Week#2 Research: Moral development (compare Kohlberg's and Theory Erikson)

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Original Paper

Human Development 2015;58:137–153 DOI: 10.1159/000433502

What Develops in Moral Identities?

A Critical Review

Tobias Krettenauer Steven Hertz

Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ont. , Canada

Key Words

Adolescence · Development · Identity · Morality

Abstract

According to the standard model of moral identity development, moral identities emerge during adolescence and early adulthood. Contrary to this assumption, however, moral identity research has consistently failed to demonstrate any age-related change in this developmental period. The present paper discusses implications of this non-find- ing. It is argued that researchers need to broaden the scope of inquiry and include de- velopmental aspects of the moral identity construct that have been neglected in the past. Three areas are identified where moral identity development likely occurs in ado- lescence and beyond: (1) context-dependent differentiation and integration of the self- importance of moral values, (2) growth in internal moral motivation and (3) unfolding of narratives of moral responsibility. It is suggested that any systematic investigation into these areas will reveal important developmental changes in moral identities and, thus, will confirm the developmental nature of the moral identity construct.

The moral identity construct has made some history in psychology. Since being introduced in the early 1980s by Blasi [1983, 1984], it has been subject of hundreds of research articles, dissertations and book chapters. Conferences were organized around the theme [Edelstein, Nunner-Winkler, & Noam, 1993; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009] and major review articles published [Bergman, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2005, 2011]. In the most recent edition of the Handbook of Moral Development , an entire chapter was devoted to the topic [Walker, 2014]. This rise of the moral identity con- struct coincides with the eclipse of Kohlberg’s stage model [Kohlberg, 1984]. In fact, it can be seen as a response to two major limitations Kohlberg’s theory has been re- peatedly criticized for: first, the difficulty of predicting moral action from moral judg- ment within the stage model [see Walker, 2004]; second, the exclusive focus of this model on moral cognition at the expense of other important aspects of moral func-

Tobias Krettenauer Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University 75 University Ave. W. Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5 (Canada) E-Mail tkrettenauer @ wlu.ca

www.karger.com/hde E-Mail [email protected]

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tioning, notably moral affect. The moral identity construct promised to bridge the gap that separates moral judgment from moral action by providing a more inclusive account of moral development which integrates moral cognition with emotions, moral motivation, and the self [cf. Hart, 2005]. After more than 25 years of research in this area, it seems fair to ask, ‘‘Did the construct deliver what it promised?’’

In the past 25 years, dozens of studies were conducted to investigate the relation- ship between moral identity and moral behavior. Considering only those studies that independently assess moral identity and moral behavior (and do not merely take moral behavior as a marker of moral identity), Hertz and Krettenauer [2015] were able to identify 77 experimental and correlational studies that investigated a broad range of prosocial, ethical and antisocial behaviors in relation to individuals’ moral identity. The vast majority of studies reported small to moderate effects of moral identity consistent with the notion that moral identity strengthens individuals’ read- iness to engage in prosocial action and to abstain from antisocial or harmful behavior. Moreover, moral identity was repeatedly found to counteract situational pressures and affordances for acting immorally [e.g., Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Felps, & Lim, 2009; Brebels, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Van Hiel, 2011]. Even though the moral iden- tity construct does not fare significantly better than other predictors of moral action [notably moral emotions; see Malti & Krettenauer, 2013], these findings overall sug- gest that a person’s moral identity is of considerable psychological import when it comes to explaining moral behavior.

The moral identity construct has enjoyed great popularity as a predictor of ac- tual behavior in academic fields outside developmental psychology. By contrast, the issue of moral identity development has been investigated much less. When studies reported age-graded change in adolescence or early adulthood, findings typically turned out to be non-significant (for details see next section). Thus, there is little em- pirical support for age-graded change in a developmental period that is commonly considered crucial for moral identity formation. Correspondingly, leading advocates of the construct openly concede ‘‘a paucity of developmental research’’ [Lapsley & Stey, 2014, p. 97] and lack of knowledge regarding ‘‘precursors of moral identity and developmental trajectories’’ [Hardy & Carlo, 2011, p. 214]. Evidently, the moral iden- tity construct has not taken roots in developmental psychology so far, and its initial promise to provide a vantage point from which to build an integrative theory of mor- al development is far from being fulfilled.

