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Managing Organizational Change
A Multiple Perspectives Approach Third Edition
Ian Palmer
Richard Dunford
David A. Buchanan
MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: A MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES APPROACH, THIRD EDITION
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Palmer, Ian, 1957-
Managing organizational change : a multiple perspectives approach / Ian Palmer, Richard Dunford,
David A. Buchanan. -- Third Edition.
p. cm.
Revised edition of Managing organizational change, 2009.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-07-353053-6 (alk. paper)
1. Organizational change. 2. Organizational change--Management. I. Dunford, Richard.
II. Buchanan, David A. III. Title.
HD58.8.P347 2016
658.4’06--dc23
2015033668
The Internet addresses listed in the text were accurate at the time of publication. The inclusion of a website does not indicate an endorsement by the
authors or McGraw-Hill Education, and McGraw-Hill Education does not guarantee the accuracy of the information presented at these sites.
mheducation.com/highered
DEDICATIONS
From Ian To Dianne, Matthew, and Michelle
From Richard To Jill, Nick, and Ally
From David To Lesley with love—and thanks
This book is also dedicated to the memory of Gib Akin, our
co-author from 2005 to 2014.
iv
A number of people have contributed to this edition, and we owe them all a debt of grat-
itude, including Jonathan Bamber, Lesley Buchanan, Daloni Carlile, Mimi Clarke, and
Alastair McLellan. In addition, we would like to thank our McGraw-Hill Education team,
including Michael Ablassmeir, Director, Laura Hurst Spell, Senior Product Developer; Jeni
McAtee, Evan Roberts, Karen Jozefowicz, Content Project Managers; Gunjan Chandola
(Lumina), Full-Service Content Project Manager; and DeAnna Dausener, Content Licens-
ing Specialist. We would also like to thank the second edition reviewers for their helpful
feedback: Diane Bandow, Troy University; Cynthia Bean, University of South Florida–
St. Petersburg; Bradford R. Frazier, Pfeiffer University; Dominie Garcia, San Jose State
University; Selina Griswold, University of Toledo; Mark Hannan, George Washington
University; Christopher S. Howard, Pfeiffer University; Jim Kerner, Athens State Uni-
versity; Catherine Marsh, North Park University; Patricia A. Matuszek, Troy University;
Ranjna Patel, Bethune Cookman University; Mary Sass, Western Washington University;
Dennis Self, Troy University; Patricia Scescke, National Louis University.
Acknowledgements
v
Preface ix
PART 1 Groundwork: Understanding and Diagnosing Change 1
1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 3
2 Images of Change Management 31
3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 61
4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 101
PART 2 Implementation: The Substance and Process of Change 137
5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 139
6 Vision and the Direction of Change 171
7 Change Communication Strategies 205
8 Resistance to Change 249
9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 279
10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 315
PART 3 Running Threads: Sustainability, and the Effective Change Manager 353
11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 355
12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 385
Name Index 423
Subject Index 433
Brief contents
vi
Preface ix
Part 1
Groundwork: Understanding and Diagnosing Change 1
1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 3
Learning objectives 3
Stories About Change: What Can We
Learn? 4
The Story of Beth Israel Deaconess
Medical Center 5
The Story of Sears Holdings 8
The Story of J. C. Penney 10
Tension and Paradox: The State of the Art 14
Assessing Depth of Change 18
What’s Coming Up: A Road Map 19
Change Diagnostic: The Beth Israel Story 21
Change Diagnostic: The Sears Holdings
Story 23
Change Diagnostic: The J. C. Penney Story 24
Exercise 1.1: Writing Your Own Story of
Change 26
Additional Reading 27
Roundup 27
References 28
2 Images of Change Management 31
Learning objectives 31
What’s in a Name: Change Agents, Managers,
or Leaders? 32
Images, Mental Models, Frames,
Perspectives 33
The Six-Images Framework 34
Six Images of Change Management 37
Using the Six-Images Framework 46
Self-Assessment: What Is Your Image of
Managing Change? 49
Self-Assessment: Scoring 51
Exercise 2.1: Assessing Change Managers’
Images 52
Exercise 2.2: The Turnaround Story at
Leonard Cheshire 53
Additional Reading 55
Roundup 56
References 57
3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 61
Learning objectives 61
Environmental Pressures for Change 62
Why Do Organizations Not Change in
Response to Environmental Pressures? 79
Why Do Organizations Not Change after
Crises? 82
Internal Organizational Change Drivers 85
Exercise 3.1: Top Team Role Play 91
Exercise 3.2: Case Analysis: The Sunderland
City Story 91
Exercise 3.3: The Reputation Trap: Can You
Escape? 92
Additional Reading 93
Roundup 94
References 96
4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 101
Learning objectives 101
Organizational Models 102
Organization Strategy and Change 108
Diagnosing Readiness for Change 117
Built-to-Change 124
Exercise 4.1: The Capital One Financial
Story 125
Contents
Contents vii
Exercise 4.2: Scenario Planning 127
Exercise 4.3: Readiness for Change
Analysis 128
Additional Reading 130
Roundup 131
References 134
Part 2
Implementation: The Substance and Process of Change 137
5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 139
Learning objectives 139
What Changes? 140
Innovation 146
Organizational Culture 150
Technology 155
Exercise 5.1: The Nampak Story 161
Exercise 5.2: Organizational Culture
Assessment 162
Exercise 5.3: How Will the Digital Revolution
Affect Your Organization? 163
Additional Reading 163
Roundup 164
References 166
6 Vision and the Direction of Change 171
Learning objectives 171
Vision: Fundamental or Fad? 172
The Characteristics of Effective Visions 174
How Context Affects Vision 180
How Visions Are Developed 181
Why Visions Fail 187
Linking Vision to Change: Three
Debates 189
Exercise 6.1: Interviewing Change
Recipients 197
Exercise 6.2: Analyze Your Own
Organization’s Vision 197
Exercise 6.3: The Role of Vision at Mentor
Graphics 197
Additional Reading 198
Roundup 199
References 201
7 Change Communication Strategies 205
Learning objectives 205
The Change Communication Process 206
Gender, Power, and Emotion 211
Language Matters: The Power
of Conversation 215
Change Communication Strategies 222
Contingency Approaches to Change
Communication 228
Communication Channels and the Role
of Social Media 232
Exercise 7.1: Listen to Who’s Talking 238
Exercise 7.2: How Defensive Are You? 239
Exercise 7.3: Social Media at the
Museum 240
Additional Reading 241
Roundup 242
References 244
8 Resistance to Change 249
Learning objectives 249
WIIFM, WAMI, and the Dimensions
of Resistance 250
Benefits 251
Causes 253
Symptoms 260
Managers as Resisters 261
Managing Resistance 263
Exercise 8.1: Diagnosing and Acting 270
Exercise 8.2: Jack’s Dilemma 270
Exercise 8.3: Moneyball 271
Additional Reading 272
Roundup 272
References 274
viii Contents
9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 279
Learning objectives 279
Alternative Approaches to Managing
Change 280
Organization Development (OD) 280
Appreciative Inquiry (AI) 291
Positive Organizational Scholarship (POS) 293
Dialogic Organizational Development 295
Sense-Making 298
Exercise 9.1: Reports from the Front Line 304
Exercise 9.2: Designing a Large-Scale Change
Intervention 304
Exercise 9.3: Making Sense of
Sense-Making 304
Exercise 9.4: Interpreting the Interpreter:
Change at Target 305
Exercise 9.5: Change at DuPont 306
Additional Reading 308
Roundup 308
References 310
10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 315
Learning objectives 315
Alternative Approaches to Managing
Change 316
Why Change Fails 317
Change by Checklist 319
Stage Models of Change Management 325
Process Perspectives on Change 331
Contingency Approaches to Change
Management 335
Exercise 10.1: Develop Your Own Change
Model 341
Exercise 10.2: The British Airways Swipe
Card Debacle 342
Exercise 10.3: The Italian Job 344
Additional Reading 346
Roundup 346
References 349
Part 3
Running Threads: Sustainability, and the Effective Change Manager 353
11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 355
Learning objectives 355
Initiative Decay and Improvement
Evaporation 356
Praiseworthy and Blameworthy Failures 359
Actions to Sustain Change 362
Words of Warning 369
Exercise 11.1: A Balanced Set of
Measures 373
Exercise 11.2: Treating Initiative Decay 373
Exercise 11.3: The Challenger and Columbia
Shuttle Disasters 374
Additional Reading 379
Roundup 380
References 382
12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 385
Learning objectives 385
Change Managers: Who Are They? 386
Change Managers: What Kind of Role
Is This? 394
Change Management Competencies 397
Political Skill and the Change Manager 403
Developing Change Management
Expertise 410
Exercise 12.1: Networking—How Good
Are You? 412
Exercise 12.2: How Resilient Are You? 413
Exercise 12.3: How Political Is Your
Organization? 415
Additional Reading 416
Roundup 417
References 419
Name Index 423
Subject Index 433
ix
Since the previous edition of this book published in 2009, the organizational world has
changed dramatically—the global financial crisis, fresh geopolitical tensions, environ-
mental concerns, greater focus on corporate social responsibility, economic uncertainties,
emerging new markets, dramatic technological developments, demographic shifts, chang-
ing consumer tastes and expectations. Add to that mix the growing significance of social
media, where positive and critical views of organizations and their products and services
can be shared instantly and globally with large numbers of people.
From a management perspective, it feels as though the drivers for organizational change
are now more numerous, and that the pace of change has also increased; more pressure,
more change, faster change. While the pace of change may only appear to have quickened,
failure to respond to those pressures, and in some cases failure to respond quickly enough,
can have significant individual and corporate consequences. The personal and organiza-
tional stakes appear to have increased.
The management of organizational change thus remains a topic of strategic impor-
tance for most sectors, public and private. Current conditions have, if anything, increased
the importance of this area of management responsibility. This new edition, therefore,
is timely with regard to updating previous content, while introducing new and emerging
trends, developments, themes, debates, and practices.
In the light of this assessment, we believe that the multiple perspectives approach is
particularly valuable, recognizing the variety of ways in which change can be progressed,
and reinforcing the need for a tailored and creative approach to fit different contexts. Our
images of how organizational change should be managed affect the approaches that we
take to understanding and managing change. Adopting different images and perspectives
helps to open up new and more innovative ways of approaching the change management
process. We hope that this approach will help to guide and to inspire others in pursuit of
their own responsibilities for managing organizational change.
This text is aimed at two main readers. The first is an experienced practicing manager
enrolled in an MBA or a similar master’s degree program, or taking part in a management
development course that includes a module on organizational change management. The
second is a senior undergraduate, who may have less practical experience, but who will
probably have encountered organizational change through temporary work assignments,
or indirectly through family and friends. Our senior undergraduate is also likely to be
planning a management career, or to be heading for a professional role that will inevi-
tably involve management—and change management—responsibilities. Given the needs
and interests of both types of readers, we have sought to present an appropriate blend of
research and theory on the one hand, and practical management application on the other.
Instructors who have used our previous edition will find many familiar features in this
update. The chapter structure and sequence of the book remain much the same, with some
minor adjustments to accommodate new material. The overall argument is again underpinned
by the observation that the management of organizational change is in part a rational or tech-
nical task, and is also a creative activity, with the need to design novel strategies and processes
Preface
that are consistent with the needs of unique local conditions. We hope that readers will find
the writing style and presentation clear and engaging. We have also maintained the breadth of
coverage of the different traditions and perspectives that contribute to the theory and practice
of managing organizational change, with international examples where appropriate.
The development of this new edition has introduced new content and new pedagogical
features. The new content for this edition includes the following:
Depth of change: Change can be categorized and understood with regard to how deeply
it penetrates an organization. A “depth of change” model is explained, using a “shal-
low to transformational” scale, forming the basis for discussion and analysis at various
points in the text (chapters 1, 4, and 12).
New tensions and debates: A new section explores contemporary dilemmas in orga-
nizational change management. One of these concerns striking the balance between
large-scale transformational change (which can be disruptive) and “sweating the small
stuff” (which can create a platform for further changes). A second concerns pace, with
some commentators advising how to speed up change, while others warn of the dangers
of “the acceleration trap” (chapter 1).
Change managers or change leaders: Some commentators claim this is an important
distinction, while others argue that this is a words game. Can we resolve this debate
(chapter 2)?
Post-crisis change: Recommendations for change from investigations into accidents,
misconduct, and catastrophes are often not implemented. We explore why this should
be the case—in conditions where it might be presumed that change would be welcome
and straightforward (chapter 3). We also consider briefly the problems and practice of
communication during and after crises (chapter 7).
Change in a recession: Is change more challenging when economic conditions are dif-
ficult? A new section argues that change may be more straightforward during a reces-
sion (chapter 3).
Innovation: We explore how change is driven by the proactive development, adop-
tion, and diffusion of product and operational innovations, along with the distinction
between sustaining and disruptive innovations, and the nature and development of
innovative organization cultures (chapter 4).
Built to change: We explore the organizational capabilities that contribute to change,
adaptation, responsiveness, and agility, considering mechanistic and organic manage-
ment systems, segmentalist and integrative cultures, and the concept of the “built-to-
change” organization (chapter 4).
Change communication strategies: This chapter has been thoroughly updated, with the
emphasis on change communication, exploring the characteristics of effective change
communication strategies, the potential impact and applications of social media as cor-
porate communications tools, and the “communication escalator” (chapter 7).
Middle management blockers: The traditional stereotype has middle managers sub-
verting top team initiatives. Recent research suggests that this image is wrong, and
that middle management are often the source of creative strategic ideas as well as the
“engine room” for delivery (chapters 8 and 12).
x Preface
Organization development and sense-making approaches: As in the previous edition,
recent developments in organization development, appreciative inquiry, positive orga-
nizational scholarship, and dialogic organization development are explored (chapter 9).
Contingency and processual approaches: Covered in the last edition, recent develop-
ments have been incorporated to update these sections, reflecting their influence on
theory and practice (chapter 10).
Praiseworthy and blameworthy failures: The section on “recognizing productive fail-
ures” has been updated with recent commentary suggesting that some failures should
be rewarded (chapter 11).
The effective change manager: What does it take? This new chapter explores the capa-
bilities of change managers, considering competency frameworks, interpersonal com-
munication processes and skills, issue-selling tactics, and the need for the change
manager to be politically skilled (chapter 12).
The pedagogical features in the text include:
• learning outcomes identified at the beginning of each chapter;
• fewer, and shorter, “high-impact” case studies of organizational change and other diag- nostic and self-assessment exercises for classroom use;
• movie recommendations, identifying clips that illustrate theoretical and practical dimensions of organizational change management;
• a short “roundup” section at the end of each chapter, with reflections for the practic- ing change manager, and summarizing the key learning points (linked to the learning
outcomes);
• a small number of suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter.
Since this book was first published, we have continued our conversations with man-
agers who have been using it as part of their teaching, consulting, and other organiza-
tional change activities. In so many of these conversations, it was reassuring to hear how
the multiple perspectives framework that underpins this book struck the right chord with
them, opening up new, innovative, and different ways of seeing, thinking, conceptualizing,
and practicing organizational change. We hope that this new and updated third edition will
continue to inspire various change journeys, and we look forward to more conversations
along the way.
Online Resources
Instructors: If you are looking for teaching materials in this subject area, such as case stud-
ies, discussion guides, organizational diagnostics, self-assessments, company websites, or
audio-visual materials (feature films, YouTube clips) to use in lectures and tutorials, then
go to McGraw-Hill Connect: connect.mheducation.com
Continually evolving, McGraw-Hill Connect has been redesigned to provide the only
true adaptive learning experience delivered within a simple and easy-to-navigate environ-
ment, placing students at the very center.
Preface xi
• Performance Analytics – Now available for both instructors and students, easy-to-decipher data illuminates course performance. Students always know how they are doing in class,
while instructors can view student and section performance at a glance.
• Personalized Learning – Squeezing the most out of study time, the adaptive engine within Connect creates a highly personalized learning path for each student by identify-
ing areas of weakness and providing learning resources to assist in the moment of need.
This seamless integration of reading, practice, and assessment ensures that the focus is
on the most important content for that individual.
The Connect Management Instructor Library is your repository for additional resources
to improve student engagement in and out of class. You can select and use any asset that
enhances your lecture.
The Connect Instructor Library includes:
• Instructor Manual
• PowerPoint files
• Test Bank
Students: If you are looking for additional materials to improve your understanding of
this subject and improve your grades, go to McGraw-Hill Connect: connect.mheduca-
tion.com
Manager’s Hot Seat: Now instructors can put students in the hot seat with access to an
interactive program. Students watch real managers apply their years of experience when
confronting unscripted issues. As the scenario unfolds, questions about how the manager
is handling the situation pop up, forcing the student to make decisions along with the
manager. At the end of the scenario, students watch a post-interview with the manager and
view how their responses matched up to the manager’s decisions. The Manager’s Hot Seat
videos are now available as assignments in Connect.
LearnSmart: LearnSmart, the most widely used adaptive learning resource, is proven
to improve grades. By focusing students on the most important information each stu-
dent needs to learn, LearnSmart personalizes the learning experience so they can study
as efficiently as possible.
SmartBook: An extension of LearnSmart, SmartBook is an adaptive ebook that helps
students focus their study time more effectively. As students read, SmartBook assesses
comprehension and dynamically highlights where they need to study more.
xii Preface
1
1 Groundwork: Understanding and Diagnosing Change
CHAPTER 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
CHAPTER 2 Images of Change Management
CHAPTER 3 Why Change? Contemporary Drivers and Pressures
CHAPTER 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
The central theme of the four chapters in Part 1 is groundwork. How are we to approach
an understanding of organizational change? With what approaches, perspectives, or
images of change management should we be working? What drivers and pressures
produce organizational change? What diagnostic tools can we use in order to decide
what aspects of the organization and its operations will need to change or will benefit
from change?
PART
3
Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
Learning objectives
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 1.1 Understand how stories of change can contribute to our knowledge of theory
and practice.
LO 1.2 Explain why managing organizational change is both a creative and a rational
process.
LO 1.3 Identify the main tensions and paradoxes in managing organizational change.
LO 1.4 Evaluate the strengths and limitations of our current understanding of this field.
1Chapter
w w w .C a r to o n S to c k .c o m
4 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
LO 1.1 LO 1.2 Stories About Change: What Can We Learn?
Changing organizations is as messy as it is exhilarating, as frustrating as it is satis-
fying, as muddling-through and creative a process as it is a rational one. This book
recognizes these tensions and how they affect those who are involved in managing
organizational change. Rather than pretend that these tensions do not exist, or that they
are unimportant, we confront them head on, considering how they can be addressed and
managed, recognizing the constraints that they can impose. We also want to demon-
strate how the images that we hold about the way in which change should be managed,
and of the role of change agents, affect how we approach change and the outcomes we
think are possible.
To begin this exploration, we present three stories of recent changes. The first con-
cerns the turnaround of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston. The sec-
ond concerns the new organizational model introduced at Sears Holdings in an attempt
to restore falling sales and profits. The third concerns innovative efforts to restore fall-
ing sales and a fading brand at J. C. Penney, a retailer. These stories address differ-
ent problems, but they display many common issues concerning the management of
change. Each of these accounts comes with a set of assessment questions. We would
like to ask you to think through the answers to those questions for yourself, or in a class
discussion.
Our aim is to demonstrate that stories about change can be one valuable source of
practical lessons, as well as helping to contribute to our general understanding of change.
These stories are of course distinctive, one-off. How can they contribute to knowledge
and practice in general, in other sectors and organizations? Stories are one of the main
ways of knowing, communicating, and making sense of the world (Czarniawska, 1998;
Pentland, 1999; Dawson and Andriopoulos, 2014). Our stories have actors: change lead-
ers, other managers, staff, customers. They take decisions that lead to actions that trig-
ger responses: acceptance, resistance, departure. There is a plot: a serious problem that
could be solved by organizational change. There are consequences: to what extent did the
change solve the problem, and were other problems created along the way? The sequence
of events unfolds in a typical manner: … and then … and then. This tells us why the out-
comes were reached.
Our narratives are not just descriptions of a change process, of what happened. They
also provide us with explanations. These are process narratives. Process narratives have
several advantages over more traditional (quantitative, statistical) research methods (Mohr,
1982; Poole et al., 2000; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005):
they tell us about the context, give us a sense of the whole, a broader frame of reference;
complexity can be expressed within a coherent sequence of events;
the nature and significance of the causal factors acting on events are exposed;
the narrative patterns transcend individual cases.
This approach is based on what is called narrative knowing (Langley, 2009). Because
stories can reveal the mechanisms or logics behind a sequence of events, they are process
theories. (We will explore process perspectives on change in chapter 10.) What combina-
tions of factors drive, slow down, accelerate, block the change process? The three stories
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 5
that follow explain the relative success of the organizational changes at Beth Israel, Sears,
and J. C. Penney. We will ask you to consider the extent to which those explanations, each
based on a single unique case narrative, can be applied to managing organizational change
in general, in other settings.
Although our three stories are quite different from each other, they have common fea-
tures, with regard to the issues and processes that shape the outcomes of organizational
change. Despite the differences, they demonstrate common tensions and the choices
that are involved in the change process. When you have made your own assessments, in
response to the questions that precede each story, you will find our suggested answers in
the Roundup section at the end of the chapter.
LO 1.1 The Story of Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
Issues to Consider as You Read This Story
1. Identify five factors that explain the success of this corporate turnaround.
2. How would you describe Paul Levy’s role and contributions to this turnaround?
3. What insights does this story have to offer concerning the role of the change leader?
4. What lessons about managing organizational change can we take from this experience
and apply to other organizations, in healthcare and in other sectors? Or, are the lessons
unique to Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center?
The Setting
This is the story of a corporate turnaround, rescuing the organization from financial
disaster and restoring its reputation, competitiveness, and profitability. Based in Boston,
Massachusetts, the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (BID) was created in 1996 by
the merger of two hospitals. The business case for the merger was that the larger organiza-
tion (over 600 beds) would be better able to compete with, for example, the Massachusetts
General Hospital and the Brigham Women’s Hospital. The two merged hospitals had dif-
ferent cultures. Beth Israel had a casual management style that encouraged professional
autonomy and creativity. Deaconess Hospital was known for its rules-based, top-down
management. Staff were loyal to their own organization. After the merger, the Beth
Israel culture dominated, and many Deaconess staff, especially nurses, left to join the
competition.
The Problems
By 2002, BID was losing $100 million a year and faced “financial meltdown.” There were
problems with the quality and safety of care, with low staff morale, and with poor relation-
ships between clinical staff and management. The media attention was damaging BID’s
reputation.
The Solutions
External management consultants recommended drastic measures to turn around the hos-
pital’s finances, and Paul Levy was appointed chief executive officer of BID in 2002. Levy
had no healthcare background and little knowledge of hospitals. He felt that gave him an
6 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
advantage, as he was a “straight talker” and could act as an “honest broker.” But staff were
skeptical at first.
Levy’s turnaround strategy was based on two themes: transparency and commitment to
quality. His first action was to share with all staff the full scale of the financial difficulties,
to create “a burning platform,” from which escape would only be possible by making radi-
cal changes. His second approach was to signal absolute commitment to the continuous
improvement of quality, in order to build trust and to establish a sense of common pur-
pose. Levy described his management style:
Perhaps I had an overly developed sense of confidence, but my management approach is that
people want to do well and want to do good and I create an appropriate environment. I trust
people. When people make mistakes it isn’t incompetence, it’s insufficient training or the
wrong environment. What I’ve learned is that my management style can work.
Phase 1: With the hospital “bleeding money,” urgent action was necessary. Levy accepted
some of the management consultants’ recommendations, and several hundred jobs were
lost, in an attempt to restore financial balance. He refused to reduce nursing levels, but
the financial crisis was resolved.
Phase 2: Medical staff were tired of poor relationships with management. In 2003, Levy
hired Michael Epstein, a doctor, as chief operating officer. Epstein met with each clini-
cal department to win their support for the hospital’s nonclinical objectives and to break
down silo working. Kathleen Murray, who had joined BID in 2002, was director of per-
formance assessment and regulatory compliance. The hospital had no annual operating
plans, and she set out to correct this, starting with two departments that had volunteered
to take part in phase 1, orthopaedics and pancreatic surgery. Other departments soon
joined in. Operating plans had four goals, addressing quality and safety, patient satis-
faction, finance, and staff and referrer satisfaction. One aim was to make staff proud of
the outcomes and create a sense of achievement. Although the performance of doctors
would now be closely monitored, the introduction of operating plans was seen as a
major turning point.
Phase 3: To help address the view that medical errors were inevitable, Levy appointed
Mark Zeidel as chief of medicine. Zeidel introduced an initiative that cut “central line
infection” rates, reducing costs as well as harm to patients and providing the motivation
for more improvements. The board of directors were not at first convinced that perfor-
mance data should be published, but Levy was persuasive, and he put the information
on his public blog, which he started in 2006, and which became popular with staff, the
public, and the media, with over 10,000 visitors a day. Levy explained:
The transparency website is the engine of our work. People like to see how they com-
pare with others, they like to see improvements. Transparency is also important for clini-
cal leaders and our external audience of patients and insurers. We receive encouraging
feedback from patients. We’ve also managed to avoid a major controversy with the media
despite our openness. Transparency’s major societal and strategic imperative is to provide
creative tension within hospitals so that they hold themselves accountable. This account-
ability is what will drive doctors, nurses and administrators to seek constant improvements
in the quality and safety of patient care.
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 7
Other performance data were published, for the hospital and for individual depart-
ments. This included measures to assess whether care was evidence-based, effective,
safe, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable. Progress in meeting priorities for
quality and safety could be tracked on the hospital’s website, and the data were used by
staff to drive quality improvements. The board also set tough goals to eliminate prevent-
able harm and increase patient satisfaction. Every year, staff were invited to summarize
their improvement work in poster sessions, featuring the work of 95 process improvement
teams from across the hospital.
Levy hired staff with expertise in lean methods. Previously an option, training in qual-
ity and safety became mandatory for trainee doctors, who had to take part in improvement
projects. The culture was collaborative, and nurses had the respect of doctors. Patients
often chose BID for the quality of nursing care. The departmental quality improvement
directors met twice a month to share experiences. Department meetings routinely dis-
cussed adverse events. A patient care committee fulfilled a statutory requirement for
board oversight of quality and safety. The office of decision support collected data on
complication rates, infection rates, department-specific quality measures, and financial
goals. A senior nurse said: “We felt a sense of ownership with issues of quality. We have
dashboards up in the units to see how we are doing. Staff know what the annual operat-
ing goals are, as they are actively involved in setting them and integrating them into
their work.”
The Outcomes
By 2010, BID was one of the leading academic health centers in the United States, with
6,000 employees and state-of-the-art clinical care, research, and teaching. Competing
effectively with other major healthcare organizations, BID was generating annual reve-
nues of over $1.2 billion.
Postscript
Paul Levy resigned in January 2011. He explained his decision in a letter to the board of
directors, making this available to staff and the public on his blog. The letter included the
following remarks:
I have been coming to a conclusion over the last several months, perhaps prompted by
reaching my 60th birthday, which is often a time for checking in and deciding on the
next stage of life. I realized that my own place here at BID had run its course. While I
remain strongly committed to the fight for patient quality and safety, worker-led process
improvement, and transparency, our organization needs a fresh perspective to reach new
heights in these arenas. Likewise, for me personally, while it has been nine great years
working with outstanding people, that is longer than I have spent in any one job, and I need
some new challenges.
Story Sources Abbasi, K. (2010) Improvement in Practice: Beth Israel Deaconess Case Study. London: The
Health Foundation.
http://www.bidmc.org/
http://runningahospital.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/transitions.html
8 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
LO 1.1 The Story of Sears Holdings
Issues to Consider as You Read This Story
1. How would you describe Eddie Lampert’s leadership style?
2. How would you assess his approach to implementing major organizational change—in
this case, restructuring the whole company with a new organizational model?
3. On balance, would you assess his organizational model as having been a success, or not?
4. What lessons about managing organizational change can we take from this experience
and apply to other organizations, in this or other sectors?
The Setting
Sears Holdings Corporation was a specialty retailer, formed in 2005 by the merger of
Kmart and Sears Roebuck. The merger was the idea of Eddie Lampert, a billionaire hedge
fund manager who owned 55 percent of the new company and who became chairman.
Based in Illinois, the company operated in the United States and Canada, with 274,000
employees, 4,000 retail stores, and annual revenues (2013) of $40 billion. Sears and
Kmart stores sold home merchandise, clothing, and automotive products and services. The
merged company was successful at first, due to aggressive cost cutting.
The Problem
By 2007, two years after the merger, profits were down by 45 percent.
The Chairman’s Solution
Lampert decided to restructure the company. Sears was organized like a classic retailer.
Department heads ran their own product lines, but they all worked for the same merchan-
dising and marketing leaders, with the same financial goals. The new model ran Sears
like a hedge fund portfolio with autonomous businesses competing for resources. This
“internal market” would promote efficiency and improve corporate performance. At first,
the new structure had around 30 business units, including product divisions, support func-
tions, and brands, along with units focusing on e-commerce and real estate. By 2009, there
were over 40 divisions. Each division had its own president, chief marketing officer, board
of directors, profit and loss statement, and strategy that had to be approved by Lampert’s
executive committee. With all those positions to fill at the head of each unit, executives
jostled for the roles, each eager to run his or her own multibillion-dollar business. The new
model was called SOAR: Sears Holdings Organization, Actions, and Responsibilities.
When the reorganization was announced in January 2008, the company’s share price
rose 12 percent. Most retail companies prefer integrated structures, in which different
divisions can be compelled to make sacrifices, such as discounting goods, to attract more
shoppers. Lampert’s colleagues argued that his new approach would create rival factions.
Lampert disagreed. He believed that decentralized structures, although they might appear
“messy,” were more effective, and that they produced better information. This would give
him access to better data, enabling him to assess more effectively the individual compo-
nents of the company and its assets. Lampert also argued that SOAR made it easier to
divest businesses and open new ones, such as the online “Shop Your Way” division.
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 9
Sears was an “early adopter” of online shopping. Lampert (who allegedly did all his
own shopping online) wanted to grow this side of the business, and investment in the stores
was cut back. He had innovative ideas: smartphone apps, netbooks in stores, a multiplayer
game for employees. He set up a company social network, “Pebble,” which he joined
under the pseudonym “Eli Wexler,” so that he could engage with employees. However,
he criticized other people’s posts and argued with store associates. When staff worked out
that Wexler was Lampert, unit managers began tracking how often their employees were
“Pebbling.” One group organized Pebble conversations about random topics so that they
would appear to be active users.
The Chairman
At the time of the merger, investors were confident that Lampert could turn the two compa-
nies around. One analyst described him as “lightning fast, razor-sharp smart, very direct.”
Many of those who worked for him described him as brilliant (although he could overesti-
mate his abilities). The son of a lawyer, it was rumored that he read corporate reports and
finance textbooks in high school, before going to Yale University. He hated focus groups
and was sensitive to jargon such as “vendor.” His brands chief once used the word “con-
sumer” in a presentation. Lampert interrupted, with a lecture on why he should have used
the word “customer” instead. He often argued with experienced retailers, but he had good
relationships with managers who had finance and technology backgrounds.
From 2008, Sears’ business unit heads had an annual personal videoconference with
the chairman. They went to a conference room at the headquarters in Illinois, with some
of Lampert’s senior aides, and waited while an assistant turned on the screen on the wall
opposite the U-shaped table and Lampert appeared. Lampert ran these meetings from his
homes in Greenwich, Connecticut; Aspen, Colorado; and subsequently Florida, earning
him the nickname “The Wizard of Oz.” He visited the headquarters in person only twice a
year, because he hated flying. While the unit head worked through the PowerPoint presen-
tation, Lampert didn’t look up, but dealt with his emails, or studied a spreadsheet, until he
heard something that he didn’t like—which would then lead to lengthy questioning.
In 2012, he bought a family home in Miami Beach for $38 million and moved his
hedge fund to Florida. Some industry analysts felt that Sears’ problems were exacerbated
by Lampert’s “penny pinching” cost savings, which stifled investment in its stores. Instead
of store improvements, Sears bought back stock and increased its online presence. In
2013, Lampert became chairman and chief executive, the company having gone through
four other chief executives since the merger.
The Outcomes
Instead of improving performance, the new model encouraged the divisions to turn against
each other. Lampert evaluated the divisions, and calculated executives’ bonuses, using a
measure called “business operating profit” (BOP). The result was that individual busi-
ness units focused exclusively on their own profitability, rather than on the welfare of the
company. For example, the clothing division cut labor to save money, knowing that floor
salesmen in other units would have to pick up the slack. Nobody wanted to sacrifice busi-
ness operating profits to increase shopping traffic. The business was ravaged by infighting
as the divisions—behaving in the words of one executive like “warring tribes”—battled
10 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
for resources. Executives brought laptops with screen protectors to meetings so that their
colleagues couldn’t see what they were doing. There was no collaboration, no cooperation.
The Sears and Kmart brands suffered. Employees gave the new organization model a new
name: SORE.
The reorganization also meant that Sears had to hire and promote dozens of expensive
chief financial officers and chief marketing officers. Many unit heads underpaid middle
managers to compensate. As each division had its own board of directors, some presi-
dents sat on five or six boards, which each met monthly. Top executives were constantly
in meetings.
The company posted a net loss of $170 million for the first quarter in 2011. In
November, Sears discovered that rivals planned to open on Thanksgiving at midnight, and
Sears executives knew that they should also open early. However, it wasn’t possible to get
all the business unit heads to agree, and the stores opened as usual, the following morn-
ing. One vice president drove to the mall that evening and watched families flocking into
rival stores. When Sears opened the next day, cars were already leaving the parking lot.
That December, Sears announced the closure of over 100 stores. In February 2012, Sears
announced the closure of its nine “The Great Indoors” stores.
From 2005 to 2013, Sears’ sales fell from $49.1 billion to $39.9 billion, the stock value
fell by 64 percent, and cash holdings hit a 10-year low. In May 2013, at the annual share-
holders’ meeting, Lampert pointed to the growth in online sales and described a new app,
“Member Assist,” that customers could use to send messages to store associates. The aim
was “to bring online capabilities into the stores.” Three weeks later, Sears reported a first
quarter loss of $279 million, and the share price fell sharply. The online business contrib-
uted 3 percent of total sales. Online sales were growing, however, through the “Shop Your
Way” website. Lampert argued that this was the future of Sears, and he wanted to develop
“Shop Your Way” into a hybrid of Amazon and Facebook.
Story Sources Kimes, M. 2013. At Sears, Eddie Lampert’s warring divisions model adds to the troubles.
Bloomberg Businessweek, July 11.
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-07-11/
at-sears-eddie-lamperts-warring-divisions-model-adds-to-the-troubles.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sears_Holdings
http://www.forbes.com/profile/edward-lampert
http://www.searsholdings.com
http://www.shopyourway.com
LO 1.1 The Story of J. C. Penney
Issues to Consider as You Read This Story
1. What aspects of Ron Johnson’s turnaround strategy were appropriate, praiseworthy?
2. What mistakes did Ron Johnson make?
3. What would you suggest he could have done differently?
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 11
The Setting
J. C. Penney Company, Inc. (known as JCPenney, or JCP for short) was one of America’s
largest clothing and home furnishing retailers. An iconic brand, founded by James Cash
Penney and William Henry McManus in 1913, the headquarters were in Plano, Texas. By
2014, with annual revenues of around $13 billion, and 159,000 employees, JCP operated
1,100 retail stores and a shopping website at jcp.com. JCP once had over 2,000 stores,
back in 1973, but the 1974 recession led to closures. The company’s main customers were
middle-income families, and female. JCP had a “promotional department store” pricing
strategy with a confusing system of product discounts. There were around 600 promo-
tions and coupon offers a year. Mike Ullman, chief executive since 2004, had grown sales
with a strong private label program, with brands such as Sephora, St. John’s Bay cloth-
ing, MNG by Mango, and Liz Claiborne. Another 14 stores were opened in 2004, and the
e-commerce business exceeded the $1 billion revenue mark in 2005.
The Problems
When the stock reached an all-time high of $86 in 2007, JCP was performing well. How-
ever, the recession in 2008 affected sales badly; core customers had mortgage and job
security problems. Between 2006 and 2011, sales fell from $19.9 billion to $17 billion.
JCP had one of the lowest annual sales per square foot for department stores (around
$150). Macy’s and Kohl’s, the main competition, had sales per square foot of around $230.
In 2011, the catalogue business, with nineteen outlet stores, was closed, along with seven
other stores and two call centers. The New York Times accused JCP of “gaming” Google
search results to increase the company’s ranking in searches, a practice called “spamdex-
ing.” Google’s retaliation dramatically reduced JCP’s search visibility.
In 2008, JCP struck a deal with Ralph Lauren to launch a new brand, American Living,
sold only in their stores. But JCP was not allowed to use Ralph Lauren’s name or the Polo
logo. The idea failed. Sales continued to fall. In 2011, 50 to 70 percent of all sales were
discounted, based on a “high-low” pricing strategy. An item would be priced initially at,
say, $100. Customers would see the product and like it, but not like the price. After six
weeks, the price was marked down, say, to $50, and the goods started to sell. But those
items had been sitting on a shelf doing nothing for over a month.
The Solutions
In 2010, two billionaire investors, Bill Ackman and Steven Roth, approached Ullman with
an offer to buy large amounts of JCP stock. They felt that the company had potential.
Ackman and Roth were invited to join the board, attending their first meeting in February
2011. Leaving that meeting, Ullman was involved in a serious car accident, suffered mul-
tiple injuries, and spent three months in a neck brace, making his existing health problems
worse. The board wanted a replacement, and there were no internal candidates. Ullman
suggested Ron Johnson, who was working for Steve Jobs at Apple. Johnson then met with
Ackman and Roth to explore possibilities. Johnson said that he was concerned about the
lack of innovation in department stores, and he brought a positive, “can do” approach
more typical of Silicon Valley than retailing.
In November 2011, Ron Johnson was appointed chief executive officer. JCP stock rose
17 percent on the announcement. Johnson had been responsible for setting up Apple’s
12 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
highly profitable retail stores, and he had also been successful at another retailer, Target.
In December, after one month in post, he presented to the board his plans to revive the
company with a fundamentally new way of doing business. The board agreed. Johnson
told a journalist, “I came in because they wanted to transform; it wasn’t just to compete or
improve.” In a board update before leaving, Ullman noted that Johnson had not asked him
any questions about how the business was currently running.
Johnson moved quickly. First, he wanted to transform the culture. In February 2012,
he installed a large transparent acrylic cube in the company headquarters. The cube was
a version of the new company logo. Johnson told staff that he did not want to see the old
logo anywhere in the building. For a week, staff threw “old Penney” items into the cube:
T-shirts, mugs, stationery, pens, tote bags.
Second, no more promotions. Why wait six weeks to mark an item down to the price at
which it would sell? Why not sell at that price from the start? Johnson simplified the pric-
ing structure with “everyday” prices, which were what used to be sale values; “monthly
value,” for selected items; and “best price,” linked to paydays—the first and third Fridays
of each month. The stores were tidier, with no messy clearance racks, and the customer
relationship became “fair and square” (another slogan).
Third, Johnson developed a “store within a store” strategy, with each store becoming a
collection of dozens of separate “boutiques.” He wanted a higher percentage of younger
and higher-priced brands such as Joe Fresh clothes, Martha Stewart home furnishings,
Michael Graves Designs, Happy Chic, and furniture from the British designer Sir Terence
Conran. These new boutiques, of course, were not interested in having their brands diluted
by discount pricing. Traditionally, JCP got 50 percent of sales from its own brands, which
were displayed by product (bath mats) rather than brand (Martha Stewart). When a direc-
tor asked him when he was going to test his new approach, Johnson replied that he had
made his decision relying, like Steve Jobs, on instinct. Hundreds of stores were to be
redesigned by the end of 2012. JCP already sold Levi’s jeans, but Johnson wanted 700
Levi’s boutiques in the stores; building these boutiques cost JCP $120 million. Southpole,
a clothing brand that appealed to black and Hispanic customers, was dropped. St. John’s
Bay, a less fashionable women’s clothing brand generating $1 billion annual revenues,
was dropped.
The speed of these changes would be motivating and unifying, Johnson thought. He
wanted to rebrand an old, stale company with a modern name and logo. Johnson was a
charismatic and passionate presenter. He said that the changes would be painful and would
take four years to complete. The board were awed by the scale of the transformation, but
they did not challenge him. Johnson talked about the “six Ps”: product, place, presenta-
tion, price, promotion, personality. One analyst noted, “One ‘P’ that seems to be missing
is people.” Employees were also excited about the developments, especially when Johnson
threw them a lavish party, costing $3 million.
Johnson wanted to make checkout simpler, with roving clerks taking payment on iPads.
Millions were spent on equipping stores with Wi-Fi. He also wanted all items to have an
RFID tag, but that proved to be too expensive. He also decided to separate the store buying
group from the JCP.com buying group, an approach used by Apple. However, this meant
that there was no coordination between what was available online and what customers
could find in the stores. Johnson was more concerned with “the look and feel” of the
physical stores, and less support went to the website.
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 13
Johnson hired his own new team of top executives, who distanced themselves from
the existing staff; most of them refused to move to Dallas, flying there weekly instead.
If you were not part of this new team, you were out of the loop. One director called the
“old” staff DOPES: dumb old Penney’s employees. Veterans called the new team the Bad
Apples. The new human resources director cancelled performance reviews as being too
bureaucratic. This made it easier to fire people; managers did not have to consult per-
formance data before making that decision. The new team recruited Ellen DeGeneres—a
television celebrity and lesbian—to appear in JCP advertising. A conservative group, One
Million Moms, threatened a boycott, claiming that, “DeGeneres is not a true representa-
tion of the type of families that shop at their store. The majority of J.C. Penney customers
will be offended and chose to no longer shop there.” The relationship with DeGeneres was
discontinued. Johnson introduced a new exchange policy; customers could return an item,
without a receipt, and receive cash. This policy was immediately abused, and one popular
item was returned so often that its sales turned negative. The plan to put Martha Stewart
stores into JCP stalled when Macy’s sued, claiming breach of its own agreement with the
home furnishings brand.
The Outcomes
The results published in February 2012 were poor. Revenues had fallen by $4.3 billion,
making a $1 billion loss. The stock fell to $18, and Standard & Poor’s cut JCP’s debt
rating to CCC+ (a long way from “triple A”). In April 2012, JCP laid off 13 percent of
its office staff in Texas, closed one of its call centers, and also “retired” many manag-
ers, supervisors, and long-serving employees on the grounds that new working practices
required less oversight. In May 2012, store sales were down 20 percent compared with
the previous year. Johnson had projected a short-term drop in sales, but not by that much.
He commented that, “I’m completely convinced that our transformation is on track,” lead-
ing to a 5.9 percent rise in the stock. In July 2012, a further 350 headquarters staff were
laid off. By October 2012, online sales were almost 40 percent down over the year. It
was estimated that the decision to separate the two buying groups had cost JCP around
$500 million.
During Johnson’s two-year tenure, the price of the JCP stock fell by almost 70 percent,
and sales fell in 2012 by 25 percent, resulting in a net loss of $985 million. JCP had
alienated its traditional customers, who were used to shopping for discounts, but had not
attracted new ones, and 20,000 employees had lost their jobs. In March 2013, Steven Roth,
who had backed Johnson’s appointment but who had now lost faith, sold over 40 percent of
his JCP shares at a loss of $100 million. Bill Ackman resigned from the board in August,
selling his shares at a loss of $470 million.
In April 2013, the company chairman told Johnson that the board would be accepting
his resignation; within a few weeks, all but one of the other senior staff hired by Johnson
had also left. Mike Ullman was reinstated. He immediately restored the old promotional
pricing model. In May, JCP ran an “apology ad,” with an earnest female voice admit-
ting, “We learned a very simple thing, to listen to you.” A coincidence of timing, in June,
Johnson’s renovated home departments opened in stores, selling Jonathan Adler lamps,
Conran tables, and Pantone sheets. Too expensive for core customers, these departments
failed and were withdrawn. However, traditional sales in stores started to grow slowly, and
by November, Internet sales had increased by 25 percent on the previous year (Ullman had
14 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
reintegrated the stores and online buyers). Sales of the private brand merchandise lines
that had been restored also began to return to previous levels.
The JCP brand had been damaged. Sales per square foot of shopping space had fallen
steadily since 2010 as shoppers turned to Macy’s and Kohl’s. Macy’s sales per square foot
had risen. With sales and profitability falling, in January 2014, JCP closed 33 underper-
forming stores (3 percent of the total), with 2,000 layoffs. This would reduce annual oper-
ating costs by $65 million, but the company had made a loss of $1.4 billion in 2013. After
100 years in business, with Mike Ullman back in charge, JCP stock continued to fall in the
first half of 2014. Commenting on Johnson’s legacy at JCP, one analyst said, “Nobody will
be attempting something similar for a very long time.”
Story Sources Reingold, J., Jones, M., and Kramer, S. 2014. How to fail in business while really, really trying.
Fortune, July 4, 169(5):80–92.
http://ir.jcpenney.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=70528&p=irol-homeprofile
http://www.jcpenney.com/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._C._Penney
http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2013/08/21/what-went-wrong-at-j-c-penney/
LO 1.3 LO 1.4 Tension and Paradox: The State of the Art
tension when two or more ideas are in opposition to each other
paradox when two or more apparently correct ideas contradict each other
From a management perspective, organizational change is seen as problematic. How do
we persuade people to accept new technologies that will make their skills, knowledge,
and working practices obsolete? How quickly can people who find themselves with
new roles, and new relationships, learn how to operate effectively after a major reor-
ganization? How about this new system for capturing and processing customer infor-
mation? We prefer the old system because it works just fine. Change can be difficult.
Change that is not well managed, however, can generate frustration and anger.
Most estimates put the failure rate of planned changes at around 60 to 70 percent
(Keller and Aiken, 2008; Burnes, 2011; Rafferty et al., 2013). In a global survey of 2,000
executives by the consulting company McKinsey, only 26 percent of respondents said that
their transformational changes had successfully improved performance and enabled the
organization to sustain further improvements (Jacquemont et al., 2015). There is, there-
fore, no shortage of advice. However, that advice is both extensive and fragmented. The
literature—research and other commentary—can be difficult to access, and to absorb, for
the following reasons (Iles and Sutherland, 2001):
multiple perspectives there are contributions from several different schools, academic dis-
ciplines, and theoretical perspectives—there are several literatures
conceptual spread the concepts that are used range in scale, from whole schools of
thought or perspectives, through methodologies, to single tools
fluid boundaries depending on the definitions of change and change management
in use, the boundaries of the topic vary between commentators
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 15
rich history interesting and useful contributions date from the 1940s, and recent
work has not necessarily made previous commentary irrelevant
varied settings as with our stories, evidence and examples come from a range of
organizational types and contexts, using different methodologies
Multiple perspectives is the most significant of these properties of the literature. That is
usually seen as a problem—“the experts can’t agree.” We disagree, and we prefer instead
to emphasize the advantages in adopting a multiple perspectives approach to the manage-
ment of organizational change. First, a perspective that works in one context may not work
well in a different setting: we will explore contingency frameworks in chapter 10. Second,
this is a way of opening up debate: “Should we define our problem in these terms, or in
some other way?” Third, multiple perspectives encourage the search for creative solutions:
“Can we combine ideas from two or more approaches and adapt them to fit our context?”
We will meet all of these characteristics again in later chapters.
The practicing manager, less interested in theoretical perspectives, wants to know
“what works?” There are difficulties in providing a clear answer to that question, too, for
the following reasons:
many variables even with simple changes, the impact is multidimensional, and
measuring “effectiveness” has to capture all of the factors to
produce a complete picture
slippery causality it is difficult to establish cause and effect clearly across complex
processes that unfold over time, usually at the same time as lots
of other changes
many stakeholders different stakeholders have different views of the nature of the
problem, the appropriate solution, and the desirable outcomes—
whose measures to use?
What works well in one setting may not work well in another. The broad outlines of a good
change strategy are widely known and accepted. What matters is the detail, concerning how
a strategy or intervention is designed for a particular organization. For example, most prac-
tical guidelines begin by suggesting that change will be more readily accepted if there is a
“sense of urgency” that underpins the business case for change. That sense of urgency can
be seen in the financial meltdown at Beth Israel and the falling profitability at both Sears
and J. C. Penney. Note, however, that there are many different ways in which a sense of
urgency can be established and communicated. Some methods may emphasize the “burning
platform” in a way that heightens anxiety and encourages escape. Other approaches might
encourage instead a “burning ambition” to confront and solve the problem.
What works depends on the context. It is rarely possible to just do what someone else
has done. Change is in part a rational process; we know what kinds of issues need to be
taken into account. Change is also a creative process; it is always necessary to design—to
create—an approach that is consistent with local circumstances. Accounts of how other
organizations have handled change can be a rich source of ideas that can be adapted cre-
atively to address similar problems in other settings.
The field of change management is also rich in tensions and paradoxes. We will explore
six of these briefly, in the form of key questions. These issues will also appear in later
LO 1.2
LO 1.3
16 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
chapters. You will probably encounter further tensions, in your reading across the subject
and in practice. How these tensions and paradoxes are managed has implications for the
process and outcomes of change.
Transformational Change, or Sweat the Small Stuff? Where to start—with sweeping radical changes, or a gradual process of incremental initia-
tives? We will explore a simple model for “locating” the scale of change in the next section.
However, faced with geopolitical, economic, demographic, sociocultural, and technolog-
ical developments, most organizations seem to think in terms of deep transformational
change. The Beth Israel, Sears, and J. C. Penney stories reflect this view, implementing
whole-organizational changes to deal with survival threats. This may mean that minor
changes are seen as less valuable and important and are overlooked in favor of the “high
impact” initiatives. This could be a mistake. Moore and Buchanan (2013), for example,
demonstrate how an initiative designed to fix small problems rapidly in an acute hospital
generated major performance improvements for almost no cost. In this case, “sweating
the small stuff” was an enabling strategy, getting people involved (the small problems
were identified by staff), establishing a reputation for getting things done, and creating the
platform for further developments. Shallower changes can facilitate and complement the
deeper initiatives, and evidence suggests that these should not be underestimated.
