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Law Enforcement Fusion Centers: Cultivating an Information Sharing Environment while Safeguarding Privacy

Jeremy G. Carter1 & David L. Carter2 & Steve Chermak2 & Edmund McGarrell2

Published online: 20 May 2016 # Society for Police and Criminal Psychology 2016

Abstract The national network of fusion centers, of which there are currently 78 nationwide, was created in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and continue to play an integral role in contemporary law enforcement. Their mission, put simply, is to facilitate information sharing across disparate agencies and organizations. Despite a signif- icant presence within the law enforcement landscape, fusion centers have received relatively minimal scholarly attention. This limited literature alludes to operational challenges and public concerns that inhibit fusion center effectiveness. More specifically, little information is known about how fusion cen- ters develop relationships with external partners as well as institute mechanisms to safeguard against violations of indi- vidual privacy. The present research employs a combination of national survey data and three in-depth case studies of fu- sion centers in Florida, Nevada, and Michigan to provide ini- tial answers to these questions. Implications for improved pol- icy and practice are discussed.

Keywords Fusion center . Law enforcement intelligence .

Information sharing

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the need for greater information sharing and increased intelli- gence capabilities across various law enforcement levels and locales became widely apparent (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). State and major urban area fusion centers, of which there are currently 78 nationwide, have been one of the main vehicles for enhancing information sharing by acting as hubs for information and intelligence on terrorist, criminal, and other public safety threats within a particular geographic area (Carter & Carter, 2009a). Though the litera- ture on fusion centers is beginning to take shape, there remains two critically understudied questions that rest at the core of fusion center research and practice. First, how do fusion cen- ters develop relationships with both law enforcement and non- law enforcement organizations? Second, what mechanisms do fusion centers utilize to safeguard against violations of indi- vidual privacy? The present research employs a mixed- methods approach to provide initial answers to these ques- tions. More specifically, national survey data is reported to describe these issues and three in-depth case studies of fusion centers in Florida, Nevada, and Michigan are leveraged to identify specific organizational practices.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Fusion Centers and the Sharing of Information

Fusion centers are brick-and-mortar entities comprised of rep- resentatives primarily from federal, state, and local law en- forcement agencies as well as members of the private sector and public organizations. In theory, this diverse composition of organizations is best positioned to identify and understand

* Jeremy G. Carter [email protected]

1 School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University - Purdue University Indianapolis, 801 W. Michigan Street, BS 4081, Indianapolis, IN 46202, USA

2 School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27 DOI 10.1007/s11896-016-9199-4

threats facing a particular jurisdiction or region. The premise of fusion centers is that information analyzed from diverse sources gleans more accurate intelligence (Clark, 2007) through a Bfusion^ process resulting from analyzed raw intel- ligence provided by the disparate organizations (Carter & Chermak, 2012). Dissemination of intelligence products to relevant stakeholders brings the intelligence fusion process full circle and helps to ensure that fusion centers do not oper- ate as silos of information (Ratcliffe, 2008). While the idea of state and regional collaborative centers is not new to law en- forcement (Carter & Carter, 2009a), the rise of contemporary fusion centers occurred simultaneous to the emergence of intelligence-led policing (ILP) within the United States (Carter & Carter, 2009b; Chermak et al., 2013). In the highly fragmented U.S. law enforcement environment, fusion centers are positioned to enhance ILP practice (Carter, 2015). With currently 53 state and 25 major urban area fusion centers spread throughout the country and U.S. territories, each center is designed to cover a specific geographic area, connecting local, state, and federal law enforcement, emergency services, transportation services, and a wide variety of private busi- nesses within their state or geographic area. Further, these centers serve as a force multiplier that enhances the analytic capabilities within their areas of operation (Saari, 2010). Each jurisdiction has distinctive and diverse needs. As a Congressional Research Service report stated, BThere appears to be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ structural or operational model for fusion centers^ (Rollins, 2008, pp.18). In fact, a large number of centers have undergone changes in structure and focus since their inception in order to meet the needs of their constituents.

Few scholars have gained access to fusion centers and be- gun to examine the intelligence process within these organi- zations. Graphia-Joyal (2010) employed a qualitative study that included 49 interviews at four fusion centers in the north- east region of the U.S. Her study concluded that centers had yet to develop a robust analytical capability. Rather, they had been providing investigative case support that lacked analysis to inform operational, tactical, or strategic action (the goal of intelligence analysis). This lack of analysis with regard to intelligence production has been echoed by other scholars examining intelligence-led and analytic-driven policing. In their ethnographic study of four intelligence units from the United Kingdom, Innes, Fielding, and Cope (2005) concluded that analytic functions within these units were, in reality, a repackaging of traditional policing data and information. The intelligence units examined attempted to lend a degree of objectivity to the products created as a result of an analytic process that lacked any true scientific application. This may be the result of what Cope (2004) contends to be a cultural disconnect between analysts and police personnel as well as a general lack of understanding as to how analysis can influence police practice. Similarly, through 86 interviews

with varying police intelligence personnel from six agencies in Canada, Sanders, Weston, and Schott (2015) observed that intelligence production and information sharing were steeped in rhetoric and contingent upon an agency’s culture to em- brace innovative analyses. Though each agency appeared to institutionalize intelligence-led policing, actual intelligence analysis and analytic-driven decision making was an excep- tion rather than the rule.

Cooney, Rojek, and Kaminski (2011) provide a more optimistic outlook with respect to information sharing. Using a quantitative survey of local law enforcement personnel in South Carolina, they illustrated the utility of the state fusion center and noted that 75 percent of the police executives found the center to be moderately use- ful or very useful. A general sense of the applicability of fusion center products to client operations may be chal- lenging given the diversity of end-user needs. This is both a strength and weakness of the fusion center model as these centers are designed to promote information and intelligence sharing across disparate organizations, but this organizational variation creates hurdles for centers to tailor analytic products (Carter, 2015). A diverse group of end-users is ideal for information collection and dissemination as personnel from different law en- forcement environments (i.e., federal, state, local, rural, urban) and sectors (i.e., financial, private business, pub- lic health, transportation, emergency management) are able to provide unique information to be integrated into the analytic process. However, many fusion centers cur- rently lack the resources and analytic capacity to create analytic products that are tailored to the unique needs of these diverse groups. As Lewandowski and Carter (2014) observed in their survey of fusion center end- users, this lack of specificity within analytic products can create dissatisfaction and hinder relationships be- tween fusion centers and their end-users as the value fusion centers can provide via their analytic capacity is minimized.

Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) employed a mixed- methodology to examine the volume and frequency of infor- mation that flowed from local law enforcement to the state fusion center. Their statistics reported that 48 percent of New Jersey troopers had not communicated with the fusion center and that many of the troopers voluntarily sent informa- tion only because they believed it would help their investiga- tion – not because it could have implications for terrorism or other criminality. Within the qualitative portion of their re- search, Ratcliffe and Walden (2010, pp. 9) found that fusion center services were largely unknown or misunderstood by troopers, with one trooper noting: BI don’t know when to use them, so I don’t use them. I don’t know what they can do for me.^ Despite this disconnect, the researchers found some positive outcomes as troopers who did engage the fusion

12 J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27

center almost always received the information or intelligence they were seeking.

Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) also indicated that troopers in their study interpreted their role as one that consumes and further distributes intelligence products received from the cen- ter, but they had no responsibility for pushing information to the fusion center. In their recommendations for this gap in information sharing, the authors concluded fusion centers must develop an outreach component to ensure that fusion center partners are not only aware of their services, but also direct them on how to effectively collect and contribute infor- mation to the fusion center. Relatedly, scholars have recog- nized that law enforcement may not understand the utility of fusion centers because the centers need to bemore proactive in marketing themselves. Studies have noted that the centers do a poor job of communicating their analytic services (Chermak et al. 2013; Graphia-Joyal, 2010) and data availability (Carter & Chermak, 2012). In a similar vein, Cooney et al. (2011) found that personnel who had received training about a fusion center’s capabilities were more likely to rate the center as useful.

Private and Public Health Sectors as Fusion Center Partners

To best protect against acts of terrorism and develop compre- hensive threat awareness capabilities, fusion centers have been directed to engage the private and public health sectors to establish a process for sharing information (Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005). The Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) (2006) observed that the private sector can be a rich resource of in- formation. Many large corporations have sophisticated secu- rity operations that monitor global threats to their facilities, products, and personnel. This information is more diverse than that traditionally captured by law enforcement and can provide for more robust analytic products. Similarly, the pri- vate sector is a Bneed to know^ consumer of law enforcement intelligence as 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the United States is operated within the private sector (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2005). Moreover, the private sec- tor has a large personnel force that could be leveraged to significantly increase the capacity for fusion centers to receive reports of suspicious activity.

In 2011 the Health Security: Public Health and Medical Integration for Fusion Centers document was published by the U.S. Department of Justice to provide a roadmap for inte- grating public health information into the fusion process. This initiative urged fusion centers to work with public health part- ners to conduct ongoing risk assessments and mutually access relevant and timely information in support of threat aware- ness. The integration of public health partners positions health information to be readily available in an environment where

analytic techniques are commonplace for strategic planning and identifying threats (Carter & Rip, 2013). This collabora- tive effort is believed to enhance the preparedness level of public health practitioners across the country, while supporting the fusion center all-hazards approach to preven- tion, protection, and response (Riegle, 2009).

A report from the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (2011, pp.55) notes the benefit of public health par- ticipation in fusion centers:

B[Fusion center participation enhances…] the ability to conduct multijurisdictional, multidisciplinary exchange of health-related information and situational awareness data among federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal levels of government, and the private sector. This capa- bility includes the routine sharing of information as well as issuing of public health alerts…in preparation for, and in response to, events or incidents of public health significance.^

Moreover, contemporary policing has recognized the im- portance of integrating public health information into policing strategies to further reduce crime, disorder, and calls for ser- vice while improving the quality of communities (Wood et al., 2015). Such strategies are rooted in the movement of harm- focused policing that seeks to facilitate public safety through a more expansive view of the role of police while BAn emphasis on harm would provide a welcomed focus for intelligence-led policing^ (Ratcliffe, 2015, pp.179). The inclusion of health- related information in fusion centers is just one aspect that raises concerns of the legality and privacy issues surrounding law enforcement information sharing. Related concerns have been voiced by critics of fusion centers and are thus an em- phasis of the present study to provide insight into how fusion centers attempt to safeguard against these concerns.

Privacy Concerns in the Information Sharing Environment

Law enforcement generally, and fusion centers more specifi- cally, have access to vast amounts of diverse data from law enforcement and open sources (Pearsall, 2010). This effort to collect large amounts of information and data, combined with efforts to develop mechanisms for secure access and sharing, have led civil rights advocates to worry that this increase in data and federal security clearances serves as proof of far- reaching law enforcement initiatives to collect and secretly share personal information (Taylor & Russell, 2012). Such concerns are fostered by the assumption that fusion centers operate as a pre-emptive law enforcement action wherein in- formation is collected without the presence of a reasonable suspicion (Masse & Rollins, 2007) and that such data is read- ily available to an array of law enforcement and non-law

J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27 13

enforcement personnel who could use this data for purposes of unlawful discrimination1 (Monahan & Palmer, 2009).

Critics of fusion centers contend that fusion centers have developed ad-hoc secure sharing portals (i.e., web-based da- tabases or internal databases with credential login) to serve as mechanisms for sharing information with varied end-users (US House of Representatives 2013). As these sharing systems are largely developed and operated by fusion centers themselves with no overseeing authority, concerns may exist surrounding background checks for access to sensitive infor- mation, expectations for information and data usage, and processes to review, renew, or revoke continued access. Such an approach is largely necessitated by a confound of security and legal requirements that apply to some users (such as law enforcement personnel) but not others (such as private sector personnel) (Monahan & Palmer, 2009). Moreover, critics perceive an overall lack of transparency with respect to how fusion centers actually share information, who has access to information, and how information is used by different partners that may include, for example, partners from the financial banking sector, critical infrastructure (transporta- tion and energy), public schools, and public health (hospitals and state health organizations).

The involvement of non-law enforcement partners in fusion centers has been a source of contention as such participation is thought to be questionable as to whether or not the government has the right to view, analyze, and disseminate the personal data collected by these organizations (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2008). Moreover, it has been alleged that the involvement of private organizations in the fusion center process allows for fusion centers to circumvent the law by operating through a private entity (Monahan & Palmer, 2009) and that such partnerships may provide opportunities for corruption and the misuse of information (Newkirk, 2010). In response, fusion centers claim they have rigid privacy policies which have been independently reviewed by designated U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel as well as having required non-disclosure agreements with all fusion center personnel and partners (Senate 2012).

The creation of DHS’ Nationwide SAR Initiative to report suspicious activities that may be precursor behaviors for acts of terrorism has further fueled fusion center privacy and civil rights concerns (Harper, 2009). Privacy advocates contend that this initiative opens the door for racial profiling (German & Stanley, 2008) and the unlawful surveillance of citizens (Monahan, 2011, Monahan & Regan, 2012). Others have gone as far to allege the collection of suspicious activity reports may equate to the identification of dangerous classes

of people (Taylor & Russell, 2012) resulting in tensions be- tween these classes of individuals and the police (Deflem, 2004). Kurlander (2005) notes that legal mechanisms have slowed such initiatives. However, German and Stanley (2008) contend that the federal government allows states to exempt fusion centers from these legal constraints. To remedy these issues, it has been suggested that fusion centers employ an independent authority to ensure centers are operating with- in constitutional and legal bounds and that there exists a sys- tem of accountability (Rollins & Connors, 2007; Taylor & Russell, 2012). Despite these concerns and calls for systems of checks and balances, research has yet to quantify the extent to which fusion centers safeguard against privacy concerns and develop effective practices for protecting civil rights. The present research provides actionable findings to inform this shortcoming.

