EDMG611Wk7

OrganizingfortheBigOne_AReviewofCaseStudiesandaResearchAgendaforMultix2010AgencyDisasterResponse.pdf

Organizing for the Big One: A Review of Case Studies and a Research Agenda for Multi- Agency Disaster Response

Norbert Steigenberger Seminar for Business Administration, Corporate Development and Organization, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

Disaster response operations require the cooperation of agencies that seldom interact in their daily operations. The result is a complex coordination problem, which has been in the focus of many case studies. In an effort to facilitate cross-case learning, this study presents a review of empirical studies on the multi-agency coordination of disaster response operations. The review covers 80 empirical studies and highlights the impor- tance of training, expertise, planning and plan enactment, leadership and personal acquaintance between the actors in emergent multi-agency response networks. The analysis results also show that while some areas have received extensive coverage in scholarly publications (e.g., training, skills), a number of important topics have yet to be studied in sufficient depth (e.g., leadership and role taking, plan enactment). Based on these insights, a research agenda is proposed and a number of recommendations for practical disaster response management are made.

1. Introduction

From a global perspective, disasters are a frequent occurrence (Coleman, 2006; Eshghi & Larson,

2008) and anthropogenic conditions can increase the probability that a disaster will strike (Bouwer, 2011; Eshghi et al., 2008). Disasters cause human suffering and substantial economic and social damage and require an organized response in the form of rescue or damage containment operations. Disaster response activities involve ‘providing emergency aid and assis- tance, reducing the probability of secondary damage and minimizing problems for recovery operations’ (Petak, 1985, p. 3). By definition, disasters cannot be managed with the resources of a single organization but require resources and collaboration from multiple agencies (Shaluf, 2007). It is imperative for public administrations to develop and maintain a capacity for effective coordinated disaster response management.

Numerous records of suboptimal disaster response operations in the past show that often this require- ment has not been met (e.g., Birkland & DeYoung, 2011; Moe & Pathranarakul, 2006; Schneider, 2005).

Despite the importance of this topic, research on effective multi-agency coordination of disaster response management is fragmented. The reason is that, due to the complexity of a disaster event, most contributions are in-depth case studies. Case studies are designed to provide ‘rich insights into a specific situation’ (Yin & Heald, 1975, p. 371) and are there- fore well suited for the study of disaster response operations. But cross-case learning is not straightfor- ward, as insights are typically specific to a highly con- textualized scenario and contingency conditions might play an important role for cross-case learning, as pro- cedures effective in one context might be inappropri- ate or dysfunctional in another context. Accordingly, cross-case conclusions are seldom drawn and insights

Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Volume 24 Number 2 June 2016

do not consolidate into a coherent picture. This is a problem for scholars, practitioners and policymakers alike (Lalonde, 2007). If research results remain iso- lated, it will continue to be difficult to draw conclu- sions about or develop recommendations for other disaster response situations. For scholars, the frag- mentation of the literature complicates theory devel- opment and the conceptualization of study designs, as the important research gaps are not clearly identified.

This objective of this study was to aid both researchers and practitioners by compiling a review of multi-agency disaster response case studies. In doing so, the study complements previous cross-case studies (e.g., Crichton, Ramsay & Kelly, 2009) with a broad synthesis of empirical case studies on multi-agency dis- aster response presented in the last decades. The review evaluates the rich body of case studies pub- lished in recent decades, synthesizes the insights obtained, contextualizes them with contingency condi- tions and proposes a framework depicting the state of knowledge. Finally, recommendations for the manage- ment of multi-agency disaster response operations are developed and a research agenda for the years to come concludes the study.

2. Methodology

Disasters as unplanned natural or man-made events with a sudden and severe negative impact on human live, the functioning of society and/or the physical environment. Disaster response operations are of a magnitude that they cannot be successfully executed with the resources of a single organization alone but require interorganizational coordination and pooling of resources (Eshghi et al., 2008; Shaluf, 2007; Shaluf, Ahmadun & Said, 2003).

The following systematic literature review (Tranfield, Denyer & Smart, 2003) consolidates findings obtained from case studies on multi-agency coordination of disas- ter response operations. To maintain focus, I excluded studies dealing with other stages of disaster manage- ment (disaster planning, preparedness and recovery), studies on communication with stakeholders not involved in the disaster response operation (e.g., the media or the general public) and studies focusing on specific technical aspects of disaster response (e.g., emergency nursing). The analysis is restricted to papers published in peer-reviewed scholarly journals to ensure a certain standard of methodological rigour and to obtain an academic focus (cf. Birkland, 2009). Based on the sampled studies, I then conducted within-case and cross-case content analyses, developing and discussing an integrative framework.

Sample development followed standard procedures for literature reviews (Hoon, 2013; Jones & Gatrell, 2014; Tranfield et al., 2003). I first searched for the

keywords ‘disaster management’, ‘disaster response’, ‘emergency management’ and ‘emergency response’ in the Google Scholar database (for a description of these key terms and their distinction from the related term ‘crisis management’ cf. Shaluf et al., 2003) and dupli- cated this search in the databases EBSCO Academic Search Complete and Sociological Abstracts. I then fol- lowed citation trees up (via the ‘cited by’ mechanism of Google Scholar) and down (via an evaluation of the references sections of included studies), reading titles and abstracts of papers that might be relevant. This initial search produced a sample of 399 pieces. From those, empirical articles that studied multi-agency coordination of disaster response management who focused on specific and identifiable disaster events were selected. The result was a final sample of 76 articles containing 80 empirical analyses (some publi- cations report more than one case study).1

I then coded the core characteristics of these 80 case studies (Hoon, 2013), including the type of disas- ter studied (natural, technical, terrorist, exercise), the socio-economic setting (urban/rural, developed/devel- oping country), the organizational level in focus (staff/ on scene) and the data sources (interviews, secondary data, field observations, personal experience and sur- veys). I also coded the organizations that were the focus of each study (first responders, professional staff, governmental staff, nongovernmental organiza- tions such as Red Cross or Medecins Sans Frontieres, or others). To verify coding quality, 60 studies were also coded by a second coder, a postgraduate who was otherwise unaware of the research questions. Coders agreed on 85 per cent of all codes, a re-exam- ination of where codes deviated indicated that the ini- tial coding quality was appropriate. The objective nature of the codes also strengthens the notion that coder bias is not an issue in this study.

3. Qualitative data analysis

As an initial structure for this review, I applied a mod- ified version of the 4C framework suggested by Com- fort (2007) and arranged the multi-agency disaster response activities around ‘critical terms’ in disaster response management (Comfort, 2007: 191). Com- fort’s work has informed various other studies in dis- aster response (e.g., Choo & Nadarajah, 2014; Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2013; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011; Wolbers & Boersma, 2013), and it is particularly suited as a structure for the review as it provides a comprehensive understanding of the components cen- tral to a successful disaster response operations.

1 A list of the studies included as well as the coding is avail- able as supplementary material to this study.

Organizing for the Big One 61

The ‘critical terms’ in the 4C framework are cogni- tion, communication, coordination and control. Cogni- tion is the process of perceiving signals and then utilizing those signals to mentally establish a reliable prediction of future events (Comfort, 2007). Cogni- tion refers to the interpretation of sensory inputs for strategy development and tactical decision-making as well as an input for downstream and upstream com- munication. Communication involves the exchange of information as an attempt to develop a continuously updated common operational picture as a basis for coordination and decision-making (Comfort, 2007; Cramton, 2001; Reddy, Paul, Abraham, McNeese, DeFlitch & Yen, 2009; Wolbers et al., 2013). Coordi- nation addresses the alignment of actions as well as the distribution and commitment of resources, and control is the allocation of decision-making power within an emergent disaster response network as well as the agencies’ abilities and willingness to lead or be subject to leadership (Comfort, 2007; Faraj & Xiao, 2006). To successfully manage a complex disaster response operation, these ‘critical terms’ must be car- ried out satisfactorily. Therefore, this structure is a useful basis from which to evaluate the cases. For the purpose of the review, I merged the coordination and control themes, because coordination and control were typically discussed in close conjunction, that is control emerges as a subtheme of coordination in the review. Therefore, I found a 3C adaptation to be most appropriate. Cognition and communication provide the basis for coordination, which directly affects disas- ter response performance. Cognition and communica- tion are also connected, as communication processes require cognitive evaluations, while communication provides the input for cognitive activities and is, in turn, affected by the coordination structure of a disas- ter response system. Figure 1 gives an overview of the framework applied in the analysis.