The present paper represents an attempt to change this situation. By discussing what features of a moral identity likely undergo systematic developmental change, we hope to stimulate further investigations into the topic of moral identity development, which ultimately will help to overcome the lack of developmental knowledge lament- ed by scholars in moral identity research. Towards this end, we first will describe what can be considered the standard model of moral identity development, which so far has received very little empirical support. The lack of empirical evidence for age- graded change in adolescents’ and young adults’ moral identities is due – at least partly – to a top-down logic of research that places strong emphasis on the moral identity construct as a predictor of moral action and largely neglects its developmen- tal features. As a consequence, common conceptualizations and measures of moral identity are not sensitive for detecting developmental changes in this construct. Whereas moral identity research has been dominated by trait-based or sociocognitive approaches, it is argued that a personological approach is most suitable for identify-

Moral Identities 139 Human Development 2015;58:137–153 DOI: 10.1159/000433502

ing areas of developmental change in moral identities. Three areas will be discussed in detail, namely context-dependent differentiation and integration of moral values, growth in internal moral motivation and the unfolding of narratives of moral respon- sibility. Changes in all three areas are likely to occur in adolescence and beyond but have been largely neglected by previous moral identity research.

Moral Identity Development: The Standard Model

Guiding Assumption

Moral identity has been defined as ‘‘the degree to which being a moral person is important to an individual’s identity’’ [Hardy & Carlo, 2011, p. 212]. In other words, if individuals feel that moral values such as being honest, compassionate, fair and generous are central for defining their personal identity, they have a strong moral identity. Following this definition, the goal of moral identity development is in the integration of self and morality such that self-concerns and moral concerns become unified. Researchers may employ different notions as to what this integration of self and morality exactly entails and may rely on various methodological approaches to assess it empirically. Still, in its most basic form, the idea of an integration of self and morality has been the guiding principle for much research on moral identity develop- ment, as the following examples covering three decades of moral identity research demonstrate.

The idea of an integration of self and morality is clearly present in Blasi’s early writings [Blasi, 1988, 1995] when he describes two aspects of moral identities: (a) the centrality of moral values for the individual’s self-understanding and (b) the level of their internalization or self-integration. Moral values can be more or less central in defining the content of a person’s identity, as well as more or less integrated in the self-system. Once integrated, they are experienced as self-ideals a person wants to achieve rather than as social expectations one is supposed to meet. In Blasi’s [1995] own words:

Values … are integrated with one’s motivational and emotional systems, are made the object of agentic processes, including responsibility; and are finally taken as a basis for the construc- tion of one’s self-concept and identity … These themes should not be seen as defining devel- opmental steps, but rather, as being dialectically interrelated throughout one’s life. (p. 234)

Colby and Damon [1992] elaborated on the notion of an integration of self and morality on the basis of a qualitative study of moral exemplars (i.e., people who dem- onstrated outstanding and sustained moral commitment over their life course). They found that moral exemplars expressed a marked unity between self and morality such that their own personal interests and desires were identical with what they perceived as morally desirable. Moral exemplars ‘‘… seamlessly integrate their moral commit- ment with their personal concerns so that the fulfillment of the one implies the fulfill- ment of the other’’ [Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 300]. This enables them to act with great certainty, spontaneity, and little doubt or hesitation when acting morally.

Taking a more rigorous empirical approach than Colby and Damon [1992], Frimer and Walker [2009] were able to further corroborate and expand the notion of an integration of self and morality. According to Frimer and Walker’s reconciliation

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model of moral identity development, human motivation entails a fundamental du- ality between agency and communion. Individuals normally work towards either achieving their own goals or advancing those of others. This duality is overcome either by prioritizing one motivational system over the other or by reconciling the two. Rec- onciliation is the integration of agency and communion such that agential desires are fulfilled through the pursuit of communal concerns. According to Frimer and Walker, reconciliation lays the foundation for sustained moral commitment that often has been considered a marker for a strong moral identity [see Hart, 2005]. Furthermore, reconciliation is the hallmark of moral maturity. As Walker [2014] puts it, ‘‘In moral maturity, agency and communion do become meaningfully integrated’’ (p. 513).

Timing

When does this integration of self and morality that constitutes a person’s mor- al identity typically occur in the course of development? According to Blasi and Glo- dis [1995] there is a shift in identity modes from Identity Observed to Management of Identity that typically occurs sometime between middle adolescence and emerging adulthood. In the Identity Observed mode, there is a split between inner feelings and thoughts that reflect one’s genuine self, on the one side, and public appearance and socially guided actions on the other. Management of Identity , by contrast, empha- sizes inner standards, beliefs, values and goals that define one’s identity: ‘‘… identity consists of managing one’s life and shaping oneself in order to approximate one’s ide- als. Commitment to these ideals, fidelity in action, and concern for self-consistency become, then, important aspects of the sense of self’’ [Blasi & Glodis, 1995, p. 424]. Commitment, fidelity and consistency are all qualities that describe essential features of a moral identity. Thus, with changes in identity modes from Identity Observed to Management of Identity , a moral identity becomes increasingly possible. According to Blasi and Glodis this transition normally occurs in the years of middle adolescence to emerging adulthood.

