Abstract Most people believe that they know themselves better than anyone else knows them. However, a complete picture of what a person is like requires both the person’s own perspective and the perspective of others who know him or her well. People’s perceptions of their own personalities, while largely accurate, contain important omissions. Some of these blind spots are likely due to a simple lack of information, whereas others are due to motivated distortions in our self-perceptions. Perhaps for these reasons, others can perceive some aspects of personality better than the self can. This is especially true for traits that are very desirable or unde- sirable, when motivational factors are most likely to distort self-perceptions. Therefore, much can be learned about a person’s personality from how he or she is seen by others. Future research should examine how people can tap into others’ knowledge to improve self-knowledge.

Keywords self-knowledge, accuracy, peer reports, personality, meta-perception, self-insight

‘‘Do we understand each other?’’ Gracie wants to know. . . .

‘‘Better than we understand ourselves,’’ I tell her.

—Straight Man, Richard Russo, p. 106

Who knows you best? Most of us have the powerful intuition

that we know ourselves better than others know us (Pronin,

Kruger, Savitsky, & Ross, 2001). Indeed, there are several good

reasons to think that we are the best judge of ourselves: We have

privileged knowledge about our own histories, our thoughts and

feelings, and our private behaviors. Yet, we all know people who

seem to be deluded about themselves—which raises the uncom-

fortable possibility that we, too, might be so deluded.

When it comes to our own personalities, there is increasing

evidence that our blind spots are substantial. Moreover, others

can sometimes see things about our personalities that we cannot.

The aim of this paper is to review the latest evidence concerning

the accuracy of self- and other-perceptions of personality and

show that a complete picture of what a person is like requires

both the person’s own perspective and the perspective of others

who know him or her well. This conclusion has implications for

researchers and practitioners who rely on self-reports and for

people who want to get to know others—or themselves.

How Could We Not Know?

The first step in establishing that others know things about our

personality that we do not is to show that there are gaps in our

self-knowledge. Why do we sometimes misperceive our own

personality? Some blind spots may be due to a simple lack of

information. We have all experienced the supervisor who,

unbeknownst to him, has a persistent frown when listening

intently and, as a result, is a lot more intimidating than he real-

izes. A simple dose of feedback could bring his self-perception

in line with his behavior (or even better, bring his behavior in

line with his self-perception). Blind spots can also be due to

having too much information—we have access to so many of

our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that we often have a hard

time mentally aggregating this evidence and noticing patterns

(Sande, Goethals, & Radloff, 1988). For example, most of us

can probably think of many times when we have acted friendly

or unfriendly, making it difficult to know how friendly we are

in general. In other words, it is difficult for us to see the forest

for the trees.

In many cases, however, blind spots are not so innocent—

they are the result of motivated cognitive processes. One

motive that has a strong influence on self-perception is the

motive to maintain and enhance our self-worth (Sedikides &

Gregg, 2008). There is a great deal of research documenting

Corresponding Author:

Simine Vazire, Department of Psychology, Washington University in St. Louis,

One Brookings Dr., Campus Box 1125, St. Louis, MO 63130

E-mail: [email protected]

Current Directions in Psychological Science 20(2) 104-108 ª The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0963721411402478 http://cdps.sagepub.com

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the lengths people will go to in order to maintain a positive

view of themselves, leading to flawed self-assessment

(Dunning, 2005). While our desire to protect our sense of

self-worth influences our self-perception, it is not clear that

these biases are always in the positive direction. Indeed, there

are important individual differences in self-enhancement

(Paulhus, 1998) and some people seek to confirm their overly

negative self-views (Swann, 1997). What is beyond doubt is that

self-perception is not simply an objective, neutral process. Moti-

vated cognition influences and distorts self-perception in a mul-

titude of ways that help to create and maintain blind spots in self-

knowledge. As a result, we cannot judge our own personality as

dispassionately as we might a stranger’s.