Methods

To date, much of the fusion center research has employed survey methodologies (Car ter, 2015; Chermak et al., 2013; Lewandowski & Carter, 2014; Cooney et al., 2011). While these studies have provided much-needed scholarly guidance, they lack contextual detail necessary to explain nuances of these complex organizations (Carter, 2015). Chermak, et al. (2013) note that while their study allows them to identify patterns of information sharing that hold across various fusion cen- ters, it does not allow them to dig deeper into the reasons for their findings. Carter (2015) urged for such in-depth studies to better identify the determinants of information sharing. Few studies have explored fusion center func- tioning through in depth interviews; those that do have shed valuable insights. As Graphia-Joyal (2010) noted, interviewing personnel allowed for exploration of Bpoorly understood contexts and constructs^ (pp. 362), providing a richer set of data that help inform future policy and research. Law enforcement fusion centers are designed to facilitate information sharing across, and analyze information from, disparate organizations. This mission involves a range of complex and nuanced practices that have received minimal scholarly attention to date. The present study seeks to illustrate these prac- tices and provide unique context as to how fusion centers engage in information sharing with diverse organizations and make efforts to safeguard against privacy concerns. To this end, the present study employs a mixed-methods approach consisting of a national survey of fusion cen- ters and three in-depth case studies conducted at fusion centers in Florida, Nevada, and Michigan within the same time period.

1 Racial profiling, violations of privacy and the abridgement of First Amendment protections of expressive activity are the most commonly expressed concerns.

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Survey of Fusion Centers

Survey data were gleaned from a larger project2 and include responses from 96 fusion center personnel.3 The survey sam- ple of fusion center respondents comprised of persons who attended the National Fusion Center Conference (NFCC). Attendees of the NFCC include fusion center directors, ad- ministrators, and upper-level operational personnel. This sam- pling strategy, which includes nationally representative fusion center personnel, was chosen for three reasons. First, in at- tending this conference, these persons were identified by their respective fusion center as a key representative of their orga- nization. Second, as a result of their selection on behalf of their center, this sample includes personnel who have a working knowledge of key issues tied to their fusion center and its intelligence capacity. Thus, these persons are best able to ad- dress the organizational capacity of their centers. Third, these persons’ awareness of the contemporary intelligence struc- tures, requirements, and formal communication networks in- volved in fusion centers increases the likelihood that they will have direct knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of these issues. This sampling approach to target key knowledge- able personnel in law enforcement organizations has been utilized in police research focused on specialty personnel when examining similar contemporary issues, such as police assigned to cybercrime (Bossler & Holt, 2012; Holt & Bossler, 2012).

Table 1 displays descriptive information of the fusion cen- ters represented in the current study. Responses were reported predominantly by administrators (51%) and supervisors (20%). This is beneficial to the validity of the responses, as these persons are most likely to have an accurate perception of the activities that occur within the center as they oversee daily operations and strategic planning. The modal response cate- gory for tenure at the fusion center was one to three years. This is not outside the norm, given the nature of turnover within fusion centers as agencies rotate assigned personnel. In the case of newly assigned personnel, having been assigned to the fusion center for only one to three years may not be indic- ative of a lack of knowledge, since assigned personnel are typically chosen as a result of their experience in intelligence operations within their home agency.

Case Studies

Greene (2014) challenged scholars to balance quantitative pre- diction and qualitative context in policing research. He argued the evidence-based movement, while beneficial for a number of reasons, diluted the Bcognitive lens^ (pp. 193) through which meaning could be gleaned from research to inform practice and future inquiry. He further contended that such context must be captured through qualitative methods. The present study embraces this approach through in-depth case studies of three fusion centers; Florida Fusion Center (FCC), Southern Nevada Counter-terrorism Center (SNCTC), and Michigan Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC). A case study approach is most appropriate for this research given little is known about the organizational practices of fusion centers and their highly complex structures (Fitzpatrick, Sanders, & Worthen 2003). Each of these centers became operational in 2007, are designated as Bprimary^ centers by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,4 and focus on counter-terrorism, all-threat, all-crimes, and all-hazards. The FFC is operated solely by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) while the MIOC is co-operated by the Michigan State Police (MSP) and National Guard. The SNCTC is operated by the Las Vegas Metro Police Department (LVMPD). These three centers display welcomed variation across their organizational structure and geographic location. While the FCC and SNCTC exhibited organizational consistency over time, the MIOC was undergoing an admin- istrative transition at the time of study. This transition period

2 Grant award number 2008-IJCX-0007 from the National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice. 3 The most responses from within a single fusion center was three, which occurred for two centers. Ten fusion centers had two respondents while the remaining 70 fusion centers in the study had a single survey respon- dent. The findings to follow present responses from all 96 survey respon- dents as this approach was deemed most appropriate by the research team to reflect perceptions of fusion center practices. For diagnostic purposes, a complex survey design in STATA (ICv14) was employed to adjust for clustered responses from respondents within the same fusion center. Not surprisingly, given minimal multiple responses from the same center and the present research’s focus on descriptives, the findings were consistent.

Table 1 Fusion Center Respondent Descriptives (n = 96)

n (Percent)

Respondent’s Position

Administrator 49 (51%)

Supervisor 19 (20%)

Investigator 7 (8%)

Analyst 10 (10%)

Not Specified 11 (11%)

Respondent Years at Fusion Center

Less than 1 Year 10 (10%)

1-3 Years 39 (41%)

4-9 Years 26 (27%)

More than 10 Years 5 (5%)

Not Specified 16 (17%)

Operational Focus of Fusion Center

Terrorism Only 5 (5%)

BAll-Crimes^ 28 (29%)

BAll-Crimes, All-threats, All-Hazards^ 50 (52%)

Not Specified 13 (14%)

4 http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information

J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27 15

provided an opportunity to observe operational challenges that are likely experienced by the broader national network of fu- sion centers (i.e., change in management and other personnel; developing new policies and procedures; staff learning new job responsibilities, developing new information sharing partnerships).

Though the FCC, SNCTC, and MIOC are only three of 53 officially recognized primary fusion centers, their organizational capacity mirrors those of the general fusion center population. A report by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2014) documented the organizational ca- pabilities and practices of each fusion center nationwide and quantified operational scores for each center across a range of metrics. Based on these metrics, the three fusion centers ex- amined in the case studies each received an overall rating comparable to centers across the country. This rating lends credence to the generalizability of the findings to be presented in the current study as the operations and practices of the center of study are consistent with those nationwide. More specifically, the likeness of the fusion centers sampled in the present study to those of the greater population of fusion cen- ters suggests promise for the findings to be applicable for improved practice for fusion centers across the United States. The decision to conduct case studies at these three centers was the result of the research team’s contacts with key fusion center staff as well as independent recommenda- tions from subject matter experts.

Following the completion of the national survey of fusion centers, the research team conducted on-site visits with each fusion center to interview administrative and analytic person- nel. Interviews were conducted with the use of a semi- structured interview protocol that was developed to explore findings observed in the national survey as well as the afore- mentioned operational challenges identified in research and federal reports. At each of the three centers, the research team conducted interviews with the fusion center’s Director (lead administrator), one supervisor of center operations, one re- cords management person, and two intelligence analysts (one of which was a supervisory analysts at each center) for a total of five interviews per center. In total, the majority of interview time, an average of 90 minutes per interview, was conducted with fusion center directors, administrators, and supervisory analysts as the research team was focused on gathering data regarding key fusion center practices, policies, and initiatives. Upper-level management personnel were best positioned to inform the research team on these issues.

