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### **MEND, NEVER END, THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE**

The U.S. Selective Service System has been dead now for more than a quarter of a century. Despite a rocky start, the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) that replaced the draft now provides America with the highest-quality military in its history and the finest armed services in the world today. Yet, recruiting and retention problems have long been apparent, and 1999 proved to be the Pentagon's toughest recruiting year since the early 1980s. As a result, Washington is hearing increasing calls for a return to conscription. But the draft was bad policy during the Cold War and would be especially foolish today. Renewed conscription would simultaneously reduce the quality of new servicemen and increase the cost of the military. Nor would a draft ease the problem of retaining skilled personnel or inculcate civic virtue among American youth as a whole. Perhaps conscription's greatest negative would be its injustice, since it compromises the very constitutional liberties that the U.S. military exists to defend.

Throughout the first ninety years of its existence, the federal government relied on volunteers to man its professional force of regulars. Militia duty was compulsory in most states, but the requirements were limited and faded over time. National conscription was first imposed during the Civil War and promptly met with substantial resistance in both the Confederacy and the Union. An even more comprehensive draft arose during World War I. But in both cases conscription disappeared with the end of hostilities. In 1940, with war raging in Europe and an aggressive Japan active in East Asia, Congress adopted the first peacetime draft, and conscription persisted--save for a fifteen-month hiatus in 1947 and 1948--until 1973. So accepted did it become in a world dominated by the Cold War that in 1967 a congressional advisory group, the so-called Clark Commission, rudely dismissed the idea of a volunteer military for "placing [the nation's] faith in its own citizenry to rally to its defense when the national security is threatened."(n1)

What killed the draft was the widespread resistance to the Vietnam War and recognition of how unfair the system was, falling as it did disproportionately on the poor and ethnic minorities. In 1973 President Richard Nixon finally ended conscription, hoping to dampen protests against the Vietnam War. But low pay, post-Vietnam demoralization, and the poor social status of military service made the transition difficult and quickly inspired support for a return to compulsion. Only under the Reagan administration, when better pay and benefits and a renewed respect for military service made it an attractive career again, could the AVF be deemed a success.

#### **The Chorus Only Grows**

By the end of the century, however, the chorus chanting on behalf of conscription has grown in numbers and volume. Among its members are pundits such as George Wilson, a former Washington Post military correspondent, who insisted that "the time has come to enact a fair, limited and selective draft to fill the billets that a reasonable amount of recruiting cannot fill."(n2) Lawmakers such as Representative Stephen E. Buyer (R-Ind.), chairman of the House National Security Committee's Military Personnel Subcommittee, have suggested that "there are benefits to a draft."(n3)

That Washington is even discussing this issue is bizarre. Advocates have typically based their case on the requirements of national survival in an emergency. In 1985 Georgetown professor Philip Gold contended: "Conscription is only necessary if it is to be the American purpose to offer this planet alternatives to either Armageddon or a communist New Dark Age. Nothing else, nothing less, can justify its return."(n4) Although he

proved to be more than a little hysterical, Gold's belief that America faced just such a choice presented the best case for a draft--that the survival of America and the world depended on it.

It turned out that conscription was not needed then, and it certainly is not needed now. The nation is at peace, and no major war threatens. The United States stands astride the globe as a colossus, its enemies are pathetic and its allies secure. As General Colin Powell famously observed, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung [of North Korea]."(n5) Together with its friends and allies, America accounts for roughly 80 percent of global military spending, and spends as much on defense as the next seven powers combined. Allied states such as France are abandoning conscription, and Gold, now president of Aretea, a Seattle-based think tank, calls conscription "the absolutely positively worst idea," one which "would generate nothing but massive disruption, expense, inefficiency and inequity."(n6)

Nor can one conceive of the circumstances in which a draft would be needed in the future. Although the Clinton administration initiated war with Yugoslavia and predictions of future conflicts abound, none involves a clash of massive armies on the scale of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact conflict during the Cold War.