One vivid example of blind spots in self-knowledge comes

from research on the discrepancies between people’s explicit

and implicit perceptions of their own personality. Implicit per-

sonality is typically measured by tapping into people’s auto-

matic associations between themselves and specific traits or

behaviors. The logic behind these measures is that people form

automatic or implicit associations (e.g., between the concepts

‘‘me’’ and ‘‘assertive’’) based on their previous patterns of

behavior. Thus, the traits that people automatically associate

with themselves in implicit tests may predict behavior above

and beyond the traits they consciously endorse in explicit mea-

sures of personality. Indeed, this is exactly what has been

found. In one study, people’s implicit self-views of their per-

sonality predicted their behavior even after controlling for what

could be predicted from their explicit self-views (Back,

Schmukle, & Egloff, 2009). This pattern was strongest for

extraversion and neuroticism, traits that are non-evaluative and

that people are typically willing to report honestly, which sug-

gests that people have implicit knowledge about their pattern of

behaviors that they cannot report on explicitly.

Are these implicit blind spots merely an efficient way to

process information—it may be easier to form implicit associa-

tions than to constantly update our explicit self-views—or are

they the result of motivated cognition? If processing self-

knowledge implicitly were merely a matter of efficiency, we

should be able to increase the congruence between our explicit

and implicit self-views simply by focusing our attention on the

behavioral manifestations of our implicit personality. Contrary

to this prediction, participants who watched themselves on

video did not bring their explicit self-views more in line with

their implicit personality, despite the fact that strangers who

watched the same videos were able to detect the implicit

aspects of the targets’ personalities (Hofmann, Gschwendner,

& Schmitt, 2009). Thus, it seems that our motives sometimes

lead us to ignore aspects of our personality that others can

detect. As a result, our conscious self-perceptions provide a

valuable but incomplete perspective on our personality.

How Do They Know?

The second step in establishing that others may know things

about our personality that we do not is to show that others are

adept at detecting personality. As it turns out, many aspects of

personality are remarkably transparent to others, even when we

are not intentionally broadcasting them. For example, many

traits can be judged accurately from people’s physical appear-

ance, their Facebook profiles, or a brief interaction (Kenny &

West, 2008). This evidence suggests that our day-to-day beha-

vior is infused with traces of our personality and that others

make good use of these cues when inferring our personality

(Mehl, Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006). In addition, we (inten-

tionally and unintentionally) broadcast our personality in our

living spaces, music collections, and online habitats (Gosling,

2008). In other words, others have plenty of fodder for detect-

ing our personality, while we see ourselves through the dis-

torted lens of our own motives, biases, wishes, and fears.

Of course, not all others are created equal—the relationship

between the judge and the target matters. While too much inti-

macy can lead to the same biases that distort self-perceptions

(e.g., one’s self-worth can be threatened as much by the knowl-

edge that one’s spouse is incompetent as it is by the thought of

one’s own incompetence), closeness is usually associated with

greater accuracy (see Biesanz, West, & Millevoi, 2007, for a

thorough review). Moreover, the better we get along with oth-

ers, the more accurately they can infer our thoughts and feel-

ings (Thomas & Fletcher, 2003). Overall, across all types and

levels of acquaintance that have been examined, people form

remarkably accurate impressions of one another.

These findings show that we are astute judges of each

others’ personalities, likely due to the importance of interperso-

nal perception for our social species. As a result, other people—

especially those who spend a lot of time around us and who we

open up to—almost inevitably become experts on our personal-

ity. This conclusion should cast serious doubt on the longstand-

ing assumption among researchers that we necessarily know our

own personality better than others know us. It seems likely that,

at least for some aspects of personality, others might be in a bet-

ter position to see us clearly than we are.

Who Knows What?