While expanding on his own research into the development of self-understand- ing in childhood and adolescence, distributive justice, and moral exemplars, Damon [1996] arrived at a similar conclusion. As demonstrated in research on children’s self- understanding [Damon & Hart, 1988], younger children make no reference to their moral beliefs or goals when describing themselves. This typically does not happen before adolescence. As Damon [1996] wrote:

[Children] do not think of themselves as persons who are fair or not fair … Their moral concerns do not translate into concerns about who they are. This segregation is resolved towards the end of childhood, when in fact children do begin thinking about themselves in terms of how kind, just, and responsible they are. (p. 217)

Along with this change in children’s self-understanding, Damon [1996] ob- served greater consistency between children’s beliefs and actions particularly when tempted to act selfishly or to cheat. Thus, according to Damon, early to middle ado- lescence appears to be crucial for the emergence of a moral identity. This does not preclude further development in later age periods. Colby and Damon [1993] de- scribed changes across the lifespan as a dialectical process where moral goals lead to moral actions, which in turn strengthen preexisting goals and commitments.

Moral Identities 141 Human Development 2015;58:137–153 DOI: 10.1159/000433502

Frimer and Walker [2009] refer to the reconciliation of agency and communion as an Eriksonian crisis. Resolving this crisis becomes a critical developmental cross- road that defines the range of future developmental outcomes available to the indi- vidual. Frimer and Walker state that reconciliation is ‘‘a process that begins, at earliest, in adolescence but may occur at any later point in the lifespan. Once established, we believe integrated identity remains stable’’ [Frimer & Walker, 2009, p. 1671]. Note that in more recent publications, Walker and collaborators shifted away from this focus on adolescence and investigated the integration of agency and communion from child- hood to old age [Dunlop, Walker, & Matsuba, 2013; Walker & Frimer, 2015].

The various accounts of moral identity development described above converge with regard to three major developmental assumptions. First, it is assumed that the in- tegration of self and morality that constitutes a moral identity is not available to children. In this sense, children lack a moral identity. This does not preclude that less demanding forms of morality-self integration occur in childhood [cf. Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Sanghang, & Yoon, 2010; Krettenauer, 2014; Krettenauer, Campbell, & Hertz, 2013]. Second, self and morality become increasingly integrated in adolescence or emerging adulthood, giving rise to a moral identity. Third, once this integration is achieved, it al- lows individuals to embark on different developmental pathways. Those who have inte- grated self and morality to a considerable extent, and consequently have developed a strong moral identity, will likely seek out for opportunities to put their moral commit- ments into action, which in turn may further strengthen their moral identity. By con- trast, those with weak moral identities will embark on non-moral careers, allowing them to keep their agentic desires separate from communal or other moral concerns.

Taken together, these assumptions form what could be called the standard mod- el of moral identity development. According to this view, moral identity development consists of three phases. The first phase, childhood, is void of moral identity. It is fol- lowed by the period of identity formation (adolescence to emerging adulthood). After identities are formed, individuals embark on moral identity elaboration, which is likely a multidirectional process where the moral identities of some individuals are further strengthened and others’ not.

The Empirical Challenge: Lack of Evidence for Developmental Change

According to the standard model, a moral identity is not present in childhood and emerges at some point in time between early adolescence and emerging adult- hood. If most normally developing teenagers start to integrate moral values into their self over the adolescent years (at least to some extent), a moderate association be- tween moral identity and age is to be expected for this age period. However, studies do not support this view.

Research on adolescents’ moral identity development typically is based on a list of values, both moral and non-moral, that is presented to participants (e.g., being honest, generous, responsible, caring, fair versus being athletic, energetic, organized). Respondents are asked to rate these values according to their self-importance. A sum score is derived that reflects the self-importance of moral values (sometimes in abso- lute terms, sometimes relative to non-moral values). Whereas the standard model would imply a positive correlation between moral identity and adolescents’ or young adults’ age, this score was repeatedly found to be unrelated to age in several large-scale

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cross-sectional studies as well as two longitudinal studies covering the age period of mid to late adolescence [Hardy, 2006; Hardy, Walker, Olsen, Woodbury, & Hickman, 2014; Hardy, Walker, Rackham, & Olsen, 2012; Krettenauer, 2011; Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, & Alisat, 2003].