Still, the advocates of conscription have their reasons--above all, the AVF's problems with recruiting. The propensity of 16-to-21-year-old men to enlist in the military dropped from 34 percent in 1991 to 27 percent in 1997. The army and navy fell short of their recruiting goals in 1998 and last year every service aside from the Marine Corps had a difficult time. At the same time, the services are losing skilled veterans of all sorts. For instance, the air force retains just half the pilots it needs and estimates a potential shortage of two thousand pilots by 2002. The navy figures that it has a worldwide shortage of 18,000 sailors. Its ships sail on average with only 90 percent of their official complement, and the ratings of most ships have fallen to the second-highest level of readiness (C-2). Manpower shortages and readiness problems are also evident in a number of army divisions.(n7)

Secondly, critics of the AVF lament the expense of recruiting new soldiers. Already the military spends \$7,187 per new recruit, up from \$5,460 (adjusted for inflation) a decade ago. The army's cost runs \$11,187 per recruit, yet its shortfalls only add pressure to increase bonuses and compensation even more. George Wilson wonders, "How much is too much for recruiting an all-volunteer force?"(n8)

Thirdly, the alleged unrepresentativeness of the volunteer force rankles some critics. Journalist Jacob Weisberg complains, "Instead of a draft, which distributes risk fairly, we have a volunteer force that hires mainly minorities and working-class whites to bear the burden on behalf of those with brighter prospects."(n9) In short, the U.S. military appears as a mercenary force hardly befitting the ideals of a great republic.

Finally, and particularly galling to some critics, is the failure of many political leaders to serve in the military. President Clinton symbolizes the problem, but he is far from alone. The proportion of members of Congress who served in the military has dropped from more than 75 percent in 1971 to less than 34 percent in 1999. The Army Times editorialized that a new draft "would ensure that future generations of political leaders would enter office understanding the military, its strengths and weaknesses, and its culture."(n10)

## **No "There" There**

This lengthy bill of particulars against voluntarism may appear impressive, but in truth there is really no "there" there. Most of the criticisms have been batted around since the founding of the AVF and are no more persuasive today than they were twenty-five years ago. In fact, the military's problem is not a lack of recruits, but a shortage of high-quality recruits, and the reason for that is that the AVF is choosier than selective service. The commanding general of the army, Major General Evan Gaddis, reports that of roughly nine million males between the ages of 17 and 21, "only 14 percent are the high quality, fully qualified and available prospects all

military services want to recruit."(n11) The Pentagon could solve its recruiting problems tomorrow if it simply lowered its standards to those of a conscript military.

It goes without saying that it is preferable to attract brighter recruits: those with more education perform better and are more likely to finish their tours. But the Pentagon's specific goals are still arbitrary. In 1997 the army reduced its objective for high school graduates from 95 percent to 90 percent. Lieutenant General Frederick Vollrath, the army's deputy chief of staff for personnel, acknowledged that the former standard "was not based on any absolute analytical requirement in order to sustain the force."(n12) According to Vollrath, the recruiting command had set the higher goal because it thought it was achievable.

As a result, despite the problems now besetting the AVF, it remains a far higher quality force than during the draft era. The percentage of "high-quality" enlistees, that is, those who hold high school diplomas and score above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), jumped 50 percent between 1973 and 1997. (n13)

### **A Positive Dynamic**

The AVF attracts superior personnel for two important reasons. First, the services can choose not to accept high school dropouts and so-called Category IVs and Vs--people who score well below average on the AFQT. As the Pentagon puts it, "Non-graduates and persons with lower aptitude scores would be more vulnerable to Uncle Sam's draft call than they would be to today's invitation to enlist."(n14) For this reason, few leaders in the armed services would like to return to conscription. As Gordon Sullivan, former army chief of staff and current president of the Association of the United States Army, has stated: "Military commanders prefer high-quality volunteers to mixed-quality draftees."(n15)

Moreover, the AVF by definition draws in people who want to be there, which creates a dramatically more positive dynamic. It is free to discharge soldiers who abuse drugs, perform poorly, or otherwise are ill suited to service life. Draftees, by contrast, must be retained at almost all costs lest indiscipline become a means of escape.

