differenti- ation, marketing differentiation, and cost leadership, respectively. Although these reliabilities are not as high as we had hoped, they are well within the range recommended by Van de Ven and Ferry (1980) for broad constructs. Responses were made on a 7-point scale (15 we never use this strategy to 75 we always use this strategy).
As shown in Table 3, exploratory factor analyses suggest that the strategy items comprise only two factors: one for differentiation and one for cost leader- ship. However, Miller (1988) provided a discussion of the validity of, and the distinctions among, the three strategy subscales used in this study. For a subset of the firms in Miller’s (1988) study, two strategy professors read detailed descrip- tions of the firms’ strategies and determined the extent to which each firm was pursuing a given strategy. The conclusions of these two raters matched the ratings given by respondents in approximately 90% of the cases, providing evidence of construct validity. As a result, we have chosen to maintain the distinction between innovative and marketing differentiation in our analyses. CFA revealed a mar- ginal-to-poor fit (CFI5 0.71, GFI5 0.82).
Results
Means, SD, zero-order correlations, and estimated reliabilities are presented in Table 4. In each case, reliabilities were calculated using coefficient alpha. The two measures of outsourcing intensity were highly skewed. In both cases, log trans- formations were conducted to normalize their distributions. Skewness for both core and peripheral outsourcing intensity were reduced to within acceptable limits.
Direct Effects of Outsourcing Intensity on Performance
Regression analyses determined the influence of outsourcing intensity on financial, innovation, and stakeholder performance. In each case, the appropriate type of previous performance was used as a control variable. Table 5 presents the results of these tests. Linear combinations of the predictors, adjusted for the number of independent variables, explained 29% of the variance in financial performance, 39% of the variance in innovation performance, and 15% of the variance in stakeholder performance. In each case, the majority of the variance was explained by the prior performance control variable. Neither peripheral outsourcing intensity nor core outsourcing intensity was a significant predictor of any of the three types of current firm performance. Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported, indicating that there is no direct, firm-level performance effect of outsourcing intensity for the firms in this sample.
Moderating Effects of Firm Strategy and Environmental Dynamism
Firm strategy and environmental dynamism were proposed as moderators of the outsourcing intensity-firm performance relationship and were tested with
779AN ANALYSIS OF OUTSOURCING AND ITS EFFECTS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE
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780 K.M. GILLEY AND A. RASHEED
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 26, NO. 4, 2000
moderated multiple regression. The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 6 through 9.
Firm Strategy As a Moderator. Hypothesis 3 proposed that the effect of outsourcing intensity on firm performance was dependent on firm strategy. More specifically, a cost leadership strategy was hypothesized to reduce the negative performance effects of outsourcing and to increase the positive effects. The
Table 5. Results of Regression Analyses for Performance Implications of Outsourcing Intensity
Predictors
Standardized Regression Coefficients Firm performance
Financial (n 5 89)
Innovation (n 5 90)
Stakeholders (n 5 91)
Past performance .55*** .65*** .42*** Peripheral outsourcing .05 2.01 .04 Core outsourcing 2.04 .08 .00
F (full model) 13.19*** 20.30*** 6.33*** R2 .32 .41 .18 Adj. R2 .29 .39 .15 df 3, 85 3, 86 3, 87
*** p , .001.
Table 6. Results of Regression Analyses for Moderating Effects of Cost Leadership Strategy
Predictors
Standardized Regression Coefficients Firm performance
Financial (n 5 89)
Innovation (n 5 90)
Stakeholders (n 5 91)
Past performance .55*** .64*** .42*** Peripheral outsourcing .03 .01 .04 Core outsourcing 2.05 .09 .00 Cost leader strategy .11 2.14† 2.04 Peripheral outsourcing3
cost leader strategy 1.33* 2.07 .87 Core outsourcing3 cost
leader strategy 2.10 1.06* .50 F (full model) 8.15*** 12.27*** 3.72** R2 .37 .47 .21 Adj. R2 .32 .43 .15 df 6, 82 6, 83 6, 84
†p , .10 *p , .05 ** p , .01 *** p , .001.
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opposite was proposed for differentiation strategies. Therefore, the benefits of outsourcing were proposed to be greater for cost leaders.
Cost leadership strategy interacted with peripheral outsourcing intensity (b 5 1.33, p , .05) to predict financial performance. The Chow test for all interactions involving cost leadership strategy was significant (F5 2.44,p , .10). In addition, cost leadership strategy interacted with core outsourcing (b 5 1.06, p , .05) to predict innovation performance. The Chow test was significant (F 5 2.90, p , .05). Finally, innovative differentiation strategy interacted with peripheral outsourcing (b 5 0.45, p , .10) to predict innovation performance. This Chow test was also significant (F5 7.66,p , .001). Marketing differenti- ation strategy was not a moderator of any of the relationships. Nevertheless, these findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 3.
The results of these moderator tests suggest that the effects of outsourcing are not the same for firms pursuing different strategies (see Figure 2, Panels A-C). For cost leaders, there is a positive relationship between outsourcing and perfor- mance. More specifically, for cost leaders, peripheral outsourcing has a positive effect on financial performance, and core outsourcing has a positive effect on innovation performance. The results were similar for innovative differentiators. A strong positive relationship was found for innovative differentiators. In tandem, these findings suggest that the benefits of outsourcing are more fully realized by firms pursuing cost leadership or innovative differentiation strategies. The finding for cost leaders is consistent with Hypothesis 3, whereas the finding for innovative differentiators is the opposite of what was predicted.
Table 7. Results of Regression Analyses for Moderating Effects of Marketing Differentiation Strategy
Predictors
Standardized Regression Coefficients Firm performance
Financial (n 5 89)
Innovation (n 5 90)
Stakeholders (n 5 91)
Past performance .51*** .59*** .42*** Peripheral outsourcing .04 2.01 .03 Core outsourcing 2.05 .08 2.00 Mktg. diff. strategy .14 .17† .07 Peripheral outsourcing3
mktg. diff. strategy 2.09 .11 2.29 Core outsourcing3
mktg. diff. strategy 2.02 2.05 .03 F (full model) 6.97*** 10.95*** 3.35** R2 .34 .44 .19 Adj. R2 .29 .40 .14 df 6, 82 6, 83 6, 84
†p , .1 ** p , .01 *** p , .001.
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Environmental Dynamism as a Moderator. Hypothesis 4 proposed that the outsourcing intensity-firm performance relationship varies across firms in different environments. Specifically, environmental dynamism was proposed to enhance the positive effects of outsourcing on firm performance and neutralize the negative effects. Therefore, the benefits of outsourcing were proposed to increase with increasing dynamism. Results are shown in Table 9.
Environmental dynamism was found to interact with peripheral outsourcing intensity (b 5 2.81,p , .10) to predict stakeholder performance. The Chow test showed that this moderator was significant (F5 2.58, p , .10). Contrary to Hypothesis 4, it appears that the benefits of peripheral outsourcing to firm performance actually decline in more dynamic environments. Conversely, the findings of this study suggest that firms operating in relatively stable environ- ments have more to gain from outsourcing. This is shown in Panel D of Figure 2.
Discussion
Performance Implications of Outsourcing The performance implications of outsourcing decisions have been widely
debated. However, very little empirical research has been conducted to determine whether and to what extent outsourcing influences firm performance. In the current study, the impact of peripheral and core outsourcing intensity on financial, innovation, and stakeholder performance was examined. The results indicate that firms pursuing more intense outsourcing strategies do not experience significant, direct performance impacts.
Table 8. Results of Regression Analyses for Moderating Effects of Innovative Differentiation Strategy
Predictors
Standardized Regression Coefficients Firm performance
Financial (n 5 89)
Innovation (n 5 90)
Stakeholders (n 5 91)
Past performance .54*** .43*** .40*** Peripheral outsourcing .04 .00 .03 Core outsourcing 2.05 .02 2.02 Innov. diff. strategy .06 .40*** .12 Peripheral outsourcing3
innov. diff. strategy 2.29 .45† 2.41 Core outsourcing3
innov. diff. strategy .15 2.16 2.06 F (full model) 6.69*** 16.34*** 3.67** R2 .33 .54 .21 Adj. R2 .28 .51 .15 df 6, 82 6, 83 6, 84
†p , .1 ** p , .01 *** p , .001.
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This finding should not be interpreted as outsourcing has no effect whatso- ever on firm performance. In the current study, performance was measured at the firm level. Thus, outsourcing was found to have no direct impact on the financial, innovation, or stakeholder performance of the firmoverall. However, it is highly likely that outsourcing has an effect on the individual functional areas in which it occurs. For example, a firm’s manufacturing operations may experience cost reductions as a result of outsourcing, or a firm may improve its customer service by shifting it to an outside specialist organization. Therefore, individual functional areas may experience performance improvements or declines as a result of outsourcing. However, in the current study, nofirm-levelperformance impact of outsourcing was detected, leading to the conclusion that the firm-level benefits of outsourcing may have been overstated in the past. The extent to which potential functional-level performance effects from outsourcing are translated into firm- level effects should be examined. Whether a functional-level performance im- provement in, say, shipping improves a firm’s bottom line, or is offset by transactions costs and other expenses, has not been examined in prior research. This is a promising area that should be investigated.
In addition, the dangers associated with outsourcing may not be as large as they appear. For example, Teece’s (1987) argument that relying on outsourcing can lead to a loss of R&D competitiveness is not supported here, because outsourcing intensity did not have a significant negative effect on innovation performance. Also, the danger of eventual competition from suppliers and other dangers associated with outsourcing may be exceptions to the rule, rather than the
Table 9. Results of Regression Analyses for Moderating Effects of Environmental Dynamism
Predictors
Standardized Regression Coefficients Firm performance
Financial (n 5 89)
Innovation (n 5 90)
Stakeholders (n 5 91)
Past performance .54*** .62*** .42*** Peripheral outsourcing .02 .02 .02 Core outsourcing 2.03 .07 .00 Dynamism 2.10 .12 2.06 Peripheral outsourcing3
dynamism 2.38 2.17 2.81†
Core outsourcing3 dynamism 2.47 2.63 2.42 F (full model) 7.17*** 11.02*** 4.06** R2 .34 .44 .22 Adj. R2 .30 .40 .17 df 6, 82 6, 83 6, 84
†p , .1 ** p , .01 *** p , .001.
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norm. However, these dangers of outsourcing are long-term and may not have been adequately captured in this research.
Moderators of the Outsourcing-Performance Relationship The results of this study indicate that the influence of outsourcing on firm
performance is not the same for firms following different strategies or operating in different environments. Although outsourcing had no significant direct effect on firm performance, it was involved in several significant interactions with strategy and dynamism to predict performance.
Firm strategy was found to moderate the relationships between both periph- eral and core outsourcing intensity and financial and innovation performance. Specifically, outsourcing was positively related to performance for firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy and negatively related to performance for firms that were not. Furthermore, outsourcing was positively related to performance for innovative differentiators and negatively related to firms that were not pursuing innovative differentiation strategies. The finding that companies vigorously pur- suing cost leadership strategies have more to gain from outsourcing is intuitively appealing. As predicted, by outsourcing tasks, cost leaders may be able to incrementally lower their costs, thereby improving their cost position relative to their industry rivals. The finding that innovative differentiators gain from out- sourcing is also interesting. Innovative differentiators that outsource a higher
Figure 2
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portion of their peripheral activities were found to achieve higher levels of innovation performance. In other words, by outsourcing their peripheral tasks and focusing their efforts on more “innovation-enhancing” activities, firms pursuing an innovative differentiation strategy are able to become better innovators.
The effect of outsourcing on firm performance also varied with differing levels of environmental dynamism. In very stable environments, stakeholder performance was positively related to a firm’s level of peripheral outsourcing. The opposite was found for firms operating in highly dynamic environments. These results are contrary to our hypothesis. One reason for this finding may be that the transaction costs associated with negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing outsourc- ing arrangements increase in more dynamic environments. In addition, rapidly changing technologies may allow supplier firms, which specialize in developing and/or implementing a particular technology or process, to capture a higher portion of the economic rents generated by the outsourcing agreement. In other words, in rapidly changing environments, powerful suppliers with specialized skills may be able to exert higher levels of bargaining power over outsourcing firms. This is the case especially when the number of suppliers is limited or when the outsourcing firm’s bargaining power declines as a result of its decreasing ability to reinternalize the outsourced activity (because of dramatic shifts in technology, for example). Thus, although certain benefits of outsourcing may increase in more dynamic environments, there are increasing costs associated with outsourcing in those environments that may offset the benefits. Therefore, firms outsourcing in more dynamic environments must be aware that the full benefits of outsourcing may not be realized. In fact, firm performance may actually decline.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
This study has several limitations. First, the generalizability of this study’s findings may be limited. Although the sample was representative of the population of interest based upon firm size and industry type, there is a striking lack of representativeness of firms in various stages of industry development and with varying levels of unionization. There were no firms in introduction-stage indus- tries and only one in a decline-stage industry. Also, less than 6 percent of the sample had any unionized employees. Thus, the outsourcing behavior of firms in either the youngest or most mature industries was not examined, nor was the outsourcing of unionized firms. In addition, firm size may be an issue. It is conceivable that larger firms outsource more activities. Further, smaller firms might outsource different activities than large ones, given that their skill base and core competencies are very different. Thus, extremely large or extremely small firms may have performance implications of outsourcing that conflict with this study’s findings. Finally, because all of the firms in the sample were manufac- turers, generalizing the findings to service firms may be difficult. It is possible that the pattern of outsourcing may be different for service firms than it is for manufacturers, because service industries are characterized by less tangible out- puts and simultaneous consumption and production (Boddewyn, Halbrich, & Perry, 1986). Future research should attempt to gather outsourcing information from firms in introduction- and decline-stage industries, as well as from unionized
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firms, those in service industries, and those with very few or very many employ- ees.
Another potential limitation of this study is common method bias. This is a general criticism of survey research, because the independent and dependent constructs are often measured entirely with self-reported data (as was the case here). However, common method bias may not be as much of a limitation as once thought. The reason is that, although common method bias inflates zero-order correlations, it also increases the shared variance among the independent vari- ables. This makes it more difficult to find unique, significant beta weights. Also, because common method bias is a main effect (meaning that it only inflates the zero-order correlations), it does not inflate the likelihood of finding moderator variables. This reduces the chance that common method bias had an important effect on the conclusions of this study.
An additional limitation of this study concerns our measure of outsourcing. Specifically, our measure, although it asked respondents to indicate the percentage of the value of each activity being supplied by an outside firm, is fundamentally a perceptual one. Outsourcing research may be advanced through the development of a more objective measure of a firm’s reliance on outsourcing. One potential approach to doing so is to collect information on the product level, and then to aggregate the firm’s various product-level outsourcing initiatives into a firm-level measure. Nayyar (1993) noted that business-level and product-level strategic issues can be quite different within a firm, and we believe that a more fine- grained, product-level approach to outsourcing research is needed. Objective data are likely available by product and would be invaluable in assessing the perfor- mance implications of outsourcing strategies.