At this point, one may question the validity of adolescents’ self-reports regarding the self-importance of moral values. However, even when the well-validated measure developed by Aquino and Reed [2002] was used, no age differences between 15- and 20-year-olds were found [Krettenauer & Casey, in press]. Similar findings were re- ported in studies with young adults [Gu, 2011; Matherne & Litchfield, 2012; McFerran, Aquino, & Duffy, 2010; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2011; Reynolds, Dang, Yam, & Leavitt, 2014]. All these studies replicated the finding from the very first study on adolescent moral identity development conducted by Arnold [1993] that did not reveal any rela- tionship between the self-rated importance of moral virtues and adolescents’ age.

Thus, moral identity as assessed by current measures typically does not evidence significant age-related increases in a developmental period that is considered crucial for moral identity formation according to the standard model. To be sure, chrono- logical age is only a proxy for development and more longitudinal data are needed to draw definite conclusions. Still, the consistent failure of past research to document any age-related change in adolescents’ and young adults’ moral identities warrants further scrutiny.

Responding to the Challenge: Bringing Development to the Forefront

Considering the lack of empirical support for developmental change in moral identities, skeptics of the moral identity construct [e.g., Nucci, 2004; Proulx & Chan- dler, 2009] may contend that this finding is not accidental but reflects a major flaw of the concept itself. Since its inception, the moral identity construct has been discussed both as a developmental dimension and as an important dimension of individual dif- ferences [Lapsley & Hill, 2009]. The lack of empirical support for age-graded change in individuals’ moral identities may indicate that this construct primarily represents a dimension of individual differences that undergoes very little change in the course of development. The available data, at this point, do not refute this conclusion. Yet, in view of the general literature on the development of morality, personality, and identity, a general lack of change appears highly implausible. Young children do not have a moral identity. Moral identities emerge in the course of development. The very notion of an identity formation is the antithesis of stability. More importantly, many individ- ual characteristics that are assumed to be highly stable over the course of development (e.g., personality traits, aggressiveness, intelligence) undergo systematic change in the way these characteristics are expressed in everyday behavior. From this perspective, developmental change in moral identities is the default scenario. Stability is a particu- lar instantiation of constancy in change [for a more elaborate discussion of this issue as it applies to the concept of moral character, see Lerner & Schmid Callina, 2014].

With regard to moral identity development, two aspects of change need to be distinguished: development of individual differences and general age-related change in features defining a person’s moral identity. Development of individual differences can be multidirectional and is not necessarily paralleled by general age-related trends. Thus, some moral identities become stronger over time and others weaker, poten-

Moral Identities 143 Human Development 2015;58:137–153 DOI: 10.1159/000433502

tially yielding no general developmental trend in the way morality is integrated into the self. Conversely, a general development trend is fully compatible with little to no change in individual differences. Whereas the development of individual differences and general age-related change are two analytically distinct aspects of development, empirically they likely co-occur and interact in the course of moral identity develop- ment. Thus, individual differences are transformed as moral identities develop from less to more mature. At the same time, a general developmental trend can lead to more or less stable individual differences as the rate of development slows down for some individuals but not for others.

Evidently, the various forms of developmental change and their interactions have been largely unexplored in moral identity research so far. As described at the beginning, researchers have been focusing mostly on moral identity as a predictor of moral behavior. In many studies, investigating age-related differences was peripheral. This focus of analysis was justified by a top-down logic in research [cf. Lapsley & Stey, 2014]. According to this logic, it is advisable to first identify the critical features of a mature adult moral identity that reliably predict moral behavior. Once this task has been accomplished, researchers are assumed to be better equipped to track the devel- opmental pathways that lead to the desired outcome [Walker, 2014]. This logic of research certainly has its merits, however, it leaves earlier and less mature forms of moral identity largely undefined. As a consequence, the developmental processes that link less developed with more mature forms of moral identity remain elusive. Identi- fying a possible endpoint of development as such is not sufficient for extrapolating a developmental history. Investigations into developmental change of important fea- tures defining a person’s moral identity, therefore, are indispensable.

Taking these various lines of argument together, it is hardly surprising that re- search to date has largely failed to empirically demonstrate the developmental nature of the moral identity construct. Common conceptualizations and measures may not be sensitive for important developmental changes in this construct. In order to iden- tify these changes, researchers need to step up efforts on conceptual as well as em- pirical grounds. They need to clarify conceptually what features of moral identities likely undergo systematic developmental change as these features are not necessarily implied in the prediction of moral action. Based on this conceptual groundwork, re- searchers need to empirically investigate developmental change in moral identities more systematically than has been done in the past.

In the second half of the present paper, we undertake a first step in this direction by identifying important areas of moral identity development that have been neglect- ed in previous research.