Career retention has long been a Pentagon concern. However, conscription would actually exacerbate that problem. A draft brings in untrained, resentful first-termers who reenlist in far lower numbers than do volunteers. Before the advent of the AVF, only 10 percent of first-termers stayed on, compared to about 50 percent today. Moreover, with a draft, the increased difficulties in working with recalcitrant soldiers mean that even experienced noncommissioned officers are less likely to re-up.(n16) Thus, a return to conscription would undoubtedly result in a military that lacks experience, stability, and efficiency.

Nor is coercion cheaper than voluntarism, despite some savings in recruiting costs. First, even radical pay cuts would save little since first-termers earn the lowest pay in the military anyway. Secondly, the obvious unfairness of dramatically reducing benefits for the unfortunate conscripts would generate increased expenses elsewhere. For example, because of conscripts' shorter terms and lower reenlistment rates, total costs would rise if the Pentagon were forced both to train larger numbers of soldiers and offer more generous reenlistment pay and bonuses in order to build and maintain a career force. To that must be added the costs of draft classification, induction, and enforcement. Nor is this mere speculation. In 1982, the Reagan administration's Military Manpower Task Force concluded that a return to the draft would actually hike budget costs by about \$1 billion annually: "The anticipated cost savings," stated the task force, "would probably be illusory."(n17) Similar estimates from other studies during the mid-1980s ran from \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion. Finally, conscription would make the military less efficient, since the services would make less effort to utilize their manpower. Before becoming secretary of the navy, Richard Danzig observed, "When it receives people at no cost, the military, like most institutions when this happens, tends to treat them as if they were virtually of no worth."(n18)

A draft would also generate significant social costs. The Vietnam era demonstrated that the price of the inevitable avoidance activities and economic dislocations can be substantial. Conscription inspired a plethora of avoidance schemes, including early marriages, unnecessary schooling, inefficient employment, and political violence.

Nor would conscription deliver a more representative force. In fact, the notion that the military is dominated by dumb minorities and lower-class whites is a scurrilous myth. In broad sweep, the AVF has slightly more African-Americans, high school graduates, above-average students, and members of the middle class, and slightly fewer college graduates, Hispanics, and members of the lower and upper classes than the general population. It is quintessentially middle American. Virtually all members of the armed forces, active and selected reserves, have a high school diploma or its equivalent, compared to just 79 percent of the comparable youth population. The vast majority of new recruits fall in the top three AFQT categories, compared to 69 percent of their civilian counterparts. On average, new soldiers read at a higher level than civilian youths of the same age. Almost all officers have at least a bachelor's degree. Fewer enlistees have college degrees than their civilian counterparts, but roughly similar numbers are college capable. Young recruits join the military when others their age are attending a university. Surveys have found servicemen to have higher educational aspirations than comparable civilians, and many enlist precisely to obtain the tuition aid offered by the Defense Department. The SAT scores of new enlistees also suggest that they are capable of attending a representative sample of colleges.

As for socioeconomic status, even during the AVF's early years it was incontestable, reported Sue Berryman of Columbia University, that enlistees "do not come from the more marginal groups on any of four dimensions: family socioeconomic status, measured verbal and quantitative abilities, educational achievement, and work orientation." (n19) Years later the Pentagon made much the same point: "While the socioeconomic status of recruits is slightly lower than the general population, today's recruits have higher levels of education, measured aptitudes, and reading skills than their civilian counterparts." (n20)

### **The "G.I. Generation" Was Unique**

As for the critics' accurate observation that fewer American political leaders today have served in the military, that largely reflects the passing of the World War II and Cold War generation, from which a very high percentage of young men were drawn into the military between 1941 and 1973. That generation was unique in American history, the only comparable one being that of the Civil War era. During most of the nation's history the military was rightfully small, and the number of national leaders who had served in it were few. No ill effects were obvious at the time: no Praetorian elite grew up among the military, nor did civilian leaders wantonly squander soldiers' lives.

Despite the endless, and endlessly ferocious, arguments over representativeness, the most important point may be how little conscription would affect the composition of today's force. New enlisted accessions fell from 405,650 in fiscal 1973 to less than half that today, or about 14 percent of the total force of 1.4 million. Since few draftees reenlist, conscription would primarily change the composition of this small, transient pool of new recruits. And even there the difference would be minimal. More than 3.8 million men and women turn 18 every year (that number will soon exceed four million). Assume a draft of men only: just 10 percent would end up in uniform, a far lower portion than in years past.