Systematic Tools, or Messy Political Process? If one looks below the surface of cases of managed change, one can always discern the
ever-present effect of the “other side” of organizational life. The ambiguities, uncertainties,
ambivalences, tensions, politics and intrigues are always involved, and are influential and
addressed in some manner—however half-cocked, fudged, guessed at, messed up or little
understood.
(Badham, 2013, p. 24)
Most of the practical guidance on change implementation (chapters 9 and 10) suggests a
straightforward sequence of steps, with advance support from diagnostic tools and assessments
(chapters 4 and 5). This is a systematic process, with helpful tools. We have already suggested
that change is a creative process as well as a rational one. It is also a political process. Organiza-
tions are political systems, and because there are often “winners and losers,” change is a politi-
cal process. The systematic tools-based approach, the creativity, and the politics work hand in
hand. We will explore the political skills that change managers require later (chapter 12). It is
important to recognize that, despite what the textbook or the change management consultant
says, those systematic tools are only part of the answer to “how to do it, and how to get it right.”
Organizational Capabilities, or Personal Skills? Beth Israel, you may remember, was formed by the merger of two organizations with dif-
ferent cultures. One had a casual management style that encouraged professional auton-
omy and creativity. The other was known for its rules-based, top-down management. The
research evidence suggests that the “casual” style is likely to be more open to change, and
that this will be a more “agile” and responsive organization. Top-down management and
rules suggest that change will be slow, if it happens at all, dependent on due process and
committee cycles. In other words, we need to pay attention to organizational capabilities
to understand the change drivers and barriers (chapter 5). The skills of change leaders are
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 17
of course also important. However, skilled change agents struggle in rules-based organi-
zations, and agile and responsive organizations still need capable change agents. We will
explore the capabilities of effective change managers in chapter 12.
Rapid Change, or the Acceleration Trap? The pace of change—social, political, economic, technological—appears to have accelerated.
Can organizations keep up? There is now a considerable amount of advice on how to speed up
change, to accelerate the pace. Rapid change, however, can cause problems. Can people keep
up? Change too fast, and you run the danger of destabilizing the organization and creating
staff burnout. There is also, therefore, advice on how to manage “painless change” and how to
avoid “the acceleration trap.” We will explore the dilemma of pace further in chapter 3.
Change Leader, or Distributed Leadership? It is widely assumed that change needs a champion, a senior figure, who sets the direction,
inspires others, and drives the project. A lot of work has gone into identifying the competen-
cies of the “ideas champion,” the effective change leader. This parallels work on the capabili-
ties of effective leaders in general (although most researchers argue that leadership success is
highly contingent). However, in most organizations, change is not a solo performance but a
team effort. There is usually a “guiding coalition” of more or less senior managers, who guaran-
tee permission for change, oversee progress, and unblock problems that arise. Research has also
shown how change is driven by large numbers of organizational members, in an approach that
is also called “distributed leadership,” “leadership constellations,” or “leadership in the plural.”
Learning Lessons, or Implementing Lessons? Change following crises, accidents, misconduct, failures, and other extreme events
often does not happen. There is always an investigation, which produces recommenda-
tions for preventing such an event from happening again (or at least reducing the prob-
ability). The evidence shows that those recommendations are often ignored. One might
assume that, in such circumstances, change would be rapid, straightforward, and wel-
come. The distinction between passive learning (identifying lessons) and active learn-
ing (implementing changes) is important here. The latter does not automatically follow.
Why is that not the case? In exploring “why organizations change” in chapter 3, we
will also consider why organizations do not change, when they perhaps should.
Change Has Never Been So Fast
That this is an age of change is an expression heard
frequently today. Never before in the history of
mankind have so many and so frequent changes
occurred. These changes that we see taking place
all about us are in that great cultural accumulation
which is man’s social heritage. It has already been
shown that these cultural changes were in earlier
times rather infrequent, but that in modern times
they have been occurring faster and faster until
today mankind is almost bewildered in his effort
to keep adjusted to these ever increasing social
changes. This rapidity of social change may be due
to the increase in inventions which in turn is made
possible by the accumulative nature of material cul-
ture (i.e., technology).
Source: Ogburn (1922), pp. 199–200.
18 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
The perceptive reader will have noticed that the answer to each of these six paradoxes,
these six questions, is in each case “both.” We need big change and small change. Change
is at the same time a systematic process and a political one. We need both organizational
and individual capabilities. The pace of change must, if possible, vary with circumstances.
Change is almost always driven by “a cast of characters” that includes one or more cham-
pions and many supporters. There is no point in learning lessons if we do not then imple-
ment them. As noted earlier, the way in which these tensions are confronted and managed
both drives and constrains the change process, and influences the outcomes.
LO 1.4 Assessing Depth of Change
We have noted the tension between “transformational change and the small stuff.”
Depth is one metaphor that can be used to categorize change. Figure 1.1 presents a
framework for that assessment.
Of the scale
Disruptive innovation
Frame-breaking, mold-breaking
Redraw dramatically organization and sector boundaries
Deeper
Paradigm shift, strategic change
New ways of thinking and solving problems, whole system change
New ways of doing business
Deep change Change the mission, vision, values, the organization’s philosophy, in
order to symbolize a radical shift in thinking and behavior
Change the organization’s definition of success
Create new goals, objectives, targets
Sustaining
innovation
Improve business planning to symbolize a shift in thinking
Tighten up on documentation, reporting, controls
Reallocate resources
Grow some departments, cut others, create new units
Shallow change Fine tuning: cut costs, improve eiciencies
Constantly “nibble away” making minor improvements
Not on the scale “Sweat the small stuf”—quickly solve the minor annoying problems
that nobody has bothered to fix; “grease the wheels”
FIGURE 1.1 Assessing Depth of Change
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 19
At the bottom of this figure sits the “small stuff” that may not even be regarded as
“change.” In the middle of the scale we have “sustaining innovation,” which involves improv-
ing on current practices. At the top of the scale is “disruptive innovation,” which involves
radically new business models and working methods (Christensen, 2000). One obvious
point to make is that, in considering change in an organization, the proposed solution should
be consistent with the diagnosis of the problem. Using shallow changes to address strategic
challenges may not be appropriate, and attempting to solve minor difficulties with disruptive
innovation could consume disproportionate amounts of time and resources.
Shallow changes are usually easier to implement than frame-breaking changes. Trans-
formational “off the scale” changes are more challenging because they are costly and time-
consuming, and they affect larger numbers of people in more significant ways, potentially
generating greater resistance. In most cases, many changes are likely to be under way at
the same time, at different depths. Recognizing this, many organizations have established
corporate project or program management offices (PMOs) to support and coordinate their
initiatives (Ward and Daniel, 2013). The U.S. Project Management Institute’s white paper
(2012) gives examples of the aims and benefits of PMOs at the State Auto insurance com-
pany in Ohio and the National Cancer Institute in Maryland.
One of the tensions in this framework concerns the ambitions of the individual man-
ager. When interviewed for the next promotion, stories about the impact of the deep trans-
formations for which one has been responsible are typically more impressive than stories
about minor stuff.
LO 1.4 What’s Coming Up: A Road Map
This text is divided into three parts. Part 1, including this chapter, sets out the ground-
work, and is concerned with understanding and diagnosing change, and with different
images of change management. Part 2 focuses on implementation, exploring the sub-
stance of change, the role of vision, managing resistance, developing communication
strategies, and several approaches to the implementation process. Part 3 examines two
running threads that relate to all of the previous chapters. The first concerns managing
the sustainability of change, which we argue has to be considered from the beginning
and not managed as an afterthought. The second running thread is an assessment of
what it takes to be an effective change manager—which is, of course, the theme of the
book as a whole. Figure 1.2 sets out a road map, an overview of the content.
One of the main assumptions underpinning this road map is that our images of the roles
of change leaders affect how we approach the other issues on the map. Remember, for
example, how the different change leadership styles adopted by Paul Levy at Beth Israel,
Eddy Lampert at Sears, and Ron Johnson at J. C. Penney colored their approaches to
communicating the changes that they wanted to implement. This explains why “images,”
chapter 2, is at the center of the figure. However, by necessity, a book such as this fol-
lows a linear sequence for presentational reasons. This is not necessarily the sequence
in which change leaders will need to consider these issues, or in which instructors will
wish to introduce and explore these themes. What will work best depends on context. In
some cases, the question of “vision” may be fundamental to the change process, and it
would be unwise to proceed until that issue has been resolved. In many change models
20 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
to be aware of
change manager
images, and to see the change
process through
diferent lenses:
director
coach
navigator
interpreter
caretaker
nurturer
Part 1 chapters 1 and 2
to understand the
pressures and drivers
for change, internal and external
to diagnose the
nature and depth
of the changes required and
individual and organizational readiness
Part 1 chapters 3 and 4
to determine
what is going to change
to develop a credible and compelling
vision
of the organization’s future
to design “high impact”
change communication strategies
to anticipate and respond to
resistance to change
to decide how the process will be driven: organization development and sense-
making approaches
to decide how the process will be driven: checklist, process, and contingency
approaches
Part 2 chapters 5 to 10
strategies to embed change and
manage sustainability
efective change managers
individuals and teams
Part 3 chapters 11 and 12
FIGURE 1.2 To Be an Effective Change Manager, This Is What You Need …
and textbooks, the question of sustainability is presented at the end, as it is here. How-
ever, if sustainability is not built into change implementation from the beginning, then this
may become an unnecessary problem. Communication is another issue that is typically
involved throughout the change process.
This road map comes with an added caution. If you follow the recipe correctly, that
cake should be perfect; enjoy. However, success is not guaranteed by following a set of
change implementation guidelines. There are two main reasons for this. First, designing
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 21
a change process is a task with both technical and creative components; blending these
components can in many circumstances be a challenging business involving much trial
and error. Second, what works depends on organizational context, which is not stable but
which can change suddenly and in unpredictable ways. External conditions can change,
intensifying or removing the pressures for change. Budget considerations may mean that
resources are diverted elsewhere. Key stakeholders change their minds and shift from sup-
porting to resisting. There are numerous factors that are not under the control of change
leaders, and things go wrong despite careful planning and preparation. This is one reason
why, as chapter 12 explains, resilience or “bouncebackability” is a core attribute for effec-
tive change leaders.
LO 1.1 Change Diagnostic: The Beth Israel Story
Here are the four questions that you were asked to consider while reading the Beth
Israel story, followed by our suggested answers:
1. Identify five factors that explain the success of this corporate turnaround.
2. How would you describe Paul Levy’s role and contributions to this turnaround?
3. What insights does this story have to offer concerning the role of the change leader?
4. What lessons about managing organizational change can we take from this experience
and apply to other organizations, in healthcare and in other sectors? Or, are the lessons
unique to Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center?
The story of this turnaround has been cited as one from which other healthcare orga-
nizations can learn, in other countries. The account on which this case is based was com-
missioned by the Health Foundation in the United Kingdom. As we will see, many of the
change management issues raised here are common and can be found in other sectors and
cultures. While it is always possible to argue that healthcare is “special” in some respects,
many of the change management concerns are generic.
1. Identify five factors that explain the success of this corporate turnaround.
The sense of urgency, the “burning platform,” created deliberately by the new chief
executive, who was open with all staff about the true position concerning the hospi-
tal’s finances.
The focus that was consistently maintained on improving the quality and safety of
patient care, which appealed (perhaps more than budget layouts) to the professional
values of clinical staff.
The phased approach that involved, first and quickly, fixing the finances; second,
repairing medical-managerial relationships and getting staff involved in operational
plans; and third, focusing on safety issues and eliminating harm. Frontline staff
involvement was key.
Making hospital and department performance data available to staff, the public, and
the media, to inspire pride in achievement and to stimulate further improvements.
The creation of a “leadership constellation” through the appointment of other senior
staff who understood and who supported the chief executive’s goals and strategy
(Denis et al., 2001).
22 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
2. How would you describe Paul Levy’s role and contributions to this turnaround?
Did Paul Levy actually change anything directly? He described his style as “creating
the environment” that enabled other people to do good work.
One of his main contributions was to insist on transparency, about the hospital’s
financial problems and with performance data. That transparency may have been
uncomfortable for some, but it created pride in achievement and the motivation for
continuous improvement.
A second key contribution concerned his consistency of purpose, the relentless
focus on the quality and safety of patient care, which were issues that engaged and
motivated clinical staff.
His innovative use of the Internet and his personal blog about “running a hospital”
made sure that everyone—staff, patients, the wider community, the media—knew
what he was thinking and doing and why, building respect and trust.
He stayed with BID for nine years. Not many chief executives stick around for this
long. But tenure helps to build influence and reinforces the consistency of purpose.
3. What insights does this story have to offer concerning the role of the change
leader?
Levy had no healthcare background. Maybe this means that one does not need spe-
cialist sector knowledge and experience to drive a corporate turnaround. But he
made sure that he had access to those specialist resources though his other senior
appointments.
He had confidence in his management approach. That confidence may be as impor-
tant as the style—maybe a different style, applied consistently, could be just as
effective, especially when it involved laying off a number of staff soon after taking
up his new post, and standing up to the board of directors and defending a view dif-
ferent from theirs.
The role of a change leader is a demanding one, and it can be difficult to maintain
for long periods. It is necessary to recognize when it is time to leave—and also
to know when leaving would damage the project. Levy departed only after BID’s
financial, clinical, and operational performance goals had been achieved and the
future of the hospital was secure.
4. What lessons about managing organizational change can we take from this experi-
ence and apply to other organizations, in healthcare and in other sectors? Or, are
the lessons unique to Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center?
This is controversial. A lot of the research evidence concerning organizational change
management—what works and what doesn’t—relies on case study accounts such as this.
Could an approach to rapid and radical organizational change that worked in a large hos-
pital in Boston be applied to a small software design company in Sacramento? Looking
at the details, the answer is probably “no”; the software company doesn’t have to worry
about medical engagement and patient safety metrics. Looking at the approach in general,
however, the answer is probably “yes.” If our software company was losing money and
reputation, a new “straight talking” chief executive with clear and consistent goals, an
inclusive management style, a strong management team, and a transparent approach to the
use of performance data to motivate improvement could be a highly effective combination.
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 23
In other words, if we look beyond the details, we can see a number of actions that
could well be applied in other settings. Also, when one gathers a number of such stories,
of successes and failures, similar patterns emerge, especially with regard to establishing a
sense of urgency and purpose, creating a strong and stable senior team, using “leadership
constellations” to drive change, a participative management style, staff engagement, open
communications, and transparency of performance information that is used for feedback,
performance management, motivation, and reward purposes. The Beth Israel story is a
compelling one, but it is neither idiosyncratic nor unique.
LO 1.1 Change Diagnostic: The Sears Holdings Story
Here are the four questions that you were asked to consider while reading the Sears
Holdings story, followed by our suggested answers:
1. How would you describe Eddie Lampert’s leadership style?
2. How would you assess his approach to implementing major organizational change—in
this case, restructuring the whole company with a new organizational model?
3. On balance, would you assess his organizational model as having been a success, or not?
4. What lessons about managing organizational change can we take from this experience
and apply to other organizations, in this or other sectors?
Is this the Sears story, or the Eddie Lampert story? One commentator concluded that,
in addition to the other difficulties facing retailers, Sears had a unique problem—Lampert
himself.
1. How would you describe Eddie Lampert’s leadership style?
Lampert could be described as a transformational leader. He was highly intelligent and
decisive. He was innovative, concerning both the company structure and its service
delivery. He had a clear and interesting vision for the online future of the business.
Check out “Shop Your Way” for yourself.
However, he also appears to have been an autocratic leader. There is little evidence
to suggest that he either sought or considered the views of others, including his senior
colleagues, before making business-critical decisions. He was something of a recluse,
preferring to meet with his division heads infrequently, and through a video link (and
he rarely allowed media interviews). His “engagement” with staff through the com-
pany’s social network was more confrontational than consultative.
2. How would you assess his approach to implementing major organizational change—
in this case, restructuring the whole company with a new organizational model?
If rapid action is necessary to rescue an organization that is experiencing extreme dif-
ficulties, then an autocratic approach may be appropriate. It takes time to pause, to ask
everyone else what they think should be done, to process that feedback, to develop
a more widely informed decision, to check that with those involved, and then to
implement the approach. By that time, the company could be bust. Lampert’s “cri-
sis management” style may thus have been appropriate immediately after the merger.
Although profitability was declining, it is debatable whether that approach was appro-
priate in 2008.
24 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
A more prudent approach in this case would probably have been to listen to the
views of colleagues, at all levels of the company, and to take those into account before
imposing that reorganization. There could have been many other ways in which to
achieve the required end results, including improved divisional and corporate perfor-
mance, and data transparency. Whatever restructuring was implemented, it was prob-
ably going to be more successful if those who were affected understood the decision,
had contributed significantly to it, and had agreed with it. “Behavioral flexibility” is
one of the core capabilities of managers and leaders at all levels in an organization.
This means adapting one’s overall approach and personal style to fit the circumstances.
Lampert did not do that.
3. On balance, would you assess his organizational model as having been a success,
or not?
From 2005 to 2013, the company’s sales, profits, and share value fell. Although not
mentioned in the case account, many experienced executives left the company, frustrated
by the impact of the restructuring. Divisional collaboration was stifled, and it appears
that the competition stimulated by the new organizational model was not healthy com-
petition. The model, therefore, appears to have been damaging to the company’s perfor-
mance and to its reputation. The new model, however, made it easier for Lampert to set
up the online business as a division run independently of the other units. It may thus be
too early to assess the longer-term overall success of that organization restructuring.
4. What lessons about managing organizational change can we take from this experi-
ence and apply to other organizations, in this or other sectors?
Change leaders need to adapt their style to fit the context. An autocratic style can rap-
idly resolve a crisis. In other circumstances, “decisive action” may leave others feel-
ing that they have been excluded, and they may decide to undermine decisions that
they feel were ill-advised (especially where the approach was considered to be idiosyn-
cratic) as well as imposed on them.
LO 1.1 Change Diagnostic: The J. C. Penney Story
Here are the three questions that you were asked to consider while reading the J. C.
Penney story, followed by our suggested answers:
1. What aspects of Ron Johnson’s turnaround strategy were appropriate, praiseworthy?
2. What mistakes did Ron Johnson make?
3. What would you suggest he could have done differently?
1. What aspects of Ron Johnson’s turnaround strategy were appropriate,
praiseworthy?
First, he was charismatic, passionate, energetic, and persuasive, using theatrics (the
acrylic cube) to draw attention and generate excitement. These are useful characteristics
for change leaders to possess, although in this case they contributed to the problems. It
is possible to be too charismatic, too passionate, too energetic, too persuasive, too theat-
rical. Second, he was highly innovative, bringing lots of fresh ideas to a long-established
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 25
and stale organization. Organizations that have been trading for a century will often
benefit by importing new thinking and practices from other sectors. Third, he was
action-oriented and wanted to move quickly, to bring about radical change rapidly.
2. What mistakes did Ron Johnson make?
Ignoring the company’s traditional core customers was probably his first and most seri-
ous mistake. There was no market research, either directly with customer groups or
indirectly through store staff and managers, to develop a better understanding of the
buying habits and preferences of JCP customers. How would customers interpret the
changes that he wanted to implement? It would have been helpful to know the answer
to that question before proceeding. This lack of customer knowledge led to some disas-
trous marketing, and to pricing and merchandising strategies that alienated core cus-
tomers without attracting new shoppers. Selling more expensive products seems like
a good way to increase sales per square foot, but only if your customers want those
items and can afford to buy them. Second, he allowed his new top team of “outsiders”
to distance themselves from the existing JCP managers and staff. This meant that the
top team had restricted access to the business knowledge stored in the corporate mem-
ory, and it also created unnecessary tensions between the DOPES and the Bad Apples.
Third, he made critical decisions based on his own judgement, dismissing the views
of other senior executives. Fourth, he acted rapidly. While speed may be necessary,
especially in a crisis, introducing so many changes at a quick pace was destabilizing.
Finally, and linked to the fourth point, he did not pilot test his big ideas before commit-
ting the investment and implementing them.
Johnson’s approach to change at JCP had two other adverse consequences. First, he
damaged the brand image, and that would take time—perhaps years—to repair. Sec-
ond, he closed the door to any future JCP chief executive who might be tempted to play
the part of charismatic innovator.
3. What would you suggest he could have done differently?
There is no correct answer to this question, but there is a wide range of possibili-
ties. The first obvious suggestion concerns better customer intelligence. Did sales fall
because middle-income families were hit by recession and customers became confused
by pricing practices? Or would customers have welcomed an expansion of the range of
JCP exclusive private brands and a modified promotions program instead? A second
suggestion concerns testing new ideas in a small number of representative outlets to
see how those would work before committing the whole organization. Third, review the
decision to fill senior management roles with friends and “outsiders”; did the organiza-
tion have internal candidates who could have filled at least some of those roles equally
well? Find ways to integrate new with existing staff: teambuilding, corporate events, job
rotations and partnerships, insisting that senior staff move to Dallas. In summary, these
suggestions concern market research, pilot testing, recruitment, and promotions policy.
However, this does not suggest that changes should have been made slowly, just a little
less rapidly. That would have allowed mistakes and wrong turns to become apparent, so
that they could be withdrawn, lessons learned, and revised plans put in place. Johnson’s
charisma, passion, and energy could have driven this alternative approach effectively.
A final suggestion for Ron Johnson would be: ask your board to probe and to chal-
lenge your decisions, and listen carefully to what they say. The why and how of change
26 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
in this case would probably have been more successful if these had been the result of
board decisions, and not Ron Johnson’s decisions. The board themselves, in this case,
seem to have made the mistake of not challenging their new, charismatic, persuasive,
passionate chief executive.
EXERCISE 1.1
Writing Your
Own Story
of Change
Think of a change that you have experienced, in either your work or personal life. We would like to ask you to write a story about that experience. Here is a definition of a story to help you:
A story expresses how and why life changes. It begins with a situation in which life is relatively in balance: You come to work day after day, week after week, and every- thing’s fine. You expect it will go on that way. But then there’s an event—in screen- writing, we call it the “inciting incident”—that throws life out of balance. You get a new job, or the boss dies of a heart attack, or a big customer threatens to leave. The story goes on to describe how, in an effort to restore balance, the protagonist’s sub- jective expectations crash into an uncooperative objective reality. A good storyteller describes what it’s like to deal with these opposing forces, calling on the protagonist to dig deeper, work with scarce resources, make difficult decisions, take action despite risks, and ultimately discover the truth. (McKee, 2003, p. 52)
Plan A
Write down your experience of change in about one page, and then answer these questions:
What made this experience a “story”?
What lessons for managing change can you take from your story?
Compare these with the lessons from the Beth Israel, Sears, and J. C. Penney stories. Which are the same?
From your experience, what new lessons have you added, particularly for future changes in which you might be involved?
In small groups, share your lessons with colleagues. Which lessons are similar, and what are the differences among you?
What three main conclusions can you take from these stories about managing change?
Plan B
In small groups of around four to six people, ask each of the group members to tell their story of change, taking only three or four minutes each. Record key elements of each story on flip-chart paper. When everyone has told their story, answer the following questions:
What are the common themes and issues across these stories?
What are the differences between these stories?
Of the change lessons from Beth Israel, Sears, and J. C. Penney, which are revealed in the groups’ stories, and which are absent? What are the implications of this?
Are there any further lessons embedded in these stories that could apply to future changes in which group members may be involved?
What three main conclusions can you take from these stories about managing change?
LO 1.1
Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes 27
Christensen, C. M., and Carlile, P. R. 2009. Course research: Using the case method to
build and teach management theory. Academy of Management Learning and Education
8(2):240–51. Explains how to use stories and case studies in management teaching, to
develop, test, and improve theory.
Denning, S. 2004. Telling tales. Harvard Business Review 82(5):122–29. Explains the
power of organizational storytelling and demonstrates how leaders can use stories to tell
people about themselves, trigger action, transmit values, encourage collaboration, “tame
the grapevine,” share knowledge, and “lead people into the future.”
Hughes, M. 2011. Do 70 per cent of all organizational change initiatives really fail? Jour-
nal of Change Management 11(4):451–64. The author challenges the evidence behind the
argument that so many change initiatives fail.
Metz, I., and Culik, C. T. 2008. Making public organizations more inclusive: A case study
of the Victoria Police Force. Human Resource Management 47(2):369–87. A case study of
rapid and successful culture change, led by a woman, Christine Nixon, recruited from out-
side the male-dominated police force. Note the lessons that the authors draw from this case.
Reisner, R. A. F. 2002. When a turnaround stalls. Harvard Business Review 80(2):45–52.
This case study concerns the U.S. Postal Service and is written by Robert Reisner, vice
president for strategic planning. Note the lessons that he draws from his experience.
Successful change is not guaranteed, despite the care and attention given to implementation
planning. If there is one firm prediction that we can make about change, it is that it will go
wrong, however meticulously designed. Why? By definition, we are always doing it for the
first time—in this organization, facing these problems, with these resources, given the past
history—and so on. One cannot confidently predict what will happen. The change leader
is always building the plane as it flies. This is not an argument against planning; it is an
argument for recognizing when things are going wrong, learning from that, and adapting
accordingly. So this text does not set out to tell change leaders “what to do.” Such perspec-
tives perpetuate the problem by creating the illusion that the outcomes can be kept under
control if carefully planned steps are followed. Most people’s experience of organizations
suggests that they are complex and untidy—and political—arenas. Acknowledging these
characteristics is the first step to taking a more realistic view of what change leaders can
expect to achieve. As discussed in the next chapter, it is more appropriate to think in terms of
shaping the change process rather than controlling it. We hope that reflective change leaders
will accept that choices must be made for change to proceed, and that these are informed
choices, not adopted on the grounds that there is “one best way” to approach the process.
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this
chapter, in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
* Recognize how stories of change can contribute to our knowledge of theory and
practice.
Stories can be read as process narratives, which explain what happened in a given con-
text. These explanations are therefore theories of change, pointing to the combination
Roundup
LO 1.1
Additional Reading
28 Chapter 1 Managing Change: Stories and Paradoxes
of factors interacting over time, leading to more or less successful change. While those
theories cannot be copied simply to other organizations and contexts, they are still
a rich source of general lessons, and aspects of one organization’s approach can be
adapted to fit other organizational contexts, if appropriate.
* Understand why managing organizational change is both a creative and a rational
process.
As with management practice in many other areas, what is going to work well when it
comes to implementing change depends on the organizational context. While general
guidelines help to identify the factors to take into consideration, the details have to
be determined by local, informed management and staff judgement. That is a creative
process.
* Identify the main tensions and paradoxes in managing organizational change.
Should we focus on transformational changes, or do we need to “sweat the small stuff”
as well? Should change be a rational, systematic process, or do we need to recognize
the political dimension? What is more important, organizational capabilities or indi-
vidual skills in implementing change? Should we accelerate the changes or adopt a
more measured pace? Do we rely on one change champion or recognize the distributed
contributions of many change agents? Once we have “learned the lessons” from a crisis
or other extreme event, how do we ensure that these are put into practice?
* Assess the strengths and limitations of our current understanding of this field.
There is a significant amount of commentary, but little consensus. Most of the advice
says much the same thing, but the failure rate of change is still high. The commentary is
highly fragmented and includes multiple perspectives and conceptualizations. Evidence
comes from a range of different settings and approaches, and contributions from last
century are still relevant today. Establishing cause and effect with regard to change and
outcomes is made difficult by the many variables, and the many stakeholders typically
involved.
LO 1.2
LO 1.3
LO 1.4
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31
2Chapter Images of Change Management
Learning objectives
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 2.1 Evaluate the use that different authors make of the terms change agent, change
manager, and change leader
LO 2.2 Understand the importance of organizational images and mental models
LO 2.3 Compare and contrast six different images of managing change and change
managers
LO 2.4 Explain the theoretical underpinning of different change management images
LO 2.5 Apply these six images of managing change to your personal preferences and
approach, and to different organizational contexts
w w w .C a r to o n S to c k .c o m
32 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
LO 2.1 What’s in a Name: Change Agents, Managers, or Leaders?
This chapter focuses on those who drive and implement change. We first consider how
those individuals are described, and then explore different ways in which their roles
can be understood. This is not just a theoretical discussion. An understanding of orga-
nizational change roles has profound practical implications for the way in which those
roles are conducted. And if you are in a change management role, now or in future, the
way in which you understand your position will affect how you fulfill those responsi-
bilities and whether you are more or less successful.
The use of terms in this field has become confused, and we first need to address this
problem. Do the terms change agent, change manager, and change leader refer to differ-
ent roles in relation to organizational change? Or are these labels interchangeable?
For most of the twentieth century, the term change agent typically referred to an exter-
nal expert management consultant who was paid to work out what was going wrong in an
organization and to implement change to put things right. This model is still in use. In the
United Kingdom, if your hospital is in financial difficulties, the national regulator, Moni-
tor, will appoint a “turnaround director” (external expert change agent with a fancy job
title) to sit on your board of directors and tell you how to cut costs and restore financial
balance. External change agents do not all work like that. Many adopt the “process consul-
tation” approach popularized by Edgar Schein (1999). Here, the role of the “expert” is to
help members of the organization to understand and solve their own problems.
Today, a change agent is just as likely to be a member of the organization as an external
consultant. The term is now often used more loosely, to refer to anyone who has a role
in change implementation, regardless of job title or seniority. Given the scale and scope
of changes that many organizations face, a significant number of internal change agents
may be a valuable—perhaps necessary—resource. Internal change agents usually have a
better understanding than outsiders of the changes that would lead to improvements. In
short, when you see the term “change agent,” it is important to check the meaning that is
intended, unless that is obvious from the context. When we use the term change agent in
this book, we will always indicate clearly to whom this applies.
Conventional wisdom says that, with regard to the other terms in our section head-
ing, management and leadership are different roles, and that this is an important distinc-
tion. One of the main advocates of this distinction is John Kotter (2012). For him, change
management refers to the basic tools and structures with which smaller-scale changes are
controlled. Change leadership, in contrast, marshals the driving forces and visions that
produce large-scale transformations. His main point, of course, is that we need more
change leadership.
This argument has two flaws. The first concerns the assumption that large-scale
transformations are more meaningful and potent, and are therefore more valuable than
small-scale change. They are not, as the discussion of “depth of change” (figure 1.1) in
chapter 1 suggested.
For example, Cíara Moore and David Buchanan (2013) report a change initiative called
“Sweat the Small Stuff.” Staff in one clinical service in an acute hospital were asked to
identify small, annoying problems that had not been fixed for some time. These included
broken equipment and faulty administrative processes. The five problems were addressed
Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 33
by a three-person team including an “animateur” who set up and coordinated the project, a
clinical champion who engaged medical colleagues, and a “who knows who knows what”
person whose administrative background and networks helped the team to identify short-
cuts, “workarounds,” and “the right people” to solve these problems quickly. All five prob-
lems were solved within five days. The total costs came to £89 for a piece of equipment,
and the 40 minutes that the animateur spent in conversations. The benefits were “financial
(US$35,000 income generation), processual (safer patient allocation), temporal (tasks per-
formed more quickly, less waiting time), emotional (less annoyance, boredom, frustration),
and relational (improved inter-professional relations)” (Moore and Buchanan, 2013, p. 13).
One of the overarching benefits of “sweating the small stuff” was better management-
medical relationships, laying the foundation for further improvements, in this area and
in others. Fixing the small stuff was beneficial in its own right and was the precursor
for future major changes. The animateur’s job title was “operations manager”; was she a
change manager, or a change leader?
The second flaw in the argument concerns the belief that the contrasting definitions of
these management and leadership concepts will survive contact with practice. They do
not. While it may be possible to define clear categories in theory, in practice these roles are
overlapping and indistinguishable. The general distinction between management and lead-
ership is challenged by Henry Mintzberg (2009, pp. 8–9), who argues, “I don’t understand
what this distinction means in the everyday life of organizations. Sure, we can separate
leading and managing conceptually. But can we separate them in practice? Or, more to the
point, should we even try?” He asks, how would you like to be managed by someone who
doesn’t lead, or led by someone who doesn’t manage? “We should be seeing managers as
leaders, and leadership as management practiced well.”
In short, management versus leadership is not a distinction worth arguing over, and
may be more simply resolved by a combination of personal and contextual preference. In
this book, we will use the terms change management (or manager) and change leadership
(or leader) synonymously—unless there is a reason for making a distinction, which will
then be explained.
LO 2.2 Images, Mental Models, Frames, Perspectives
More important than the terminology, the internal mental images that we have of our
organizations influence our expectations and our interpretations of what is happening, and
of what we think needs to change, and how (Morgan, 2006; Hatch and Cunliffe, 2012;
Bolman and Deal, 2013). We typically hold these images, metaphors, frames of reference,
or perspectives without being conscious of how they color our thinking, perceptions, and
actions. These images, which can also be described as mental models, help us to make
sense of the world around us, by focusing our attention in particular directions. The key
point is that, while an image or mental model is a way of seeing things, a standpoint draw-
ing our attention to particular issues and features, it is also a way of not seeing things,
shifting our attention away from other factors, which may or may not be significant.
For example, if we have a mental image of organizations as machines, then we will be
more aware of potential component “breakdowns” and see our role in terms of mainte-
nance and repair. In contrast, if we think of organizations as political arenas, we are more
34 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
likely to be aware of the hidden agendas behind decisions and try to identify the winners
and losers. We are also likely to see our role, not as maintaining parts of a smooth-running
machine, but as building coalitions, gathering support for our causes, and stimulating con-
flict to generate innovation. Shifting the lens again, we may see our organizations as small
societies or “microcultures.” With this image, we are more likely to focus on “the way
things get done around here,” and on how to encourage the values that are best aligned to
the type of work that we do. A microculture image highlights the importance of providing
vision and meaning so that staff identity becomes more closely associated with the work
of the organization. Each frame thus orients us to a different set of issues.
There are no “right” and “wrong” images here. These are just different lenses through
which the world in general, and organizations in particular, can be seen and understood.
The images or lenses that we each use reflect our backgrounds, education, life experi-
ences, and personal preferences. There are some problems for which a “machine” image
may be more appropriate, and other problems where a “microculture” image is relevant.
Some problems may best be understood if they are approached using two or three images
or lenses at a time.
Those who are responsible for driving and implementing change also have their own
images of organizations—and more importantly, images of their role as change manager.
Those images clearly influence the ways in which change managers approach the change
process, the issues that they believe are important, and the change management style that
they will adopt. Like the child with a hammer who treats every problem as if it were a nail,
the change manager is handicapped in drawing on only one particular image of that role. It
is therefore important, first, to understand one’s personal preferences—perhaps biases—in
this regard. It is also important, second, to be able to switch from one image of the role
to another, according to circumstances. This ability to work with multiple perspectives,
images, or frames concerning the change management role is, we will argue, central to the
personal effectiveness of the change manager and also to the effectiveness of the change
process.
We will outline six different “ideal type” images of managing change, describing the
assumptions that underpin each image and the theoretical views that support them. We will
then explore how change managers can draw from and use these multiple perspectives and
images of managing change.
LO 2.3 The Six-Images Framework
How are our images or mental models of organization and change formed? To answer
this question, Ian Palmer and Richard Dunford (2002) first identify two broad images
of the task of managing, which can be seen as either a controlling or as a shaping activ-
ity. They then identify three broad images of change outcomes, which can be seen as
intended, partially intended, or unintended. Why focus on change outcomes and not on
the change process in this approach? The outcomes of change do not always depend
entirely on the decisions and actions of those who are implementing change. Change
outcomes are often affected by events and developments outside the organization, and
which are beyond the direct control of individual change managers, whose intentions
may be swamped by those external factors. How change managers see those outcomes
Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 35
is therefore a significant component of their image of the change management role.
Combining these images of managing and of change outcomes leads to the six images
of managing organizational change summarized in table 2.1: director, coach, naviga-
tor, interpreter, caretaker, nurturer.
Management as Controlling The image of management as a controlling function has deep historical roots, based
on the work of Henri Fayol (1916, 1949) and his contemporaries (Gulick and Urwick,
1937) who described what managers do, captured by the clumsy acronym POSDCoRB.
This stands for planning, organizing supervising, directing, coordinating, reporting, and
budgeting—activities that the change manager, as well as the general manager, may
be expected to carry out. This reflects a “top-down,” hierarchical view of managing,
associated with the image of organization as machine. The manager’s job is to drive the
machine in a particular direction. Staff are given defined roles. Resources (inputs) are
allocated to departments to produce efficiently the required products and/or services
(outputs). This image is today reflected in the work of Henry Mintzberg (2009), who
describes contemporary management roles in terms of deciding, focusing, scheduling,
communicating, controlling, leading, networking, building coalitions, and getting things
done. Harold Sirkin et al. (2005) argue that “soft” factors such as culture, leadership,
and motivation do not significantly affect the success of organizational change, and that
change managers should concentrate on the “hard” factors instead—controlling, com-
municating, scheduling, monitoring. The hard factors have three properties:
First, companies are able to measure them in direct or indirect ways. Second, companies
can easily communicate their importance, both within and outside organizations. Third, and
perhaps most important, businesses are capable of influencing those elements quickly. Some
of the hard factors that affect a transformation initiative are the time necessary to complete it,
the number of people required to execute it, and the financial results that intended actions are
expected to achieve. Our research shows that change projects fail to get off the ground when
companies neglect the hard factors. (Sirkin et al., 2005, p. 109)
Management as Shaping This image of management as a shaping function, enhancing both individual and orga-
nizational capabilities, also has deep roots, based on the “human relations” school of
management from the 1930s (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; Mayo, 1945). It has
also been influenced by the organization development movement (Bennis, 1969; Burke,
1987). This image is associated with a participative management style that encourages
TABLE 2.1 Images of
Change
Management
Images of Managing
Images of Change Outcomes Controlling (Roles and Activities)
Shaping (Enhancing Capabilities)
Intended director coach
Partially intended navigator interpreter
Unintended caretaker nurturer
36 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
involvement in decision making in general, and in deciding the content and process of
change in particular. Employee involvement in change is based on two assumptions.
First, that those who are closest to the action will have a better understanding of how
things can be improved. Second, that staff are more likely to be committed to mak-
ing changes work if they have contributed to the design of those changes. Managing
people is thus concerned with shaping (and not directly controlling) behavior in ways
that benefit the organization. The contemporary concern with “employee engagement”
is another manifestation of this image. From a global survey of over 2,500 executives
carried out by McKinsey, a management consultancy, Keller et al. (2010, p. 1) argue
that the success of transformational change depends on “engaging employees collab-
oratively throughout the company and throughout the transformation journey,” and on
“building capabilities—particularly leadership capabilities.” They also found that:
[W]hen leaders ensure that frontline staff members feel a sense of ownership, the results show
a 70 per cent success rate for transformation. When frontline employees take the initiative to
drive change, transformations have a 71 per cent success rate. When both principles are used,
the success rate rises to 79 per cent. . . . Given the importance of collaboration across the
whole organization, leaders at companies starting a transformation should put a priority on
finding efficient and scalable ways to engage employees. (Keller et al., 2010, pp. 3 and 5)
There is no argument concerning which of these images—controlling or shaping—
is “correct” and which is “wrong.” It is possible to marshal argument and evidence in
support of both frames. We may have to ask, however, which would be more appropriate
or effective in given circumstances.
Table 2.1 also identifies three dominant images of change outcomes, based on the
extent to which it is assumed that change outcomes can be wholly planned and achieved.
Intended Change Outcomes The dominant assumption of this image is that intended change outcomes can be
achieved as planned. This assumption is at the core of much of the commentary on
organizational change and has dominated management practice for over half a century
(Burnes, 2014). Change is the realization of prior intent through the actions of change
managers. Chin and Benne (1976), whose work has been influential in this area, iden-
tify three broad strategies for producing intentional change:
Empirical-rational strategies assume that people pursue their own self-interest. Effective
change occurs when a change can be demonstrated as desirable and is aligned with the
interests of the group who are affected. Where change has those properties, then intended
outcomes will be achieved.
Normative–re-educative strategies assume that changes occur when people abandon their tra-
ditional, normative orientations and commit to new ways of thinking. Producing intentional
outcomes in this way involves changes in information and knowledge, but also in attitudes
and values.
Power-coercive strategies rely on achieving the intended outcomes through the compliant
behavior of those who have less power. Power may of course be exercised by legitimate
authority or through other, less legitimate, coercive means.
These three strategies share the view that the intended or desired outcomes of a change
program can be achieved through using different change strategies.
Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 37
Partially Intended Change Outcomes In this image, it is assumed that some, but not all, planned change outcomes are achiev-
able. Power, processes, interests, and the different skill levels of managers affect their
ability to produce intended outcomes. As Mintzberg and Waters (1985) note, the link
between initial intent and final outcome is not necessarily a direct one. This is due to
the fact that both intended and unintended consequences may emerge from the actions
of change managers; intended outcomes may be adapted along the way, or externally
imposed forces may modify what was originally intended. For these reasons, change
initiatives do not always deliver the outcomes that were planned.
Unintended Change Outcomes Less attention has been paid to this image in commentary on change management,
but this is a common theme in mainstream organization theory. This image recognizes
that managers often have great difficulty in achieving the change outcomes that were
intended. This difficulty stems from the variety of internal and external forces that can
push change in unplanned directions. Internal forces can include interdepartmental pol-
itics, long-established working practices that are difficult to dislodge, and deep-seated
perceptions and values that are inconsistent with desired changes. External forces can
include confrontational industrial relations (which can bring management-inspired
changes to a standstill), legislative requirements (tax demands, regulatory procedures),
or industry-wide trends affecting an entire sector (trade sanctions, run on the stock
market). These internal and external forces typically override the influence of individ-
ual change managers, whose intentions can be easily swamped. On occasion, of course,
intentions and outcomes may coincide, but this is often the result of chance rather than
the outcome of planned, intentional change management actions.
LO 2.3 LO 2.4 Six Images of Change Management
Table 2.1 identifies six different images of change management, each dependent in turn
on contrasting images of the function of managing, on the one hand, and of the delivery
of change outcomes, on the other. We can now outline each of these images and their
theoretical underpinnings.
Change Manager as Director (Controlling Intended Outcomes) The director image views management as controlling and change outcomes as being
achievable as planned. The change manager’s role here, as the title indicates, is to steer the
organization toward the desired outcomes. This assumes that change involves a strategic
management choice upon which the well-being and survival of the organization depends.
Let us assume that an organization is “out of alignment” with its external environment,
say, with regard to the information demands of a changing regulatory system and the more
effective responses of competitors. The change management response could involve a new
corporate IT system, to capture more efficiently and to analyze larger volumes of data.
The director image assumes that this can be mandated, that the new system can be imple-
mented following that command and that it will work well, leading to a high-performing
organization that is more closely aligned to its external environment.
38 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
What theoretical support does this image have? As chapter
10 will explain, there are a number of “n-step” models, guide-
lines, or “recipes” for change implementation that are based
on the image of the change manager as director. The change
manager is advised to follow the steps indicated (the number of
steps varies from model to model), more or less in the correct
sequence, and regardless of the nature of the change, in order
to ensure successful outcomes. These models are united by the
optimistic view that the intended outcomes of change can be
achieved, as long as change managers follow the model. One of
the best known “n-step” models was developed by John Kotter
(1995), who advocates a careful planning process, working through the eight steps in his
approach more or less in sequence, and not missing or rushing any of them. Even Kotter
acknowledges that change is usually a messy, iterative process. Nevertheless, he remains
confident that, if followed correctly, his “recipe” will increase the probability of a success-
ful outcome.
As chapter 10 will also explain, contingency theories of change argue that there is no
“one best model” for change managers to follow. These perspectives argue that the most
appropriate approach is contingent; that is, it depends on the context and on the circum-
stances (Stace and Dunphy, 2001; Huy, 2001). Contingency theorists thus part company
with n-step “best practice” guides, suggesting that a range of factors such as the scale and
urgency of the change, and the receptivity of those who will be affected, need to be consid-
ered when framing an implementation strategy. In other words, the “best way” will depend
on a combination of factors—but as long as the change manager takes those factors into
account, and follows the contingent model, then the intended outcomes should be delivered.
Change Manager as Navigator (Controlling Some Intended Outcomes) In the navigator image, control is still at the heart of management action, although a vari-
ety of external factors mean that, although change managers may achieve some intended
change outcomes, they may have little control over other results. Outcomes are at least
partly emergent rather than completely planned, and result from a variety of influences,
competing interests, and processes. For example, a change manager may wish to restruc-
ture a business unit by introducing cross-functional teams to assist product development.
While a change manager may be able to establish teams (an intentional outcome), getting
them to work effectively may be challenging if there is a history of distrust, information
hoarding, and boundary protection by the business units. In this situation,
functional managers may appoint to the cross-functional teams people who
they know will keep the interests of their department uppermost and block
any decisions that might decrease their organizational power (an unintended
outcome of putting the teams in place).
Exploring why change initiatives stall, Eric Beaudan (2006, p. 6) notes,
“No amount of advance thinking, planning and communication guarantees
success. That’s because change is by nature unpredictable and unwieldy.
The military have a great way to put this: ‘no plan survives contact with
the enemy.’” He also argues that “leaders need to recognize that the initial
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Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 39
change platform they create is only valid for a short time. They need to conserve their
energy to confront the problematic issues that will stem from passive resistance and from
the unpredictable side effects that change itself creates” (Beaudan, 2006, p. 6). Change
may be only partially controllable, with change managers navigating the process toward a
set of outcomes, not all of which may have been intended.
What theoretical support does this image have? Processual theories (see chapter 10)
argue that organizational changes unfold over time in a messy and iterative manner, and
thus rely on the image of change manager as navigator (Langley et al., 2013; Dawson
and Andriopoulos, 2014). In this perspective, the outcomes of change are shaped by a
combination of factors including the past, present, and future context in which the orga-
nization functions, including external and internal factors; the substance of the change,
which could be new technology, process redesign, a new payment system, or changes to
organization structure and culture; the implementation process (tasks, decisions, timing);
political behavior, inside and outside the organization; and the interactions between these
factors. The role of the change manager is not to direct, but to identify options, accumulate
resources, monitor progress, and navigate a way through the complexity.
Change managers must accept that there will be unanticipated disruptions, and that
options and resources need to be reviewed. Change navigators are also advised to encour-
age staff involvement. For senior management, rather than directing and controlling the
process, the priority is to ensure receptivity to change and that those involved have the
skills and motivation to contribute. However, given the untidy, nonlinear nature of change
processes, navigators—consistent with the metaphor—have room to maneuver; the course
of change may need to be plotted and replotted in response to new information and devel-
opments. There is no guarantee that the final destination will be that which was initially
intended. In some instances, change may be ongoing, with no clear end point.
Change Manager as Caretaker (Controlling Unintended Outcomes) In the caretaker image, the (ideal) management role is still one of control, although the
ability to exercise that control is severely constrained by a range of internal and external
forces that propel change relatively independent of management intentions. For example,
despite the change manager’s desire to encourage entrepreneurial and innovative behavior,
this may become a failing exercise as the organization grows, becomes more bureaucratic,
and enacts strategic planning cycles, rules, regulations, and cen-
tralized practices. In this situation, the issues linked to inexorable
growth are outside the control of an individual change manager.
In this rather pessimistic image, at best managers are caretakers,
shepherding their organizations along to the best of their ability.
Theoretical support for the caretaker image can be drawn from
three organizational theories: life-cycle, population ecology, and
institutional theory.
Life-cycle theory views organizations passing through well-
defined stages from birth to growth, maturity, and then decline or
death. These stages are part of a natural developmental cycle. There
is an underlying logic or trajectory, and the stages are sequential
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). There is little that managers can © J
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40 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
do to prevent this natural development; at best they are caretakers of the organization as
it passes through the various stages. Harrison and Shirom (1999) identify the caretaker
activities associated with the main stages in the organizational life cycle, and these are
summarized in table 2.2. Change managers thus have a limited role, smoothing the various
transitions rather than controlling whether or not they occur.
Population ecology theory focuses on how the environment selects organizations for
survival or extinction, drawing on biology and neo-Darwinism (White et al., 1997). Whole
populations of organizations can in this perspective change as a result of ongoing cycles of
variation, selection, and retention:
Organizational variation occurs as the result of random chance.
Organizational selection occurs when an environment selects organizations that best fit
the conditions.
Organizational retention involves forces (e.g., inertia and persistence) that sustain
organizational forms, thus counteracting variation and selection (Van de Ven and
Poole, 1995).
Some population ecology theorists suggest that there are limited actions that change man-
agers can take to influence these forces, such as:
interacting, perhaps through key stakeholders, with other organizations to lessen the
impact of environmental factors;
repositioning the organization in a new market or other environment.
In general, however, the implication of this perspective is that managers have little sway
over change where whole populations of organizations are affected by external forces.
TABLE 2.2 Life-Cycle Stages and Caretaker Activities
Developmental Stage Caretaker Activities
Entrepreneurial Stage Founder initiates an idea
Collectivity Stage Coordination through informal means as group identity develops
Formalization Stage Formalization of operations, emphasizing rules and procedures, efficiency and stability
and control
Elaboration Stage
more complex and environment changes
Source: Adapted from Harrison and Shirom, 1999, pp. 307–14.
Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 41
For example, managers of many financial institutions struggled to deal with the wide-
spread global crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, in
September 2008. That event affected adversely the global population of finance organiza-
tions (and the governments that had to recapitalize them).
Institutional theory argues that change managers take broadly similar decisions and
actions across whole populations of organizations. The central concern of this perspec-
tive is not to explain change, but to understand “the startling homogeneity of organiza-
tional forms and practices” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 148). These similarities can
be explained by the pressures associated with the interconnectedness of organizations that
operate in the same sector or environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) distinguish three
such pressures, which in practice interact:
coercive, including social and cultural expectations and government-mandated changes;
mimetic, as organizations imitate or model themselves on the structures and practices
of other organizations in their field, often those that they consider more successful and
legitimate;
normative, through the professionalization of work such that managers in differ-
ent organizations adopt similar values and working methods that are similar to each
other.
Not all organizations succumb to these pressures; there are what DiMaggio and Powell
call “deviant peers.” However, the assumption is that these external forces are inexorable
and individual managers have only limited ability to implement change outcomes that are
not consistent with these forces. At best, change managers are caretakers with little influ-
ence over the long-term direction of change.