3.1 Cognition

The cognitive appraisal of a disaster event is a chal- lenge that decision-makers on all levels face. The pri- mary issue in the field of cognition is the importance of experience and skills. Experience and skills, as acquired through training or practical exposure, are both necessary to develop the routines required for

performing tasks under the pressures of time and situ- ational complexity (Kilby, 2008; Schraagen & Ven, 2011; Telford & Cosgrave, 2007). Experience is also necessary to enact communication and coordination plans, as these typically require a familiarity with the respective system and its terminology (Lutz & Lindell, 2008). Disasters are rare events for every person, so for most actors it is unlikely that any degree of indi- vidual practical experience exists (exceptions are some highly specialized leadership personnel). Training or exercises are required to provide an environment where skills and experience can be developed for all those involved in a disaster response operation.

Stress and physical exhaustion can impede cognitive tasks during disaster response management. Typical stressors in disaster conditions include time pressure, the need to make ethically challenging and/or high- stake decisions, physical danger and high workload (Connelly, 2006; Crichton, Lauche & Flin, 2005; Flan- nery & Everly, 2004; Paton & Flin, 1999). Stress ham- pers the ability to develop situation awareness in complex task environments (Endsley, 1995). It also causes decision-makers to apply standard behaviours, to be reactive rather than forward-looking (Crichton & Flin, 2001), and to overlook small clues (Weick, 1990). Stress and physical exhaustion can also lead to decision paralysis and reduced communication capabil- ities (Schneider, 2005; Waugh, 2007). As such, stress is a particular problem for individual disaster response coordinators. One way to reduce stress and physical exhaustion is careful workload management. Another option is to provide the means for restoration and recovery, such as recreation areas (Connelly, 2006). Social support from colleagues has also been reported as a means to cope with stress (Hunt, Smith, Hamerton & Sargisson, 2014). If these recreational activities are not possible, the rotation of key personnel from coordi- nation responsibility might be a good strategy to avoid costly errors in judgment and decision-making.

Artefacts such as maps, shared information spaces and whiteboards have been shown to be helpful to structure inputs and to develop a shared understand- ing at the staff level (Salmon, Stanton, Jenkins & Walker, 2011). The downside of a sophisticated tool such as shared information spaces is that their cost, in terms of the time and mental capacity required for their effective operation, makes them less useful under

Figure 1. Analytical framework, based on Comfort (2007).

62 Norbert Steigenberger

conditions of resource strain, high workload and time pressure (Moynihan, 2008). Therefore, artefacts require sufficient complementary resources, if that is not possible, simple tools such as whiteboards or maps should be used.

3.2 Communication

The availability of a technical communication infras- tructure is a strong predictor of success or failure in disaster response activities. Large-scale natural disas- ters often destroy the local technical infrastructure (Celik & Corbacioglu, 2010; Wise, 2006; Yang, 2010), but an unreliable technical infrastructure has also been reported independently from the immediate disaster effect, caused, for example, by overcrowded commu- nication networks or limited network coverage (Lin- nenluecke et al., 2013; Okumura, Suzuki, Fukuda, Kohama, Takasu, Ishimatsu & Hinohara, 1998; Rimstad, Nj�a, Rake & Braut, 2014; Simon & Teperman, 2001). Incompatibility of communication devices employed by different agencies has also been a frequent problem (Dawes, Cresswell & Cahan, 2004; Kapucu, 2006; L�opez Carresi, 2008; Rimstad et al., 2014). An inoper- able communication infrastructure will hamper or even prevent coordination and command and thus seriously impede the capacity for unified action. A reliable communication environment is therefore criti- cal for effective multi-agency disaster response man- agement. The establishment of redundant communication systems (e.g., radio, mobile phone, amateur radio networks, text messaging) is recom- mended to preserve the ability to communicate under disaster conditions (Garnett & Kouzmin, 2007; Kapucu, 2006). L�opez Carresi (2008) suggests the establishment of different communication channels for different coordination activities to compensate for overcrowded information channels. This strategy comes at a price, however. Parallel communication channels have been shown to result in information loss (Helsloot, 2005), while ‘listening in’ seems to ben- efit coordination (Weeks, 2007). ‘Listening in’ to pub- lic broadcasting such as TV or radio has occasionally been shown to benefit the development of a shared mental model (Oloruntoba, 2013).

For effective communication, coordinators must decide which information to share. Sharing too much information can overcrowd communication channels as well as information processing capacities of decision- makers. Sharing too little information results in a situa- tion where decision-makers lack the necessary input to develop an accurate operational picture (Reddy et al., 2009; Sobel & Leeson, 2007). Training and practical experience can help to establish a shared understanding of roles and information demands, either directly, from the professional knowledge of the roles of others, or

indirectly, via personal acquaintance (Olejarski & Gar- nett, 2010; Salmon et al., 2011). Communication plans are generally the simplest and

most straightforward means to address information allocation problems in multi-agency disaster response operations, but these plans need to be up to date when disaster strikes. If the persons or roles identified in a communication plan are not actually present or no longer exist, or if contact information is incorrect, communication plans can become a liability (Ahmadun, Shalu & Aini, 2003; Cyganik, 2003). It is also important to have only one unified plan in place, rather than var- ious parallel plans (Wise, 2006). Personal acquain- tances between key people can compensate for a lack of formal communication plans and provide a shortcut for relaying information (Nolte et al., 2011; Olejarski et al., 2010; Waugh, 2007), provided that these key people have a solid working relationship (Garnett et al., 2007). Often, planned or emergent communication net-

works in disaster response activities are centralized (Butts, Petrescu-Prahova & Cross, 2007), meaning that few people receive the bulk of the information com- municated throughout the network. These people serve as network hubs, they filter information col- lected from various sources and then decide which information to relay (Crichton et al., 2005). Pooling of information aids the development of consistent coor- dination, but the downside of a centralized communi- cation network is the high probability that network hubs will be overburdened, especially if these central persons are also responsible for decision-making and coordination. If these hubs become ineffective, subnet- works may be cut off from the information flow, with substantial negative consequences for coordination and operation performance (Okumura et al., 1998; Schweinberger, Petrescu-Prahova & Vu, 2014). In addi- tion, when overburdened, decision-makers tend to revert to a reactive decision-making style, which has been found to be inferior to proactive decision-making (Helsloot, 2005; Lalonde, 2004). It is thus critical to identify network hubs in communication networks and to provide either the necessary resources to ensure communication efficiency or to decentralize the net- work. Individuals and agencies must be willing to share

information and must be prepared to coordinate with each other. This is often problematic when political or strategic interests intervene that are not related to the disaster response activity, which is a frequent problem experienced in international disaster response events involving NGOs as well as with local communities (Berlin & Carlstr€om, 2011; Perry, 2007; Telford et al., 2007) and with political agencies (Birk- land et al., 2011; Olejarski et al., 2010). In these cases, persons or agencies tend to withhold information, act

Organizing for the Big One 63

in an uncoordinated way, or commit resources based on individual instead of strategic considerations. In social psychology, this phenomenon is termed impres- sion management (Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Patriotta & Spedale, 2009). In addition to ineffective information sharing and resource deployment, actions driven by motives of impression management also tend to ham- per the development of trust (Garnett et al., 2007). Trust, importantly, has been shown to increase the willingness to share information and to initiate cooper- ation (Dawes et al., 2004; Karp, Sebbag, Peiser, Dukhno, Ovnat, Levy, Hyam, Blumenfeld, Kluger, Simon & Shaked, 2007; Saab, Tapia, Maitland, Maldon- ado & Tchouakeu, 2013). Through this mechanism, the presence of just a few organizations following impression management logics has the potential to dis- rupt the effectiveness of the larger operation. Trust develops through successful cooperation over

time (Beck & Plowman, 2014; Kapucu, 2006; Saab et al., 2013) and is of particular importance in decen- tralized disaster response operations where collabora- tion is not enforced through hierarchy (Kapucu, 2006). When self-serving agendas and problems related to impression management are absent, agen- cies often develop a shared identity as being part of the disaster response effort (Beck et al., 2014), which fosters trust and in turn encourages the prioritization of superordinate goals over the tactical or strategic goals of each individual agency. As a means to reduce problems related to impres-

sion management, self-organization and delegation can reduce the need for cooperation. This in turn limits the consequences of a lack of trust and helps to con- tain the adverse effects of impression management. A strong vertical hierarchy might also mitigate this prob- lem (Adrot & Moriceau, 2013; Kapucu, 2006), but both strong centralization and decentralization come at a price (cf. below).