The goal of this article is not to bring readers to despair of

self-perceptions. Rather, the goal is to make the case that

others sometimes see aspects of our personality that we are blind

to. Perhaps the most important evidence is the body of

research that directly compares the accuracy of self- and

other-perceptions of personality. Here we focus on studies that

measure accuracy using a correlational approach—that is, by

comparing judgments by the self and others to a criterion. The

available evidence suggests that self- and other-perceptions are

roughly equally good at predicting behavior in a laboratory

(e.g., behavior in a group discussion; Kolar, Funder, & Colvin,

1996; Vazire, 2010), predicting real-world behavior (e.g., beha-

vior when out with friends; Vazire & Mehl, 2008), and predict-

ing outcomes (e.g., discharge from the military; Fiedler,

Oltmanns, & Turkheimer, 2004). However, the overall equality

in levels of accuracy obscures a more interesting pattern: Self-

and other-ratings of a person’s personality do not simply provide

redundant information. Instead, they capture different aspects.

Others Sometimes Know Us Better Than We Know Ourselves 105

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Vazire (2010) recently proposed the self–other knowledge

asymmetry (SOKA) model to map out the aspects of personal-

ity that are known uniquely to the self or uniquely to others.

According to this model, the differences between what we

know about ourselves and what others know about us are not

random but are driven by differences between the information

available to the self and others and motivational biases that dif-

ferentially affect perceptions of the self and others (Andersen,

Glassman, & Gold, 1998).

Specifically, Vazire (2010) proposed that the self has better

information than others do for judging internal traits—traits

defined primarily by thoughts and feelings, such as being anx-

ious or optimistic—but that others have better information than

the self for judging external traits—traits defined primarily by

overt behavior, such as being boisterous or charming. In addi-

tion, Vazire argued that self-perception on highly evaluative

traits (e.g., being rude, being intelligent) is severely distorted

by biases. As a result, self-ratings on evaluative traits often

do not track our actual standing on those traits (but instead

might track individual differences in self-esteem or narcis-

sism). In contrast, when perceiving others on highly evaluative

traits, we are able to form impressions that are mostly accurate

(assuming we have enough information). This is not to say that

others see us more harshly than we see ourselves. In fact, there

is evidence that close others may in fact have more positive

impressions of us than we do, but that their perceptions are nev-

ertheless more accurate. This can happen if people who have

the most positive ratings from their friends also tend to actually

have the most positive personalities (even if nobody’s

personality is quite as delightful as their friends portray it).

In this case, friends’ ratings would be overly positive in an

absolute sense, but more accurate in their rank order, and thus

friends’ ratings would be a very good predictor of actual beha-

vior (e.g., those whose friends say they are the most friendly are

likely to behave the friendliest).

To test these hypotheses, Vazire (2010) compared self-

and friend-ratings of personality to how people behaved in

videotaped laboratory exercises and how they performed on

intelligence and creativity tests. Consistent with Vazire’s first

hypothesis, self-ratings of internal, neutral traits (e.g., anxiety,

self-esteem) were better than friends’ ratings at predicting beha-

vior (Fig. 1). Consistent with her second hypothesis, friends’ rat-

ings of evaluative traits (e.g., intelligence, creativity) were better

than self-ratings at predicting performance in these domains.

Consistent with the SOKA model, other research has shown

that close others are often better than the self at predicting very

desirable or undesirable outcomes, such as college GPA, rela-

tionship dissolution, and coronary disease. Together, these

findings suggest that those who know us well sometimes see

things that we do not see in ourselves, particularly when it

comes to aspects of our personality that are observable to others

and that we care a lot about (and thus cannot see objectively).

What Do We Do Now?

The appropriate conclusion from the empirical literatures

seems to be that to know people’s personalities, we need to

know both how they see themselves and how they are seen

Accuracy of Self- and Friend-Ratings for Different Traits

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

Low observability, low evaluativeness (e.g.,

anxious)

High observability, low evaluativeness (e.g.,

talkative)

Low observability, high evaluativeness (e.g,

intelligent)

Type of Trait

A cc

ur ac

y (F

is he

r' s

z) Self Friends

Fig. 1. Average accuracy scores (transformed to Fisher’s z-scores for purposes of comparison) for self- and friend-ratings of personality traits that are less observable and less evaluative (left), more observable and less evaluative (middle), and less observable and more evaluative (right). Adapted from Vazire (2010).

106 Vazire, Carlson

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by others who know them well. The fact that self-perception

is an important part of personality is not new; the novel finding

is that others also know a lot about us that we don’t know.