Change Manager as Coach (Shaping Intended Outcomes) In the coach image, the assumption is that change managers (or change consultants)
can intentionally shape the organization’s capabilities in particular ways. Like a sports
coach, the change manager shapes the organization’s or the team’s capabilities to ensure
that, in a competitive situation, it will be more likely to succeed. Rather than dictating
the state of each play as the director might do, the coach relies on establishing the right
values, skills, and “drills” so that the organization’s members can achieve the desired
outcomes.
What theoretical support does this image have? Organization development (OD) theory
reinforces the image of the change manager as coach, by stressing the importance of
values such as humanism, democracy, and individual development (see chapter 9). OD
“interventions” are designed to develop appropriate skills, reduce interpersonal and inter-
divisional conflict, and to structure activities in ways that help the organization’s members
better understand, define, and solve their own problems. As the OD movement evolved,
the emphasis shifted from team-based and other small-scale interventions to organization-
wide programs, designed to “get the whole system in the room” (Weisbord, 1987, p. 19;
Burnes and Cook, 2012). As a movement underpinned by values, OD advocates can be
evangelical about the advantages of helping organization members develop their own
skills in problem solving to achieve their intended outcomes, claiming not only that the
approach works but that it produces results with less resistance, greater speed, and higher
commitment (Axelrod, 1992).
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42 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
Change Manager as Interpreter (Shaping Some Intended Outcomes) The change manager as interpreter has the task of creating
meaning for others, helping them to make sense of events
and developments that, in themselves, constitute a changed
organization. It is up to change managers to represent to others
just what these changes mean. However, there are often competing
interpretations of the same issues, especially where there are
different groups who do not necessarily share common interests
and perceptions (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007). This suggests that
only some meanings—and therefore some change intentions—are
likely to be realized.
In this contested climate, managers as interpreters “need to be
able to provide legitimate arguments and reasons for why their
actions fit within the situation and should be viewed as legitimate”
(Barge and Oliver, 2003, p. 138). Downsizing, for example, is one situation where compet-
ing interpretations are inevitable. Change managers may portray this action as a way of
strengthening the organization in the face of environmental pressures and thus protecting
more effectively the jobs of those who remain. Others, however, may tell different stories, of
management incompetence and of underhand ways of “outplacing” politically troublesome
individuals or even whole departments under the cover of “efficiency.” Stephen Denning
(2004), mentioned in chapter 1, emphasizes the power of storytelling, observing, “I’ve seen
stories help galvanize an organization around a defined business goal” (p. 122), and that a
“well told story” can be more inspiring and motivating than a detailed analytical approach.
In other words, when it comes to interpreting the meaning of change for others, the effective
interpreter tells better stories than the competition.
What theoretical support does this image have? Architect of the influential processual
perspective on organizational change, Andrew Pettigrew (1985, p. 442) sees the “manage-
ment of meaning” as central. He argues, “The management of meaning refers to a process
of symbol construction and value use designed to create legitimacy for one’s own ideas,
actions, and demands, and to delegitimize the demands of one’s opponents.” The change
manager seeking to introduce significant, strategic change may thus be faced with the
prospect of trying to create a story that will dislodge a well-established ideology, culture,
and system of meaning. Change managers, of course, do not have a monopoly on storytell-
ing skills; sometimes the stories of others are better, and they “win.”
The interpreter image is central to Karl Weick’s (1995; 2000) sense-making theory
of organizational change. Sense-making, Weick explains, is what we do when we face a
problem—a surprise or a crisis, for example—and have to work out how we are going to
respond. For sense-making to work in these situations, however, four factors have to be
present. First, it has to be possible to take some action to address the problem; almost any
action will do, as long as experiment and exploration are allowed. Second, that action must
be directed toward a purpose or goal. Third, the context must allow people to be attentive
to what is happening and to update their understanding accordingly. Fourth, people need
to be allowed to share their views openly, in a climate of mutual trust and respect. Weick
calls these four components of sense-making animation, direction, attention, and respect-
ful interaction.
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Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 43
Weick (2000, p. 225) also observes that emergent, continuous, cumulative change is the
norm in most organizations. The textbook focus on planned, transformational, revolution-
ary, disruptive change is partial and misleading. Emergent change involves the develop-
ment of new ways of working that were not previously planned:
The recurring story is one of autonomous initiatives that bubble up internally; continuous
emergent change; steady learning from both failure and success; strategy implementa-
tion that is replaced by strategy making; the appearance of innovations that are unplanned,
unforeseen, and unexpected; and small actions that have surprisingly large consequences.
Emergent changes are thus driven by continuous sense-making, often by frontline staff,
and not by senior management. Indeed, top team intervention may inhibit change. Weick
(2000, p. 234) argues that, while the four sense-making activities of animation, direction,
attention, and respectful interaction are necessary for learning, adaptation, and change,
“they are also the four activities most likely to be curbed severely in a hierarchical com-
mand-and-control system.” For successful change, Weick concludes, management must
become interpreters, recognizing that “organizational change is emergent change laid
down by choices made on the front line. The job of management is to author interpreta-
tions and labels that capture the patterns in those adaptive choices. . . . Management
doesn’t create change. It certifies change” (Weick, 2000, p. 238; emphasis added).
Change Manager as Nurturer (Shaping Unintended Outcomes) The image of change manager as nurturer assumes that even small changes can have a
large impact on organizations, and that managers may be unable to control the outcomes
of these changes (Thietart and Forgues, 1995). However, they may nurture the organiza-
tion, developing qualities that enable positive self-organizing. Like a parent’s relationship
with a child, future outcomes are nurtured or shaped, but the ability to produce intended
Interpreters at Work Four Conditions for Changing Mindsets
success of change relies on persuading individuals
to change their “mindsets”—to think differently
-
-
fundamental changes in organization culture, in
collective thinking and behavior—from reactive to
changing mindsets at level three:
Employees will alter their mindsets only if they see
the point of the change and agree with it—at least
enough to give it a try. The surrounding structures
(reward and recognition systems, for example)
must be in tune with the new behaviour. Employ-
ees must have the skills to do what it requires.
Finally, they must see people they respect model-
ling it actively. Each of these conditions is realized
independently; together they add up to a way of
changing the behaviour of people in organizations
by changing attitudes about what can and should
happen at work.
44 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
outcomes is limited because of the impact of much wider, sometimes
chaotic forces and influences. Specific directions and outcomes of
change cannot be intentionally produced but rather emerge and are
shaped through the qualities and capabilities of the organization.
Perspectives supporting the nurturer image include chaos theory
and Confucian/Taoist theory.
Chaos theory argues that organizational change is nonlinear, is
fundamental rather than incremental, and does not necessarily entail
growth (table 2.3). Chaos theorists, drawing also on complexity the-
ory, explore how organizations “continuously regenerate themselves
through adaptive learning and interactive structural change. These
efforts periodically result in the spontaneous emergence of a whole
new dynamic order, through a process called self-organization” (Lich-
tenstein, 2000, p. 131). The phenomenon of self- organization is driven
by the chaotic nature of organizations, which in turn is a consequence
of having to grapple simultaneously with both change and stability. In
this context, the change manager has to nurture the capacity for self-
organization, with limited ability to influence the direction and nature of the spontaneous
new orders that may emerge. This may sound abstract and puzzling, but this describes
the emergent strategy—nurturing capabilities—that the successful Brazilian entrepreneur
Ricardo Semler (2000) adopted in his manufacturing company, Semco. This explains how
Semco successfully diversified into electronics.
Semco A Chaotic Business?
-
-
sions about virtually all company issues, from strat-
-
practices and philosophies illustrate principles of
-
That rather unusual management philoso-
has seemed a little too radical for mainstream
-
able to transform itself continuously and organi-
statements and strategies, announcing a bunch
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Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 45
Confucian/Taoist theory—perhaps better regarded as a philosophy—adopts assump-
tions with regard to organizational change that are fundamentally different from Western
views (Marshak, 1993). Change is regarded as:
cyclical, involving constant ebb and flow;
processional, involving harmonious movement from one state to another;
journey-oriented, involving cyclical change with no end state;
based on maintaining equilibrium, or achieving natural harmony;
observed and followed by those who are involved, who seek harmony with their uni-
verse; and
normal rather than exceptional.
TABLE 2.3 Chaos Theory and Change Management
Change Management Actions Core Elements
Managing transitions Get them involved in decision making and problem solving
Building resilience
environment
Managing order and disorder, the present and the future
Balance the needs for order and change
Creating and maintaining a learning organization Make continuous learning available to everyone
Source: Adapted from Tetenbaum (1998).
Taoist Approach to Change Leadership
are no “off the shelf” remedies or coping strategies
role of the leader, they argue, is to be a facilitator
and encouraging the “positive deviants” in the orga-
of discovery, making them the evangelists of their
Learn from the people
Of the best leaders
When the task is accomplished
The people all remark
We have done it ourselves
46 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
Organizational change outcomes from this standpoint are not intended so much as pro-
duced through the nurturing of a harmonious Yin-Yang philosophy in which each new
order contains its own negation. Embedded in this philosophy, therefore, is an image of
the change manager as nurturer.
LO 2.5 Using the Six-Images Framework
Each of these images of managing change represents a Weberian “ideal type.” They are
“ideal” in the sense that a “pure” version of the concept may not exist, but they give
us a set of benchmarks, or templates, against which practice can be compared. (Note:
“ideal” does not in this case mean “desirable.”) These images are not separate catego-
ries; they form two continua, from controlling to shaping management roles, and from
planned to unintended outcomes. The boundaries of these six images are blurred, and
their elements may overlap in practice. The case study at the end of this chapter, “The
Turnaround Story at Leonard Cheshire,” illustrates how this happens in practice.
These six images are enduring, each having, as we have seen, differing theoretical
underpinnings that serve to legitimate them. Nevertheless, as already noted, the caretaker
and nurturer images are less frequently discussed in relation to change management—
although they are more widely accepted in other domains of organization theory,
particularly where there is less practice orientation. In contrast, the director, navigator,
coach, and interpreter images involve more active, intentional, and directional views
of the ability of change managers to produce organizational change, whether through
control or shaping actions. In this sense, they are more positive images than caretaking
and nurturing, which reflect a more reactive view of managerial effectiveness—in terms of
both why changes occur and the extent to which these changes are driven by management
intentions. Managers obviously do not like to feel that they are insignificant players in their
organizational worlds. Rather, the assumption that they are able to produce positive and
intentional change is an important component of the Western change management lexicon.
The need to be seen to be producing positive intentional change was demonstrated to
us in the following example. A well-known change consultant based in Washington, DC,
told us how he intended to use the six-images framework in a major international organi-
zation to help their staff to understand the impact of the culture of the organization and
its many competing discourses of change. The company agreed to use the framework and
even requested copyright permission. However, some senior executives argued against
using it, “because it might legitimate managers not assuming responsibility for initiating
and managing change; it might give them an out.” This was for two reasons. First, there
was the possibility of seeing change having unintended outcomes. Second, there was the
possibility that change managers would have minimal impact where the organization was
dominated by enforced change from the outside. The six-images framework was not used.
This example is instructive for the following reasons. Some commentators distinguish
between topics that are “sacred” and those that are “profane.” Some topics are not to be
questioned, and to do so is not legitimate. The experience of our Washington consultant
indicates that the idea that change can be controlled to produce intentional outcomes is
sacred. It is profane to suggest otherwise—that managers may be overwhelmed by forces
beyond their control. The view that we would like to promote in this text is that it is time
Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 47
to end this divide. It is necessary to recognize that, in the long run, such a distinction is
unhelpful. This stance hinders change managers by discouraging a reflective, self-critical
view of their actions and of what is achievable in any given context.
So, how should the six-images framework be used in practice? There are three inter-
related issues where reflection on the part of the change manager is valuable: surfacing
assumptions about change, assessing dominant images of change, and using multiple
images and perspectives of change.
Surfacing Assumptions about Change The six-images framework guides us in reflecting on the images and assumptions we
hold about managing change. As we noted at the start of this chapter, we all have mental
models and these help us to simplify and to make sense of the complex organizational
worlds in which we operate. At the same time as they simplify and illuminate, they
turn our attention toward some things and away from others. Being aware of the mental
models with which we work helps us think more carefully about their relevance—and
the extent to which the assumptions they entail are really ones that are going to be of
assistance to us in approaching organizational change.
Being aware of these images enables change managers to assess the assumptions that
are being made by others with whom they are working or interacting or from whom they
are taking advice. Resulting from this assessment may be actions to reorient the images
others have of the particular change in which they are involved by providing new images
through which the change can be seen.
For example, a change manager working with a navigator image may get others, who
may view change through a director image, to acknowledge that unanticipated outcomes
may occur as change unfolds. The navigator may persuade others to accept that one pos-
sibility of engaging in a change is that their current view of what is desired at the end
may shift as the process unfolds and new possibilities emerge. In this sense, awareness of
differing change management images can lead to an educational process within a change
team. It requires encouragement of conversations around images and assumptions about
the anticipated change, testing these with the group, and ensuring that all members of the
team share common change image(s). This ensures that individual change managers are
not talking past one another and making assumptions that are not shared by others.
Assessing Dominant Images of Change The six-images framework encourages change managers to reflect on whether they
are dominated by one particular image, and on the limitations of that perspective. For
example, the director image turns our attention to the outcomes we want to achieve and
the steps needed to get there; at the same time, it turns our attention away from whether
the outcomes are really achievable (or even desirable) and whether unintentional out-
comes also might occur should we pursue a particular change course.
The framework also directs attention to whether the organization in which the change
is to occur is dominated by a particular view of what is achievable and how change should
unfold. Indeed, Hamel and Prahalad (1994) point out that some organizations are domi-
nated by a particular view of how things should get done—almost to the point where the
view is part of the “genetic coding” of the organization and is therefore seen as natural and
not open for negotiation. In this case, change managers whose images are not consistent
48 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
with the dominant organizational image may experience frustration and stress as they
work with a change that may be seen as less legitimate or irrelevant.
Using Multiple Images and Perspectives of Change It is possible that a change manager’s “image-in-use” may depend on their personal
preferences, or it may be an unconscious decision based simply on the use of a familiar
approach. One of the advantages of exposure to the range of images is to reduce the
likelihood of a change manager using a single image because of a lack of understand-
ing of the range of options. The six-images framework directs attention to the range of
available options and to how their use may vary between contexts. A conscious choice
of image-in-use can be based on at least the following four sets of considerations.
Image-in-use depends on the type of change. Change managers may assess some types
of change as being more amenable to one image or approach rather than another. An inter-
preter approach might be seen as possible for one but not another type of change. Change
managers are thus advised to adjust their image of change, and the perception of what is
possible, depending on the situation. Anderson and Anderson (2001), for example, adopt a
coaching image, arguing that developmental and transitional change can be managed from
this perspective, but not transformational change. They draw on a navigator image in relation
to transformational change, arguing that there are too many intangibles that can inhibit the
achievement of predetermined outcomes; what is required is a mindset that accepts that orga-
nizations can be led into the unknown without the end point being predictable in advance.
Image-in-use depends on the context of the change. As chapter 10 explains, manage-
ment approach should ideally be consistent with the context. In some settings, organiza-
tional members may be unhappy with the status quo and ready for change. The appropriate
image-in-use in this context could be coach or interpreter, involving people in order to
identify desired change outcomes and how those should be achieved. Where change faces
hostility and resistance, and intended outcomes are thus in jeopardy, a caretaker or naviga-
tor image may be more appropriate. However, if change is necessary for the organization’s
survival, then a director image may necessary.
Image-in-use depends on the phase of change. Change processes pass through differ-
ent phases (see chapter 10). Change managers may thus choose to use different images
at different stages of the process, or depending on perceptions of the phase that change
has reached. For example, in initiating an externally imposed or encouraged change (such
as the Malcolm Baldrige Quality Awards) in order to continue as an accredited supplier,
change managers may feel that the caretaker image is appropriate, as change was not
generated internally. However, as change progresses, an interpreter image may become
relevant, conveying to staff new meanings associated with the implementation such as
enhanced professionalism and the possibility of diversifying into new areas.
Image-in-use depends on simultaneous involvement in multiple changes. At any given
time, in any one organization, there are often many changes unfolding, in different busi-
ness units or across the organization as a whole. Some of those changes could be exter-
nally driven, and a caretaker image may apply. Where externally generated change is not
negotiable—a change in legislation, for example, demanding compliance—then a director
image may be necessary. Other initiatives, however, may be internally generated, and a
director image may again be appropriate to achieving desired outcomes in a controlled
way. This implies that skilled and reflective change managers are able to adapt, to move
Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 49
between images depending on how conditions are developing. It may also be appropriate
to manage simultaneously with multiple images where these are related to different but
concurrent initiatives. As noted earlier, the Leonard Cheshire case below illustrates this
possibility.
SELF- ASSESSMENT
What Is Your
Image of
Managing
Change?
1 2 3 4 5
Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Communications should emphasize the inevitability of change ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
2 ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
The aim of communication about change is to send clear, unambiguous messages, so organization members understand
❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
5 - ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
6 Communication about change needs to foster supportive con- ditions and to convey the need for members to be ready to
❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
7 ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
8 ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
9 Organizational change is unpredictable, and resistance may or may not affect the outcomes, but managers should respond to
❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
An appropriate vision for change is most likely to emerge ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
(Continued)
LO 2.5
50 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Communicating about change involves attending to the varied interests of stakeholders and persuading them of the benefits of change or, if necessary, modifying changes to produce the best
❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
It is generally possible for managers to have significant control ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Managers should help resisters develop the capacity to cope ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Communication about change should ensure that organization members are “on the same page” about the values linked to the
❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
A vision for organizational change emerges from the clash of ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
in an organization, they can nurture staff capabilities, and thus ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Managers should redirect change to go around resistance, ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
To implement change successfully, managers must interpret the change for organizational members and help them to make
❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Visions for organizational change are likely to have a limited ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
account, to ensure that as many people as possible, inside and ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
22 ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Leaders cannot impose a vision for change, as competing stake- ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑
Source: This assessment was designed by, and is reproduced here with the permission of Jean Bartunek, Professor of Management and Organization, Boston College, MA.
Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 51
SELF- ASSESSMENT
Scoring
Director Coach
5
total: total:
Navigator Interpreter
7
total:
8
22 total:
Caretaker Nurturer
2
total:
6 9
total:
-
52 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
2 Are change leaders more likely to be successful if they remain faithful to their domi-
TABLE 2.4 Six Images of Change Management
Image Sound Bite Approach to Change When to Use
Director to happen”
Management choice, command and control survival, and change manager has
Navigator expect the unexpected
affect change plans
Caretaker might be possible”
Accept the force of external context factors and adapt as necessary
When environmental forces are
sector
Coach our capability to deal capabilities—values,
skills, drills—to respond effectively to change
need to resolve interpersonal conflicts and build understanding to solve their
Interpreter “We need to think differently about this”
Managing meaning through interpretations that explain and convey understanding to others
When different stakeholders have
and they do not share common interests
Nurturer encourage involvement, continuous learning, and self-organizing
constant regeneration and adaptive learning
EXERCISE 2.1
Assessing
Change
Managers’
Images
-
- LO 2.2
Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 53
-
EXERCISE 2.2
The Turn-
around Story
at Leonard
Cheshire
Issues to Consider as You Read This Story
-
The Context
support included care in a range of residential settings, respite services, and skills devel-
The Problem
home as a teenager, but her ambitions had taken her into a management career in other
The Solution
Phase 1:
LO 2.5
(Continued)
54 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
If I am late or if anybody is late for anything and the reason is that it is because they
Phase 2: -
-
making procurement more efficient and by reducing spending on expensive agency staff
people share your commitment and passion and values and they are not doing things
campaign to stop this practice:
Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 55
-
The Outcomes
Story Sources Carlisle, D. 2014. The woman who banned the f-word. Health Service Journal (February 28):
24–28.
http://www.leonardcheshire.org/
Battilana, J., and Casciaro, T. 2013. The network secrets of great change agents. Harvard
Business Review 91(7/8):62–68. Research concluding that it is the networks of change
agents that can make them more successful, especially where the nature of their networks
(“bridging” or “cohesive”) matches the type of change that they are pursuing.
Chatman, J. 2014. Culture change at Genentech: Accelerating strategic and financial accom-
plishments. California Management Review 56(2):113–29. This is a case study of success-
ful culture change in a pharmaceuticals company. The senior vice president, Jennifer Cook,
said: “My leadership philosophy is that individuals are people first and employees second.
Our best employees make a choice to come to work every day and we have to earn the right
to have them want to come back. The way I look at it is that I’m bringing a framework and
infrastructure as a way to harness the group’s thinking, but it’s their thinking” (p. 113). Con-
trast this philosophy with that of Ron Johnson at J. C. Penney (chapter 1).
McCreary, L. 2010. Kaiser Permanente’s innovation on the front lines. Harvard Business
Review 88(9):92–97. This famous healthcare organization has an internal “innovation
consultancy” that employs change agents to watch, note, sketch, and identify better ways
of working, asking staff how they feel about their work, holding “deep dive” events with
staff to generate ideas. The aim is to introduce service-oriented innovation quickly and
economically. This is a caretaker image of change managers—controlling, but looking
for unpredictable outcomes.
Pascale, R. T., and Sternin, J. 2005. Your company’s secret change agents. Harvard
Business Review 83(5):72–81. Argues that the leader’s role is not to direct change but to
identify and encourage the organization’s “positive deviants” who are creating new solu-
tions and ways of working on their own initiative. This supports the nurturer image of the
change manager, shaping conditions that again will lead to unpredicted outcomes.
Additional Reading
56 Chapter 2 Images of Change Management
Roundup
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this chapter,
in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Evaluate the use that different authors make of the terms change agent, change man-
ager, and change leader.
Some commentators argue that the distinction between change managers and change
leaders is clear and significant. We have argued, in contrast, that in practice these two
roles are closely intertwined. This is a semantic squabble that is not worth arguing
about. The term change agent traditionally refers to an external consultant or adviser,
and while that role is still common, the term today is used more loosely, to refer to
internal as well as external change agents.
Understand the importance of organizational images and mental models.
The images or mental models that we all have provide us with ways of understanding
the world around us. While these images are useful, we have to appreciate that “ways
of seeing” are also “ways of not seeing.” Focusing on specific attributes of a situation
of necessity means overlooking other attributes—which may sometimes be important.
Change managers approach their task with an image of the organization, an image of
the change process, and an image of their role in change. These mental models—our
“images-in-use”—have profound implications for change management practice.
Compare and contrast six different images of managing change and change managers.
We explored six images of the change manager: director, navigator, caretaker, coach,
interpreter, and nurturer. Each is based on different assumptions about the role of man-
agement (controlling versus shaping) and about the change outcomes being sought
(intended, partly intended, unintended).
LO 2.1
LO 2.2
LO 2.3
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
-
images described in this chapter in
-
What are the strengths and limitations
of the images that you have identified
What skills do you think are associated
Are there areas of personal skill devel-
opment that are needed in order for
you to feel more comfortable in using
-
to bring consideration of alternative
strategies could you use to assist you in
As a small group exercise: Com-
pare your responses to the above
Chapter 2 Images of Change Management 57
Explain the theoretical underpinning of different change management images.
Each image finds support in organization theory and change management theory, which
was explored briefly. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that these images, which
have strikingly different implications for practice, are based on research evidence and
theory.
Apply these six images of managing change to your personal preferences and approach,
and to different organizational contexts.
We identified three uses of the six-images framework: surfacing assumptions, assessing
dominant images, and using multiple perspectives and images. There are no “right” and
“wrong” images of change management. It is valuable to be able to interpret problems
and solutions in general, and change processes in particular, from different standpoints.
This “multiple perspectives” approach can help generate fresh thinking and creative
solutions.
This framework has other uses, explored in later chapters. One concerns the assessment
of change as successful or not. That judgement is often related to one image rather than
another. We often ask: Was it managed well? What went right? What went wrong? Did
we achieve what we wanted? However, judging success is open to interpretation. As
Pettigrew et al. (2001, p. 701) argue, “Judgements about success are also likely to be
conditional on who is doing the assessment and when the judgments are made.” The
six-images framework highlights the need to raise conversations early about judging
the success of change, and to ensure a broadly common view of that judgement across
the organization.
LO 2.4
LO 2.5
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61
3Chapter Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
Learning objectives
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 3.1 Understand the environmental pressures that can trigger organizational
change.
LO 3.2 Explain why not all organizations are affected equally by external pressures.
LO 3.3 Explain why organizations often fail to change following crises.
LO 3.4 Identify internal organizational factors that trigger change.
LO 3.5 Relate differing images of managing change to pressures for change.
F r a n k C
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a m
T h e N
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Y o r k e r C
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62 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
LO 3.1 Environmental Pressures for Change
Managers are faced with a paradox. On the one hand, organizations are advised to
change rapidly, or perish (Kotter, 2012). On the other, management is advised to avoid
the risks of implementing too much change too quickly (Bruch and Menges, 2010). As
noted in chapter 1, evidence suggests that the failure rate of planned change programs
is high. One survey of senior executives found a success rate of only 30 percent (Keller
and Aiken, 2008). Another, more optimistic study found that less than 60 percent of
reorganizations are successful (CIPD, 2014).
As failures of organizational change appear to be widespread, and widely acknowl-
edged, what drives managers to embark on such risky ventures? One answer is based on an
economic perspective, and is aligned to “management as control” images and assumptions:
In competitive economies, firm survival depends on satisfying shareholders. Failure to
do this will lead investors either to move their capital to other companies, or to use their
influence to replace senior management. Managers thus introduce change to improve
organizational performance in terms of profitability and higher company share prices.
An alternative view, aligned with “management as shaping” images and assumptions, is
the organizational learning perspective:
Organizations and human systems are complex and evolving and cannot be reduced to a sin-
gle objective of maximizing shareholder value. Change is also related to the need to increase
an organization’s adaptive capacity—because how to increase shareholder value, and the
knowledge underpinning that goal, are likely to change over time. Change is explained by
the desire to build capacity to respond to, and to shape, external pressures and demands.
Whatever the explanation, organizations are clearly faced with a variety of pressures to
change, from many directions. External pressures for organizational change include, for example:
economic and trading conditions, domestic and global;
new technologies and materials;
changes in customers’ requirements and tastes;
activities and innovations of competitors, mergers and acquisitions;
legislation, regulation, and government policies;
shifts in local, national, and international politics;
changes in social and cultural values.
Internal pressures for organizational change can include, for example:
new product and service design innovations;
low performance and morale, high stress and staff turnover;
new senior managers or top management team, who want to “make their mark”;
inadequate skills and knowledge base, triggering training programs;
head office and factory relocation, closer to suppliers and markets;
recognition of problems triggering reallocation of responsibilities;
innovations in the manufacturing process;
new ideas about how to deliver services to customers.
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 63
In what follows, we will explore a selection of these external and internal pressures. But
change is not simply a matter of reacting to events. Organizations and individuals can antici-
pate trends and opportunities and be proactive as well. Susan Mohrman and Edward Lawler
(2012, p. 42) argue that we need to focus on “next practice” as well as “best practice” because:
The major challenge for organizations today is navigating high levels of turbulence. They operate
in dynamic environments, in societies where the aspirations and purposes of various stakeholders
change over time. They have access to ever-increasing technological capabilities and information. A
key organizational capability is the ability to adapt as context, opportunities, and challenges change.
Paradoxically, one outcome of change is often supposed to be equilibrium. Managers
are expected to stabilize the unstable and destabilize the rigid; adapt to the present and
anticipate the future; improve what is and invent what is to be; lead a renaissance while
preserving tradition, the possibilities for which are grounded in the belief that progress is
possible and that management can make a difference. As table 3.1 points out, the ways in
TABLE 3.1 Images of Change and Understanding the Pressures
Image Understanding the Pressures for Change
Director Change is a result of strategic pressure, entering new markets, or correcting an internal problem to improve efficiencies. These pressures are controllable, and the management task is to direct the organizational response.
Navigator Change results from strategic threats and opportunities, and from the need to deal with internal problems. However, the best response may not be obvious, given the many and often conflicting priorities that management faces, and the range of influences and com- peting interests that need to be considered.
Caretaker The pressures for organizational change are many and inexorable, and managers cannot control this agenda. External pressures arise from new regulations or market conditions, for example. Internal pressures can be triggered by growth or operational innovations. How- ever, these pressures can be overwhelming, and they are difficult to resist. The role of man- agement, as caretakers, is to look after the organization as it is buffeted by these pressures, having limited choice in the actions that need to be taken in response.
Coach The pressures for change are constant. They arise from the need to coordinate teamwork, values, and mindsets, and to generate the collaboration that leads to improved organizational outcomes. Change pressures are therefore continuous and developmental, and they help to shape the orga- nization’s capabilities to respond to further change and to further improve performance.
Interpreter Given the many internal and external pressures for change, staff need management to provide meaning, to help understand “what is going on.” Those who will be affected need to under- stand the significance of their roles, what needs to happen and why, and where the organiza- tion is heading. Managers must help to make sense of changes. This is a sense-making role, providing clarity and contributing to individual identity and to organizational commitment.
Nurturer Organizations change as a result of a variety of forces, some weak, some strong. The weaker pressures, however, can have a disproportionate impact on the organization. These pressures may not all be rational, but may instead be chaotic and difficult to coordinate. The management role, therefore, is to nurture or to develop the organization’s adaptive capacity to respond to those challenges.
LO 3.5
64 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
which managers experience those triggers of change, and those to which they attend, will
be influenced by their images of managing change.
To understand why managers embark on apparently risky change ventures, this chap-
ter begins by exploring the environmental pressures—some will argue imperatives—for
organizational change. We then consider why some managers do not respond to such pres-
sures. We take that discussion into an exploration of why “remedial” change often does
not happen where it would be expected, following accidents, disasters, and other crises.
Finally, we explore the numerous internal organizational pressures for change. It is impor-
tant to recognize that there are many triggers of organizational change, and that those that
are discussed here do not represent a comprehensive list.
Environmental pressures are explanations for change. These pressures take many
forms, and include opportunities (e.g., new technologies, products, and markets) as well
as threats (e.g., falling market share, tighter regulation, bad investments). At the extreme,
change may be necessary to avoid going out of business altogether. Here, we will explore
six sets of external environmental pressures that can lead to change. Change may come
about as a response to fashion; demographic trends; external mandate; globalization and
related geopolitical developments; “hypercompetition”; and threats to corporate credibil-
ity and reputation (figure 3.1).
An organization and its management rarely have the luxury of facing only one of these
external environmental pressures at any given time. For many organizations in developed
economies, most, if not all, of these pressures are constantly active, and all may be consid-
ered to be high priority.
Fashion In 2001 Boeing, the well-known aircraft manufacturing company, initiated a series of
changes under the direction of its chief executive, Philip M. Condit (Holmes et al.,
2001). Condit was frustrated by the slow pace of change in the company, and con-
cerned about slow growth in sales of commercial jet aircraft. His changes were similar
to those introduced by Jack Welch at General Electric (GE), a multinational conglom-
erate that was widely recognized for its successful transformational changes. Following
GE, the changes at Boeing included:
a new corporate learning and training unit in St. Louis, to create a “unified company
culture”;
changing the organization culture;
The Hype Cycle
You can often gain valuable insight from radi-
cal management innovations, even if they fiz-
zle out. And they do fizzle out. Nine-tenths of
the approximately 100 branded management
ideas I’ve studied lost their popularity within a
decade or so. These include GE’s Work-Out, W.L.
Gore’s lattice structure, Xerox’s communities of
practice, Thermo Electron’s Spinout model, and
Google’s 20% innovation time policy.
Source: Birkinshaw (2014), p. 55.
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 65
restructuring the business into three key divisions—commercial, military, and space;
giving the chief executives of those divisions greater freedom;
making the divisions compete for access to corporate funding;
setting high performance standards.
This is an example of what neo-institutional theorists refer to as mimetic isomorphism
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This occurs when organizations imitate (mimic) the struc-
tures and practices of others, but not necessarily in the same sector, and usually those that
they consider to be legitimate and successful.
Organizational change can thus be a response to the latest management fad or fash-
ion, as individual managers wish to be considered professional, progressive, and up to
FIGURE 3.1
Fashion
“The next big thing”
let’s appear progressive
Demography
the silver tsunami
Boomers, Gen Y, Gen C
legislation regulation
social responsibility
Mandate
process, product, and service failures
governance problems
Reputation
disruptive, high-velocity innovation
out-of-sector competition
Hypercompetition
interdependent global economy
global warming, climate change
Geopolitics
Environmental pressures
for change
66 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
date. As table 3.2 illustrates (selectively), management has been subjected to a constant
stream of fads. Eric Abrahamson (1996) points out that, while appearing to be novel
and valuable, many fads lack the systemic research that would legitimate their claims
to enhance performance. The “fashion setters,” including consulting firms, management
gurus, business publications, and business school academics, do not necessarily profit
from the critical assessment of these ideas. Some fads do benefit some organizations, but
Abrahamson also argues that some fads—downsizing, for example—can have devastat-
ing implications for organizations and their employees. One reason for the failure of fads
to deliver their promise is that most new methods, approaches, and techniques have to
be tailored to the circumstances of each new setting. It is rarely possible to copy exactly
what another organization has done and expect to achieve the same benefits over the
same period of time.
It is unlikely that managers will succumb continually to pressures to implement fash-
ionable changes that have limited benefits. Market forces and customer preferences propel
organizations in some directions, and not in others. Fads go through cycles. An innovative
idea first attracts the attention of journalists, academics, and consultants, and this is valu-
able in terms of codifying and publicizing new working practices. However, one result
of this attention is to heighten expectations, which can then be dashed as further appli-
cations fail to deliver as promised. Enthusiasm can then be replaced by skepticism, and
Decade Fashions
1950s Management by objectives (MBO) Program evaluation and review technique (PERT) Employee assistance programs (EAPs)
1960s Organization development Sensitivity training and T-groups The managerial grid (concern for staff, concern for results)
1970s Quality of working life movement (QWL) Job enrichment Quality circles
1980s Organization culture Total quality management (TQM) International Standards Organization 9000 (ISO 9000)
1990s Business process reengineering (BPR) Autonomous, self-directed work groups High-performance organizations Lean and 5S: sort, systematize, shine, standardize, sustain
2000s The learning organization Employee engagement Disruptive innovation
2010s High reliability organizations (HROs) Built-to-change organizations The networked enterprise Big data, data analytics, artificial intelligence
TABLE 3.2 A Short (Selec-
tive) History of
Management
Fashions (with
Acronyms)
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 67
organizations start hunting for “the next big thing.” Julian Birkinshaw (2014, p. 57) sug-
gests that management should follow these steps before adopting another management fad:
1. Wait: Do not rush to adopt, but do not dismiss the approach either. Give the new idea
time to succeed or fail.
2. Identify the essence of the idea: What is the underlying logic, what are the underpin-
ning assumptions, what fresh insights led to this development?
3. Look for results: Did the new approach make the improvements that were expected?
Were there any side effects? Would this work in your organization, or would your cul-
ture, systems, and structures be barriers?
4. Experiment: Set up a trial, gather the evidence, review, and continue if successful.
Birkinshaw (2014, p. 57) concludes: “It’s easy to get so swept up in the glamour of a new
idea that the prospect of implementing it seems straightforward. But remember that success-
ful management innovators typically had to work very hard, over many years, to put their new
ideas into place. Applying those ideas inside your own company is likely to take even longer.”
Demography: From the Silver Tsunami to Generation C
Veterans, born 1925 to 1942; also known as the silent generation, matures, traditionalists
Baby Boomers, born 1943 to 1960; also just called Boomers
Generation X, born 1961 to 1981, also known as baby busters, the thirteenth, the lost
generation
Generation Y, born since 1981 onward; also known as millennials, nexters, echo boomers
Generation C, born since 1990; connected, communicating, always clicking
These dates are approximate—different commentators disagree
(Parry and Urwin, 2011)
Demographic changes, affecting workforce composition and motivation, pose some
of the greatest challenges for organizational change management in the twenty-first cen-
tury. In all industrialized economies, the workforce is ageing, as we live longer and have
fewer children. In 2010, the average (median) age of Americans rose to 37.2. In 2000, it
was 35.3. The proportion of the population who have retired from employment is growing
relative to the proportion still in work. This is an accelerating global phenomenon. In the
United States, the percentage of the population aged 65 or over is expected to double, from
only 10 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in 2050.
Baby Boomers have been described as a silver tsunami sweeping across affected coun-
tries (The Economist, 2010). This ageing population has social consequences. Boomers
who were born after the Second World War (which ended in 1945) started celebrating their
60th birthdays from around 2006. In 2014, the global population of those aged 65 or more
was 600 million; it was predicted that, by 2034, that population would almost double, to
1.1 billion (The Economist, 2014, p. 11). Boomsday, by Christopher Buckley (2007), is a
fictional account of the anger of younger generations whose taxes pay for the pensions,
health, and welfare of those Boomers in their old age. Governments have tried to raise
retirement ages to reduce the drain on welfare, healthcare, and pension budgets.
The silver tsunami has change management consequences. Organizations will need to
fill the gaps as Boomers retire, taking their knowledge and experience with them, while
68 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
the proportion of skilled youngsters in the workforce is shrinking. Some older workers—
“nevertirees”—have decided to carry on working, and organizations will have to learn how to
manage them. Will older workers adapt to new technologies and working practices, and take
management orders from youngsters? These are new problems, and there is little research or
experience on which to draw. Some approaches to managing older workers include:
exit interviews to capture their wisdom;
mentoring systems in which Boomers coach their replacements;
phased retirement rather than a sudden stop;
shorter working weeks with flexible hours;
pools of retired staff who can be called upon for special projects;
working during busy periods punctuated by “Benidorm leave.”
A recent survey of over 1,000 managers found that most organizations had not yet
developed their age management policies (Pickard, 2010). Younger managers find it dif-
ficult to manage older workers, who have different drives and need flexibility (to care for
elderly parents and grandchildren, for example). Management styles have to be consulta-
tive, drawing on the experience of older workers for whom money is probably not the
main or only motivator.
Nevertirement and Nevertirees
Barclays Wealth is a bank for “high net worth” people (http://www.barclayswealth.com). To find out more
about their customers’ future plans, they surveyed 2,000 wealthy individuals, who had at least £1 million of
assets to invest. They found that, rather than planning a conventional retirement, many planned to go on
working ( Leppard and Chittenden, 2010):
Country % Planning to Work beyond Retirement Age
Saudi Arabia 92
United Arab Emirates 91
Qatar 91
South Africa 88
Latin America 78
UK 60
Ireland 59
USA 54
Japan 46
Spain 44
Switzerland 34
In other words, “nevertirement” could become more popular, and this may not apply just to the wealthy.
Organizations will need to change their human resource policies and working practices to deal effectively
with this trend.
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 69
Generation Y are the children of the Boomers. Do Boomers and Gen Ys want different
things from work? Sylvia Ann Hewlett and colleagues (2009) suggest that these groups
actually share a number of attitudes, behaviors, and preferences. Their findings are based
on surveys of around 4,000 college graduates, followed by focus groups and interviews.
The rewards from work that Boomers regard as important are:
1. High-quality colleagues
2. An intellectually stimulating workplace
3. Autonomy regarding work tasks
4. Flexible work arrangements
5. Access to new experiences and challenges
6. Giving back to the world through work
7. Recognition from the company or the boss
The rewards from work that Gen Ys regard as important are:
1. High-quality colleagues
2. Flexible work arrangements
3. Prospects for advancement
4. Recognition from the company or the boss
5. Steady rate of advancement and promotion
6. Access to new experiences and challenges
Both groups want to serve a wider purpose, want opportunities to explore their interests
and passions, and say that flexible working and work-life balance are important to them.
They also share a sense of obligation to the wider society and the environment. (Gen Xs
are less likely to find those obligations important.) When choosing an employer, money is
less important, as they are interested in other forms of reward: teamwork, challenge, new
experiences, recognition.
In the context of managing organizational change, and given these demographic trends,
the contributions of vision (chapter 6) and communications (chapter 7) are likely to be central
to engaging the commitment and motivation of those who are going to be involved. Human
resource management policy and practice will need to emphasize teamwork, collaboration,
flexible working, flexible retirement, project work, short-term assignments, opportunities to
support external causes, and eco-friendly work environments. Another valuable practice may
involve intergenerational mentoring; Boomers often welcome the chance to mentor and support
Gen Ys, who can share their potentially better understanding of social networking technologies.
Generation C is the label given to those born after 1990. “C” stands for “connected,
communicating, content-centric, computerized, community oriented, always clicking”
(Friedrich et al., 2011, p. 3). This is the first generation to have grown up with the Internet,
social media, and mobile handheld computing, for whom 24/7 mobile and Internet con-
nectivity are taken for granted and freedom of expression is the norm. These technologies
encourage more flexible forms of working, and less hierarchical organizations, and they
are blurring the boundaries between work and personal life.
By 2020, Gen C will make up over 40 percent of the population in America, Europe,
and the BRIC countries (Friedrich et al., 2011). Gen C will be “on the grid 24/7”: being
70 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
connected around the clock is normal. The number of mobile phone users in the world is
expected to grow from 4.6 billion in 2012 to 6 billion in 2020. Over the same period, the
number of Internet users will increase from 1.7 billion to 4.7 billion. Gen C will thus have
a wide range of personal relationships driven by social networks, voice channels, online
groups, blogs, and electronic messaging. These facilities will create fast-moving busi-
ness and political pressures as information and ideas spread more widely, more quickly.
Most Gen C employees will bring their own computers to work rather than use corpo-
rate resources. There will probably be more work done by virtual project groups, with
fewer face-to-face meetings, and less frequent travel. Organizations will probably have
to change working conditions and practices to accommodate those preferences, and to
exploit the opportunities.
External Mandate In 1996, ChevronTexaco (then Texaco) settled a racial discrimination lawsuit for $176
million. The suit was filed by the company’s African-American staff, who alleged that
managers and employees were involved in racist acts. They claimed that racism was insti-
tutionalized in the company’s culture and practices to such an extent that it “caused Tex-
aco to be branded the worst of corporate rogues” (Labich, 1999). The settlement followed
other companies such as Shoney’s, which in 1992 paid $133 million to settle a discrimi-
nation suit on behalf of 20,000 people, and Denny’s, which in 1994 paid $54 million to
settle two cases in which customers claimed the restaurant had not served or seated them
(Faircloth, 1998). In 2000 Coca-Cola settled a case for $192 million (Salter, 2003).
The settlement agreements for ChevronTexaco and Coca-Cola included organizational
changes, to establish external diversity task forces and to monitor company practices and
ensure fair treatment for minorities (Salter, 2003). Both companies were under court orders
to improve their record on diversity management. This led to other changes in corporate
policies and cultural practices. For example, at ChevronTexaco, staff had to attend diver-
sity training, managers attended communication courses, minorities were targeted for new
hires, and key executive appointments were made to symbolize the shift in culture. New
change programs were implemented to eliminate racism from hiring, retention, and pro-
motion decisions (Labich, 1999). In September 2002, the fifth report of ChevronTexaco’s
Equity and Fairness Task Force outlined the changes made in the 1996 settlement; there
were still some problems to be solved, but the company culture had changed for the better.
It is now widely accepted that organizations should support a range of environmental as
well as social causes. The economist Milton Friedman (1970) once argued, “The business
of business is business.” His view is now unfashionable. The corporate social responsibility
(CSR) movement expects companies to promote environmental or “green” issues as well as
social policies. This has become a major source of pressure for change. Many organizations
are addressing these issues, to strengthen their reputations as “responsible corporate
citizens.” The importance of this viewpoint has been highlighted in the twenty-first century
by the corporate scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and the Japanese company livedoor, where
executives were accused of fraudulent transactions that benefitted them personally. These
cases led to new regulations affecting corporate governance in America—the infamous
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Expensive and cumbersome to implement, that legislation was
designed to restore public confidence by improving corporate accounting controls. Table 3.3
lists typical CSR policies (Huczynski and Buchanan, 2013, p. 68).
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 71
Change is often forced on organizations through formally mandated legislation and
regulation. Neo-institutional theorists call this coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983), which may be formal or informal:
Formal coercive pressures include government mandates such as new laws and poli-
cies. Organizations are thus forced to change to meet new requirements relating to,
for example, pollution, taxation, or affirmative action. Subsidiary organizations may be
forced to adopt accounting standards, performance criteria, and other practices to suit
the parent organization.
TABLE 3.3 CSR Policies and Practices
Environment
1. Pollution control 2. Product improvement 3. Repair of environment 4. Recycling waste materials 5. Energy saving
Equal Opportunities
1. Minority employment 2. Advancement of minorities 3. Advancement of women 4. Support for minority businesses 5. Support for other disadvantaged groups
Personnel
1. Employee health and safety 2. Training 3. Personal counselling 4. Subcontractor code of behavior 5. Providing medical care or insurance
Community Involvement
1. Charitable donations 2. Promoting and supporting public health initiatives 3. Support for education and the arts 4. Community involvement projects
Products
1. Safety 2. Quality 3. Sustainability, percentage of materials that can be recycled
Suppliers
1. Fair terms of trade 2. Blacklisting unethical, irresponsible suppliers 3. Subcontractor code
72 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
Informal coercive pressures arise when interdependent organizations persuade (perhaps
force) each other to behave in particular ways, and to collude with each other in cer-
tain actions. Although not formally or legally required, resisting these pressures means
breaching strong cultural norms; conformity may not be mandatory, but is expected.
These pressures for change, therefore, can be overwhelming, and irresistible.
Globalization and Geopolitical Developments In the twenty-first century, developed Western economies see both threats and oppor-
tunities in the economic growth of countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China—
the so-called BRIC economies. Those economies have lower labor costs and have
become attractive locations for manufacturing operations and for customer service call
centers. There is a widespread perception that “outsourcing” manufacturing and ser-
vice operations in this way is happening at the expense of jobs in North America and
Europe. Collectively, these trends and developments have been captured by the label
globalization—the intensification of worldwide social and business relationships that
link localities in such a way that local conditions are shaped by distant events.
Natural disasters in one part of the world can have global consequences. In March
2011, one of the strongest earthquakes ever recorded occurred off the northeast coast
of Japan. The earthquake triggered a cascading event sequence that included a tsunami
followed by containment failures at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. These events led
to considerable loss of life, damage to property, disruption to business, damage to the
Japanese economy, and censure for government ministers and power company managers
for regulatory failures contributing to the power plant problems (Kingston, 2012). The
quake and tsunami closed key ports and airports and disrupted the global supply chain for
semiconductor products (of which Japan produces 20 percent). Honda, Mitsubishi, Nissan,
Suzuki, and Toyota suspended their car manufacturing operations, and Nissan considered
moving a production line to the United States. Component supplies to Boeing and Sony
Coca-Cola Thirsty for Sustainability
Sensitive to accusations that it runs a wasteful,
unethical, and polluting business that does not
make a social contribution, Coca-Cola in Europe
responded with a series of corporate responsibility
initiatives (Wiggins, 2007):
Restricting the marketing of its products to
children
Working with the World Wildlife Fund to find
ways to cut back and to replenish the 290 billion
liters of water that the company uses annually
Working with Greenpeace to develop environ-
mentally friendly beverage coolers and vending
machines to reduce the emission of hydrocar-
bon greenhouse gasses
Monitoring the agricultural impact of the com-
pany’s tea, coffee, and juice drinks products,
which require it to purchase ingredients from
around the globe
Websites accuse the company of exaggerating
the benefits of an unhealthy product, of manage-
ment complicity in the deaths of union organizers
in bottling plants in South America, and of reducing
and polluting local water supplies in India:
www.killercoke.org
www.indiaresource.org/campaigns/coke/2004/
risingstruggles.html
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 73
were also disrupted. The terrorist attacks on New York on September 11, 2001, and the
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) were radically different crises that
also had global implications for a range of organizations, and not just airlines and related
businesses.
In the face of such events, companies may need to review supply chains, joint ventures,
the locations of their facilities, and other investment decisions. Many types of geopolitical
event can have consequences for organizations that trade with and/or have investments in
affected regions. Examples include civil war (e.g., Syria, since 2011), political instability
(e.g., Egypt, since 2011), and other international geopolitical tensions (e.g., Russia and
Ukraine, since 2014). Organizations may simply withdraw facilities and discontinue rela-
tionships with regions and organizations perceived to represent physical or financial risks.
In 2001, faced with escalating violence from separatist Aceh rebels, Exxon suspended gas
production at its Arun facility in Indonesia and evacuated its staff.
John Kotter (1995) argued that four sets of forces were translating global trends and
developments into organizational adaptations and changes: new technologies, the expan-
sion of international trade, maturing markets, and the end of the “cold war.” While the lat-
ter set of factors may have been stalled, if not reversed, by the Russian annexation of the
Cloud Control
External pressures for organizational change can
have “knock on” effects on internal support func-
tions not directly involved in shifts in strategy. Adobe
is a global software company, known for products
such as Acrobat, Flash Player, and Photoshop. Based
in San Jose, California, Adobe has 11,000 employees
in 43 countries, with annual revenues of $4.5 bil-
lion, half of which are generated outside the United
States. New technologies, however, are opening up
opportunities for small competitors.
In 2011, Adobe decided to stop selling its
licensed products in shrink-wrapped packages
and became a cloud-based provider of digital ser-
vices. Instead of receiving a CD in a box, customers
either download the software they require or pay
a monthly subscription. For employees, this meant
new ways of working, and a new role for the human
resource (HR) function.
Adobe had a traditional office-bound administra-
tive HR function. That worked well when Adobe was
selling software products, but it was less appropri-
ate to the cloud-based approach. HR had to work
as “business partners” located in employee resource
centers. HR consulting teams worked on problems
directly with senior managers and with staff on the
ground. HR roles became more varied and, being
less office-bound, more people-oriented. Rather
than wait for calls, HR staff conducted “walk-ins,”
visiting on their own initiative parts of the company
to explore what support they could provide. Adobe
employs large numbers of “millennials” (Gen Ys)
who are motivated by innovation, change, and per-
sonal development. Keeping them engaged meant
designing varied, challenging jobs.