Analytic Strategy

Survey responses are presented in figure format for illustrative purposes. Valid percent is presented along the x-axis. Means and standard deviations are also reported in the tables below each figure. Reliability coefficients (alpha) are provided to

demonstrate internal consistency across the items presented within groups. Though the items contained within groups, and presented as such, do not reflect any form of latent con- struct, the use of reliability coefficients assists to affirm that the items reported grouped appropriately for discussion. Qualitative data was captured through investigator field notes and audio recordings of interviews that were later transcribed, managed, and analyzed within theme-identification software (Nvivo v11). Drawing upon a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1999) that allows for repeat constructs, or elements, to emerge in qualitative data in combination with insights provided from previous research, key response traits, indicators, and themes were reviewed and agreed upon by the research team. To enhance the validity of interpretations from the interviews, the research team undertook additional phone and email communications with fusion center personnel oc- curred to solicit feedback, clarify, and reaffirm the information gathered (King, 1994). Though the research team identified additional information believed to be insightful, only the find- ings which gained saturation and consensus among those interviewed are reported. Saturation of qualitative findings is a subjective threshold (Fusch & Ness, 2015) with debate sur- rounding necessary sample size (O’Reilly & Parker, 2013).

The present study sought to establish saturation using three methods. First, case studies were conducted at three unique fusion centers. This allowed the research team to interview persons from diverse environments. Second, different person- nel types were interviewed that included administrators, ana- lytic supervisors, and analysts. This personnel diversity allows for the triangulation of individual perceptions of different per- sonnel types to converge on consistent themes (Denzin, 2012) and therefore reinforce the reliability and validity of qualita- tive findings (Stavros &Westberg, 2009). Though the bulk of interviews were conducted with upper-management, the per- ceptions and observations from all personnel were captured and analyzed. Relatedly, the research team employed a satu- ration grid to cross-tabulate qualitative data across respon- dents and positions. The use of such grids demonstrate levels of saturation when consistent findings are intersected across people and positions (Brod, Tesler, & Christiansen, 2009).

Discussion of Findings

Given the mixed-methodology and the focus of this research to inform fusion center practice and policy, findings are both reported and discussed in this section. The unique insights from the case studies provide contextual nuances for the sur- vey findings reported and are thus discussed in parallel. This section presents findings that illustrate fusion center practices and operational gaps from a national sample and unique prac- tices and lessons learned from three fusion center case studies to inform gaps and challenges identified in the survey findings

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and previous research. Conclusions, in addition to recommen- dations for policy, are provided in the subsequent section.

Cultivating Relationships for Information Sharing: Survey Results

Respondents were asked to indicate how close of a working relationship they experienced for purposes of information sharing with a range of jurisdictions and sectors. Respondents were also asked to indicate their level of satis- faction with these relationships. Figure 1 reports respondents’ perceptions of these information sharing relationships as Bvery close^ or Bdistant.^ Survey respondents indicated hav- ing the closest information sharing relationships with law en- forcement organizations; specifically with state (60%) and local (58%) law enforcement followed by other fusion centers (47%). Given the mission of fusion centers to serve as infor- mation hubs, it is reasonable to question why the reported percentages are not higher. Information from the site visit interviews suggest that fusion centers were focusing on get- ting their structure and processes in place – including the more mundane but time-consuming process of installing secure sys- tems and gaining security clearances. Interviews at each site visit clearly indicated that personnel understood the need to have proactive outreach with agencies in their jurisdictions.

The extent to which these relationships were perceived as Bdistant^ was minimal across each of these law enforcement categories. Interestingly, this is not the case with respect to the private and public health sectors. Respondents reported a Bdistant^ relationship (22%) with the private sector more

frequently than a Bvery close^ relationship (15%). Although 31 percent of respondents indicated a Bvery close^ relation- ship with public health, a relatively large proportion also indicated their relationship with public health as Bdistant^ (18%). Interviews during the site visits found that establishing relationships with the private sector and public health posed information sharing challenges related to privacy for which there was little precedent. Hence, some relationships were started with operational agreements. Information sharing agreements would take longer and were largely dependent on legal advisors.

In terms of satisfaction, fusion centers sampled were gen- erally not very satisfied with their information sharing rela- tionships. Consistent with perceptions of working proximity, respondents rated their satisfaction levels higher among law enforcement partners. Private sector (9%) and public health (13%) were again the sector receiving the fewest positive sat- isfaction results. Given the overall lack of engagement displayed in Figure 1, these low responses might be linked to lack of interaction with these entities as opposed to specific concerns about these relationships. Moreover, despite few re- spondents reporting a Bdistant^ relationship with law enforce- ment organizations, the overall levels of Bvery close^ relation- ships are perhaps lower than would be expected given the mission of fusion centers to facilitate information sharing across disparate law enforcement organizations. This holds true for reported satisfaction with other law enforcement or- ganizations as well. These descriptives begin to illustrate the gap between fusion centers and the organizations which they seek to engage in information sharing.

FBI State LE Local LE Other FC Private Sector Public Health

Very Close Mean 0.39 0.60 0.58 0.47 0.15 0.31

Very Close S.D. 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.35 0.47

Distant Mean 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.18

Distant S.D. 0.33 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.42 0.38

Very Satisfied Mean 0.17 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.09 0.13

Very Satisfied S.D. 0.37 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.29 0.33

Very Close: n = 96, α = .933

Distant: n = 96, α = .763

Very Satisfied: n = 96, α = .914

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Federal Bureau of

Investigation

State Law

Enforcement

Local Law

Enforcement

Other Fusion

Centers

Private Sector Public Health

Very Close Distant Very Satisfied

Figure 1 Relationships for Information Sharing

J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27 17

Unique practices to close these gaps and improve relation- ships were found among the case study fusion centers. The most unique and promising practices gleaned from the case studies focused on fostering relationships with the private sec- tor. These findings are interesting given the survey results reported minimal fusion center interaction and satisfaction with the private sector. It is important to note that the survey occurred as most fusion centers were becoming operational, and thus one would expect weak relationships with private sector. In addition, two of the centers chosen for the case studies (Florida and Nevada) had reached operational maturi- ty. As a result, these two centers had been able to experience the value in such relationships and reached an operational period where such partnerships could be cultivated; as evi- denced by the innovations below.

Cultivating Relationships for Information Sharing: Case Studies Findings

Through discussion with the center personnel, the FFC was conscious of these relationship gaps and conducted a Bgap analysis^ to identify the root problems and develop solutions for improved information sharing. This gap analysis revealed that relationships with local law en- forcement seemed to hinge on two factors; 1) local agen- cies recognizing what information needed to be pushed to the FFC and, 2) a lack of awareness of resources the FFC actually provides. This knowledge shortcoming was coupled with a lack of commitment from local law en- forcement executives. An FFC administrator noted this B…lack of support and buy-in at all levels of the organi- zation is a key obstacle to effective information sharing. The sub-par commitment is not in the form of unwilling- ness to share information but insufficient resources need- ed to meet the standards for information sharing we [FFC] outline to ensure quality, legality and effectiveness.^ In addition, the gap analysis identified three barriers to pri- vate sector cooperation. FFC personnel explained that pri- vate businesses were 1) hesitant to share proprietary in- formation, 2) desired intelligence products that related to their operational environment, and had 3) difficulty in gaining access to government information sharing systems as a result of their non-law enforcement status.