Such a small, selective sample would include only a few more college graduates and sons of the elite (along with the less qualified men whom the military currently rejects) than the current group of new enlistees. And if volunteers were still accepted--not to do so would be inane--the number of draftees could be as low as ten or twenty thousand annually. The overall change in the representativeness of the military would be virtually nil.

### **More Unconvincing Arguments**

Still, some argue that a conscript force would be a more effective constraint on foreign policy adventurism. During the Kosovo war, a former aide to Lyndon Johnson, Joseph Califano, contended that "[t]he all-volunteer force has made it too easy for a president to order American troops and aircraft into wars and dangerous 'peacekeeping' adventures."<sup>(n21)</sup> Actually, the AVF is a powerful constraint on militarism. During the Vietnam War conscription provided the Johnson and Nixon administrations with a ready supply of manpower to pursue increasingly unpopular policies. Only after years of mounting casualties did public opposition grow sufficiently to end the draft. Had the United States relied on a volunteer military, young men could have effectively halted the war by refusing to join.

Moreover, as noted earlier, the AVF represents mainstream America. Indeed, reliance on the reserves during the Gulf War immediately spread the impact of George Bush's decision to go to war to all sectors of society, including professional classes.<sup>(n22)</sup> The public seems to accept the frequent deployments of recent years because they have, so far, generated few casualties, not because the troops involved are professionals.

In fact, the concern expressed by some of today's conscription advocates about maintaining Washington's new commitments in Bosnia and elsewhere suggests that they see the draft precisely as a means to continue unpopular and unnecessary deployments. Far from allowing political leaders to prosecute elitist wars without popular support, the AVF is starting to constrain officials who want to undertake such endeavors. Should significant casualties occur in Kosovo or elsewhere, potential recruits could reverse Washington's strategy by saying no.

The argument for a renewed draft would be more serious, albeit still unconvincing, if conscription were to be universal and justified by a genuine national security threat. But that case is impossible to make.<sup>(n23)</sup> So only two arguments appear to have any force. One is that a draft is necessary to fulfill the growing U.S. commitments to Bosnia, Haiti, Macedonia, Somalia, Kosovo, East Timor, and who knows where else in the future. Today, soldiers are understandably less than enthusiastic about serving in such conflicts. The only criterion for such "humanitarian" intervention appears to be that no serious American interests are involved. Yet, even if there were merit to what Michael Mandelbaum has derisively called "foreign policy as social work," there is no justification for forcing young Americans into uniform to undertake it. For most of American history the only argument for compulsion was that a draft was necessary to preserve the nation from an external threat. Indeed, when Congress reinstated the draft in 1940, it limited the deployment of conscripts to U.S. possessions or the Western Hemisphere. In contrast, some advocates today are pushing coercion to sustain precisely the most frivolous of America's commitments. But young Americans have no duty to patrol a new colonial empire, mend failed societies, rebuild Humpty Dumpty states, or settle ancient and far-away quarrels. What better evidence is there that such conflicts are "not worth the bones of a single American rifleman" (to paraphrase Bismarck) than the refusal of free people in a free society to enlist for such duty?

Even Washington's more serious overseas commitments are no excuse for conscription. The United States maintains 100,000 soldiers in Europe even though the Red Army has gone home and Britain, France, and Germany each spend as much as or more than Russia does on the military. Japan is the globe's second-ranking economic power and faces no serious security threats, and South Korea's gross domestic product is nearly thirty times as great as North Korea's. It is hard to argue that a U.S. military presence is required at all in these regions, let alone a presence sustained by a draft.<sup>(n24)</sup>

What we are left with is the contention that conscription promotes good citizenship, and of course it is true that Americans have important moral obligations to one another. But these duties are to other members of society, not to the state, and they are owed by everyone, not just by the young males most likely to be drafted. It is all too convenient for political leaders well beyond draft age to sit in the comfort of their congressional (or think tank, or newspaper) offices and pontificate about the duty of young people to sacrifice for everyone else.