Adobe also stopped conducting annual perfor-
mance reviews, as they consumed a lot of manage-
ment time, demotivated staff, and contributed to
high staff turnover. With the new “check in” system,
staff review and set their own development goals
when they think this is appropriate, with immedi-
ate and ongoing feedback rather than an annual
conversation. HR runs workshops for managers on
providing effective, positive feedback. Staff turnover
has fallen to its lowest level ever.
Why did HR at Adobe change the way in which
it operated? Because the company strategy and cul-
ture had changed, and HR had to find new ways of
working to support those developments.
Sources:
http://www.adobe.com/company/fast-facts.html
Smedley, T. 2014. Send in the cloud. People Management, May: 43–44.
74 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
Ukrainian province of Crimea in 2014, Kotter’s general argument remains valid, particu-
larly with regard to the series of organizational adaptations and changes that he identifies.
Figure 3.2 presents an updated version of his argument.
Another significant geopolitical pressure affecting all organizations, regardless of size,
sector, or location, is climate change due to global warming—an issue that has risen to
prominence since Kotter developed his argument. Climate change has the potential to
reshape dramatically the organizational landscape, in many ways. Traditionally seen as
another corporate social responsibility issue, Michael Porter and Forest Reinhardt (2007,
p. 22) argue that climate change has now become a business problem, with operational and
strategic dimensions:
A firm that has more employees than it needs in its shipping department is operationally
ineffective; its managers are wasting resources and creating a drag on performance. In the
FIGURE 3.2 Globalization
and Organiza-
tional Change
Technological
innovation
fast and easy
communication
fewer tarif
barriers
slower growth in
developed
economies
privatization and
deregulation
continuing threat
of low cost
imports
geopolitical
instability
civil and inter-state
conflicts
non-state groups
seeking territorial
control
sporadic terrorism
freer trade
free global
capital flows
global finance
system more
vulnerable to
minor shocks
global
information
networks
rapid transport
“global village”
social networking
More risks, more
competition, more
speed
reduction in number and significance of traditional “working class”
increased female participation in workforce
growth of services, decline of manufacturing
growth in number and significance of ‘knowledge workers’
increasingly sophisticated information and communication technologies
increasing cognitive skill demands
new structures, holacracies, virtual organizations, networks, alliance
mergers, acquisitions, sector consolidation
organizational culture change
“fast, flat, flexible” organization designs
More opportunities,
new markets, fewer
barriers
International
trade Mature markets
Globalization
Organizational adaptation and change involving:
Changing “world
order”
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 75
same way, a firm that produces excess emissions in its shipping operations is also operation-
ally ineffective—it is wasting resources and incurring unnecessary costs that are certain to
rise. Implementing best practices in managing climate-related costs is the minimum required
to remain competitive.
In addition to understanding its emission costs, every firm needs to evaluate its vulnera-
bility to climate-related effects such as regional shifts in the availability of energy and water,
the reliability of infrastructures and supply chains, and the prevalence of infectious diseases.
The firm’s leaders should systematically assess these risks and then decide which to reduce
through redesigning operations, which to transfer to others through insurance or hedging
contracts, and which to bear.
To assess the strategic implications, Porter and Reinhardt (2007) argue that organiza-
tions need to adopt an “inside out, outside in” perspective. “Inside out” means understand-
ing the impact that the organization has on its environment. “Outside in” means assessing
how climate change will affect how the organization operates. Regulations concerning
greenhouse gas emissions and emissions costs are likely to make some business models
expensive, particularly those that rely on transport-intensive supply chains. E-commerce,
with high numbers of small shipments, may be affected.
Eric Lowitt (2014) argues that, although a warmer planet is threatening to many orga-
nizations, there are also opportunities. Lowitt suggests how to reduce operational, regula-
tory, and reputational risks, and provides ideas for cutting costs, improving performance,
improving customer relationships, and increasing competitiveness and organizational
resilience. He explores a range of organizational responses to four climate change issues
concerning: threats to raw material supplies; rising costs of energy and materials; threats
to distribution from extreme weather events; and alienating customers by ignoring envi-
ronmental impacts (table 3.4 summarizes).
Table 3.4 Climate Change Impacts and Organizational Responses
Impacts Responses
Unpredictable availability of raw materials, volatile prices
ExxonMobil includes a carbon emissions price in pro forma financial calculations Walmart suppliers must certify that all sourcing of materials is legal and environmentally sound
Wasted energy and materials drive up manufacturing costs and threaten regulatory action
Apple has a manufacturing plant in Arizona that runs entirely on renew- able energy Nike has a facility that eliminates the use of water and process chemi- cals in fabric dyeing
Extreme weather events disrupt transport and distribution
HP and Dell have increased their use of ocean freight shipments, rather than air, due to climate change concerns BT (British Telecommunications) plans infrastructure investment on the basis of flooding scenarios, 50 to 100 years ahead
Alienate customers by ignoring environmental impacts
Patagonia has a “buy less” campaign that encourages customers to resale used Patagonia items Ford improved the fuel economy of its top-selling truck by making the body from aluminum to reduce the vehicle weight
76 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
Hypercompetition In 1998 Gateway, the personal computer company, faced fierce competition, overshad-
owed by Dell, its direct-sales rival. Gateway founder and chief executive Ted Waitt
took the company through a major restructuring, hiring 10 new top managers and
changing the way the company went about doing business, including its name, prod-
ucts, alliances, and business strategy (Kirkpatrick, 1999). In 2008, the California-based
battery and electric powertrain maker Tesla launched its first all-electric sports car,
the Roadster. Tesla was not previously considered to be in the automotive manufactur-
ing sector. Rejecting the traditional automotive dealership model, Tesla sold its cars
directly to customers through “galleries” located in shopping malls. The first driverless
cars are likely to have been developed by Google, an Internet services company. The
Internet and smartphones have also generated innovative business models, such as the
“freemium,” where customers get the basic product free and pay a premium, usually a
subscription, for more powerful functions. Examples include LinkedIn, Dropbox, Spo-
tify, and NYTimes.com (Kumar, 2014). In 2013, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
awarded a $600 million contract for a data center, not to IBM or another computer
company, but to Amazon, an online retailer.
These developments represent the hypercompetitive environment that many organiza-
tions now face (D’Aveni, 1994). Terms such as “disruptive innovation,” “high velocity,”
“postbureaucratic,” and “chaotic” have been used to describe this environment, which
some commentators associate with a “postmodern organizational paradigm.” When orga-
nizations from other sectors start selling products and services that compete with yours,
you are facing hypercompetition.
Aligned with the rise of e-commerce and the Internet, organizations are faced with
global changes in consumer preferences, industry boundaries, social values, and, as
mentioned earlier, demographics. Organizations are forced to deliver goods and services
more quickly, more customized, and more flexibly. But hypercompetition means that
market leaders cannot be complacent. By 2007, Dell was facing challenging times, as
profits and share price declined. After 20 years of outstanding performance, with sales
rising from $500 million in 1991 to $32 billion in 2001, Dell was facing the combined
Pressure to Change at YouTube
It is not only established, pre-digital age organiza-
tions that are subject to pressure to change. The
“new kids on the block” are not exempt, as Nicole
LaPorte (2014) explains.
One of the key reasons that Susan Wojcicki was
appointed in 2014 as Google’s senior vice president
in charge of YouTube was that, despite YouTube
being one of Google’s most important brands, there
was a perception that the brand was “punching
below its weight” (Ynon Kreiz, CEO of Maker Stu-
dios: La Porte, 2014, p. 61). There was a widespread
view that YouTube had yet to develop a business
model that produced the volume of revenue that
its popularity should deliver. While Facebook’s mar-
ket capitalization was $170 billion, that of YouTube
was only $15–$20 billion, reflecting the fact that
Facebook had been more successful in migrating its
audience and business to phones.
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 77
effects of the decline in the quality of after-sales service, highly efficient competitors
such as Lenovo who had substantially eroded Dell’s cost advantage, and growing
consumer sentiment that Dell was “well off the pace” (Kirkpatrick, 2006). Michael
Dell commented, “This has been a wake-up call for us. We’re using this whole period
as a time to re-examine every part of the company. If you ask, ‘Is Dell in the penalty
box?’ Yeah, Dell’s in the penalty box. Then we’ll use this opportunity to fix everything”
(Kirkpatrick, 2006, p. 36).
Such pressures have required a variety of organizational changes, as in the case of Del-
phi Corporation (previously Delphi Automotive Systems Corporation). The Delphi plant
in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, is an automotive supplier of catalytic converters. Its history dates
back some 100 years, although it was spun off as a former division of General Motors in
1999. A number of dramatic changes were made to the plant in the subsequent two years,
moving it from an old-style assembly line to one based on small cells of workers. Each
cell of around four people was organized in the form of a U or a circle, and plastic con-
veyor systems that could be dismantled quickly and reformed to meet new orders were
used to deliver the necessary parts. The workers in each cell were involved in decision
making, with responsibility for work scheduling, quality, and productivity. The modular
and portable nature of the workstations enabled greater flexibility, speed, and customiza-
tion in manufacturing converters. This was necessary to meet the demands of automakers
who wanted converters customized to meet their specific needs, and who also were reduc-
ing the numbers of their suppliers.
These business environment pressures meant that the former delivery time of 21 days
was no longer adequate, and neither was the inflexible assembly line, which was unable
to deliver product variety. The end result of the changes was a system that could complete
customized orders in five days and productivity that was 25 percent higher. However, even
changes such as these in its Oak Creek plant could not fend off the hypercompetitive pres-
sures facing the Delphi Corporation across its operations. In October 2006, the Delphi
Corporation filed for bankruptcy, having shed some 1,200 people from its Oak Creek plant
over the previous year. Their chief executive Robert Miller indicated in February 2007
that, in relation to all its U.S. plants, the company was discussing with stakeholders a
What Worries Dropbox?
Dropbox CEO Drew Houston is concerned that Drop-
box needs to keep evolving and not rest on its lau-
rels. He’s worried that his business will be attacked,
not by Google, Microsoft, or Apple, but by “the next
twenty-something who wedges her way into his user
base and peels off Dropbox’s features before he can
build more of them” (McCorvey, 2015, p. 104). He
doesn’t want to join the list of innovative companies
who, within a short space of time, go from being
“the disruptor” to “the disrupted.”
His awareness of this danger is manifest in that
one of the first things that he shows new recruits
to Dropbox is a slideshow featuring the logos of
Myspace, Netscape, Lotus, RIM, and Friendster as
cautionary tales.
“What do these companies have in common?”
Houston asks his new colleagues. “No one wears
their T-shirts anymore, except maybe as a Hallow-
een costume” (McCorvey, 2015, p. 104).
78 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
comprehensive restructuring to restore competitiveness (Dressang and Barrett, 2006). The
pressures of hypercompetition are not always easy to anticipate.
Maintaining Corporate Credibility and Reputation Reputational pressures can arise suddenly. In August 2007, Mattel, the world’s largest
toy manufacturer, recalled more than 10 million toys as a result of quality-control prob-
lems in the Chinese factories where they were made. Business journalists were asking
two key questions: “What is going to be the reputational damage?” and “What is Mattel
going to do to try to minimize it?”
During the 1990s, Walt Disney Company was cited by BusinessWeek as having one
of the worst corporate boards in the United States. Issues included close ties between the
chief executive and directors, lack of management experience, and minimal oversight of
the company (Lavelle, 2002). However, it was not until the corporate crises that confronted
Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom that Disney and other companies started to change their gov-
ernance structures and practices. At Disney:
only independent directors were allowed on audit and compensation committees;
limits were placed on the number of other boards of which directors can be members;
directors had to own a minimum of $100,000 in stock of the company;
board meetings were held separate to management;
ties between the company and directors were severed;
consulting firms were not used for financial auditing purposes.
Change is thus often associated with maintaining proper corporate governance mecha-
nisms to ensure a positive reputation. Some companies (such as Walmart) have a board-
level director responsible for reputation management. Corporate reputation, defined as “a
collective representation of a firm’s past actions and results that describes the firm’s ability
to deliver valued outcomes to multiple stakeholders,” is an intangible but important corpo-
rate asset, being positively correlated with organizational performance (Fombrun and van
Riel, 1997, p. 10). Maintaining and enhancing corporate reputation is therefore important
to an organization’s survival, although the pressure to change to maintain reputation may
vary from company to company.
Sometimes strategic changes can signal that an organization is taking steps to “put its
house in order.” One common sign of “a new era” is the symbolic exit of a high-profile
appointment, such as the chief executive; examples include the departures of Gerald
Levin from AOL Time Warner, Jean-Marie Messier from Vivendi Universal, and Thomas
Middelhoff from Bertelsmann. Gunther and Wheat (2002, p. 130) note, “These executives,
as it happened, had all bet too heavily on the Internet; their companies performed poorly,
and they were held accountable. That’s the way shareholder capitalism is supposed to
work.” These symbolic actions attempt to influence shareholders’ sense-making processes
with respect to the credibility and reputation of the organization. Of course, some changes
that are intended to create a positive image may be disrupted by other events. One iconic
example was the Macondo Well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 that killed
11 workers and seriously damaged the reputation for risk management and safety that BP
had been trying to rebuild following previous disastrous or damaging workplace incidents
(National Commission, 2011).
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 79
LO 3.2 Why Do Organizations Not Change in Response to Environmental Pressures?
Organizations and their managers do not all respond to external pressures for change
in the same way. Some resist, some delay their response, and some may not even
recognize the issues as important. To explain why external pressures do not always
lead to change, we will outline four debates. The first concerns the tension between
organizational learning and “threat-rigidity.” The second concerns objective versus
cognitive constructions of the environment. The third involves the balance between
forces for change and forces for stability. Finally, we consider bridging and buffering
strategies.
Organizational Learning versus Threat-Rigidity Not all organizations adapt when faced with external pressures. In the 1990s, Walt
Disney did not rectify its corporate governance until prompted by other similar scandals.
Nike was slow to respond to criticism for having products made offshore in exploitative
working conditions. It is not clear, therefore, whether environmental pressures facilitate
or inhibit adaptation and innovative organizational change. Organizational learning
theorists argue that environmental pressures do lead to change, as managers learn from
problems and try to close the gap between performance and aspirations. Threat-rigidity
theory, however, argues that pressures inhibit change, as management decisions become
constrained when faced with threatening problems (Mone et al., 1998).
Clark Gilbert (2005, 2006) considers the case of an organization facing discontinu-
ous change, triggered by fundamental shifts in its operating environment. One example is
the development of digital media, which have affected traditional “hard copy” newspaper
(and textbook) print products. Gilbert argues that change results from performance gaps.
These gaps may be threat-based, such as a decline in sales and profit. Gaps may also be
opportunity-based, such as developing new products. Threats, however, can trigger rigid
behavioral responses, restricting information flow, constraining decisions, and empha-
sizing control over existing resources. Opportunity-based responses, on the other hand,
may suggest new, flexible ways of working, but because current capabilities and practices
remain successful, commitment to change may be lacking.
Gilbert argues that this paradox occurs because “it is not that one set of capabilities
suddenly becomes obsolete, to be replaced with another. Rather, it stems from the fact that
the path from one capability to the other is not continuous. In such settings, the previous
position may continue to evidence residual fit, even while the new position expands and
develops” (Gilbert, 2006, p. 151). IBM continued to develop its mainframe products for
20 years, despite the emergence of the minicomputer market that fundamentally changed
the industry. The paradox suggests that companies in this situation need to be able to have
coexisting frames that focus on both threats and opportunities, one frame protecting cur-
rent business and the other helping to move the company into new arenas. This can be
achieved, for example, through structural differentiation, with separate organizational
units dominated by different cognitive frames. Senior management must be able to inte-
grate these competing frames, ensuring that the company takes appropriate, timely actions
across its operations.
80 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
“Trapped by success” is another reason why organizations can fail to respond to pres-
sures for change. Sull (1999) argues that successful companies may be trapped by their
“winning formula” when conditions change. Arrogance founded on success can lead to
the assumption that market dominance will continue unchallenged. Cognitive frames thus
become blinkered by success; operating routines become embedded as correct; relationships
with stakeholders inhibit the exploration of new ventures; shared beliefs become company
dogma. Organizations can thus become “learning disabled” and not respond appropriately
to pressures for change. Some commentators argue that Nestlé was slow to respond to the
impact of the Internet because of the long-term market success of its brands. That suc-
cess linked a risk-averse culture to a bureaucratic structure. Similarly, one interpretation of
Dell’s declining fortunes in 2006 is that it “succumbed to complacency in the belief that its
business model would always keep it far ahead of the pack” (Byrnes et al., 2007).
Environment: Objective Entity versus Cognitive Construction It is tempting to think of the environment, “the world out there,” as a physical presence
generating pressures to which management then has to respond. That notion has been
challenged by the strategic choice perspective, which argues that organizations make or
“enact” their own environments by deciding the sectors and markets in which they will
operate. Those decisions are typically based on the personal preferences of powerful
senior managers (Child, 1972, 1997). The strategic choice perspective challenged the
view that an organization’s internal structure and processes were largely determined by
external contingencies and that managers were therefore limited to ensuring that the
organization was appropriately adapted to its context.
Treating the environment as an objective reality, the question of the accuracy of man-
agement perceptions of the key contingences and pressures arises. Boyd et al. (1993) iden-
tify two kinds of perceptual errors:
A Type 1 error occurs when the environment is (objectively) stable, but managers per-
ceive it as turbulent and take (unnecessary) actions.
A Type 2 error occurs when managers threaten the survival of their firms by failing to
act because they perceive the environment as stable when it is (objectively) turbulent.
Advocating the “enacted environment” perspective, Linda Smircich and Charles Stub-
bart (1985) also argue that “the outside world” is a construction based on individual per-
ceptions. Even within a single organization, managers are likely to interpret differently
what is happening in the external environment and to reach different conclusions with
regard to changes that may or may not be desirable. William Bogner and Pamela Barr
(2000) take this position further, arguing that managers’ sense-making contributes to
the perpetuation of hypercompetitive environments. They suggest that managers’ cogni-
tive frameworks influence what they notice, how they interpret events, and the resultant
actions. The shared beliefs that develop over time in an industry then become taken for
granted. In hypercompetitive environments, Bogner and Barr (2000, p. 221) argue:
A common cognitive framework emerges that suggests to managers that success is based on
a series of rapid and anticipatory actions that move industry to the next round of competition.
Institutional forces pressure firms to adopt the behaviors of those that are more successful,
and process-dominated recipes emerge as the new industry recipe when it becomes apparent
that the better-performing firms are those that utilize the adaptive sense-making processes.
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 81
In other words, hypercompetitive environments and the organizational changes associ-
ated with them are perpetuated by the cognitive interpretations of managers. In this per-
spective, managers are trapped by their cognitive sense-making frames.
Forces for Change versus Forces for Stability Mark Mone et al. (1998) argue that four sets of factors affect whether or not environ-
mental pressures will lead to innovation and change when an organization is faced with
decline:
Institutionalized mission: Where stakeholders have clear expectations of how an organiza-
tion will pursue its goals, the organization’s capacity to innovate will be constrained. In
contrast, relaxed or ill-defined stakeholder expectations can act as a catalyst for innova-
tion by giving the organization more flexibility to respond to the problems it faces.
Power structures: The capacity for innovation is constrained when power is diffuse in an
organization, but power that is concentrated acts as a catalyst by increasing the capacity
for making decisions and allocating resources to implement change.
Resource commitment: Where resources are already committed, innovation is stifled, but
where there are high levels of uncommitted resources, innovation is encouraged.
Explanations of the problem: Where organizational decline is perceived to be beyond man-
agement control, attempts to innovate are unlikely; where decline is attributed to con-
trollable factors, the necessity for and incentive to innovate are clearer.
These arguments alert us to the need to consider both the forces for stability and for
change, and how those forces compete and interact. For example, a hypercompetitive envi-
ronment could be seen as an “obvious” driver of innovation and change. But as Carrie
Leana and Bruce Barry (2000) argue, this view overlooks the forces for stability that may
also be in play along with those forces for change: “both are a necessary part of organiza-
tions’ effective functioning in the long-term.” Table 3.5 summarizes these forces.
TABLE 3.5 Forces for Change, Forces for Stability
Forces for Change Forces for Stability
Adaptability of the organization to its environment
Cost containment, e.g., making human resources a variable rather than a fixed cost
Impatient capital markets demanding more immediate returns on investments
Control through managerially imposed performance targets
Competitive advantage, being responsive to changing market conditions
Institutionalism of current practices due to solidity of past practices and power structures
Transaction costs, e.g., stable employment allows investment in staff development
Sustained advantage gained through stable organizational relationships difficult to imitate
Organizational social capital, established trust among coworkers becomes a valued asset
Predictability and uncertainty reduction, the need for which inhibits change
Source: Based on Leana and Barry (2000).
82 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
Bridging (Adapting) versus Buffering (Shielding) Responding to pressures for change arising from environmental uncertainty is a classic
theme in organization theory. James Thompson (1967, p. 159) argued, “Uncertainty
appears as the fundamental problem for complex organizations, and coping with uncer-
tainty, as the essence of the administrative process.” There are two broad strategies for
managing uncertainty: bridging and buffering.
Bridging strategies are designed to maintain organizational effectiveness by adapting to
external changes. For example, in a school, bridging strategies may be used to lift student
educational performance in deprived socioeconomic areas. Strategies might include invit-
ing parents and other family members to assist classroom teachers.
Buffering strategies are designed to maintain organizational efficiency by avoiding
change, by shielding the organization from external pressures. Thompson (1967) describes
a number of techniques for smoothing the effects of external shocks through forecasting,
planning, and stockpiling: “By the time environmental shock waves reach the stability-
sensitive technical core, they are diffused into manageable adjustments and innovations”
(Lynn, 2005, p. 39). Returning to the school example, a principal may shield teaching staff
by insisting on following formal rules that state that external groups such as parents, com-
munity agencies, and businesses must make any initial contact through the principal rather
than directly to a teacher. Martin Meznar et al. (2006) found that when organizations were
“in the public eye,” getting a lot of press coverage, buffering strategies were more likely to
increase. This involved using public relations techniques to promote their position and to
change public perceptions and expectations.
In practice, the avoidance of organizational change by buffering may also depend on
organizational networks, which are able to “share” buffering strategies across a number of
organizations. Most organizations may have to engage both buffering and bridging strate-
gies simultaneously, depending on the circumstances that they face. However, buffering
may make an organization less competitive, by insulating it against necessary innovation
and change.
LO 3.3 Why Do Organizations Not Change after Crises?
Why would organizations not implement change following accidents, crises, and disas-
ters, in order to prevent further similar events? This is a situation in which it might be
assumed that change would be welcome, automatic, straightforward. Expectations and
receptiveness should be high, resistance low. The evidence shows, however, that these
assumptions are often incorrect.
Victoria Climbié, an eight-year-old girl, was killed by her guardians in the London
borough of Haringey in 2000. The public inquiry into her death, chaired by Lord Laming
(2003), blamed systemic failures among the agencies responsible for monitoring vulner-
able children: local authority, social services, National Health Service, police. The inquiry
made 108 recommendations. In 2007, also in Haringey, 17-month-old Peter Connelly was
killed by his mother and her boyfriend, while under the supervision of the same agen-
cies that had failed Victoria (Care Quality Commission, 2009; Laming, 2009). These
cases attracted significant press and media coverage in the United Kingdom. Interviewed
in January 2008, Laming observed that many child protection agencies had ignored his
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 83
recommendations (BBC, 2008). Asked how he felt about similar cases of child abuse since
his report in 2003, Laming replied, “I despair about the organizations that have not put in
place the recommendations which I judged to be little more than good basic practice. I
reject the notion that any of this is rocket science. I believe this is about day by day good
practice, and I am disappointed if there are organizations that took several years to put in
place recommendations that I judged could be put in place within a matter of months.”
Victoria and Peter suffered appalling abuse. Press coverage included graphic images of
their injuries. How could a similar tragedy occur in the same setting? Why were Laming’s
(2003) recommendations not all implemented if they were “good practice”?
This is a recurring narrative that applies to many different kinds of event. Another iconic
example concerns the losses of the NASA space shuttles Challenger (1986) and Colum-
bia (2003), the causes of which displayed striking similarities (Vaughan, 1996; Columbia
Accident Investigation Board, 2003; Mahler and Casamayou, 2009). The NASA shuttle
losses were complex incidents, and they have been subjected to exhaustive analysis, but two
conclusions are significant. First, although the immediate causes of these disasters were
technical (O-ring failure; foam insulation damaged a wing), the main contributory causes
were organizational: budget pressures, launch program expectations, management style,
subcontractor relationships. Second, there were failures in organizational learning (see
chapter exercise 11.3). Mahler and Casamayou (2009) offer an interesting analysis of what
NASA learned from the Challenger disaster, what was not learned from that event, and
what was learned but subsequently forgotten—leading ultimately to the Columbia disaster.
One of the main reasons for failures to change after extreme events thus concerns orga-
nizational learning difficulties. Brian Toft and Simon Reynolds (2005) distinguish between
passive learning (identifying lessons) and active learning (implementing changes). Many
organizations, it appears, focus on passive learning but overlook active learning, or find
that difficult to achieve.
In explaining why organizations do not change following crises, Amy Edmondson
(2011, p. 49) notes the effort that goes into after-action reviews, postmortems, and inves-
tigations: “Time after time I saw that these painstaking efforts led to no real change.” The
problem, Edmondson argues, is that most managers think that failures are bad (some are),
and that learning from these events is straightforward (ask people what went wrong and
tell them to avoid similar mistakes in future). Both of those views, she argues, are incor-
rect. Failure is not always bad, and learning from organizational failures is complex; it is
almost always necessary to look further than “procedures weren’t followed.” That involves
what she calls “first-order reasoning,” looking at immediate causal factors such as the
failed O-ring. She argues that it is also necessary to understand the second- and third-order
reasons. That is challenging because complex failures typically involve combinations
of many events across different parts of an organization over time. Edmondson (2011,
p. 54) advocates the use of multidisciplinary team-based analysis to explore those kinds of
issues, and offers the following example:
A team of leading physicists, engineers, aviation experts, naval leaders, and even astronauts
devoted months to an analysis of the Columbia disaster. They conclusively established
not only the first-order cause—a piece of foam had hit the shuttle’s leading edge during
launch—but also second-order causes: a rigid hierarchy and schedule-obsessed culture at
NASA made it especially difficult for engineers to speak up about anything but the most
rock-solid concerns.
84 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
Edmondson also argues that organizational failures lie on a continuum, from praiseworthy
(innovative experiments that just didn’t work) to blameworthy (deliberate sabotage). How-
ever, speaking of this continuum (which we will consider again in chapter 11), she notes that:
When I ask executives to consider how many of the failures in their organizations are
truly blameworthy, their answers are usually in single digits—perhaps 2% to 5%. But
when I ask how many are treated as blameworthy, they say (after a pause or a laugh)
70% to 90%. The unfortunate consequence is that many failures go unreported and
their lessons are lost.
(Edmondson, 2011, p. 50)
For effective post-incident change, Edmondson argues, the organization needs a “psy-
chologically safe environment” in which failures can be discussed openly. This involves
five steps:
1. There must be a shared understanding of the kinds of failures that can occur in a par-
ticular context, and why openness is important for learning.
2. Those who report failures—the “messengers”—should be praised, rather than shot.
3. Known problems must be acknowledged, and mistakes admitted openly and honestly.
4. To defuse resistance and defensiveness, management must invite participation, seeking
ideas and creating opportunities for staff to analyze failures and explore remedies.
5. There must be clarity concerning actions that are blameworthy, so boundaries are clear,
and people are accountable.
Adopting a different perspective, David Buchanan (2011) argues that explanations for
failures in post-incident change may lie in the altered nature of the organizational con-
text. Mainstream commentary on change management focuses on change with progres-
sive, developmental agendas—restructuring, quality, process redesign, innovation, new
technology and working practices—aimed at cost reduction, quality, time to market, “agil-
ity,” customer service, growth, market share, and profitability. Changes following extreme
events, in contrast, have defensive agendas, which aim to prevent things from happening.
The contrasts between “routine” and “post-incident” contexts are summarized in table 3.6.
TABLE 3.6 Routine and Extreme Contexts
Routine Contexts Post-Incident Contexts
Business development
Progressive agenda: make things happen
Take risks
Participation of those involved
Our own communications strategy
Local ownership of the agenda
Local implementation
Local control of implementation timing
Exciting for change agents
Control of risk
Defensive agenda: stop things from happening
Minimize risks
Participation as witnesses
Overtaken by media commentary
Externally imposed agenda
All comparable sites affected
Implementation when directed
Unappealing for change agents
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 85
The context following an extreme event may itself be nonroutine, rendering conven-
tional change guidance (participation, communication) difficult to apply. Receptiveness
may be low if the incident is seen as atypical, and recommended changes may be seen
as a costly overreaction. In cases of mistake or misconduct, controls imposed to deter
“the guilty” also apply to “the innocent,” fostering resentment. The membership of an
investigating team influences both the nature and credibility of recommendations. Differ-
ent stakeholders and advocacy groups may disagree with each other’s opinions and may
use the incident to pursue other agendas (Smith and Elliott, 2007). Externally imposed
change, by an inquiry or regulatory body, may not be seen as legitimate. Introducing
changes while emotions are running high may increase anxiety and resistance (Bowers
et al., 2006); change under “normal” conditions is often stressful, without the complica-
tion of an extreme event.
Buchanan (2011) also argues that implementing a defensive change agenda may be
less appealing for the change manager. The main indicator of the success of that agenda
is the nonoccurrence of the next event. That may be less exciting than the development of
something new (products, systems, business models), which in career terms is also likely
to be more rewarding. It may be helpful therefore, in a post-incident context, to design a
change agenda that marries progressive and developmental components with defensive,
preventive elements.
LO 3.4 Internal Organizational Change Drivers
In this section, we discuss five potential drivers from within the organization (figure 3.3),
related to:
growth;
integration and collaboration;
corporate identity;
a new chief executive;
power and politics.
Growth Organizations often grow as they age, especially if they are successful. In 1992, Kevin
Sharer joined Amgen Inc., now a leading Fortune 500 biotechnology company, as its
president and chief operating officer. His aim was to turn it into a major pharmaceu-
tical company. To grow the business, Amgen had to move beyond its start-up days
when decisions were based on hallway conversations, scientists had little consideration
for the company’s market, and salespeople were only loosely accountable for sales.
When Sharer became chief executive in 2000, he introduced a series of organizational
changes. These included individual rather than regional-based performance targets for
sales representatives; monitoring the number of sales calls made each week; and hand-
held computers to record details of sales conversations so that poor tactics could be
identified and rectified (Hemp, 2004).
Robert Herbold faced similar issues when he left Procter & Gamble to join Microsoft.
He was astounded at the lack of discipline in Microsoft in terms of how decisions were
86 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
made and priorities were established. The hallmark corridor decision making of start-up
companies was not appropriate for managing an organization as large and as complex
as Microsoft. Herbold established formalized decision-making processes and other proto-
cols, to balance entrepreneurial creativity with the need for greater discipline. The changes
at Amgen and Microsoft both involved the routinization of work practices. Such changes
are often the result of growth, implemented to handle the complexity of a growing busi-
ness, to bring rigor to their operations (Herbold, 2002).
Of course, not all organizations continue to grow. One study of small business owners
in Britain found that many of these managers actively resisted the growth of their busi-
nesses beyond the point at which they lost personal control of day-to-day operations.
Beyond this point, they lost job satisfaction, which, at least for some, was why they had
moved from large organizations in the first place and set up their own company (Scase
and Goffee, 1987). Other writers have observed that growth is not necessarily a linear,
sequential movement from one stage to the next. As discussed in chapter 2, chaos theory
argues that change may be nonlinear and fundamental rather than incremental and may
not involve growth. In addition, younger organizations may fail to grow because of the
inexperience of their managers and through lack of organizational slack or the resources
FIGURE 3.3 Internal Organizational Change Drivers
signal for change, fresh energy
new directions
shared purpose and goals
corporate brand
stakeholder interests
influencing/interfering in decision making
Power and politics
Corporate identity
New chief executive
increasing size and complexity
rules versus creativity
Growth
cross-divisional communication
need for information sharing
Integration and coordination
Internal organizational
change drivers
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 87
to absorb bad business decisions. For other new organizations, the growth challenge is to
maintain the “entrepreneurial feel”:
Google has been phenomenally successful. But it has a challenge ahead if it is to
retain the culture and feel associated with its success. It’s easy to feel like an outlaw
band that’s changing the world when you have 100 employees. It’s incredibly difficult
when you have 10,000 or 100,000.
(Lachinsky, 2007, p. 57)
Integration and Coordination Some changes are made in order to better integrate the organization or create economies
of scale across different business units. SunAmerica, a financial network of brokers, was
acquired by the giant insurance company American International Group (AIG). The resul-
tant broker-dealer network consisted of six businesses: Advantage Capital, FSC Securities,
Royal Alliance, Sentra Securities, Spelman, and SunAmerica Securities. Signalling greater
integration of these businesses, the name was changed from the SunAmerica Financial
Network to the AIG Advisory Group. At the same time, changes entailing consolidation
across the different businesses included centralization in New York, San Diego, and Phoe-
nix of recruitment, legal compliance, and advisory services. Other changes included the
creation of uniform standards across the businesses, better profiling of the AIG brand, and
leveraging buying power across the network (Cooper and Kulkowski, 2002).
When Dick Brown became chief executive of EDS in 1999, he became head of a com-
pany that had pioneered IT services, but whose market share was being eroded by faster,
newer IT companies. Brown saw that coordination and information sharing in EDS were
weak. He found that he could not even send an email to all 140,000 people who worked
for the company, as there were 16 separate email systems. In addition, the company had
48 different business units, which involved a lot of duplication and which often did not
communicate well with each other or have a consistent customer orientation. This meant
that some parts of the organization were involved in activities that other parts had tried and
rejected, but this information was not transmitted. This also meant that there was a lack
of coordination between business units in collaborating to solve customers’ problems. For
example, EDS was in danger of losing Continental, a major client for whom it handled
reservation, accounting, and payroll systems. Unfortunately, these systems kept crashing,
and projects were delivered late and with poor-quality results. Brown launched a series of
cultural and structural changes to provide a more overt customer orientation. The impetus
for these changes was better coordination and collaboration across the multiple business
units of the company. In 2003, EDS replaced Brown after a period of earnings warnings,
an SEC probe, and a contract problem. Nevertheless, Brown claimed that as a result of
changes during his four-year tenure, there were four business lines rather than 48 business
units, costs had been reduced by $5 billion, and productivity had increased (Breen, 2001).
Corporate Identity When Antoine Cau became chief executive of the Forte Hotel Group, which included
London Hotels, UK Hotels, and International Hotels, he found that they were often in
competition with each other, and that hotel employees lacked cultural identity with
Forte and its brand. Service excellence was key to achieving customer satisfaction,
88 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
which was linked to employee satisfaction. In order to address these issues, Cau cre-
ated four distinct market segments: Le Meridien, Posthouse, Heritage, and Travelodge.
He then introduced a cultural change program across the four hotel groups. His aim
was to enhance the commitment of staff, strengthening the identity of the Forte brand,
and to improve customer service. These aims were achieved by promoting staff devel-
opment and employee recognition schemes to increase job satisfaction (Erstad, 2001).
When Philip N. Diehl became head of the U.S. Mint, it was seen as slow, inefficient,
and lacking in commercial performance standards. Its main goal was to produce coins,
but the Mint had no idea of the magnitude of its coin inventory. It also manufactured col-
lectible and commemorative coins. However, the timing of commemorative issues was
dictated by Congress, sometimes five or six times a year. This meant that commemorative
coins were no longer rare and were of decreasing interest to collectors. The Mint faced an
identity crisis: Was it a passive organization making coins, including commemoratives,
simply following the dictates of the Federal Reserve and Congress? Or should it act more
like a market-based organization, launching its own products and promotional campaigns?
Establishing a new identity for the Mint through organizational changes such as making
commemorative coins more collectable (by issuing fewer of them), using online market-
ing, portraying its role as a purveyor of history, and marketing innovations such as the 50
State Quarters Program helped move it toward a new, more modern, customer-focused
identity (Muoio, 1999).
A New Chief Executive The new broom phenomenon, when a new chief executive arrives, can act as a signal
that old ways are about to change. Arthur Martinez became head of the merchandising
group at Sears at a time when the company produced one of its worst sales records,
reporting a net loss of $3.9 billion, most of which came from the merchandising group.
In “new broom” tradition, in his first 100 days, Martinez started a turnaround plan, reori-
enting marketing away from being a “man’s store,” to appeal to women as well. At the
same time as moving into cosmetics and other specialty store products, he closed 113
stores, eliminated the 100-year-old Sears catalogue, reengineered store operations, and,
through training, incentives, and new staffing procedures, moved the company toward a
service culture to appeal to both male and female customers (Rucci et al., 1998).
When Kenneth D. Lewis took over as CEO of Bank of America, he instituted what has
since been called “a quiet revolution,” moving the business “from empire-building to value
creation.” Rather than follow the growth strategy of his predecessor, he sought to grow prof-
its by downscaling the bank’s operations, getting rid of underperforming businesses such as
auto leasing, and divesting unprofitable customer segments. He also brought in new man-
agers to infuse the organization with new ideas and sought to improve customer service
through enhanced training programs for tellers, moving away from organizing around prod-
uct lines in favor of customers, and encouraging cross-selling of products by tying executive
salaries to performance targets. These moves apparently had their desired effect: by March
2007, Bank of America claimed, under Lewis’s leadership, to be “one of the world’s largest
financial institutions and the fifth most profitable company in the world” (Faust, 2002).
When 35-year-old Kate Betts took over as editor-in-chief at Harper’s Bazaar, she was
charged with changing the 130-year-old company. The company had stagnated compared to
other magazines such as Vogue and Elle and was seen as stodgy and tedious—descriptions
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 89
not best associated with fashion magazines. In “new broom” form, in her first six months,
she changed the magazine’s logos, typeface, and staff in order to create a new mindset and
a better profile for the magazine. This included replacing over half of the senior staff with
her own “dream team” in order to regain market share related to younger readers (Brooker,
2000).
However, unlike Lewis at Bank of America, not all new broom changes are neces-
sarily the right ones. Bercovici (2003) claims that Betts “threw Bazaar into a newsstand
nosedive.” In 2001 Glenda Bailey replaced Betts as editor-in-chief. Bercovici also argues
that “much of Bailey’s revamp has amounted to undoing Betts’ misbegotten innova-
tions, returning the magazine to its roots as a haven for the fashion elite,” which included
“restoring the old Harper’s Bazaar logo, which Betts had replaced with a blocky modern-
ist design.”
In Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s (2003, pp. 64–65) analysis of organizational turnarounds at
Gillette, the BBC, and Invensys, she notes that they were all led by a new chief executive.
She asks: “Does this mean that only a new broom can sweep clean?” Her answer is that
this is probably the case. New CEOs have advantages over their predecessors:
They are likely to be able to create energy for change.
They are not constrained by past practice.
They can focus on the organization’s known but unresolved “sacred cows.”
Having no association with previous customer relationship issues, they are able to han-
dle customer-related problems with credibility.
Power and Politics Power and political pressures come in many forms. Some are associated with board-
level changes. The tussle between Philip Purcell and John Mack for the chief execu-
tive’s position at Morgan Stanley after the company had been bought by Dean Witter
and Discover Financial Services Inc. in 1997 is one example; Purcell became CEO
(Thornton and Reed, 2001). As noted above, another example concerned the ousting of
Jean-Marie Messier, CEO of Vivendi, in mid-2002. The Economist (2002) claimed that
it was the Bronfman family, a major shareholder in the company, which had lost nearly
$2 billion due to poor share performance over the previous year, who were behind the
push to get rid of Messier. Removing Messier was also aligned with the interests of the
French political right, who were concerned about ownership issues related to television
and telephone companies.
Some changes are made to alter traditional internal power relationships, to speed
up decision making, and to allow wider involvement. One example was at IBM when
Sam Palmisano took over as CEO from Lou Gerstner. In January 2003, he abolished the
92-year-old, 12-person executive management team. Described as the “inner bastion of
power and privilege” at IBM, this committee was the “inner sanctum” that made deci-
sions about IBM’s strategy and direction. In disbanding the committee, Palmisano sent a
message that power relationships were being restructured to avoid decisions being slowed
down by waiting for the monthly meetings of this committee (Ante, 2003).
Other power pressures leading to change relate to internal conflicts. For example, at
Roche, the pharmaceutical company, a range of organizational changes were made, includ-
ing teamwork, in order to assist the fast-developing field of genomics. In 1999 Lee Babiss,
90 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
head of preclinical research at Roche’s headquarters at Nutley, noticed that there were
an increasing number of corridor conversations between researchers working on genom-
ics and those working in other areas such as oncology and cancer research. He sought to
harness these interactions by creating interdisciplinary research teams that cut across tra-
ditional power and scientific departmental boundaries. For example, the Genomics Oncol-
ogy (or GO) team brought together a diverse group of researchers united by the aim of
using genomic innovations to assist the development of anticancer drugs. However, not all
teams at Roche worked well. Previously, from the mid-1990s onward, teams of scientists
were set up to compete with each other for access to scarce resources. Over time, these
interactions became internal warfare, leading to the hoarding of technical expertise and
knowledge within teams. It also led to a reluctance to abandon team projects, especially
where the careers of research scientists were linked to their success. In 1998 this was
abandoned in favor of a collaborative approach that recognized the importance of estab-
lishing team structures that shared knowledge and information.
Using Power and Politics to Secure the City
Interorganizational politics can sometimes block
change. Christopher Dickey (2009) describes how,
following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001, the New York
Police Department (NYPD) created a Counter-
Terrorism Bureau (CTB). To be successful, the CTB
had to be invisible to the public, who were paying
for this service through taxation, and the Bureau’s
intelligence gathering took place elsewhere on the
planet, which meant taking New York cops off the
city streets. The new Real Time Crime Center at
One Police Plaza in Manhattan cost $11 million. But
three years after the attacks, people had started to
forget. To counteract the apathy, the Bureau orga-
nized impressive shows of force, deliberately turn-
ing up without warning at high-profile targets like
the Empire State Building, to remind the public that
the bad guys were still out there.
The CTB also had to work with other agencies,
particularly “the three-letter guys”: FBI, CIA, ATF,
DEA. Relations between the FBI and the CTB were
managed through a Joint Terrorism Task Force. The
head of the NYPD Intelligence Division was David
Cohen:
Cohen’s years at Langley and in the New York
office of the CIA had taught him “there’s no such
thing as information sharing, there is only infor-
mation trading,” as he told his colleagues at the
NYPD. You go to the FBI and say, “Tell me what
you’re doing,” they’re going to say, “Go f***
yourself,” is the way another senior official with
the NYPD put it.
Back channels to the CIA or other parts of the
intelligence community could only take you so
far. To get the stuff you needed, you had to be
able to pull your weight. You had to be giving as
well as getting. Otherwise you were going to be
like the puny kid having sand kicked in his face
by bullies. (Dickey, 2009, p. 140)
This led to an “overseas program,” with NYPD
operatives working abroad in liaison positions with
forces that had their own counter-terrorist units, to
exchange and gather intelligence. This meant that
Cohen was able to establish a power base through
his own intelligence operation, and the three-letter
guys had to come and ask him for information.
Information sharing then became possible. The
ability to understand and to use power and orga-
nization politics effectively was fundamental to the
success of the NYPD CTB in its efforts to detect and
prevent future attacks.
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 91
EXERCISE 3.1
Top Team
Role Play
1. In groups of three, choose an organizational change with which you are familiar, perhaps in your current employment, or in an organization about which you have recently been reading. If neither of those options works, then, for the purposes of this exercise, invent an organization and a change initiative.
2. Now revisit table 3.1, “Images of Change and Understanding the Pressures.” Each person in your group must choose one of those images of managing change and will play that role.
3. Your group is now in a senior management board meeting. You are discussing an agenda item at the request of the chairman of your board, who wants to know why the organization is going through the change that you have identified.
4. Debate how you will respond to the chairman’s request, with each member of your group (board) playing their role based on the change management image that they have selected.
5. When you have decided how you are going to respond to the chair’s request, consider the following questions:
Did one of your images better explain the rationale for change than the others, and why?
On reflection, what criteria did you use for making this judgement with regard to the comparative advantage of a particular image?
Is there an image with which you personally have a particular affinity or preference? Why? What would it take for you to change that preference?
EXERCISE 3.2
Case Analy-
sis: The
Sunderland
City Story
Is change more difficult in a recession? As you read the following account of change in a local government agency in England (based on MacLachlan, 2011), consider the follow- ing questions:
1. What features of a downturn can make managing organizational change more difficult?
2. What features of a downturn can make managing organizational change more straightforward?
3. Sunderland City Council introduced several changes to deal with the twin goals of maintaining services and reducing spending. What factors explain the success of their program?
With the recession that began in 2009, local government in England had to cut spend- ing while maintaining the same levels of services to the local population. Could costs be cut with a radical redesign of services and new ways of working? Sunderland City Council employed 8,000 people in the northeast of England, receiving two-thirds of their bud- get from central government. In 2010–11, funding fell 10 percent, by £58 million, and more cuts were expected over the next three years. Management wondered whether, given the sharp downturn in the economy, staff would be demotivated and concerned about layoffs. At the start of 2010, the Council launched a transformation program; could things be done differently, but without losing jobs?
Unwilling to force staff to retire early or accept redeployment, the Council created an internal jobs market. This encouraged staff in areas that were shrinking to apply for jobs in expanding services, using a web-enabled assessment and employee-job matching system.
LO 3.1
LO 3.5
(Continued)
92 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
This was linked to a retraining program designed to transform the skills profile of the work- force, focusing on personality, values, and potential, as well as on knowledge and past experience. An employee portal was established to allow staff to create their own CVs.
Resistance to these moves came not from staff but from managers who felt that their recruitment decisions were being constrained. For staff who were unable to find new roles, a unit was established called “Switch”: Staff Working In Transition and CHange. Over 200 people between roles, including managers, worked in this unit, reducing the Council’s use of temporary staff on fixed-term contracts, for maternity cover, for exam- ple. The Switch team was also used to drive change, with efficiency savings projects, designing future job roles, and providing careers advice to other staff in transition.
The flexible working scheme was popular, allowing staff voluntarily to reduce their paid hours (with the option to increase them again), and to “purchase” up to two weeks’ additional annual leave by spreading the salary sacrifice over the year. A “be your own boss” scheme offered support to employees who wanted to start their own businesses, giving them 20 days’ paid leave and access to a small business adviser. The 50 staff who wanted to proceed continued working part time for the Council to give them some income security while they established their businesses. Local employers were invited to “borrow” and to pay Council staff on secondments.
EXERCISE 3.3
The Reputa-
tion Trap:
Can You
Escape?
What happens if a company cannot change how it is viewed by consumers? As you read this case, consider the following questions:
1. What does this case reveal about the challenges faced by successful businesses? Is it possible to be too successful?
2. How does a successful organization determine whether an environmental change is a brief fad or fashion to be ignored, or a development that requires a fundamental rethinking of the way in which it does business?
3. What change issues does this case raise with regard to the significance of reputation?
4. What actions would you recommend be taken by Big Food and the fast-food compa- nies that have been caught in the reputation trap?
Try this simple test. Say the following out loud: Artificial colors and flavors. Pesticides. Preser-
vatives. High-fructose corn syrup. Growth hormones. Antibiotics. Gluten. Genetically modified
organisms. If any one of these terms raised a hair on the back of your neck, left a sour taste in
your mouth, or made your lips purse with disdain, you are part of Big Food’s multibillion-dollar
problem. In fact, you may even belong to a growing consumer class that has some of the world’s
biggest and best-known companies scrambling to change their businesses. (Kowitt, 2015, p. 61)
Fortune magazine prides itself on being able to feel and report “the pulse” of U.S. busi- ness. In 2014 and 2015, two articles by Beth Kowitt, “Fallen Arches” and “The War on Big Food,” explored the impact that consumer preference for healthy foods was having on Big Food organizations such as General Mills and Kraft, and also on some fast-food outlets like McDonald’s and Subway. A growing number of consumers are suspicious of processed foods. Ironically, although processing (e.g., salting and curing) has traditionally been associ- ated with reducing the risk of illness from the food we eat, food processing is now seen as the antithesis of healthy eating.
The annual sales of processed food are declining, but these are the core products of mul- tibillion-dollar Big Food companies. Since 2009, the top 25 food and beverage companies
LO 3.1
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 93
Abrahamson, E. 2004. Change without pain: How managers can overcome initiative
overload, organizational chaos, and employee burnout. Boston: Harvard Business School
Press. Argues the need to manage carefully the pace of change, rather than have ongoing
dramatic transformations that destabilize the organization and burn out staff.
Beard, A., and Hornik, R. 2011. It’s hard to be good. Harvard Business Review
89(11):88–96. Profiles five organizations with exemplary approaches to responsible
business practices: Royal DSM (Netherlands), Southwest Airlines (United States), Broad
Group (China), Potash Corporation (Canada), and Unilever (United Kingdom).
Additional Reading
in the United States have lost market share equivalent to $18 billion. Some fast-food com- panies are also facing a similar shift in consumer preferences. For example, in 2014, in their U.S. operations, McDonald’s reported four consecutive quarters of falling sales, and an overall 30 percent drop in profit, while Subway’s sales dropped 3 percent, or $400 million.
Big Food has reacted by increasingly marketing their products as “natural,” review- ing their product recipes, and acquiring many small health and natural food companies. However, this has not resolved their reputational problem. According to Gary Hirshberg, founder and chairman of Stonyfield Farm, “There’s enormous doubt and scepticism about whether large companies can deliver naturality and authenticity” (Kowitt, 2015, p. 64). According to Don Thompson, CEO of McDonald’s, “People today are questioning the integrity and quality of the food at a much higher level” (Kowitt, 2014, p. 116). Some fast- food brands, such as Chipotle Mexican Grill (annual growth rate 20 percent) and Firehouse Subs, are thriving in this environment, but not McDonald’s or Subway. McDonald’s seems to be suffering from its past success, which built its reputation as the quintessential fast- food brand. Today, however, it is operating in an environment where a growing number of customers are choosing “fresh and healthy” rather than “fast and convenient” (Kowitt, 2014, p. 109). The challenge for McDonald’s is to convince customers that it can be both.