3.3 Coordination & Control

Effective coordination requires a clear idea by all par- ties of the command structure, the roles to be played by agencies involved in the joint effort and the capabil- ities and resources that these agencies have at their disposal (Comfort, 1994; Stephenson, 2007; Wise, 2006). A coordination plan outlines the roles and command structures (Comfort, 1994), and significant coordination problems regularly occur when such a plan is missing (Ana, Sridhar, Olakunle & Gregory, 2007; Moe et al., 2006; Wise, 2006) or not enacted, for example, in early stages of a disaster response activity (Beck et al., 2014). The persons and agencies to be coordinated require a clear understanding of the plan in order to be able to enact it (e.g., Col, 2007; L�opez Carresi, 2008; Olejarski et al., 2010).

Dawes et al. (2004) concluded that the main role of disaster response plans should not be to prescribe action but to inform all parties about their roles and responsibilities, as well as about scenarios and poten- tial threats. The coordination plan needs to be as lean and simple as possible to limit the amount of training necessary to successfully enact it in a disaster response situation (cf. Moynihan, 2008). The success- ful enactment of a plan requires training in the form of exercises and/or practical exposure (cf. above). Exercises are also important for effective plan devel- opment, serving as stress tests for coordination plans (Lutz et al., 2008; Salmon et al., 2011). If a plan works poorly in a training scenario, respecification may be required. A visual representation of the plan is also important, for example, through the visualization of each agency’s role in the response plan (Militello, Pat- terson, Bowman & Wears, 2007; Salmon et al., 2011). Physical artefacts also benefit plan enactment and coordination on the operational level, for example, to identify decision-makers at the disaster site (Ardagh, Richardson, Robinson, Than, Gee, Henderson, Kho- daverdi, McKie, Robertson, Schroeder & Deely, 2012).

There has been a longstanding debate regarding the degree to which coordination should be centralized and, relatively, to what degree decision-making should be distributed among network actors in a disaster response system (Garnett et al., 2007). Centralized coordination and decision-making allow for strong strategic planning and resource deployment and facili- tate the development of a common operational pic- ture. However, it is also demanding with respect to leadership, information processing and decision-making. Decentralization allows more flexible and potentially more resilient operations, at the cost of a loss of capacity for strategic action (Cheng, 2013; Kilby, 2008; Phillips, Neal, Wikle, Subanthore & Hyrapiet, 2008; Simon et al., 2001; Th�evenaz & Resodihardjo, 2010). Another downside of centralization is that local efforts might be hampered or even supplanted by the central- ized response. This might lead to a loss of speed and effectiveness in disaster response (Alexander, 2010). Leonard and Howitt (2010) stated that spatial decen- tralization of decision-making is less risky, as spatial decentralization promotes quicker reactions to on-the- scene occurrences, especially when upstream commu- nication is difficult. Another way to decentralize is along the lines of organizations, which also limits the capacity for unified action and in particular the coordi- nated allocation of resources but circumvents many problems of centralized coordination (Rimstad et al., 2014). Centralized coordination can create a bottle- neck. If this bottleneck is wide enough, that is if the coordinating person or agency is capable, with respect to resources as well as skills, of processing the incom- ing information, developing a common operational

64 Norbert Steigenberger

picture, coordinating action in response and utilizing the available resources, then a centralized command is superior to one that is decentralized. If the bottleneck is too narrow, damage to the disaster response system can be severe, as resources and capabilities will remain underutilized, decisions may be stalled or not taken at all, and a common operational picture will not be in place or will be inaccurate. This results in a greatly reduced capacity for effective and efficient strategic and operational coordination.

Another coordination problem is a lack of leader- ship, especially at the staff level, which can result from information overload or work overload (Helsloot, 2005; Linnenluecke et al., 2013), lack of mental resili- ence (Crichton et al., 2001; Schneider, 2008) or lack of expertise and experience (Parker, Stern, Paglia & Brown, 2009; Th�evenaz et al., 2010). Lack of leader- ship leads to reactive or paralytic decision-making, poorly coordinated and ineffective action on ground, isolation and duplication of efforts and misplacement of resources (Lalonde, 2004; Olejarski et al., 2010). This problem tends to be most salient in the early stages of a disaster response event, where roles and structures have not yet been established, and time pressure is particularly high (Beck et al., 2014). Obser- vant and careful staffing, intense advanced training and the establishment of an efficient coordination and communication plan are the means to minimize lead- ership problems.

The effectiveness of leadership also depends on the personalities and leadership capacities of the decision- makers. Lalonde (2004) found three different decision- maker archetypes: collectivist, reactor and integrator. Olejarski et al. (2010) later added paralytic as a fourth type. Collectivists communicate very actively and adopt their approach to different needs and situations, while integrators show a problem-oriented approach, focusing on the identification of first-best solutions. The other two archetypes tend to stall decision-mak- ing, which is often problematic. Currently, there is a limited understanding of why and when decision- makers act according to these archetypes. It is likely that intrapersonal as well as organizational and situa- tional contingencies play a role.

A less-studied coordination problem is bureaucratic decision-making, which has been found to hamper coordination activities in some cases (Sobel et al., 2007; Takeda & Helms, 2006; Weeks, 2007). The gen- eral advice is to limit bureaucracy as far as possible in particular when time pressure is an issue and situa- tional dynamics are high. Reimer, Kulig, Edge, Lightfoot and Townshend (2013) discuss the benefits of bureau- cratic decision-making in some detail and conclude that bureaucratic decision-making should be primarily employed when rapid decision-making in a stable envi- ronment is required. Bureaucratic decision-making

also requires continues attempts to obtain legitimacy, otherwise this form of coordination will turn into a burden for the disaster response operation. If a situa- tion demands flexibility, bureaucratic approaches should be avoided (Reimer et al., 2013). Cultural heterogeneity can be a problem for multi-

agency coordination in international operations (Perry, 2007; Phillips et al., 2008; Schaafstal, Johnston & Oser, 2001). Although there have been various reports that cultural issues are problematic with respect to the relationship between the disaster response agencies and the people in need (Cheng, 2013; Phillips et al., 2008), there has been little research on the effect of heterogeneous cultures on the communication and coordination between agencies. Trust, as a precondi- tion for successful coordination, is also an important topic in the field of coordination and control, as dis- cussed above.

4. Contingency conditions

The next step in the analysis is to study case charac- teristics and to establish boundary conditions of the obtained insights. Table 1 shows a descriptive analysis of the sampled studies. Based on a cross-tabulation of

Table 1. Contingency Conditions

Studies in total

Type of disaster

Natural 54 (68%) Technical breakdown 9 (11%) Terrorist attack 12 (15%) Exercise 5 (6%)

Urbanization Urban 45 (56%) Rural 35 (44%)

Economic status

Developed country 63 (79%) Developing country 17 (21%)

Focal agency First responder, SAR, Hospital 19 (24%) Professional staff 20 (25%) Governmental staff 27 (34%) NGO 4 (5%) Other 10 (12%)

Level Staff/Command 38 (47%) Operational 26 (33%) Both 16 (20%)

Methodology1 Interviews 29 (36%) Primary data (surveys etc.) 4 (5%) Personal experience (author was part of the disaster response effort)

3 (4%)

Field observations (author observed the disaster response effort)

9 (11%)

Secondary data (reports etc.) 61 (76%)

SAR, search and rescue. 1 A number of studies had more than one data source. The per- centage relates to the total number of studies in the sample and therefore do not total 100%.