Areas of Developmental Change in Moral Identities

In his overview chapter, Walker [2014] distinguished three major approaches to investigating issues of moral personality, motivation, and identity: trait-based, socio- cognitive, and personological approaches. Trait-based approaches assume cross-sit- uational consistency and temporal stability in behavioral dispositions relevant for individuals’ moral conduct. Sociocognitive approaches, by contrast, stress the impor- tance of situation-specific knowledge structures and schemas that guide self-regula- tion and action. Personological approaches take up the integrative framework pro-

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vided by Dan McAdams [cf. McAdams & Pals, 2006] and argue that moral personal- ity, motivation and identity need to be studied on different layers of abstraction that are all equally important for describing the moral person. These layers address dispo- sitional traits, characteristic adaptations, and the life story.

Even though trait-based, sociocognitive and personological approaches do not explicitly address developmental change in moral identities, they largely differ with regard to their ability to accommodate this issue. For trait-based approaches, the es- sence of development is in stability. Change needs to be dealt with as an aberration. For sociocognitive approaches, development results from more fundamental process- es of schema formation and activation and, hence, is in itself not a topic of interest. Correspondingly, ‘‘all social cognitive theories share a common defect, which is the absence of a developmental account of the pathways that bring individuals to adult forms of functioning’’ [Lapsley & Hill, 2009, p. 203]. The personological approach, by contrast, is not committed to a particular personality theory that emphasizes either stability or malleability. At the same time, it provides rich observations of personality change across the lifespan [see McAdams & Olson, 2010]. A personological approach to moral identity, therefore, seems to be most promising when trying to specify im- portant areas of moral identity development that have been neglected in the past.

It is important to note, however, that the personological approach developed by McAdams relates to personality in general and does not specifically deal with the topic of moral identity. McAdams [2009] considers the life story as foundational for a person’s identity. Consequently, within this framework the identity construct seems to be restricted to individuals’ narratives about their past. In contradistinction to McAdams, however, Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, and Hallett [2003] identified not just one but two different strategies of identity construction: a narrative and an essential- ist strategy. Self-continuity and identity can be achieved through the authorship of a life story (narrative strategy), or it can be achieved by assuming immutable charac- teristics that define the core self (essentialist strategy). To the extent that a person adopts an essentialist strategy, traits become part of their identity. Finally, in many areas of identity development, researchers emphasize the importance of future-ori- ented commitments and life goals that constitute a person’s identity [cf. Schwartz, Luyckx, & Vignoles, 2011]. These commitments qualify as characteristic adaptations in McAdams’ terminology.

Thus, a moral identity is by no means limited to a person’s life story but can manifest itself on all three layers of personality description as specified by McAdams: dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and narratives. On the broadest, most abstract, and least contextualized level, moral identities are reflected by those moral traits individuals ascribe as important to themselves in general (e.g., being honest, caring, tolerant, etc.). On an intermediate level, moral identities are represented by different motivations and goal orientations individuals maintain in various areas of their life (e.g., being a caring parent and a fair-minded colleague). On the least ab- stract levels, moral identities are expressed in life stories about moral achievements and failures in people’s lives. These life stories mitigate discrepancies and inconsis- tencies among conflicting self-aspects [McAdams, 1993] and sustain a personal sense of moral agency [Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010]. In the following section, we will point out developmental changes on each level that can be reasonably expected but that have not been documented in the moral identity literature so far because commonly utilized measures of the construct are insensitive to these aspects.

Moral Identities 145 Human Development 2015;58:137–153 DOI: 10.1159/000433502

Self-Importance of Moral Values: Differentiation and Integration

It is commonly assumed that traits are highly decontextualized self-descriptions that apply to all areas of life equally. At the same time, there is clear empirical evidence that individuals make context-specific adjustments in global self-descriptions de- pending on what social role is assumed [Diehl & Hay, 2007]. Thus, general self-de- scriptions (such as being talkative, considerate, responsible) can vary depending on whether a respondent sees herself in the role of a student, friend, romantic partner, child, (co)worker, etc. [Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993]. More importantly, this context-specific differentiation of self-representations marks an important devel- opmental achievement commonly attributed to the age period of adolescence. Harter [2012] describes the construction of multiple selves as a ‘‘critical developmental task’’ (p. 76) of adolescence that is attributable to cognitive growth and an increased dif- ferentiation in social role expectations. In her own studies, she found an increased differentiation in self-descriptions across various contexts (family, friends, school) between early and middle adolescence that was accompanied by a heightened aware- ness of conflict [Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & Whitesell, 1997; Harter & Monsour, 1992]. This increased differentiation was followed by an integration of conflicting self-descriptions between middle and late adolescence owing to the development of higher-order self-representations.