To remedy these shortcomings, the FFC implemented two initiatives. First, a formal intelligence-liaison officer (ILO) program was developed to gain participation and information integrity compliance with local law enforce- ment. Second, the FFC created the BBusinessSafe^ pro- gram as an outreach component specifically for the pri- vate sector. The ILO program involved the assignment of specific persons to be a designated information sharing point of contact that sends, receives, and integrates infor- mation between their agency and the FFC. In addition to

sharing information, the ILO is responsible for the legality and integrity of information, communicating FFC re- sources to their home agency, and communicating their agency needs to the FFC. Though an ILO may be physi- cally assigned to the fusion center, the more common arrangement was for the ILO to perform his or her fusion center responsibilities simultaneously to those of their home agency from their home location. This ILO program also created a mechanism through which the FFC could Bmarket^ their resources and capabilities to local law en- forcement with the hope of garnering additional support from the ILO’s neighboring agencies. As one FFC inter- viewee noted, BThe ILO program provides a grass-roots approach to developing the much-needed local law en- forcement participation in the broader information sharing environment.^

To engage the private sector, the FFC launched the BusinessSafe program that incorporates both website and in-person components. The website is a designated private sector-only secure portal that provides businesses with the necessary tools and resources to facilitate two-way com- munication with the fusion center. This website hosts a variety of private sector specific fact sheets for businesses to reference that are categorized within specific business areas – such as businesses operating out of ocean ports, theme parks, or sporting events. Private sector partners are able to retrieve these analytic products as well as gain access to threat and security information that the FFC determines is applicable and legal for sharing. This website allows for businesses to push information to the FFC and connect with other designated security personnel from the private sector in their region. To safeguard against individual privacy concerns, legalities of law en- forcement information, and the proprietary nature of pri- vate sector information, both the FFC and private sector organization would sign memorandums of understanding (MOU) that specifically outlined how information would be shared, stored, and utilized. Participation in the BuisnessSafe program was contingent upon the agreement to this MOU. Private sector partners were also able to engage in in-person meetings with FFC personnel as well as ILO personnel in their specific region. FFC personnel explained that these face-to-face contacts helped to estab- lish relationships and communicate the diverse needs of both parties. At the time of study, the FFC utilized BusinessSafe to disseminate notices regarding breaking news, possible threats, suspicious activity, and specific preparedness techniques pertinent to approximately 4, 000 local business partners.

An innovative and comprehensive private sector en- gagement program was also found with the SNCTC. One of the self-proclaimed Bgreatest strengths^ of the SNCTC was its ability to collect suspicious activity

18 J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27

information from the community generally and private sector more specifically. Given Las Vegas’ reliance on tourism, the hospitality-dominated business industry in the area, and the interconnectedness of high traffic tour- ism and the SNCTC’s counterterrorism mission, the SNCTC recognized the need to develop a formal relation- ship with the hospitality industry to serve as a force mul- tiplier. With this in mind, the SNCTC created a formal partnership with the Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority (LVCVA). Similarly, the LVMPD entered into a formal agreement with the LVCVA to enhance this pri- vate sector initiative. This agreement outlined the respon- sibility for both organizations to provide certain services in accordance with their respective statutory authority. The LVCVA determined that being a formal and active participant of the SNCTC was a direct benefit to the hos- pitality industry in Clark County. As part of this agree- ment, the LVCVA is a member of the board of governors (oversight committee) of the SNCTC and is required to dedicate personnel, or provide the financial support to hire personnel, in order to fulfill the mission of SNCTC. In order for this formal partnership to work effectively, the participatory role of the LVCVA in the SNCTC was adapted to allow participation without violating any stat- utes or laws regarding confidentiality and privileged in- formation to which only law enforcement agencies have access. To facilitate this partnership, the LVMPD hired a private-sector specific intelligence analyst dedicated to the interests of the hospitality industry. This analyst is funded by the LVCVA but is an employee of LVMPD and is assigned to the SNCTC for the purpose of responding to the needs and security of the hospitality industry.

Though the private sector is primarily concerned with criminality related to gaming in Nevada, they are commit- ted to an all-threats approach with the SNCTC. A highly successful example of this partnership was a SAR initia- tive between the University of Nevada Las Vegas Institute for Security Studies, state and local public safety, home- land security agencies, and the SNCTC to develop a ter- rorism SAR awareness video titled BNevada’s Seven Signs of Terrorism^. The video - available in both English and Spanish languages - provides an informative summary key behaviors and activities that are character- istic of terrorist planning and preparations. The video used local examples in order for viewers to personally relate to the information. The key to the success of the terrorism SAR video was the fact that hotels in Las Vegas required all employees to view the video; a promising indication of commitment to the partnership between the SNCTC and the private sector hospitality industry.

The MIOC has employed a different model to facilitate direct communication with their diverse stakeholders; a dedicated set of sector-specific telephone source lines.

These lines would be direct communication channels for three key sectors: 1) critical infrastructure and key re- sources, 2) environmental risk, and 3) border security. At the time of study, the Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Desk (CIKR) was the only operational source line. The environmental risk and border security lines were programs in progress, but would follow a similar model. The CIKR was a telephone source line, with mul- tiple dialing numbers, created to specifically receive and distribute information with the private sector. This point of contact was staffed around the clock with personnel trained specifically with knowledge of the state’s key crit- ical resources and partners (such as car manufacturers). Private partners were able to call the CIKR desk to pro- vide information they believed the MIOC would deem beneficial or to receive information in response to an in- quiry. An additional function of this desk was to conduct private sector outreach to promote capabilities of the MIOC. Although private sector liaisons were not formally integrated within the MIOC structure on a full-time basis at the time of study, this desk shared intelligence analytic products with private sector members on both a proactive and need-to know basis. Personnel staffing the CIKR desk were responsible for reaching out to existing partners to solicit feedback regarding intelligence products and infor- mation needs while also making contact with new poten- tial partners that may have been unaware of the MIOC.

In sum, the FFC, SNCTC, and MIOC each exhibited unique practices for cultivating relationships, especially with respect to non-law enforcement partners. These practices took the form of active and dedicated outreach efforts that aligned with fusion center, partner, and local needs. These practices range in scope and scalability and it appears to be incumbent upon individual fusion centers to assess what local partners should be formally involved with the center and what form their outreach efforts should take in attempting to leverage potential relationships. The practices identified here can likely be modified or amended to meet a range of fusion center needs.

Methods of Sharing Information: Survey Results

The types of information being shared with officers and partners are characterized in three basic ways: Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), For Official Use Only (FOUO) and Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES). The fusion center that produced the intelligence product is stating the information is not for public distribution and asking that recipients only share the information with those persons who have the Bright-to-know^ and Bneed-to- know^ the information.Despite thesecaveats, there isnosanction if the information is shared widely. While virtually all fusion centers have access to classified information, the distribution of

J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27 19

thesematerials iscloselymonitoredbecausetherearebothadmin- istrative and criminal sanctions if these guidelines are violated.