Organizing for the Big One 65

findings from these studies, it is possible to identify case characteristics that affect the obtained results. First, we see a focus on developed countries, while

disasters that occur in developing countries have received scarce coverage. Even when a disaster in a developing country was the focus of a case study, that study often examined the actions of first-world organi- zations. Examples include cases in which western organizations acted in the aftermath of the Pacific Tsu- nami in 2004 (Perry, 2007; Telford et al., 2007) or the 2010 Haiti Earthquake (Nolte et al., 2011; Yates & Paquette, 2011). Considering that training and planning play a crucial role for successful disaster response (cf. above), and also considering that developing countries seldom have the resources to train personnel to the extent developed countries do, this lack of research regarding disaster response in developing countries is unfortunate. Lack of planning (Bang, 2012; Moe et al., 2006) and lack of skills and coordination (Ana et al., 2007) have been shown to impair disaster response efforts in developing countries, while autonomy and flexibility have been shown to be helpful (Kilby, 2008; Phillips et al., 2008). These few studies indicate that developing countries require somewhat modified approaches to multi-agency disaster response manage- ment compared to those in developed countries and would likely best focus on local autonomy and flexibil- ity. The same is true for intersector collaboration, when public sector organizations interact with private organizations as well as organizations from other cul- tural backgrounds. However, the literature is currently too sparse to allow strong recommendations. Disaster response operations in urban vs. rural envi-

ronments pose some specific challenges regarding the management of dysfunctional infrastructures and the need for search missions to cover large areas. However, differences in coordination, communication, command and control are small in this study’s data set. In urban environments, information overflow seems to be a lar- ger problem than in rural environments (Butts et al., 2007; Dawes et al., 2004), while the spatial extension of operations in rural settings has occasionally been a prob- lem for the development of shared mental models (e.g., Beck et al., 2014; Smith & Dowell, 2000). This implies that in rural environments an appropriate command structure would involve a larger degree of decentraliza- tion compared to an operation in urban environments, for example, in the form of local hubs rather than one central headquarters (e.g., Beck et al., 2014). The effect of other issues, such as skill levels, coordination and leadership, does not visibly change with respect to the urbanization of the target area. The studies sampled for this review show a bias

towards natural disasters, but there is no indication in the data that the nature of a disaster has an effect on the multi-agency disaster response operation, aside

from the effect that natural disasters tend to lead to larger disaster response operations than technical breakdowns or terrorist attacks. Regarding the focal agency, a rather specific pattern emerges, based on the roles actors play in the multi-agency disaster response. While first responders and on-scene staff struggle with problems of reconnaissance, the techni- cal infrastructure, technical skills, plan enactment, information sharing (e.g., Kapucu, 2006; Lutz et al., 2008) and typical issues for coordinating staff are information overload, communication problems or dif- ficulties from lack of experience (Comfort, 1994; Par- ker et al., 2009; Wise, 2006). In summary, different challenges are faced by personnel on the ground and the staff responsible for coordinating a disaster response effort. Still, these differences are straightfor- ward and are based on the respective roles.

With respect to methodology, secondary data, such as those available in reports prepared for governmen- tal bodies, are by far the most relevant data source for case studies in this field of research. In 43 studies, secondary data were actually the only data source employed to characterize the case. Considering that secondary data are often of doubtful quality (Birkland, 2009), this is a dangerous method choice. Insights obtained from a case study rest on more solid ground if the researchers triangulate data sources, for exam- ple, through the acquisition of own data, either in the form of interviews, surveys, observations or, prefer- ably, a combination of sources and methods (Bansal & Corley, 2011; Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2013). A good example of a study backed by strong data is the case study by Beck et al. (2014) on the 2003 Colum- bia shuttle recovery mission. The authors conducted interviews, evaluated secondary data (e.g., meeting notes and media reports) and archival data and drew on observations. Although not all studies can or need to be so broad in their data acquisition, a multi-source approach is advisable. That said, in the conducted analysis the choice of method has no visible impact on study results, although studies with stronger data typically arrive at more nuanced and detailed results.

5. Discussion

The third and concluding step in the analysis is research synthesis, aligning the insights obtained in a comprehensive framework and delineating important areas for future research, based on both the qualita- tive data analysis and the analysis of contingency con- ditions. Figure 2 depicts the relationships that emerged from the sampled empirical literature. Con- sidering that this research incorporated 80 case stud- ies, the framework is surprisingly consistent. In fact, results overlap substantially between the case studies.

66 Norbert Steigenberger

In the lower section of Figure 2 are the three main themes that are required to successfully manage a dis- aster event: cognition, communication and coordina- tion. Above are the contingencies that affect each other as well as these three themes, ordered such that those conditions that can be influenced during the disaster management effort are found below those that typically cannot. The arrows indicate positive (solid line) or negative (dashed line) relationships. Dotted lines imply that the direction of an effect is contingent upon other conditions.

Operational conditions or decisions often mediate the relationship between predisaster conditions and cognition, communication and coordination. Trust, for example, affects coordination and communication and is affected by whether or not the actors are acquainted, the training they received, cultural hetero- geneity and political agendas. Many relationships are straightforward and well-recognized. Stress, for exam- ple, negatively affects a person’s ability for cognition and coordination, while a dysfunctional communica- tion infrastructure hampers or destroys the ability to communicate effectively during disaster management. Only two cases of moderation appear in the frame- work: skills and experience moderate the relationship between plans and communication and between plans and coordination. For our scholarly understanding of the phenomenon, Figure 2 delineates where our understanding is currently well developed.

Taking a practice perspective, the arrows indicate what disaster management should think about when

preparing for or acting in a disaster response situation. For example, it is important to develop an under- standing of the magnitude of the disaster quickly, to respond appropriately with regard to plans, stress management and the use of appropriate technical tools (Crichton et al., 2009; Flin, O’Connor & Crich- ton, 2008). The topics displayed in Figure 2 need not be in place or be relevant in all disaster response activities. Impression management and cultural differ- ences, for example, are an important consideration in international and cross-sectoral response operations, but are less relevant in operations without these char- acteristics. The boxes can be read positively as well as negatively. Dysfunctional communication infrastructure is an often-occurring burden for communication, implying that a resilient communication infrastructure is a solid ground for effective communication. Building resilience regarding communications is therefore an important step to increase the effectiveness of a disas- ter response situation. Based on the general depiction of conditions and

effects in Figure 2, the following section provides an elaborate discussion of two key topics who are central in many disaster response operations and whose effects are nuanced and contingent. The first is plan enactment. The existence of a plan outlining the com- munication and coordination structures is of critical importance for a successful multi-agency disaster response. The size of the disaster and the availability of resources in the command staff are the most important contingencies making up the coordination

Figure 2. Integrative framework, based on results from this study.