A volunteer military, by contrast, correctly invites patriotic youth to join the military and sends the bill to old and young alike. That is the proper way for a republic dedicated to the protection of individual liberty to defend itself. Is military service nevertheless necessary to teach citizenship values? No, because values that have not been instilled during a person's first eighteen years through family, religion, community, and school are not likely to be implanted during a couple of years of forced servitude in the army. Nor should a democracy want the military to impose a particular set of values. The armed forces are a tool to defend a free society, not a mechanism to indoctrinate a free people.

Still, there is no gainsaying that the AVF suffers some problems with recruiting and retention, and such difficulties are likely to persist to some degree in the future. Pacific fleet commander Admiral Archie Clemins has said, "We're now finding out what an all-volunteer force costs when there is zero unemployment."<sup>(n25)</sup> In a world in which America rides high and faces no obvious security threats, even the most patriotic are likely to see civilian jobs as a good alternative.

### **Fixing the AVF**

What, then, should be done to help the military meet its personnel goals? Some obvious steps would include adding recruiters, increasing advertising, improving marketing, and expanding use of the Internet. Better screening and preparation of recruits might help reduce attrition, as would selected pay increases and attention to broader "quality of life" issues. The military is a tough life, especially for soldiers and their families stationed overseas.

But policymakers need to think creatively about how best to alleviate specific shortages. Increased use of civilian contractors and less stringent quality standards should be considered as means to reduce recruiting and retention pressures. Charles Moskos of Northwestern University suggests offering shorter terms of enlistment to draw in unmarried young people interested in a little adventure. In focus-group interviews, many young men objected to lengthy terms (four to five years) and the consequent "interruption of life." A downside of this proposal, though, is that short stints increase turnover, and thus recruiting and training expenses and unit disruption. Army spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Jamie Sullivan argues simply that it is not cost-effective.

Equally important, civilian society should speak well of the military and encourage military service. Indeed, just as some voters view community service, such as time spent in the volunteer fire department, as a criterion of election to office, so might they consider service in the military. A willingness to join the armed forces should not be the only or the most important factor in choosing political leaders, but voters concerned about representativeness in the armed forces could treat military service as one indication of a candidate's commitment to the larger community.

All these measures would help, but the challenge facing the military is more fundamental. A particularly contentious issue is preserving (or restoring) the military's unique culture. While the propensity of women between 16 and 21 to enlist remained unchanged between 1991 and 1994, that of young men dropped by a third.<sup>(n26)</sup> Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness, worries that "[t]here is something wrong with the changes in the culture of the military that is turning off young men, and young men are the primary market."<sup>(n27)</sup>

The extent to which the military has lost what was once part of its fundamental appeal is a matter of debate. One issue is whether the military has become more an occupation than an institution--that it essentially hires soldiers in the way a construction company hires carpenters. Recruiting appeals seem to be directed more to self-actualization than to service to one's country. Another question is whether the services promote soldiers based on managerial skills rather than combat and leadership abilities.

Although some blame the AVF for "civilianizing" the military, it is inconceivable that the sort of conscript force so beloved by those who preach the virtues of a citizenry-in-arms could have been kept isolated from larger cultural currents in the United States. Moreover, it is peace, not voluntarism, that raises questions about career advancement and the preparedness of the military for war. Indeed, it was a conscript force that was badly mauled in the early days of the Korean War.

A related concern is the transformation of the military's mission from warfighting to operations other than war: peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and so forth. Such missions temporarily degrade the fighting capacity of military units and might have a longer-term corrosive impact on the armed services as an institution. As John Hillen, a member of the National Security Study Group and a former army officer who served in the Gulf War, observes: "I have yet to run into anybody who joined because they wanted to be a peacekeeper."(n28)

Thus, policymakers should consider the essential attributes of military service that have for centuries led patriotic young people to risk their all on behalf of their fellow citizens. That requires serious review of recruiting appeals, promotion practices, training programs, service education, military missions, and much more. It might behoove the armed services to emphasize better how they are different from civilian work--"the real meaning of military service and the intangible personal growth attributes intrinsic to it," as one analyst put it,(n29) There is obviously a market for tough service, as the Marine Corps's continued recruiting success proves.