Morality is not limited to a particular social context but cuts across all areas of life (e.g., family, school, friends). It can, therefore, reasonably be expected that the self-importance of moral values varies across social contexts (to some extent, at least) and that this context-dependent differentiation increases in adolescence. Even though this expectation has not been investigated in the context of moral identity develop- ment, a study of adolescents’ value differentiation using Schwartz’ typology [e.g., Schwartz et al., 2012] supports this view. In a large-scale cross-sectional study with Israeli and German adolescents, Daniel, Schiefer, Möllering, Benish-Weisman, Boehnke, and Knafo [2012] found that the value orientations of young adolescents ( M = 11.6 years) with regard to benevolence, achievement, conformity and self-direc- tion were less differentiated across the three social contexts of family, school and country than the value orientations of 16-year-olds. Thus, adolescents’ value orienta- tions became more differentiated between early and middle adolescence. In this study, value integration was not addressed.

In a cross-sectional interview study covering an age range from 14 to 65 years, Krettenauer, Murua, and Jia [2015] investigated the context dependency of individu- als’ moral identities. In this study, the self-importance of moral values was assessed separately in the context of family, work/school (depending on participants’ age), and community. It was found that cross-context differentiation increased from adoles- cence to early adulthood, peaked around the age of 25 years, and decreased thereafter. For older participants, centrality of moral values was not merely in the importance of certain moral values but in the fact that these values were consistently important across all areas of life. This may bolster individuals’ sense of moral agency as moral actions may be more strongly experienced as emanating from the self rather than from demand characteristics of a given situation. From this perspective, the integra- tion of context-specific moral values may strengthen individuals’ moral identities.

It is important to note at this point that differentiation and integration refers to a general principle of development [cf. Raeff, 2011] and, as such, is not limited to

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changes in cross-context coherence in the self-importance of moral values. As indi- viduals grow older, they may become increasingly aware that morality matters to them more in some areas of their lives than in others (fragmentation), or they may realize that moral priorities change under varying circumstances (compartmentaliza- tion). While these realizations may be at first experienced as self-contradictory and confusing, individuals may later develop strategies to integrate their contextually dif- ferentiated moral identities. They may create justifications for why morality is less important in certain areas of their lives. Or, they may identify moral traits they con- sider important amidst contextual variation. Thus, their moral identities may inte- grate stable elements along with variable elements.

Growth in Internal Moral Motivation

The self-importance of moral values reflects an important aspect of a person’s moral identity. However, it does not fully encompass the notion of an integration of self and morality that has been guiding moral identity research [see Krettenauer, 2011]. Individuals may feel that a moral value (e.g., honesty) is important to them because they want to avoid trouble and do not want to disappoint others. By contrast, others may feel that honesty is a self-ideal they do not want to betray. In the former case, self-importance of honesty is externally motivated whereas in the latter case the motivation is internal to the self.

Developmental psychology has a long history of studying different forms of in- ternal or autonomous motivation. Various models of ego and identity development proposed a general developmental trend towards higher levels of internal motivation. These models generally assume that, with development, individuals’ commitments to life goals, values and ideals are increasingly experienced as self-chosen rather than externally imposed by others [e.g., Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Loevinger, 1993; Marcia, Waterman, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993]. Even Kohlberg’s stage model of moral development suggests a decline in external motivation as adolescents move out of the preconventional stages 1 and 2 and standards of individual conscience become more salient at the conventional stages 3 and 4 [see Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007].

While these models tend to view a high level of internal motivation as an end- point of development in that, once achieved, it is maintained across a broad range of domains, self-determination theory considers it a flexible attribute that is more con- text-dependent [for an overview see Ryan & Deci, 2008]. According to self-determi- nation theory, individuals’ motivation to act can be described along a continuum defined by the poles of extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation. Extrinsically motivated actions are instrumental to achieving standards set by others whereas intrinsic moti- vation is inherent in the activity freely chosen by the individual. Intrinsic motivation is limited to activities that are inherently gratifying and pleasurable. Actions that are based on the desire to meet social expectations or cultural norms can hardly be in- trinsic in this sense. However, individuals are able to integrate these expectations to varying degrees, which leads to different levels of self-regulation along the continuum that is defined by the polarity of extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation. These levels are labelled introjected , identified and integrated motivation [Ryan, 1993]. On the intro- jected level, compliance with social expectations becomes independent of external

Moral Identities 147 Human Development 2015;58:137–153 DOI: 10.1159/000433502

contingencies. Yet, norms and rules are subjectively experienced as social expecta- tions one is supposed to follow rather than as standards one wants to meet. This trans- formation of ‘‘shoulds’’ into ‘‘wants’’ takes place once individuals develop identified and integrated motivations. On the identified level, individuals express a basic per- sonal agreement with a norm or societal expectation whereas on the integrated level norms are experienced as self-ideals one wants to achieve.