Another potentially important avenue for future research on outsourcing is the investigation of “fit” among firms’ outsourcing intensities, business-level strategies, and environments. It is quite likely that certain levels of outsourcing intensity are best suited for particular combinations of generic strategy and environmental dynamism. In the current study, however, we were unable to empirically pursue this line of inquiry because of our limited sample size. Power analyses (Cohen, 1988) indicated that our sample was much too small to ade- quately test the effects of an outsourcing-environment-strategy fit on performance. This area of exploration may yield results that greatly enhance mangers’ abilities to formulate and implement successful outsourcing strategies.
Because outsourcing strategies and their performance implications evolve over time, future research should be directed toward collecting longitudinal data. For example, in the past, one of the strongest arguments against outsourcing was that it transfers critical knowledge to supplier firms. This takes many years to develop and may be examined more effectively through longitudinal research.
Finally, the relationship between outsourcing and vertical integration should be examined. To the extent that outsourcing can reduce a firm’s involvement in successive stages of production, the effects of outsourcing on performance should be similar to those of vertical integration on performance. As discussed above, our measure of outsourcing is similar to Harrigan’s (1984) conceptualization of vertical integration. As such, our research represents an initial attempt to examine
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the outsourcing-performance relationship within a vertical integration framework. Our findings suggest that reductions in integration through outsourcing, at least for the firms in our study and the types of activities examined, may not have significant, direct effects on performance. This is interesting in light of the findings of D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) and Rumelt (1974, 1982), who suggested that vertical integration has a direct effect on performance. However, the exact nature of the outsourcing-vertical integration relationship has not been the subject of rigorous examination. More research is needed to better understand how outsourcing fits with the vertical integration literature, as well as the larger body of strategic management knowledge.
Conclusion
This study has attempted to determine the performance implications of outsourcing strategies. Although no direct effect of outsourcing on performance was detected, outsourcing interacted with firm strategy and environmental dyna- mism to predict performance. Our findings suggest that the benefits of outsourcing may be more fully realized by firms pursuing cost leadership and innovative differentiation strategies. Furthermore, firms operating in relatively stable envi- ronments may also achieve performance increases through outsourcing. Future research should attempt to further specify the effects of outsourcing on perfor- mance by examining the outsourcing behavior of a broader sample of firms, including those in introduction- and decline-stage industries, firms with high levels of unionization, and service firms.
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o3 (toward a model of strategic outsourcing).pdf
www.elsevier.com/locate/jom
Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481
Toward a model of strategic outsourcing
Tim R. Holcomb *, Michael A. Hitt 1
Texas A&M University, Mays Business School, Department of Management,
College Station, TX 77843-4221, United States
Available online 16 June 2006
Abstract
Acknowledging efficiency motives, firms have increasingly turned to outsourcing in an effort to capture cost savings.
Transaction cost theory (TCT) has been the dominant means of explaining outsourcing as an economizing approach whereby
cost efficiencies are achieved by assigning transactions to different governance mechanisms. Recent research has used the resource-
based view (RBV) to examine the role of specialized capabilities as a potential source of value creation in relationships between
firms. Although research in supply chain management has expanded substantially, only limited applications of TCTand the RBVare
available, especially in the field of operations management. We extend both perspectives to explain conditions leading to strategic
outsourcing.
# 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Strategic outsourcing; Operations strategy; Resource-based view; Transaction cost theory; Resource management; Value creation;
Operations management; Supply chain management; Capabilities; Vertical disintegration; Intermediate markets
1. Introduction
Understanding how firms establish firm scope has
interested management scholars for some time, and a
body of research has explored the boundary conditions
firms consider when choosing to source activity from
the marketplace (e.g. Fine and Whitney, 1999; Gilley
and Rasheed, 2000; Quinn, 1999). In particular, this
research highlights the complex choices firms make
when deciding whether to internalize or outsource
production. On the one hand, internalization requires
firms to commit resources to a course of action, which
may limit strategic flexibility and be difficult to reverse
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 979 845 4852;
fax: +1 979 845 9641.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (T.R. Holcomb),
[email protected] (M.A. Hitt). 1 Tel.: +1 979 458 3393; fax: +1 979 845 9641.
0272-6963/$ – see front matter # 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jom.2006.05.003
(Leiblein et al., 2002). On the other hand, internaliza-
tion may be required by firms to more effectively carry
out production. The complexity of these boundary
decisions has intensified in recent years stimulated by
increased competitive pressures, the rapidity of tech-
nological change, and the dispersion of knowledge
across different organizations and geographic markets
(Hoetker, 2005; Teece, 1992). Accordingly, a variety of
outsourcing arrangements has emerged. We rely on both
transaction-based and resource-based logics to explain
the emergence of one such arrangement strategic
outsourcing in which firms rely on intermediate markets
to provide specialized capabilities that supplement
existing capabilities used in production.
What determines firm scope? A well-developed
approach for boundary decisions associated with firm
scope is transaction cost theory (TCT). According to
this perspective, firms integrate production to minimize
costs from opportunism and bounded rationality of
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481 465
firms and their suppliers, the uncertainty and frequency
of market exchange, and asset specificity that arises
from supplier-firm or firm-customer relationships
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). This theory holds
that certain types of governance mechanisms manage
exchanges with particular characteristics more effi-
ciently than others; cost economizing therefore reflects
a firm’s efforts to minimize costs arising from the
governance of market exchanges.2 Accordingly, the
decision to outsource often rests on economizing
motives related to the fit between firms’ governance
choices and specific attributes about an economic
exchange (Grover and Malhotra, 2003; Silverman et al.,
1997).
Recently, however, scholars have presented
resource-based perspectives of integration that augment
transaction-based views and sharpen the focus on firms’
relative advantages (Combs and Ketchen, 1999;
Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Poppo and Zenger, 1998).
This growing body of work, which is based on the
original work of Penrose (1959) and uses Barney’s
(1991) more recent translation of the resource-based
view (RBV) of the firm, emphasizes the importance of
resources in guiding firm activity and the management
of a firm’s portfolio of capabilities as central to
competitive advantage.3 More specifically, this research
contends that the reasons for internalization extend
beyond the cost of transacting through the market to the
conditions that enable firms to establish, maintain, and
use capabilities more efficiently than markets can do
(Conner, 1991; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Teece et al.,
1997).
2 There are multiple sources and aspects of transaction costs. Coase
(1937), for example, emphasized the ‘frictional’ costs, such as those
costs that arise from negotiating, drafting, and monitoring contracts.
Williamson (1975, 1985) expanded this perspective by focusing
attention on the costs of transactional hazards (e.g. difficulties) and
governance mechanisms to limit such hazards. Whereas Williamson
focuses on the tendency of transaction difficulties to emerge as a
function of the exchange, Coase’s frictional costs are a feature of
economic conditions that occur independent of deliberate calculation
or motives (see also Jacobides and Winter, 2005). 3 Resources, broadly defined, have often been used in the literature
in a generic sense to include capabilities (e.g. Barney, 1991). Other
scholars have claimed that capabilities represent how firms manage
resources (e.g. Dutta et al., 2005; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) or that
capabilities represent a unique combination of resources that enable
firms to pursue specific actions that create value (Sirmon et al. in
press). For purposes of this paper, we use ‘resources’ to represent
tangible or intangible assets owned or controlled by firms (Barney,
1991; Grant, 1996) and ‘capabilities’ to represent organizational
routines that allow firms to effectively integrate and use resources
to implement their strategies (Lavie, 2006; Winter, 2003).
The resulting convergence between these two
theories has stimulated a number of empirical studies,
which has created a more effective understanding of
what drives strategic outsourcing. For example, in
recent years, transaction cost scholars have accepted
that transaction-based and resource-based perspectives
‘‘deal with partly overlapping phenomena, often in
complementary ways’’ and that capability endowments
matter to boundary decisions (Williamson, 1999, p.
1098). Combs and Ketchen (1999) found evidence that
firms often place resource-based concerns ahead of
exchange economies when deciding on potential
interfirm cooperation. Complementary to this view,
Madhok (2002) pursued the question of how firms
should organize production given certain resource-
based conditions (e.g. pre-existing strengths and
weaknesses). He suggested that boundary decisions
depend not only on the conditions surrounding the
transaction, but also on capability attributes, and the
governance context that it creates. Thus, substantial
empirical support exists for the proposition that
capability considerations trade-off with economizing
constraints in the decision to outsource (e.g. Hoetker,
2005; Jacobides and Winter, 2005; Poppo and Zenger,
1998).
Our work contributes to this stream by extending
earlier conceptualizations of outsourcing based on
economizing conditions, such as asset specificity, small
numbers bargaining, and technological uncertainty, to
include factors that influence the selection and
integration of capabilities from intermediate markets
(Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Jacobides and Winter,
2005). In particular, we consider the complementarity
of capabilities, strategic relatedness, relational cap-
ability-building mechanisms, and cooperative experi-
ence as four important conditions that establish a
resource-based context for strategic outsourcing.
According to this perspective, in the decision regarding
the strategic outsourcing of production, firms evaluate
internally accessed capabilities and those capabilities
available externally from intermediate markets, and
consider how they might best be integrated to produce
the greatest value.
Therefore, this work goes beyond the question of
governance mechanisms to enrich our understanding of
capability selection and use, providing a more mean-
ingful understanding of strategic outsourcing. Whereas
transaction-based perspectives typically confine out-
sourcing to more specialized, repetitive activities such
as manufacturing, logistics, and facilities management,
resource-based theory provides a context to explain
strategic outsourcing arrangements for more visible and
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481466
potentially sensitive functions such as research and
development (R&D), engineering design, and customer
support. This trend is evident in the personal computer
(PC) and communications equipment sectors, where
growing demand for new product offerings has driven
the market for third-party R&D and design. As a result,
the volume of outsourced R&D, design, and manu-
facturing services in these two sectors is expected to
grow almost two-fold between 2004 and 2009, from
$179 billion to $345.5 billion (Carbone, 2005).
Despite the dramatic increase in strategic out-
sourcing in recent years, few systematic studies of
strategic outsourcing have been completed (Gilley and
Rasheed, 2000). In fact, this topic has received only
limited exposure in the fields of healthcare management
(e.g. Billi et al., 2004; Roberts, 2001), economics (e.g.
Chen et al., 2004a; Shy and Stenbacka, 2003), and
strategic management (e.g. Fine and Whitney, 1999;
Quinn, 1999; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). Accordingly,
this work represents an early attempt to frame and
provide a theoretical understanding to the strategic
outsourcing concept in operations and supply chain
management research using both transaction-based and
resource-based logics.
This work follows Grover and Malhotra’s (2003)
call for more research by operations management
scholars that integrate strategic management and
organizational theory into the study of interfirm
relationships. In particular, our work contributes to
the stream of research synthesizing TCT and the RBV
by integrating them to extend earlier conceptualiza-
tions of outsourcing. We also make three important
contributions to the outsourcing literature. First, we
offer a more concise definition of strategic outsourcing
that extends transaction-based logics and considers
value created when firms more effectively leverage the
specialized capabilities these relationships provide.
Second, we explain how developing a ‘capabilities
view’ better informs the discourse about the out-
sourcing choices that firms make. Prior work has
established a relationship between outsourcing and
cost economies from the selection of more efficient
governance mechanisms (e.g. Cachon and Harker,
2002; Walker and Weber, 1984). However, to date,
there has been little understanding provided of the role
that internal and external capabilities play in strategic
outsourcing decisions. Herein, we shift the focus on
value creation from different exchange conditions to
value chain structures and to the process by which firms
produce goods and services. Thus, we provide
managers with a richer framework to understand the
trade-offs between internalization, past relationships
and experience, and capabilities that guide their
decision to internalize or outsource. Third, we high-
light the expanded role that boundaries serve in the
formation of strategic outsourcing relationships.
Establishing firm boundaries requires understanding
more than how internally- and externally-sourced
production activities affect performance (Araujo et al.,
2003). It also requires a better understanding of the
bridging function that boundaries perform in linking
firms’ production activity with intermediate markets
(McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). Accordingly, we argue
that a more complete understanding of the organization
of economic activity requires a greater sensitivity to the
interdependence of capabilities, production activity,
and interfirm relations that emerge from boundary
decisions, as suggested by Coase (1988).
Fig. 1 summarizes our model for strategic out-
sourcing. This model depicts conditions for value
creation integrated with economizing arguments for
strategic outsourcing. These theoretical arguments are
examined in the following sections. We begin with a
concise review of the literature and derive a more
complete definition of strategic outsourcing. Next,
transaction-based and resource-based arguments for
outsourcing are reviewed. Building on these two
perspectives, we present a model of strategic out-
sourcing that uses transaction- and capability-based
factors to examine a firm’s decision to outsource.
Finally, we discuss opportunities for future research.
2. Theoretical foundation
Whereas transaction-based perspectives explain
different governance mechanisms, resource-based
theory considers the relative capabilities of focal
firms and exchange partners as important in vertical
integration decisions (e.g. Afuah, 2001; Argyres,
1996). According to this view, firms are largely
heterogeneous in terms of their resources and
capabilities (e.g. Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984),
and thus often carry out the same activity with
different production efficiencies and costs. As a result,
separate firms that display different ways of accom-
plishing the same task achieve different cost effi-
ciencies and performance outcomes.
2.1. Strategic outsourcing defined
We define strategic outsourcing as the organizing
arrangement that emerges when firms rely on inter-
mediate markets to provide specialized capabilities that
supplement existing capabilities deployed along a
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481 467
Fig. 1. A theoretical model for strategic outsourcing.
firm’s value chain.4 Further, we suggest that strategic
outsourcing creates value within firms’ supply chains
beyond those achieved through cost economies. As
explained later, intermediate markets that provide
specialized capabilities emerge as different industry
conditions intensify the partitioning of production. As a
result of greater information standardization and
simplified coordination, clear administrative demarca-
tions emerge along a value chain (Jacobides, 2005).
Partitioning of intermediate markets occurs as the
coordination of production across a value chain is
simplified and as information becomes standardized,
making it easier to transfer activities across boundaries
(Richardson, 1972). Accordingly, an orientation toward
strategic outsourcing evolves, as specialized capabil-
ities emerge, resulting in a greater dependence on
intermediate markets for production (Fine and Whitney,
1999; Quinn, 1999).
The decision to outsource existing production
represents the simplest form of strategic outsourcing.