### **Abolish the Imperial Foreign Policy, Not the AVF**

Most important of all, Washington should return to a foreign policy suited to a republic, not an empire. In March 2000, the army announced that it was limiting overseas deployments of active and reserve personnel to six months. But this change is not nearly sufficient. The deployments themselves, not their duration, pose the real problem, because what is at issue is not U.S. security, but that of Washington's allies and clients. The Cold War subsumed America's traditional reluctance to get entangled in overseas conflicts (and brought with it the only peacetime draft in U.S. history not presaging an imminent "hot" war). That involvement, with plans to fight two nearly simultaneous wars, continues today. However, the end of hegemonic communism--the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, global network of Soviet surrogates, and ideologically aggressive regimes such as Maoist China has largely eliminated the threat to U.S. allies in Europe and East Asia. At the same time, America's populous and prosperous friends are quite capable of defending themselves from any conceivable threats in the near future.

Thus, Washington should be phasing out antiquated alliances and treaties and downsizing its forces accordingly. Such steps should be taken over time and in consultation with allies. But the United States should move from being meddler of first resort to balancer of last resort. The first line of defense should be provided by allied states, with a still powerful but smaller U.S. military in reserve for use against a hegemonic threat that cannot be contained by friendly nations.

Above all, the United States should drop its potpourri of New World Order commitments such as the attempts to build a nonexistent nation in Bosnia and settle a brutal civil war in Kosovo. Although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright claims that even she does not expect America to be "the world's policeman," as of March 1999 President Clinton had deployed U.S. forces more than forty-six times--almost four times more often than Bush and three times more often than Reagan. If the Europeans want to occupy the Yugoslav province of Kosovo, so be it. There is no need for the United States to take on such a neo-imperial role.

The Pentagon responds to such criticism of endless peacekeeping missions by arguing that soldiers actually appreciate them. It proudly reports that first-termers serving in Bosnia reenlist at the same level (57.6 percent) as those elsewhere in Europe (57.8 percent). It does not mention that those reenlisting in Bosnia collect a tax-exempt bonus and that mid-term soldiers in Bosnia reenlist at a noticeably lower rate, 70.2 percent compared

to 76.3 percent. The New York Times has reported that "the combat readiness, morale and effectiveness of the troops appears to plummet after six months of duty."(n30)

Potential recruits have much the same reaction. Focus-group interviews of young men indicate that among their most important qualms about joining the military is America's increasing role as international policeman. According to a study at the Defense Manpower Data Center, young people today "objected to being put in jeopardy to fight someone else's battle," and that parents, too, "generally were not supportive of this evolving role for the United States military."(n31)

Even if only a minority of soldiers, potential soldiers, and their families are unhappy with the military's role, the impact on retention and recruiting will be significant. Indeed, in a force whose members are older, more often married, and have more children than those of the conscript military, such discontent is almost certain to rise. Should future peacekeeping enterprises such as Kosovo turn bloody, public dissatisfaction will explode, and the recruiting and retention problem will turn into a crisis.

Adjusting U.S. foreign policy is the best means to reduce pressure on American armed forces. With a smaller force less frequently deployed, the Pentagon would need fewer personnel, first-termers and careerists, NCOs and officers. George Wilson admits that this is an obvious alternative to his proposal for a selective draft, but argues that "nobody is talking seriously about doing that."(n32) It is time Americans did, because it is time they remember that the purpose of their armed forces is to defend individual liberty. Conscription would be costly, especially to the military. But above all, it would destroy the very liberty it is purported to save.

(n1) Citizen Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 28, 1967, p. 18.

(n2) George Wilson, "Selective Draft Could Be Answer to the Shortfall," Navy Times, Dec. 7, 1998, p. 31.

(n3) "Lawmakers Debate Reviving the Draft," Dallas Morning News, Sept. 26, 1998.

(n4) Philip Gold, *Evasions: The American Way of Military Service* (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1985), p. 152.

(n5) "Overheard," Newsweek; Apr. 22, 1991, p. 19.

(n6) Philip Gold, "Viewpoint: Resuming Peacetime Conscription Bad Idea That Would Clog Courts," News Tribune (Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 29, 1998.