Just as relationships and initiatives to cultivate infor- mation sharing between fusion centers and external orga- nizations are critical to success, so too are the methods through which information and intelligence are dissemi- nated to, and collected from, external organizations are salient to sustained success. In two case studies of fusion center end-users, Lewandowski and Carter (2014) and Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) observed that recipients of fusion center products may become frustrated with for- mal, bureaucratic processes to receive information and intelligence from fusion centers. While these studies are insightful to understand end-user perceptions, little is known regarding the mechanisms through which fusion centers disseminate information and intelligence products and how such mechanisms are perceived by fusion center personnel. The following findings lend insights into this unknown.

Survey respondents were asked to indicate through which methods their fusion center disseminated informa- tion. The results are reported in Figure 2. Generally, re- spondents reported sharing information through less for- mal methods. Email (79%), personal contact (73%), and meetings (66%) were the most frequently reported methods. Though less frequent, respondents indicated sharing information via telephone (40%) and fax (20%) as well. Information sharing systems – such as RISS.net and Law Enforcement Online – were reported to be used by 61 percent of respondents. HSIN (operated by DHS), RISS.net (operated by the Bureau of Justice Assistance) and Law Enforcement Online (operated by the FBI) are all secure but unclassified information systems. The Fusion Center Guidelines urge fusion centers to Bleverage

the databases, systems, and networks available … to max- imize information sharing (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2003, pp.6). These information sharing systems are designed to facilitate the sharing of, and ac- cess to, information between fusion centers and external partners. Given the importance of such systems to infor- mation sharing, survey respondents were asked to indicate if they had access to an information sharing system and whether or not they perceived the system to meet their information sharing needs.

As illustrated in Figure 3, there exists a large discrep- ancy between respondent registered user access to these sharing systems and respondents’ perceptions that the sharing systems met their information sharing needs. The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) (91%), Law Enforcement Online (LEO) (89%), and Regional Information Sharing System (79%) were the most frequently reported systems to which respondents were registered users. Across all of the systems reported, HSIN was the most positively viewed system with only 20 percent of respondents indicating it met their informa- tion sharing needs. Interviews suggest that intelligence personnel and analysts, while having access to all these systems and more, will typically default to the use of one system – often that is a local system rather than the na- tional system. Ironically, a commonly expressed frustra- tion was that HSIN, RISS.net and LEO all required com- plex configurations of passwords that had to be changed every six months. This stumbling block became suffi- ciently prominent that representatives from the three sys- tems, met on several occasions with the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council to develop processes to have a Single Sign On (SS) for all three systems. Despite a consensus in the value of the SSO, the hurdle

Email Personal Contact Formal Meetings Information Sharing System Telephone Fax

Mean 0.79 0.73 0.66 0.61 0.40 0.20

S.D. 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.40

n = 96, α = .723

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Email Personal Contact Formal Meetings Information

Sharing System

Telephone Fax

Figure 2 Methods of Sharing Information

20 J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27

could not be cleared. Insights from the case studies help to understand the gap between user access and perceived utility illustrated in Figure 3.

Methods of Sharing Information: Case Studies Findings

Contextualizing these descriptive findings are the specific information sharing practices of the three case study fu- sion centers. Each of the three case study centers had access to Law Enforcement Online and the Homeland Security Information Network. Despite being registered users of these networks, all three fusion centers have cre- ated their own secure information sharing portal. In each instance, the fusion center personnel explained that the creation of their own system allowed the fusion center to tailor the system functionality to meet their information sharing needs as well as the needs of their partnering external organizations. These unique, center-specific sys- tems were used to communicate with local partners while national systems (such as LEO and HSIN) were used for communications with other fusion centers. Each center expressed varying levels of dissatisfaction with the na- tional information sharing systems (i.e., HSIN, LEO, etc.). Personnel at each of the centers expressed similar sentiments that these systems were of Bbasic functionality^ and that varying functional aspects could be enhanced to better serve their needs. An issue of common occurrence was that many local agencies – and especially community organizations and private businesses – lacked awareness and access to formal sharing systems as a result of bureaucratic approval processes.

Law enforcement agencies carefully control access to information systems for three basic reasons: (1) concerns about privacy, and consequently, civil liability (2) con- cerns that sensitive threat information and (3) historical

information contained in police records systems simply should not be shared with non-law enforcement person- nel. Moreover, each center expressed displeasure with an inability to have a more two-way system of information sharing where fusion centers could push intelligence prod- ucts to the community as well as receive raw information and products from outside organizations via the same sys- tem. As a result of this one-way nature of formal sharing systems, information pushed to fusion centers from local sources typically occurs via email, telephone, and person- al contacts. Such insight confirm the survey findings re- ported in Figure 2 regarding methods of information shar- ing as well as the low approval of information sharing systems illustrated in Figure 3.

To remedy the functional shortcomings and bureaucratic processes accompanying national information sharing sys- tems, the FFC and SNCTC created their own center-specific system to share information directly with local partners. The FFC created the Statewide Intelligence Site (InSite) while the SNCTC created the All-Data Virtual Information Sharing Environment (ADVISE). The InSite and ADVISE systems share similar functionality that, as personnel at both centers indicated, are Bmore user friendly for our clients.^ Both sys- tems allow for active two-way information sharing between the fusion center and external organizations via secure online web access in addition to hosting access to a range of archived intelligence products, information bulletins, and criminal his- tory data. From an access management perspective, each fu- sion center reviews applications for, and grants access to, the sharing system.While this process requires certain checks and balances, such as verifying user information and compliance with privacy regulations, the processes for external organiza- tions to gain access to these unique systems – and thus engage in information sharing – are more streamlined and efficient when compared to national systems.

HSIN LEO RISS FBINET ATIX

User Mean 0.91 0.89 0.79 0.44 0.39

User S. D. 0.18 0.21 0.36 0.50 0.50

DMN Mean 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.04

DMN S.D. 0.40 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.20 Registered User (User): n = 96, α = .564

Definitely Meets Needs (DMN): n = 96, α = .748

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

Homeland Security

Information Network

(HSIN)

Law Enforcement

Online (LEO)

Regional Information

Sharing System (RISS)

Federal Bureau of

Investigation Network

(FBINET)

Automated Trusted

Information Exchange

(ATIX)

Registered User Definitely Meets Needs

Figure 3 Information Sharing Systems

J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27 21

Moreover, personnel interviewed at both the FFC and SNCTC indicated the management of their own sharing systems allowed them to better identify and track the or- ganizations in which they were engaged for information sharing. This allowed both centers to further develop re- lationships and initiatives with these external partners as well as develop plans for information collection require- ments based on both fusion center and client needs. Though the MIOC utilizes HSIN as their primary sharing system, it decided to integrate a system known as Memex that created compatibility and information compliance with the data systems of their existing law enforcement partners. MIOC personnel interviewed explained that this decision was driven by feedback from external partners who expressed frustration with the HSIN portal. As one supervisor at the MIOC noted, BOur users couldn’t simply pull down information we made available or push us in- formation they thought was relevant…Memex made the sharing of information a more functional reality.^

Mechanisms toAffirmAppropriate Intelligence Practices: Survey Results

As noted in the review of literature, fusion centers have been the focal point of criticism regarding individual pri- vacy with respect to the collection and retention of per- sonal identifying information; especially terrorism-related information. Though a salient issue for society in general and fusion center research and practice more specifically, the protection of individual privacy in the fusion center environment has received sparse scholarly attention. To this end, Figure 4 displays the extent to which survey respondents indicated they had mechanisms in place to safeguard individual privacy. The two most frequent mechanisms were a specific policy to guide the sharing

of information with external organizations (88%) and a record system that is compliant with 28 CFR Part 23 (88%); the leading regulatory requirement governing the retention of personal identifying information in law en- forcement criminal intell igence records systems. Consistency with federal privacy standards (78%), auditing intelligence records (78%), and requiring privacy policy training (71%) were also quite common among the centers sampled. Interestingly, only 32 percent of respon- dents indicated they provided privacy training to local law enforcement.