Ryan, Kuhl, and Deci [1997] propose a general organismic tendency to progres- sively rely on internal modes of motivation or self-regulation at the expense of exter- nal regulation. At the same time, actual development of internal motivation depends on environmental factors that support internal self-regulation [Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997; Grolnick & Raftery-Helmer, 2014]. The various modes of self-regulation are assumed to coexist dynamically in relation to the social environment. Internal motivation may decline over time due to the prevalence of extrinsic contingencies in a particular social context (e.g., school or workplace) but might increase in other con- texts [e.g., Renaud-Dubé, Taylor, Lekes, Koestner, & Guay, 2010]. Because of this context dependency, the various modes of self-regulation – as described by self-de- termination theory – do not represent general behavioral dispositions but reflect characteristic adaptions to a particular social context.

It is important to note that the four different forms of extrinsic motivation (ex- ternal, introjected, identified and integrated) are not stages of development [Deci & Ryan, 2014]. That is, individuals do not have to move sequentially through each form of motivation in order to achieve the most integrated form. Moreover, individuals may be motivated simultaneously by all four types of motivation, even when perform- ing the same activity. Self-determination theory assumes that an integrated motiva- tion typically does not emerge until late adolescence [Deci & Ryan, 2014]. Age-relat- ed increases in internal forms of motivation over the lifespan have been reported repeatedly with regard to personal goals [Sheldon, Houser-Marko, & Kasser, 2006; Sheldon & Kasser, 2001], but also in the context of fulfilling social role obligations [Sheldon, Kasser, Houser-Marko, Jones, & Turban, 2005].

There is very little empirical research that investigates the different forms of modes of motivation as described in self-determination theory within the context of morality. In a cross-sectional sample of 15- to 17-year-old adolescents, Hardy, Padil- la-Walker, and Carlo [2008] reported a positive correlation of r = 0.16 between age and an overall autonomy index that reflected the degree to which adolescents prefer internal modes of moral motivation (identified and integrated) relative to external modes (external and introjected). However, this positive correlation was mostly driv- en by an age-related decrease in introjected motivation and not attributable to an age-related increase in identified or integrated motivation. Similar findings were ob- tained by Krettenauer [2011] in a longitudinal study of 13- to 19-year-old adolescents. In this study, it was found that external motivation (extrinsic and introjected) de- creased over a 1-year time interval whereas internal motivation (identified and inte- grated) did not evidence any significant change. These findings may indicate that development of moral motivation is characterized by a decline of external motivation so that the relative (but not absolute) importance of internal moral motivation in- creases with age. Such a trend would be consistent with the findings reported by Shel- don et al. [2006] with regard to social role obligations.

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148 Krettenauer/Hertz

Unfolding Narratives of Moral Responsibility

Moral identities inevitably include future-oriented life plans and goals. Other- wise, moral identities could hardly function as a predictor of sustained moral com- mitments. However, moral identities are not limited to this proactive function. As Erikson [1959] noted, identities provide a sense of continuity over time as they inte- grate past experiences with future-oriented life plans and goals. This integrative func- tion of identities is particularly stressed in research on narratives [McLean & Pasu- pathi, 2012]. By narrating a life story, individuals manage to connect past, present and future; they create a sense of unity across varying social role contexts and situations. Life stories may be either ‘‘big’’ or ‘‘small’’ [Bamberg, 2007]. They may reflect auto- biographical accounts of formative life experiences generated in a self-reflective pro- cess and directed to an imaginary audience, or they may occur as interactive dialogues between conversational partners negotiating the meaning of an everyday event.

There is strong empirical evidence that life stories (‘‘big’’ and ‘‘small’’) develop in adolescence and beyond. Life stories become temporarily, causally, and themati- cally more coherent in adolescence [Habermas & Bluck, 2000; Habermas & de Sil- veira, 2008]. Whereas children have no difficulties telling stories about their lives, it is not before adolescence that these stories become imbued with an articulate sense of self. As adolescents grow older, they more frequently make explicit connections between past experiences and their current self [Habermas & Paha, 2001]. These self- event connections take different forms [see Pasupathi, Mansour, & Brubaker, 2007]; past events may provide confirming evidence for stable traits, or they may point at previously hidden personality characteristics that had been revealed by the event. Al- ternatively, events may have caused personality change by providing a learning expe- rience or by transforming one’s self-view beyond the specific event recalled. The ten- dency to gain these more general insights from past events describes an important development trend in adolescents’ small stories about hurting and helping others [Recchia, Wainryb, Bourne, & Pasupathi, 2014]. Adolescents may also dismiss the self-relevance of a past event by actively discounting it. Even then, self and event are connected by negation.