Subway might seem to be a strange brand to have suffered from the “move to health,” given that its growth has in the past been due to its positioning as a healthy alternative to “traditional” fast food. As one indicator of Subway’s success, it is “the world’s most ubiq- uitous restaurant chain,” with almost 44,000 outlets in 110 countries (Harwell, 2015). However, according to Darren Tristan, executive vice president of the industry research firm Technomic, Subway’s problem is that “fresh” no longer means what Subway offers. For example, people want meat that has been freshly cut, not a precut slice peeled off wax paper. Subway has also been criticized for using the food additive azodicarbonamide (E927, a flour bleaching and dough conditioning agent) in its bread.
Summarizing the situation, IBIS World food analyst Andrew Alvarez observes, “We’re in a new environment—the Chipotle environment—with a new type of rhetoric, quality and marketability. Subway’s platform, its presentation, almost looks primordial” (Harwell, 2015, p. 5).
Case Sources:
Harwell, D. 2015. The rise and fall of Subway, the world’s biggest food chain. The Washington
Post, May 30:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-rise-and-fall-of-subway-the-worlds-biggest-
food-chain/2015/05/29/0ca0a84a-fa7a-11e4-a13c-193b1241d51a_story.html, accessed June 20, 2015.
Kowitt, B. 2014. Fallen arches: Can McDonald’s get its mojo back? Fortune, December 1:106–16.
Kowitt, B. 2015. The war on big food. Fortune, May 21:61–70.
94 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this
chapter, in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Understand the environmental pressures that can trigger organizational change.
We explored external pressures that encourage organizations to change. Fashion: man-
agers want to appear to be “progressive,” looking out for “the next big thing.” Demog-
raphy: organizations need to consider how to address the changing motives of each
new generation and the approaching “silver tsunami” of an ageing workforce. Man-
date: many changes are nonnegotiable, driven by legislation and regulation, and others
are difficult to avoid, such as expectations of corporate responsibility. Geopolitics: in
LO 3.1
Roundup
Benn, S., Dunphy, D., and Griffiths, A. 2014. Organizational change for corporate sus-
tainability. 3rd ed. London: Routledge. Develops a unified view combining ecological
and human sustainability, with case studies and practical advice for change agents.
Buchanan, D. A. 2011. Good practice, not rocket science: Understanding failures to
change after extreme events. Journal of Change Management 11(3):273–88. Distin-
guishes post-incident organization contexts from “routine” contexts in order to identify
the potential barriers to change following accidents, failures, and other crises.
Bughin, J., Chui, M., and Manyika, J. 2010. Clouds, big data, and smart assets: Ten tech-
enabled business trends to watch. McKinsey Quarterly (August):1–14. Explores how
organizations are developing new business models to exploit rapidly developing tech-
nologies, such as “distributed cocreation,” “networks as organizations,” “the Internet of
things,” and “big data.”
Gratton, L. 2011. The shift: The future of work is already here. London: Collins. Explores
how the forces of globalization, society change, demography, technology, and use of
natural resources are reshaping work and organizations; offers advice on how to “future-
proof” your career.
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
To what extent can you identify the external
environmental pressures for change in your
organization?
To what extent can you influence whether and
how to change?
Do you relate better to one or more of the
change management images outlined in table
3.1, with regard to the organizational changes
in which you are involved? Why is this the case?
Which of the possible reasons for avoiding
change that have been discussed in this chap-
ter have you experienced? On reflection, how
might you have contributed to overcoming
those avoidance tactics? And how would you
judge your likely success in that attempt?
How easy is it to raise issues in your organization
about the rationale for specific changes? Is there
a dominant rationale? And if so, why?
What personal criteria might you adopt to
ensure that you are initiating change “for the
right reasons”? Set out some key questions that
might help to guide you in future, to ensure that
your rationale for change is clear to you and
clear to those who will be affected.
Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers 95
a highly interdependent global economy, events in distant locations can have “ripple
effects” around the planet, and all organizations need to address the implications of
climate change and global warming. Reputation: an organization’s sales and credibility
can be badly affected by process, product, service, and internal governance failures,
and rapid changes to restore and build reputation may often be necessary. Hypercom-
petition: change is being driven by disruptive, high-velocity innovation, which is partly
technology-driven, and can be seen most vividly in “out-of-sector” competition, where
organizations which are not in your business sector start to steal your customers.
It is important to note two further points. First, these six sets of pressures are inter-
related, and most or all of them may be active at any one time. Second, this list of
pressures is not comprehensive but is constantly shifting with local, national, and inter-
national trends and developments.
Explain why not all organizations are affected equally by external pressures.
We explored four sets of explanations for the absence of change in the face of external
pressures. First, external threat can lead to rigidity rather than innovation, as decision
making becomes constrained and focused. Second, a pressure for change has to be per-
ceived and interpreted as such before action is triggered, and if those external events
are not understood as significant, change is unlikely to happen. Third, even in the face
of a clear need for change, forces for stability may interfere. These include stakeholder
expectations, which limit innovation; dispersed power, which impedes decision mak-
ing; and a lack of resources to support innovation. Fourth, management may decide to
use buffering strategies to shield the organization from adaptive change.
Explain why organizations often fail to change following crises.
Although it might be expected that change following accidents, failures, and other cri-
ses would be straightforward, this is not always the case. The causes of these incidents
are usually complex and systemic, requiring systemic solutions that can be difficult and
costly to implement. Many organizations are good at passive learning (identifying les-
sons) but not so good at active learning (implementing those changes). Not all failures
are blameworthy; some are praiseworthy. Most failures, however, are treated as blame-
worthy, and this is a further barrier to active learning, as it maintains a psychologi-
cally unsafe environment. The post-incident change agenda is often a defensive one,
designed to stop such incidents from happening again. This is less appealing to change
managers, who can experience more challenge and career rewards from implementing
progressive change. It may be helpful to combine defensive agendas with progressive
agendas to progress the former.
Identify internal organizational factors that trigger change.
We explored five sets of internal triggers of organizational change. Growth generates
problems of increased size and complexity, and at some point the need for formal rules
interferes with the need for creativity and innovation. Integration and coordination
are common problems in larger organizations, often requiring cultural, structural, and
process solutions to improve cross-divisional communication and information sharing.
A new chief executive is often expected to bring fresh ideas and energy and to move
the organization in new directions. Corporate identity may be an abstract concept, but
shared purpose and goals, and a strong corporate brand, can be valuable competitive
LO 3.2
LO 3.3
LO 3.4
96 Chapter 3 Why Change? Contemporary Pressures and Drivers
assets requiring appropriate changes to protect and build them. Power and politics both
drive and interfere with organizational change, depending on the interests of stakehold-
ers and their ability to influence management decision making.
Relate differing images of managing change to pressures for change.
Chapter 2 discussed three uses of the six-images framework: surfacing assumptions,
assessing dominant images, and using multiple perspectives. We argued that there are
no “right” and “wrong” images of change management and that it is valuable to be
able to interpret problems and solutions in general, and change processes in particular,
from different standpoints. This “multiple perspectives” approach can help to generate
fresh thinking and creative solutions. In this chapter, we have seen how external and
internal pressures or drivers do not necessarily lead to change; those pressures are fil-
tered through the perceptions of the need for change, and those perceptions are in turn
colored by the images that managers have of the change process. One manager’s reac-
tion to a particular external or internal pressure, therefore, may not be shared by others.
The issues discussed in this chapter suggest that more successful change managers are
likely to be those who have a clear, personal understanding about the pressures on them
to change their organizations, a well-developed rationale for what they are attempting
to achieve, and a clear view of the likely effects of their actions.
LO 3.5
Abrahamson, E. 1996. Management fashion. Academy of Management Review 21(1):254–85.
Abrahamson, E. 2004. Change without pain: How managers can overcome initiative
overload, organizational chaos, and employee burnout. Boston: Harvard Business School
Press.
Anonymous. 2002. Maître dethroned. The Economist 364(8280):58–59.
Anonymous. 2010. The silver tsunami. The Economist, February 6:72.
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Ante, S. A. 2003. The new blue. BusinessWeek Online, March 17.
BBC. 2008. File on 4: Child protection policies, programme number 08VQ3930LHO.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/22_01_08_fo4_abuse.pdf, accessed March 2008.
Beard, A., and Hornik, R. 2011. It’s hard to be good. Harvard Business Review
89(11):88–96.
Benn, S., Dunphy, D., and Griffiths, A. 2014. Organizational change for corporate sus-
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Bercovici, J. 2003. From Harper’s Bazaar to Bailey’s Bazaar. Media Life Magazine.com,
February 12.
Birkinshaw, J. 2014. Beware the next big thing. Harvard Business Review 92(5):50–57.
Bogner, W. C., and Barr, P. S. 2000. Making sense in hypercompetitive environments:
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101
What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
Learning objectives
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
LO 4.1 Understand the use of diagnostic models in planning organizational change
LO 4.2 Use strategic analysis tools to assess the need for organizational change
LO 4.3 Diagnose organizational receptiveness to and individual readiness for change,
and use those assessments as the basis for action to increase receptiveness and
readiness
LO 4.4 Explain the characteristics of the “built-to-change” organizational model, and
assess the applicability, strengths, and limitations of this approach
4Chapter
S e e C
o p y ri
g h t
P a g e F
o r
C re
d it
L in
e
102 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
LO 4.1 Organizational Models
The theme of this chapter is diagnosis. With regard to organizational change, what is the
problem? Can we improve our understanding of the context and nature of the problem?
And can this diagnostic approach help us to solve the problem, or problems, that we find?
In short—what has to change? This chapter introduces a number of diagnostic frameworks
and tools. Some diagnostic models consider the operation of the organization as a whole,
such as the “7-S Model.” Others, such as “scenario planning,” start with strategy. Some
are designed to explore specific aspects of the change process, such as organizational and
individual readiness for change. The “built-to-change” model argues that organizations
can be designed in a way that makes “change management” diagnostic tools redundant.
The way in which these diagnostic models, frameworks, and tools are deployed depends
on the image of change management in use (chapter 2).
Director You can use these diagnostics to strengthen your knowledge base and con-
fidence with regard to what needs to change, identifying key relationships
and focusing on where change is needed and the results that you want.
Navigator You will also find these diagnostics useful to “map” the organization’s envi-
ronment and help you to assess appropriate responses.
Caretaker You will be less impressed by the capability of these diagnostics to support
change, but those which focus on the external environment (PESTLE and
scenario planning) help to identify trends and developments to which the
organization should respond.
Coach You will probably be more interested in diagnostics that focus on goals and
on the capabilities required to achieve them.
Interpreter You will find particularly useful the diagnostics that emphasize images,
framing, and cognitive maps.
Nurturer With your interest in emergent strategy, you may not be convinced about the
value of this diagnostic approach.
Who does the diagnosing? This is an important question, and answers vary. Some per-
spectives see this as a senior management prerogative, perhaps also involving external
consultants and advisers. Those consultants may use their diagnostic expertise to help their
clients to manage the change process, rather than to determine the content of the changes.
However, other perspectives emphasize the need to involve at the diagnostic stage those
who will be affected by change; involvement can strengthen commitment to the change
process, and thus increase the probability of success. Some organization development
(OD) consultants explicitly reject the role of “diagnostician,” arguing that their role is to
help the organization’s members to do this for themselves.
Our treatment of models relies on the following assumptions:
The members of an organization, managers and staff, have their own views of “how
things work,” and “what causes what.” In other words, “diagnosis” with regard to orga-
nizational change is going to happen whether or not explicit diagnostic tools are used.
Implicit causal models have the power to influence how we think about organizational
issues and problems, and what we believe are the appropriate courses of action.
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 103
The option of not using a diagnostic model, therefore, is not available. We either use an
implicit model, or choose an explicit one, such as those described in this chapter.
Implicit models based on accumulated experience can provide valuable insights. How-
ever, implicit models have limitations. First, they may be based on the limited experi-
ence of a small number of people. Second, because they are implicit, it is difficult for
others to understand the assumptions underlying decisions based on those models.
Warner Burke (2013) identifies five ways in which explicit models are useful:
1. Simplify complexity: They use a manageable number of categories to help simplify
complex, multivariate situations
2. Highlight priorities: They help to prioritize the issues that need most attention.
3. Identify interdependencies: They identify key organizational interdependencies (e.g.,
strategy and structure).
4. Provide a common language: They provide a common language with which different
stakeholder groups can discuss organizational properties.
5. Offer a process guide: They can offer guidance with respect to the appropriate sequence
of actions in a change process.
This chapter describes several organizational models. Each adopts a different focus on
aspects of organizational functioning, and no one model, or small collection of models,
can be described as “best.” It is always important to choose, or to adapt, a model that fits
the organization’s problem by triggering discussion and analysis among those involved,
leading ultimately to action. In many cases, in terms of problem solving, the debate that a
model prompts can be more important than the model itself. Our aims here are to illustrate
the variety of models that are available, in order to give you a basis from which to choose
those that most closely fit your interests and purposes.
The Six-Box Organizational Model Marvin Weisbord (1976, p. 431) developed one of the first organizational diagnos-
tics, which he described as “my efforts to combine bits of data, theories, research, and
hunches into a working tool that anyone can use.” In the context of our discussion of
implicit and explicit models, it is interesting to note that Weisbord subtitled his article,
“Six Places to Look for Trouble With or Without a Theory.” It is not surprising that his
model is based on sets of factors or “boxes”:
1. Purposes: What business are we in?
2. Structure: How do we divide up the work?
3. Rewards: Do all tasks have incentives?
4. Helpful mechanisms: Have we adequate coordinating technologies?
5. Relationships: How do we manage conflict among people?
6. Leadership: Does someone keep the other five boxes in balance?
Weisbord (1976, p. 431) uses a radar screen analogy: “Just as air controllers use radar
to chart the course of an aircraft—height, speed, distance apart and weather—those seek-
ing to improve an organization must observe relationships among the boxes and not focus
on any particular blip.”
104 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
As a change diagnostic, therefore, this model has two main applications. First, in pro-
viding a small set of categories that simplify (perhaps oversimplify) the complexity of an
organization, this facilitates the process of deciding which factors or sets of factors are
generating problems, and which therefore require attention. Second, it reminds the change
manager to consider the wider systemic implications of actions that address only one or
two of those categories or boxes.
The 7-S Framework The 7-S framework was developed by Robert Waterman, Tom Peters, and Julien Phillips
(1980) while they were working as management consultants with McKinsey & Company.
They argue that organizational effectiveness is influenced by many factors, and that suc-
cessful change depends on the relationships between those factors. In an approach similar
to that of Weisbord (1976), they identify seven sets of factors (figure 4.1):
Structure in this framework refers to the formal organization design.
Strategy concerns how the organization plans to anticipate or respond to changes in its
external environment in order to strengthen its competitive position.
Systems are the formal and informal procedures that determine how things get done—
budgeting, cost accounting, IT, and training systems, for example. Waterman et al.
(1980, p. 21) note that one way to change an organization without disruptive reorgani-
zation is to change the systems.
Style refers to patterns of management actions, how managers spend their time, what
they pay attention to, the signals that they send about priorities, and attitude to change.
Staff can refer to appraisal, training, and development processes, and also to attitude,
motivation, and morale—but more importantly in this framework, this refers to how
managers are developed.
Superordinate
goals
Structure
SystemsStrategy
Skills
Staf
Style
FIGURE 4.1 The 7-S
Framework
Source: Based on
Waterman et al.,
(1980, p.18).
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 105
Skills concern what an organization does best, expressed in the dominant attributes and
capabilities that distinguish it from competitors.
Superordinate goals refer to the organization’s guiding concepts, values, aspirations, and future
direction—which are sometimes captured by the term “vision,” discussed here in chapter 6.
In later versions of the 7-S framework, these goals are also referred to as “shared values.”
As a change diagnostic, this framework emphasizes the interconnectedness of the seven
sets of factors, and also argues that the “soft” issues (style, staff, skills, shared values) are
just as important as structure, strategy, and systems. Waterman et al. (1980, p. 17) explain:
Our assertion is that productive organization change is not simply a matter of structure,
although structure is important. It is not so simple as the interaction between strategy and
structure, although strategy is critical too. Our claim is that effective organizational change is
really the relationship between structure, strategy, systems, style, skills, staff, and something
we call superordinate goals. (The alliteration is intentional: it serves as an aid to memory.)
The framework thus identifies the areas on which to focus, the questions to ask, and the
relationships and alignments to consider when planning organizational change. A full 7-S
analysis, exploring each of the elements of the framework in depth, can be rich and valu-
able, but is time-consuming.
Applying 7-S to Intuit
In 2000, Steve Bennett, vice president of GE Capi-
tal, became chief executive of Intuit, a financial
software and services company with three prod-
ucts, Quicken, TurboTax, and QuickBooks, which
respectively had 73 percent, 81 percent, and 84
percent of their markets. However, given this mar-
ket dominance, many analysts felt that Intuit was
less profitable than it should be. The company
also had a reputation for slow decision making,
allowing competitors to steal a number of market
opportunities. Bennett wanted to change all that.
In his first few weeks, he visited most of Intuit’s
locations, addressed most of its 5,000 employ-
ees, and spoke personally to each of the top 200
executives. He concluded that staff were passion-
ate about the firm’s products, but that not much
attention was being paid to internal processes (this
account is based on Higgins, 2005).
In terms of the 7-S framework, this is what he did:
Strategy: To expand Intuit’s portfolio, he
expanded the product range by acquisition.
Structure: He created a flatter structure and
decentralized decision making, giving business
units greater control and responsibility for the
product process from development to delivery.
Systems: The rewards system was more closely
aligned to achieving strategic objectives.
Style: He emphasized the need for a performance-
oriented focus, and he provided a vision for
change, putting effort into “selling” that vision.
Staff: He built on the commitment of staff to
Intuit’s products by emphasizing the critical
role of quality and efficiency in maintaining and
building the company’s reputation.
Skills: To enhance staff capabilities with regard to
quality and efficiency, resources were allocated to
training and development, and some select man-
agers were hired from GE in specific skill areas.
Superordinate goals: Bennett’s approach was
“vision-driven,” with his paper, “Steve’s Dream
for Intuit,” outlining strategic objectives and how
they would be achieved; to “sell” this vision, he
communicated constantly with staff.
As a result of Bennett’s changes, operating profits
increased in 2002 and 2003 by 40 to 50 percent. By
2014, Intuit had global revenues of over $5 billion,
with 8,000 employees in the United States, Canada,
United Kingdom, India, and other countries (http://
www.intuit.com).
106 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
The Star Model The star model of organizational design, developed by Jay Galbraith et al. (2002),
argues that, for an organization to be effective, its strategy, structure, processes,
rewards, and people practices have to be in alignment (figure 4.2). This model thus
overlaps with the McKinsey 7-S framework.
Strategy in this model plays a dominant role, because if the strategy is not clear, then
there is no basis for making other design decisions.
Structure is defined as the formal authority relationships and grouping of activities, as
shown on an organization chart.
Processes and lateral capability concern the formal and informal systems that coordi-
nate the organization’s activities.
Reward systems relate to how performance is measured and compensated, in ways that
align individual actions to organizational objectives.
People practices concern the organization’s human resource policies and practices:
selection, training and development, performance management.
As a change diagnostic, this model emphasizes how these five elements are intercon-
nected. Changes in one area are almost certain to affect others, and not always in predict-
able ways. Despite the significance of strategy, organizational performance will suffer if
one or more of the five sets of factors is out of alignment with the others. For example,
while changing the structure may be relatively straightforward and visible, this can have
little or no impact on performance without complementary changes elsewhere in the orga-
nization. Galbraith et al. (2002) explain the implications of misalignment of each of the
five “points of the star,” as summarized in table 4.1.
Strategy Vision
Direction
Competitive advantage
Structure Power and authority
Reporting relationships
Organizational roles
People Practices Staing and selection
Performance feedback
Learning and development
Processes and
Lateral Capability
Networks, processes,
teams, integrative roles,
matrix structures
Reward Systems Goals, scorecards, and metrics
Values and behaviors
Compensation/rewards
FIGURE 4.2 The Star
Model
Source: Based on Galbraith et al. (2002).
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 107
The Four-Frame Model Lee Bolman and Terry Deal (2013) explain four different frames or lenses, each provid-
ing a different perspective on how an organization functions. Their aim is to promote
the value of “multiframe thinking,” which means seeing the same situation in different
ways. Problems arise, they argue, when we become locked into our one favored way
of seeing the world—and our organization—and then fail to see other critical aspects
or issues. We met frames before, in chapter 2, in our discussion of mental models;
same thing. The structural frame in this model concerns the organization of groups
and teams. The human resource frame concerns how the organization is tailored to
satisfy human needs and build effective interpersonal relationships and teamwork. The
political frame concerns how power and conflict are dealt with, and how coalitions are
formed. The symbolic frame relates to how the organization builds a culture that gives
purpose and meaning to work and builds team cohesion. The four-frame model is illus-
trated in figure 4.3 (Bolman and Deal, 2013, p. 19).
Each frame is associated with a metaphor. The structural frame sees the organization as
a machine, and the problem concerns efficient design. The human resource frame treats the
organization as a family, and the task is to meet the needs of both the organization and its
members. The political frame sees organizations as sites of collaboration and conflict, as
the interests of internal and external stakeholders sometimes overlap, and sometimes dif-
fer. For the symbolic frame, the essence of the organization lies with its culture— symbols,
beliefs, values, norms, rituals, and meanings.
As a change diagnostic, the four-frame model invites the change manager to see the
organization through several different lenses at the same time. This can deepen under-
standing of problems and helps to generate creative solutions by highlighting previously
unseen or unconsidered possibilities.
TABLE 4.1 The Impli-
cations of
Misalignment
Source: Based on Gal- braith et al. (2002).
Design component Leads to Implications for practice
Strategy If strategy is missing, unclear, or not agreed
Confusion No common purpose People pulling in different directions No criteria for decision making
Structure If the structure is not aligned to strategy
Friction Inability to mobilize resources Ineffective execution Lost competitive advantage
Processes If coordinating mecha- nisms are left to chance
Gridlock Lack of collaboration across boundaries Long decision and innovation cycle times No sharing of information and best practice
Rewards If metrics and rewards do not support the goals
Internal competition
Diffused energy, wrong results Low standards Frustration and staff turnover
People If staff are not enabled and empowered
Low performance
Effort without results Low job satisfaction
108 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
Metaphorical Diagnostics
In many situations, diagnosis of the need for and
substance of change can be enhanced by capturing
the perspectives of a wide range of the staff who
are involved—at all levels. However, getting people
to talk about the “as is” situation, and what needs
to change, can sometimes be awkward. A useful
technique for overcoming this potential blockage
builds on the concept of “frames,” asking people to
describe their organization (or part of the organiza-
tion) and how it works using a metaphor (an image,
or a simile): “My organization is like a well-oiled
machine”; “My division is a shark-infested pond.”
In our experience, most people quickly generate
such an image when asked: “My organization is like
a dinosaur—large, slow-moving, unresponsive to
change, and headed for extinction.” These images
differ from one individual to another, and become
the basis of discussion, as their originators provide
further detail about what they intended to convey
with their metaphor.
FIGURE 4.3 The Four-Frame Model
Frame
Structural Human Resource Political Symbolic
Organizational
Metaphor
Factory or
machine
Family Jungle Theatre, carnival, temple
Central
Concepts
Roles, goals, poli-
cies, technology,
environment
Needs, skills,
relationships
Power, conflict,
competition,
politics
Culture, meaning,
metaphor, ritual,
ceremony, stories, heroes
Image of
Leadership
Social
architecture
Empowerment Advocacy and
political savvy
Inspiration
Basic
Leadership
Challenge
Attune structure
to task, technol-
ogy, environment
Align
organizational and
human needs
Develop agenda
and power base
Create faith, beauty,
meaning
LO 4.2 Organization Strategy and Change
In this section, we shift the focus from organizational models to strategic analysis
tools. Strategy is a major driver of change, but it is not the only factor. Here, we explain
six tools that are in common use for exploring and shaping an organization’s strategy.
These are gap analysis, the PESTLE framework, scenario planning, elements of strat-
egy, the strategic inventory, and the cultural web.
Gap Analysis Gap analysis is a simple, flexible, and widely used tool for reviewing the current “as is”
state of an organization, and what has to change. This involves asking three questions:
1. Where are we now?
2. Where do we want to get to?
3. What do we need to do in order to get there?
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 109
These are general questions that almost always elicit a response—from staff at all levels
in an organization—and they are therefore a good basis for discussion. A key issue con-
cerns the degree of consensus in the responses of those who are asked. If everyone agrees,
then action may be rapid. However, if rapid action is not necessary in the circumstances,
it can be useful to deliberately orchestrate a challenge to the consensus. That challenge
could reinforce the consensus view, or it could prompt a reconsideration of “taken for
granted” assumptions. A low degree of consensus prompts further attention to the organi-
zation’s goals, on the grounds that commitment to action should have a reasonably broad
base of agreement, at least concerning the first two questions. Agreement on the third
question may be desirable but is not necessary as long as there is commitment to support
the formal decision on the course of action to be taken.
Gap analysis is flexible with regard to focus and timescale. The first question can relate
to the organization as a whole, or to one or more divisions. If appropriate, it can address a
range of other specific issues: where are we now with regard to staff engagement, updat-
ing our information systems, developing new product lines, streamlining our procurement
processes, and so on. The second question may ask, where do we want to get to in six
months, or two years, or five years, and so on. The simplicity and flexibility of this tool
make it both easy to use and powerful.
As a change diagnostic, this can be a helpful way of establishing a change agenda
(what do we need to do in order to get there?) that has been explored in depth and that is
understood by those involved. Through open discussion, the resultant agenda can gain a
high degree of consensus, but the disagreements that have been aired will also be known
and understood. One problem with gap analysis is that it often suggests a felt need for
deep, transformational change (see figure 1.1, p. 18), which immediately generates an
overwhelming and potentially resource-intensive agenda.
PESTLE Framework PESTLE is an environmental scanning tool, which provides a structured method for organiz-
ing and understanding complex trends and developments across the political, economic, social,
technological, legal, and ecological factors that can affect an organization. Figure 4.4 shows a
typical PESTLE analysis. This is an illustration, and is not comprehensive. The tidy categories in
the figure can overlap in practice; legislative changes may be politically motivated, and ecologi-
cal concerns reflect changing social values and preferences. The point of the analysis, however,
is to identify the environmental factors that may affect the organization now and in the future.
Environmental complexity makes prediction hazardous. We can predict demographic
trends with some accuracy, with respect to mortality, and gender and age profiles. We can
normally predict economic trends with some confidence in the short to medium term—say
two to three years. Trends in social values and lifestyles, politics, technological innovation,
or the impact of new technology cannot be predicted with much confidence—although
that does not stop journalists and others from making the attempt. Predicting geopolitical
events, such as terrorist attacks and wars, is even more difficult. PESTLE analysis thus
relies heavily on informed guesswork and judgement.
As a change diagnostic, the environmental audit that PESTLE produces can be used to
guide strategic decision making and contingency planning, to exploit opportunities, and to
address potential threats and risks (Morrison and Daniels, 2010). The resultant agenda may
involve immediate change initiatives and can also include longer-term change planning.
110 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
FIGURE 4.4 PESTLE Analysis
Political:
government policy, ideology
geopolitical events, war
civil unrest, political instability
terrorism, non-state groups
interest groups
trade union policies and activities
Economic:
economic growth patterns
competitor behavior
supplier behavior
raw material prices
currency exchange rates
tax regime
wage rates
Social:
demographic trends
lifestyle preferences
social values
attitudes to work
discrimination trends
labor mobility
skills availability
The
organization
Technological: Legal: Ecological:
computing power and costs
new products, new facilities
engineering innovations
new materials
Internet trading
new production methods and
processes
innovation in transport
specific laws
European harmonization, of
legislation and taxation
international law
international trade agreements
human rights
local regulations, by-laws
environmental concerns,
protecting countryside and
shoreline
reducing toxic emissions,
pollution, spills
regulations concerning use of
certain techniques, e.g., genetic
modification of food
hazard prevention
noise pollution
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 111
Scenario Planning Scenario planning involves the imaginative development of one or more likely pic-
tures of the characteristics of the possible futures for an organization sometimes, but
not necessarily, considering “best-case/worst-case” possibilities. The organization can
then plan an appropriate response to those futures (Verity, 2003). Recent concerns with
regard to geopolitical risks have made scenario planning more popular (see “Scenario
Planning in a High-Risk World, to 2018”). The results of a PESTLE analysis can of
course contribute to scenario development. The Royal Dutch/Shell Company was
responsible for developing scenario planning in the 1970s, and this tool is thus also
known as the “Shell method.”
For example, the consultancy company PricewaterhouseCoopers used scenario plan-
ning to explore the future of work (Arkin, 2007). They developed three possible scenarios
for 2020:
Orange world Big companies have been replaced by networks of small, specialized
enterprises. People work on short-term contracts, exploring job
opportunities online through portals developed by craft guilds.
Green world Demographic change, climate, and sustainability are key business
drivers. Employment law, employee relations, and corporate respon-
sibility are vital in this heavily regulated environment.
Blue world Huge corporations are like mini-states, providing staff with housing,
health, education, and other welfare benefits. Human capital metrics are
sophisticated, and people management is as powerful as finance.
As a change diagnostic, scenario planning encourages creative “blue skies” decision
making, to identify the most probable futures for the organization. This analysis then
forms the basis for prioritizing, planning, and acting to implement appropriate changes.
Chapter exercise 4.2 invites you to carry out a scenario planning exercise for an organiza-
tion with which you are familiar.
Scenario Planning in a High-Risk World, to 2018
The Economist Intelligence Unit (Mitchell, 2008)
surveyed 600 global executives in 2008 and asked
them which risks were the most threatening to their
business over the next decade, to 2018. The top 12
risks that concerned these executives were:
Increase in protectionism
Major oil price shock
Collapse in asset prices
Emergence of a disruptive business model
International terrorism
Unexpected regulatory change
Global recession
Instability in the Middle East
Increased competition from emerging-market
companies
Talent shortages
Climate change
Increased industrial pollution
Only 26 percent said that they used scenario
planning regularly, 41 percent used it on an ad hoc
basis, and 29 percent said that they would be using
it in future.
112 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
Elements of Strategy Strategy is often considered to be at the heart of change because it addresses the basic issues
with which an organization has to deal: what are we seeking to achieve, and how? Strategy
and change intersect because strategies can change (“change of strategy”) and change may
be necessary in order to realize a set strategy (“change for strategy”). Donald Hambrick and
James Fredrickson (2001) developed a framework that characterizes organization strategy in
terms of five mutually reinforcing elements: arenas, vehicles, differentiators, staging, and eco-
nomic logic (table 4.2). Misalignment of these elements indicates a potential need for change.
From this perspective, only when all five strategic elements have been determined is
it possible to assess the structures and systems that will be appropriate to pursuing the
strategy. However, before moving to this stage, it is important to test the quality of the pro-
posed strategy. Hambrick and Fredrickson (2001) suggest the six “key evaluation criteria”
explained in table 4.3.
As a change diagnostic, therefore, this analysis identifies the organizational changes
that are necessary in order to pursue a desired strategy. If for any reason (cost, time, exper-
tise) those changes are difficult or impossible to implement, then the strategy may have to
be reconsidered. This approach can also help to generate an integrated package of change
initiatives that are mutually self-reinforcing, and which are aligned with organization
TABLE 4.2 The Elements
of Strategy
1. Arenas: What business will we be in? Which product categories? Which market segments? Which geographic areas? Which core technologies? Which value-creation stages?
2. Vehicles: How will we get there? Internal development? Joint ventures? Licensing/franchising? Acquisitions?
3. Differentiators: How will we win in the marketplace? Image? Customization? Price? Styling? Product reliability?
4. Staging Speed of expansion? Sequence of initiatives?
5. Economic Logic Lowest costs through scale advantage? Lowest costs through scope and replication advantage? Premium prices due to unmatchable service? Premium prices due to proprietary product features?
Source: Academy of Management Executive, Hambrick and Fredrickson © 2001 by the Academy of Management (NY). Reproduced with
permission of Academy of Management (NY) in the format Textbook via Copyright Clearance Center.
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 113
strategy. While integration and alignment may sound like straightforward advice, this can
often be difficult to achieve in practice. For example, problems can arise when changes
that are optimal for one division of the organization undermine activities and changes in
other divisions (see point 5 in table 4.3 about spreading resources too thinly).
The Strategic Inventory Strategy is about the future, committing resources to activities based on “assumptions,
premises and beliefs about an organization’s environment (society and its structure,
the market, the customer, and the competition), its mission, and the core competencies
needed to accomplish that mission” (Picken and Dess, 1998, p. 35). These assumptions,
premises, and beliefs, often formed over time through experience, become a “men-
tal grid” through which new information is sifted and interpreted. To the extent that
this grid comprises assumptions and beliefs that accurately reflect the environment, the
quality of strategic decision making is enhanced. However, when assumptions fail to
reflect key elements of the business environment, they can lead to the adoption of inap-
propriate strategies, a phenomenon known as “strategic drift.”
As a change diagnostic, identifying and validating management’s strategic assumptions
can be useful in assessing whether or not strategy is consistent with key elements of the
TABLE 4.3 Testing the
Quality of Your
Strategy: Key
Evaluation
Criteria
Key Evaluation Criteria
1. Does your strategy fit with what’s going on in the environment? Is there a healthy profit potential where you’re headed? Does strategy align with the key success factors of your chosen environment?
2. Does your strategy exploit your key resources? With your particular mix of resources, does this strategy give you a good head start on your competitors? Can you pursue this strategy more economically than competitors?
3. Will your envisaged differentiators be sustainable? Will competitors have difficulty matching you? If not, does your strategy explicitly include a ceaseless regimen of innovation and opportunity creation?
4. Are the elements of your strategy internally consistent? Have you made choices of arenas, vehicles, differentiators, staging, and economic logic? Do they all fit and mutually reinforce each other?
5. Do you have enough resources to pursue this strategy? Do you have the money, managerial time and talent, and other capabilities to do all that you envision? Are you sure you’re not spreading your resources too thinly, only to be left with a collection of weak positions?
6. Is your strategy implementable? Will your key constituencies allow you to pursue this strategy? Can your organization make it through the transition?
Are you and your management team able and willing to lead the required changes?
Source: Academy of Management Executive, Hambrick and Fredrickson © 2001 by the Academy of Management (NY). Reproduced with
permission of Academy of Management (NY) in the format Textbook via Copyright Clearance Center.
114 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
TABLE 4.4 The Strategic
Inventory
Defining the boundaries of the competitive environment What are the boundaries of our industry? What is our served market? What products or services do we provide? Who are the customers? Who are the noncustomers? What is the difference between them? Who are our competitors? Who are the noncompetitors? What makes one firm a competitor and the other not? What key competencies are required to compete in this industry? Where is the value added?
Defining the key assumptions Who is our customer? What kinds of things are important to that customer? How does he or she perceive us? What kind of relationships do we have? Who is the ultimate end user? What kinds of things are important to this end user? How does he or she perceive us? What kind of relationship do we have? Who are our competitors? What are their strengths and weaknesses? How do they perceive us? What can we learn from them? Who are the potential competitors? New entrants? What changes in the environ- ment or their behavior would make them competitors?
Assumptions and Strategy Strategic Drift and the Beech Starship
In the early 1980s, Raytheon Co. acquired Beech, a
light-aircraft company that had fallen on hard times.
The managers appointed by Raytheon proposed to
reinvigorate Beech by producing an advanced tur-
boprop aircraft based on the latest carbon-fiber
technology. It was expected that this technology
would enable Beech to compete at the lower end
of the business jet market, with a product that was
60 percent the price of competitors as well as being
more fuel efficient. An 85 percent scale model “Star-
ship” was built and, on the basis of good reviews,
Beech announced that it would invest in a new fac-
tory to make the plane, which would be ready for
sale in two years (Picken and Dess, 1998).
This initiative was based on several assumptions:
1. That Beech could complete the design of the
new aircraft and get Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) certification within two years.
2. That the new carbon-fiber technology would not
be a significant problem, even though it was not
covered by the existing regulations.
3. That sufficient aircraft would be built to justify
the expenditure on a new factory.
However, the FAA had never certified an all-
composite aircraft and insisted on compliance
with the standards for metal aircraft. This led to
a redesign, which increased the weight, which
required a bigger engine, which needed more
fuel, which meant more weight, which meant fur-
ther redesign, and so on. Eventually, the Starship
made it to market, but it was four years late, car-
ried only 6 passengers rather than 10, and cruised
at 335 knots instead of 400. The price advantage
over jets had also disappeared. The expected
demand failed to materialize, and the production
line was closed.
business environment. This assessment can then identify whether an organization’s strat-
egy should be a focal point for change. To establish the degree of consensus on domi-
nant strategic assumptions, Joseph Picken and Gregory Dess (1998) developed a “strategic
inventory” (table 4.4).
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 115
What is the industry’s value chain? Where is value added? What is the cost struc- ture? How does our firm compare? How about our competitors? What technologies are important in our industry? Product technologies? Production technologies? Delivery and service technologies? How does our firm compare? How about our competitors? What are the key factors of production? Who are the suppliers? Are we dependent on a limited number of sources? How critical are these relationships? How solid? What are the bases for competition in our industry? What are the key success fac- tors? How do we measure up? How about our competitors? What trends and factors in the external environment are important to our industry? How are they likely to change? Over what time horizon? Are we able, in assessing our knowledge and assumptions, to separate fact from assumption?
Is our assumption set internally consistent? For each pair of assumptions, can we answer “yes” to the question: “If assumption A is true, does assumption B logically follow?”
Do we understand the relative importance of each of our assumptions? In terms of its potential impact on performance? In terms of our level of confidence in its validity? In terms of the likelihood and expectation of near-term change? In terms of its strategic impact?
Are our key assumptions broadly understood? Have we documented and communicated our key assumptions? To our key manag- ers? To the boundary-spanners? To other key employees?
Do we have a process for reviewing and validating our key assumptions and premises?
Is there a process in place? Are responsibilities assigned? Are periodic reviews
planned and scheduled?
Picken and Dess (1998) suggest that, where there is consensus on strategic assump-
tions, the organization should seek an independent validation, to check for biases. Where
significant divergence exists, attention should focus on which (and whose) assump-
tions are currently embedded in strategy, and which (and whose) can again be indepen-
dently validated. The strategic inventory involves a more sophisticated analysis than
that provided by the widely used SWOT approach to understanding an organization’s
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. The danger with SWOT analysis is
that it becomes a listing not of strengths but “perceived strengths,” not weaknesses but
“perceived weaknesses,” and so on. It may simply capture existing beliefs, the current
dominant logic, which may need to be challenged in order to improve organizational
performance.
The Cultural Web Organization culture is often seen as a response to performance problems and is a
component of many change diagnostics. Gerry Johnson (1998; Johnson et al., 2013)
116 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
describes organization culture in terms of a “cultural web” that has seven elements
(figure 4.5):
1. The paradigm: The set of assumptions commonly held throughout the organization
with respect to basic elements of the business such as what business we’re in, how we
compete, who our competitors are.
2. Rituals and routines: These concern how organizational members treat each other and,
perhaps more importantly, associated beliefs as to what is right and proper and valued
in this regard.
3. Stories: As told by organization members, stories are a form of oral history and com-
municate and reinforce core elements of the culture.
4. Symbols: Logos, office design, dress style, language use, and other symbols convey
aspects of the culture.
5. Control systems: What is valued in the organization is communicated through what is
measured and rewarded.
6. Power structures: These concern the most influential management groups in the
organization.
7. Organizational structure: The formal and informal differentiation and integration
of tasks.
As a change diagnostic, Johnson (1998; Johnson et al., 2013) describes the value of
“mapping” the organization’s cultural web. First, exposing issues that are rarely discussed
is a useful way of questioning traditional norms and habits. If what is taken for granted
is never questioned, then change will be difficult. Second, cultural mapping can highlight
potential barriers to change. Third, it may also be possible through this approach to iden-
tify aspects of the culture that are especially resistant to change. Fourth, a culture map
FIGURE 4.5 The Cultural
Web
Source: Based on Johnson (1998).
Stories Symbols
Rituals and
Routines The
Paradigm Power
Structures
Organizational
Structures Control
System
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 117
can be the basis for considering the changes that will be necessary to pursue a new strat-
egy. Finally, practical ideas for managing those changes can then be developed.
The unit of analysis for the cultural web is the organization as a whole. The change
manager with a specific initiative in a particular division, therefore, may not find this
approach helpful in identifying ways to increase the probability of success of that change
project.
LO 4.3 Diagnosing Readiness for Change
The diagnostics that we have discussed so far have been designed to help decide whether
or not an organization has to change, and if so, to determine what has to change. It is
often appropriate to ask two other sets of questions before pressing ahead with imple-
mentation. First, is the organization as a whole receptive to change? We will explore
this question through the concepts of the receptive organizational context, absorptive
capacity, and the innovative organization. We will also discuss the technique of force-
field analysis to assess how receptive an organization is to a particular change. Chapter
exercise 4.3 offers another readiness diagnostic. Second, are those who will be affected
ready for these changes? In this section, therefore, we will explore both organizational
receptiveness (or readiness) and individual readiness (or receptiveness) to change. The
aim, of course, is not simply to establish levels of organizational and individual readi-
ness. Understanding why readiness may be low is a platform for remedial action, to
strengthen receptiveness and readiness where appropriate.
The Receptive Organizational Context Organizations vary in their receptiveness to change. This variation depends on a num-
ber of conditions (Eccles, 1984):
1. Is there pressure for change?
2. Is there a shared vision of the goals, benefits, and direction?
3. Do we have effective liaison and trust between those concerned?
4. Is there the will and power to act?
5. Do we have enough capable people with sufficient resources?
6. Do we have suitable rewards and defined accountability for actions?
7. Have we identified actionable first steps?
8. Does the organization have a capacity to learn and to adapt?
Where the answers to these questions are “yes,” organizational receptiveness is high,
and resistance to change is likely to be limited. However, without pressure, clear goals,
trust, power to act, resources, and so on, receptiveness is likely to be low, and the
changes will be more difficult to implement. It is important to note that an organiza-
tion as a whole may be more or less receptive to change, regardless of the attitudes of
individual members.
This simple receptiveness diagnostic highlights two practical issues. The first is timing.
Some conditions (growing pressure, for example) may improve simply by waiting. The
118 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
second concerns action, to strengthen the conditions when receptiveness is low. Remedial
actions could involve:
Ensuring that the rationale for change is strong and understood.
Articulating a clear vision of goals and benefits.
Confidence-building measures to develop interpersonal and interdivisional trust.
Ensuring that key positions are held by dynamic, high-performing individuals.
Developing change management capabilities across the organization.
Providing adequate resources (people, technology, training) to support the proposed
changes.
Aligning performance management and reward systems with change goals.
Clearly establishing the initial action plan.
Developing learning organization capabilities.
The key point is that organizational receptiveness to change can be managed, by
taking steps to change the conditions that lower receptiveness. Most of those steps are
cost-neutral.
Absorptive Capacity Wesley Cohen and Daniel Levinthal (1990) developed the related concept of “absorptive
capacity,” which they defined as the ability of an organization to value, to assimilate,
and to apply new knowledge. Absorptive capacity depends on an organization’s exist-
ing stock of knowledge and skills, and a “learning organization culture” with leader-
ship and norms that support the acquisition, sharing, and application of new ideas. From
their comprehensive review of work on this abstract and complex concept, Shaker Zahra
and Gerard George (2002, p. 185) redefine absorptive capacity as “a dynamic capabil-
ity pertaining to knowledge creation and utilization that enhances a firm’s ability to
gain and sustain a competitive advantage.” They argue that absorptive capacity has four
dimensions:
1. Acquisition: The ability to find and to prioritize new knowledge and ideas quickly and
efficiently.
2. Assimilation: The ability to understand new knowledge and to link it to existing
knowledge.
3. Transformation: The ability to combine, convert, and recodify new knowledge.
4. Exploitation: The ability to use new ideas productively.
Acquisition depends on the organization’s external links and networks, which are often
available only to a small number of professional staff and senior management. Assimila-
tion, transformation, and exploitation rely more on internal capabilities, relationships, and
systems. These four dimensions can also be managed. Actions to increase an organiza-
tion’s absorptive capacity include widening the exposure of staff to external networks;
the use of job rotation and cross-functional teams to encourage the sharing of knowledge
and ideas across organizational boundaries; wider employee participation in management
decision making; and relaxing rules, procedures, and routines that stifle exploration and
experimentation (Jansen et al., 2005). Once again, many of these actions are cost-neutral.
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 119
The Innovative Organization A related perspective on receptiveness to change has focused on innovative organiza-
tions. Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1983; 1989) makes a distinction between integrative and
segmentalist organization structures and cultures. Integrative structures and cultures
display the following features:
Holistic problem-solving
Team orientation
Cooperative environment
Mechanisms for ideas generation and exchange
Sense of purpose and direction
Ability to overthrow history and precedent
Use of internal and external networks
Person- and creation-centered
Results-oriented
Segmentalist organizations, in contrast, are characterized by the compartmentalization
of problem-solving and a preoccupation with hierarchy, efficiency, and rules. Segmentalist
organizations, Kanter argues, are “innovation smothering,” and integrative organizations
are “innovation stimulating.” It is usually not difficult to identify innovation smoth-
ering and stimulating cultures by observing both the physical features of the organiza-
tion (layouts, color schemes) and staff behavior; see “Charlie’s Angels and the Red Star
Corporation.”
If we understand the features of an organization that respectively stimulate and smother
creativity and innovation, then we can start to change or remove those that smother and
strengthen those that stimulate. Table 4.5 illustrates the features to look for. These are not
comprehensive lists, and you will be able to identify other stimulating and smothering
features yourself, by observation.
Charlie’s Angels and the Red Star Corporation
We are going to ask you to watch part of the movie
Charlie’s Angels (Columbia Pictures, directed by
Joseph McGinty Nichol [“McG”], 2000). Charlie’s
Angels are three private investigators on a mission
to rescue a billionaire who has been kidnapped for
his sophisticated software skills. Go to DVD track
14, where Alex (played by Lucy Liu), masquerad-
ing as an “efficiency expert,” leads the Angels
into the Red Star Corporation headquarters, in an
attempt to penetrate their security systems. Watch
this sequence until the end of Alex’s presentation,
when she says, “Better yet, can anyone show me?”
As you watch this short clip, consider the following
questions:
Is this an organization that stimulates or smoth-
ers creativity and innovation?
How do you know? Identify the clues, visual
and spoken, that support your assessment of
the Red Star organization culture.
What general characteristics of innovative
organizations are illustrated here?
120 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
TABLE 4.5 Organizational Features That Stimulate and Smother Innovation
Stimulating Innovation Smothering Innovation
No boundaries Large organization
Flat organization structure Many layers of management
Small unit size Risk aversion, negativity
Fast approval processes Closed-door policy
Empowerment of staff Bureaucracy
Cross-functional teams Controlled environment
Job rotation Cumbersome approval processes
Flexible career paths Too many procedure manuals
Supportive rewards and recognition Segregation—keeping groups apart
Management backing for innovation Avoid competition
Allocation of resources, including time Encourage mediocrity, “good enough” is OK
Sharing information Perfectionism, “not good enough” is punished
Positive culture that celebrates successes “We’ve tried that before, we know best”
Encourage creative processes, brainstorming Inadequate resources
Allowed to take risks and make mistakes Overload, stress, burnout, people leaving
Focus on results and not methods Emphasize the urgent, not the important
Exploit problems to create opportunities Culture of blame, recriminations for failure
Links to external organizations and events Inward looking
Weekend retreats, informal, out of office No resources for training and development
Rules for Stifling Innovation
Rosabeth Moss Kanter (2002) instructs manage-
ment on how to stifle innovation:
Regard a new idea from below with suspicion,
because it’s new, and because it’s from below.
Insist that people who need your approval to
act first go through several other levels of man-
agement to get their signatures.
Ask departments or individuals to chal-
lenge and criticize each others’ proposals. That
saves you the job of deciding; you just pick the
survivor.
Express criticism freely, and withhold praise.
That keeps people on their toes. Let them know
that they can be fired at any time.
Treat identification of problems as signs of fail-
ure, to discourage people from letting you know
when something in their area isn’t working.
Control everything carefully. Make sure people
count anything that can be counted, frequently.
And above all, never forget that you, the
higher-ups, already know everything important
about this business.
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 121
Force-Field Analysis Force-field analysis is a popular diagnostic, developed in the mid-twentieth century
by Kurt Lewin (1943; 1951). As a change diagnostic, this tool has two main purposes.
First, it can be used to assess whether or not an organization is ready for a particular
change initiative. Second, if readiness or receptiveness is low, force-field analysis can
help to identify and prioritize the preparation or “groundwork” that may be required
before implementation can begin. The analysis involves identifying the forces that are
respectively driving and restraining movement toward a given set of outcomes, called
the “target situation.” The “field” is usually drawn like this:
Target Situation: Develop Customer-Orientation
Driving Forces Restraining Forces
Static sales Difficult to recruit capable sales staff
Increasingly aggressive competition High turnover among part-time staff
Rising number of customer complaints Trained and capable staff are “poached”
Brand being criticized on social media Our competitors face similar problems
New chief executive supports this move Cost of customer relationships training
This example is artificial, to illustrate the approach. It is unusual, for example, to have
the same number of forces on the driving side as on the restraining side. Having con-
structed the field, the forces that have been identified can each be weighted or scored, say
from 1 (weak) to 10 (strong), to produce a rough calculus to the balance of forces. This
scoring procedure can give the analysis a false image of quantified rigor. More important
than the forces and their scores is the discussion that produces the analysis. Who conducts
this analysis is thus also important, often a project team or steering group. The underpin-
ning discussion can expose wide differences in perception, both of the forces in play, and
of their strength. The debate helps either to resolve those differences, or at least to allow
those involved to know how their opinions vary, and how those differences have arisen.