4 Avalue chain, as defined herein, consists of the set of value-adding
activities within a supply chain that may be undertaken for a product
to be made or a service to be rendered. The concept of the value chain
was originally used to conceptualize the set of productive activities
that occur within the boundaries of any given firm, such as research
and development, engineering design, inbound/outbound logistics,
marketing, etc. (see Porter, 1985). Our definition of the term is
consistent with the general use (e.g. Porter, 1985) to mean a structured
set of activities associated with a firm’s productive output, regardless
of whether they take place within the boundaries of a single integrated
firm or occur externally using intermediate markets. Focusing on
distinct activities that firms perform provides an efficient way of
examining how boundaries change and how specialized capabilities
from intermediate markets can be leveraged to accommodate some or
all of the activities within a value chain.
Gilley and Rasheed (2000) refer to this organizing form
as ‘substitution-based outsourcing.’ With substitution,
firms discontinue internal production (e.g. the produc-
tion of goods or services) and replace existing activities
and/or factors of production (e.g. resources) with
capabilities provided by intermediate markets. Accord-
ingly, applying a capabilities perspective, we suggest
that firm scope is partly determined by considering the
performance differential between existing internal
capabilities and those available in intermediate markets
for substitution. By contrast, firms can also decide to
outsource production a priori. Gilley and Rasheed refer
to this form as ‘abstention-based outsourcing,’ which
occurs when firms acquire capabilities from inter-
mediate markets, rather than incur the necessary
investments to internalize production. Thus, firm scope
is also determined by examining the differential
between the costs of internally developing new
capabilities against accessing these capabilities in
intermediate markets (Argyres, 1996; Langlois and
Robertson, 1995).
Research indicates that economizing firms often
consider the value of their capabilities in decisions
about internalizing an activity or conducting it
through intermediate markets (e.g. Argyres, 1996;
Combs and Ketchen, 1999; Hoetker, 2005). Specifi-
cally, in deciding whether or not to internalize, firms
often compare their capabilities with those of other
firms—as signaled by the price and quality terms that
exchange partners are prepared to provide (Jacobides
and Winter, 2005). However, due in part to ambiguity
that emerges based on imperfections in the market,
boundedly rational agents are often unable to foresee
potential synergies from the integration of distinctive
capability combinations.
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481468
An important distinction introduced herein is how
resource-based logics influence the decision to strate-
gically outsource more effective specialized capabilities
along a value chain, beyond that which we know by
examining different governance mechanisms. More
effective capabilities can enable firms to increase
inventory turns, shorten product development cycles,
and reduce the time-to-market for new products (Clark
and Fujimoto, 1992; Petersen et al., 2005). Stated
differently, we contend that strategic outsourcing not
only creates cost economies by shifting production
activity from a focal firm to intermediate markets, but
also creates economic value, especially when produc-
tion involves the use of potentially more valuable
specialized capabilities (Fine and Whitney, 1999;
Mowery et al., 1996). Argyres (1996) was one of the
first to provide qualitative evidence on the role of
capabilities in internalization decisions, observing that
capabilities are a significant driver of firm scope in the
cable connector industry. When comparing transaction-
and firm-level influences on firm scope, Leiblein and
Miller (2003, p. 854) found that firm-level capabilities
‘‘independently and significantly’’ influence firms’
boundary decisions. Jacobides and Hitt (2005, p.
1222) examined how capability differences shape the
make-versus-buy decision concluding that, ‘‘productive
capabilities can and do play a major role in the
determination of vertical scope, and account for ‘mixed
governance modes’.’’
2.2. Specialized capabilities and the emergence of
intermediate markets
A stream of research originally characterized as
‘vertical disintegration’ (Stigler, 1951) helps explain
strategic outsourcing by developing a ‘capabilities
view’ (e.g. Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Leiblein and
Miller, 2003). According to this perspective, the
emergence of new intermediate markets is driven
largely by the desire of firms to pursue gains from the
trade of specialized production. Richardson (1972) was
one of the first to suggest that boundaries were
contingent on the different activities in which firms
engage, the capabilities such activities require, and the
selection and use of those capabilities along a value
chain. Jacobides (2005) examined conditions leading to
increased specialization. He explained the emergence of
new intermediate markets on the basis of gains from
intrafirm specialization that condition a market, divid-
ing previously integrated value chains among different
sets of specialized firms and shifting the focus on value
creation from the final market for goods or services ‘‘to
the value chain structure and the process by which the
good or service is produced’’ (2005, p. 490).
In the automobile sector, for example, advances in
engineering and production technologies have led
manufacturers to decouple supply chain capabilities
giving up parts of the value chain to newly formed
specialists in intermediate markets (Fine and Whitney,
1999). Similar trends are evident in the PC and
communications sectors, with the emergence of electro-
nics manufacturing services (EMS) and original design
manufacturing (ODM) firms, such as Flextronics, Hon
Hai, Sanmina, and Compal Communications, and the
corresponding growth of original equipment manufac-
turers inthesesectorsthatonlymarket,butdonotdesignor
manufacture their own equipment. In the banking sector,
standardization and advances in information technology
led to significant specialization of production activities
such as application development and data processing,
which enabled non-financial firms such as IBM, EDS, and
Accenture to become key participants in the intermediate
market for information services. Accordingly, given
advances in technology and standardization, new inter-
mediate markets emerge, decomposing the value chain,
allowing firms to ‘acquire’ valuable yet specialized
capabilities cost-effectively via the market. As a result,
firm boundaries shift as activities that were carried out
internally are ‘transferred’ to newly formed intermediate
markets.We thereforeargue that strategicoutsourcing not
only allows firms to reduce costs, but also to enhance their
portfolio of capabilities, and value creation potential,
especiallywhenfirmsproduceuniquecombinationsusing
capabilities provided by these markets.
We suggest that three assumptions underlie resource-
based views about strategic outsourcing. First, selection
determines gains available to firms from capabilities
accessed in the intermediate markets and then
intensifies the effect of these capabilities on firm
performance. Complementarity and relatedness creates
uniquely valuable synergy, especially when specialized
capabilities are effectively combined and when no other
combination can replicate the resulting value chain
activities (Harrison et al., 1991, 2001; Prahalad and
Bettis, 1986; Richardson, 1972; Tsai, 2000). To the
extent that intermediate markets have superior cap-
abilities that complement a firm’s existing capabilities,
selection processes will combine the specialized
internal and external capabilities. By contrast, if a firm
possesses superior capabilities that are already inte-
grated, selection will accommodate internalization.
Second, strategic outsourcing relationships form
within a social context. Ties, both direct and indirect,
with firms in intermediate markets create a network
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481 469
(Uzzi, 1997), and become an important source of
information about the reliability and performance of
current and future exchange partners (Granovetter,
1985). Such information helps a focal firm to learn
about capabilities available in intermediate markets.
Repeated ties improve trust in current and potential
exchange partners and increase the likelihood of future
cooperation (Gulati, 1995). Accordingly, cooperative
experience forges close bonds over time and increases
confidence that exchange partners will pursue mutually
compatible interests thereby reducing the probability of
opportunism (Das and Teng, 1998), and facilitating the
exchange of capabilities crucial for performance (Combs
and Ketchen, 1999; Uzzi, 1996). Because strategic
outsourcing involves coordinating the actions of two or
more firms, cooperative experience is vital to its success.
Third, firms enhance their ability to leverage
specialized capabilities by developing and refining
mechanisms that strengthen the synergies such cap-
abilities provide. We refer to these mechanisms as
relational capability-building mechanisms (Dyer and
Singh, 1998; Makadok, 2001), which allow firms to
enhance the potential value of specialized capabilities
deployed along a value chain. When purposefully
developed, relational capability-building mechanisms
allow firms to accumulate, integrate, and leverage
experience over time; they are derived from previous
capability-building actions, the results of those actions,
and the future actions firms pursue (Fiol and Lyles,
1985). From a transaction-based perspective, these
mechanisms reduce coordination and integration costs
and enable firms to exploit new opportunities in the
market, especially when they develop the mechanisms
to more effectively manage the portfolio of capabilities
they acquire from intermediate markets. These mechan-
isms also create causal ambiguity, obscuring the use of
capabilities deployed across a value chain and making it
difficult for competitors to determine a priori the
sources of value within firms’ supply chains.
In sum, we contend that specialized capabilities
accessed by strategic outsourcing may allow firms to
achieve greater performance gains. In the following two
subsections, we briefly describe several economic
incentives behind strategic outsourcing and contrast
this organizing arrangement with two related concepts:
strategic purchasing and strategic alliances.
2.3. Economic motives and incentives behind
strategic outsourcing
Although previous empirical studies of outsourcing
have produced equivocal results, there is increasing
evidence that certain economic motives may prompt a
firm’s decision to pursue this organizing form. We
provide three possible economic motives behind strategic
outsourcing. First, strategic outsourcing potentially
reduces bureaucratic complexity. As firms grow, infor-
mation asymmetries emerge (Hitt et al., 1996). Asym-
metries produce information deficits. Information
deficits add to the administrative demands of organizing
transactions. Excessive bureaucratic costs associated
with governance oversight reduce firm performance
(D’Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994; Rothaermel, Hitt and
Jobe, in press). In turn, these demands distract managerial
attention from important sources of innovation and
growth and add to the costs of internalization (D’Aveni
and Ravenscraft, 1994). As transactionvolumes increase,
mobility and exit barriers form reducing strategic
flexibility and often trapping firms in obsolescent tech-
nologies (Harrigan, 1985). Thus, strategic outsourcing
helps firms align competing priorities, focus manage-
ment attention on growth and innovation opportunities,
and target resources to those tasks firms do best.
Second, strategic outsourcing improves production
economies, especially when firms fail to achieve
sufficient production scale to overcome cost disadvan-
tages (Teece, 1980). Because decisions about price and
production are made before actual demand is observed,
as transaction volumes vary, firms may find it difficult to
make optimal use of available capacity or may ration
production when existing production scale limits
activity (Green, 1986). Strategic outsourcing allows
firms to avoid or reduce rationing and meet production
requirements by relying on intermediate markets as
demand varies over time; it also provides a mechanism
for firms to reduce uncertainty, transfer risk, and share
scale economies with specialized firms from these
markets. As a result, overhead is reduced, production
costs decline, and investments in certain facilities and
equipment are eliminated, which in turn reduces firms’
break-even points.
Based on the considerations noted above, financial
advantages evolve in three ways. First, firms pursuing
strategic outsourcing through substitution (Gilley and
Rasheed, 2000) benefit from financial capital (cash)
exchanged for internal factors of production (e.g.
facilities, equipment, management and production
personnel, etc.) when assets are transferred or sold to
firms in intermediate markets. The nature and size of
this financial capital-factor exchange often has sub-
stantial effects on the total value of strategic out-
sourcing ‘deals’. Second, with strategic outsourcing,
firms can reduce or eliminate longer-term capital
outlays to fund future investments related to the
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481470
‘outsourced’ production. This allows firms to partly
shift specific internal costs, including fixed charges,
such as amortization and depreciation costs, to
intermediate markets. Finally, strategic outsourcing
can buffer firms by providing access to resources (Miner
et al., 1990). Thus, firms reduce their exposure as
capacity and costs are more directly linked to actual
production output (e.g. the number of ‘units’ produced).
This allows firms to transfer the risk of changes in
production as well as responsibility for future capital
outlays to intermediate markets.
Third, increases in bureaucratic complexity increase
the coordination costs associated with different factors
of production, especially when specialization reduces
the degrees of freedom (Rothaermel et al., in press).
Diminishing returns result when the loss of strategic
flexibility and the increase in administrative costs
outweigh the benefits of integration (Jones and Hill,
1988). Accordingly, when increased specialization
simplifies coordination across a value chain (Jacobides,
2005), or when internal production is more efficient
through intermediate markets, firms are more likely to
integrate and use specialized capabilities.
2.4. Strategic outsourcing and related concepts
We draw a distinction between strategic outsourcing
and strategic purchasing. Strategic purchasing refers to
the ongoing process of soliciting, negotiating, and
contracting for the delivery of goods and services from
suppliers (Chen et al., 2004b; Murray and Kotabe,
1999). Key activities include procurement, supplier and
contract management, and other related supply chain
management actions (Salvador et al., 2002) that involve
arms-length transactions with suppliers (Chen and
Paulraj, 2004). Firms regularly purchase products or
services from suppliers on a frequent or recurring
basis—from the procurement of production inputs to
the purchase of supplies for office and administrative
use (Walker and Weber, 1987). Accordingly, these
decisions tend to be more routine and rarely involve the
transfer of resources (Chen et al., 2004a). By contrast,
strategic outsourcing is less common, and may involve
the transfer or sale of resources to firms in intermediate
markets. Moreover, strategic outsourcing reflects a
primary ‘‘relational view’’ involving linkages with
exchange partners that provide access to specialized
capabilities. This relational view explains performance
gains that arise when these capabilities are configured
along the value chain to create value that cannot be
realized through internalization (Das and Teng, 1998;
Sirmon et al., in press). Equating strategic outsourcing
with the purchase of goods and services fails to capture
full nature of this organizing form.
We also differentiate strategic outsourcing from
strategic alliances. Strategic alliances represent colla-
borative arrangements that firms establish to achieve
common goals in which benefits are ultimately shared
by alliance partners (Inkpen, 2001). As such, in
alliances, individual firm performance is a function
of both the total value generated by the alliance and the
share of this value each firm appropriates (Alvarez and
Barney, 2001; Hamel, 1991). Alliances also allow
partners to share risks and resources (Ireland et al.,
2002), to gain access to new knowledge (Dyer and
Singh, 1998), and to obtain access to new product
markets (Hitt et al., 2000). By contrast, strategic
outsourcing arrangements generally involve a focal
firm’s decision to deploy specialized capabilities along
its value chain thereby linking firm performance
directly to the productive activities it controls. While
alliances infer joint decision-making and shared
residuals, strategic outsourcing primarily benefits firms
that originate the action (Insinga and Werle, 2000) by
allowing them to appropriate directly the residual value
such actions create. Accordingly, outsourcing decisions
are not based on appropriation logic per se, rather on
economic terms defined by a focal firm after consider-
ing the different cost/performance trade-offs.
3. Transaction-based arguments for strategic
outsourcing
Efficiency assumptions in TCT drive the classical
reasoning for strategic outsourcing. With this view,
difficulties that emerge from market-based exchanges
generate transaction costs. Such costs include negotia-
tion, contracting, monitoring, and enforcement costs, as
well as costs incurred when resolving disputes. Based
on this perspective, the performance implications of
outsourcing and thus the decision criteria firms apply
are based on the alignment of different governance
structures with attributes of the exchange and the
underlying contracting environment. For example, a
firm that selects a simple governance structure lacking
adequate safeguards and controls is exposed to moral
hazard and hold-up risks when the contracting
environment is complex or when it involves transac-
tion-specific investments (Leiblein et al., 2002). By
contrast, selecting an excessively complex governance
structure for a simple contracting environment unne-
cessarily intensifies bureaucratic complexity, which
reduces decision-making speed, decreases strategic
flexibility, and increases overall costs (Williamson,
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481 471
1985). Accordingly, cost economies as a consequence
of effective governance structures represent important
criteria in the decision to strategically outsource. We
briefly describe three transaction-based considerations
for strategic outsourcing: asset specificity, small
numbers bargaining, and technological uncertainty.