While these trends have been reported repeatedly, it is an open question as to how they jointly apply to moral identity development and the fact that people typi- cally are able to recall events that both confirm and disconfirm their identity. Proulx and Chandler [2009] demonstrated that 16- to 18-year-olds, more often than 13- to 15-year-olds, articulate a multiplist self-view when facing conflicting memories about past moral and immoral behavior. They proposed a general developmental trend to- wards increasing multiplicity and context dependency in adolescents’ self-views that makes it possible to narrate one’s good behaviors as internally motivated and one’s bad behaviors as externally provoked. Contrary to Proulx and Chandler’s account, Krettenauer and Mosleh [2013] found that adults more often than adolescents made a connection between past immoral behavior and their current self. Moreover, adults explicitly acknowledged the conflictual nature of past moral and immoral behav- iors more often than adolescents. Thus, adopting a multiplist narrative about one’s (im)moral past may be the predominate strategy in adolescence but likely does not define the endpoint of moral identity development.

Recently, Dunlop, and Walker [2013] argued that narrative forms of identity construction may be far less common than generally assumed. Therefore, scholars

Moral Identities 149 Human Development 2015;58:137–153 DOI: 10.1159/000433502

may be mistaken in claiming that the creation of a life story is essential for identity development. In light of this critique, it is important to note that, in the context of moral identity development, life stories appear to be indispensable. By telling stories about past moral achievements and failures while connecting them with their current self, individuals self-reflectively and/or discursively define the scope of their moral responsibilities [cf. Tappan, 1991, 2010]. They define which types of action, situa- tions, and life circumstances are charged with moral responsibilities and what falls outside this zone. Blasi [1983] argued that judgments of responsibility are essential to bridge the gap between moral judgment and action. From a developmental perspec- tive, it appears that responsibility is not an isolated judgment but the unfolding of ‘‘small’’ and ‘‘big’’ stories of assuming moral responsibility for certain actions and denying it for others. These developing narratives of responsibility are essential to bring dispositional moral traits and internal moral motivations to bear for moral ac- tion.

Conclusion

When discussing the lack of empirical evidence for age-graded change in adoles- cents’ and young adults’ moral identities, it was argued that scholars need to broaden the scope of inquiry and include developmental aspects of the construct that may have been previously neglected. By adopting a personological approach to moral identity, we identified three areas of developmental change in moral identities that have not been at the forefront of moral identity research so far. It was argued that moral identity development likely proceeds (1) as context-dependent differentiation and integration of the self-importance of moral values, (2) as growth in internal mor- al motivation, and (3) as the unfolding of narratives of moral responsibility. These three aspects of moral identity development represent three distinct layers of person- ality description widely used in personality research (traits, characteristic adapta- tions, narratives). We expect that any systematic investigation into one of these as- pects will reveal developmental change in moral identities, confirming the develop- mental nature of the moral identity construct. Furthermore, the three areas likely influence each other reciprocally in the course of development, and form a dynami- cally interrelated developmental system. In line with this view, Krettenauer [2011] found that the centrality of moral values positively predicted growth in internal mor- al motivation over time. Moreover, internal moral motivation was found to be associ- ated with individuals’ narratives about past moral and immoral actions [Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013]. A detailed description of how these three areas intersect in moral identity development is beyond the scope of the present paper and awaits future re- search.

It is important to note, at this point, that development in all three areas is by no means restricted to adolescence or emerging adulthood. From the perspective adopted in this paper, moral identities emerge in adolescence and mature in adult- hood. In other words, adolescence is considered the first step into developing an adult moral identity [cf. Moshman, 2005]. Moreover, we identified three areas of moral identity development where developmental change most likely occurs. This was by no means meant to imply that moral identity development is limited to these three areas.

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150 Krettenauer/Hertz

Recently, Lerner and Schmid Callina [2014] presented a relational developmen- tal systems model of moral character, arguing that moral character is not a fixed per- sonality trait (or a combination thereof) that predicts moral conduct over extended periods of time and independently of context. As noted by Mascolo [2014] in his commentary to Lerner and Schmid Callina, from a developmental systems view, mor- al character refers to particular psychological processes within a certain type of mor- al identity where an individual ‘‘identifies himself with a sociocultural system of mor- al values that have their origins outside of the self, which are thereupon internally appropriated, transformed, and made one’s own’’ (p. 351). While the present study did not explicitly employ a developmental systems view, it fully endorses the notion that moral identities (similar to moral character) are anything but static and immu- table entities but develop as individuals engage in meaningful relationships with so- cial and cultural systems.

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