If the driving forces are overwhelming, then the change can go ahead without signifi-
cant problems. If the restraining forces are overwhelming, then the change may have to
be abandoned, or delayed until conditions have improved. However, if the driving and
restraining forces are more or less in balance, then the analysis can be used to plan appro-
priate action. The extent to which the force field is balanced is a matter of judgement.
Used in a group setting, this method helps to structure what can often be an untidy discus-
sion covering a wide range of factors and differing perceptions.
Managing a balanced force field to promote movement toward the target situation
involves the following considerations:
1. Increasing the driving forces can often result in an increase in the resisting forces. This
means that the current equilibrium does not change, but instead is maintained with
increased tension.
2. Reducing the resisting forces is preferable, as this allows movement toward the desired
outcomes or target situation without increasing tension.
3. Group norms are an important force in resisting and shaping organizational change.
122 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
Individual Readiness for Change Individual readiness for change is a predisposition, perhaps even impatience, to welcome
and embrace change. Where individual readiness is high, change may be straightforward.
But when readiness is low, as with organizational receptiveness, some “groundwork” may
be required to increase levels of change readiness among those who are going to be affected.
Rafferty et al. (2013) view change readiness as an individual attitude that has both cog-
nitive and emotional (or “affective”) dimensions. “Collective readiness” for change, of a
group or organization, is based on the shared beliefs that develop through social interac-
tion and shared experiences. Underpinning an individual’s change readiness, therefore, are
five beliefs:
1. Discrepancy: The belief that change is needed.
2. Appropriate: The belief that the proposed change is an appropriate response.
3. Efficacy: The individual’s perceived capability to implement the change.
4. Principal support: The belief that the organization (management, peers) will provide
resources and information.
5. Valence: The individual’s evaluation of the personal costs and benefits; no benefits, no
overall positive evaluation of readiness.
Individual change readiness is demonstrated through support for, openness toward, and
commitment to change. These attitudes and behaviors can be influenced by three sets of factors.
The first concerns external pressures, including industry and technology changes, new
regulations, and professional group memberships. The second set of factors concerns what
Rafferty et al. (2013) call “internal context enablers,” including change participation and
communication processes, and leadership. The third set of factors concern personal char-
acteristics and include needs, values, and traits such as self-confidence, risk tolerance,
dispositional resistance to change, and self-efficacy.
From a change management perspective, therefore, individuals’ readiness for change can
be assessed and can also be influenced. With regard to increasing readiness, research evidence
points in particular to the power of the internal enablers. Individual readiness for change can
be influenced by processes that are designed to enhance participation in decisions, by high-
quality change communications, and by perceptions of the organization’s history of change
(previous experience, support for change, congruence of values). Again, there are practical
steps that change managers can take in order to increase the probability that a change initia-
tive will be welcome and successful—and most of those steps involve little or no expenditure.
Stakeholder Analysis Another approach to assessing individual readiness for change involves stakeholder
analysis, which focuses on the positions of key stakeholders. A stakeholder is any-
one who is likely to be affected by an organizational change or program of changes,
and who can influence the outcomes, directly or indirectly. Those stakeholders may be
members of the organization, or of external groups and agencies, including other orga-
nizations. Stakeholder analysis usually involves the following steps:
1. Identify the stakeholders for the change initiative under consideration. Stakeholders
may have a formal connection to the organization: owners, managers, suppliers, cus-
tomers, employees. However, other individuals and groups are often able to exert influ-
ence: regulatory bodies, financial institutions, local government officials.
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 123
2. Establish what each of those stakeholders expects to gain or lose if the changes go
ahead, and their respective power to support or block the initiative.
3. Check each stakeholder’s “track record” with regard to comparable issues. Were they
supportive, or not? If possible, identify what position your stakeholders are taking with
regard to the current change. Behaviors are more significant than attitudes. Those who
say that they are supporters may quickly switch their views in the face of difficulties.
Equally, however, those who are initially hostile to the change may become supportive
if they believe that the change will happen and be of benefit to them.
4. Use the planned benefits of the change to strengthen support for the proposals. It is
often possible to find ways to address the concerns of those who feel they will lose out,
by altering the nature of the changes proposed, perhaps, or by offering to reduce their
losses in other ways.
The levels of stakeholders’ power can be plotted against their interests, as shown in
the “power-interest matrix” in figure 4.6. Action to manage the stakeholders for a given
change initiative can then be based on this matrix (Grundy, 1997):
Can new stakeholders be added to change the balance?
Can oppositional stakeholders be encouraged to leave?
Can the influence of pro-change stakeholders be increased?
Can the influence of antagonistic stakeholders be decreased?
Can the change be modified in a way that meets concerns without undermining the
change?
If stakeholder resistance is strong, should the proposal be revisited?
Stakeholder analysis informs change managers about the likely responses of key stake-
holders, and steps can then be taken to manage those stakeholders, to weaken opposition
and strengthen support.
It seems to be clear that, with regard to both organizational receptiveness to change and
individual readiness to change, the change manager does not have to accept the diagnosis.
There are practical—and often inexpensive—actions that can be taken to increase recep-
tiveness and readiness. The diagnostic approaches described in this section help to identify
what those actions could involve.
LEVEL OF INTEREST
Low
A
Minimal efort
B
Keep informed
C
Keep satisfied
D
Key players
High
Low
POWER
High
FIGURE 4.6 Power-Interest
Matrix
Source: Based on Grundy (1997).
124 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
LO 4.4 Built-to-Change
The observation that some organizations are simply better able to manage and implement
change than others has a long history. This notion of ability to change is different from assess-
ing whether an organization is ready to change or can absorb further change. For example,
from their study of the electronics sector in Scotland in the 1950s, Tom Burns and George
Stalker (1961) distinguished between mechanistic and organic management systems (what we
now call organization cultures). By mechanistic, they meant rigid and bureaucratic. Organic
systems, in contrast, are flexible and adaptable (or “agile”). Their main argument still holds:
mechanistic organizations perform well in stable environments, but in turbulent environments,
organic organizations perform better. As we discussed earlier, Kanter (1983) subsequently
“rediscovered” this argument in her distinction between “segmentalist” (mechanistic, bureau-
cratic) and “integrative” (organic, agile) cultures.
Echoing those previous arguments, Christopher Worley and Edward Lawler (2006)
note that many businesses are organized in ways that discourage change, and that this
is not consistent with the contemporary need for agility and adaptation. The competing
organizational need for stability and predictability leads to structures and management
practices that are designed to minimize variability and instability. The problem, they argue,
is that organizations are usually built to last. The answer is to design organizations that
are built-to-change, that are efficient in terms of today’s performance and also flexible in
responding to environmental trends and developments. The contrasts between traditional
and built-to-change organization designs are summarized in table 4.6.
TABLE 4.6 Traditional and “Built-to-Change” Organization Design Principles
Traditional Built-to-Change
Job descriptions that detail specific responsibilities Goal-setting reviews to identify what individuals and teams should achieve in the near future
Hire people with the capabilities for the job for which they have applied
Hire people with initiative, who like change, who are quick learners and want development
Employment contract based on expectations set out in job description
Employment contract stating that support for change is an expected condition of employment
Job-related skills training Ongoing training in skills to support change
Pay and rewards based on seniority and focused on individual job performance
Variety of rewards—bonuses, stock—for all staff, and group and unit bonuses linked to change
Pay for the job, and what it involves Pay for the person, and what they contribute
Specialist market research and environmental scan- ning staff/departments; most staff thus have an internal focus
Maximize the “surface area” of staff in touch with customers and environment; most staff thus have an external as well as an internal focus
Hierarchical structures Process-based, cross-functional network structures
Inflexible annual budgeting Costs controlled by profit centers
Quarterly/annual performance updates Transparent real-time performance information
Senior leaders set direction, give orders Shared leadership, all levels in the organization
Leadership development for the “stars” Leadership development for most staff
Source: Based on Worley and Lawler (2006).
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 125
The built-to-change organization uses design principles concerning talent management,
reward systems, organization structure, information and decision processes, and leader-
ship. This approach assumes that “continuous change is simply business as usual” (Worley
and Lawler, 2006, p. 23). This presents a challenge to conventional approaches to change
management, which assume the need for a planned organizational transition from one
state to another. However, if an organization can be inherently built-to-change, then the
processes and techniques of managing organizational change described in texts like this
one may only be required rarely and in extreme circumstances.
From a survey of 40 service and manufacturing sector organizations, Worley and
Lawler (2010, p. 2) conclude that any organization can develop agility, defined as “an
evolving change and design capability, a leadership challenge that is never finished, only
approached over time, but which yields consistently high levels of sustainable effective-
ness.” The organizations with consistently high performance had higher agility scores,
measured using the design principles in table 4.6.
Chapter exercise 4.1 describes one organization that has developed “built-to-change”
capabilities. Is this model effective, and is it more widely applicable?
Designed Not to Change
The reality is that today’s organizations were sim-
ply never designed to change proactively and
deeply—they were built for discipline and efficiency,
enforced through hierarchy and routinization. As
a result, there’s a mismatch between the pace of
change in the external environment and the fastest
possible pace of change at most organizations. If it
were otherwise, we wouldn’t see so many incum-
bents struggling to intercept the future.
Source: Hamel and Zanini (2014).
EXERCISE 4.1
The Capital
One Finan-
cial Story
As you read the following account, consider the following questions:
1. The “built-to-change” model has been promoted as desirable for most if not all orga- nizations. However, from a corporate management perspective, what are potential disadvantages of developing a built-to-change organization?
2. From the perspective of an individual employee, what are the benefits of working in a built-to-change organization?
3. For the individual employee, what are the potential disadvantages of working in a built-to-change organization?
4. Capital One Financial operates in a fast-moving sector. To what extent will built-to- change design principles apply to organizations in other industries, with different environments?
Capital One Financial was one of America’s largest financial services companies, with annual revenues of more than $20 billion, 45 million customer accounts, and around 40,000 employees. Worley and Lawler (2009) tell the story of how Capital One became a “built-to-change” organization by developing an “enterprise-wide change capabil- ity.” Like all financial services organizations, Capital One had to respond, frequently and
LO 4.4
(Continued)
126 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
rapidly, to regulatory changes and shifting market and economic conditions. To remain competitive, change had to be routine.
In an era when environments are changing faster and faster, the rhetoric on organi- zational effectiveness is clear: successful organizations must be more agile and adapt- able. Redesigning work processes, integrating acquired businesses, implementing large-scale information technology systems, and entering foreign markets are a few of the challenging changes companies are implementing. Any one of them can prove very difficult to accomplish—most estimates put the success rate for a large-scale organizational change at about 25–30 percent. Successfully implementing several of them in a short time period is virtually impossible. (Worley and Lawler, 2009, p. 245)
How did the company develop its change capability? Worley and Lawler (2009) iden-
tify four elements in Capital One’s approach, summarized in table 4.7.
TABLE 4.7 Capital One: Built-to-Change Elements
Element In Practice at Capital One
Focus on the future Analysts’ time spent on exploring future trends and implications
Momentary advantages
“Test and learn” approach to developing new income streams
Organizational flexibility
Hire people who like change, flat structures, vague job descrip- tions, decentralized decision making, pay for results, flexible performance management process, frequent reorganizations
Change capability Competencies related to change, and ability to change routinely
Recognizing the need for constant change, a small number of “high potential” staff were given training in leadership and change management. This was successful in gen- erating valuable change initiatives. However, this approach could not provide the enter- prise-wide change capability that the company believed was necessary. Management did not want to set up either a central corporate resource or a group whose members could be assigned to help business units implement change as needed. The solution was the “Building a Change Capability” (BCC) project, which had three components.
First, create “versatilist” line managers with the knowledge and skills to lead change; neither generalists nor specialists, these versatilists were able to accelerate the change process on their own initiative, without asking for help.
Second, to achieve simplicity and speed, Capital One decided to use a standard change methodology across the organization, replacing the 17 different models that were previously in use, along with 160 different tools. The chosen approach was the ADKAR model, which stands for creating Awareness, having the Desire, the Knowledge, and the Ability, and Reinforcement (Hiatt, 2006). This was easy for staff to understand and use, and was consistent with the previous change management training.
Third, two change courses were offered by the company’s corporate university, to explain the ADKAR model and identify change management behaviors. The model and other rel- evant materials were also disseminated through a change management portal on the com- pany intranet, with case studies, diagnostic tools, and templates with which to develop change and communication plans. The BCC project also meant that there would be no staff
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 127
EXERCISE 4.2
Scenario
Planning
Here is one structured methodology for scenario planning, for your own organization or for one with which you are familiar:
1. “Brainstorm” the range of environmental factors that have the potential to impact on the performance of your organization. In the spirit of brainstorming, accept all sugges- tions at this point, and suspend judgement as to the significance of any suggested factor.
2. Ask individuals to identify which factors from this list they believe to be the “key driv- ers” of the organization’s performance over a specified time period—say, five years.
3. Aggregating these individual responses, identify the five most commonly cited key driv- ers; these could be, for example, exchange rates, new technologies, entry by new com- petitors, mergers, competition for key staff, costs and/or shortages of raw materials.
4. Using these key drivers as the core elements, construct three future scenarios for the organization: the most likely, an optimistic scenario, and a pessimistic one. The “most likely” scenario is constructed on the basis of the “best guess” as to what will happen to each of the five key drivers over the specified time frame. Note that “best guess” does not imply a casual approach; best guess can be based on sophisticated market intelligence and forecasting. The “optimistic” and “pessimistic” scenarios focus atten- tion on how the organization might respond to each of those outcomes. The con- struction of the scenarios requires skill, and it is not uncommon for organizations to employ external consultants who are experienced in scenario development. Scenarios need to be compelling and plausible narratives, even if they are unlikely to happen. This is necessary if they are to form the basis of discussion concerning the organiza- tion’s response to those three possible futures.
5. Finally, outline the different organizational change agendas that will be required to deal with each of those three possible futures.
LO 4.3
in the human resource management function with full-time jobs dedicated to change man- agement, as the aim was to distribute those capabilities throughout the company.
BCC implemented several initiatives, including a large-scale systems conversion proj- ect, a human resources reengineering project, a system to measure and reward change management competencies, and a workplace redesign project called “Future of Work.” The outcome for Capital One was:
It does not “manage change” as if it were some unwanted intruder; it does not view change management as an afterthought to improve the chances of getting some key resistors to “buy into” a new initiative. Change is integrated into the way Capital One formulates strategy, structures itself, and measures and rewards performance. (Worley and Lawler, 2009, p. 245)
Success with this approach to change gave Capital One staff the confidence and desire to take on even more initiatives. Worley and Lawler (2009) argue that Capital One had effectively integrated change capabilities with business knowledge, creating a climate of continuous change. They offer three key learning points for other organizations. First, signal the commitment to developing change capability by providing training opportu- nities, and by rewarding the acquisition of change-related skills. Second, develop sup- portive organization structures and systems (table 4.6). Third, be prepared to learn from experience in the process of developing the organization’s capacity for change. Change capability, they conclude, is the “missing ingredient” in organizational effectiveness.
128 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
EXERCISE 4.3
Readiness
for Change
Analysis
The purpose of this diagnostic is to assess whether a specific organizational change ini- tiative, project, or program has been well planned. Before you begin this assessment process, therefore, you must agree on a description of the proposed change or changes:
You can carry out this assessment on your own, or with colleagues in the organiza- tion—your steering group or project team, for example. Study the following items and circle the appropriate number on the scale. The number that you circle should reflect your view of the quality of the work carried out on that item, with respect to this change, so far. Keep the agreed definition of the proposed change in mind throughout this analysis.
This is a generic assessment tool, and the wording may not apply directly to your organization. If you feel that an item is not relevant to your circumstances, either ignore it, or think of a way in which that item should be reworded to make it more appropriate.
If you are working on this assessment with other members of your program, project, or change management team, complete this analysis individually before sharing and discussing your scores. You may find that different team members see things differently. Exploration of those differences can be extremely valuable in developing a shared understanding of the proposals, and in determining where the action priorities lie.
LO 4.3
Source: This analysis is based on Woodcock and Francis (1992).
1. The change proposal has been financially justified as giving an adequate return on investment.
no financial justification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 full financial justification
2. The assumptions on which the financial justification is based have been fully defined.
assumptions not defined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 assumptions clearly defined
3. The costs of the proposed change have been realistically predicted—that is, all possible costs have been identified.
costs not identified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all costs identified
4. The costs of disruption to the present systems have been specifically identified.
disruption costs not identified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 disruption costs identified
5. The leadership of the proposed change has been identified.
change leaders not identified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 change leaders identified
6. The leaders of the proposed change are willing volunteers.
change leaders are not willing volunteers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 change leaders are willing volunteers
7. A comprehensive implementation plan for the proposed change has been prepared.
no comprehensive plan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 comprehensive plan prepared
The change proposal being considered is:
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 129
8. All of those who could comment on the plan have had adequate time to study it.
no adequate comment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 full comments available
9. Care has been taken to ensure that the risks inherent in the proposed change have been identified and assessed.
risks not identified or assessed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 risks identified and assessed
10. Outside comment from impartial specialists has been invited on the wisdom of the proposed change.
no external comment invited 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 comprehensive external comment invited
11. Consideration has been given to the new skills that will be required for the effective implementation of the proposed change.
no consideration of skills requirement
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 full consideration of skills requirement
12. All those who could inhibit or stop the proposed change have been identified.
potential blockers not identified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 potential blockers identified
13. A strategy has been devised for winning over all those who could inhibit or stop the proposed change.
no “winning over” strategy identified
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 comprehensive “winning over” strategy identified
14. The proposed change can be linked directly with the strategic plans of the organization.
no clear links with strategic plans 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 clear links with strategic plans
15. Those responsible for the proposed change have studied the nature and outcomes of similar initia- tives in other organizations.
no other organizations visited or reviewed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 several other organizations visited and reviewed
16. Although based on similar initiatives elsewhere, the need to tailor the proposed changes to the local context is recognized.
no allowances made for customization
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 realistic allowances made for customization
17. Clear success criteria and success measures have been identified.
no success criteria or measures identified
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 comprehensive success criteria and measures identified
18. Procedures have been established to help the organization learn from the experience of implement- ing these changes.
no learning procedures in place 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 comprehensive learning proce- dures in place
130 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
Scoring
Simply add the numbers that you have circled to produce a score between 20 and 140. If several members of your group or team have completed this analysis, then add all of their individual scores and calculate the average. What does the resultant score suggest?
20–40 Considerable anxiety should be experienced about the proposed changes.
41–80 Much work needs to be done to develop an effective change program.
81–100 The proposal is well developed, but change management can be improved.
101–140 This is a well-planned change proposal.
Action
Where are the main problems and blockages, and what can we do to address those? Identify those items that you scored with five points or less, or use the average item scores for the group or team as a whole. Select the five lowest-scoring items. Prioritize these, then brainstorm appropriate actions to address each of them in turn to improve readiness:
Problem Item Appropriate Actions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Blenko, M. W., Mankins, M. C., and Rogers, P. 2010. The decision-driven organization.
Harvard Business Review 88(6):54–62. Argues that links between organization structure and
performance are weak and that decision-making processes and decision quality are more
important. Offers a diagnostic based on links between structure, roles, culture, and decisions.
Gardini, M., Giuliani, G., and Marricchi, M. 2011. Finding the right place to start
change. Rome and Milan: McKinsey & Company. Argues the benefits of focusing ini-
tially on those staff groups who will have the most influence over the work that is going
Additional Reading
19. Top management is deeply committed to the success of the proposed changes.
no top management commitment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 full top management commitment
20. The overall leadership of the proposed change is able and willing to exercise decisive leadership.
uncertain overall leadership 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 superior overall leadership
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 131
to change; starting in this way can accelerate the change process and contribute to long-
term engagement.
Kanter, R. M. 2006. Innovation: The classic traps. Harvard Business Review 84(11):
73–83. Describes the steps that organizations need to take to become more flexible and
innovative; identifies the strategy, process, structural, leadership, and communications
mistakes that organizations typically make, and how to remedy these.
Miller, P., and Wedell-Wedellsborg, T. 2013. The case for stealth innovation. Harvard
Business Review 91(3):90–97. Argues that, if you have a great new idea, the advice that
you “get a mandate from the top” may be misguided. Better to innovate by stealth, “under
the radar,” until you have hard evidence and “proof of concept.”
Wilkinson, A., and Kupers, R. 2013. Living in the futures: How scenario planning changed
corporate strategy. Harvard Business Review 94(5):118–27. Describes how Shell developed
scenario planning in the 1960s and assesses the company’s use of the method. Finds that “a
sustained scenario practice can make leaders comfortable with the ambiguity of an open future.
It can counter hubris, expose assumptions that would otherwise remain implicit, contribute to
shared and systemic sensemaking, and foster quick adaptation in times of crisis” (p. 127).
This chapter has introduced a range of diagnostic tools that can contribute to the manage-
ment of change by providing a perspective on a range of organizational situations. Models
of “how organizations work” complement the implicit models that managers and others
have in their heads. No one model is “correct” or “best,” but each offers the opportunity to
view the organization from a particular perspective. Choice of approach is therefore likely
to be influenced by the image or images of change of those managers who are responsible
for making the decisions. The models, frameworks, and tools from this chapter are sum-
marized in table 4.8, which suggests when each may be useful.
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this
chapter, in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Understand the use of diagnostic models in planning organizational change.
We explained a number of organizational models: the six-box model, the 7-S frame-
work, the star model, and the four-frame model. Not difficult to apply in practice,
LO 4.1
Roundup
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
Do you feel that you now have knowledge of a
number of diagnostic tools/models?
Do you believe that you could apply those tools
and models when necessary?
If you were to select two or three favorite tools/
models, which would they be and why?
Is there a key area of organizational activity
where you would like a diagnostic tool that is
not provided in this chapter? Where might you
go to find such a tool?
To what extent do your image(s) of change influ-
ence which diagnostic tools you are most com-
fortable using or see as most relevant?
132 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
TABLE 4.8 Change Diagnostics and Their Uses: A Summary
Diagnostic Use When You Want To …
Six-box model Simplify the complexity, focus on key problems Be reminded of the systemic implications of actions in one area
7-S model Recognize interconnectedness Pay attention to the “soft” factors as well as structure and strategy
Star model Recognize interconnectedness and “knock on” effects Align your strategy, structure, people, processes, and rewards
Four-frame model See the organization through different lenses at the same time Generate deeper understanding to develop creative solutions
Gap analysis Develop a change agenda that addresses future conditions Generate understanding and consensus around the agenda
PESTLE framework Understand the impact of multiple environmental pressures Exploit future opportunities and deal with risks and threats
Scenario planning Encourage creative thinking and acceptance of uncertainty Prioritize, plan, and implement future-oriented changes
Elements of strategy Identify changes necessary to pursue a given strategy Develop an integrated package of self-reinforcing changes
Strategic inventory Clarify and validate strategic assumptions Decide what changes are necessary to drive strategy
Cultural web Map and understand the components of the organization culture Challenge the taken for granted and identify barriers to change
Receptive context Determine how receptive the organization is to change Decide action to increase receptiveness if necessary
Absorptive capacity Assess the organization’s ability to assimilate and apply new ideas Increase absorptive capacity with appropriate actions
Innovative organization Assess if the organization stifles or stimulates innovation Develop or strengthen innovative organization characteristics
Force-field analysis Assess the driving and restraining forces for a given change Manage the balance of forces to encourage the change
Readiness for change analysis Assess organizational and individual readiness for a given change Identify the “groundwork” needed before the change goes ahead
Individual readiness Assess individual readiness for a given change Take appropriate steps to increase individual readiness
Stakeholder analysis Identify how those affected could influence the change process Manage stakeholders given their power and their interest
Built-to-change model Ensure that change happens more quickly and smoothly Design an organization in which continuous change is routine
Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach 133
these models serve a number of purposes. They simplify complexity, highlight priori-
ties, identify interdependencies, provide a common language, and offer a guide to the
change implementation process.
Use strategic analysis tools to assess the need for organizational change.
We explained several strategic analysis tools: gap analysis, the PESTLE framework, sce-
nario planning, the elements of strategy framework, the strategic inventory, and the cul-
tural web. Gap analysis is a simple but powerful tool for assessing the need for change.
The other tools in this section generate more detailed assessments on need for and nature
of change, based on more in-depth questioning of current strategy and future goals.
Diagnose organizational receptiveness to and individual readiness for change, and use
those assessments as the basis for action to increase receptiveness and readiness.
We explored the features of the receptive organizational context, the concept of “absorp-
tive capacity,” and properties of the innovative organization. We identified the steps that
can be taken to strengthen receptiveness, to increase absorptive capacity, and to intro-
duce organization features that stimulate (rather than smother) creativity and innovation.
Force-field analysis can often be a useful technique in this respect. Organizational recep-
tiveness may be necessary but is not sufficient, and we also explored the factors that
influence individual readiness for change and how those can be influenced to strengthen
readiness. Stakeholder analysis can often be a useful framework in this context.
Explain the characteristics of the “built-to-change” organizational model, and assess
the applicability, strengths, and limitations of this approach.
We contrasted “traditional” principles of organization design with “built-to-change”
principles, concerning talent management, reward systems, organization structure,
information and decision processes, and leadership. In an organization that is “built-
to-change,” continuous change is “business as usual” and does not have to involve a
planned transition from one state to another. In short, the built-to-change model of the
organization challenges the conventional change management models and principles
described in this chapter. Given the design principles involved, any organization could
potentially develop the agility that “built-to-change” implies.
Debrief: Charlie’s Angels and the Red Star Corporation
Does the Red Star Corporation culture stimulate or smother innovation? Here is the
evidence:
Clues Implications
Straight rows of equally spaced desks facing in the same direction with identical tidy desktop layouts
Order, discipline, routine, standardization, regi- mentation, don’t “step out of line”
Absence of color, everything white, flat bright lighting
No distractions, no colors, no stimulations, focus on the task in hand
All-male workforce No diversity; these are software engineers, forgive them, it’s not their fault
LO 4.2
LO 4.4
LO 4.5
(Continued)
134 Chapter 4 What to Change? A Diagnostic Approach
A ditzy female administrator Even less diversity, women limited to subordinate “backroom” positions
Identical male office wear No freedom of expression, suppression of personal identity by “uniform”
Tiered formal lecture theatre One-way, top-down communication is the norm using this layout
Procedures reward mediocrity Radical thinking is discouraged
Managers reject ideas from below Don’t challenge your boss, keep those great ideas to yourself, you’ll only get into trouble
The general characteristics of organizational innovation illustrated here are:
1. We are all capable of generating creative, innovative ideas.
2. Organization culture and management style can smother creativity and innovation.
3. It sometimes takes an “external shock” (or person) to recognize the need to change the
organization culture, to become more innovative.
4. If you come up with a great idea, don’t tell me, show me.
Arkin, A. 2007. The generation game. People Management 13(24):24–27.
Blenko, M. W., Mankins, M. C., and Rogers, P. 2010. The decision-driven organization.
Harvard Business Review 88(6):54–62.
Bolman, L., and Deal, T. 2013. Reframing organizations: Artistry, choice, and leadership.
5th ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Burke, W. W. 2013. Organizational change: Theory and practice. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications.
Burns, T., and Stalker, G. M. 1961. The management of innovation. London: Tavistock
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Cohen, W. M., and Levinthal, D. A. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on
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Eccles, T. 1984. Succeeding with change: Implementing action-driven strategies. London:
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Galbraith, J., Downey, D., and Kates, A. 2002. Designing dynamic organizations.
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Gardini, M., Giuliani, G., and Marricchi, M. 2011. Finding the right place to start
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Grundy, T. 1997. Accelerating strategic change: The internal stakeholder dimension.
Strategic Change 6(1):49–56.
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137
2 Implementation: The Substance and Process of Change
CHAPTER 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
CHAPTER 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
CHAPTER 7 Change Communication Strategies
CHAPTER 8 Resistance to Change
CHAPTER 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
CHAPTER 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
The central theme of the six chapters in Part 2 is implementation. What is the substance
of the changes that are to be introduced? What is the vision for the organization’s future,
given the external environment, technology developments, regulatory changes, and other
trends? Is that vision interesting, exciting, compelling, motivating? Through what strate-
gies should the vision and substance of change proposals be communicated to the orga-
nization’s stakeholders? What is the nature of resistance and, if necessary, how should
that be managed to capture the potential benefits of competing ideas as well as to address
the concerns of the resisters? There are several approaches to change implementation,
each drawing on different theoretical perspectives, with different implications for prac-
tice. What are these approaches, what are their benefits and drawbacks, and how can the
change manager choose between them?
PART
139
What Changes— and What Doesn’t?
Learning objectives
On completion of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 5.1 Explain several different ways of categorizing different types of change
LO 5.2 Identify practical implications of different types of change for the change
manager
LO 5.3 Understand the difference between sustaining and disruptive innovation, and
explain the practical implications of this distinction for change management
LO 5.4 Assess the significance of organizational culture with regard to organizational
performance and reputation, and the role of leaders as culture architects
LO 5.5 Assess the potential impact of new digital technologies in general, and the
potential organizational benefits of applications of social media in particular
5Chapter
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140 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
LO 5.1 What Changes?
What changes? Well, anything and everything, from an individual’s job description, to
a whole organizational system, which could involve other organizations as well. Here
are some examples:
aspirations, attitudes to risk and innovation, budgeting procedures, business model, collabo-
ration and conflict, culture of the organization, downsizing, external relationships such as
partnerships and joint ventures, information systems, leadership and management style, loca-
tion and layout of facilities, manufacturing processes, materials used in products and service
delivery, merger or acquisition, pay and reward systems, performance appraisal and manage-
ment systems, performance targets, power bases, product design, role of customers/clients,
role of middle management, service delivery models, skill mix, staff engagement, structure
of the organization, success criteria, support services in-house or outsourced, teamwork,
technology, workforce composition, working practices
The short version of this list might say that what changes can include strategy, structure,
technology, systems and procedures, human resource management practices, internal and
external relationships, leadership style, and culture. These issues are not independent. In
practice, they are closely coupled and should be mutually reinforcing. They can, however,
be contradictory, which is also potentially damaging. Common contradictions include:
expecting high-performance teamwork while basing rewards on individual performance;
encouraging middle management autonomy while withholding vital performance
information;
demanding cross-functional information exchange in a strong “organizational silo”
structure;
combining a staff engagement policy with an autocratic top-down leadership style.
It is also apparent that changes in one domain may have “knock-on” or “ripple” effects,
creating or requiring changes in other areas. New technology, for example, is likely to
change skill mix requirements, working practices, rewards, and performance appraisal and
management systems, and may also require supportive changes in leadership and manage-
ment behavior. These examples of knock-on effects are obvious, but they emphasize that
“what doesn’t change?” is also a relevant issue. In practice, the ripples from even simple
changes in an organization can be difficult to predict, and thus difficult to manage. One
example concerns the redesign of working practices in one area, which leads to perfor-
mance improvements, which lead to pay increases for those involved, which trigger jeal-
ousy and anger in the areas which were not involved in the initiative. Extending the changes
to those other areas should reduce the tension, but the anger and perceived sense of betrayal
(why were we not chosen?) can be stored in the corporate memory for some time.
In sum, “what changes?” is a deceptively simple question, with a potentially complex
series of answers. There are several ways in which the content or the substance of change
can be categorized. For example, some changes are planned, while others are emergent.
Planned changes, as the term suggests, are those that are implemented in anticipation of,
or in response to, known trends and developments. Changes in motor vehicle engine design
and manufacturing methods (technology, materials, and working practices) are likely to be
prompted by changes in legislation regulating carbon emissions. Emergent changes are
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 141
What Changed at Barclays Bank?
The subprime mortgage crisis in 2008 had a major
impact on the financial services sector. In addition
to big losses, the sector faced tighter regulation
of their investment activities, which were seen as
aggressive and risky. Under its previous chief execu-
tive, Bob Diamond, Barclays Capital aspired to be
the largest investment bank in the world, and addi-
tional staff were hired to grow that part of the busi-
ness. But in 2012, it was revealed that staff were
manipulating the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate
(LIBOR), and Barclays was fined £290 million. The
chairman, chief executive, and chief operating offi-
cer left the bank in July. An internal review criticized
the investment business for its “win at all costs” cul-
ture that was arrogant and selfish and put financial
gain before customers (Salz, 2013).
The reputational damage from the LIBOR scan-
dal, and new regulatory requirements, meant a
different approach. Antony Jenkins was appointed
chief executive in 2012. In 2014, he announced the
following changes, triggering an immediate 8 per-
cent rise in the bank’s share price:
Aspirations “Capital” was dropped from the company name, which became just Barclays The “world leader” aim was abandoned, allowing Barclays to focus on the U.S. and UK markets, on Africa, and on a small number of Asian clients
Business model Barclays would no longer trade in physical commodities, or in esoteric “deriva- tive” products such as swaps and options, leveraged loans, and mortgage- backed securities The company would invest its own funds rather than those of its customers Investment banking would only account for 30 percent of the bank’s profits Focus on a narrower range of customers, rather than on high-risk lending
Culture “Customer first,” clarity, and openness became priority, with a focus on cus- tomer relationships replacing an aggressive short-term approach to growth, which rewarded commercial drive and winning, and created a culture of fear of not meeting targets; pay for investment bankers was cut
Downsizing Over three years, starting in 2014, branches were closed, and 19,000 jobs were cut, including many at the New York and London headquarters, staff in high street businesses (cashiers, branch managers), and 7,000 investment banking staff (some of whom were very high earners) Costs were cut by £1.7 billion in 2014
Technology More automation of transactions to reduce costs, with more customers banking online or on mobile devices; 30 completely automated branches were opened by 2014, with the loss of 6,500 cashiers—retrained as “digital eagles” with iPads, to help customers use the new computer systems
These changes were designed to create a leaner,
stronger, better balanced, and more focused busi-
ness, generating increased return on equity and bet-
ter rewards for shareholders. This was also designed
to restore customer confidence and trust, and the
bank’s reputation. Addressing the previous cultural
failings, an internal document, The Barclay’s Way:
How We Do Business, was published in 2013. This
emphasized ethics, fairness, and customer/client
relationships, and set out a values-driven code of
conduct based on respect, integrity, service, excel-
lence, and stewardship. (This account is based on
Aldrick, 2013; Arnold and Sharman, 2014; Costello
and Leroux, 2014; Goff, 2014; Treanor, 2014.)
142 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
those that just happen, or have to happen, in response to unforeseen events, such as the
sudden opening of new market opportunities, or accidents and failures, or major geopoliti-
cal developments. It is difficult to plan ahead for those events in other than very general
terms. As we discussed in chapter 2, it is possible to argue that emergent change is now
more common, given the complex, fluid, and unpredictable nature of the environment in
which most if not all of our organizations are operating (Weick, 2000). In contrast, much
of the practical advice on change implementation assumes a carefully considered and
planned approach.
We also need to distinguish between incremental change, which is gradual and small
scale, and transformational change, which is radical and groundbreaking, and can often
be rapid. There is a widespread perception today that organizational change up to the mid-
twentieth century was typically incremental and infrequent, and that from the late twenti-
eth century to the present, change has become more common and traumatic. However, as
noted in chapter 1, some commentators argue that radical, transformational change is not
new, but was also a feature of the first half of the twentieth century—if not before. But,
there is a more important question here: is too much attention now lavished on large-scale
transformational change, while the role of small-scale changes is overlooked?
Some commentators use the terms first-order change and second-order change to
describe the difference between incremental and transformational change (e.g., Coghlan
and Rashford, 2006).
First-order change involves a specific initiative that solves a problem, and/or makes
improvements, in ways that do not present a challenge to current methods and think-
ing. First-order change is adaptive and implies a degree of continuity and order. This is
captured in the expression, “change to stay the same” (Bate, 1994). The incorporation
of a growing range of safety features in motor vehicles—from seat belts to electronic
proximity sensors—is a series of first-order changes that improve the product without
making any major changes to it.
Second-order change leads to organizational transformation, by introducing new prod-
ucts, services, and ways of doing business, based on creative lateral thinking that alters
current core assumptions. Second-order change is disruptive and discontinuous, and is
captured in the expression, “move to get to a new position” (Bate, 1994). The develop-
ment of electric-powered self-driving motorcars, made by companies that are not con-
sidered to be in the automotive sector, is an example of second-order change.
David Coghlan and Nicholas Rashford (2006) also identify third-order change, based
on the habitual questioning of assumptions and points of view, contributing to what can
be a chaotic process of continual adaptation, self-renewal, and self-organization. What
will come after electric and driverless cars, and “phone app taxi services”? Walmart and
other retail supermarkets sell motorcars thus threatening established dealer networks. Given
current global trends in house prices, will property developers and real estate agents offer
discounted or free motorcars with house and apartment purchases as an inducement to cus-
tomers? Will dealers in congested cities (Beijing, London, Mumbai, New York) provide free
motorcycles with the cars that they sell, so that customers can make their own “park and
ride” arrangements to get to work? Will we continue to own cars anyway, or hire them when
we need them, ordering them by iPhone? These developments, and others more difficult to
predict, are examples of third-order change that, in some sectors, could become the norm.
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 143
The categories of change that we have discussed so far have involved simple dichoto-
mies (“either this or that type”), with third-order change offering another option. These
are helpful categories, but they may be too simplified to deal with the complex patterns of
contemporary organizational change. Depth is another metaphor that can be used to cat-
egorize different types of change, as shown in figure 5.1. At the bottom of this figure sits
the “small stuff” that may not even be regarded as “change.” Mid-scale includes “sustain-
ing innovation,” which involves improving on current practices. At the top of the scale is
“disruptive innovation,” which involves radically new business models and working meth-
ods (Christensen, 2000). It is not difficult to locate incremental and first-order change
(shallow, sustaining), second-order or transformational change (deep, strategic), or third-
order change (off the scale, disruptive) on this scale. The depth metaphor simply provides
a richer picture of the patterns of change that we are likely to see in most organizations.
What are the practical change management implications of these categories of change?
The first, and most obvious, implication concerns matching solutions with problems.
LO 5.2
FIGURE 5.1 Assessing Depth of Change
Of the scale Disruptive innovation
Frame-breaking, mould-breaking
Redraw dramatically organization and sector boundaries
Deeper
Deep change
Deeper
Change the mission, vision, values, the organization’s philosophy,
to symbolize a radical shift in thinking and behaviour, second-
order change
Sustaining
innovation
Improve business planning to symbolize a shift in thinking
Tighten up on documentation, reporting, controls
Shallow change
Incremental, fine tuning: cut costs, find e!ciencies, first-order
change
Constantly ‘nibble away’ making minor improvements
Not on the scale
Paradigm shift, strategic change, third-order change
New ways of thinking and solving problems, whole system change
New ways of doing business
Change the organization’s definition of success
Create new goals, objectives, targets
Reallocate resources
Grow some departments, cut others, create new units
“Sweat the small stuf”-quickly solve the minor annoying
problems that nobody has bothered to fix; “grease the wheels”
144 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
Despite the current fashion for deep transformational change, simple problems that are
well understood can usually be resolved with simple, shallow, incremental changes.
Addressing fundamental strategic opportunities and threats with fine-tuning, however, will
typically lead to disappointment.
A second implication concerns the nature of the change management task. The manage-
ment of shallow change typically requires less management capability and fewer resources
than implementing frame-breaking initiatives. The former are likely to involve few depar-
tures from the familiar, may be relatively low in both cost and perceived risk, and pose little
threat to the status quo with which people are comfortable. In contrast, deep, disruptive, or
“off the scale” change is often abrupt, painful, risky, and expensive and can stimulate stron-
ger and more widespread resistance, potentially creating a major management challenge.
A third practical issue concerns management reputation. Change management experience
and capability have become “core selection factors” for candidates seeking promoted posi-
tions in many organizations (Beeson, 2009). Candidates who can answer those interview
questions with accounts of the deep changes in which they have played a role are more likely
to be preferred to those whose previous roles have involved them in only shallow, incremen-
tal initiatives. We have only anecdotal evidence to suggest that deeper changes can often be
driven as much by personal career motives as by corporate need. Figure 5.1 can therefore
be read not just as a change typology, but also as a personal positioning tool for ambitious
change managers. Assess the profile of changes in which you are currently engaged. If this
involves shallow initiatives, explore how you can become involved with, or personally gen-
erate, deep changes that you can then discuss at the next job or promotion interview.
As discussed earlier, a lot of attention has been paid to deep, disruptive, transforma-
tional change. However, in most organizations, at any given time, changes are likely to be
taking place across the range covered in figure 5.1. Small changes can contribute to and
support deeper initiatives. Some changes may start small but develop with experience into
larger-scale initiatives. Deep changes demand time and resources, diverting attention from
those necessary smaller-scale projects.
How to Choose Your Thrust and Limit Your Agenda
Most organizations come under pressure to change
from many directions: creative new ideas, internal
issues and inefficiencies, external trends and devel-
opments. These pressures can generate a long and
complex change agenda. Paying attention to all of
those issues, however, means spreading resources
thinly and a potential loss of focus. Tom Peters
(2014, pp. 8–9) argues that top management must
limit the agenda by choosing one or two “plausi-
ble important thrusts.” He identifies six criteria on
which the choice of these thrusts should be based:
1. Internal achievability: Can a “cost-oriented” com-
pany begin to turn itself into a “product innova-
tion” leader in three to five years?
2. Political feasibility: Can the top team be per-
suaded to support the thrust?
3. Soundness in competitive or regulatory terms: Is a
marketing thrust a good choice for a high-cost
producer in a shrinking market?
4. Freshness: Will it be perceived as a new direction?
5. Early wins: Will it be possible to show some
results in the first few months, even though full-
scale implementation may take years?
6. Excitement: Can most people from middle man-
agement on up eventually become enthusiastic
about it?
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 145
This pattern of shallow to deep change raises a fourth challenge, to coordinate those
initiatives to avoid duplication, overlap, and unnecessary cost. Research once suggested
that most organizations experienced periods of stability that were interrupted on occa-
sion by more profound changes. This was known as the theory of “punctuated equilib-
rium” (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). That theory was based, however, on evidence
from computer companies in the 1960s. That may not be the case today, as the pattern
of change has become more programmatic. In response, many organizations have set up
corporate program management offices (PMOs) to support and coordinate their initia-
tives (Ward and Daniel, 2013). A study by the Philadelphia-based Project Management
Institute (2012) found that 84 percent of organizations had set up PMOs, which have the
following benefits:
reduce the number of projects that fail;
deliver projects under budget and ahead of schedule;
improve productivity;
increase cost savings.
There is no standard PMO model, and this varies between organizations in terms of
structure, location, and roles. The Project Management Institute study identified four fac-
tors contributing to the effectiveness of PMOs: First, they need a senior executive cham-
pion. Second, their role must be clearly understood. Third, the change professionals who
staff the PMO must have the respect of functional departments. Finally, PMOs need to
collaborate with functional departments in the development of initiatives, and not act as
“change police.”
For example, at State Auto Insurance Company in Ohio, change projects would
appear at random, and the company had no mechanism to ensure that projects stayed
within budget and met their objectives. A PMO was made responsible for methodology,
governance, change management, delivery, and portfolio management. Units that want
to launch change projects have to construct a business case showing their alignment
with corporate strategy. At the National Cancer Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, the
PMO head found that teams working on early-phase drug development projects started
every project plan from scratch. But there was a lot of overlap, with 80 percent of the
work activities being either identical or similar from one project to another. The PMO
designed a system to avoid this duplication. Previously, the teams held 16 four-hour
meetings to develop their project plan. This was cut to only four meetings (Project
Management Institute, 2012).
We have identified different types of change, reaching beyond a simple categorization
(first-order, second-order). We have described other ways to conceptualize change (using
a depth metaphor) and to assess the profile of change in an organization at any one time.
These categories and concepts have implications for change management practice: match-
ing solutions to problems, assessing the complexity of the change management task, link-
ing involvement in change to personal reputations and careers, and coordinating a wide
portfolio of change through a program management office.
Through the rest of this chapter, we will develop these themes, first exploring different
kinds of innovation and the distinction between sustaining and disruptive innovation. We
then turn attention to two changes that are likely to confront many organizations: culture
change and technology-driven change. These are often seen as second-order changes, but
146 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
this depends on the perspective from which they are interpreted. The kinds of changes
that can take place with regard to organizational culture and to how new technologies are
used can be profound and transformational. Throughout, the challenges for change man-
agers posed by innovation, culture change, and technology developments will be consid-
ered. The most obvious challenges, perhaps, involve maintaining the pace of change while
ensuring effective implementation and sustained gains.
Innovation
One of the key drivers of change is innovation. This term is not confined to new prod-
ucts. Other important innovations concern ways to organize, better working practices,
and new ways to provide services. The word thus tends to be used in a broad sense,
to mean the adoption of any product, system, process, program, service, or business
model new to this organization. An idea may have developed elsewhere, but it can be
seen as an innovation here.
It is helpful to identify different kinds of innovation. For example, we can distinguish
between product innovations (new gadgets) and operational innovations. Michael Hammer
(2004) describes operational innovation as finding new ways to lead, organize, work,
motivate, and manage. He describes a vehicle insurance company that introduced “imme-
diate response claims handling,” operating 24 hours a day. This involved scheduling visits
to claimants by claims adjusters who worked from mobile vans, and who turned up within
nine hours. Previously, with office-based adjusters, it took a week to inspect a damaged
vehicle. Handling 10,000 claims a day, adjusters were empowered to estimate damage and
write a check on the spot. These operational innovations led to major cost savings, with
fewer staff involved in claims handling, lower vehicle storage costs, better fraud detection,
and reduction in payout costs. Customer satisfaction and loyalty also improved.
Toyota’s Lean production system is another example of an operational innovation that
improves product quality and reduces costs by redesigning the manufacturing process
without directly affecting product design. Walmart has an innovative approach to purchas-
ing and distribution, using “cross-docking,” where goods are switched from one truck
to the next at distribution centers without going into storage. Dell Computers’ “build to
order” business model was also a disruptive innovation.
Clayton Christensen and Michael Overdorf (2000) make a distinction between sustain-
ing innovations and disruptive innovations, identified in figure 5.1. Sustaining innovations
improve existing products and processes: a more fuel-efficient motorcar, streamlining an
administrative process. Disruptive innovations introduce wholly new processes and ser-
vices, such as an all-electric motorcar or social networking. Disruptive innovations imply
deep transformational change.
Innovations that are disruptive do not necessarily involve chaos and upheaval. What is
disrupted is often traditional ways of thinking and acting. Digital photography, for exam-
ple, has not just replaced traditional “wet film” formats and the cameras that required
them. This development has changed the ways in which we capture, manipulate, display,
share, and think about images. The extra cost of taking more photographs is close to zero,
and we are more likely to share our shots on a website, or display them on a digital photo
frame or on television, than to print them for the family album. How many manufacturers
LO 5.3
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 147
of cameras predicted that one day versions of their product would be given away free by
mobile telephone companies? Digital photography has been a truly disruptive innovation.
The business model developed by the online retailer Amazon has disrupted the tradi-
tional retailing sector while changing our shopping habits. Although Amazon began by
selling books, the company has diversified into selling everything, also allowing third par-
ties to sell their goods through its website, and even selling its own consumer electron-
ics products such as Fire Phone and Kindle. Amazon is also a major provider of cloud
computer services. U.S. customers can find around 230 million different products on
Amazon’s website.
Challenges for the Change Manager (1) Operational innovations can be more difficult to implement than product innovations.
Potential users can see and touch a new product—a smartphone, for example—and
they can try it out for themselves. An operational innovation, however, has to be imple-
mented before anyone can really see how it is going to work—a streamlined process
that will reduce time to market. This means that the benefits can take time to appear,
particularly when the initial specification has to be adjusted with experience. Convinc-
ing others of the value of an operational innovation, therefore, is not always straightfor-
ward. Hammer (2004) argues that business culture undervalues operations, which are
seen as boring and low status. Operations are not as glamorous, or as easily understood,
as deal-making or new technology and are therefore not regarded as a source of com-
petitive advantage. A further problem is that the “ownership” of an operational innova-
tion may be vague, because it crosses functional boundaries.
Hammer (2004) argues that operational innovations are often driven by “catalysts” who
are committed to finding and exploiting such opportunities, and who are relentless in their
attempts to convince senior management. Everett Rogers (1995) observed that adoption of
innovations follows a pattern. First, small numbers adopt, followed by “takeoff,” achieving
a critical mass of adopters. Finally, the pace slackens as saturation is reached, typically
short of 100 percent (you never convince everyone). Rogers argues that this pattern is
influenced by the five groups in table 5.1.
Hammer’s catalysts are Rogers’ innovators. Change is thus often dependent on innova-
tors and early adopters in particular. Hammer offers four suggestions for accelerating the
Disruptive Innovation in the Nineteenth Century The Stethoscope
That it [the stethoscope] will ever come into gen-
eral use, not withstanding its value, I am extremely
doubtful; because its beneficial application
requires much time, and it gives a good deal of
trouble both to the patient and practitioner, and
because its whole hue and character is foreign,
and opposed to all our habits and associations. It
must be confessed that there is something ludi-
crous in the picture of a grave physician formally
listening through a long tube applied to a patient’s
thorax, as if the disease within were a living being
that could communicate its condition to the sense
without. (John Forbes, in the preface to his trans-
lation of De L’Auscultation Mediate ou Traite du
Diagnostic des Maladies des Poumons et du Coeur
[A Treatise on Diseases of the Chest and on Medi-
ate Auscultation], by R. T. H. Laennec, T&G Under-
wood, London, 1821.)
148 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
Innovators Usually the first in their social grouping to adopt new approaches and behaviors, a small category of individuals who enjoy the excite- ment and risks of experimentation
Early adopters Opinion leaders who evaluate ideas carefully, and are more skeptical and take more convincing, but take risks, help to adapt new ideas to local settings, and have effective networking skills
Early majority Those who take longer to reach a decision to change, but who are still ahead of the average
Late majority Even more skeptical and risk averse, wait for most of their colleagues to adopt new ideas first
Laggards Viewed negatively by others, the last to adopt new ideas, even for reasons that they believe to be rational
incidence of operational innovation. First, look for role models in other sectors. Second,
challenge constraining assumptions (“this will never work because”). Third, turn the “spe-
cial case” into the norm. And finally, rethink the core dimensions of the work—who does
it, where, when, how thoroughly, with what results; how can these dimensions be rede-
signed to make the process more effective?
Challenges for the Change Manager (2) Disruptive innovations can be more difficult to implement than sustaining innovations,
as they are often viewed as risky. Christensen and Overdorf (2000) note that dras-
tic change involving disruptive innovation can jeopardize an organization’s business
model and core capabilities (see “Not a Good Kodak Moment”). A further challenge
is that disruptive products and services are often not as good as those in current use.
The service provided by the low-cost business model of Southwest Airlines may not be
as good as that of conventional carriers, but is simpler, more accessible, and cheaper.
The quality of images produced by the first digital cameras was much poorer than that
from film cameras. In addition, most organizations have no routine processes for deal-
ing with disruptive innovations. Disruptive innovations are thus often introduced by
smaller new entrants or start-ups in a sector, rather than by the older, larger, and domi-
nant incumbents (Hwang and Christensen, 2008).
In contrast with disruptive innovations, it is easier to convince others of the value of
sustaining innovations, which make existing processes, products, and services work bet-
ter. Rogers (1995) argued that the probability of an innovation being accepted is increased
when it has these properties:
1. Advantageous when compared with existing practice
2. Compatible with existing practices
3. Easy to understand
4. Observable in demonstration sites
5. Testable
6. Adaptable to fit local needs
TABLE 5.1 From Inno-
vators to
Laggards
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 149
It is difficult to demonstrate these properties with disruptive innovations—which can
be difficult to understand, cannot be observed and tested, and cannot be compared with
current practice until after they have been implemented. For the organization seeking to
develop the capabilities for handling disruptive innovation, Christensen and Overdorf
(2000, p. 73) make the following suggestions: consider acquiring an organization that
already has these capabilities; create an independent organization to deal with the prob-
lem; or create new structures, such as dedicated, cross-functional teams.
Change Manager as Disruptive Innovator What advice is there for the change manager seeking to develop and implement dis-
ruptive innovations to their organization? Jeff Dyer, Hal Gregersen, and Clayton
Christensen (2011) argue that anyone can be innovative by using the right approach.
Innovators use the five habits shown in table 5.2.
These habits are not confined to a small number of special people; they can be devel-
oped. The change manager can thus become more innovative by following this advice,
and by collaborating with “delivery-driven” colleagues. Dyer and colleagues argue that
organizations also need to encourage these habits, stimulating employees to connect ideas,
to challenge accepted practices, to watch what others are doing, to take risks and try things
out, and to get out of the company to meet others.
In Defense of Sustaining Innovation As argued in chapter 1, it would be a mistake to think that transformational, disrup-
tive innovation is the solution to most current organizational problems, for at least
Not a Good Kodak Moment
Kodak invented the first digital camera in 1975 and
the first megapixel camera in 1986. So why did the
development of digital photography drive Kodak
to bankruptcy in 2012? In 1975, the costs of this
new technology were high and the image quality
was poor. Kodak believed that it could take at least
another ten years before digital technology began
to threaten their established camera, film, chemical,
and photo printing paper businesses. That forecast
proved to be accurate, but rather than prepare,
Kodak decided to improve the quality of film, with
sustaining innovations. With hindsight, it is easy to
spot that mistake. But the market information avail-
able to management from the 1970s through the
1990s, combined with the company’s financial per-
formance, made the switch to digital appear risky.
In 1976, Kodak accounted for 90 percent of film
and 85 percent of camera sales in America. Kodak’s
annual revenues peaked in 1996, at $16 billion;
profits in 1999 were $2.5 billion. However, success
encouraged complacency and reinforced confi-
dence in the brand. Analysts noted that it might be
unwise to switch from making 70 cents on the dol-
lar with film, to 5 cents with digital. But by 2011,
Kodak’s revenues had fallen to $6.2 billion, and the
company was reporting losses.
Kodak’s competitor, Fuji, recognized the same
threat and decided to switch to digital while gen-
erating as much return as possible from film and
developing new lines of business, including cos-
metics based on chemicals used for film process-
ing. Both companies had the same information, but
they came to different assessments, and Kodak was
too slow to respond. By the time Kodak began to
develop digital cameras, mobile phones with built-
in digital cameras had become popular.
Kodak invented the technology but did not rec-
ognize just how disruptive an innovation digital
would prove to be, making their traditional business
obsolete (Barabba, 2011; The Economist, 2012).
150 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
two reasons. First, considerable business benefit can be achieved through small-scale
initiatives and sustaining innovations. Many healthcare organizations have imported
“lean” techniques from manufacturing and made significant performance improve-
ments that benefit patients, staff, and the organization as a whole (Graban, 2009).
Second, many organizations have highly profitable businesses based on traditional
products, such as Harris Tweed, Swiss watches, Samuel Adams Boston lager. Some
traditional technologies, having once been overtaken by innovative replacements,
have reemerged. In the United States, by 2014, 30 cities had reintroduced green
“environment-friendly” trams or were planning to do so; sales of vinyl LPs increased
from zero in 1993 to 6 million in 2013. New technology does not simply displace old
technology. The appeal of some old technologies is enduring (sailing boats, paper
books), and some items are bought for their aesthetic value, regardless of price (The
Economist, 2014).
These considerations further complicate our answer to this chapter’s question: what
changes? There are different kinds and degrees of innovation. The challenge for the
change manager is to determine which (or which combination) is appropriate to a particu-
lar organization at a given time. As Kodak’s experience suggests, reaching that assessment
involves judgement and intuition as well as data.
LO 5.4 Organizational Culture
Are people enthusiastic about working for this organization? Do they feel valued? Are
there development and career opportunities? Are customers and clients valued and
given good quality service? Are leaders and managers respected and trusted? Is infor-
mation shared openly? Is teamwork and collaboration between divisions the norm? Do
staff agree with the purpose of the organization? These are just some of the indicators
of an organization’s culture. When the answers to those questions turn to “no,” then
organizational effectiveness suffers.
One definition of organizational culture, therefore, is “the way we do things around
here.” A more technical definition regards organizational culture as the shared values,
beliefs, and norms that influence the way employees think, feel, and act toward others,
TABLE 5.2 The Five
Habits of
Disruptive
Innovators
Associating Innovators are good at seeing connections between things that do not appear to be related, drawing ideas together from unrelated fields
Questioning Innovators are always challenging what others take for granted, asking, “Why is this done this way—why don’t we do it differently?”
Observing Innovators watch the behavior of customers, suppliers, competitors—looking for new ways of doing things
Experimenting Innovators tinker with products and business models, sometimes accidentally, to see what happens, what insights emerge
Networking Innovators attend conferences and other social events to pick up ideas from people with different ideas, who may face similar prob- lems, in other fields
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 151
both inside and outside the organization. It is also argued that organizations each have
their own distinct “personality,” or style, or ideology, or climate, which gives them their
unique identity. For example, walk into a McDonald’s restaurant and note the atmosphere,
décor, lighting, attitude of staff to customers, style and variety of food and drinks, speed
of service, cost, and any other details that catch your attention. Next, walk into one of
McCormick & Schmick’s restaurants and pay attention to those same factors; you will
see a different culture. Ann Cunliffe (2008) argues that organizational culture is important
because it:
shapes the public image of an organization;
influences organizational effectiveness;
provides direction for the company;
helps to attract, retain, and motivate staff.
This issue can be the cause of many problems. Falling sales, customer complaints, staff
absenteeism and turnover, or poor public reputation, for example, can often be attributed
to organizational culture. It is therefore not surprising that culture change programs have
become popular. Some theorists argue that organizations cannot have distinct cultures in
the way that human societies do. But we can accept that criticism and still find practical
value in the concept if organizational culture is simply taken to cover the values, beliefs,
and norms that shape employee—and management—behavior. If those behaviors are inap-
propriate or dysfunctional in some way, then “culture” offers a useful lens through which
we can understand why, and what action we can take to change those behaviors.
We can also make a distinction between strong and weak organizational cultures
( Gordon and DiTomaso, 1992). A strong culture is one in which the organization’s values
are widely shared and intensely held, and which thus guide behavior. A weak culture, in
contrast, displays little agreement about core values or about expected behaviors. Strong
cultures thus suggest emotional attachment and commitment to an organization, unity in
approach, and “walking the talk.” Much of the commentary on this topic thus assumes that
companies with strong cultures perform better. The quotes that opened this section, from
Lenovo’s chief executive, support this view.
Yang Yuanqing, Chief Executive of Lenovo
Lenovo [Chinese multinational computer manufac-
turer] is often cited for sustaining a healthy corporate
culture. What’s the secret to that?
“We focus on three elements. The first is an
ownership culture: we try to empower people
to think for themselves, to make decisions for
themselves. Everyone is an engine. The second is
a commitment culture: if you commit to some-
thing, you must deliver. The third is a pioneer
culture: we encourage our people to be more
innovative.”
How do you actually promote innovative behavior?
“There are a lot of ways to do it. For example, I
hold monthly brainstorming sessions with our R&D
team. At each session we focus on one topic—it might
be a product, a service, or a technology. Another
approach is through the budget. For our R&D people,
we allow 20% of the budget to be flexible, so they
can decide which areas they want to focus on and
what they want to develop”
Source: Yuanqing (2014), pp. 107–8: interviewed by Harvard
Business Review.
152 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
We also know that organizational culture can cause serious problems. NASA and the
oil exploration company BP provide iconic examples of what can happen when culture
goes wrong.
Organizational Culture at NASA, and the Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster In February 2003, while the space shuttle Columbia was reentering the earth’s atmo-
sphere, a piece of insulating foam broke off and damaged the left wing. This caused
the shuttle to disintegrate, killing the seven crew members. Why did this happen, par-
ticularly after the loss of the shuttle Challenger and its crew in 1986, when an O-ring
failed at liftoff? In answering that question, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
(CAIB, 2003) considered a combination of physical and organizational causes, argu-
ing that both had contributed to the disaster. Here is what the Board’s report had to say
about the organizational culture at NASA (emphasis added):
The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Program’s history
and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the
Shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures,
mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an
agreed national vision for human space flight. . . . Cultural traits and organizational prac-
tices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a
substitute for sound engineering practices; organizational barriers that prevented effective
communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion;
lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an informal
chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organization’s
rules. (CAIB, 2003, pp. 9 and 177)
In the Board’s view, NASA’s organizational culture and structure had as much to do with
this accident as the External Tank foam. Organizational culture refers to the values, norms,
beliefs, and practices that govern how an institution functions. At the most basic level, orga-
nizational culture defines the assumptions that employees make as they carry out their work.
It is a powerful force that can persist through reorganizations and the reassignment of key
personnel. (p. 177)
Perhaps the most perplexing question the Board faced during its seven-month investiga-
tion into the Columbia accident was “How could NASA have missed the signals the foam
was sending?” Answering this question was a challenge. The investigation revealed that in
most cases, the Human Space Flight Program is extremely aggressive in reducing threats to
safety. But we also know—in hindsight—that detection of the dangers posed by foam was
impeded by blind spots in NASA’s safety culture. (p. 184)
NASA’s culture of bureaucratic accountability emphasized chain of command, procedure,
following the rules, and going by the book. While rules and procedures were essential for
coordination, they had an unintended but negative effect. Allegiance to hierarchy and proce-
dure had replaced deference to NASA engineers’ technical expertise. (p. 200)
It was therefore not surprising that the CAIB report’s first recommendation following
this investigation was:
It is the Board’s opinion that good leadership can direct a culture to adapt to new realities.
NASA’s culture must change, and the Board intends the following recommendations to be
steps toward effecting this change. (p. 225)
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 153
A comparison of the Challenger and Columbia disasters concluded that the causal fac-
tors were similar: structures for processing information, contractor relations, political and
budgetary pressures—and organizational culture. This analysis argued that organizational
learning and change were difficult for NASA—and for other public agencies—due to a
combination of external political and economic pressures, and an organizational culture
that was defensive, and characterized by a climate of fear of raising alarms (Mahler and
Casamayou, 2009). (We revisit the Challenger and Columbia disasters in the case study
exercise at the end of chapter 11.)
Organizational Culture at BP, and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster On April 20, 2010, when the blowout preventer failed, a mile under water, the explo-
sion and fire on the 33,000-ton Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico
killed 11 of the 126 crew members and seriously injured 17 others. Oil poured from the
Macondo wellhead on the seabed, drifting toward the Louisiana coast 50 miles away,
threatening wildlife and the local fishing and tourism industries. Around 5 million bar-
rels of crude oil spilled into the Gulf before the flow stopped on July 15. This was
the biggest environmental disaster in the United States since the Exxon Valdez spilled
750,000 barrels of crude oil in Prince William Sound in 1989. The investigation blamed
leadership and management for creating the conditions in which this accident was
allowed to happen. Here is what the accident investigation said about BP’s culture
(National Commission, 2011; emphasis added):
The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable
mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk
management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry. (p. vii)
Investments in safety, containment, and response equipment and practices failed to keep
pace with the rapid move into deepwater drilling. Absent major crises, and given the remark-
able financial returns available from deepwater reserves, the business culture succumbed to
a false sense of security. The Deepwater Horizon disaster exhibits the costs of a culture of
complacency. (p. ix)
In the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster—a crisis that was unanticipated, on
a scale for which companies had not prepared to respond—changes in safety and environ-
mental practices, safety training, drilling technology, containment and clean-up technology,
preparedness, corporate culture, and management behavior will be required if deepwater
energy operations are to be pursued in the Gulf—or elsewhere. (p. 215)
If an organizational culture is dysfunctional, the potential outcomes, from these exam-
ples, include:
loss of life and serious injury;
widespread economic and environmental damage;
damage to the reputations and careers of senior management;
loss of public trust and confidence in the organization, if not the whole sector;
massive fines for misconduct.
In other words, failure to manage organizational culture costs lives, reputations,
careers—and money, affecting the wider community and the economy as well as causing
154 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
internal organizational damage. The other likely outcome, as in these cases (and Barclays,
discussed earlier), is that the organization is faced with a transformational change agenda.
The investigation into the Columbia disaster concluded that the organizational culture at
NASA had to change. The Deepwater investigation advised that BP’s culture of compla-
cency had to change to prevent further incidents and to regain public trust. (The crisis
management aspects of the BP incident are explored in chapter 7.)
The Salz (2013) review criticized strong subcultures at Barclays, rather than praise
them. An organization may have a strong culture and shared values, but it is important to
know what those values are. Organizational cultures at Barclays, NASA, and BP appear
to have been strong, but they were also wrong. Strong cultures can lead to inappropri-
ate behaviors, encourage conformity, complacency, and inertia, and take time to develop
and change. A survey in 2013 of over 1,000 financial services sector staff in the United
Kingdom found that culture change was indeed slow. Only half the respondents agreed
that there had been a culture change initiative led by senior management, and less than a
fifth of those agreed that there had been any real change. A fifth of all respondents said that
culture change initiatives had been superficial and ineffective. This survey concluded that:
[W]hile some senior leaders in parts of the banking sector are having at least partial success
in changing culture to become more customer focused, some parts of the industry are largely
operating as before. This is reinforced by the survey findings that a third of respondents still
identify shareholders as their organization’s most important stakeholder, with only about
50% identifying customers as their most important stakeholder. (CIPD, 2013, p. 26)
Changing an organizational culture is in many respects similar to managing any other
form of change. However, culture is usually defined in terms of shared values, beliefs, and
norms. Those are attributes of individuals and groups that are difficult to change directly.
Most approaches to culture change thus advocate action to change behavior, through new
working practices, systems, and human resource policies. This approach assumes that,
once the benefits of those new behaviors become clear, the values, beliefs, and norms that
reinforce those behaviors will adjust naturally.
For example, Emily Lawson and Colin Price (2010) argue that the success of change
relies on persuading individuals to change their “mindsets”—to think differently about
their jobs and how they work. This first involves changing behavior. They identify three
levels of change. First, some outcomes (increasing revenue) can be achieved without
Risky Culture
Inside Job (2010, director Charles Ferguson, nar-
rated by Matt Damon) examines the global financial
crisis of 2008. Over the previous decade, deregu-
lation allowed the finance sector to take risks that
older rules would have discouraged. As you watch
this film, identify the various stakeholders (includ-
ing academics), their competing interests, their
relationships, and their efforts to conceal sensitive
information. How did those competing interests,
relationships, and “information games” contribute
to the crisis? The film concludes that, despite this
crisis, the underlying culture has remained much
the same. How has the sector been able to avoid
fundamental changes to financial regulation? What
does this account reveal about the nature of organi-
zational culture?
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 155
changing working practices (selling noncore assets). Second, staff can be asked to change
working practices in line with current thinking (finding ways to reduce waste). The third
level involves fundamental changes in organizational culture, in collective thinking and
behavior—from reactive to proactive, hierarchical to collegial, inward-looking to exter-
nally focused. They identify three conditions for changing mindsets at level three:
The surrounding structures (reward and recognition systems) must be in tune with the new
behaviour. Employees must have the skills to do what it requires. Finally, they must see
people they respect modelling it actively. Each of these conditions is realized independently;
together they add up to a way of changing the behaviour of people in organizations by chang-
ing attitudes about what can and should happen at work. (Lawson and Price, 2010, p. 32)
In other words, “mindsets” may not be altered directly, but they can be changed by a
careful rethinking of structures, skills, and role models. The effectiveness of Barclays’
“truthfulness training” may thus depend not just on the training content but on the extent
to which wider organizational conditions encourage the desired “mindset” or not.
Many organizations today, therefore, are concerned that their culture is appropriate,
in the context of corporate strategy, performance, external scrutiny and regulation, and
reputation. Culture change programs often target staff engagement, teamwork and collab-
oration, and information sharing and creativity, as well as costs, revenues, and customer
service. For the change manager, it is important to remember that the role of the board,
and of senior leadership in general, is key in this context.
Culture Change Starts with You
Yum Brands, the parent company of KFC, Pizza Hut,
and Taco Bell, has returned 16.5 percent annually
since 1997 (the year it was spun off from PepsiCo),
compared with the 3.9 percent average achieved by
the Standard & Poor’s 500 large companies during
this time. According to business journalist Geoff Col-
vin (2013, p. 62), “No one who follows Yum doubts
that [CEO David] Novak’s team building framework
is at the heart of the company’s success.”
Novak inherited an organization where perfor-
mance and morale were low, where headquarters
blamed the franchisees and the franchisees blamed
headquarters. He decided that the organizational
culture had to change. Novak introduced a leader-
ship development program, “Taking People With
You,” which focused on managers developing
self-awareness with regard to their own truthful-
ness, reliability, openness, and self-centeredness, as
well as how they treated other team members and
responded to others’ mistakes. “In Novak’s program
you’re not fit to build a team until you’ve worked
hard on yourself [and] only then does the program
get into forming strategy, communicating it, and
gaining alignment, plus the nuts and bolts of orga-
nization and process” (Colvin, 2013, p. 63).
LO 5.5 Technology
Developments in technology in general, and in information and computing technology
in particular, have long-running and ongoing implications for organizational change
management. Some developments have created disruptive innovation (online business
models), while others have improved the productivity of individuals (word processing).
156 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
Early social science studies of technology in the 1950s focused on textile manufactur-
ing (in India) and coal mining (in the United Kingdom). The Tavistock Institute of
Human Relations, whose researchers conducted those studies, developed the sociotech-
nical systems perspective. This argues that the social organization of work is not wholly
determined by technology, but can be—and therefore should be—designed taking into
consideration the individual and social needs of employees. The aim of sociotechnical
system design is thus to find the best fit between the social and technical dimensions.
A system designed to meet social needs ignoring the technical system will run into
difficulties. On the other hand, a system designed only to meet the demands of technol-
ogy will raise social and organizational problems. Sociotechnical design thus aims for
“joint optimization” of social and technical needs. The resultant sociotechnical system
design is thus a matter of creative management choice (Emery and Trist, 1960).
These arguments are perhaps even more important today. Technological change appears
to be rapid and relentless. In the rush to implement new technology and to gain benefits
ahead of competitors, there may be little time to consider the social system design before
the next development appears. This presents a challenge for the change manager. On the
one hand, it may be necessary to maintain the pace of technology change. On the other
hand, it will be helpful to ensure that the organization of the work of those who will oper-
ate new systems strengthens the staff capabilities, motives, and commitment that contrib-
ute to effective operation. Good sociotechnical design is still at a premium.
We will explore in this section the implication of two technology trends. The first con-
cerns the impact of digitization. The second relates to corporate applications of social media.
Most organizations, in most sectors, are likely to be affected by these developments, whether
they wish to be or not. We do not have space to explore the extraordinary range of special-
ized new technologies that will affect specific sectors, such as 3-D printing (depositional
manufacturing), or nanotechnology applications in medicine, for example. However, regard-
less of sector, new technologies tend to generate broadly similar organizational and change
management issues, so the implications of our discussion will be widely applicable.
The Impact of Digitization In a report from McKinsey, the consulting company, Martin Hirt and Paul Willmott
(2014, p. 1) argue that digital technologies are “profoundly changing the strategic con-
text: altering the structure of competition, the conduct of business, and, ultimately, per-
formance across industries.” Emphasizing that digitization is a “moving target,” they
identify three strategic opportunities:
enhancing interaction, between customers, suppliers, employees, and other stakehold-
ers, as consumers come to prefer tailored, mixed-media, digital online communication
channels;
improving management decisions, by processing “big data” and information from “the
Internet of Things,” and thus being able to refine (personalize) marketing allocations
and reduce operational risks by sensing equipment breakdowns;
creating new business models, such as crowdsourcing product development and peer-
to-peer customer service.
These developments can drive down prices, as customers can instantly compare prices
and rapidly switch to other sellers and brands. As we noted earlier, digitization lowers the
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 157
entry barriers to start-ups in many areas, and established organizations will face competi-
tion from unexpected areas (such as food retailers offering financial services that com-
pete with banks). Those employees who are displaced by digitization, as more processes
(administrative and manufacturing) become automated, may not have the capabilities that
will enable them to find employment in the more highly skilled jobs that remain. Hirt
and Willmott (2014, p. 8) also point to the “relentlessly evolving business models—at
higher velocity,” which digitization is encouraging. Banks, taxi drivers, travel companies,
camera makers, and universities—among others—are seeing traditional business models
undermined by faster-moving and cheaper competitors whose offerings are more appeal-
ing to Internet-savvy consumers. The crowdsourcing website WhoCanFixMyCar.com may
disrupt the motorcar repair business by connecting drivers needing repairs with mechanics
looking for work (Foy, 2014).
Even Lego, the highly profitable (and privately owned) Danish toy manufacturer,
famous worldwide for its colored bricks, is not immune from digital developments. The
company’s traditional business model is simple, transforming plastic that costs $1 a kilo
into Lego box sets that sell for $75 a kilo. However, children increasingly play games on
iPads and smartphones, and Lego’s sales growth slowed after 2010. How can Lego com-
pete in the evolving digital world?
Lego’s first experiment with an online game, Lego Universe, was not successful.
They then developed a partnership with a Swedish company, Mojang, which designed
Minecraft, a popular computer game based on virtual landscapes resembling Lego build-
ing blocks (https://minecraft.net). Lego now sells sets based on the game. Another part-
nership involved TT Games, to develop video games based on Lego ranges such as Star
Wars and Legends of Chima. The Lego Movie, made in collaboration with Warner Bros,
generated $500 million when it was released in 2014. In partnership with Google, The
Lego Movie was accompanied by a video game, new construction sets (the giant Sea
Cow pirate ship and the hero Emmett), and a website (http://www.buildwithchrome
.com). The movie sequel is scheduled for 2017. Another innovation was Lego Fusion.
Items built with Lego bricks are captured using a smartphone or tablet, which imports
them into a 3-D digital online world where users can play using their own designs. Lego
was one of the most-watched brands on YouTube. Emphasizing the continuing impor-
tance of the physical brick, and physical play, Lego’s chief executive, Jørgen Vig Knud-
storp, explained, “I see digital as an extra experience layer” (Milne, 2014). With record
sales and earnings, Lego became the world’s most popular and most profitable toymaker
in 2015; the company estimates that, on average, every person on earth owns 102 Lego
bricks (Milne, 2015).
A global survey by McKinsey of 850 senior executives found that most companies
were planning to increase spending on digital initiatives, either to strengthen competitive
advantage in an existing business, or to create new business models and revenue streams
(Gottlieb and Willmott, 2014). Growth was expected to come mainly from digital cus-
tomer engagement and digital innovation, including new products, operating models, and
business models. In terms of digital priorities, automation ranked lowest. However, orga-
nizational hurdles were preventing faster development:
problems finding staff with digital skills;
organization structures unsuitable for developing digital businesses;
158 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
inflexible business processes, designed to handle conventional initiatives;
lack of good quality information to inform decisions;
“inability to adopt an experimentation mindset” (Gottlieb and Willmott, 2014, p. 6).
The most pressing needs for skilled staff were in areas such as analytics, online devel-
opment, project management, cloud computing, joint business enterprise, and cybersecu-
rity. To remain competitive, therefore, many organizations may be compelled to adopt a
version of Lego’s pattern of rapid experimentation and innovation. The change manage-
ment challenge will be to develop that approach, implementing appropriate changes to
structures, processes, and information systems, and developing “experimentation” organi-
zational cultures. Investment in training and development may be required to fill the skills
gap. Further change management challenges will involve identifying opportunities, mov-
ing quickly to explore benefits, and dropping unsuccessful experiments. It may be difficult
to maintain this pace without generating the stress and burnout of “initiative fatigue.”
Applications of Social Media With the development of “Web 2.0,” or “the social web,” the Internet moved into a
new phase in the twenty-first century. Web 2.0 technologies include Internet-based
information systems such as social networking (or social media), blogs, collabora-
tive databases, and YouTube and other file-sharing sites. These applications allow a
much higher degree of participation and interaction, between systems and users, and
between users, than conventional Web 1.0 “flat” websites. More people now use tab-
lets and smartphones, which are mobile devices, as well as personal computers and
smart televisions, to access social networking sites. Social media are thus radically
changing the ways in which we interact with each other, develop our relationships,
share experiences, and form opinions. These networking tools have also changed the
ways in which organizations interact with and gather information about their custom-
ers. The amount of time that we devote to the Internet is increasing. In the United
States, time spent on personal computers and smartphones rose by over 20 percent
between 2011 and 2012, and the use of apps doubled over that period as smartphone
ownership grew and more apps became available (Bannon, 2012). Social media have
three valuable properties:
1. They provide “multidirectional” flows of information between friends, colleagues,
organizations, and management, compared with the static “one-way” communication
from conventional web pages.
2. They allow users to develop new connections, encouraging collaboration across bound-
aries such as organizational silos.
3. These are “low friction” tools; they are attractive, pervasive, easy to use, and no spe-
cialized equipment is required (Gifford, 2014, p. 11).
The number of social media websites is growing. Facebook and Twitter are joined by
LinkedIn and Pinterest, Blogger and Wordpress—among others. Marketing and customer
services have already been affected. Social media allow consumers to share opinions of
brands to a wider audience than word of mouth can reach. Facebook claims over 1 billion
users; LinkedIn has 300 million; over 250 million people use Twitter; Pinterest has over
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 159
70 million users. This list of social media outlets and their user numbers will be out of
date before this book is printed. Consumers are therefore “hyper-informed” when mak-
ing purchasing decisions. Customer service is also being transformed, with half of U.S.
customers using social media to raise complaints or ask questions; a third of social media
users say that they prefer this channel to the phone when dealing with customer ser-
vice issues (Bannon, 2012). Organizations must be sensitive to these trends and respond
accordingly.
Employees may be more enthusiastic about using social media than employers. Most
corporate applications have an external focus and appear to have had limited impact on
employee relations. A survey of the Fortune Global 100 organizations in 2012 by the pub-
lic relations company Burson-Marsteller found that 70 percent had YouTube channels and
75 percent had Facebook accounts. Some had several accounts on each platform, so that
they could target specific audiences and locations with regard to particular issues. The
survey also found that each of those Global 100 organizations had an average of almost
56,000 mentions a month on Twitter (Stanford, 2013, p. 214).
A UK survey of 2,000 employees and 600 human resource managers in 2013 also
found that while the personal use of social media was widespread, few used these tools
for work. The main reasons for using social media included keeping up to date with news,
building one’s professional network, keeping in touch with others, sharing knowledge,
learning more about areas of interest, and building reputation. Over half of senior leaders,
and 40 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds, said that they used social media for work. Only
one quarter of organizations surveyed had an internal social media platform, and those
were used mainly for staff, human resource, and operational updates. And only one quarter
allowed staff to connect personal smartphones and tablets to the organization’s IT network.
Internal organizational uses are not inhibited by lack of access but more by perceived lack
of relevance and loss of control over information (Gifford, 2013). Many organizations do
not support bring-your-own-device (BYOD) practices. A survey of 1,765 UK employers
found that 80 percent had disciplined staff for using social networking sites at work, and
many had banned their use (Martin et al., 2008).
There appear to be many organizational uses for social media, which promise to trans-
form internal communications and staff engagement, recruitment, and learning. Social
media could be central in encouraging more open, communicative, egalitarian, collabora-
tive, and responsive organizational cultures. However, ease of communications can also
generate information overload.
Oscar de la Renta and Instagram
As a leading fashion brand, it was normal prac-
tice for Oscar de la Renta to debut its new designs
on the pages of Vogue or Elle. However, in summer
2013, it released its fall advertising campaign on Ins-
tagram. Erika Bearman, Oscar de la Renta’s senior
vice president of communications, had 345,000
Instagram followers, and in the caption of each image
placed on Instagram, Bearman invited her followers
to preorder the collection on Oscardelarenta.com.
Source: Hempel (2014).
160 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
We will explore in chapter 7 how organizations are using these Web 2.0 applications,
particularly to improve internal and external communications and to strengthen employee
engagement.
Birkinshaw and Pass (2008, p. 15) argue that Web 2.0 could radically alter the nature
of work, tapping knowledge from across the organization, encouraging informal coor-
dination, and making the workplace more engaging. A study of corporate applications
in the United Kingdom in 2013–2014 found that many organizations were advanced in
using social media externally but that few had developed effective internal uses (Gifford,
2014). One exception was Adnams, an independent brewer and distiller, which encour-
ages staff to use social media to engage with customers and develop their own online
“personas” at the company through social media platforms and blogs. Another was Santa
Fe Group, a global relocation service, which has developed an enterprise social learn-
ing network called “The Academy Online” to help build a common corporate culture
across the group. One explanation for the slow progress with internal corporate uses of
social media concerns the lack of clear return on the investment. Another factor is job
and organization design not suited to the good use of social networking tools. That study
concluded that social media would not alone transform organizational culture, but should
be seen as a tool or a platform for change.
There appear to be three major change management challenges in these technology
developments.
The first challenge concerns finding ways to exploit digitization and social media
applications effectively to achieve organizational goals. Those goals may include exter-
nal relationships and reputation, and internal culture change to improve engagement,
information sharing, collaboration, and the organization’s ability to respond rapidly to
trends and new ideas. Some applications may be sustaining, and some may be disrup-
tive. As we have seen, these technologies can be a useful platform for organizational
culture change.
The second challenge concerns finding the best “fit” between new digital technologies
and online tools, and the social system of the organization, including the needs, inter-
ests, and preferences of employees. Sociotechnical system design has become more
important in this context, and given the pace of technology development, perhaps more
difficult.
A third challenge will thus be to design and redesign effective sociotechnical systems
when, as noted earlier, the technologies involved are moving targets. The number and
nature of digital tools and social networking sites are constantly changing and evolving.
Individuals and organizations are still developing an understanding of how they can be
used effectively for personal and corporate benefit.
Addressing these challenges in a context of rapid development involves experimenta-
tion, and some experiments will be unsuccessful. From a change management perspective,
therefore, organizations need to be more fault tolerant. This involves welcoming the les-
sons from unsuccessful experiments, rather than blaming and punishing the guilty when
things go wrong (Edmondson, 2011).
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 161
EXERCISE 5.1
The Nampak
Story
This is a story of successful organizational culture change. How can we explain this suc- cess? As you read this story, consider the following questions:
1. Which dimensions of the 7-S framework, described in chapter 4, did Eric Collins and his senior management colleagues focus on in order to change Nampak’s culture? Reminder: The “hard” dimensions are strategy, structure, and systems. The “soft” dimensions include staff, skills, style, and shared values, or superordinate goals.
2. Which dimensions of the 7-S framework were not affected?
3. Where does this culture change initiative belong on the “depth” scale in figure 5.1, between shallow and deep change? In your judgement, would a different emphasis across the seven factors of that framework have produced deeper change, with better results, and how?
Context
Nampak was a South African–owned bottle and plastics manufacturer with 600 factory workers and 80 managers in the United Kingdom. A typical manufacturing company, it focused on costs, investing in machinery and processes rather than people. Labor costs were low, and the company had been very successful. In 2007, the newly appointed managing director Eric Collins realized that the company had driven efficiencies as far as it could using traditional approaches. He decided to add value through people.
Problem
Although the company was successful, the organizational culture was poor. People were treated badly and morale was low. The blame culture spread to customers. Complaints at one site reached 25 a month, which was damaging for a company that relied on three key customers. Apart from hiring, firing, and discipline, Nampak had no estab- lished human resource management policies and practices. In a staff satisfaction survey in 2007, 80 percent said that they would not recommend Nampak to friends and family as a place to work. Looking at the survey results, the new HR director, Cathie Wright- Smith, concluded, “There was everything wrong with this business that you can think of.” There were also problems with the executive board, who were status-conscious and accustomed to having a high degree of control, with only a dozen people making all the key decisions.
Solution
Collins met customers to get their critical feedback on the company. But when he met his own employees in “Challenge Collins” sessions, to hear their grievances in person, he was shocked. The level of dissatisfaction was high, and the anger was directed at him. However, Collins wanted to give staff the opportunity to vent their frustrations, and to show that they had a leader who was listening.
Wright-Smith ran focus groups, asking staff what would make Nampak a better place to work. Three themes emerged. The first was communication; people did not know what was going on, and they were not involved. Second, staff did not feel that they had training and development opportunities, or a career with the company. Third, line man- agers rarely provided feedback on their performance. This led to the design of a new
LO 5.4
(Continued)
162 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
performance management system, based on what employees said that they wanted: personal development, and not objectives with tick boxes. Some line managers had never had conversations like this with their staff before, and they now did this monthly. Line managers were seen as “dogsbodies,” although they were key to shaping the company’s culture. To emphasize their importance, they were offered the first training and development opportunities, a “leadership excellence” course, exploring influence, motivation, and team development methods. This was so successful that it generated demand from other managers for similar training.
New initiatives developed rapidly. Half the workforce were trained in a range of subjects, assessment centers replaced the traditional selection process, and induction and buddy schemes were introduced. The company launched a senior leaders pro- gram, a fast-track route for high-potential staff, undergraduate and graduate place- ment schemes, and a suggestions scheme offering financial rewards. A corporate social responsibility program linked with local schools, inviting pupils into the factory and sending staff to schools to talk about recycling. Shop floor staff worked with the schools attended by their children, and some staff came back on their days off to show people around the factory, with pride. Wright-Smith ran sessions for directors on lead- ership and emotional intelligence.
Outcomes
Collins said, “We’ve had a paradigm shift in culture.” In the 2010 staff survey, 80 per- cent said that they would recommend Nampak to friends and family as a place to work, reversing the 2007 position. In addition, 90 percent said that they were satisfied with their jobs, and 98 percent said that their managers listened to them. Overhead costs per million bottles made improved by 7 percent. No closures or layoffs were needed to make savings. Customer complaints fell to zero. Collins said, “We’re just a more collaborative, committed organization with pride in our work.” The main costs, according to Collins, concerned the commitment of time and focus (Smedley, 2011).
EXERCISE 5.2
Organi-
zational
Culture
Assessment
1. What words would you use to describe the positive and negative dimensions of your organization’s culture, or an organization with which you are familiar?
2. How can you explain the negative aspects of that organizational culture? Why have those dimensions developed in that way? What factors are causing, supporting, or reinforcing those dimensions?
3. What are the consequences of the negative dimensions of this organizational cul- ture? In what ways are they harmful to the organization, its employees, suppliers, and customers?
4. What actions can you take to change the dysfunctional aspects of the culture? The 7-S framework (chapter 4) is a good place to start. What changes need to be made to the “hard” factors: strategy, structure, systems? What changes need to be made to the “soft” factors: style, staff, skills, shared values? How does senior leadership behavior have to change?
5. What would those actions cost?
LO 5.4
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 163
EXERCISE 5.3
How Will
the Digital
Revolution
Affect Your
Organiza-
tion?
Briefing (1)
You have decided to leave your organization tomorrow, to set up your own business in competition with your large, out-of-date, slow-moving, bureaucratic former employer.
You have identified your organization’s main weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Critically, you have worked out how a combination of digitization technologies and social net- working tools could be used to undermine your organization’s traditional business model. Or, customers may have “after-market” needs that your organization is not fulfilling.
Describe your new business model. What digital tools and social media technologies will you use to attract customers or clients from your previous employer to your busi- ness—and perhaps from other organizations in the sector? How quickly can you set up this business? What will it cost you to set up this business?
Briefing (2)
OK, you are not leaving the organization after all. That briefing was designed to make you think about potential threats to your organization from agile and innovative “out of sector” competitors. Let us assume that the new business model that you have just described is real, and that somebody else has already thought about it—and may already be setting it up. How can your organization respond to that threat? Better still, how can your organization counter that threat before it emerges?
Draw up an internal action plan for transforming the organization’s current business model, or for creating a separate unit or division to develop your new business model alongside the existing one.
LO 5.5
Brynjolfsson, E., and McAfee, A. 2014. The second machine age: Work, progress, and
prosperity in a time of brilliant technologies. New York and London: W. W. Norton &
Company. An optimistic analysis of the pervasiveness of digital technologies and their
dramatic impact on individuals, organizations, society, and the economy.
Gratton, L. 2011. The shift: The future of work is already here. London: Collins. Explores
how trends in globalization, society, demography, technology, and use of natural
resources are reshaping work, and offers advice on how to “future-proof” your career.
Perlow, L. A. 2012. Sleeping with your smartphone: How to break the 24/7 habit and
change the way you work. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press. Explores individual
and organizational benefits and problems of “hyperconnectivity” and how to retain work-
life balance and improve performance by collectively “disconnecting.”
Schein, E. H. 2010. Organizational culture and leadership. 4th ed. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass. Classic and recently revised text exploring the nature and significance of organizational
culture and the crucial role of leaders as “architects” of culture.
Additional Reading
164 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
Roundup
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
In what kinds of change initiatives are you cur-
rently involved—shallow, deep, mixed? If your
current involvement concerns mostly shallow
initiatives, how will that affect your ability to
answer questions about your change manage-
ment experience at the next job/promotion
interview? Do you need to “reposition” your
profile to include deeper changes?
Does your personal comfort zone favor involve-
ment in major, transformational, deep changes?
Why? Or are you more comfortable implement-
ing lower-risk, shallow changes—which can of
course still be highly effective? In your judge-
ment, what are the personal and organizational
implications of your preferences?
In your judgement, does your organization
need disruptive innovation, in which areas,
and why? Or would those changes be too
“disruptive” and less effective than continuing
to implement sustaining innovations?
You are a social media user, accessing your
favorite websites from at least one mobile
device—your smartphone or tablet. You also
use those sites through your smart Internet-
connected television. How do you feel about
your organization using social media to com-
municate with you? Does this open up new
sources of information and fresh communica-
tion channels with management and staff?
Or will this open you to 24/7 availability
and give you information overload? How do
employees in general in your organization
feel about this?
In answer to the question “what changes?” this chapter has introduced terms for describing
different types of change, based on the metaphor of depth; some changes are shallow, oth-
ers are deep. We then focused on three areas of organizational change: innovation, culture,
and technology. These are not the only dimensions of organizational change, of course,
but they are issues that most if not all organizations will continue to face for some time.
Why have these particular themes acquired such a high priority? A failure to innovate can
lead to organizational decline. Dysfunctional organizational cultures can have disastrous
consequences. Digitization and social media have the potential to create new and poten-
tially disruptive business models, making many established business models obsolete. The
“controlling” images of change management—director, navigator, caretaker—may be less
useful in this context. Dealing with a rapidly developing, uncertain, and unpredictable
climate, the “shaping” images of change management may be more appropriate—coach,
interpreter, navigator.
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this
chapter, in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Explain several different ways of categorizing different types of change.
Organizational changes are typically varied and multifaceted. Change one aspect of
an organization and the interdependencies lead to “knock-on” or “ripple” effects that
lead to further change elsewhere. We introduced a number of different ways of describ-
ing and classifying change, and these are summarized in table 5.3. The concepts of
transformational change and disruptive innovation have become fashionable. Given the
rapid pace of technology development, and of change driven by other socioeconomic,
cultural, and legislative pressures, transformation and disruption appear to be attractive
LO 5.1
Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t? 165
options. However, we have to recognize that less profound, shallow, simple changes
can often be valuable in context. Small changes can also underpin and trigger major
initiatives. The potential organizational value of shallow change should therefore not be
underestimated.
Type of Change Description
Planned Implemented in anticipation of, or in response to, known developments
Emergent Just happens, or has to happen, in response to unforeseen events
Incremental Gradual, small scale
Transformational Radical, groundbreaking, disruptive
First-order Solves a problem using methods based on current assumptions
Second-order Transforms the organization with creative thinking and new busi- ness models
Third-order Habitual overturning of assumptions, continual adaptation and self-renewal
Shallow Another label for incremental, small-scale change, fine-tuning
Deep Another label for transformational, disruptive change, mold-breaking
TABLE 5.3 Different Types
of Change
Identify practical implications of different types of change for the change manager.
One practical implication of our change classification system concerns, as just men-
tioned, the potential of small changes to deliver benefit in their own right and to contrib-
ute to deeper initiatives. A second implication for the change manager is that shallow
changes are likely to be more straightforward to implement: less cost, less risk, less
disruption, less resistance. Organizational transformations present a different order of
change management challenge. A third implication, however, is that a change manag-
er’s involvement in deep change is more likely to contribute to experience, reputation,
and career than managing small initiatives. This leads to the suspicion that some deep
changes could be designed to address personal interests rather than corporate needs.
At any given time, especially in larger organizations, there are likely to be many
change initiatives under way, across the spectrum of figure 5.1, from shallow, to mid-
range, to deep. The problem of coordinating such a pattern of change has led to the
establishment of program management offices (PMOs) in many organizations. PMOs
can thus support change and help to avoid the duplication of effort and cost. Where they
are seen as “change police,” their contributions may be curtailed.
Understand the difference between sustaining and disruptive innovation, and explain
the practical implications of this distinction for change management.
Sustaining innovations improve current practice, while disruptive innovations intro-
duce wholly new ways of doing things. From a change management perspective,
LO 5.2
LO 5.3
166 Chapter 5 What Changes—and What Doesn’t?
it is usually easier to persuade others of the value of sustaining innovations; dis-
ruptive innovations are more difficult to explain, and because they make current
practice obsolete, they may be seen as more risky. Most organizations do not have
established procedures or routines for handling disruptive innovations—which are
thus often implemented by small start-up companies rather than large established
organizations.
The change manager can become a “disruptive innovator” by adopting five habits:
associating, questioning, observing, experimenting, and networking. These are habits
that anyone can develop, with practice.
Assess the significance of organizational culture with regard to organizational perfor-
mance and reputation, and the role of leaders as culture architects.
Organization culture is regarded by some commentators as an abstract concept with
limited organizational use. Defining culture as “the way we do things,” however, it
seems that some organizations have dysfunctional cultures, which can lead to highly
undesirable consequences. We saw how dysfunctional cultures at Barclays bank,
NASA, and BP contributed to financial crisis, loss of life and serious injury, wide-
spread economic and environmental damage, damage to the reputations and careers
of senior management, loss of public trust and confidence in the organization, and
massive fines for misconduct. Culture change, where necessary, becomes a priority
in the face of such evidence, and culture change programs have consequently become
popular.
Assess the potential impact of new digital technologies in general, and the potential
organizational benefits of applications of social media in particular.
A “moving target,” digitization offers three sets of strategic opportunities: enhanced
interaction with stakeholders, improved management decisions, and new business
models. Many organizations have seen their successful business models undermined
by digital start-ups. Social media also seem to have many applications with regard to
communications, staff engagement, recruitment, and learning. These tools could thus
offer platforms for developing more open, communicative, egalitarian, collaborative,
and responsive cultures. However, organizations have been slow to respond to these
opportunities, and we may be in an “experiment and learn” phase. As mentioned earlier,
this context puts a premium on the coach, interpreter, and navigator images of change
management.
LO 5.4
LO 5.5
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171
Vision and the Direction of Change
Learning objectives
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 6.1 Explain the arguments for and against the concept of vision, and how approaches
to this issue depend on the image held of managing organizational change.
LO 6.2 Identify the characteristics of effective visions.
LO 6.3 Assess how the context in which a vision is developed affects its meaning.
LO 6.4 Apply different methods and processes for developing vision.
LO 6.5 Explain why some visions fail.
LO 6.6 Explain the arguments concerning the relationship of vision to organizational
change.
6Chapter
w w w .C a r to o n S to c k .c o m
172 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
LO 6.1 Vision: Fundamental or Fad?
Mission: This relates to goals, and refers to the overriding purpose of the organization. It is sometimes described in terms of the apparently simple but challenging question: “what busi-
ness are we in?” The mission statement helps keep managers focused on what is central to
their strategy.
Vision: This too relates to goals, and refers to the desired future state of the organization.
It is an aspiration which can help mobilize the energy and passion of organizational
members. The vision statement, therefore, should answer the question: “what do we want to
achieve?”
(Johnson et al., 2011, p. 8)
There is understandable confusion between the terms “mission” and “vision.”
Mission emphasizes purpose and outcomes. Vision, in contrast, focuses on future
aspirations and can thus be a key driver of organizational change. This helps to
explain why most of the change management perspectives explained in chapter 10
emphasize the importance of a clear and meaningful vision, without which direction
and motivation will be weak or absent. There is, however, debate over whether vision
is truly fundamental to change and effectiveness, or whether this is just a manage-
ment consultancy fad.
Highlighting the importance of vision and direction, Paul Victor and Anton Franckeiss
(2002, p. 41) argue, “It is imperative that change is aligned with a clear vision and busi-
ness strategy and that subsequent activities and interventions are coordinated and consis-
tent.” Hans Hinterhuber and Wolfgang Popp (1992, p. 106) argue that vision underpins
successful entrepreneurial activities and corporate change programs, defining vision as
“an orientation point that guides a company’s movement in a specific direction. If the
vision is realistic and appeals both to the emotions and the intelligence of employees,
The Coca-Cola Company Vision
Our vision serves as the framework for our Roadmap
and guides every aspect of our business by describ-
ing what we need to accomplish in order to con-
tinue achieving sustainable, quality growth.
People: Be a great place to work where people are
inspired to be the best they can be.
Portfolio: Bring to the world a portfolio of quality
beverage brands that anticipate and satisfy people’s
desires and needs.
Partners: Nurture a winning network of customers
and suppliers, together we create mutual, enduring
value.
Planet: Be a responsible citizen that makes a dif-
ference by helping build and support sustainable
communities.
Profit: Maximize long-term return to shareowners
while being mindful of our overall responsibilities.
Productivity: Be a highly effective, lean and fast-
moving organization.
Source: From http://www.coca-colacompany.com/
our-company/mission-vision-values (accessed
November 3, 2014).
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 173
it can integrate and direct a company.” Effective visions, they add, can be expressed
clearly—and are thus easily communicated—in just a few words (e.g., “Our vision is to
achieve price leadership and good design at the same time”).
Visions are thus linked to strategy and competitive advantage, enhancing organizational
performance and sustaining growth. Clear visions enable boards to determine how well
organizational leaders are performing and to identify gaps in current practices. Visions
help staff identify with the organization, and inspire the motivation to achieve personal and
corporate objectives. Organizations preparing for transformational change often undertake
“revisioning” exercises to guide them into the future. The visioning process itself can
enhance the self-esteem of those who are involved, because they can see the outcomes of
their efforts. Jeffrey Pfeffer (2010, p. 92) argues that vision is a source of influence: “Make
the vision compelling. It’s easier to exercise power when you are aligned with a compel-
ling, socially valuable objective.” Opponents will struggle to challenge such an agenda.
A lack of vision, on the other hand, is associated with organizational decline and fail-
ure. Graham Beaver (2000, p. 205) argues, “Unless companies have clear vision about
how they are going to be distinctly different and unique in adding and satisfying their
customers, then they are likely to be the corporate failure statistics of tomorrow.” The
absence of a clear and compelling vision may explain why some companies fail to exploit
their core competencies despite having access to adequate resources. Business strategies
lacking in visionary substance may fail to identify when organizational change is required.
Lack of an adequate process for translating shared vision into collective action may be
associated with the failure to produce transformational organizational change.
The concept of vision is powerful. However, it remains controversial, and invites cyni-
cism when every organization expresses a bland vision that includes “excellence,” “corpo-
rate responsibility,” “empowered employees,” and “delighted customers.” However, there
has been little research in this area, and there is disagreement on how to define and mea-
sure the term. As with change management in general, there is a lot of advice on how to
develop a vision, with little or no consensus on effective approaches. Some commentators
have argued that the preoccupation with vision has meant that the term has been overused
and trivialized (Beaver, 2000) and is thus in danger of losing any value.
Debates around appropriate definition and substance do not necessarily invalidate the
value of vision in clarifying an organization’s purpose and direction. The challenge for
the organization in general, and the change manager in particular, is to avoid an abstract
statement of vision accompanied with platitudes and grandiose statements that provide
little detail about what the future should look like. On the other hand, a vision that is
too specific, focusing on short-term targets and goals, and encouraging only incremen-
tal improvement is also of limited value. Visions become useful when they are midway
between these two extremes, setting out an engaging picture of the future, with sufficient
meaningful detail to which those involved can relate (Belgard and Rayner, 2004).
These arguments reflect a deeper question. The link between vision and organizational
change depends on the image of change management in use. Table 6.1 illustrates how each
of the six different images expresses a different understanding of this link. We invite the
reader to use this table to identify how different images focus attention on some issues and
approaches, and not others.