3.1. Asset specificity
Among the exchange conditions originally identi-
fied by Williamson (1975), asset specificity has been
perhaps the most robust empirically. Specific assets, in
contrast to general purpose assets, are considered an
obstacle to market efficiency, because they are costly
to redeploy to alternative uses (Williamson, 1991).
Thus, asset specificity is the principal factor giving
rise to transaction costs. Williamson (1985) defined
asset specificity as durable investments that are made
in support of particular exchange transactions.
Specific assets are investments made in specific,
non-marketable resources and reflect ‘‘the degree to
which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses
and by alternative users without sacrificing productive
value’’ (Williamson, 1991, p. 281). Highly specific
supply chain assets, for example, might include
investments in facilities, equipment, personnel, and
firm- or process-specific training associated with the
production of goods or services that have little or no
use outside the exchange relationship (Grover and
Malhotra, 2003).
With strategic outsourcing, one of the principal
challenges in deciding whether to make a specific
investment concerns the possibility that exchange
partners might act opportunistically. Asset specificity
creates a bilateral interdependency between the firms
(Carney, 1998; Jones, 1983). As such, conditions of
outsourcing often lead to one or more firms being
‘‘locked in’’ and increasingly vulnerable. Trading
hazards created by the structure of the market exchange,
in turn, produce transactions costs. Diseconomies
related to weak incentives and monitoring costs emerge.
Under these conditions, asset specificity exposes
outsourcing firms to potential opportunism, when
exchange partners advance their own self-interest.
Contracting in such situations is difficult, expensive,
and often counter-productive. Consequently, where
resource investments by focal firms are idiosyncratic to
an exchange relationship, interfirm cooperation is likely
to involve internalization. Thus, we propose that:
Proposition 1a. Requirements for firm-specific invest-
ments by a focal firm in exchange-specific assets
between the firm and specialized firms from intermedi-
ate markets negatively affect the likelihood a firm will
pursue strategic outsourcing.
Under certain conditions, however, asset specificity
may serve as a catalyst for interfirm cooperation. When
firms involved in outsourcing relationships are required
to invest collectively in the development of specific
assets or new capabilities, such collaboration can form a
reciprocal interdependency that increases the level of
cooperation and reduces the incentive to engage in
opportunism. These conditions reduce the costs of using
capabilities from intermediate markets (Combs and
Ketchen, 1999; Teece, 1992). Accordingly, in contexts
that involve mutual investments in capabilities, colla-
boration may encourage mutual gain, even when such
investments result in exchange-specific assets, and thus
increase the likelihood a firm will pursue strategic
outsourcing. Thus, we propose that:
Proposition 1b. Requirements for collaborative invest-
ments in exchange-specific assets between a firm and
specialized firms from intermediate markets positively
affect the likelihood a firm will pursue strategic out-
sourcing.
3.2. Small numbers bargaining
TCT scholars also argue that small numbers
bargaining situations create market inefficiencies that
create higher switching costs and increase the like-
lihood of opportunistic behavior (e.g. Klein et al., 1978;
Williamson, 1975). The possibility of opportunistic
behavior arises when the number of specialized firms in
intermediate markets is small, resulting in small
numbers bargaining (Williamson, 1975). Moreover,
the likelihood of opportunistic behavior is most severe
when focal firms are required to make significant
exchange-based investments because such investments
may be subject to hold-up by external partners (Klein
et al., 1978). Small numbers bargaining affects the
distribution of bargaining power in outsourcing
relationships. Bargaining power is defined as the ability
to influence the outcomes of negotiated relations
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; Schelling, 1956). Firms
with more bargaining power can obtain more favorable
outcomes. In this case, bargaining power is important
because it can lead specialized firms to act opportu-
nistically in order to gain an advantage in outsourcing
relationships. Thus, small numbers bargaining reduces
the likelihood firms will pursue outsourcing.
Moreover, when the degree of competitiveness
within intermediate markets is low (e.g. small number
of specialized firms), specialized firms acting oppor-
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481472
tunistically may be less willing to share costs caused by
changes in production volume or design specifications,
thereby increasing transaction costs for a focal firm
(Walker and Weber, 1987). By contrast, the higher the
degree of competitiveness in an intermediate market,
the more likely that partners will collaborate to share
scale economies by leveraging adjustment costs across
customers (Walker and Weber, 1984). Such economies
dampen opportunistic bargaining, reduce potential
transaction costs, and therefore provide a stronger
incentive for firms to outsource. Accordingly, the
greater the density of specialized firms, the lower a focal
firm’s exposure to small numbers bargaining, and the
more likely that strategic outsourcing will emerge.
Thus, we propose that:
Proposition 2. The number of specialized firms from
intermediate markets is positively related to the like-
lihood a firm will pursue strategic outsourcing.
3.3. Technological uncertainty
Technological uncertainty refers to unanticipated
changes in circumstances surrounding technology, i.e.,
new generations of technology that render existing
technology obsolete (Folta, 1998; Robertson and
Gatignon, 1998). Broadly defined, technology repre-
sents theoretical and practical knowledge, skills,
production and supply chain systems, and related
artifacts that can be deployed along a firm’s value chain
to develop goods and services (Burgelman et al., 1996).
Changes in technology create new complexities for
structuring value chain activities, especially when new
knowledge is applied at a faster rate reducing the time
between innovations (Song and Montoya-Weiss, 2001).
In the presence of technological uncertainty, greater
resource commitments produce more exposure to
negative ‘shocks’. Thus, relative to arrangements that
provide ‘on-demand’ access to capabilities through
intermediate markets, technological uncertainty may
serve as a disincentive to internalize because it often
requires greater resource commitments.
These conditions may prompt firms to pursue
strategic outsourcing to reduce their exposure to
unforeseen contingencies and to improve financial
and operational stability and predictability. Schoon-
hoven (1981, pp. 355–356) found that ‘‘destandardiza-
tion’’ and ‘‘decentralization’’ of task execution had
positive effects on firm performance under conditions of
technological uncertainty. Harrigan (1985, 1986)
argued that increases in technological uncertainty
may lead firms to use less firm-specific resources. As
a consequence, internalization is likely to decrease in
the long-run, because strategic outsourcing allows firms
to partly transfer the risk of task variability to the
intermediate markets. Specialized firms in these
markets may be better able to achieve cost efficiencies
that are difficult for focal firms to achieve by balancing
task requirements across multiple customers. As
technological uncertainty increases, internal economies
of specialization deteriorate in relation to the external
economies of specialized firms (Teece, 1980). As such,
strategic outsourcing not only can provide scale
economies during periods of technological uncertainty,
but may also act as a coping strategy helping to deal
with risk. From this perspective, strategic outsourcing
provides more predictable and orderly patterns of
exchange within and between firms.
However, at higher levels of technological uncer-
tainty, larger information deficits increase the likelihood
for opportunism, making it costly to handle exchanges
through intermediate markets. These asymmetries
reduce the ability to foresee potential contingencies
that may occur in the future making it costly to write,
monitor, and enforce complete contracts (Grossman and
Hart, 1986). As a result, parties to such exchanges are
more likely to regularly renegotiate the terms of their
relationship, which increases the likelihood of oppor-
tunism. At increasingly higher levels of uncertainty,
greater information deficits emerge, reducing cost
economies and increasing the difficulty of interfirm
collaboration. Reductions in cost economies lead to
diminishing returns. At higher levels of technological
uncertainty, firms find it difficult to accurately predict a
priori the combination of possible events and outcomes
that are likely to emerge from production (March and
Simon, 1958). Thus, beyond a certain level of
technological uncertainty, we expect this relationship
to be negative. Specifically, we propose that:
Proposition 3. Technological uncertainty will have a
non-linear (inverse U-shaped) effect on the likelihood a
firm will pursue strategic outsourcing, with the slope
positive at low and moderate levels of technological
uncertainty but negative at high levels of technological
uncertainty.
3.4. Critique of transaction-based arguments for
strategic outsourcing
While providing a number of important insights
regarding the most efficient means to govern a
particular economic exchange (Grover and Malhotra,
2003), TCT generally involves a set of restrictive
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481 473
assumptions that ignore the potential influence of a
firm’s extant governance forms, its portfolio of
exchange transactions, and other firm-specific capabil-
ities on value created through value chain activities.
Thus, in equilibrium, TCT implies that all firms facing a
similar set of exchange conditions and transactional
attributes will reach similar conclusions regarding
which activities to internalize and which activities to
outsource (Leiblein and Miller, 2003). However, this
proposition is untenable. Comparisons of internaliza-
tion decisions across firms in the same industry suggest
that the internalization decisions often differ dramati-
cally. For instance, while companies such as IBM and
Nokia have remained historically integrated, other
companies such as Dell, HP, Ericsson, and Motorola
outsource a variety of production functions ranging
from R&D and engineering design to manufacturing
and logistics. Moreover, variance in performance within
and between these two groups of firms suggests a more
complex set of factors affect the decision to outsource.
Thus, using economizing motives alone limits the
quality of discourse about the decision to outsource. In
the following section, we extend the conceptual
orientation of strategic outsourcing to consider
resource-based factors.
4. Resource-based arguments for strategic
outsourcing
Drawing on the RBV, we extend transaction-based
perspectives of strategic outsourcing by focusing
attention on the role of specialized capabilities obtained
through intermediate markets. This approach, however,
requires a refinement in the traditional role of
boundaries. In particular, while conventional
approaches to boundary conditions emphasize bound-
aries as an economizing buffer to environmental
contingencies (Araujo et al., 2003), boundaries also
act as a bridge to intermediate markets through
relationship ‘ties’ formed by a focal firm. In other
words, boundaries integrate as well as separate a firm
from its environment. In this work, we define bridging
as the process by which firms establish linkages with
intermediate markets, suggesting that new capabilities
may be obtained through relationships established
within and across a firm’s relationship network (e.g.
Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973). Herein, our focus is on
the specialized capabilities provided through these
relationships.
The ability to access new and potentially more
valuable capabilities is a critical driver of strategic
outsourcing because these actions can fundamentally
alter a firm’s capability endowments (Morrow et al.,
2005), making it easier to pursue new opportunities in
the market. We maintain that different conditions affect
the value of capabilities sourced from intermediate
markets. In particular, we briefly describe four resource-
based considerations for strategic outsourcing: com-
plementarity of capabilities, strategic relatedness,
relational capability-building mechanisms, and coop-
erative experience.
4.1. Complementarity of capabilities
Beginning with Penrose (1959), strategy scholars
have proposed that firms enhance value chain perfor-
mance when they align with exchange partners in order
to access complementary capabilities (e.g. Harrison
et al., 1991; Rothaermel, 2001; Teece, 1986). Applied to
strategic outsourcing, this argument suggests that firms
seek ties with specialized firms that possess capabilities
beneficial to and needed by a focal firm. Such
capabilities may be required to replace existing
capabilities deployed along a value chain (e.g.
substitution-based outsourcing) or to fulfill a specific
need not currently available in a firm (e.g. abstention-
based outsourcing).
Capability complementarity reflects a situation in
which specialized capabilities enhance the value
creation potential of a focal firm’s own capability
endowments. Complementary capabilities are differ-
ent, yet mutually supportive (Luo, 2002a; Hitt et al.,
2001). Richardson (1972) suggests that capabilities
are complementary when they ‘‘represent different
phases of production and require in some way or
another to be coordinated’’ in order to create
maximum value (Richardson, 1972, p. 889). Where
complementarities exist, the integration of internal
and external capabilities enhances the potential
performance gains firms realize, especially when
economies of scope in production increase their
market power (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992). When
complementary capabilities are idiosyncratic and
indivisible, and thus not otherwise available in the
factor markets (Barney, 1986), strategic outsourcing
can provide access to them.
When complementary capabilities are linked
together, they are especially difficult for competitors
to duplicate because imitation not only requires
obtaining the capabilities from intermediate markets,
but also duplicating their deployment along a value
chain (Holcomb et al., 2006). Barney (1988) suggested
that acquiring firms gain above normal returns from
acquisitions only when private or uniquely valuable
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481474
synergies can be realized. Private and uniquely valuable
synergy is created when information about the
combination is obscured from rivals and when no other
combination of firms could produce the same value.
Research suggests that firms participating in exchange
relationships that involve complementary capabilities
perform better than firms with relationships that are
formed to achieve cost economies (Harrison et al.,
2001; Holcomb et al., 2006). Chung et al. (2000) also
found the likelihood of alliance formation was
positively related to the complementarity of investment
banks’ capabilities. Similarly, other research suggests
that firms consider the potential for complementarity an
important partner selection criterion (Hitt et al., 2000,
2004).
Different but complementary resources can help a
firm improve scale economies, enhance responsiveness
and innovative potential, and increase quality. Further-
more, because complementary capabilities are gener-
ally relationship-specific (Dyer and Singh, 1998), the
value created may be unavailable to rivals through
alternative sources (e.g. private; Barney, 1988), which
may create a sustainable competitive advantage. Thus,
strategic outsourcing relationships are more important
to value-creating activities when these relationships
provide specialized capabilities that are complementary
to those currently held by a firm, especially when the
integration of those capabilities across a value chain
create private and uniquely valuable synergy. From the
resource-based perspective, firm scope then is deter-
mined by the limits in specialization and the need to
maximize gains from the combination of complemen-
tary capabilities along a value chain.
By applying this logic, we argue that strategic
outsourcing is a likely alternative when benefits from
specialized capabilities accessed from intermediate
markets are based on complementarity. A complemen-
tarity perspective for strategic outsourcing suggests that
a firm will ally with partners in whom the greatest
complementarity exists between the firm’s capability
endowments and those held by partners in intermediate
markets. Thus, we conclude that the complementarity of
capability endowments between a firm and its exchange
partners has a positive effect on the likelihood the firm
will pursue strategic outsourcing. Specifically, we
propose that:
Proposition 4. The extent of complementarity that
exists between a firm’s existing capability endowment
and capabilities available from intermediate markets
positively affects the likelihood a firm will pursue
strategic outsourcing.
4.2. Strategic relatedness
Strategic relatedness characterizes the degree to
which firms are strategically similar; it reflects the
extent to which firms produce similar goods and
services, serve similar markets, utilize similar produc-
tion and supply chain systems, or rely on similar
technologies. Relatedness provides a rationale for
capability-sharing between firms (Prahalad and Bettis,
1986; Rumelt, 1974; Tsai, 2000). We expand this view
of ‘relatedness’ to include goal congruence and the
commonality of knowledge-sharing routines. A high
degree of relatedness between a firm and its exchange
partners implies that they share common goals and are
able to transfer knowledge between them more
effectively. Accordingly, strategic relatedness is an
important factor in a firm’s decision to pursue strategic
outsourcing.
Goal congruence is the degree to which firms’
operational, strategic, and performance objectives
overlap and/or reinforce one another. When firms’
goals are not congruent, performance considered
satisfactory to a focal firm may not be satisfactory to
exchange partners and vice versa. Likewise, behavior
promoting the interests of a focal firm may not promote
the interests of those partners (Luo, 2002b). The
presence of congruent goals helps to resolve these
potential concerns. Despite the importance of goal
congruity for success in exchange relationships (Luo,
2002a), evidence suggests a lack of goal congruity in
many such relationships. As profit-maximizing goals
are aligned, strategic outsourcing not only reduces
monitoring and enforcement costs associated with the
arrangement but also increases synergies as well. When
goals are aligned, specialized firms are more likely to
share common interests with a focal firm and thus be
more supportive of exploiting new opportunities, even if
such opportunities require these firms make additional
investments. These synergies enable firms with ‘com-
mon goals’ to more quickly exploit competitive
imperfections observed in the market (Mahoney and
Pandian, 1992), and thus hold the potential to create
value beyond cost savings alone.
Goal congruency also reduces conflict and
encourages cooperative behavior (Parkhe, 1993). Thus,
firms with exchange partners that share congruent goals
find it easier to collaborate thereby enhancing the value
of these relationships. Moreover, congruent goals
improve the quality of relationships with exchange
partners, which reduce the probability of opportunism
(Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). With the threat of
opportunism reduced, exchange partners may be more
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481 475
willing to make additional resources available. Finally,
congruent goals can reduce the need for formal
contractual arrangements (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
These informal agreements in turn promote adaptability
and reduce the need for formal governance mechanisms
(Uzzi, 1997). Thus, costs are reduced to the extent that
less monitoring and enforcement is required.
By contrast, incongruent goals often lead to the
development of sub-goals, which exchange partners
may pursue at the expense of a focal firm (Williamson,
1975). Incongruent goals also impede cooperation, limit
the exchange of resources between exchange partners
(Luo, 2002a), and can lead to early termination of these
relationships. Furthermore, in the presence of incon-
gruent goals, the time and energy spent resolving
disputes detract from developing and implementing
innovative strategies and can prevent valuable strategies
from emerging. Incongruent goals therefore make it
difficult to leverage specialized capabilities accessed by
firms through strategic outsourcing. Thus, we argue that
goal congruency affects the likelihood a firm will
pursue capabilities from intermediate markets through
strategic outsourcing. Specifically, we propose that:
Proposition 5a. Goal congruency between a firm and
specialized firms from intermediate markets positively
affect the likelihood a firm will pursue strategic out-
sourcing.
A high degree of strategic relatedness also results
when focal firms and specialized firms share common or
similar knowledge-sharing routines (Dyer and Singh,
1998). We define knowledge-sharing routines as regular
patterns of interactions that permit the transfer,
assimilation, and integration of new knowledge (Grant,
1996). The advantage of such routines lies in the ability
to economize effort, which reduces coordination costs
and affords greater capacity for knowledge-sharing
between firms.
Common knowledge-sharing routines may emerge
as new intermediate markets are formed by increasing
specialization within an industry (Jacobides, 2005). For
example, with the emergence of intermediate markets
specializing in information services, firms have
increasingly transferred in-house computing systems
resources—i.e., programming and data center opera-
tions personnel, computer hardware, and enterprise
application software as well as software design and
programming processes and methodologies—to firms
in these markets (e.g. EDS, IBM, and Accenture) who
integrate and use these resources. As a result of these
transfers, focal firms commonly share routines with
their partners, which facilitates knowledge-sharing.
Further, because firms within an industry often share
common knowledge structures, the emergence of
vertically specialized markets in an industry increases
the likelihood they will share common knowledge-
sharing routines. Accordingly, the emergence of
intermediate markets increases the diffusion of knowl-
edge and thus increases the probability of strategic
outsourcing in an industry.
Various scholars have argued that interorganizational
learning is also critical to competitive success, noting
that firms’ partners are, in many cases, the most
important sources of new knowledge (Powell et al.,
1996; Von Hippel, 1988). Common knowledge-sharing
routines between a firm and its exchange partners
enable more efficient absorption and use of acquired
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive
capacity includes relationship-specific capabilities,
such as knowledge-sharing routines, that arise when
firms develop mutually specialized ways of exploiting
each other’s capabilities. Dyer and Singh (1998) define
partner-specific absorptive knowledge as a function of
(1) the extent to which firms develop overlapping
knowledge bases, and (2) the extent to which partners
develop routines that maximize the benefit of their
interactions. In sum, we conclude that effective
knowledge-sharing routines are crucial to the exploita-
tion of intermediate markets and thus affect the
likelihood firms will pursue strategic outsourcing.
Thus, we propose that:
Proposition 5b. Commonality of knowledge-sharing
routines between a firm and specialized firms from
intermediate markets positively affects the likelihood
a firm will pursue strategic outsourcing.
4.3. Relational capability-building mechanisms
Evidence suggests that firm performance is affected
by its abilities to integrate, build, and reconfigure
resources. This process is referred to as dynamic
capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). According to Loasby
(1998, p. 139), ‘‘‘managing capabilities’ is itself a
capability’’; that is, firms develop capabilities over time
that help them develop and link productive capabilities
across a value chain. In particular, dynamic capabilities
have been used to explain why firms in the same industry
perform differently. For example, Helfat and Peteraf
(2003) suggest that dynamic capabilities are embedded
within firms and consist as a set of specific and
identifiable strategic and organizational routines. We
use the work on the dynamic capabilities (e.g. Teece et al.,
1997; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) to define relational
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481476
capability-building mechanisms as routines that allow
firms to synthesize and leverage specialized capabilities
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Makadok, 2001). Our view of
these mechanisms also complements ‘recombinatory’
(e.g. Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Grant, 1996; Kogut and
Zander, 1992) views of capabilities, which emphasize the
manipulation of competences residing within the firm.
Accordingly, these mechanisms improve a firm’s ability
to accumulate, integrate, and leverage specialized
capabilities across a value chain, and affect its ability
to pursue new opportunities in the future.
Relational capability-building mechanisms also act as
a focal point for learning and leveraging experiences from
past capability-building actions, the results of those
actions, and the firm’s future actions (Fiol and Lyles,
1985). They represent a more systematic and routine
implementation of dedicated processes that support
production activity involving the use of specialized
capabilities. For example, Kale et al. (2002) found that
firms with a dedicated capability to manage interfirm
relationships generated substantially higher market value
than firms without such capability. Stated differently,
firms that systematically invest indeveloping theability to
manage interfirm relationships consistently perform
better than others that choose not to make such
investments. Zollo and Singh (2004) found that dedicated
processes inwhichfirmsaccumulate andexplicitlycodify
acquisition experience significantly improved overall
acquisition performance by counteracting the coordina-
tion problems that future contingencies create. Accord-
ingly, we expect investments in development of relational
capability-buildingmechanisms will reduce coordination
and integration costs, and improve the synergisticbenefits
available through strategic outsourcing.
In sum, relational capability-building mechanisms
not only enable firms to generate greater value
(Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Makadok, 2001), but
also create additional ambiguity that allow firms to
sustain certain advantages over time (Rumelt, 1984).
Under these conditions, we expect relational capability-
building mechanisms to directly affect the likelihood
firms pursue strategic outsourcing. Accordingly, we
propose that:
Proposition 6. Relational capability-building mechan-
isms positively affect the likelihood a firm will pursue
strategic outsourcing.
4.4. Cooperative experience
Strategic outsourcing relationships are formed
within a social context that influences selection
decisions and the pattern of interfirm linkages that
emerge. We represent cooperative experience as
repeated ties, direct and indirect, formed with specia-
lized firms from intermediate markets. Repeated ties
with these firms create a pattern of relationships in
which focal firms can access information about the
reliability and performance of current and future
partners (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). These ties
reduce information asymmetries, heighten awareness
about specialized capabilities and firms from inter-
mediate markets, and establish a basis for trust. In turn,
trust enhances the potential benefits of strategic
outsourcing by reducing the risk of adverse selection
and improving the level of collaboration once such
relationships are established. Herein, we define trust as
a firm’s confidence in the reliability of a specialized firm
to fulfill its obligations and act fairly when the
possibility for opportunism is present. Zaheer et al.
(1998) found that organizational trust formed by
repeated market exchanges is an important driver of
interfirm relationships because it enhances overall
performance, decreases the complexity and costs of
negotiation processes, and reduces conflict. Examining
international joint ventures (IJVs), Luo (2002b) found
that cooperation had a linear effect on IJV performance,
especially at higher levels of contract term specificity
and contingency adaptability, which represents the
extent to which unanticipated contingencies are
accounted for and the guidelines for handling such
contingencies are specified in a contract. We suggest
that a focal firm’s cooperative experience with
specialized firms reduces information asymmetry and
opportunistic behavior, and thus enhances the potential
benefits of strategic outsourcing. Accordingly, coop-
erative experience increases the likelihood that addi-
tional outsourcing arrangements will be pursued with
these firms in the future.
Whereas, according to the transaction-based view,
interfirm cooperation occurs only when the costs of
governing production can be minimized, the resource-
based perspective suggests that firms share capabilities in
order to stimulate growth (Combs and Ketchen, 1999).
As such, cooperation represents ‘‘the willingness of a
partner firm to pursue mutually compatible interests . . . rather than act opportunistically’’ (Das and Teng, 1998, p.
492). Because market exchanges are embedded in a
social context, the governance of interfirm exchanges
involve more than contracts; they depend on the level of
cooperation between the firm and its partners (Luo,
2002b). For such relationally-governed exchanges, the
enforcement of obligations, promises, and expectations
involves social processes that promote norms of
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481 477
adaptation and information exchange. The significance
of cooperative experience is reflected in the paradox that
results: firms are expected to pursue strategies and
programs that best serve their interests; however,
interfirm relationships require simultaneous investment
and restraint in order for each party to gain maximum
value from the relationship (cf. Das and Teng, 1998).
The pattern of cooperation that emerges when
intermediate markets form around specialized capabil-
ities (Jacobides, 2005; Richardson, 1972) encourages
firms to engage in repeated exchanges, especially as these
markets mature improving accessibility to specialized
capabilities. Repeated ties with specialized firms
improve trust and increase the likelihood of future
cooperation (Gulati, 1995). This pattern of connections
broadens the firm’s scope and also affects the nature of
ongoing capability development processes (Araujo et al.,
2003; Jacobides and Winter, 2005), i.e., the way in which
a firm shapes or improves its value chain over time.
Changes in capabilities then reshape intermediate
markets, allowing additional firms to participate. These
changes facilitate growth in the number of potential
suppliers but also increase the complexity of the selection
and coordination process. Cooperative experience
provides knowledge that helps in selecting and coordi-
nating specialized capabilities in which relationship ties
serve as a valuable conduit for rich information.
Previous cooperation, defined in terms of both the
length and quality of the exchange relationship, fosters
a climate of trust, openness and confidence. Repeated
interactions or ‘‘cycles of exchange’’ between parties
strengthen their willingness to trust each other and to
expand the boundaries the relationship (Rousseau et al.,
1998). Over time, such relationships become integrated
into the social context that develops between firms,
which fosters knowledge-sharing, supports adaptability,
and deters opportunism. In so doing, the synergy from
exchange relationships is magnified. Specifically,
exchange relationships based on trust are more likely
to exploit market opportunities requiring access to
resources from exchange partners. Such relationships
are more likely to result in collaborative efforts to
exploit emerging opportunities in the market. We
conclude that cooperative experience affects the like-
lihood firms will pursue strategic outsourcing. Thus, we
propose that:
Proposition 7. Cooperative experience between a firm
and specialized firms from intermediate markets,
defined by the length and the quality of previous rela-
tionships, positively affects the likelihood a focal firm
will pursue strategic outsourcing.
5. Discussion and conclusion
The dominant goal most often cited for strategic
outsourcing is cost efficiency. According to this
perspective, firms internalize value chain activity to
minimize costs from opportunism and bounded
rationality, the uncertainty of frequent market
exchanges, and specific assets that may arise from this
organizing arrangement. This rationale, in part, holds
that specific governance mechanisms used to manage
certain exchanges are more efficient and reflects the
view of firm boundaries as the point at which resource
owners relinquish control over access and use.
Accordingly, transaction-based perspectives develop
logic for strategic outsourcing on the basis of
economizing motives linking governance choices to
attributes of an exchange.
The restrictive assumptions offered by TCT suggest
that, in equilibrium, firms with similar exchange
conditions will make the same decisions about strategic
outsourcing. However, the arguments presented herein
show this proposition to be incomplete. Strategic
outsourcing enables firms to bridge boundaries and
access capabilities from intermediate markets that are
subsequently deployed along the value chain. Accord-
ing to the RBV, resource heterogeneity leads to
otherwise similar firms displaying significantly differ-
ent ways of accomplishing the same set of value chain
activities, emboldened by the use of different capabil-
ities. We argued that by linking value chain activities
with intermediate markets for the purpose of gaining
access to valuable specialized capabilities, firms can
accrue value beyond the cost economies available
through more efficient governance mechanisms. Thus,
we augmented transaction-based arguments with
resource-based perspectives to sharpen the focus on
conditions that might favor the use of specialized
capabilities.
The purpose of this work has been to extend our
understanding of strategic outsourcing by integrating
transaction-based and resource-based logics. First, we
offered a more concise definition of strategic out-
sourcing and extended the focus on cost economies
resulting from more efficient governance mechanisms
to consider value that is created when firms more
effectively leverage the specialized capabilities that
outsourcing relationships provide. An important dis-
tinction introduced herein is how firms’ understanding
of their capabilities and those of specialized firms affect
their decision to strategically outsource. We also
showed how the emergence of new intermediate
markets (e.g. vertical disintegration; Jacobides, 2005;
T.R. Holcomb, M.A. Hitt / Journal of Operations Management 25 (2007) 464–481478
Richardson, 1972) provides a theoretical framework
explaining the logic for a ‘capabilities view’ of strategic
outsourcing. In particular, we shift the focus on value
creation from different exchange conditions to value
chain structures and to the process by which firms
produce goods and services. Accordingly, intermediate
markets that maintain specialized capabilities emerge as
conditions within an industry intensify the partitioning
of production activity. As a result, boundaries shift to
accommodate access to specialized capabilities that are
then deployed along a firm’s value chain.
Second, we extended the view of boundaries as
providing a bridge between firms and intermediate
markets (Araujo et al., 2003) to explain how value chain
linkages are enabled through strategic outsourcing. On
the one hand, boundaries provide a space for the
development of valuable and difficult-to-imitate cap-
abilities within the firm—the buffering function. On the
other hand, boundaries provide a bridge to access
specialized capabilities outside the control of the firm.