Mechanisms toAffirmAppropriate Intelligence Practices: Case Studies Findings

These descriptive findings generally illustrate the steps fusion centers are taking nationwide to safeguard against violations of privacy; however they provide little insight regarding specific practices as to how fusion centers operationalize such safeguards. The three case studies provide detail as to how this is achieved. To begin, each of the case study centers instituted policies and practices that are tailored to a system of check and balances. One of the most common approaches to establishing operational policies to guide the legal collection and handling of in- formation was the establishment of memorandums of un- derstanding (MOU) between the center and formal infor- mation sharing partners. The FFC, MIOC, and SNCTC each discussed their MOUs and noted that each included specific language directed to the legal compliance of in- formation collection, storage, and dissemination. Any en- tity seeking to receive information from the fusion centers – including other law enforcement agencies – must sign the MOU prior to gaining access to information and in- telligence products. Each fusion center provided the

Intell Policy 28 CFR

Part 23 Audit

Federal

Standards

Personnel

Privacy

Training

Privacy

Training to

Police

Mean 0.88 0.88 0.78 0.78 0.71 0.32

S.D. 0.33 0.33 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.47

n = 96, α = .785

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Formal

Intelligence

Function Policy

28 CFR Part 23

Compliant

Audit Intelligence

Records

Privacy Policy

Meets Federal

Standards

Personnel

Required to

Receive Privacy

Training

Center Provides

Privacy Training to

Police

Figure 4 Safeguarding Privacy

22 J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27

research team a copy of their MOU for review. Though each MOU varied with respect to references to specific state laws and guidelines, consistent characteristics of these MOUs included direct language guiding the defini- tion of privacy, consent to records audits, maintaining security of information, responsibility for the accurate documentation and dissemination of information, liability for improper dissemination, and the responsibility of the partnering organization to provide privacy training for each user seeking access to fusion center information. Furthermore, each center examined employs a vigorous privacy policy5 that is accessible by law enforcement and the general public via the fusion center’s website.

Unique practices to safeguard privacy emerged within each center. At the FFC, the Director receives guidance from a Constitutional Protections and Privacy Advisory Board (CPPAB) that collaborates with community privacy advocacy groups to ensure that privacy and civil rights are appropriately protected by the FFC’s information acquisi- tion, dissemination and retention practices as defined by the FFC's written policy. The CPPAB is comprised of three members not actively associated or employed by the FFC or participating agency. The members are indi- viduals with well-established credentials in the fields of criminal justice and/or the law. At the time of study, the CPPAB members are comprised of an American Civil Liberties Union Director from the state of Florida, a re- tired Special Agent in Charge with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a member from the Center for Advancement of Human Rights at Florida State University. The CPPAB reviews and recommends updates or changes to the FFC privacy policy and procedures for protecting civil rights and civil liberties in response to changes in applicable laws, or as otherwise necessary. The CPPAB is consulted to participate in any independent inquiry into complaints of alleged privacy violations and advises the FFC of their findings and any recommended corrective action. The MIOC leverages a similar privacy advisory board comprised of community privacy advo- cates, privacy-trained law enforcement officers, and a del- egate appointed by the Director. Unlike the FFC CPPAB, the MIOC’s privacy board is less formal and typically convenes in instances where a privacy complaint has been filed. The FFC CPPAB is a more innovative model that should be considered a Bbest practice^ for other fusion centers across the country.

The SNCTC employs a dedicated group of personnel referred to as the BQuality Assurance Section^ (QAS). This group of personnel is led by a deputy director of quality assurance (privacy officer) that oversees three

sub-groups. The first is the security group that is respon- sible for the operational and physical security of the cen- ter’s classified environments, the maintenance of all ac- cess and alarm systems, and the proofs of compliance for all security matters. This group is also the single point of contact for all applications for security clearances, and maintains a roster of security clearances including dates for renewal investigations. Second, the privacy protection group that is responsible for ensuring that the SNCTC adheres to all pertinent laws, rules, and regulations relat- ing to the protection of personal privacy and civil liber- ties. This group is also responsible for implementing the program and systems necessary - through training person- nel - to provide regular and periodic audits to ensure compliance and provide proofs of compliance for all SNCTC investigations and intelligence products. Lastly, the performance measurement group tasked to develop and collect the data to measure the ability of the SNCTC to perform its established mission. As it relates to privacy, this group seeks to determine if all operational tasks engaged in by the SNCTC align with the informa- tion sharing privacy policy, federal privacy standards, and applicable state and federal laws. Moreover, the QAS is responsible for ensuring compliance of information shar- ing partners with all applicable policies and laws. Thus, the QAS has regulatory power over the SNCTC as well as external partners seeking to engage with the SNCTC.

Conclusions and Implications for Policy

The present study provides unique insights into the oper- ational nuances and challenges faced by fusion centers nationwide as well as a number of insightful mechanisms through which centers can navigate these challenges. At the heart of effective threat prevention, mitigation and response is two-way information sharing among all agen- cies that have a responsibility for the safety, security and sustained functionality of America’s communities. To this end, if processes are not developed to ensure full partici- pation of all information sharing partners, the functional capability of the fusion centers will be reduced. Sampled fusion center personnel indicated efforts to develop rela- tionships with different agencies; especially other law en- forcement agencies and a more diverse range of public safety, private sector, and public health organizations. To achieve their goals, these partnerships need to be broad- ened and substantively sustained. While it is achievable, it is a difficult barrier to overcome.

Comprehensive threat assessments require raw infor- mation from diverse sources to maximize validity and reliability of analysis. As such, fusion centers must pro- actively reach out to both law enforcement and non-law

5 The Privacy Policy is a national standard required of each fusion center in order to receive federal funding.

J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27 23

enforcement partners to 1) communicate center resources and capabilities, 2) learn about local intelligence needs, 3) develop local collection requirements to make information sharing more efficient/effective, and 4) develop mecha- nisms that allow for more efficient two-way information sharing. For fusion centers to be effective, reciprocal in- formation sharing relationships must be developed with law enforcement agencies within the jurisdiction of the fusion center. Findings indicate that the most effective way to accomplish this is through an ILO/FLO program that can build and sustain local law enforcement relationships.