Organizing for the Big One 67

plan. For large-scale disasters, disasters for which the central command has restricted capacities as well as for disasters where interorganizational coordination is not a big issue, plans with decentralized coordination structures are appropriate. For small-scale operations or for complex operations with interorganizational dependencies, stronger centralization is preferable, requiring a well-staffed and well-trained command. Communication plans should, in both cases, be abstract, referring to roles and functions rather than specific persons. The plan’s most important function is the definition of roles, ideally with a practical prescrip- tion for how these roles should be enacted in a disas- ter situation. Another important aspect is that the development of the plan itself can increase awareness for the potential magnitude of a disaster event (Crich- ton et al., 2009). There is a critical debate regarding the usefulness of

plans for disaster response management and organiza- tional preparedness in more generality. Plans can be what Clarke (1999) termed ‘fantasy documents’ (p. 2), rhetorical tools to establish legitimacy within an orga- nization or an interorganizational system, instead of actual guidelines for critical situations (see Harmon, Green & Goodnight, 2014 on the relationship between rhetorical tools and legitimacy). Other authors challenge the ability of plans to successfully structure emergent and complex operations such as those found in disaster response management, due to unpredictability and complexity (Brown & Eriksson, 2008; Eriksson & McConnell, 2011). Yet the studies examined in this review provide little empirical evi- dence that both critical points were of substantive importance in the examined disaster response efforts. While it is clear that even a good plan cannot guaran- tee the success of a disaster response operation due to the uncertainty entailed, the case studies reviewed provide strong support for the notion that effective plans substantially strengthen the likelihood that a dis- aster response effort will be successful, also providing insights regarding how an effective plan should look like based on various contingencies (cf. above). One important insight obtained in the review is that a rela- tively small number of problems tend to occur very frequently in disaster response operations, in particu- lar the collapse of the communication infrastructure, incomplete or inappropriate information sharing, for example due to cultural differences, and ineffective or overburdened leadership. Developing plans that con- sider these standard problems as contingency condi- tions would be an important step towards a resilient disaster response system (cf. Eriksson et al., 2011; Stern, 2013). The second point warranting discussion is the mul-

tiple roles of exercises. Exercises affect disaster response management positively via four mechanisms.

Firstly, they provide a platform for the development of advanced work-related skills and decision-making capacities (Dunbar & Garud, 2009; Klein, 1995). Lar- ger scale exercises also create opportunities to learn from other organizations (Moynihan, 2008). Secondly, exercises provide the chance to expose participants to the disaster response plan, the roles of participating agencies, their duties and obligations and to the infor- mation requirements and command structures of other agencies, all of which set the ground for suc- cessful plan enactment. Thirdly, interagency training fosters personal acquaintances and relationships between key personnel. Personal acquaintance is a powerful tool for self-coordination and self-adaption, a baseline for the shared understanding of roles and information demands, and a fallback position should the hierarchical command structure fail (Cramton, 2001; Dawes et al., 2004; Kapucu, 2006; Phillips et al., 2008; Rimstad et al., 2014). Finally, exercises allow for the evaluation and improvement of existing disaster response plans. If a plan does not work well during an exercise, its revision may be advisable. A well-exe- cuted exercise should therefore account for all these goals. Training can be supplemented by practical expe- rience, but the ability to achieve this goal is clearly limited by the fact that most of those involved in a disaster response operation experience these events very seldom. There is also the danger of adverse learning, when success in carrying out a complex operation might be causally misattributed if lucky cir- cumstances were the reason for a positive outcome or vice versa (Dunbar et al., 2009; Moynihan, 2008; Roese & Olson, 1996). Exercises have therefore a key role to play in developing resilient disaster response capacities. Serious and honest postaction analyses or other appropriate learning forums can improve the degree of learning from exercises (Leonard, Graham & Bonacum, 2004; Leonard-Barton, 1990; Moynihan, 2008).

In general, it seems advisable to approach multi- agency disaster response management in terms of contingencies and backup plans (Dawes et al., 2004). What actions must be taken if one part of a pre- planned disaster response system fails? What actions must be taken if an important factor develops differ- ently than expected? Typical contingencies are the col- lapse of the communication infrastructure, the absence of key personnel and, subsequently, loss of leadership, or a need to rely on inexperienced person- nel. Advanced planning for these types of situations can substantially improve the resilience of a multi- agency disaster response operation.

Two unresolved problems are the disruptive aspects of impression management and unskilled leadership. Practical preventive steps are to staff key positions with agencies and persons unlikely to be influenced by these

68 Norbert Steigenberger

motives and to establish a strong command structure. Decision-makers in operational disaster response activi- ties must have extensive expertise (cf. Crichton et al., 2009). Key decision-makers should be well-trained pro- fessionals from the field and not, for example, politicians or other nonprofessionals. Political leadership is impor- tant, especially with regard to communicating with stakeholders and legitimizing trade-off decisions, but the operational management of disaster response activities requires expertise that political leaders typically do not have and/or are reluctant to develop (Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003; Schneider, 2005). In this review, we found that most empirical studies focusing on decision-makers with a political background concluded that the respec- tive disaster response activity suffered from suboptimal leadership.

6. Research agenda

Over all, findings overlap strongly between studies, implying that the consistently reported themes depicted in Figure 2 are important considerations for multi-agency disaster response management. While these core themes are well understood and recognized, there are a number of gaps in the literature. First, recent research on disaster response is descriptive and focused on highly visible phenomena, while there is very limited understanding of the reasons, precondi- tions and consequences of observed relationships. For example, while we know that a clear understanding of roles is important, we have a fragmented idea at best of how individuals and agencies responsible for disaster response activities arrive at a clear understanding of their roles. Roles are enacted by role-typical behaviour (Bechky, 2006), and, although the roles of individuals within organizations are fairly stable, the roles of indi- viduals and agencies in complex task environments such as a multi-agency disaster response are often not clear from the outset, but are negotiated and enacted ‘on the run’ (Beck et al., 2014). It is also important to note that there is a limit to planning, as, in particular, in large-scale disasters, the response operation might par- tially emerge from situational dynamics, such as individ- ual initiative of specific persons, spatial proximity or remoteness of key actors (Schweinberger et al., 2014). Currently, our understanding of this emergent charac- ter of disaster response is limited. Role taking in disas- ter response is a complex process and one we know very little about.

Following this notion, it would also be important to study empirically how the predictability of a disaster event affects decision-makers’ perceptions as well as their ability to successfully enact plans and assign and take roles in a disaster response operation. In particu- lar, cascading disasters such as the East Japan earth- quake of 2011, which led to a tsunami, a meltdown in

a nuclear power plant as well as energy outages (Baubion, 2013), might provide an interesting field to study how interlinked disaster events affect each other and how the escalation of magnitude can be dealt with regarding decision-making and disaster response per- formance (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Adaptive response systems, resting on stronger decentralization, have been suggested (Baubion, 2013), but currently we have little strong empirical evidence on how disaster response systems deal with disaster escalation and related uncertainties. Leadership plays an important role in disaster

response management, yet we know little about the personality characteristics that distinguish effective leaders from those who are less effective. The con- cept of leader archetypes, as brought forward by Lalonde (2004), is an important step, but the condi- tions for the emergence of these archetypes are not well understood, nor are the consequences (Moynihan & van Wart, 2013). Accordingly, we do currently not fully understand why some persons lead effectively while others do not in disaster response operations. The notion that stress plays a role in disaster

response suggests the importance of other factors affecting cognition and decision-making, such as emo- tions (Barsade, 2002; Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Epstein, 1994) or mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Dane, 2011). Another promising concept linking cog- nition with disaster response outcomes is sensemak- ing, as highlighted in other literatures (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, 1993). Sensemaking describes how individuals facing an unknown situation interpret this situation individually and collectively, contingent upon, for example, experience, role, orga- nizational culture, focus of attention or emotions (Lockett, Currie, Finn, Martin & Waring, 2014; Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis, Vogus & Lawrence, 2013; Steigenberger, 2015). Sensemaking is a particularly promising theoret- ical framework for disaster response management, as it acknowledges explicitly that individuals interpret ongoing events not in a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ way but develop individually plausible interpretations based on their respective situation, which explains why inter- pretations of events diverge substantially between indi- viduals, groups and organizations at a given point in time (Weick, 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005). Considering sensemaking as the link between cogni- tion and action, we can derive a clearer understanding of the cognitive and affective underpinnings of multi- agency coordination, as some studies demonstrated (e.g., Adrot et al., 2013; Linnenluecke et al., 2013; Schraagen et al., 2011). Employing these and other conceptually well-rooted theories could be the next step towards a theory of disaster response manage- ment, which is currently only vaguely visible on the horizon.

Organizing for the Big One 69

Finally, there is an evident need to develop insights about disaster response operations in developing countries, where resources are scarce, infrastructures are relatively underdeveloped, and frequent training and generous staffing are often not available (e.g., Bang, 2012; Porfiriev, 1996). At present, knowledge is limited regarding how multi-agency systems could work effectively under these conditions. Considering that the many large-scale disasters strike in developing countries (Eshghi et al., 2008), this shortcoming needs to be addressed.