While TCT generally establishes firm boundaries on the
basis of anticipated efficiencies, our extended model of
strategic outsourcing accommodates a view of bound-
aries in which firms join with exchange partners to
create synergies they cannot realize alone.
This extended model of strategic outsourcing
suggests several research questions worthy of further
investigation. First, we still know very little about the
process by which specialized capabilities are deployed
and integrated along a value chain. For example, how do
firms integrate specialized capabilities along the value
chain? What performance measures best reflect
synergies created by the use of specialized capabilities
across the value chain? Although exchange transactions
through the market can often be economized, value
derived from strategic outsourcing lies more in the
combinative value of specialized capabilities available
through intermediate markets. Thus, scholars should
closely examine the underlying processes involved with
integration and measurement of specialized capabilities
along a value chain.
Second, our understanding of the sources of value
creation is limited. Do focal firms pursuing outsourcing
benefit more by selecting valuable capabilities from
intermediate markets or by more effectively integrating
these capabilities in difficult-to-imitate ways? Using our
model of strategic outsourcing, for example, scholars
can evaluate Makadok’s (2001) assertions regarding
synergies from the two main sources of rent genera-
tion—resource-picking and capability-building—
within a strategic outsourcing context. According to
this perspective, specialized capabilities affect firm
performance by enhancing the productivity of other
capabilities that firms possess.
Finally, as strategic outsourcing arrangements con-
tinue to expand in scope and complexity, scholars
should more closely examine specific attributes of
outsourcing ‘deals,’ especially when such deals involve
the divestment of assets by a focal firm as part of the
exchange. In some cases, these arrangements involve
the exchange of substantial financial considerations for
assets controlled by a focal firm. Where is value created
(and lost) by focal firms and intermediate markets? How
do financial considerations affect focal firms’ decision
to outsource? What are the implementation challenges?
How do investors view these arrangements? Thus,
research that provides a more comprehensive view of
strategic outsourcing deals and anticipates aggregate
economic considerations is needed.
The value-creating potential of the firm is at the heart
of the theory of the firm. Adopting a model of strategic
outsourcing can help scholars and practitioners to
understand the strategic, operational, and financial
motivations and incentives behind this organizing
arrangement. If outsourcing is pursued strategically,
firms can achieve above normal returns. Examining the
different conditions in which value creation occurs can
extend management’s view of strategic outsourcing and
provide a new paradigm for supply chain practitioners
to demonstrate the practical benefits of strategic
outsourcing.
Acknowledgements
We thank David Ketchen, Tomas Hult, and the two
anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. We
also benefited from valuable comments and suggestions
by Sharon Alvarez, Lorraine Eden, and Michael Holmes
on earlier drafts of this article.
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- Toward a model of strategic outsourcing
- Introduction
- Theoretical foundation
- Strategic outsourcing defined
- Specialized capabilities and the emergence of intermediate markets
- Economic motives and incentives behind strategic outsourcing
- Strategic outsourcing and related concepts
- Transaction-based arguments for strategic outsourcing
- Asset specificity
- Small numbers bargaining
- Technological uncertainty
- Critique of transaction-based arguments for strategic outsourcing
- Resource-based arguments for strategic outsourcing
- Complementarity of capabilities
- Strategic relatedness
- Relational capability-building mechanisms
- Cooperative experience
- Discussion and conclusion
- Acknowledgements
- References
o4 (bringing together strategic ..).pdf
European Management Journal Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 647–661, 2003 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Pergamon
Printed in Great Britain 0263-2373/$30.00doi:10.1016/S0263-2373(03)00113-0
Bringing Together Strategic Outsourcing and Corporate Strategy: Outsourcing Motives and Risks BERTRAND QUÉLIN, HEC School of Management, Jouy-en-Josas FRANÇOIS DUHAMEL, HEC School of Management, Jouy-en-Josas
The authors report the results of a study on the motives of corporate headquarters in large Euro- pean manufacturing firms for engaging in outsourc- ing and the risks they perceive to be associated with strategic outsourcing operations. Four main issues can be highlighted: preoccupations about core busi- nesses and reduction of cost of capital are linked; access to external expertise and quality improve- ments are specific expectations for outsourcing firms; operational cost savings, still a predominant concern, must be balanced with the cost of monitor- ing suppliers; the ‘increased flexibility’ objective emerges as a distinct issue. 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Corporate strategy, Strategic outsourc- ing, Core business, Risk
Corporate headquarters in large, diversified Euro- pean companies are under great pressure to create value for their businesses. They must achieve a ‘par- enting advantage’ and strive to be the best possible parents for their businesses (Goold et al., 1994, p. 8). To create advantages for their companies, corporate parents, according to Goold et al. (2001, p. 85), assume three roles or channels: a minimum corporate parent role that consists of ensuring the existence and development of the firm as a legal entity, a policy- making role and a service provision role for the busi- nesses.
To meet the value creation challenge for their busi-
European Management Journal Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 647–661, October 2003 647
nesses, corporate managers look more and more to outsourcing. Increasingly requiring company-wide policies to be consistent and shared services to help the firm’s businesses develop, outsourcing modifies the firm’s frontiers. Intense is the pressure from the market and the financial operators to reduce asset investments and to outsource certain activities (e.g. inventory, warehouses or real estate), as these actors expect improvements in the value created for share- holders. Indeed, there is evidence that outsourcing contributes positively to market value (Rappaport, 1986; Alexander and Young, 1996a; Hayes et al., 2000). Yet it must also create value for the firm (reduced costs, improved performance) and for the end user. For outsourcing to be meaningful, both value creation and value appropriation processes must be appraised (Alexander and Young, 1996a; Auguste et al., 2002).
Outsourcing is a choice that lies in the corporate pol- icy, not just business strategy, area, as it modifies the firm’s boundaries as a legal entity and generally involves top management decision makers. Affecting company-wide resource allocation policies and asset management practices, outsourcing decisions often involve several divisions in large, diversified compa- nies, as in the case of IT outsourcing operations.
In the first part of this paper, we review the different features of strategic outsourcing. In the second part, we highlight the current trends in strategic outsourc- ing. In the following sections, we examine a hier-
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
archy of the motives and risks associated with out- sourcing operations. Finally, we propose a number of recommendations that require managers to focus on several key points involved in the implementation of strategic outsourcing operations.
What is Strategic Outsourcing?
In this article, we define outsourcing as the operation of shifting a transaction previously governed intern- ally to an external supplier through a long-term con- tract, and involving the transfer of staff to the vendor (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993b; Barthélemy, 2001)1.
Outsourcing is a trend that will continue over time. It has long been considered as a means to reduce costs, but cost reductions can only be achieved in spe- cific conditions, e.g. the external provider must have access to economies of scale that the outsourcer does not. In short, if outsourcing was reduced simply to performing the same tasks at a lower cost, internal reorganisation may well be a more efficient way to achieve this type of objective (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a), especially since managers often find that cost savings are in fact not attained through outsourcing ventures. The switching costs incurred by the tran- sition to an external provider, such as those associa- ted with supplier selection, negotiations, reorganis- ation and control, are high.
Actually, outsourcing equates with more than just improved operational effectiveness. In fact, it is not limited to peripheral tasks, such as catering or gard- ening, but involves a growing number of the firm’s activities and functions, notably those that substan- tially contribute to its added value. This notion of strategic outsourcing was introduced by Quinn and Hilmer (1994). However, if most firms in the same industry were to choose the same type of solution, such as outsourcing, the strategic advantage would no longer be valid, as companies would all converge to the same business model (Porter, 1996). To be con- sidered as a strategic choice, outsourcing must be a distinctive feature of specific firms in an industry.
Alexander and Young (1996b) challenge the conven-
Five Elements Characterise Strategic Outsourcing:
❖ A close link between outsourcing processes and the key success factors of a firm in an industry (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994).
❖ The transfer of ownership of a business function previously internalised, often including a transfer of personnel and physical assets to the service provider.
❖ A global contract, longer and denser than a classical subcontracting agreement. ❖ A long-term commitment between the client and the service provider. Previous research, based on more
than one hundred major contracts, shows an average contract duration of 6–7 years (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993b; Barthélemy, 2001).
❖ A contractual definition of service levels and of each partner’s obligations (Doig et al., 2001).
European Management Journal Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 647–661, October 2003648
tional wisdom that core activities should be kept in- house and evoke several distinctions between the dif- ferent types of core activities. Activities critical to performance should be distinguished from activities that create a competitive advantage. The first type concerns activities, such as IT, logistics or facilities management, that support the core businesses, with- out necessarily being a distinctive feature of a specific firm in its market. The second type refers to activities that create a current or potential competitive advan- tage for the firm.
Strategic outsourcing concerns both of these types of activities that contribute substantially to the firm’s added value. By identifying the business functions to outsource, companies can benefit from an increased specialisation in the areas on which they choose to focus, through increased learning, shared experience, professional career path incentives or other ways that enhance value (Alexander and Young, 1996a). Brown et al. (2002, p. 65) illustrate the advantages of this type of specialisation, through the description of business networks co-ordinated by companies such as Li & Fung and Cisco.
Due to its strategic importance, outsourcing is a busi- ness decision that involves not only operational man- agers, but also top management. Outsourcing influ- ences the resources allocated to business units as well as the level of vertical specialisation of the firm’s activities, both of which are strategic corporate decisions (Grant, 2002, p. 388). Since it deals with modification of the firm’s frontiers, strategic out- sourcing, deemed as business strategy (Insinga and Werle, 2000), is also a corporate strategy issue.
Outsourcing Features: A General Overview
Strategic outsourcing is now a reality, as illustrated in the following example. In December 2002, JP Morgan Chase’s top management decided to arrange a seven-
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
year, $5 billion outsourcing deal with IBM. The deal was intended to help JP Morgan Chase ‘make internal IT costs more flexible by scaling its comput- ing needs in line with internal and external demand.’ In view of this objective, the bank opted to let IBM take a major part of its data processing infrastructure. The contract included the transfer of about 4000 JP Morgan Chase employees to IBM this year. For the most part, application delivery and development, desktop support and other core competencies remained in-house at JP Morgan Chase. The deal should help the bank to centralise its IT operations, ‘allowing customers to tap into its vast computing network and rent server processing, data storage and other IT resources on a pay-as-you-use basis.’
Computerworld (Computerworld, 2002) reported that senior executives at investment banks are ‘often disillusioned with the inability of their IT depart- ments to react quickly to changing market decisions.’ They clearly look to outsourcing as a means to reduce costs (insofar as they can be measured effectively), focus on core activities and increase flexibility. This JP Morgan Chase example shows that cost reductions, while important, are but one objective expected from outsourcing. Other objectives include improved flexibility, quality and control. Regaining control of IT departments is an important driver inciting the corporate hierarchy to outsource such activities, as stated by Lacity and Hirschheim (1993b) in a more extensive empirical study. Here, outsourc- ing is clearly inseparable from the company’s long- term vision of core businesses.
The Geodis-IBM case (see Exhibit 1) is also an example of a strategic approach to outsourcing which concerns the outsourcer’s key success factors. Here, outsourcing becomes an integral part of an overall policy to exploit core competencies.
The strategic approach to outsourcing provides the firm with information about the main activities that can potentially be outsourced. From headquarters’ point of view, the type of outsourcing policies that it draws up can help its business units to benefit from expert advice. Expertise can be provided by service providers or internal specialists. Besides reflecting on different outsourcing policies to adopt, headquarters can also prepare the firm for outsourcing by centralis- ing the provision of certain services so that the busi- ness units or support activities derive benefits from economies of scale, or scope. By providing guidelines for their businesses and taking into account the evol- ution of the competencies portfolio that the Group maintains and develops, headquarters plays a role that involves verifying resource allocation and cultiv- ating the firm’s competence portfolio on a company- wide-basis.
Outsourcing is also a tool for top managers to spread risks in a more optimal manner, and to avoid large,
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often irreversible, investments. Yet, at the same time, outsourcing decisions are themselves costly to reverse. As it grows in scope, importance and con- tractual complexity, strategic outsourcing calls for an approach to risk that is different from what may have been used for less core-dependent business activities (Alexander and Young, 1996b).
A precise account of outsourcing motives and an assessment of the risks involved provide a basis for sound implementation and control (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a; McFarlan and Nolan, 1995). Goold et al. (1994, pp.19–21) propose a corporate strategy framework that carefully examines the par- ent’s characteristics by studying its structures, people and skills, functions, decentralisation contracts or mental maps. Mental maps, in particular, ‘shape the parent’s perceptions of business improvement oppor- tunities’; even if variations exist among the firm’s individuals, ‘the parent can be characterised and dif- ferentiated with regard to its dominant maps.’ This article provides an account of the motives of corpor- ate management in major diversified European firms for outsourcing and the risks they perceive to be associated with strategic outsourcing.
New Millennium Trends in Outsourcing
Outsourcing operations are becoming increasingly complex (Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, 2002), involv- ing a growing number of business functions. Compa- nies tend to outsource more mission-critical, complex operations that contribute to their growth. The com- plexity of outsourcing operations assumes several dimensions:
❖ As corporate headquarters become more involved, the number of stakeholders influenced by the out- sourcing decision becomes more numerous than a few years ago;
❖ Selection criteria are not limited to mere cost sav- ings;
❖ Contracts are becoming denser, as agreements become more sophisticated in terms of measure- ment procedures, financial management of the transferred assets, and re-insourcing clauses;
❖ Managing the transition involves the shifting of more complex interfaces between supplier and the outsourcing company;
❖ Managing the relationship under more detailed ‘service-level agreements’ (SLAs) entails more complex operations in terms of control and per- formance reporting.
Thus, processes to select vendors, negotiate contracts and implement the actual transfer of operations to the external provider have become more protracted and costly to implement.
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Exhibit 1: Outsourcing Logistics at IBM
For several years, IBM has tried to focus on more value-added activities such as services, which now account for 40 per cent of its global turnover. Since 1994, in an attempt to exploit synergies better between its different subsidiaries, especially in Europe, IBM’s corporate headquarters reduced decentralisation within the Group.
IBM considers that while logistics is not a core business, it is nevertheless a key success factor in PC sales. Although logistics do not enter into the conception of a computer’s architecture, its microprocessor or its software, IBM’s clients are particularly demanding so far as delivery is concerned. The company has trans- formed the way it distributes products throughout Europe, the Middle East and Africa. The overall objec- tives of IBM’s outsourcing policy are to reduce costs and inventory while maintaining high service levels for finished goods and critical spare parts. Several outsourcing providers were chosen to cover Europe. In October 1998, IBM signed a 5-year, 1 billion French Francs (150 millions Euro) logistics outsourcing contract with Geodis for Italy, France and Germany, and one year later, for Spain and Portugal as well. The geo- graphic scope of these three European markets would have entailed heavy investments for IBM had it not signed logistics outsourcing contracts.