(n7) See, e.g., Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), *Population in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1996* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Dec. 1997), p. 2-1; George Wilson, "The All-Volunteer Force Is in Danger," Air Force Times, Apr. 13, 1998, p. 62; Dave Moniz, "Skilled Workers Bailing Out of Military in Doves," The State (Columbia, S.C.), Oct. 2, 1998; Steven Lee Myers, "Good Times Mean Hard Sell for the Military," New York Times, Nov. 3, 1998.

(n8) Wilson, "Selective Draft Could Be Answer."

(n9) Jacob Weisberg, "Bombs and Blockbusters," New York Times Magazine, Apr. 11, 1999, p. 18.

(n10) "Time to Reconsider Compulsory Service," Army Times, Jan. 25, 1999, p. 44.

(n11) U.S. Congress, House National Security Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Hearing on Recruiting Issues, Statement of Evan Gaddis, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 18, 1999, p. 3.

(n12) "Army Press Briefing, Army Recruiting Program," United States Army, Office of Public Affairs (transcript, Neal R. Gross, Court Reporters and Transcribers), Mar. 4, 1997, p. 25.

(n13) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 1998), p. D-14. AVF critic Thomas Ricks observes: "The result of [the services'] selectivity is that the military is now far better educated than the general population." Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997 (<http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/97jul/milisoc.htm>).

(n14) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 1997, p. 9-2.

(n15) Gordon Sullivan, "Washington Tightwads Are Creating a Hollow Military," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 22, 1998.

(n16) See, e.g., James Hosek et al., "Active Enlisted Supply: Prospects and Policy Options," in *The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. William Bowman et al. (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. 197.

(n17) Military Manpower Task Force, *A Report to the President on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President, Oct. 1982), pp. A-7, A-6.

(n18) Richard Danzig, "Dinner Speech," in *Registration and the Draft*, ed. Martin Anderson (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1982), p. 110.

(n19) Sue Berryman, *Who Serves? The Persistent Myth of the Underclass Army* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 4.

(n20) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services: FY 1997, pp. 7-1 to 7-2.

(n21) Joseph Califano, "When There's No Draft," Washington Post, Apr. 6, 1999.

(n22) See, e.g., Doug Bandow, "The Volunteer Military: Better Than a Draft," Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, no. 6, January 8, 1991, p. 9.

(n23) Some AVF critics propose universal national service, with the military but one component. Such a program would do nothing to enhance military preparedness, while creating a host of problems. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, "National Service: Utopias Revisited," Cato Institute Policy Analysis, no. 190, March 15, 1993; Doug Bandow, "Unnecessary and Un-American," Orbis, Summer 1990, pp. 371-84; Doug Bandow, "Rejoinder: A Bad Deal, A Flawed Ideal," Orbis, Summer 1990, pp. 392-97; Doug Bandow, "National Service: The Enduring Panacea," Cato Institute Policy Analysis, no. 130, Mar. 22, 1990.

(n24) See, e.g., Doug Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World* (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1996).

(n25) James Crawley, "Shortage of Sailors Erodes Navy's Readiness for Combat," San Diego Union-Tribune, Sept. 2, 1998.

(n26) More recently, the propensity of women to enlist has fallen slightly, from 14 percent in 1996 to 12 percent in 1997. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal

Year 1997, p. 2-1.

(n27) Brian Mitchell, "Is the Draft in Your Future?" Investor's Business Daily, Feb. 19, 1999.

(n28) Ibid.

(n29) Randy Shepard, "Post-Cold War Propensity Trends--A Marketing Assessment," paper presented at International Military Testing Association conference "Youth Attitudes Toward Military Service in the Post-Cold War Era," San Antonio, Tex., 1996 (Defense Manpower Data Center Report no. 97-001), p. H-12.

(n30) Chris Hedges, "Studying Bosnia's U.S. `Prisoners of Peace,'" New York Times, Mar. 30, 1997.

(n31) Anita Lancaster and Jerry Lehnus, "Declining Interest in Military Service: Qualitative Insights," paper presented at conference "Youth Attitudes Toward Military Service" (Defense Manpower Data Center Report no. 974)01), pp. A-3, A-6.

(n32) Wilson, "Selective Draft Could Be Answer."

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By Doug Bandow

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