7. Conclusions

This paper synthesized the findings of 80 case studies on multi-agency coordination in disaster response management. Although the observed cases were heterogeneous with respect to various dimensions, a limited number of themes emerged that affect disaster response performance. For practical disaster response management, the main findings are that the develop- ment of a well-tailored plan and effective training are of paramount importance. An effective disaster response plan outlines roles and responsibilities and prescribes a command structure that is as decentral- ized as necessary and as centralized as possible. A good disaster response strategy also includes what if thinking. Some conditions pose frequent problems for disaster response plans. These include the collapse of the telecommunication infrastructure, a shortage of skilled personnel and the unanticipated magnitude of a disaster event. Disaster response plans should allow for these contingencies. Training provides skills, informs those involved about every actor’s roles and responsibilities, builds informal networks and serves as a stress test for disaster response plans. With respect to theory and future research needs, various open questions remain, which will require deductive research approaches. Sensemaking processes, the dynamics of role taking as well as cognitive and affec- tive processes in leadership and coordination all require further research. We have come a long way in understanding the preconditions of success and failure in disaster response, but at the same time, it seems that the journey has just begun.

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by a research grant obtained from the German Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium f€ur Bildung und Forschung), Grant Nr. 13N13014. The author wishes to acknowl- edge the financial support received. I also thank Mir- iam Heinzen for practical support in developing this manuscript.

References Adrot, A. and Moriceau, J.-L. (2013), ‘Introducing Performativity to Crisis Management Theory: An Illustration From the 2003 French Heat Wave Crisis Response’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 21, Number 1, pp. 26–44.

Ahmadun, F.R., Shalu, I.M. and Aini, M.S. (2003), ‘Review of an Incident at a Petrochemical Plant’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 85–90.

Alexander, D.E. (2010), ‘The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy on Disaster Response’, Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, Volume 2, Number 4, pp. 325–342.

Ana, G., Sridhar, M., Olakunle, E.O. and Gregory, A.U. (2007), ‘Bomb Explosions, Environment and Health: A Nigerian Experience’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 16, Number 1, pp. 6–14.

Ardagh, M.W., Richardson, S.K., Robinson, V., Than, M., Gee, P., Henderson, S., Khodaverdi, L., McKie, J., Robertson, G., Schroeder, P.P. and Deely, J.M. (2012), ‘The Initial Health-System Response to the Earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand, in February, 2011’, The Lancet, Volume 379, Number 9831, pp. 2109–2115.

Bang, H.N. (2012), ‘Disaster Management in Cameroon: The Lake Nyos Disaster Experience’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 21, Number 4, pp. 489–506.

Bansal, P. and Corley, K.G. (2011), ‘The Coming of Age for Qualitative Research: Embracing the Diversity of Qualitative Methods’, Academy of Management Journal, Volume 54, Number 2, pp. 233–237.

Barsade, S.G. (2002), ‘The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and Its Influence on Group Behavior’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 47, Number 4, pp. 644–675.

Baubion, C. (2013), OECD Risk Management: Strategic Crisis Management, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance.

Bechky, B.A. (2006), ‘Gaffers, Gofers, and Grips: Role-Based Coordination in Temporary Organizations’, Organization Science, Volume 17, Number 1, pp. 3–21.

Beck, T.E. and Plowman, D.A. (2014), ‘Temporary, Emergent Interorganizational Collaboration in Unexpected Circumstances: A Study of the Columbia Space Shuttle Response Effort’, Organization Science, Volume 25, Number 4, pp. 1234–1252.

Berlin, J.M. and Carlstr€om, E.D. (2011), ‘Why is Collaboration Minimised at the Accident Scene?: A Critical Study of a Hidden Phenomenon’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 20, Number 2, pp. 159–171.

Birkland, T.A. (2009), ‘Disasters, Lessons Learned, and Fantasy Documents’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 17, Number 3, pp. 146–156.

Birkland, T.A. and DeYoung, S.E. (2011), ‘Emergency Response, Doctrinal Confusion, and Federalism in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Volume 41, Number 3, pp. 471–493.

Boin, A. and ‘t Hart, P. (2003), ‘Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?’, Public Administration Review, Volume 63, Number 5, pp. 544–553.

Bouwer, L.M. (2011), ‘Have Disaster Losses Increased Due to Anthropogenic Climate Change?’, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Volume 92, Number 1, pp. 39–46.

Brown, K.W. and Ryan, R.M. (2003), ‘The Benefits of Being Present: Mindfulness and Its Role in Psychological Well-Being’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Volume 84, Number 4, pp. 822–848.

Brown, C. and Eriksson, K. (2008), ‘A Plan for (Certain) Failure: Possibilities for and Challenges of More Realistic Emergency Plans’, International Journal of Emergency Management, Volume 5, Number 3/4, pp. 292–310.

Butts, C.T., Petrescu-Prahova, M. and Cross, B.R. (2007), ‘Responder Communication Networks in the World Trade Center Disaster: Implications for Modeling of Communication Within Emergency Settings’, The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Volume 31, Number 2, pp. 121–147.

Catino, M. and Patriotta, G. (2013), ‘Learning From Errors: Cognition, Emotions and Safety Culture in the Italian Air Force’, Organization Studies, Volume 34, Number 4, pp. 437–467.

Celik, S. and Corbacioglu, S. (2010), ‘Role of Information in Collective Action in Dynamic Disaster Environments’, Disasters, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 137–154.

Cheng, S.S. (2013), ‘Crisis Communication Failure: A Case Study of Typhoon Morakot’, Asian Social Science, Volume 9, Number 3, pp. 18–32.

Choo, C.W. and Nadarajah, I. (2014), ‘Early Warning Information Seeking in the 2009 Victorian Bushfires’, Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, Volume 65, Number 1, pp. 84–97.

70 Norbert Steigenberger

Clarke, L. (1999), Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Col, J.-M. (2007), ‘Managing Disasters: The Role of Local Government’, Public Administration Review, Volume 67, Number s1, pp. 114–124.

Coleman, L. (2006), ‘Frequency of Man-Made Disasters in the 20th Century’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 14, Number 1, pp. 3–11.

Comfort, L.K. (1994), ‘Risk and Resilience: Inter-Organizational Learning Following the Northridge Earthquake of 17 January 1994’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 2, Number 3, pp. 157–170.

Comfort, L.K. (2007), ‘Crisis Management in Hindsight: Cognition, Communication, Coordination, and Control’, Public Administration Review, Volume 67, Number s1, pp. 189–197.

Connelly, M. (2006), ‘IMERT Deployment to Baton Rouge, Louisiana in Response to Hurricane Katrina, September 2005’, Disaster Management & Response, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 4–11.

Cramton, C.D. (2001), ‘The Mutual Knowledge Problem And Its Consequences for Dispersed Collaboration’, Organization Science, Volume 12, Number 3, pp. 346–371.

Crichton, M. and Flin, R. (2001), ‘Training for Emergency Management: Tactical Decision Games’, Journal of Hazardous Materials, Volume 88, Number 2–3, pp. 255–266.

Crichton, M., Lauche, K. and Flin, R. (2005), ‘Incident Command Skills in the Management of an Oil Industry Drilling Incident: a Case Study’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 13, Number 3, pp. 116–128.

Crichton, M., Ramsay, C.G. and Kelly, T. (2009), ‘Enhancing Organizational Resilience Through Emergency Planning: Learnings From Cross-Sectoral Lessons’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 17, Number 1, pp. 24–37.

Cyganik, K.A. (2003), ‘Disaster Preparedness in Virginia Hospital Center- Arlington After Sept 11, 2001’, Disaster Management & Response, Volume 1, Number 3, pp. 80–86.

Dane, E. (2011), ‘Paying Attention to Mindfulness and Its Effects on Task Performance in the Workplace’, Journal of Management, Volume 37, Number 4, pp. 997–1018.

Dawes, S.S., Cresswell, A.M. and Cahan, B.B. (2004), ‘Learning From Crisis: Lessons in Human and Information Infrastructure From the World Trade Center Response’, Social Science Computer Review, Volume 22, Number 1, pp. 52–66.