What IBM outsourced to Geodis ❖ Inbound logistics (from suppliers to factories) ❖ Flows between factories (5 factories: 2 in France, 2 in Italy, 1 in Germany) ❖ Flows from factories to distributors (approximately 500 distributors in the relevant countries) ❖ Flows of spare parts for maintenance
What IBM did not outsource to Geodis ❖ Transportation purchasing: due to its relative size, IBM believes it can negotiate better terms than Geodis ❖ IT systems: IT systems were rationalised in 1997, and centralised in a data centre in Germany. The
transfer to several external providers with different systems was seen as a disadvantage.
120,000 m2 of warehousing and 750 persons from IBM were transferred to Geodis. The relationship has also evolved, with new contracts covering a larger geographical area and including service provisions linked to reverse logistics.
Sources: IBM Press release; Geodis Press release; Usine Nouvelle, 7 January 1999, #2669
Although outsourcing has become a widely accepted business practice, it is not developing as quickly as its proponents would like. Gartner-Dataquest ana- lysts report a moderate growth, +2.8 per cent, in the outsourcing of IT services in 2002, compared to 2001. They warn that: ‘IT services companies need to pre- pare for a longer-term future where double-digit growth is the exception rather than the rule.’
Indeed, there is growing evidence that outsourcing involves high risks in terms of loss of competencies (Bettis et al., 1992; Doig et al., 2001) and can lead to costly failures, due to the lack of an appraisal of hid- den costs (Barthélemy, 2001). According to a recent research by Diamond Cluster International, a Chicago management consulting firm, 78 per cent of executives who outsourced an IT function have had to terminate the agreement prematurely. Their main reasons for dissatisfaction were poor service and change in the strategic direction and cost structure.
Many problems arise when the wrong objectives are sought, or when such objectives become irrelevant,
European Management Journal Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 647–661, October 2003650
due to changing market conditions or technological evolution. Hirshheim (1998) notes an emerging trend towards ‘backsourcing’, where companies take their outsourced functions back in-house at the end of the contracts’ term. However, outsourcing operations are difficult and costly to reverse. According to a recent study, in IT outsourcing, it may take an average of eight to nine months to switch to a new vendor or to reintegrate a function at the end of the initial contract (Barthélemy and Geyer, 2000).
As companies outsource more strategically though, and as outsourcing increasingly becomes a strategic tool which addresses issues of corporate change in dynamic environments (Elfring and Baven, 1994; Cross, 1995; Baden-Fuller et al., 2000), a wider mix of objectives is sought. The quest for cost savings may no longer be the optimal choice. Actually, the main challenge when outsourcing is how to manage short- term cost savings while keeping in mind long-term perspectives for competencies and reputable sup- pliers, both of which are linked intimately to quality of service.
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Exhibit 2: Examples of Outsourcing Mega-Deals at a Glance∗
Information Technology IT services remain the more mature and most important activity outsourced in large companies. In recent years, ‘mega-deals’ (global IT outsourcing contracts worth above $1 billion over 5 to 10-year periods) have been signed. According to Gartner-Dataquest, at year-end 2002, at least 14 IT outsourcing mega-deals worth a total of $28.4 billion were signed, close to twice the nine mega-deals in 2001, worth $15.1 billion in total. Recently, major corporations have signed important outsourcing deals, as shown in the following examples: Date Supplier Outsourcer Contract Total Contract Value
Duration December 2002 IBM J. P. Morgan 7 years $5 billion December 2002 EDS Bank of America 10 years $4.5 billion December 2002 IBM Deutsche Bank 10 years $2.5 billion (estd.) January 2001 EDS Sabre Holdings 10 years $ 2.2 billion June 2000 EDS Xerox 10 years $3.6 billion
Business Process Outsourcing More recently, business process outsourcing (BPO) contracts, mainly focused on human resources (HR) services management, such as payroll administration, have been signed. For example, in early 2001, Bank of America and Exult signed a 10-year, $1.1 billion HR services outsourcing contract. BAE Systems and Xchanging signed a 10-year, $1.15 billion contract for procurement operations management. Date Supplier Outsourcer Contract Total Contract Value
Duration January 2002 Exult Inc. Prudential 10 years $700 millions
Financial October 2001 Xchanging BAE 10 years $1.15 billion February 2001 Exult Inc. Bank of America 10 years $1.1 billion
Production Date Supplier Outsourcer Contract Total value of the contract
Duration January 2003 Sanmina IBM 3 years $3.6 billion September 2002 Flextronics Casio 4 years $2 billion January 2002 Celestica NEC 5 years $2.5 billion February 2001 Celestica Avaya 5 years $4 billion
Logistics Date Supplier Outsourcer Contract Total value of the contract
Duration March 2003 TNT Telecom Italia 3 years $ 139 million (estd.) June 2002 Exel Interbrew 8 years $730 millions (estd.) October 2001 Samsung UPS 5 years $500 millions May 1998 Geodis IBM 5 years $170 millions (estd.)
∗We list here only the details of outsourcing contracts as they were reported at the time of their first announcement. All values are cited in US dollars and were converted at the exchange rate observed at the time of the announcement.
The 2002 HEC Survey
Objectives
This study aims to identify the main drivers, both internal and external (such as environmental dimensions), which encourage companies to out- source business functions. It also focuses on the cri- teria used in the decision-making process and risks associated with outsourcing. While outsourcing motives and risks are generally well identified in the
European Management Journal Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 647–661, October 2003 651
literature, most contributions provide extensive lists, but fail to indicate the different contexts to which these motives and risks apply and how their impor- tance varies accordingly. Outsourcing operations are generally assessed at the business division level; the specificity of the perceptions of outsourcing at the corporate level remains to be highlighted.
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Exhibit 3: Survey Methodology
Interviews From December 2001 to March 2002, we conducted 25 semi-structured interviews with top managers with corporate responsibilities in 20 large European manufacturing groups. A large spectrum of respondents was solicited: the companies are from four different European countries: France, Germany, Italy and Belgium. The industries represented include: Oil & Gas extraction and refining, Rubber products, Concrete products, Steel and Metal processing, Chemical products, Pharmaceuticals, Glass products, Electronic equipment, Aircraft engines, Automobiles and Food products. These interviews were then completed with four service providers in the IT, Logistics and Telecommunications businesses. The interviews lasted between 1 and 3 hours, the average duration being 1 hour 30 min. The qualitative analysis of the interviews helped us to draw up a 12-page questionnaire.
Quantitative Study The 25 interviews helped to identify the main dimensions that top management perceives to drive the outsourcing decision. A 12-page questionnaire highlights the context in which the decisions were made (economic environment, competitors’ choices, suppliers’ services), the extent to which the firm has already outsourced, the positive factors and the risks perceived. To address the different facets of outsourcing, 18 activities were considered in the questionnaire. This first semester 2002 survey of European manufacturing firms aims to identify the motivations behind the decision to outsource and the risks associated with this type of business arrangement. Based on the answers of corporate managers in large manufacturing companies, representing seven Western European countries, 180 questionnaires were analysed.
The Scope of Activities Outsourced
In each European manufacturing company studied in our survey, numerous activities are affected by the outsourcing phenomenon. Of the 18 activities con- sidered in the questionnaire:
❖ At least eight activities are partially or completely outsourced by 50 per cent of companies in the sample;
❖ At least four activities are partially or completely outsourced by 80 per cent of companies in the sample;
❖ On average, companies in the sample partially (or completely) outsource seven activities.
Managers clearly indicated that, of the 18 activities or functions studied, the five below are the most affected by outsourcing (cf. Figure 1):
❖ office information technology; ❖ industrial maintenance; ❖ waste management; ❖ logistics; ❖ telecommunications.
These activities have been partially or completely outsourced in a large number of companies. Most of them are complex processes, but are considered by most industrial companies to be part of their core functions. We note that the functions which are more central to many companies’ core activities, such as finance, marketing, accounting and sales, remain the least affected by outsourcing.
The three activities most commonly cited as having
European Management Journal Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 647–661, October 2003652
the greatest outsourcing potential within the next two years (cf. Figure 2) are:
❖ office information technology; ❖ logistics; ❖ wage management.
While IT functions are already outsourced exten- sively, they still have great potential to be further outsourced. That logistics and wage management are commonly outsourced indicates a tendency by large companies to consider outsourcing more complex business processes, rather than just basic services.
A more global picture of the potential to outsource the 18 main business functions required by most manufacturing companies can be seen in a matrix with four distinct quadrants (cf. Figure 2):
❖ A first group of business functions are already out- sourced in many companies and will tend to be further outsourced in the near future: IT, logistics, payroll processes and telecommunications. The larger contracts have been signed in these areas. They are support functions for the core businesses, and great possibilities exist for sharing costs and economies of scale, not to mention a base of com- petencies which have developed over the years.
❖ A second group of business functions which are still not very widely outsourced, but which increasingly may be done in the next two years: facilities management, accountancy, and industrial maintenance. In these areas, the possibilities for sharing also exist, although they may not be as numerous as in the first group of activities.
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Figure 1 State of Outsourcing Business in the 180 Participating Firms
Figure 2 Activities with the Potential to be Out- sourced Over the Next Two Years
❖ A third group of business functions includes activities which are already outsourced quite extensively, but will not be further outsourced in the future: waste management, energy and fluids. Recently, several suppliers have developed ser- vices in these areas. Service providers find it diffi- cult to show they can obtain more economies of scale than their clients.
❖ A fourth group of functions, seldom outsourced, and for which the outsourcing potential remains weak are: marketing, finance, after-sales services, finance, recruitment, R&D, production, and indus- trial data processing. These business functions which most companies are still reluctant to out-
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source are clearly the more strategic activities that constitute sources of core competencies and/or competitive advantages.
Environmental Context of Outsourcing Decisions
Our study shows the existence of a common set of objectives considered as being important when mak- ing outsourcing decisions at the corporate level. Notably, we stress the specific importance that head- quarters attribute to the costs of investment.
Importance of the Environment and Economic Context When we first conducted our research, we considered that changes in firms’ external environments play an important role in the appraisal of outsourcing decisions. A thorough review of literature and the data gathered from our interviews enabled us to con- sider a wide array of situations. We used these to identify, in the most comprehensive way possible, the different environmental dimensions which top management considers likely to influence or deter- mine their outsourcing decision. We can highlight seven such dimensions:
❖ Speed of technological change in the core activity; ❖ Uncertainty surrounding the demand; ❖ Timing; ❖ Internal structures and the firm’s historical evol-
ution; ❖ Market maturity of the activity considered; ❖ Degree of internationalisation of the activities con-
sidered; ❖ Quality of the service provider’s proposal.
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
We then included these seven dimensions in the questionnaires. We subsequently used the results to evaluate the importance of the external factors that promote outsourcing and compared these with internal factors. Our main finding, surprisingly, is that the environment is not considered to be a truly dominant criterion in the outsourcing decision.
External factors prompting a company to outsource are, for example:
❖ frequency of technological process and product evolutions,
❖ speed of new product launches on the market, ❖ seasonal nature of the activity, ❖ cyclical character of the firm’s markets, ❖ degree and frequency of fluctuations in the work-
load, ❖ uncertainty about future markets.
These are considered by the managers questioned to be important, but non-dominant, with average scores of approximately ‘4’, on a scale of 1–7 (‘1’ being least important). As for the two external factors ‘service providers’ sales efforts’ and ‘urge to copy competi- tors’, they are not considered to affect in any signifi- cant manner the decision to outsource (these factors are deemed important for only 24.1 and 38.1 per cent of respondents, respectively).
Investment renewal, on the other hand, is considered to be an important factor by a great number of man- agers (64.2 per cent of respondents), prompting them to engage in outsourcing operations. Likewise, an activity’s capital intensiveness and the pressure of financial markets both influence the outsourcing decision (for 51.7 and 46.7 per cent of respondents, respectively).
Outsourcing Motives
A large number of publications list many motives for outsourcing. Table 1 indicates the main motives scho- lars and practitioners in this field have identified.
Table 1 Main Motives Highlighted in the Literature
Main motives identified Main references
To reduce operational costs Lacity and Hirschheim (1993b); McFarlan and Nolan (1995); Barthélemy and Geyer (2000); Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002)
To focus on core competencies Quinn and Hilmer (1994); Saunders et al. (1997); Alexander and Young (1996b); Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002)
To reduce capital invested McFarlan and Nolan (1995); Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002)
To improve measurability of costs Barthélemy and Geyer (2000) To gain access to external competencies and to improve Quinn and Hilmer (1994); McFarlan and Nolan (1995); quality Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002) To transform fixed costs into variable costs Alexander and Young (1996a) To regain control over internal departments Lacity and Hirschheim (1993a); Alexander and Young (1996a)
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Decision Criteria for Outsourcing
The questionnaire was structured in two steps:
❖ Ranking, by decreasing order, of the importance of the various decision criteria;
❖ Classification, by proximity, of the main decision criteria.
From the analysis, we found that the most important criteria when making outsourcing decisions are:
❖ The first most important criterion is to lower oper- ational costs;
❖ The second most important criterion is to focus on core activities;
❖ The third most important criterion is to gain flexi- bility.
Outsourcing is a means to lower costs. That oper- ational cost savings are a primary reason encour- aging firms to outsource highlights the perception managers have of the role which outsourcing plays in improving a firm’s operational efficiency. This cost reduction objective, can also be achieved by ration- alising and by cutting costs internally, notably by sharing resources. Our study shows that outsourcing addresses other important objectives besides that of cost savings. For instance, it can also be seen as a tool of growth for the firm’s core business activities.
To better understand how these criteria are analyti- cally connected, it is necessary to:
❖ verify that each criterion is independent when interacting with the others;
❖ distinguish the importance of the criteria by type of activity.
Factor analysis was used to identify four distinct types of decision criteria, and to separate them ana- lytically.
For Managers, Issues Concerning Core Businesses and Cost of Capital are Related The study establishes a link between a company’s focus on its core business and a decrease in its cost of capital.
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
This first factor reveals the link between strategic focus on the core business and the best possible use of the manufacturer’s capital investments.
It is not reducing the cost of capital in an isolated manner that is important. It seems this criterion can- not be dissociated from the management of core com- petencies.
Indeed, the analysis establishes a link between such preoccupations as ‘lowering the weighted average cost of capital’ and ‘improving the use of capital investments’ on the one hand, and ‘focusing on high value-added activities’ and ‘concentrating the firm’s human and capital resources on its main activities’ on the other.
Gaining Access to External Expertise is a Specific Expectation that Client Firms Have in Outsourcing Operations The second factor highlights the opportunity to use external expertise, particularly when a firm reinvests.
In fact, ‘improving performance and quality’ and ‘gaining access to service providers’ expertise’ are associated with a ‘low qualification level of personnel in certain functions’.
This implies that when reinvesting in certain activi- ties, companies perceive a gap between the perform- ance, expertise and qualifications that exists intern- ally and those available in the outsourcing marketplace.
Such an observation motivates them to outsource.
Reduction of Operational Costs Implies a Need to Monitor the Supplier’s Performance in Terms of Costs, Quality and its Capacity to Evolve over Time The third factor emphasises the issue of achieving operational cost savings while maintaining tight con- trol over the service provider’s actions. It corre- sponds to clients’ strong expectations about vendors’ productivity efforts, so that a high level of quality is maintained throughout the term of the contract.
The study shows that the frequently cited operational cost savings motive cannot be dissociated from a con- tinuous control and monitoring of the quality of ser- vices provided. Savings must be achieved at the cost of monitoring the supplier’s performance, as out- sourcing necessarily means a loss of direct control over quality, timing and service provision (see below.)
The services provided must evolve over time and the vendor must be prepared to support its clients in their globalisation efforts.
Outsourcing is a Means to Gain Flexibility From this fourth factor emerges a distinct concern linked to the flexibility outsourcing generates.
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Companies have a dual expectation from service pro- viders:
❖ they adapt to the evolutions of their clients’ mar- ket and needs;
❖ they provide and adjust means and resources to establish a fit with client expectations.
In their efforts to optimally manage business upturns and downturns, companies look to outsourcing as a means to gain the flexibility they otherwise would not have been able to achieve internally.
Who Decides and How?
In identifying external and internal factors that may encourage firms to outsource, a paradox becomes evi- dent: the perception of a corporate outsourcing pol- icy does not contradict the practice of decision-mak- ing on a case-by-case basis. Our interviews highlight the fact that most firms in the sample tend to react according to opportunities that arise. Generally, there is no predetermined plan.
The quantitative analysis enabled us to refine this judgement. Overall, almost 70 per cent of managers questioned consider the outsourcing decision to be highly centralised in their firm. Yet, while 51 per cent estimated there was a clearly defined outsourcing policy, almost 80 per cent stated the opportunities were treated on a case-by-case basis.
Insofar as outsourcing policies are concerned, invest- ment committees and financial departments guide the manufacturing companies. Although investment records are often elaborated by operational depart- ments, they are usually thoroughly examined by fin- ancial departments. When there is a need for new investments, outsourcing initiatives can be taken; in this case, the client waits for the vendor to defray the cost of new investments.
Why do Companies Outsource Certain Business Functions?
We identified several features among company-wide strategies. The assessment also varies according to the different businesses or functional levels. For the outsourcing of fluids – water – gas and facilities man- agement, the main objective is cost reduction. Out- sourcing of accountancy, payroll management and waste management is also mainly associated with the search for operational cost savings. Access to external competencies motive dominates R&D, marketing and recruitment. The objective to decrease the cost of capital is more frequently associated with the out- sourcing of fluids – water – gas and energy manage- ment.
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Four Insights can be Drawn from the Data Analysis at the Corporate Level:
❖ Corporate managers perceive an association between preoccupation about core businesses and decreasing the cost of capital. This perception is specific to corporate management.
❖ Gaining access to external expertise is a specific expectation that client firms have when they outsource.
❖ Operational cost savings must be achieved, but at the cost of a certain loss of control. ❖ Outsourcing is a distinct means to gain flexibility.
As different business activities follow a different rationale, these general objectives or decision criteria for outsourcing must be differentiated (cf. Figure 3). The objectives pursued must be compounded with a clear assessment of the risks involved so as to improve choice of the organisational arrangement which is most relevant to managing each of the dif- ferent business functions.
Outsourcing Risks
Our method used for the risk analysis is similar to that used for the decision criteria analysis.
The analysis was conducted in two steps:
❖ Ranking, by decreasing order, of the importance of the various decision criteria for outsourcing;
❖ Classification, by proximity, of the main decision criteria.
Following Aubert et al. (1998), we define outsourcing risks as negative consequences confronting the out-
Figure 3 The Main Reasons for Outsourcing — By Activity
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sourcing company following outsourcing operations. These risks are summarised in Table 2:
The most important risks that emerge from the analy- sis are:
❖ Risk of dependence on the service provider ❖ Risk linked to the service provider’s deficient
capabilities.
The first issue concerns risk of dependence on the vendor. Contractual by nature, these risks express companies’ fears of not having a safety net if and when the vendor fails to deliver the expected service in a timely manner. The risk of not being able to con- trol quality is also a major concern. These concerns clearly manifest the belief that it is difficult to change vendors or to bring the activity back in-house after the contract has terminated. In the long-term, the firm takes the risk of no longer possessing the neces- sary know-how to understand, analyse and therefore to control the evolution of a service or an activity.
The second main fear expressed involves the service provider’s capabilities, which can manifest them- selves in a ‘scarcity of financial resources’, an
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Table 2 Main Risks Identified in the Literature
Main negative outcomes Main references
Dependence on the supplier Alexander and Young (1996b); Aubert et al. (1998) Hidden costs Earl (1996); Alexander and Young (1996b); Aubert et al.
(1998); Lacity and Hirschheim (1993a); Barthélemy (2001), Loss of know-how Bettis et al. (1992); Martinsons (1993); Quinn and Hilmer
(1994); Khosrowpour et al. (1995); Alexander and Young (1996b); Earl (1996); Aubert et al. (1998); Doig et al. (2001)
Service provider’s lack of necessary capabilities Earl (1996); Aubert et al. (1998) Social risk Lacity and Hirschheim (1993b); Barthélemy and Geyer (2000)
‘absence of internationalisation’ and ‘insufficient knowledge of the client’s activities’. These issues refer to the service provider’s financial strength, its international dimension and its past experience. They determine the provider’s capacity to evolve together with the outsourcer in a dynamic business context.
As outsourcing often entails a long-term contract which cannot take into account all future contin- gencies, the service provider’s capacity to adapt its offer, both geographically (accompany its client) and technically (being at the cutting edge of technology), in a changing business context and its capacity to make necessary reinvestments are crucial. The per- ception of the risk that service providers lack these capabilities may cause top management to dismiss the outsourcing choice altogether. These perceived risks are effectively linked to the service provider’s life expectancy. For this reason, we note that in many cases, markets are oligopolistic by nature, dominated by large vendors, except perhaps in the industrial maintenance industry.
Ecological risks are generally not perceived to be a determining factor in the outsourcing decision. Like- wise, social risks, prominent in many studies, are not considered to be very important by our sample of European managers. Nonetheless, we note that French managers tend to assign greater importance to social legislation than other European managers.
All in all, the risks perceived warn managers about outsourcing while pressure to yield high perform- ance and make new investments encourages them to favour these types of business operations.
Perspectives
This study confirms that top management in Euro- pean manufacturing companies maintains a parti- cular view of outsourcing. This perception transcends the more contextual approaches that operational managers use.
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How Core Competencies and Financial Logic are Related
As can be expected, corporate headquarters devote much attention to financial management issues. The cost of investments appears more sensitive on the corporate than on the business-unit, or the functional, level. Our interviews tend to confirm the existence of a general trend — that corporate headquarters try to instil the discipline of financial markets in their busi- nesses. When a firm’s businesses and their potential and future growth are strategically analysed, when investment decisions for asset renewal or growth need to be made, the core business approach is asso- ciated with outsourcing. If an activity is not con- sidered to be core to the firm’s business, it will not be a priority in investment decisions. If, on the other hand, it is considered to be central and its future development requires heavy investments, the decision-maker will tend to draw up an outsourcing contract stipulating that the service provider covers these costs.
How to Formulate Outsourcing Policies From a Corporate Point of View
As previously stated, corporate headquarters can influence businesses in several ways, most notably by providing general guidelines, such as for outsourc- ing. Complex outsourcing contracts, fixed at the cor- porate level, entail a degree of local adaptation. For the decision to be both centralised and customised, a useful way is to draw framework contracts for top management to negotiate with the service provider. Framework contracts can help the business units to economise on transaction costs, such as those associa- ted with finding suppliers and negotiating agree- ments, and can also provide a means to achieve con- sistency and control within the firm. Figure 4 proposes a framework to formulate such policies.
Questions about outsourcing often arise when large investments are involved, either imposed by external contingencies or sought proactively by the firm. Such investments should first be considered from the viewpoint of the firm’s strategies and competencies
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
From This Study, Four Conclusions Can Be Drawn
❖ A corporate policy can be associated with the practice of a case-by-case consideration of outsourcing opportunities.
❖ The financial approach and competencies approach to decision-making for outsourcing are linked. ❖ Experience gained from previous outsourcing operations helps make this type of arrangement spread
throughout the company. ❖ Companies have strong expectations about service providers’ professionalism, references and resources
enabling them to commit over time.
Figure 4 Sketching Overall Outsourcing Policies
needs. The first step of the analysis requires that managers articulate a thorough assessment of their strategic direction and make an appraisal of relevant competencies. This often consumes much time and effort of people from different levels in the company. Too often, checklists are difficult to draw up and maintain. How to conduct this type of analysis in a precise manner is the object of a vast number of works, and is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer the interested reader to Grant (2002, ch. 5).
The second step of the analysis concerns the proper appraisal of internal capacities, acquired, maintained, developed or even discarded. Outsourcing is often the result of a firm’s recognition of its limits in terms of flexibility, control and competencies, as well as costs incurred by internal bureaucracies in a rein- vestment context. This type of analysis is especially difficult to manage, since internal departments tend to exert pressure to continue their own activity at the expense of (sometimes) more efficient external pro- viders. As Doig et al. (2001, p. 33) report: ‘managers often don’t know — sometimes because they don’t want to — how their companies really stack up against the best-in-class providers.’ We advise that any cost analysis should be based not only on current performance of internal services, but also their poten- tial for improvement. Let us be reminded, however, that outsourcing is far from being a sure means of obtaining cost savings, if this were at all possible to
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measure2. The more reluctant managers are often convinced by economies of invested capital.
The third step should clarify the state of market offer- ings, which has thus far been a major impediment to a more extensive development of strategic outsourc- ing. The complexity of outsourcers’ demands poses severe challenges for the potential service providers in the field of logistics outsourcing: ‘customers’ demands are outpacing the logistics providers’ ability to meet them.’). These issues concern mainly the service provider (see Exhibit 4).
The fourth step refers to implementation issues. Keep in mind that managers in corporate headquarters should be able both to conduct negotiations for large- scale contracts and provide guidelines for their busi- nesses. In particular, they should able to provide framework contracts to ensure a high level of consist- ency and cohesiveness in their organisations. Such framework contracts generally include: the scope of services to be delivered, suppliers to be selected, pric- ing schemes to be followed, service levels and measurement, risks and liabilities, rewards, termin- ation provisions and the consequences of termin- ation. A thorough analysis of each of these provisions is beyond the scope of this paper (see Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a, for a more complete view on this subject.) We simply underline the specificity of long- term outsourcing contracts over more constraining
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Exhibit 4: Main Recommendations for Service Providers
The service provider must:
❖ agree to make a strong commitment and should have attained a critical size; ❖ be capable of assuming the investments stipulated in the sales offer; ❖ acquire or develop strong competencies in contract management; ❖ be able to make the offer evolve over time; ❖ guarantee that it can support its main clients in their future initiatives. The service provider must also be equipped with performance measurement tools to ensure cost and knowledge transparency over time. It is important for the service provider to capitalise on experiences shared with clients, for by taking advantage of these shared experiences the vendor can help its clients learn. This implies the vendor must thoroughly understand the industrial processes of its main clients so that it can fully exploit all opportunities for service and productivity improvements. To sell their services, competencies and experience, we recommend that, as suppliers identify new investment projects, they concentrate their sales efforts at both the operational and top management levels. This is because some business units are concerned about their efficiency and performance, and at the same time, the final decision to outsource seems to be rather centralised, meaning that they are made by top management.
subcontracting contracts. Outsourcing contracts are more open to the vendor’s initiatives, risks are shared in a more balanced way, trust and long-term commit- ment are developed with the vendor call for a differ- ent approach to implementing rewards and penalties, and termination clauses must be seen from the onset of negotiations due to the complexity of the oper- ations involved.
Finally, corporate managers are encouraged to adopt a portfolio approach to their outsourcing operations, balancing riskier investments with the lower risk, lower profitability ones. This portfolio approach should serve as a tool for categorising investments, helping top management to define clear priorities and control present and future investments, taking into account the company as a whole.
In our study, we identified the renewal of large-scale industrial investments as a very significant driver in outsourcing decisions. We highlighted the specificity of outsourcing at the corporate level. These managers attribute a distinct importance to the cost of capital and concern about core competencies, the two are
European Management Journal Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 647–661, October 2003 659
inextricably linked. We also identified the main risks that management perceive to be associated with out- sourcing, particularly the risk of loss of competencies, which companies must learn to mitigate through rel- evant monitoring structures. Outsourcing is thus inseparable from the management of knowledge, especially external knowledge. The capability to reap learning benefits from outsourcing, and not just gain- ing access to knowledge, entails the capacity to train and retain a relatively low number of highly skilled key employees.
As business contexts today change rapidly, firms need increasingly to consider the long-term effects of outsourcing. The question of performance through outsourcing remains an open one (Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Leiblein et al., 2002). Indeed, a clear view of the objectives and risks involved are pre- requisites to constructing adequate performance measurements. In increasingly competitive environ- ments that exert pressure on firms to create value if managed strategically, outsourcing can be a choice that helps them gain a competitive advantage and ensure their future growth.
STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Appendix
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STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Notes
1. In this article, we will limit the study of organisational forms in outsourcing to vertical relational contracts. While there may be other forms of vertical disintegration, alliances are not considered here, nor are other more arm’s length agreements, such as purchasing services on the basis of short-term spot contracts.
2. The more reluctant managers, though, are often convinced by economies in invested capital.
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- Bringing Together Strategic Outsourcing and Corporate Strategy:
- What is Strategic Outsourcing?
- Outsourcing Features: A General Overview
- New Millennium Trends in Outsourcing
- The 2002 HEC Survey
- Objectives
- The Scope of Activities Outsourced
- Environmental Context of Outsourcing Decisions
- Importance of the Environment and Economic Context
- Outsourcing Motives
- Decision Criteria for Outsourcing
- For Managers, Issues Concerning Core Businesses and Cost of Capital are Related
- Gaining Access to External Expertise is a Specific Expectation that Client Firms Have in Outsourcing Operations
- Reduction of Operational Costs Implies a Need to Monitor the Supplier™s Performance in Terms of Costs, Quality and its Capacity to Evolve over Time
- Outsourcing is a Means to Gain Flexibility
- Who Decides and How?
- Why do Companies Outsource Certain Business Functions?
- Outsourcing Risks
- Perspectives
- How Core Competencies and Financial Logic are Related
- How to Formulate Outsourcing Policies From a Corporate Point of View
- Appendix
- References