Many aspects of a fusion center's work is different than the typical law enforcement experience. There are different pro- cesses, responsibilities and nomenclature. Findings indicate that the role of the fusion center is not intuitively apparent to law enforcement officers nor is the importance of a trusted, two-way information sharing relationship. A remedy learned from the site visits is the benefit derived from the fusion cen- ters providing training to local law enforcement personnel, intelligence analysts and in some cases relevant private sector employees. Beyond the substantive knowledge that is shared in training programs, important personal contacts are made and the fusion center can be marketed to local law enforce- ment. This outreach component builds relationships and helps ensure the quality and legal integrity of information provided to the fusion center.

While experience remains limited, findings indicate that there is value to clearly defined public-private partnerships. There remains challenges for information sharing between fusion centers and private entities due to privacy issues. Similarly, some private sector entities are reluctant to share information with fusion centers because of uncertainty related to intellectual property, client privacy, and the brand image. However, where there is clear value to the partnership and a mechanism can be established to address concerns – such as with the SNCTC – the value to both partners can be substantial.

The status of law enforcement intelligence in law enforce- ment agencies appears to be similar to the early development of community- and problem-solving policing during the early 1990s and the developing literature exploring the adoption of intelligence-led policing (Carter, 2016; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013). Law enforcement officers and executives recognize the importance of intelligence yet the implementation of law en- forcement intelligence remains uneven a decade after September 11, 2001 (9/11). Several factors may contribute to this. First, the philosophical underpinnings of law enforce- ment intelligence was significantly changed and broadened, hence a resocialization process among intelligence personnel had to occur. Second, while the 9/11 attacks remain as the benchmark for change, in reality new standards – such as the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and training

programs did not emerge until 2003. Moreover, new standards and directions continue to evolve even at the time of this writing. For example, there is an increasing application of the intelligence process for violent crime suppression, such as found in Real time Crime Centers – a notable different application than the counterterrorism role. Third, it simply takes time to develop new organizations such as fusion centers and develop them at an operational level. Similarly, training and developing new policies in America’s approximately 16, 000 law enforcement agencies is a massive task, particularly when new processes – such a participating in a fusion center – must be marketed and sold to the agencies as wise investment in resources.

Although the results of this study point to clear progress in the development of law enforcement intelligence capacity, they also reveal challenges. Clearly, there is a need for the commitment of resources in the form of personnel and train- ing. Given the federated and decentralized structure of law enforcement in the U.S., it is critical that mid- to large agen- cies have analysts who can conduct local level analysis as well as push information and intelligence to fusion centers. Findings from the present study suggest small agencies should have intelligence liaison officers who can serve as Bnodes^ in the intelligence network. This requires commitment of re- sources at a time when many agencies are operating under conditions of financial constraint. Law enforcement execu- tives as well as policymakers at local, state, and federal levels will need to consider the implications of these budgetary is- sues. While many executives acknowledged that the use of analysts made the agency Bwork smarter^ thereby having a notable effect on crime and community order, it remains a difficult concept to sell to the public and politicians. It is also clear that there is a need for continued and expanded training. This includes specific training for analysts, fusion center per- sonnel, and intelligence managers to include specifying types of information can be shared, the process for sharing informa- tion, and the application of guidelines to protect privacy, civil rights and civil liberties.

Collectively, the data identified a number of factors that help safeguard against privacy and civil rights concerns while concomitantly maximizing both threat detection and risk re- duction. The policy implications will reinforce the protection of civil rights in the intelligence process while maximizing the organizational effectiveness of the fusion center. As a result of concerns by some community members about privacy and civil rights protections related to the intelligence process, fu- sion centers should ensure their privacy infrastructure is in place. This includes having a privacy policy, training person- nel on privacy guidelines, and having a privacy review board such as the one discovered in the FFC. This review board should include diverse members from outside the fusion cen- ter to elevate legitimacy and best ensure accountability to ultimately ease privacy concerns of fusion center practices.

24 J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27

Table 2 Glossary for Acronyms

Acronym Full Name Description

28 CFR Part 23

28 Code of Federal Regulation Part 23 An operating policy for law enforcement agencies. It contains implementing standards for operating federally grant-funded multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems. It specifically provides guidance in five primary areas: submission and entry of criminal intelligence information, security, inquiry, dissemination, and review-and-purge process.

9/11 Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in NewYork,Washington, DC and Pennsylvania, United States.

ADVISE All-Data Virtual Information Sharing Environment

Secure information sharing system developed and utilized by the Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center to share information across sectors and partners.

CIKR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Desk

An outreach program in the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center to facilitate information sharing partnerships across non-law enforcement organizations.

CPPAB Constitutional Protections and Privacy Advisory Board

Advisory board within the Florida Fusion Center that collaborates with community privacy advocacy groups to ensure that privacy and civil rights are appropriately protected by the center’s information acquisition, dissemination and retention practices as defined by written policy.

CUI Controlled Unclassified Information Information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls pursuant to and consistent with applicable law, regulations, and government-wide policies but is not classified under Executive Order 13526 or the Atomic Energy Act.

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cabinet organization in the United States government that oversees domestic security. FDLE Florida Department of Law

Enforcement State law enforcement entity of Florida.

FFC Florida Fusion Center State fusion center in Florida. FLO Fusion Center Liaison Program Initiative to designate a single point of contact between a partner organization and a fusion center to facilitate

information sharing. FOUO For Official Use Only A document control designation, but not a classification. This designation is used byDepartment of Defense

and a number of other federal agencies to identify information or material that, although unclassified, may not be appropriate for public release.

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network

Information sharing network for homeland security mission operations to share sensitive but unclassified information.

InSite Statewide Intelligence Site Secure information sharing system developed and utilized by the Florida Fusion Center to share information across sectors and partners.

ILO Intelligence Liaison Officer Program National program in the United States to train individuals in public safety and the private sector to facilitate the flow of information from local to federal law enforcement operations.

ILP Intelligence-Led Policing An underlying philosophy of how intelligence fits into the operations of a law enforcement organization. LEO FBI Law Enforcement Online Secure information sharing system for law enforcement that is provided by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. LES Law Enforcement Sensitive A document control designation, but not a classification. This marking indicates recipients should be law

enforcement personnel. LVCVA Las Vegas Convention and Visitor

Authority The official marketing organization of Las Vegas that promotes tourism, conventions, meetings and special

events. It is a formal partner of the Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center. LVMPD Las Vegas Metropolitan Police

Department Municipal police department of Las Vegas, Nevada and operating agency of the Southern Nevada Counter-

Terrorism Center. MIOC Michigan Intelligence Operations

Center State fusion center in Michigan.

MOU Memorandum of Understanding Written policy agreement that guides action, inaction, expectations, and procedures for partnerships. MSP Michigan State Police State law enforcement authority of Michigan. QAS Quality Assurance Section Dedicated personnel within the Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center that oversee legal, ethical, and

policy compliances for information sharing. RISS.net Regional Information Sharing System

Network Secure information sharing system to facilitate capabilities, critical analytical and investigative support

services, and event de-confliction across the United States. SAR Suspicious Activity Report A report containing observed or reported behaviors that may be indicatives of terrorist planning or criminal

activity. SNCTC Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism

Center State fusion center of Nevada.

SSO Single Sign On Initiative to develop credentialing that allows for session/user authentication process that permits a user to enter one name and password in order to access multiple applications or secure systems.

Appendix

J Police Crim Psych (2017) 32:11–27 25

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