Dunbar, R.L.M. and Garud, R. (2009), ‘Distributed Knowledge and Indeterminate Meaning: The Case of the Columbia Shuttle Flight’, Organization Studies, Volume 30, Number 4, pp. 397–421.

Endsley, M.R. (1995), ‘Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems’, Human Factors, Volume 37, Number 1, pp. 32–64.

Epstein, S. (1994), ‘Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious’, American Psychologist, Volume 49, Number 8, pp. 709–724.

Eriksson, K. and McConnell, A. (2011), ‘Contingency Planning for Crisis Management: Recipe for Success or Political Fantasy?’, Policy and Society, Volume 30, Number 2, pp. 89–99.

Eshghi, K. and Larson, R.C. (2008), ‘Disasters: Lessons From the Past 105 Years’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 17, Number 1, pp. 62–82.

Faraj, S. and Xiao, Y. (2006), ‘Coordination in Fast-Response Organizations’, Management Science, Volume 52, Number 8, pp. 1155–1169.

Flannery, R.B. and Everly, G.S. (2004), ‘Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM): Updated Review of Findings, 1998–2002’, Aggression and Violent Behavior, Volume 9, Number 4, pp. 319–329.

Flin, R.H., O’Connor, P. and Crichton, M. (2008), Safety at the Sharp end: A Guide to non-Technical Skills. Ashgate, Aldershot.

Garnett, J.L. and Kouzmin, A. (2007), ‘Communication Throughout Katrina: Competing and Complementary Conceptual Lenses on Crisis Com- munication’, Public Administration Review, Volume 67, Number s1, pp. 171–188.

Gioia, D.A., Corley, K.G. and Hamilton, A.L. (2013), ‘Seeking Qualitative Rigor in Inductive Research: Notes on the Gioia Methodology’, Organizational Research Methods, Volume 16, Number 1, pp. 15–31.

Harmon, D.J., Green, S.E. and Goodnight, G.T. (2014), ‘A Model of Rhetorical Legitimation: The Structure of Communication and Cognition Underlying Institutional Maintenance and Change’, Academy of Management Review, Volume 40, Number 1, pp. 76–95.

Helsloot, I. (2005), ‘Bordering on Reality: Findings on the Bonfire Crisis Management Simulation’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 13, Number 4, pp. 159–169.

Hoon, C. (2013), ‘Meta-Synthesis of Qualitative Case Studies: An Approach to Theory Building’, Organizational Research Methods, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 522–556.

Hunt, S., Smith, K., Hamerton, H. and Sargisson, R.J. (2014), ‘An Incident Control Centre in Action: Response to the Rena Oil Spill in New Zealand’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 22, Number 1, pp. 63–66.

Jones, O. and Gatrell, C. (2014), ‘Editorial: The Future of Writing and Reviewing for IJMR’, International Journal of Management Reviews, Volume 16, Number 3, pp. 249–264.

Kapucu, N. (2006), ‘Interagency Communication Networks During Emergencies: Boundary Spanners in Multiagency Coordination’, The American Review of Public Administration, Volume 36, Number 2, pp. 207–225.

Karp, E., Sebbag, G., Peiser, J., Dukhno, O., Ovnat, A., Levy, I., Hyam, E., Blumenfeld, A., Kluger, Y., Simon, D. and Shaked, G. (2007), ‘Mass Casualty Incident After the Taba Terrorist Attack; an Organizational and Medical Challenge’, Disasters, Volume 31, Number 1, pp. 104–112.

Kilby, P. (2008), ‘The Strength of Networks: the Local NGO Response to the Tsunami in India’, Disasters, Volume 32, Number 1, pp. 120–130.

Klein, G.A. (1995), ‘A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid Decision Making’, in Klein, G.A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. and Zsambok, C.E. (eds), Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods (2nd edn), Ablex Publishing, Norwood, pp. 138–148.

Lalonde, C. (2004), ‘In Search of Archetypes in Crisis Management’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 76–88.

Lalonde, C. (2007), ‘The Potential Contribution of the Field of Organizational Development to Crisis Management’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 15, Number 2, pp. 95–104.

Leary, M.R. and Kowalski, R.M. (1990), ‘Impression Management: A Literature Review and Two-Component Model’, Psychological Bulletin, Volume 107, Number 1, pp. 34–47.

Leonard, M., Graham, S. and Bonacum, D. (2004), ‘The Human Factor: The Critical Importance of Effective Teamwork and Communication in Providing Safe Care’, British Medical Journal, Volume 13, Number Supplement 1, pp. i85–i90.

Leonard, H.B. and Howitt, A.M. (2010), ‘Organising Response to Extreme Emergencies: The Victorian Bushfires of 2009’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Volume 69, Number 4, pp. 372–386.

Leonard-Barton, D. (1990), ‘A Dual Methodology for Case Studies: Synergistic Use of a Longitudinal Single Site With Replicated Multiple Sites’, Organization Science, Volume 1, Number 3, pp. 248–266.

Linnenluecke, M.K. and Griffiths, A. (2013), ‘The 2009 Victorian Bushfires: A Multilevel Perspective on Organizational Risk and Resilience’, Organization & Environment, Volume 26, Number 4, pp. 386–411.

Lockett, A., Currie, G., Finn, R., Martin, G. and Waring, J. (2014), ‘The Influence of Social Position on Sensemaking About Organizational Change’, Academy of Management Journal, Volume 57, Number 4, pp. 1102–1129.

L�opez Carresi, A. (2008), ‘The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings: an Analysis of pre-Hospital Management’, Disasters, Volume 32, Number 1, pp. 41–65.

Lutz, L.D. and Lindell, M.K. (2008), ‘Incident Command System as a Response Model Within Emergency Operation Centers During Hurricane Rita’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 16, Number 3, pp. 122–134.

Maitlis, S. (2005), ‘The Social Process of Organizational Sensemaking’, Academy of Management Journal, Volume 49, Number 1, pp. 21–49.

Maitlis, S. and Sonenshein, S. (2010), ‘Sensemaking in Crisis and Change: Inspirations and Insights From Weick (1988)’, Journal of Management Studies, Volume 47, Number 3, pp. 551–580.

Maitlis, S., Vogus, T.J. and Lawrence, T.B. (2013), ‘Sensemaking and Emotion in Organizations’, Organizational Psychology Review, Volume 3, Number 3, pp. 222–247.

Militello, L.G., Patterson, E.S., Bowman, L. and Wears, R. (2007), ‘Information Flow During Crisis Management: Challenges to Coordination in the Emergency Operations Center’, Cognition, Technology & Work, Volume 9, Number 1, pp. 25–31.

Moe, T.L. and Pathranarakul, P. (2006), ‘An Integrated Approach to Natural Disaster Management: Public Project Management and its Critical Success Factors’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 15, Number 3, pp. 396–413.

Moynihan, D.P. (2008), ‘Learning Under Uncertainty: Networks in Crisis Management’, Public Administration Review, Volume 68, Number 2, pp. 350– 365.

Moynihan, D.P. and van Wart, M. (2013), ‘Lessons From Leadership Theory and the Contemporary Challenges of Leaders’, Public Administration Review, Volume 73, Number 4, pp. 553–565.

Nolte, I.M. and Boenigk, S. (2011), ‘Public-Nonprofit-Partnership Performance in a Disaster Context: The Case of Haiti’, Public Administration, Volume 89, Number 4, pp. 1385–1402.

Organizing for the Big One 71

Okumura, T., Suzuki, K., Fukuda, A., Kohama, A., Takasu, N., Ishimatsu, S. and Hinohara, S. (1998), ‘The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack Disaster Management, Part 1: Community Emergency Response’, Academic Emergency Medicine, Volume 6, Number 6, pp. 613–617.

Olejarski, A.M. and Garnett, J.L. (2010), ‘Coping With Katrina: Assessing Crisis Management Behaviours in the Big One’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 18, Number 1, pp. 26–38.

Oloruntoba, R. (2013), ‘Plans Never go According to Plan: An Empirical Analysis of Challenges to Plans During the 2009 Victoria Bushfires’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Volume 80, Number 9, pp. 1674–1702.

Parker, C.F., Stern, E.K., Paglia, E. and Brown, C. (2009), ‘Preventable Catastrophe? The Hurricane Katrina Disaster Revisited’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 17, Number 4, pp. 206–220.

Paton, D. and Flin, R. (1999), ‘Disaster Stress: an Emergency Management Perspective’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 8, Number 4, pp. 261–267.

Patriotta, G. and Spedale, S. (2009), ‘Making Sense Through Face: Identity and Social Interaction in a Consultancy Task Force’, Organization Studies, Volume 30, Number 11, pp. 1227–1248.

Perry, M. (2007), ‘Natural Disaster Management Planning: A Study of Logistics Managers Responding to the Tsunami’, International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Volume 37, Number 5, pp. 409–433.

Petak, W.J. (1985), ‘Emergency Management: A Challenge for Public Administration’, Public Administration Review, Volume 45, Number s1, pp. 3–7.

Phillips, B., Neal, D., Wikle, T., Subanthore, A. and Hyrapiet, S. (2008), ‘Mass Fatality Management After the Indian Ocean Tsunami’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 17, Number 5, pp. 681–697.

Porfiriev, B.N. (1996), ‘Social Aftermath and Organizational Response to a Major Disaster: The Case of the 1995 Sakhalin Earthquake in Russia’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 4, Number 4, pp. 218–227.

Reddy, M.C., Paul, S.A., Abraham, J., McNeese, M., DeFlitch, C. and Yen, J. (2009), ‘Challenges to Effective Crisis Management: Using Information and Communication Technologies to Coordinate Emergency Medical Services and Emergency Department Teams’, International Journal of Medical Informatics, Volume 78, Number 4, pp. 259–269.

Reimer, B., Kulig, J., Edge, D., Lightfoot, N. and Townshend, I. (2013), ‘The Lost Creek Fire: Managing Social Relations Under Disaster Conditions’, Disasters, Volume 37, Number 2, pp. 317–332.

Rimstad, R., Nj�a, O., Rake, E.L. and Braut, G.S. (2014), ‘Incident Command and Information Flows in a Large-Scale Emergency Operation’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 22, Number 1, pp. 29–38.

Roese, N.J. and Olson, J.M. (1996), ‘Counterfactuals, Causal Attributions, and the Hindsight Bias: A Conceptual Integration’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 32, Number 3, pp. 197–227.

Saab, D.J., Tapia, A., Maitland, C., Maldonado, E. and Tchouakeu, L.-M.N. (2013), ‘Inter-Organizational Coordination in the Wild: Trust Building and Collaboration Among Field-Level ICT Workers in Humanitarian Relief Organizations’, VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Volume 24, Number 1, pp. 194–213.

Salmon, P., Stanton, N., Jenkins, D. and Walker, G. (2011), ‘Coordination During Multi-Agency Emergency Response: Issues and Solutions’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 20, Number 2, pp. 140–158.

Schaafstal, A.M., Johnston, J.H. and Oser, R.L. (2001), ‘Training Teams for Emergency Management’, Computers in Human Behavior, Volume 17, Number 5–6, pp. 615–626.

Schneider, S. (2005), ‘Administrative Breakdowns in the Governmental Response to Hurricane Katrina’, Public Administration Review, Volume 65, Number 5, pp. 515–516.

Schneider, S. (2008), ‘Who’s to Blame? (Mis) Perceptions of the Intergovernmental Response to Disasters’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Volume 38, Number 4, pp. 715–738.

Schraagen, J.M. and Ven, J. (2011), ‘Human Factors Aspects of ICT for Crisis Management’, Cognition, Technology & Work, Volume 13, Number 3, pp. 175–187.

Schweinberger, M., Petrescu-Prahova, M. and Vu, D.Q. (2014), ‘Disaster Response on September 11, 2001 Through the Lens of Statistical Network Analysis’, Social Networks, Volume 37, Number, pp. 42–55.

Shaluf, I.M. (2007), ‘An Overview on Disasters’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 16, Number 5, pp. 687–703.

Shaluf, I.M., Ahmadun, F.-R. and Said, A.M. (2003), ‘A Review of Disaster and Crisis’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 12, Number 1, pp. 24–32.

Simon, R. and Teperman, S. (2001), ‘The World Trade Center Attack: Lessons for Disaster Management’, Critical Care, Volume 5, Number 6, pp. 318–320.

Smith, W. and Dowell, J. (2000), ‘A Case Study of co-Ordinative Decision-Making in Disaster Management’, Ergonomics, Volume 43, Number 8, pp. 1153–1166.

Sobel, R.S. and Leeson, P.T. (2007), ‘The Use of Knowledge in Natural- Disaster Relief Management’, Independent Review, Volume 11, Number 4, pp. 519–532.

Steigenberger, N. (2015), ‘Emotions in Sensemaking: A Change Management Perspective’, Journal of Organizational Change Management, Volume 28, Number 3, pp. 432–451.

Stephenson, M. (2007), ‘Bridging the Organizational Divide: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of United States and International Humanitarian Service Delivery Structures’, VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Volume 18, Number 3, pp. 209–224.

Stern, E. (2013), ‘Preparing: The Sixth Task of Crisis Leadership’, Journal of Leadership Studies, Volume 7, Number 3, pp. 51–56.

Takeda, M.B. and Helms, M.M. (2006), ‘“Bureaucracy, Meet Catastrophe”: Analysis of Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts and Their Implications for Emergency Response Governance’, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Volume 19, Number 4, pp. 397–411.

Telford, J. and Cosgrave, J. (2007), ‘The International Humanitarian System and the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis’, Disaster Prevention and Management, Volume 31, Number 1, pp. 1–28.

Th�evenaz, C. and Resodihardjo, S.L. (2010), ‘All the Best Laid Plans. . .Conditions Impeding Proper Emergency Response’, International Journal of Production Economics, Volume 126, Number 1, pp. 7–21.

Tranfield, D., Denyer, D. and Smart, P. (2003), ‘Towards a Methodology for Developing Evidence-Informed Management Knowledge by Means of Systematic Review’, British Journal of Management, Volume 14, Number 3, pp. 207–222.

Waugh, W.L. Jr (2007), ‘EMAC, Katrina, and the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi’, Public Administration Review, Volume 67, Number s1, pp. 107–113.

Weeks, M.R. (2007), ‘Organizing for Disaster: Lessons From the Military’, Business Horizons, Volume 50, Number 6, pp. 479–489.

Weick, K.E. (1990), ‘The Vulnerable System: An Analysis of the Tenerife Air Disaster’, Journal of Management, Volume 16, Number 3, pp. 571–593.

Weick, K.E. (1993), ‘The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 38, Number 4, pp. 628–652.

Weick, K.E., Sutcliffe, K.M. and Obstfeld, D. (2005), ‘Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking’, Organization Science, Volume 16, Number 4, pp. 409–421.

Weick, K.E. and Sutcliffe, K.M. (2007), Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an age of Uncertainty (2nd edn), Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.

Wise, C.R. (2006), ‘Organizing for Homeland Security After Katrina: Is Adaptive Management What’s Missing?’, Public Administration Review, Volume 66, Number 3, pp. 302–318.

Wolbers, J. and Boersma, K. (2013), ‘The Common Operational Picture as Collective Sensemaking’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 21, Number 4, pp. 186–199.

Yang, Y. (2010), ‘The 9/21 Earthquake in Taiwan: A Local Government Disaster Rescue System’, Disasters, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 112–136.

Yates, D. and Paquette, S. (2011), ‘Emergency Knowledge Management and Social Media Technologies: A Case Study of the 2010 Haitian Earthquake’, International Journal of Information Management, Volume 31, Number 1, pp. 6–13.

Yin, R.K. and Heald, K.A. (1975), ‘Using the Case Survey Method to Analyze Policy Studies’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 20, Number 3, pp. 371–381.

Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:

Data S1 Case studies on disaster response management.

72 Norbert Steigenberger

Copyright of Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management is the property of Wiley- Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.