How can we tap into others’ knowledge to improve our self-

knowledge? Direct, honest feedback might be very useful, but

it is rare, and probably for good reason. A more realistic strat-

egy is to take the perspective of others when perceiving our

own personality (i.e., meta-perception). Research suggests that

although we overestimate the degree to which others share our

perception of ourselves, we are able to detect the impression we

make on others, even when meeting someone for the first time

(Carlson, Furr, & Vazire, 2010). We also seem to know how we

are seen differently by people who know us in different con-

texts (e.g., parents vs. friends; Carlson & Furr, 2009). In short,

it seems that we have some awareness of how others see us,

but we do not always make use of this information when jud-

ging our own personality. Thus, we may be able to improve our

self-knowledge by placing more weight on our impressions of

how others see us—particularly, as Vazire’s (2010) research

suggests, when it comes to observable, evaluative traits (e.g.,

funny, charming).

Finally, introspection has historically attracted a great deal

of attention as a route to self-knowledge. Unfortunately, recent

research shows that many aspects of ourselves are hidden from

conscious awareness, limiting the effectiveness of introspec-

tion in the pursuit of self-knowledge (Wilson, 2009). Perhaps

a more promising avenue for increasing self-knowledge is to

reduce the self-protective motives (e.g., defensiveness) that

prevent us from seeing ourselves objectively. Recent work

suggests that self-affirmation reduces defensive responding

and makes us more open to negative information about

ourselves (Critcher, Dunning, & Armor, 2010). Along the same

lines, training in mindfulness meditation (i.e., nonjudgmental

attention to one’s current experience) improves people’s

emotion-regulation skills, memory, and attention and can

improve their ability to differentiate between their transient emo-

tional experiences and their global dispositions (Williams, 2010).

Thus, these techniques may reduce the two major obstacles to

self-knowledge: lack of information and motivational biases.

In short, little is known about successful routes to improving

self-knowledge. Clearly, much remains to be learned about how

we can know ourselves better. What is now evident, however, is

that, as a fortune cookie admonishes, ‘‘There are lessons to be

learned by listening to others.’’

Acknowledgments

We thank Krystle Disney, John Doris, Sam Gosling, Sanjay Srivastava,

and Tim Wilson for their helpful suggestions concerning this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect

to their authorship or the publication of this article.

Recommended Reading

Dunning, D., Heath, C., & Suls, J.M. (2004). Flawed self-assessment:

Implications for health, education, and the workplace. Psychological

Science in the Public Interest, 5, 69–106. A comprehensive, highly

accessible review of the practical implications of biases in self-

assessment.

Oltmanns, T.F., Gleason, M.E.J., Klonsky, E.D., & Turkheimer, E.

(2005). Meta-perception for pathological personality traits: Do we

know when others think that we are difficult? Consciousness and

Cognition: An International Journal, 14, 739–751. A study that illus-

trates the importance of self-knowledge for personality disorders.

Vazire, S., & Carlson, E.N. (2010). Self-knowledge of personality: Do

people know themselves? Social and Personality Psychology

Compass. An accessible review of the latest evidence regarding the

accuracy of self-perceptions of personality, with a more thorough

reference list than is provided in the current paper.

Wilson, T.D., & Dunn, E.W. (2004). Self-knowledge: Its limits, value,

and potential for improvement. Annual Review of Psychology, 55,

493–518. A comprehensive and thorough review of research and

theory on self-knowledge.

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/FlattenerPreset << /ClipComplexRegions true /ConvertStrokesToOutlines false /ConvertTextToOutlines false /GradientResolution 300 /LineArtTextResolution 1200 /PresetName ([High Resolution]) /PresetSelector /HighResolution /RasterVectorBalance 1 >> /FormElements true /GenerateStructure false /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles true /MarksOffset 9 /MarksWeight 0.125000 /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /PageMarksFile /RomanDefault /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UseDocumentBleed false >> ] /SyntheticBoldness 1.000000 >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [288 288] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice