EDMG509Wk8*
Rawono1
out2.pdf
Leveraging public-private partnerships to improve
community resilience in times of disaster
Geoffrey T. Stewart, Ramesh Kolluru and Mark Smith National Incident Management Systems and Advanced Technologies Institute,
University of Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana, USA
Abstract
Purpose – As noted in the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework, disasters are inherently local and ultimately the responsibility of the lowest jurisdictional level present within the impacted area. Given these parameters, this paper aims to sharpen the concept of national resilience by recommending a framework which positions community resilience as an integral variable in understanding the ability of impacted areas to effectively manage the consequences of disasters. Conceptualized as a dependent variable, community resilience is influenced by the relationships government (public) agencies develop with private sector partners and the resilience of relevant supply chains and critical infrastructures/key resources which exist in their communities.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors augment a topical literature review of academic and practitioner journals by synthesizing existing findings into a holistic framework of community resilience.
Findings – This paper argues that interdependent systems like social and economic networks will ultimately influence the ability of communities to adapt and respond to the consequences of disasters. In addressing the resilience of these systems, all levels of government must recognize and embrace the public-private interfaces that can improve their ability to manage the response and recovery phases of disaster management. While 85 percent of critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector, 100 percent of it exists within communities and impacts the ability of the nation to recover from disasters. Resilience calls upon active management and relies upon assessment and a willingness to take action in the face of adversity.
Originality/value – Resilience is discussed within economics, behavioral sciences, supply chain management and critical infrastructure protection. This paper integrates these research streams to develop a framework for shaping national resilience.
Keywords Disasters, Partnership, Supply chain management, Communities, Disaster, Community relations
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction While disasters are indelibly located within a specific impact area, the consequences and subsequent response extend well beyond the impact zone. From the highest levels of government to the individual citizen living in a vulnerable community, interest in the management of disaster consequences is at an all time high in the USA. The recent wave of mega-disasters along the Gulf Coast has captured the Nation’s attention, in particular the social and economic impacts, and has spurred discussions of national resilience within the Department of Homeland Security (Edmonson, 2008).
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0960-0035.htm
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International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management
Vol. 39 No. 5, 2009 pp. 343-364
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0960-0035
DOI 10.1108/09600030910973724
National resilience inherently challenges decision makers in private and public entities to utilize a systems approach when addressing post-disaster response and recovery. In doing so, the National Response Framework explains that incidents must be managed by the lowest jurisdictional level possible and should be augmented by other capabilities when it is appropriate (US Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The consequences of disasters, however, exploit the interconnectedness of today’s society and impact people and economies on local, regional, and national levels. Likewise, the actual work of responding and recovering from disasters is carried out by government agencies, private sector companies, non-profit organizations, and the actual impacted citizens. Acting within industry/sector silos seems to inevitably lead to reports of non-responsiveness, miscommunication, and bureaucracy.
Over the last seven years, the scientific research community has shown increased interest in disaster management and the impact of incidents on people and business practice. In the supply chain and logistics community, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 generated tremendous interest in the issues of security and risk management within supply chains (Barry, 2004; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Sheffi, 2001; Spekman and Davis, 2004). Similarly, humanitarian logistics and relief efforts emerged as research themes following the Asian tsunamis in 2004 (Balcik and Beamon, 2008; Beamon and Balcik, 2008; Beamon and Kotleba, 2006; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Perry, 2007; Thomas and Fritz, 2006; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). The momentum in logistics research was further heightened following the 2005 hurricane season (Craighead et al., 2007; Hale and Moberg, 2005). In particular, the response to Hurricane Katrina placed supply chain and critical infrastructure management prominently within a national discussion of how the US, as a Nation, should prepare for and manage the consequences of disasters.
Since the 2005 hurricane season, there has also been a tremendous amount of research on the topic of resilience. Resilience provides insight into the abilities of impacted stakeholders and systems to respond to adversity and has been addressed in national disaster planning (Arnold, 2008; Edmonson, 2008), sociology and urban planning (Campanella, 2006; Sapountzaki, 2007; Thomas, 2007), business continuity planning (Sheffi, 2005; Tompkins, 2007), and supply chain management (Supply Chain Management Review, 2006; Sheffi, 2005; Sheffi, 2006; Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Woodham, 2008). While the phenomenon is consistently conceptualized as one’s ability to recover from a disaster across these research streams, there is currently little insight into how the various forms of resilience coalesce in the aftermath of a disaster.
Stemming from the need to better understand the inherent interdependencies between public and private sector resilience is the opportunity to uncover how these two sectors should interact before, during and after a disaster. Many of the services or products that need to reach locally impacted citizens after a disaster are normally distributed within these same communities on a daily basis. Acknowledging that local distribution capabilities may be impaired post-disaster, the critical infrastructure and supply chains supporting local operations should be viewed as critical assets in the development of national resilience. The public-private interface offers opportunities for decision makers at all levels of government to build resilience by proactively coordinating and positioning the capabilities of stakeholders to collaboratively manage disaster consequences.
Public-private collaboration has traditionally been viewed as a partnership or as contractual interaction between government agencies and private sector companies.
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Across all of the aforementioned disasters, some private sector firms have responded as part of a government contract, while others responded because they have vested interests in the impact area through physical assets, suppliers, customers, and/or corporate values of social responsibility. Further, research is needed to expand the domain of PPP to include other types of interaction which may provide flexibility and enable participating firms to effectively adapt relationships to effectively address response and recovery issues that emerge in the aftermath of a disaster.
The purpose of this paper is to align existing research on resilience and PPP by recommending a framework of community resilience which integrates the inherent interdependencies amongst public and private sector organizations, critical infrastructures/key resources (CI/KR), supply chains, and local communities. As a capability, resilience emerges during the response and recovery phases of disaster management. As such, this study focuses on the aftermath of disasters and the efforts to adapt and manage pertinent consequences facing communities. The following sections will discuss the community resilience framework, managerial implications, future research and conclusions.
2. Model development and theoretical justification As previously mentioned, resilience has been studied in multiple research streams. Figure 1 presents a framework of community resilience that incorporates supply chain, CI/KR, economic and social resilience. While this framework integrates the most widely discussed resilience phenomena, there may be other types of resilience that exist and that can be included in future studies. Additionally, this study introduces public-private relationships as facilitators of resilience during post-disaster response and recovery. Each of these areas will be discussed in upcoming sections.
2.1 Public-private relationships
If [the] American government would have responded like Wal-Mart has responded (during Hurricane Katrina), we wouldn’t be in this crisis. Sheriff Harry Lee, Jefferson Parish (Broussard, 2005).
In the midst of disasters, the response of private sector companies mimics each firm’s interest in the event. In the case of Wal-Mart and many other retailers following Katrina, there were socially responsible motives to help humanity as well as motives to continue delivering value to their existing customers who were impacted (Horwitz, 2008; King, 2008). As the Nation experiences more disasters, it is becoming apparent that private sector companies can respond both efficiently and effectively to the needs
Figure 1. Theoretical framework of
community resilience
Public-private relationships
Community resilience
• Economic • SocialCritical infrastructure/
key resource (CI/KR) resilience
Supply chain resilience
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of impacted areas and receiving communities. However, current research in the domain of private-public partnerships does not adequately address the diversity of interaction that is needed to facilitate higher levels of resilience in the wake of a disaster.
The involvement of PPP across all level of government have been widely documented and is often seen in the areas of urban development, transportation, water/wastewater, utilities, schools, and financial management (Wettenhall, 2003). As defined by the National Council for Public-Private Partnerships (NCPPP), a public-private partnership is defined as [. . .]:
[. . .] a contractual agreement between a public agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility (NCPPP, 2008).
Given the contractual nature of these interactions, it is clear that public agencies are seeking to protect the public’s interest by obtaining a certain level of risk sharing, accountability and transparency (Bloomfield, 2006). While these agreements are effective in spelling out the expectations for a certain project, contracts do not guarantee performance, much less effective performance during disasters. For example, the execution of contracts for services like evacuation often calls upon contractors to quickly mobilize large numbers of vehicles. During the 2008 hurricane season, contracts were reported to have failed due to inability of contracted partner to deliver the vehicles needed by the client (Barrow, 2008; Barrow and Scott, 2008).
Additionally, the time sensitive nature of decision-making in the aftermath of a disaster appears to bring public and private sectors together in informal settings (not scheduled/planned interaction). One key factor that must be considered in stressful times is the role of trust in private-public interaction. While there is evidence that trust can lead participants to develop more informal relationships, this evidence stems from interactions between parties that had previous interactions and were not operating under time sensitive constraints like disaster response (Gazley, 2008). Given these findings, public-private interactions which involved low levels of trust would appear to migrate towards more formal or contractual interaction. This limitation of public-private interaction can be reduced by developing guidelines of appropriate interaction and by providing the proper oversight to ensure that transparency and accountability are preserved. For example, the evacuation of a region is continuously monitored by government and statistics are often disseminated from local to state to federal governments. While this information gives a clear picture of the number of evacuees, it also represents a “demand forecast” for companies like restaurants, hotels, and grocery stores operating in receiving communities. The sharing of this type of information with private sector firms should facilitate the growth of trust and influence the capabilities of public and private entities to respond more effectively.
Another factor in the growing importance of public-private relationships is the shrinking time frame in which the media and general public feel government should respond. While emergency managers encourage residents to be self-sustainable for 72 h, the magnitude of recent hurricanes has often overwhelmed personal supplies and self-reliance. Timely response thus requires collaboration between public and private entities at the local, state, and federal level. Cannon and Perreault (1999) identified several key connectors that influence the manner in which parties develop relationships.
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Summarized in Table I, these connectors include information exchange, operational linkages, legal bonds, cooperative norms, and relationship specific adaptations by the buyer or seller. These connectors describe activities which can be deployed to facilitate exchange between public and private entities (Cannon and Perreault, 1999). It is important to note that the situational context and needs of both parties may call for the use of one or a combination of multiple connectors. Disaster management examples of each connector are also provided in Table I.
Introducing varying levels of interaction within public-private relationships creates an opportunity for government and the private sector to collaboratively address disaster recovery issues. While legal bonds are appropriate in certain situations, the complexity of responding to large disasters is currently challenging government and private firms to develop innovative response strategies. As noted by Johnson et al. (2002), relationships are often the basis of exchange between buyers and sellers. As such, legal bonds may articulate parameters for certain types of exchange, but informal social contracts may have greater influence on the long-term quality of the relationship (Frankel et al., 1996; Johnson et al., 2002). In the case of public-private relationships, relational contracts could augment the public’s sectors need for risk sharing, accountability and transparency by establishing trust, mutual interest and a willingness to do what is required in a given situation (Bloomfield, 2006; Wettenhall, 2003). The presence of relational contracts was noticeable during the 2005 hurricane season when companies, like Acadian Ambulance, went beyond the domain of their existing contracts and provided services for the betterment of humanity without waiting for someone to renegotiate the service terms (Sauer, 2005). Through the emergence of relational contracts within public-private relationships, there is an opportunity to go beyond the legal bonds and to confidently interact in ways that can influence supply chain and CI/KR resilience.
It is through formal and informal interaction that public-private relationships can make a difference in managing post-disaster consequences. As shown in business-to-business and business-to-consumer settings, relationship quality facilitates the willingness of exchange partners to continue doing business together. Additionally, the relationship quality model (Crosby et al., 1990) provides a theoretical foundation for linking public-private relationships to organizational outcomes. In this particular case, a firm’s ability to adapt and manage disaster consequences could be facilitated by collaboration with local, state, and federal government agencies. The same may apply when evaluating the ability of government agencies to respond. Relationship quality focuses on the exchange partners’ evaluation of the relationship and is predominantly influenced by non-legally binding aspects of relationships like trust, commitment, reciprocity norms, and exchange efficiency (Macintosh, 2007; Palmatier, 2008; Wang et al., 2006; Wolfgang and Andreas, 2006).
2.2 Background on resilience Resilience is a concept that has been investigated in multiple disciplines and has congruence around specific characteristics. In material sciences, resilience characterizes the ability of a material to return to its original state after an alteration or deformation (Sheffi, 2006). The adaptive characteristic of resilience is also found in behavioral sciences and is described by Sapountzaki (2007, p. 277) as a “dynamic process indicating the adaptive functioning of individuals at risk.” As such,
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the construct involves the ability to adapt to adversity (Sapountzaki, 2007; Schoon, 2006).
Emerging from material and behavioral science, business research has described resilience as the ability of companies to return to pre-disaster levels of performance (Sheffi, 2006). Additionally, the domain is beginning to expand to include the active management of consequences while in the midst of adversity. In order to manage consequences, enterprises must have:
. robustness or the capability to continue operations during an incident;
. resourcefulness or the capability to manage the complexity of anticipated incidents;
. responsive infrastructures that facilitate efficiency in recovery; and
. organizational learning processes to evaluate the lessons from incidents and recommend corrective actions (Arnold, 2008).
Resilience, as defined by Norris et al. (2008b, p. 130) and used in this study, is “a process linking a set of adaptive capabilities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance”. Given the destructive nature of some hazards, the definition provides a broad scope of recovery and does not incorporate the return to pre-hazard performance. This broad contextual domain of resilience is important because there may be times when returning to pre-hazard levels of performance is not in the best interests of stakeholders (Sapountzaki, 2007). For example, repopulating a community that does not have access to electricity, sewer, and water may demonstrate ability to bounce back, but may ultimately create additional negative consequences for the residents.
Furthermore, resilience exists in a natural environment which is inherently interdependent and requires coordination across organizational boundaries. For example, the resilience of private sector retailers in restoring operations could be greatly influenced by the responsiveness of a county Sheriff in allowing assessment teams, trucks, and employees to re-enter in a timely manner. As a capability, resilience is not embedded solely within single organizations, but collectively within a network of organizations that can collaboratively manage the consequences of disasters and produce outcomes which sustain life and revitalize communities. In the next three sections, resilience will be addressed in the contexts of CI/KR, supply chains, and communities.
2.3 Critical infrastructure/key resource resilience The national strategy for homeland security defines and explains the importance of CI/KR as such:
Critical infrastructure includes the assets, systems, and networks, [. . .] so vital to the US that their destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof. Key resources are publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government (p. 25).
CI/KR cuts across physical, cyber, and human elements and is identified in the following sectors (not all 17 sectors are presented): transportation systems, telecommunications, water, agriculture and food, health care, financial systems, and information technology (HSC, 2007). These systems represent an interconnected
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backbone for the Nation’s security, economy, and quality of life. As such, the complexity of each system is magnified when its connections to other systems is compromised during an incident (Brown et al., 2006). Recognizing the importance of CI/KR, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the National infrastructure protection plan (p. 1) which seeks to “build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the Nation’s CI/KR [. . .] and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery.”
Resilience with regards to CI/KR emerges once an incident occurs and action is required. CI/KR resilience incorporates the actual infrastructure and the owner/operator capabilities needed to create a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance has occurred. Resilience is a capability that, while embedded within systems, emerges when operators recognize the need to adapt and manage consequences of specific events. For example, as part of a system of healthcare organizations, hospitals are autonomous organizations than can reorient their focus to accommodate the needs of the larger healthcare system (Rodrı́guez and Aguirre, 2006).
Roughly 85 percent of the CI/KR that needs to be protected in the United States is owned and operated by the private sector (Coullahan and Shepherd, 2008; Peck, 2005; US Department of Homeland Security, 2006). Owner/operators should have intricate knowledge of their assets position(s) within complex, interdependent infrastructure systems and possess an understanding of risks (all-hazards), vulnerabilities, and potential consequences. As such, government programs intended for hazard mitigation planning and critical infrastructure protection (CIP) require collaborative engagement with private sector operators in order to be effective in accomplishing their intended goals. Specific strategies for building CI/KR resilience with the private sector are currently being discussed in public policy research (Boin and McConnell, 2007):
P1. Stronger public-private relationships will positively influence the capability of participating CI/KR operators to manage disaster consequences that impact their ability to provide value to relevant stakeholders located within and outside the impact area.
2.4 Supply chain resilience In the wake of disasters, private and public sector supply chains are indiscriminately impacted. The notion of resilience in supply chains addresses the capability of supply chain operators to manage the consequences, which impact their ability to exchange value with supply chain partners located within and outside the impact area. It is important to note that while there are multitudes of supply chains operating in vulnerable regions across the country, the occurrence of a disaster will inherently tax the capabilities of these supply chains to restore operations and deliver value to stakeholders within the impacted area.
Supply chain resilience is an important component of the community resilience framework because it begins to highlight the interdependent nature of responding to and recovering from disasters. Supply chains exist in both private and public sectors and often involve collaboration across sectors. As such, managers can create supply chain resilience by quickly assessing areas of anticipated vulnerability, identifying actual supply disruptions, and developing strategies which address the actual situation.
In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, managers begin collecting evidence from the field and begin the process of developing situational awareness. Realizing that no two
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disasters are exactly alike, it is important for managers to objectively assess potential areas of vulnerability when responding to the event. As pointed out by Peck (2005), there are both known and unknown risks that managers face when operating within supply chains. The social and natural environments represent a level of risk that is often beyond the direct control of supply chain operators (Peck, 2005). Table II presents various types of supply chain risks, relevant drivers, and select examples of how these risks materialized in recent hurricanes (Aichlmayr, 2001; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Hillman, 2006).
As noted by Sheffi (2005), an enterprise’s ability to recover from a disaster is strengthened by incorporating flexibility and redundancy into their supply chain. Redundancy involves the establishment of reserves or back-up options that can be deployed in times of disruption. On the other hand, flexibility characterizes the sensing capabilities, which enable enterprises to identify potential threats and respond accordingly (Hale and Moberg, 2005; Rowat, 2004; Sheffi and Rice, 2005). It is in the balance of redundancy and flexibility that managers can utilize supply chain mapping to influence resilience.
As described by Falasca et al. (2008), supply chain mapping will assist managers in understanding their network’s density, complexity, and critical nodes. Supply chain
Category of risk Drivers of risk and select examples
Disruptions Natural disasters, terrorism, dependency on a single source of supply, the capacity and responsiveness of alternative suppliers Example: Natural disasters can impact one business (tornado) or cripple a large distribution networks (9/11 terrorists attacks and Hurricane Katrina). The magnitude of the disaster will impact the capacities of supply chain nodes with the impact area and could influence the responsiveness of alternative source s of supply
Delays Excessive handling due to change in transportation modes Example: Hurricane Katrina closed the port of new Orleans and undoubtedly caused delays and/or the rerouting of products entering the Mississippi River
Systems Infrastructure breakdowns in information technology, transportation, and financial networks
Forecast Inaccurate forecasts due to long lead times and the “bullwhip effect” or information distortion due to lack of supply chain visibility and exaggeration of demand in times of product shortage
Procurement Industry wide capacity utilization Receivables Number of customers and financial strength of customers Inventory Product value and demand/supply uncertainty
Example: While demand for items like generators peak during large-scale hurricanes, these events are unpredictable and do not occur with regularity. It is the irregularity of large-scale events that make the planning of inventory surge capacity difficult to predict
Capacity Cost and flexibility of capacity Example: Security within a community is largely embedded within a government service supply chain. While the magnitude and consequences of Hurricane Katrina were anticipated, the criminal activity in the aftermath overwhelmed the supply chain. The resilience of this supply chain was hampered when some security officers (capacity) voluntarily left the impact zone and others refused to enter areas of criminal activity (Financial Times, 2005; Melloan, 2005)
Source: Chopra and Sodhi (2004)
Table II. Leveraging risk
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density focuses on number and geographical spacing of supply chain nodes. Density allows a manager to quickly assess the breadth of geographical impact an event has on a supply chain by overlaying the impact area on their supply chain map. Supply chain complexity also considers the number of supply chain nodes, but also integrates the interconnectedness of the nodes. Evaluating the impact on the network will enable managers to quickly assess, adapt, and develop strategies for optimizing performance. Assessing node criticality facilitates resilience by prioritizing post-disaster action around nodes which are important to the recovery of the chain (Falasca et al., 2008). For instance, the location of staging areas for food, water, and ice prior to a hurricane will undoubtedly influence the responsiveness of government agencies to distribute these items after the event. If staging areas are poorly positioned, such as prior to Katrina, the ability to move product into the impact area will be restricted (Horwitz, 2008).
When evaluating the history of large-scale disaster response, one can argue that public and private sector efforts inherently involve redundancy. The 2008 hurricane season involved instances where redundancy was part of a coordinated plan and where it created negative consequences. During the aftermath of Hurricane Gustav, the public distribution of commodities in hard-hit areas, like Baton Rouge, Louisiana, appropriately flowed through state and local points of distribution in situations where local distributors of food, water, and ice were not open for business (Lafayette Consolidated Government, 2008). Given the impact of the storm on retail operations, public distribution was both efficient and effective. However, in areas of less impact, the redundancy across public and private supply chains became problematic. A point of distribution was established in Lafayette, Louisiana to provide food, water, ice, and tarps. While Lafayette was hit by the storm, its retail sector was largely open for business by the time the public sector distribution point was operational. Due to the lack of coordination, these commodities were distributed less than two street blocks from a large grocery store which was attempting to sell the same commodities (State of Louisiana, 2008). It is in situations like this where public-private collaboration can eliminate redundancies which may have a detrimental effect on the recovery of local supply chains.
While this is a simplistic example, it is reflective of a systemic problem which plagues a multitude of supply chains that serve local communities on a daily basis. In the absence of post-disaster coordination, government and private sector entities may respond with the best intentions and create additional consequences that require further managerial action. Effectively responding to disasters requires the involvement of local people, coordinating needs assessments, information sharing amongst stakeholders, and having logistical expertise (Perry, 2007).
The resilience of supply chains in times of disaster is also influenced by the presence of public-private relationships. The collaboration within these relationships is often driven by the projected needs of the impact area, the presence of inbound supply chains to fulfill these needs, and the importance of impacted nodes within supply chains that extend beyond the devastated area (Stackhouse, 2007; Xu and Beamon, 2006). The availability of private sector supply chain capabilities should be matched to relevant government agencies which ordinarily provide industrial support and emergency aid in times of disaster. The scope of interaction with the private sector will vary from the federal to local levels of government. Table III provides a summary and example of how private-public interaction can vary relative to government levels. First, federal agencies should typically interact with industry associations or large firms
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which have a national presence. Second, state level agencies should interact with industry associations that are important to the state’s economy and firms which have the capacity to respond to regional level disasters. Third, local level governments should interact with local and/or regional companies to build resilience within supply chains that have a vested interest in the local community:
P2. Stronger public-private relationships will positively influence the capability of participating supply chain operators to manage disaster consequences that impact their ability to provide value to relevant stakeholders located within and outside the impact area.
In discussions of CI/KR and supply chain resilience, it is important to note that these two areas are interdependent and could both improve and/or diminish the other’s resilience. While CI/KR may provide the backbone (like transportation, communications, and power infrastructures) for supply chains within local communities, supply chains are a critical component in delivering the requisite resources to organizations that may be repairing disaster related damage to CI/KR. For instance, the Mississippi River bridge collapse in Minneapolis, MN disrupted the transportation system and demanded resilience within firms distributing goods in the region. Additionally, it immediately
Government level Scope of private sector supply chains Water supply chain example
Federal National industry associations that can quickly access and coordinate the capabilities of member organizations. Interaction may exist with individual organizations that have a national presence and supply chain capacities to respond to large-scale disasters
The National Grocers Association’s membership spans the entire Nation and includes retailers, wholesalers, and associates Coca-Cola & Anheuser-Busch represent firms that distribute water nationally and may respond quickly to government requests
State Regional industry associations that have a vested industry in the state’s economy and that can quickly access and coordinate the capabilities of member organizations. Interaction may exist with individual organizations that have at least a regional presence and supply chain capacities to respond to regional disasters
Alabama grocers association has regional membership and can access water distributors throughout the state Bruno’s food stores has seven of their 23 total locations in coastal communities of alabama and distribute water to regional alabama on a daily basis
Local This level of government is ultimately responsible for the response and recovery from disasters. Thus, interaction must exist with association like chambers of commerce and private organizations that have a vested interest in the local economy
The eastern shore chamber of commerce can quickly communicate with participating grocers that have supply chains which distribute water to fairhope, AL on a daily basis Interaction with Bruno’s Food Store no. 304 in Fairhope, AL to better understand their supply chain capabilities to distribute water in times of disaster
Table III. Public-private supply
chain interface
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created needs within raw material and construction supply chains. As a local event, the bridge collapse also called upon federal agencies to influence community resilience by developing strategies for national transportation funding which could replace or repair vulnerable bridges throughout the Nation (PR Newswire, 2007). Given these interdependencies, the resilience of supply chains and that of CI/KR can potentially have both positive and negative consequences upon each other:
P3a. Improvements in the resilience of critical infrastructures/key resources will positively influence supply chain resilience.
P3b. Improvements in the resilience of supply chains will positively influence critical infrastructures/key resource resilience.
2.5 Community resilience As mentioned previously, the notion of national resilience has been gaining momentum in Washington, DC. While the Department of Homeland Security is the appropriate moderator for these discussions, its capacity to advocate and accomplish national resilience on its own is limited. The response to disasters begins at the local level and must become a local/state level event before garnering the resources of the federal government. Therefore, the scope of resilience as an outcome in the resilience framework is limited to the community level.
Community resilience is embedded within its economic and social systems. While each citizen, private sector firm, and public sector entity is challenged individually to be resilient, communities cannot expect uncoordinated efforts to improve its functioning and adaptation to the consequences of disasters. Community resilience encompasses a broader domain that includes the resilience of relevant stakeholders, which operate within its economic and social systems. As such, it is defined as a process which integrates the adaptive capabilities of relevant stakeholders to manage consequences in ways that create a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance (Norris et al., 2008b).
In the social sciences, community resilience has been defined predominately along social parameters but has also some aspects of economic resilience. For instance, Norris et al. (2008a, p. 3) explains that community resilience is “manifest in population wellness, defined as high and non-disparate levels of mental and behavioral health, functioning, and quality of life.” It is important to augment the social resilience of communities with economic resilience because the economic systems will provide the resources to adapt and act in ways that remedy the impact of the disaster (Paton et al., 2001; Pfefferbaum et al., 2005). The social and economic dimensions of community resilience will be expanded in the following sections.
2.5.1 Social resilience. Social systems within communities represent the backbone from which community resilience creates organic capabilities to sense, evaluate and adapt to post-disaster consequences. It is within these systems that communities build relationships among people and businesses as well as communication channels for gathering and disseminating information. As described by Norris et al. (2008b), the social adaptive capacities are categorized as:
. information and communication;
. community competence; and
. social capital.
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Norris et al. (2008b) also characterized economic development as a social capacity, but for the purpose of this study it is included in the economic resilience dimension.
First, information and communication represent the capabilities of a community to assimilate knowledge and effectively communicate with relevant stakeholders in the face of adversity. Some of the specifics capabilities that must be established include identifying trusted sources of information, establishing robust communication channels with key stakeholders, creating repositories of knowledge where impacted communities can create shared understanding of the incident, and creating relationships with media outlets (Norris et al., 2008a; Norris et al., 2008b). The presence of local and 24 h news networks within impact areas provides an opportunity for local officials to quickly disseminate information. Additionally, one’s inability to effectively manage media relationships may create serious risks for officials that are uninformed of emerging events within the impact area.
Second, community competence characterizes its ability to assess situations and collaboratively develop appropriate solutions. The ability to recognize, evaluate, and address emerging issues in times of disaster are critical skills that stem from the communities willingness to work towards the common good. It is not just rallying together, but also trusting that community can recover and having members who are willing to work for the common good (Norris et al., 2008b; Sampson et al., 1997). The relevant capacities of community competence include collective action and decision-making, problem solving skills, creativity, and empowerment (Norris et al., 2008a; Norris et al., 2008b).
Lastly, social capital describes the embedded resources of social networks that citizens can create and use in responding to adversity (Lin, 2001; Norris et al., 2008b). This set of capacities was readily apparent in New Orleans after Katrina when faith-based organizations facilitated citizen participation, created a sense of community and preserved attachments to neighborhoods and communities. Another capability that creates social capital focuses on networks of organizations that provide vital services to the community. It is through the reopening of entities like grocery stores, health clinics, and banks that citizens begin to regain their sense of community and start to recover (Norris et al., 2008b).
The resilience of local organizations to return after an incident helps to provide a sense of “normalcy.” However, the mortality rate of organizations to return after experiencing catastrophic data loss is alarming. Of those experiencing a catastrophic data loss, 43 percent of companies never reopened and 51 percent of companies closed within 2 years (SCORE and Hewlett-Packard, 2007). Likewise, 75 percent of companies which operate without business continuity plans go out of business within three years of experiencing a disaster (Blythe, 2002). Given the role of local organizations in social networks, it is important for communities to facilitate post-disaster collaboration between public and private sector organizations which have a vested interest in the impact area.
2.5.2 Economic resilience. The plight of economies along the Mississippi and Louisiana coasts after the 2005 hurricane season is well documented and has started to demonstrate the broader impact of regional events on the Nation’s economy (Bailey, 2006; Casselman, 2008; Colgan and Adkins, 2006; Dekaser, 2005; Haughney, 2005). As defined by Rose (2004), economic resilience is “the ability of a system to recover from a severe shock” and includes both inherent and adaptive resilience. Inherent resilience describes the ability of the economy to recover under normal circumstances by
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incorporating substitute inputs for those reduced by external incidents. Adaptive resilience augments inherent resilience by leveraging one’s ability to put forth extra effort and creatively increase inputs to account for those lost in disaster situations (Rose, 2004; Rose and Liao, 2005).
The economic system in the USA operates on micro, meso, and macro levels before, during, and after disasters. Likewise, economic resilience must be developed on all three levels. Rose (2004) summarized resilience on each level as follows:
. Microeconomic – individual behavior of firms, households, or organizations.
. Mesoeconomic – economic sector, individual market, or cooperative group.
. Macroeconomic – all individual units and markets combined, though the whole is not simply the sum of its parts, due to interactive effects of an economy (p. 309).
At the microeconomic level, resilience is bolstered through activities like reinforcing building to improve resistance, conserving resources to better adapt to a situation, and leveraging flexible technologies to better identity alternative sources of supply when local outlets are impacted. While all levels of governments can work with individual businesses to improve microeconomic resilience, meso and macroeconomic resilience focuses more on the interaction of economic sectors and markets. For instance, access to imports represents inherent resilience on the meso and macro levels. Additionally, improving the accuracy and quality of information as it relates to impacted industries/markets demonstrates adaptive resilience on the meso and macro levels (Rose, 2004; Rose and Liao, 2005).
Additionally, economic resilience is strengthened by a community’s economic development abilities in the aftermath of an incident. As noted above, the ability to identify local substitutes or alternative sources outside an impact area represents resilient decision-making at the local level. In responding to disasters, resilience is improved as resources increase in the impact zone. Resource levels can be determined by measuring items like employment rate, median household income, and corporate tax revenues per capita. Additionally, economic development activity should be focused on increasing resources through equitable and diverse means. As evidenced in New Orleans, many businesses were poised to return but could not find available local labor. While the business owners/operators could financially rebuild and return to the city, day laborers and service workers were struggling to find available housing. Thus, it is critical to recognize metrics like income equity, housing equity, education equity, and residential integration (Norris et al., 2008a; Norris et al., 2008b).
2.5.3 The social & economic resilience interface. Communities represent the synergistic blend of its economic and social systems. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, resilient communities are able to leverage community competence in ways which not only creates a sense of pride, but also foster confidence that the community, as a whole, will return. Community resilience doesn’t occur solely within individual citizens. It is also strengthened when businesses reopen, employ citizens, generate tax dollars, and create value for consumers through consumption of locally available goods and services.
Within communities, resilience is greatly influenced by the capabilities of requisite supply chains and critical infrastructures that provide access to resources. For example, the reopening of the New Orleans Superdome was an event which required great interaction between private sector, local, state, and federal entities. When the
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New Orleans Saints football team entered the Dome on Monday Night Football, it was made possible by financial, labor, and physical resources which flowed into the redevelopment project. The game itself was a consequence of the economic and social resilience of the impacted region and its stakeholders. Maybe more importantly, it was also a stimulus within economic and social systems that still resonates today along the Gulf Coast:
P4. Through improved access to resources, supply chain resilience will positively influence the capability of communities to manage the consequences of disasters to enable the restoration of economic social networks.
P5. Through improved access to resources, the resilience of critical infrastructures/key resources will positively influence the capability of communities to manage the consequences of disasters to enable the restoration of economic social networks.
3. Managerial implications Stemming from the integration of supply chain, CI/KR, social and economic resilience research, following are several insights which apply to the emergency management practitioners.
3.1 Resilience as a focus The topic of resilience is being discussed across all levels of government and the private sector. The importance of the topic is growing because it is concerned with the ability of practitioners to make decisions in the face of adversity. As such, resilience provides insight into one’s ability to operationalize disaster management plans and/or business continuity and to take action within a given context. Failure to recognize the role of resilience could compound post-disaster consequences by relying on managers and public policy officials who are not capable of adapting the most well-intended plans into strategies which are appropriate for the given situation. When time is of the essence, resilience enables managers to leverage adaptive capabilities in the management of adversity.
3.2 Mortality rate of business experiencing catastrophic data losses As was mentioned earlier, disasters are particularly regressive on businesses which are not prepared for incidents and lose critical data. Given the mortality rate of local businesses following disasters, it is imperative that models of national resilience account for the complexity which ties together all levels of government, critical infrastructures, supply chains, and the local communities where disasters actually occur. At each level of government, measures must be taken to influence the preparedness of companies. After hurricane Katrina, there were numerous discussions about backing up data in remote locations and ensuring that companies had ways of communicating with employees. Furthering these actions, data concerning one’s supply base, financial records, and customer base must be preserved to ensure the efficient transfer of operations to new facilities. At a local level, governments need to influence supply chain and economic resilience by working with state and national governments to inform local businesses about processes and options for protecting data and establishing continuity after an event.
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3.3 Identify important supply chains and CI/KR within vulnerable communities Starting at the lowest jurisdictional level, it is critical to understand the assets of a community. Whether it is the role of a local manufacturer within a national supply chains or a pipeline that runs through a remote area, communities may be able to influence operations outside of their jurisdictional boundaries. Understanding the position and relative importance of one’s assets within regional and national supply chain and CI/KR networks may provide communities with leverage in discussions on national resilience. Identifying the reach of one’s CI/KR and supply chains enables them to:
. develop more holistic continuity plans and to; and
. influence the resilience of decision-makers who will act upon interfaces that exist between this asset and other related systems.
3.4 Establish appropriate relationships with specific businesses/industries With an understanding of the role an asset or service plays in the larger social and/or economic systems, concerned parties can create a context for discussing strategies for improving the resilience of organizations which could be impacted by a disruption. Without a proper understanding of how specific businesses or governments operate, it is difficult to develop working relationships. While PPP have been leveraged in procurement situations, less formal relationships are needed to facilitate the collection and dissemination of knowledge that can have an immediate impact on the resilience of interdependent stakeholders.
4. Future research As presented in Figure 1, the impact of supply chain and CI/KR resilience on community resilience depends upon the quality of public-private interaction. While this model integrates various research streams, there is an opportunity for future research to empirically test the presented relationships. While there are existing scales to measure relationship quality and the various forms of resilience, these scales would have to be adapted to address the differences in business objectives which drive public and private organizations. To identify these differences, depth interviews could be used to establish a better understanding of public-private collaboration during time sensitive, high-stress situations. Once the constructs are refined, a match-paired sample may offer interesting insight into the areas of congruence and disparity across the various forms of resilience.
The focus of this study was on resilience in post-disaster response and recovery phases. As such, the conceptual model did not incorporate the potential influences of pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation initiatives. Future research endeavors should investigate issues pertaining to the influence of preparedness or readiness on post-disaster action. For instance, does continuity planning across one’s supply network prior to a disaster positively influence supply chain resilience in the aftermath of the event? What if the post-disaster consequences differ from those that were used in preparatory planning scenarios? Does the supply continuity planning still positively influence supply chain resilience?
Another research opportunity would focus on public-private relationships as a source competitive advantage. Resource advantage theory recognizes the relational nature of organizations as one of its nine foundational premises (Hunt and Davis, 2008; Hunt and
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Morgan, 1995; Hunt and Morgan, 1996; Hunt and Morgan, 1997). As such, research is needed to incorporate the public-private aspects of relationship development which may take place in the preparation and mitigation phases of disaster management. Additional research may explore the effects of interactions which seek to map redundant supply chains (like water, food, and refrigerated storage) and develop post-disaster solutions. Does public-private interaction during preparation and mitigation lead to stronger post-disaster relationships? Do these relationships influence the impact of post-disaster relationships on supply chain and CI/KR resilience?
As previously mentioned, the recent wave of mega-disasters has spurred discussions of national resilience within the Department of Homeland Security. Further, the National Response Plan squarely positions disasters as ultimately being local events. Future research is needed to explore the articulation of resilience between communities (as in this study), states, regions and the country at large. Specific research may ask if national resilience is focused on the resilience of the Federal government or on the resilience of the Nation’s CI/KR, supply chains, and communities. If it is the latter, is national resilience dependent on all communities or on certain communities which possess CI/KR and supply chains that have greater impact on the Nation’s economic and social resilience?
A final research initiative should examine the legal implications of informal public-private interaction. While there is a well-established research stream on relational contracts (Bloomfield, 2006; Johnson et al., 2002; Wettenhall, 2003), there is a need to articulate the legal boundaries of public-private interaction. The structure of government bid processes in the area of procurement appears to establish a structure that is widely accepted and subsequently applied in post-disaster interaction when both public and private sector organizations approach one another with requests for service. Questions of interest include: What type(s) of governance structures should be utilized when seeking to facilitate effective response and recovery while ultimately protecting the public’s interests? Are there restrictions on the types of information that public agencies can share with private sector firms seeking to manage reestablish local supply chains and CI/KR?
5. Conclusion Stemming from discussions on national resilience, this study developed a community resilience framework by aligning existing research on resilience and PPP. In doing so, the interdependencies amongst public and private sector organizations, critical infrastructures/key resources (CI/KR), supply chains, and local communities were used to highlight opportunities for improving resilience in the aftermath of disasters. Additionally, the community resilience framework begins to establish parameters within which issues of national resilience can be addressed.
Inherent in national resilience is the reality that the safety and security of the Nation is imbedded within a myriad of interdependent systems. The consequences of hazards exploit the interconnectedness of today’s society and impact people and economies on local, regional, and national levels. Through the recognition of these interdependencies, the response and recovery phases of disaster management can begin to leverage the inherent adaptive capabilities of the public and private sectors to impact community resilience. In doing so, local communities influence other communities and cumulatively they start to establish a more resilient Nation.
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About the authors Geoffrey T. Stewart is an assistant professor of marketing at the University of Louisiana. He received his PhD from the University of Tennessee. His current research interests include business relationship development, PPP, and supply chain and business resilience in the aftermath of natural disasters. Dr Stewart is also an Associate Director of the National Incident Management Systems and Advanced Technologies Institute (NIMSAT) at the University of Louisiana. NIMSAT features a multidisciplinary research agenda that seeks to provide insight into the interface between disaster management and the supply chains, and critical infrastructures/key resources that assist in developing resilient communities. Geoffrey T. Stewart is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: [email protected]
Ramesh Kolluru is the Executive Director of the National Incident Management Systems and Advanced Technologies (NIMSAT) Institute at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette. His research has resulted in 14 technology licenses and has generated more than $28M in research funding from federal and states agencies and the private sector. He is the recipient of the Governor’s Technology Leader of the Year Award for 2007 and has been instrumental in the development of various technology-based economic development initiatives, working across multiple administrations in the State of Louisiana. In addition to making presentations at various regional and national forums, he has authored 18 journal/transaction papers, 35 conference publications, and six invited articles in reputed journals. His additional responsibilities at the University include serving as the Director of the Center for Business and Information Technologies and the Assistant Vice-President for Research and Graduate Studies.
Mark Smith has been involved in the areas of business policy for 20 years, and supply chain management for the past eight years. He has published in the Journal of Management, Strategic Management, Administrative Science Quarterly, Personnel Psychology, and has cases in a number of text books. His current research interests are primarily focused on Louisiana’s economic recovery. In his position as Associate Director of Business Strategy at the Center for Business and Information Technologies (CBIT) and the National Incident Management Systems and Advanced Technologies (NIMSAT) Institute where he writes grants, helps create products, and direct projects in the economic development and disaster management areas.
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