We begin by showing that the development of a meaningful vision depends on three
features. The first concerns the content or attributes of the vision: what it is and says. The
174 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
second concerns the context in which the vision is used: where it is used and by whom.
The third concerns the process by which the vision is developed: how it emerges and who
has contributed.
Following this we identify why visions can fail to produce their intended effects.
Finally, we focus on three contentious issues relating to the role of vision in organizational
change: whether vision initiates and drives change, or rather emerges as change unfolds;
whether vision helps or hinders change; and whether vision is best understood as an attri-
bute of heroic leaders, or of heroic organizations.
LO 6.2 The Characteristics of Effective Visions
John Kotter (2006) argues that visions must be focused yet flexible. While this may
sound relatively straightforward, the attributes that make visions “visionary” and useful
have provoked debate. Some commentators focus on the content of vision statements,
while others explore the context in which visions are used. The roles of leaders in
articulating visions and the process by which visions are developed have also attracted
attention. Here, we will consider the content of visions, including their style and other
TABLE 6.1 Change Management Image and Vision: Links and Focus
Image Vision-Change Link Focusing Attention On
Director Vision is essential to successful change, and must be articulated at an early stage by leaders
Need for clear vision to drive change linked to strategy and goals
Analytical and benchmarking processes used How context affects the impact of the vision Top-down responsibility to tell/sell the vision
Navigator Vision is important, but can be compromised by competing visions of different stakeholders
Vision is the product of debate The change manager has to handle “vision collision”
when competing groups disagree
Caretaker External forces shape the change process, and vision rarely has a major influence
Visionary or charismatic leaders have limited impact when vision is not related to the events driven by those external forces
Coach Vision emerges through the leader’s facilitation skills, shaping agendas and desired futures
Vision emerges through consultation and co-creation Vision will fail without participation
Interpreter Vision articulates the core values and ideology that underpin the organization’s identity
Visions are developed intuitively through imagery and imagination, using framing, scripting, and staging techniques
Vision is the “inner voice,” the “system core” Vision emerges through change
Nurturer Visions are always temporary, emerging from the clash of shift- ing and unpredictable forces for change
Visionary change leaders cannot predict accurately the outcome of systemic forces
Vision is an organizational property, not an individual product, and can survive chaos
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 175
attributes, and also explain how the concept of vision is distinguished from the related
concepts of organizational mission and values.
Vision Attributes Table 6.2 shows several definitions of organizational vision. Most refer to a future
or to an ideal to which organizational change should be directed. The vision itself is
presented as a picture or image that serves as a guide to that future ideal. Visions can
thus be inspiring, motivational, emotional, or analytical, depending on whose defini-
tion we are using.
Definitions do not necessarily help to determine the actual content of visions. Observ-
ing that “little is known about what the essential properties of a vision are,” Kimberly Boal
and Robert Hooijberg (2001, p. 527) argue that visions have two components:
a cognitive (intellectual) component, which is based on information and expresses out-
comes and how these will be achieved;
an affective (emotional) component that appeals to values and beliefs, and thus under-
pins the motivation and commitment that are key to implementation.
Table 6.3 summarizes the views of a number of commentators on the components of
a good vision. As this table shows, most commentators point to similar attributes: they
mostly suggest that visions should be aspirational, clear, desirable, distinctive, easy to
communicate, feasible, flexible, future-focused, inspiring, meaningful, memorable, moti-
vating, and should recognize the problems facing the organization. This sounds like a long
list of attributes to incorporate in a brief statement that can be quickly communicated and
easily remembered. Some commentators, therefore, have sought to distill the essence of
these guidelines. For example, Paul Nutt and Robert Backoff (1997) identify four generic
attributes of visions that are likely to enhance organizational performance:
1. Possibility: Points to innovative possibilities for dramatic improvements
2. Desirability: Based on shared values and norms about the way things should be done
3. Actionability: Indicates the roles and contributions of those who will make the vision a
reality
4. Articulation: Communicates the future clearly through powerful imagery
What Makes an Effective Vision?
How do you build a vision? Many people assume
that vision-building should resemble long-term
planning: design, organize, implement. But defin-
ing a vision of the future does not happen accord-
ing to a timetable or flowchart. It is more emotional
than rational. It demands a tolerance for messiness,
ambiguity, and setbacks. The half-step back usu-
ally accompanies every step forward. Day-to-day
demands pull people in different directions. Having
a shared vision does not eliminate tension, but it
does help people make trade-offs. The alternative
is to bog down in I-win, you-lose fights. Leaders
must convey a vision of the future that is clear,
appealing to stakeholders, ambitious yet attain-
able. Effective visions are focused enough to guide
decision- making yet are flexible enough to accom-
modate individual initiative and changing circum-
stances. (Kotter, 2006, p. 14)
176 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
John Pendlebury et al. (1998) specify three components of visions key to change
management:
1. Why the change is needed: The problem that validates the need for change
2. The aim of the change: The solution, which must be credible, meaningful, and feasible
3. The change actions that will be taken: The means, how actions will be mobilized and
delivered
We can thus identify the desirable features of vision statements. However, this does
not reveal the criteria on which those features should be assessed. This suggests that the
affective or “feel good” content of vision is important; we know it when we see it, but this
is difficult to define or to measure. Consider the sample of vision statements taken from
leading (Fortune 100) global companies. Which of these vision statements have the char-
acteristics that we have identified so far? Which do not have these characteristics? Based
on these vision statements, for which of these companies would you find it attractive to
work? Whose vision statements would turn you away? Why? How do you explain your
preferences and dislikes with regard to these visions?
Ira Levin (2000, p. 92) argues that some vision statements have a “bumper sticker”
style, based on jargon and fashionable terms. Their similarities thus mean that they could
be used by several different companies, and they are not inspirational. Hugh Davidson
(2004) calls these “me-too” statements that lack distinctiveness, such as Ericsson’s vision
in the 1990s, “to be the leading company in tomorrow’s converged data and telecommuni-
cations market.” Levin (2000) advocates instead the development of “vision stories” that
Definitions Sources
A statement of purpose determined by management based on the organization’s core values and beliefs that defines the organization’s identity and combines an ideal manifes- tation of its direction together with a tangible prescription for realizing its goals
Landau et al., 2006a, p. 147
Image of an “ideal future.” It is aspirational and idealistic, a guiding star with dreamlike qualities
Haines et al., 2005, p. 139
A picture of the future of our organization Auster et al., 2005, p. 50
A detailed description of a desired future that provides clarity as to how the organization will need to operate dif- ferently in order to meet the changing conditions of its markets, customers, and overall business environment
Belgard and Rayner, 2004, p. 116
An ideal that represents or reflects the shared values to which the organization should aspire
Kirkpatrick et al., 2002, p. 139
An ambition about the future, articulated today; it is a pro- cess of managing the present from a stretching view of the future
Stace and Dunphy, 2001, p. 78
Articulates where the organization is headed and what it is trying to accomplish
Deetz et al., 2000, p. 54
TABLE 6.2 Vision
Definitions
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 177
portray the future in a manner to which people can relate. Table 6.4 outlines the process
for producing vision stories. Levin cites Arthur Martinez, chief executive of Sears, as
someone adept at using vision stories. Martinez required his senior managers to write sto-
ries about the businesses that they managed and how customers related to those businesses
(Domm, 2001).
Characteristics Advocates
imaginable: conveys a picture of the future desirable: appeals to stakeholder interests feasible: embodies realistic, attainable goals focused: guides decision making flexible: enables initiative and response to changing environments communicable: can be explained in five minutes
Kotter (2012a)
provides a sense of direction sets the context for making decisions reflects the organization’s values and culture recognizes and responds to pressing needs identifies current actions to create a strong future
Deetz et al. (2000)
aspiration: how the new organization will look inspiration: getting people excited about where they are headed perspiration: highlights the work required to achieve the vision
Scott-Morgan et al. (2001)
clear direction conveys ambition and excitement memorable motivating relevant, to staff and customers can be translated into measurable strategies
Davidson (2004)
future focused: what will our business look like in 5 to 10 years’ time directional: describes where the organization is going clear and easily understood: guides decisions and inde- pendent action relevant: reflects the past as well as current challenges purpose-driven: connecting to a meaningful sense of purpose values-based: shared beliefs that influence behavior and attitudes challenging: stretch goals that set a high standard unique: reflects what makes the organization different vivid: provides a striking mental image of the future inspiring: captures the heart, and engages people to commit to a cause
Ambler (2013)
TABLE 6.3 The
Characteristics
of Effective
Visions
178 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
Offering a subtly different answer to the question, “What are the characteristics of
effective visions?” Levin (2000, pp. 105–6) concludes: “A well-conceived and articulated
vision offers the promise of serving as both a springboard and a frame of reference for
fuelling such aligned action. Yet, the traditional vision statement with its abstract, lofty,
and generic language fails to fulfil this promise. The vision story, on the other hand, with
its rich imagery and vivid description, is more effective in fulfilling this promise. The
Vision Statements from Fortune 100 Companies
Exxon Mobil: Exxon Mobil is committed to being
the world’s premier petroleum and petrochemi-
cal company. To that end, we must continuously
achieve superior financial and operating results
while adhering to the highest standard of busi-
ness conduct. These unwavering expectations
provide the foundation for our commitments to
those with whom we interact.
Wal-Mart Stores: To become the worldwide
leader in retailing.
Chevron: To be the global energy company
most admired for its people, partnership, and
performance.
Sinopec: To become the largest chemical fertil-
izer manufacturer and most effective resources
processing enterprise in the chemical industry in
China, which is also geared up for competing in
the international market.
Toyota Motor: Toyota aims to achieve long-term,
stable growth in harmony with the environ-
ment, the local communities it serves, and its
stakeholders.
HSBC Holdings: We aspire to be one of the world’s
great specialist banking groups, driven by our
commitment to our core philosophies and values.
Gazprom: To establish itself as a leader among
global energy companies by entering new mar-
kets, diversifying its activities, and ensuring reli-
able supplies.
Carrefour: The Carrefour Group has one simple
ambition: making Carrefour the preferred retailer
wherever it operates.
AT&T: To design and create in this decade the
new global network, processes, and service plat-
forms that maximize automation, allowing for a
reallocation of human resources to more com-
plex and productive work.
Nestlé: To bring consumers foods that are safe,
of high quality, and provide optimal nutrition to
meet physiological needs. In addition to nutri-
tion, health, and wellness, Nestlé products bring
consumers the vital ingredients of taste and
pleasure.
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China: ICBC
adheres to the concept of scientific devel-
opment for obtaining new driving force for
growth, striving to ameliorate its opera-
tional structure, and strengthening the inter-
nal management and promoting innovative
development.
Home Depot: To create a company that would
keep alive the values that were important to us.
Values like respect among all people, excellent
customer service, and giving back to communi-
ties and society.
U.S. Postal Service: The U.S. Postal Service is com-
mitted to actions that promote sustainability—
meeting the needs of the present without
compromising the future. We are working to
create a culture of conservation among our
663,000 employees in our more than 34,000
facilities.
BMW: To be the most successful premium manu-
facturer in the industry.
Source: From Kolk (2010). Organizations update their vision statements from time to time, and this list may not be current. The aim is to offer typical illustrations for
the purposes of assessment.
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 179
Step Actions for the Senior Team
1. Become informed Leadership team articulate their vision for the future—five to fif- teen years ahead—of the organization, taking into account:
External impacts and future business challenges? Economic, social, political, and technological trends and developments? What are other organizations doing to prepare for the future? Core values and beliefs?
2. Visit the future Imagine it is five years into the future, and the organization has been so successful that business magazines want to report the story, covering:
What is the organization’s reputation and what do competitors envy? What is the customers’ experience? What contributions have been made to the community? What do employees tell friends and family about working here? What new business ventures have been developed?
3. Create the story Write the vision story as a narrative (1,500 to 2,000 words):
Describe the actors, events, actions, and consequences What are the key messages and themes? What’s happening in the marketplace? How are staff providing services and interacting with customers? What is the mood—what are people experiencing and feeling?
4. Deploy the vision Develop the story for further discussion across the organization:
Explain the business case for change and the desired outcomes Explain what is not negotiable—values, operating principles Collect responses—what needs clarification, elaboration, explanation? Finalize the vision story—translate into strategies, targets, goals
TABLE 6.4 Vision as
Storytelling—
How to
Develop the
Narrative
Source: Based on
Levin (2000),
pp. 99–105.
vision story provides people with a lifelike glimpse into the future of possibilities and
directly answers the fundamental question: What will this future mean for me?”
Vision, Mission, and Goals Visions are often confused with other terms such as mission statements, goals, and
organizational values. Visions and missions can be particularly difficult to disentan-
gle. Most commentators adopt the position set out at the beginning of this chapter,
from Johnson et al. (2011). Mission concerns what an organization is and does. Vision
describes a future scenario, where the mission is advanced, and where goals and strat-
egy are being effectively achieved. Nutt and Backoff (1997) treat visions as being simi-
lar to missions and goals, in providing direction and identifying necessary changes.
However, although goals may identify desired results, such as improved morale, lower
180 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
costs, or bigger market share, they do not necessarily articulate the actions necessary to
produce those outcomes. Nor do they usually address the role of organizational values
in achieving the result. Visions, in contrast, usually paint a picture of the future and are
inspirational. Mission statements tend to be more purposive and instrumental in outlin-
ing what needs to be done.
Vision and Market Strategy Some commentators argue that, to create competitive advantage, an organization’s
vision and strategy must be unconventional, perhaps even counterintuitive, and must
also be distinct from those of other companies. Michael Hay and Peter Williamson
(1997), for example, note that visions have an external and an internal dimension. The
external dimension concerns a shared view of the outside world: how markets work,
what drives customers, competitors, industry dynamics, macroeconomic trends, the
impact of geopolitical events. Most car tire manufacturers, they note, such as Good-
year, Michelin, and Bridgestone/Firestone, have a market vision that sees the large car
manufacturing companies as their main customers, where large market share and high
volumes are the way to drive down costs. In contrast, the comparatively unknown Coo-
per Tire and Rubber Company had a different market vision. They decided that, as
Americans were holding onto their cars for longer, the independent replacement tire
outlets were their main market.
Hay and Williamson (1997) argue that having a well-specified external vision helps
to identify how the company will grow and compete. Only then can an internal vision be
developed, pointing to the capabilities that need to be acquired to compete, and also to
what the organization seeks to become. External and internal dimensions of the vision thus
have to be aligned.
LO 6.3 How Context Affects Vision
What is the relationship between vision and the organizational context in which it is
articulated and used? Context, for the purposes of this discussion, includes organiza-
tion culture.
Nutt and Backoff (1997, pp. 316–17) assess four organizational contexts in terms of
their abilities to produce visionary strategic change. These abilities are assessed in relation
to the degree of acceptance of the need for change (change susceptibility) and the extent to
which resources for strategic change are available (resource availability).
Rigid organizations have limited available resources and lack acceptance of the need
for change. Such organizations tend to be hierarchical and inflexible (such as Eastern
and Pan Am before their collapse).
Bold organizations have limited resources, but acceptance of the need for change is
high. They tend to be more organic and less rule-bound. Visionary leadership is more
likely to emerge in this context, although this entails freeing up resources and ensuring
that key stakeholders are carefully cultivated in the process of developing the vision.
Overmanaged organizations have high resource availability but little acceptance of the
need for change. They tend to be limited in their ability to accept the need for a new
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 181
vision, due to a comparatively stable environment dominated by past practices that are
seen to have worked well and which remain relevant.
Liberated organizations have a context in which visionary processes are likely to be
most successful. Hewlett-Packard and Intel, for example, have been regarded as having
high acceptance of the need for change and high availability of resources that can be
allocated to the strategic change process.
When does a vision “take”? This context analysis suggests the need for a “trigger” that
alerts organization members to the need for a new vision, thus strengthening acceptance of
change. The power of the vision, remember, lies with the way in which it can give mean-
ing to the current situation and promise to solve the organization’s problems. Triggers can
include external turbulence and uncertainty, crises demanding new strategies or ways of
working, poor organizational performance, or transitions such as entrepreneurial start-up
to growth. In addition, change leaders can use their influence and storytelling capabilities
to frame interpretations of the current situation so as to heighten dissatisfaction with the
status quo (Lewin, 1951), thus enhancing the desire for change. In other words, change
leaders can generate a crisis situation through their visionary and rhetorical skills, rather
than waiting for one to appear (Denning, 2004 and 2005).
The national and cultural contexts in which an organization is embedded are also fac-
tors contributing to whether or not visions “take.” For example, Jerry Wind and Jeremy
Main (1999) note that Donald Burr’s vision for the airline People Express was “to become
the leading institution for constructive change in the world.” That, they observe, was vague
and preposterous. In Japan, on the other hand, a past chairman of Canon, Ryuzaburo
Kaku, referred to himself as an evangelist, saying that the organization was guided by “liv-
ing and working together for the common good.” While similar in intent to Burr’s vision,
Wind and Main argue that Kaku’s vision “worked” in Japan, where organizations are more
closely aligned with national and social interests than they are in the United States. Con-
sider again the vision statements in table 6.4, and in particular those that you assessed as
less attractive. Did those come from companies based in another country and culture?
LO 6.4 How Visions Are Developed
How are visions developed? We will consider three answers to this question, explor-
ing approaches to “crafting” a vision, the kinds of questions that can help to develop a
vision, and connecting the vision to the organization’s “inner voice.”
Crafting the Vision Lawrence Holpp and Michael Kelly (1988, p. 48) argue that crafting a vision is “a little
like dancing with a 500-pound gorilla. It takes a little while to get the steps down, but
once the dance is over, you know you’ve really accomplished something.” There are
different approaches (or dances) to crafting or creating a vision, and some of these are
outlined in table 6.5 (based on a concept similar to the “leadership styles continuum,”
discussed in chapter 10, table 10.7).
For some commentators, crafting a vision is a senior management responsibility, typ-
ically discharged by having a small team analyze needs, identify choices, and develop
182 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
recommendations (Pendlebury et al., 1998). But some see this as a collaborative effort,
involving both the top team and those who will be affected by the vision. Lynda Gratton
(1996), for example, describes how seven European companies engaged in a democratic
vision process, drawing on a range of cross-functional groups instead of imposing a top-
down approach. Allowing the vision to emerge from debates among those multifunctional
groups, she argues, can potentially lead to more creative visions and subsequent actions.
This democratic approach also ensures that the need for change (which may be urgent) is
transmitted across the organization, and it provides executives with a better understanding
of the risks and trade-offs involved in implementing the vision.
Adopting a similar approach, Nutt and Backoff (1997) suggest three vision-crafting
processes.
1. Leader-dominated approach. The CEO provides the strategic vision for the organiza-
tion. This is similar to the “tell” and “sell” approaches in table 6.5. This approach is
not consistent with the concept of empowerment, which argues that people across an
organization should be involved in the processes and decisions that affect them.
2. Pump-priming approach. The CEO provides visionary ideas and gets selected individu-
als and groups to further develop these ideas within some broad parameters. This adapt-
ing and shaping process is similar to the “test” and “consult” approaches in table 6.5.
3. Facilitation approach. Similar to the “co-create” approach in table 6.5, this draws
directly on a participative management perspective by involving a significant number
of people in the process of developing and articulating the vision. The CEO acts as
facilitator, orchestrating the crafting process. Nutt and Backoff (1997) argue that this
approach is likely to produce better visions and more successful organizational change
because those who have contributed will be more committed to making the vision
work.
Three sets of structured guidelines or “routines” for producing a vision are summarized
in table 6.6. While similar in style, they provide different levels of detail with regard to the
nature of the process and the steps that should be involved. There is no “one best way” to
do this.
TABLE 6.5 Approaches to
Vision-Crafting
Approach What It Means Used When
Tell Chief executive creates the vision and gives it to staff
Involvement is not seen as important
Sell Chief executive has a vision that he or she wants staff to accept
Chief executive is attracted to the vision and wants others to adopt it
Test Chief executive seeks feedback on ideas about a vision
Chief executive wants to see which aspects of the vision find support
Consult Chief executive seeks the creative input of staff, within set parameters
Chief executive needs help to develop the vision
Co-create Shared vision is created by chief executive and staff
Chief executive wants to identify shared visions throughout the organization
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 183
Questions That Help to Develop a Vision The approaches that we have discussed so far distinguish between different degrees
of involvement in the development of an organization’s vision. However, they do not
directly address the question of how to develop the substance of the vision itself.
Holpp and Kelly (1988) identify three different approaches and sets of questions
through which vision may be developed. They label these approaches intuitive, analytical,
and benchmarking.
Core Steps in Creating a New Vision
1 Use a qualified facilitator Develop trial vision statements
Leadership team defines the timeline
2 Assess where you have been and where you are
Discuss these with staff and customers
Conduct an environmen- tal scan of threats and opportunities
3 Think about a new direction
Revise the vision Develop appropriate interview questions
4 Co-construct a statement about the organization’s future direction
Rediscuss the vision Use questions to interview leadership team to obtain their ideal vision of the future
5 Identify roadblocks Repeat the process until an agreed vision is produced
Draft a vision of the future
6 Take action quickly to capitalize on enthusiasm; develop a strategic plan to integrate vision throughout organizational practices
Get feedback from across the organization
7 Develop a system for monitoring and adjusting the vision, such as perfor- mance review workshops
Develop a second draft
8 Share vision with lead- ership team to gain commitment: develop a catch-phrase that cap- tures its essence, and a communication plan
9 Assess implications and develop specific action plans
Deetz et al. (2000) Davidson (2004) Belgard and Rayner (2004)
TABLE 6.6 Guidelines for
Structuring the
Vision Process
184 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
The intuitive approach relies on the use of imagination and imagery to encourage staff
to participate in vision development. Managers are asked to imagine doing their jobs in
such a way that they really achieve what they want from themselves and from the other
people with whom they work:
First, they are asked to list up to ten things that they want to achieve personally and
professionally, and then to prioritize these, focusing on the top two or three.
Second, they focus on their current situation as a way to identify the tension between
their current lived experiences and their desired image.
Third, they are provided with support to help identify and implement structured action
plans to work toward achieving their vision.
The analytical approach sees visions as defined in relation to organizational or depart-
mental missions and roles. Vision is thus related to purpose and focuses on the following
questions:
Who is served by the organization?
What does the organization do?
Where does the organization place most of its efforts?
Why does the organization focus on particular work and goals?
How does the organization operationalize these efforts?
The aim of these questions is to guide the organization as a whole, and individual
departments, from the current situation to a desired future state.
The benchmarking approach bases the vision on the actions and standards of the orga-
nization’s toughest competitors. This involves asking:
What do our competitors do well?
How can we surpass this?
What quantitative and qualitative measures would indicate that we had achieved this?
What will it be like, and how will it feel, when those standards have been achieved?
The benchmarking approach is more externally focused, compared with the intuitive
and analytical approaches, which have an internal focus. Here are some of the problems
with these approaches:
The intuitive approach, which follows an organization development perspective, may
produce personal visions that are not connected to the core business of the organization
and to current or anticipated industry trends.
The analytical approach serves more to align the vision to the mission of the organiza-
tion, but pays less attention to the values and guiding logics of the organization. By
aligning too tightly with mission, the analytical approach may neglect the inspirational
element of visions.
The benchmarking approach assumes that the organization’s future will be linked to
current competitors. However, it may be more valuable to identify who will be the new
competitors in the future, especially where an organization and sector are facing trans-
formational change.
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 185
Connecting to the Organization’s “Inner Voice” Robert Quinn (1996, p. 197) makes an interesting contribution to the process of iden-
tifying change visions. He points out that, in many organizations, people want to know
what the vision is and look to the chief executive to provide it. Paradoxically, however,
where vision statements are available, such as on corporate business cards, these are
likely to be rejected as being in name only; they are not what people are “willing to
die for.” He argues that developing a vision to guide organizational actions has to go
beyond superficial statements and “confront the lack of integrity that exists in the sys-
tem,” an exercise for which few managers are well equipped.
To illustrate this view, he tells the story of a speech given by Mahatma Gandhi at a
political convention in India. When he rose to speak, many in the audience also rose, left
their seats, and paid little attention to him. However, as he spoke about what Indians really
cared about—not politics, but bread and salt—the audience sat down again and listened.
His message was unusual: “This small, unassuming man had journeyed through their heart-
land and captured the essence of India. He was vocalizing it in a way they could feel and
understand. Such articulation is often at the heart of radical, deep change” (Quinn, 1996,
p. 199). For Quinn, it is this ability to find the organization’s “bread and salt” that makes a
vision appealing, passionate, and beyond the superficial. This search for the “inner voice”
of the organization is necessary in order to develop visions that resonate and narrow the gap
between “talk and walk.” Such “bread-and-salt” visions are achieved in a circular manner
involving a bottom-up and top-down dialogue to reach the “inner voice” of the organization.
Adopting a similar position, Chris Rogers (2007, p. 229) maintains that “vision is as
much about insight as far sight.” Visions need to connect with people’s desires, feelings,
and ambitions, as well as with the organization’s intentions. Resonating with the inter-
preter image of change management, this implies that visions are important in encourag-
ing the members of an organization to develop and explore “new ways of seeing,” to gain
fresh insights, make new connections, and to be better prepared to work with the chal-
lenges that a new vision is likely to bring.
Purpose beyond Profit
A focus on purpose goes beyond asking questions
about whether a business is operating profitably
or whether an action is legal—it engages a soul-
searching focus on questions at a core level, such
as: What is a business’s sense of purpose (shared
identity and goals)? How and why did a particular
business begin (imprinting effects of founding phi-
losophies)? Who founded the enterprise and what
did they want to achieve (entrepreneurial values,
mission, and vision)? How does a sense of purpose
relate to all the stakeholders in the organization and
to the context in which it operates (stewardship and
governance)? How does a business understand itself
relative to society, and what is it doing to create a
shared sense of purpose (institutional norms and
logics)?
Source: From Hollensbe et al. (2014), p. 1228.
Table 6.7 provides examples of “bad” and “good” purpose statements (Craig and
Snook, 2014, p. 109). Many organizations express their vision in vague and general terms:
“Help others excel,” “Ensure success,” “Empower my people.” These statements do not
include a plan for translating purpose into action. Some organizations try to cover every
186 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
possibility with jargon: “Empower my team to achieve exceptional business results while
delighting customers” (p. 108). Now consider these two visions:
Google: “To organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful”
Charles Schwab: “A relentless ally for the individual investor”
In order to develop a sense of purpose that has an impact, leaders must clarify their
own purpose based on experience, preferences, and ambitions. Craig and Snook also argue
that leaders have to imagine the impact that “living the purpose” will have on their world.
While actions matter more than words, the language in which purpose statements are
expressed is important, as table 6.8 suggests.
Leaders must therefore clarify their own unique sense of purpose, and put that to
work.
Purpose-Driven Leadership
Nick Craig and Scott Snook (2014) explore the con-
cept of “purpose-driven leadership,” arguing that
the leader’s sense of purpose contributes to a clear
statement of the organization’s vision and mission:
Doctors have even found that people with
purpose in their lives are less prone to disease.
Purpose is increasingly being touted as the key
to navigating the complex, volatile, ambigu-
ous world we face today, where strategy is ever
changing and few decisions are obviously right
or wrong. (p. 106)
TABLE 6.7 From Bad to
Good Purpose
Statements
From Bad … To Good …
Be a driver in the infrastructure business that allows each person to achieve their needed outcomes while also master- ing the new drivers of our business as I balance my family and work demands
Bring water and power to the 2 billion people who do not have it
Continually and consistently develop and facilitate the growth and development of myself and others, leading to great performance
With tenacity, create brilliance
TABLE 6.8 The Language
of Purpose-
to-Impact
Planning
Traditional Development Planning Purpose-to-Impact Planning
Uses standard business language Focuses on weaknesses to address
performance States a business- or career-driven
goal Measures success with metrics tied to
the firm’s mission and goals Focuses on the present, working forward Generic; addresses the job or role Ignores responsibilities outside the office
Uses meaningful, purpose-infused language Focuses on strengths to realize career
aspirations A statement of purpose explaining how
you lead Sets incremental goals related to living your
leadership purpose Focuses on the future, working backward Unique to you, addresses who you are as a leader Takes a holistic view of work and family
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 187
LO 6.5 Why Visions Fail
Visions can fail for a number of reasons. For example, this can happen when a vision is:
too specific; fails to appreciate the inability to control change, and the degree of uncer-
tainty often associated with outcomes
too complex; difficult to understand
too vague; fails to act as a landmark toward which change actions are directed
inadequate; only partially addresses the presenting problem
irrelevant; clear picture, not firmly attached to the business
blurred; no clear picture of the future
unrealistic; perceived as not achievable
a rearview mirror; pictures the past, extrapolated into the future
Be Specific Alan Lafley at P&G
The chief executive of Procter & Gamble (P&G),
Alan Lafley, is reflecting on his five years of leading
change inside the company. One of his key com-
ments is that he found it important to provide more
than just a briefly stated vision, because people
responded better to specifics:
So if I’d stopped at “We’re going to refocus on
the company’s core businesses,” that wouldn’t
have been good enough. The core businesses
are one, two, three, four. Fabric care, baby
care, feminine care, and hair care. And then
you get questions: “Well, I’m in home care.
Is that a core business?” “No.” “What does it
have to do to become a core business?” “It has
to be a global leader in its industry. It has to
have the best structural economics in its indus-
try. It has to be able to grow consistently at a
certain rate. It has to be able to deliver a cer-
tain cash flow return on investment.” So then
business leaders understand what it takes to
become a core business.
Why did this extra level of detail help? According
to Lafley, there were two factors. One was the size
and diversity of the P&G workforce—100,000 peo-
ple from over 100 cultures. The second was that,
for managers with so much going on in their busi-
nesses, the provision of more detail on the implica-
tions of the vision helped them to focus on what
was needed to implement it (Rajat Gupta and Jim
Wendler, 2005, p. 3).
Todd Jick (2001, p. 36) adds that a vision is likely to fail when leaders spend 90 percent
of their time articulating it (but not necessarily in clearly understood terms), and only 10
percent of their time implementing it. Table 6.9 suggests other reasons why visions fail.
The sidebar “A Lack of Shared Vision?” tells a short story about the absence of a shared
vision. We will now consider two further reasons for vision failure; inability to adapt over
time, and the presence of competing visions.
188 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
Failure to Adapt Some visions stand the test of time and remain applicable and adaptable to new situations
and environments. Others, however, need to be overhauled in order to remain relevant.
This situation is illustrated by the investigation by Lloyd Harris and Emmanuel Ogbonna
(1999) into two medium-sized UK retail companies and the impact of the founders’ visions
on strategic change. In both cases, the vision was established well over 100 years ago by
the company founder and there was evidence of an escalation of commitment to the vision
by subsequent management. In one company, the vision was paternalistic (commitment
toward staff) and focused on prudent growth. This led to a strong focus on sales and prof-
itability in each new store location. These characteristics were still present in the current
management of the company. The vision itself was seen as flexible and responsive to the
prevailing environmental conditions facing the company. The researchers label the found-
er’s vision in this case as providing a “strategic dividend” for subsequent management.
TABLE 6.9 Visions Fail
When …
Source: Based on
Lipton (1996),
pp. 89–91.
Visions Fail When … Because …
The walk is different from the talk
When managers do not match their words with actions, the vision is treated by staff as an empty slogan
They are treated as the “holy grail”
The expectations will be unrealistic, and visions are not magic solutions
They are not connected to the present
Visions need to recognize current obstacles if they are to be believable and seen as achievable
They are too abstract, or too concrete
Visions must be idealistic, realistic, and tangible
Development does not involve a creative process
It is often the process as well as the final vision that helps to secure the organization’s future
Participation is limited Consensus must be built around the vision, which has to be diffused throughout the organization
People are complacent Visions that are projected too far into the future are not seen as urgent
A Lack of Shared Vision?
John Symons (2006) tells the following humorous
story:
The man in the hot air balloon was lost. Descend- ing sufficiently he shouted to a walker on the ground asking where he was. “You are 30 feet up in the air,” was her immediate response before she walked away.
Asked subsequently by a companion to explain this unhelpful behavior she said: “He was a typical man- ager. He didn’t know where he was, or how to get to where he wanted to go without the help of those
underneath him.” Somewhat mischievously she added, “Why should I do more than necessary to help someone who got to where he was by hot air and did not tell me where he was planning to go?”
As John Symons comments:
She obviously did not know or share the balloon- ist’s vision. The lesson for managers is clear. As well as enthusing those underneath, the leader needs to communicate where he or she is in relation to achieving the vision.
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 189
By contrast, in the other company, the founder’s vision was to have a store in every
town in a particular region. A second aspect of this vision concerned family control of the
company. The researchers argue that this original vision continued to drive senior manage-
ment. However, in contrast to the first company, this vision served as a “strategic hangover.”
The closed nature of the vision led successive management teams to make decisions that
were out of step with changes in the environmental conditions facing the sector, such as the
movement of large retail stores into the region, and a shift in focus of such stores from price
to quality and service. As a result, the company almost faced financial ruin on two separate
occasions. In relation to subsequent strategic change actions taken by management in these
two companies, the authors argue that “whether the original vision of the founder results in
a legacy or a hangover is clearly dependent on the original flexibility of the strategy and the
later environmental appropriateness” (Harris and Ogbonna, 1999, p. 340).
Presence of Competing Visions Visions may also fail due to what Rosabeth Moss Kanter et al. (1992) call “vision col-
lisions,” involving the presence of multiple and conflicting visions. This can happen,
for example, when the vision is crafted by organization strategists who are convinced
of the need for change, but where this sense of urgency is not shared by those who
will implement or be affected by the change (who may still be trying to embed previ-
ous changes). Vision collisions can also occur where there is a gap between the visions
of management and stakeholders. In the mid-1980s, the vision of Nike, the sportswear
company, was to make athletic footwear. However, the company found that a different
market segment was buying their shoes: not athletes, but people who were wearing Nike
trainers instead of casual shoes. Nike responded by introducing its own brand of casual
shoes. This strategy failed because Nike had not understood that customers were buy-
ing expensive “overengineered sneakers” because they appealed to their image. In other
words, the company’s vision was out of step with its customers’ vision of Nike. Multiple
and conflicting visions can also arise with company mergers. Colin Mitchell (2002), for
example, cites the failure in 2000 of the merger between Deutsche Bank and Dresdner
Bank. In this merger, there was a “failure of management to persuade Deutsche’s invest-
ment bankers of the vision for how the newly merged company would compete. Many
key employees left, and the threat of mass walkout forced Deutsche to abandon the deal
after considerable damage to the share price of both companies” (p. 104).
We need to close this discussion with a note of caution. There is limited research into
the concept and process of vision failure. As Davidson (2004) argues, while there are
many tales of failed visions, there are also many corporate insiders who have a vested
interest in declaring success.
LO 6.6 Linking Vision to Change: Three Debates
In this section, we explore three debates concerning the links between vision and orga-
nizational change. First, we ask if vision is a driver of change, or if vision emerges
through the change process. Second, we ask whether vision helps or hinders change.
Third, we assess whether vision is better attributed to heroic, charismatic leaders, or is
better understood as an organizational attribute.
190 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
Debate One—Vision: Driving Change, or Emerging During Change? Vision drives change: The change management approaches and frameworks described in chapter 10 give vision a prominent role in underpinning and implementing
organizational change.
For Kanter et al. (1992), establishing a vision is the first step toward change. Without a
vision, changes may seem arbitrary and unnecessary. Vision provides clarity about the
goals of change, avoiding the perception that this is just another cost-cutting exercise.
The vision can motivate staff to embrace change, engaging in what may seem to be
daunting or risky actions.
For Pendlebury et al. (1998), vision determines the scope, depth, and time frame of
change, and the areas that will be affected. Having a vision at the start of change is
needed for both transformational change (outlining the broader strategic intent to which
all actions are directed) as well as incremental or adaptive change (where the vision can
be more specific in terms of specifying change objectives and procedures).
The need for vision at the start of change is also embedded in the strategy literature,
where the term strategic intent is often used to represent vision. It is most usually asso-
ciated with the work of Gary Hamel and C. K. Prahalad (1989, p. 4), who argue that
“strategic intent envisions a desired leadership position and establishes the criterion the
organization will use to chart its progress.” They point to Komatsu’s “Encircle Caterpil-
lar,” and Canon’s “Beat Xerox” as visionary statements that capture strategic intent. The
strategic intent behind such statements was long term and encompassed a number of dif-
ferent change programs and actions over the short and medium term that were designed to
work toward the longer-term vision. The strategic intent expressed the desired end result
without specifying or prescribing the necessary steps for achieving it.
Vision emerges during change: Although important, it may not be possible to articulate a clear vision at an early stage during transformational or discontinuous
change. Robert Shaw (1995) argues that organization structures and management
processes may require fundamental change. It may not be possible to develop a
vision until after the process has begun to unfold, because the relevant information
may not be available in the current configuration (customer expectations, competi-
tion). In other words, discontinuous change has to be under way in order to make that
information available to inform the development of vision. Those who are leading
the change are surrounded by the presenting problems and are able to make real-time
adjustments in the context of the results of their ongoing efforts. Robert Quinn (1996,
p. 83) describes this as “building the bridge as you walk it.”
Other commentators have adopted an even stronger position, arguing that “the
vision thing” is overrated in terms of driving change. For Frederick Hilmer and Lex
Donaldson (1996), business planning, not vision or visionary leaders, produces suc-
cessful change. Analyzing corporate change at GE, they observe that “there was no
clear vision to guide the transformation” (p. 126) and that the actions of Jack Welch
were pragmatic and “based on the application of conventional business ideas about the
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 191
need for productivity improvement and high market share” (p. 127). Many visions were
produced over the period of Welch’s tenure, and a clear vision did not emerge until
most of the transformational changes had been implemented. Hilmer and Donaldson
(1996) argue that “vision rhetoric” was used simply to make management decisions
appear to be more acceptable.
Debate Two—Vision: Help Change or Hinder Change? Vision helps change: Lipton (1996) identifies five tangible benefits that skillful visions can bring to an organization:
Enhance performance: The studies by James Collins and Jerry Porras (1991, 1996,
2005) found that companies labelled as visionary were likely, over time, to deliver a
greater dividend to shareholders compared to others.
Facilitate change: Visions provide road maps that assist the transition process.
Enable sound strategic planning: Plans that have embedded within them imagery of the
future are more likely to inspire people to action.
Recruit talent: This applies particularly to the Generation Xers who want to maximize
their incomes while feeling that they are engaging in challenges greater than simply
making a profit.
Focus on decision making: Vision helps to develop the distinctive competencies that
characterize an organization.
Emmanuel Metais (2000) supports this position, arguing that “strategic vision” helps to
produce stretch in an organization by creating a sense of incompetence resulting from the
gap between the future and the current reality. This perceived incompetence encourages
creativity and the search for new ways of acquiring and using resources. At the same time,
vision can also help to leverage these resources by stimulating innovative ways of using
them. Stretch and leverage combined, Metais argues, can be used to identify new strate-
gies for achieving the vision, including actions such as:
flanking: exploiting a weakness in a dominant competitor
encircling competitors: gaining greater control of the market
destabilizing the market: changing the competitive rules
Paul Schoemaker (1992) also links strategic vision with helping to decide the prod-
ucts that an organization should make and the markets in which it should operate. Per-
formance appraisals and incentive systems can then be managed so that they align with
the vision.
Vision hinders change: Vision can impede the process of organizational change when visionary or charismatic leaders use emotional appeal as the basis for engagement
and neglect the operational details needed to make change work. A related problem is
that vision focuses on the future, diverting attention from current problems (see “Lou
Gerstner on Vision,” below). One example is the failure of the UK Internet company
Boo.com, which raised $135 million to deliver its vision, which was to have a global
presence in online clothes shopping (Lissack and Roos, 2001). It launched operations
192 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
in 17 different countries but had problems with slow software, which frustrated poten-
tial buyers:
Boo’s vision called for a broadband world of cool kids with large budgets. Boo’s reality con-
sisted of 56k modems, fussy buyers, and tight budgets. Boo was consistent with its vision but
out of sync with its present landscape. (Lissack and Roos, 2001, p. 61)
Vision can thus be a drawback when the wrong vision drives the change, when leaders
exaggerate perceptions of crisis, and when the vision fails to deliver its promise and fol-
lowers become disillusioned and lose confidence in both the leader and the organization.
Further problems will arise when there is a significant gap between the vision and the
organizational capabilities that would be required to realize it.
Vision development approaches that do not involve the people who will be affected are
thought to have negative consequences for producing successful organizational change.
For example, Harvey Robbins and Michael Finley (1997, p. 175) point out that:
Where organizations go wrong is in assuming that the vision is some precious grail-like
object that only the organizational priests are privy to—that it appears in a dream to the
executive team, who then hold it up high for the rank and file to ooh and ahh over. The prob-
lem with the priestly approach to vision-and-mission is that the resulting vision is often a lot
of garbage. The outcome, instead of being a useful reminder to keep to the change track, is a
paragraph held to be so sacred that no one dares change it.
Vision can further hinder change where, once developed, senior management become
so committed to it that they are unwilling to reevaluate and test its ongoing utility and
relevance. To do this could challenge the assumptions that the top team is truly in control,
that they have better foresight than anyone else, and that they do indeed have a clear and
compelling vision of the organization’s future. Senior management may feel uncomfort-
able questioning those issues.
Visions can hinder organizations when they have been developed using sense-making
processes that are linked to current or past practices. Lissack and Roos (2001) argue that
this approach is flawed, because predicting the future on this basis reifies the desired out-
come without enabling future changes to be built into it. Vision is based on the world in
Lou Gerstner on Vision
Louis V. Gerstner Jr., chief executive of IBM, argued in a
press conference in the mid-1990s that “the last thing
IBM needs right now is a vision.” He later wrote that
this was “the most quotable statement I ever made.”
This statement has often been cited as evidence that
he downplayed or even dismissed the role of vision in
organizational change. For example, Michael Raynor
(1998, p. 368) argues that “for a good many critics
Gerstner’s comment was greeted with a heartfelt 'it’s
about time’—that is, it is about time that a senior
executive had the courage to speak up and put all that
rhetoric about visions and missions in its place.”
Gerstner argues, however, that those who have
portrayed this view of him have misinterpreted (or
even misquoted) him, often failing to pay attention
to the “right now” part of the statement. He main-
tains that IBM had a number of vision statements:
it was now time to implement these, rather than
engage in further visioning exercises, because by
that time, “fixing IBM was all about execution.”
Source: Based on Gerstner (2003).
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 193
the future being stable and predictable. Outcomes are locked in and goals are set. The
problem is that the vision may prevent the organization from pursuing new, unanticipated
opportunities that may emerge.
For Lissack and Roos (2001), the concept of vision is limited by other assumptions. One
assumption is that organizational boundaries are well defined: staff, customers, suppliers. In
a world of fuzzy organizational networks, this assumption is questionable. A second assump-
tion is that the identity of the organization is fixed, with the vision built around that iden-
tity. We think of Lego, for example, as a toy company. However, corporate identity—what
the organization does—is constantly changing; as we saw in chapter 5, Lego is also now
an online games company. Lissack and Roos (2001, p. 61) prefer the term “coherence” to
vision. Coherence involves, “acting in a manner consistent with who you are given your
present spot in the business landscape.” An interesting argument, but it is unlikely that the
term “coherence,” emphasizing debates around boundaries and organizational identity, will
replace the concept of vision, which is deeply embedded in change management thinking.
How does vision impact individual rather than organizational identity, and can this
propel or impede change? This issue has generated debate. Landau et al. (2006a and b)
note that staff may identify strongly with an organization’s original vision, and with the
underlying beliefs and assumptions. However, when an attempt is made to inject a new
vision, this is likely to be resisted if it disrupts individual images and self-definitions. The
new vision will therefore hinder change. This problem can be addressed if it is possible
to ensure that new objectives and goals remain consistent with the values and beliefs that
underpinned the original vision.
Jeffrey Ford and William Pasmore (2006) question this position for two reasons. First,
it is not clear that vision does directly affect individual identity-forming processes. This is
an empirical question that needs to be examined, and is likely to vary across organizations.
Second, even if we accept that there is a direct relationship between individual identity and
vision, the problem lies with staff who are deeply committed to an existing identity, which
they are reluctant to change, despite the need for a new vision (and perhaps, therefore, a
new identity)—even if the new vision is necessary to secure the organization’s survival.
They note, “People should be entitled to their identities, but at the same time, organizations
do need people who are committed to a viable, sustainable vision to survive” (p. 176). This
argument reminds us that changes in vision may challenge individual identities, thereby
producing resistance to change. When developing a new vision, therefore, it is important
to assess, first, whether this will enable or disable identity-forming processes, and second,
whether this will encourage or discourage those affected to become involved in the change.
Debate Three—Vision: An Attribute of Heroic Leaders, or Heroic Organizations? Vision is an attribute of heroic leaders: Some commentators argue that success- ful organizational change depends on effective leadership. For David Nadler and Robert
Shaw (1995, p. 219), “heroic leaders” energize and support their followers and provide
them with a vision that “provides a vehicle for people to develop commitment, a com-
mon goal around which people can rally, and a way for people to feel successful.” As we
have already noted, the vision has to be clear, compelling, challenging, and credible, but
it must also be reflected in the expressions and actions of the leader who is articulating
194 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
it. Nadler (1998, p. 276) points to visionary leaders such as Jamie Houghton at Corning,
who painted “an engrossing picture of a culture in which Corning would be one of the
most competent, profitable, and respected corporations in the entire world.” He also iden-
tifies Scott McNealy of Sun Microsystems as envisioning “an information world where
people would be free to choose from a range of vendors rather than held captive by a
single, all-powerful mega-corporation.”
Ironically, some of those who are cited as visionary leaders do not see themselves as
visionary or heroic, and have challenged the significance of vision:
Robert Eaton, who managed Chrysler after Lee Iacocca, downplayed vision in favor of
measurable short-term results.
Bill Gates, one of the founders of Microsoft, once declared that “being visionary is
trivial” (Lipton, 1996, p. 86).
Nevertheless, those leaders are often praised for articulating clear, appealing, challeng-
ing images of the future of their organizations—the hallmarks of effective visions.
William Gardner and Bruce Avolio (1998) argue that effective charismatic, visionary
leaders create “identity images” that are valued and desired by others, incorporating trust-
worthiness, credibility, morality, innovativeness, esteem, and power. Drawing on a drama-
turgical perspective, they argue that charismatic leaders enact (or perform) their visions
through four processes:
1. Framing: The art of managing meaning, influencing others to accept the leader’s inter-
pretation of the vision by stressing its importance and aligning it with their values;
2. Scripting: The process of coordinating and integrating more specific sets of ideas and
actions including:
casting of the appropriate key roles
dialogue, using various rhetorical devices, such as metaphors and stories, to increase
the appeal of the message
providing direction, using verbal and nonverbal behavior and emotional displays
3. Staging: The selection of symbols, artifacts, props, and settings to reinforce the vision
4. Performing: Enacting the vision by personally demonstrating the behaviors required to
achieve the vision
It is important to note that, although having a vision is considered by many commenta-
tors to be a prerequisite for successful change leadership, others disagree. Vision may be a
necessary component of inspirational leadership, but may not be sufficient. Robert Goffee
and Gareth Jones (2000) argue that, to complement energy and vision, other qualities are
necessary, including:
revealing personal weaknesses to followers in order to gain their trust
sensing how things are in the organization and the wider environment, picking up and
interpreting subtle cues and signals
showing “tough empathy,” being passionate, caring, but realistic, focusing on what oth-
ers need rather than what they want
daring to be different, signalling and maintaining their uniqueness, while maintaining
social distance
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 195
It has also been argued that visionary leaders are needed at an everyday level through-
out the organization, and not just at the top. Such individuals provide what Chris Rogers
(2007) calls “supervision,” using interactions, conversations, and role modelling to
demonstrate:
perspective, concerning the challenges facing the organization
purpose, both personal and organizational
processes, to respond more effectively to customers
possibilities, by challenging current constraints
potential, concerning personal contributions
passion, to channel energies in meaningful ways
In this perspective, therefore, to maintain engagement and motivation, providing vision
must be a day-to-day activity involving many leaders across the organization, and not an
occasional process led by a single senior figure or a small top team.
Vision is an attribute of heroic organizations: Collins and Porras (2005) argue that visionary leaders are not necessary in order to create visionary companies, claim-
ing that the role of charisma in setting vision has been exaggerated. A charismatic
leader may even be an impediment to the creation of a visionary organization; sus-
tained organizational effectiveness depends on embedded visions, values, and ideolo-
gies, rather than on pronouncements from one senior figure. The leader’s role is to act
as a catalyst, facilitating the development of, and commitment to, the vision. This is a
process that can be achieved through a variety of leadership and management styles.
It is more important to create an organization with a vision than to have a charismatic
chief executive with a personal vision.
In this perspective, vision incorporates core ideology, which is unchanging, and defines
what the organization stands for and why it exists. An envisioned future is what the orga-
nization aspires to and changes toward over time. Ideology comprises core values and core
purpose. Core values are durable guiding principles: “the HP Way,” Walt Disney Compa-
ny’s “imagination and wholesomeness,” Procter & Gamble’s “product excellence,” Nord-
strom’s “customer service.” Collins and Porras (2005) note that most companies have only
three to five shared core values. Core purpose, on the other hand, defines the reason for the
organization’s existence:
3M: “solve unsolved problems innovatively”
Mary Kay Cosmetics: “give unlimited opportunity to women”
McKinsey & Company: “help leading corporations and governments be more
successful”
Walmart: “give ordinary folk the chance to buy the same things as rich people”
Core purpose should be durable (designed to last a century, perhaps), and differs from
goals and business strategies, which change constantly over time. The purpose may not
change, but it should inspire change, development, and progress. The envisioned future,
in contrast, consists of “BHAGs”—Big, Hairy, Audacious Goals, or daunting challenges
with specified timelines, which can involve:
196 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
Common enemy logic: Philip Morris in the 1950s wanted to “knock off RJR as the
number one tobacco company in the world”; Nike in the 1960s aimed to “crush Adidas”
Role model logic: Stanford University in the 1940s wanted to become “the Harvard of
the West”; in 1996, Watkins-Johnson’s goal was to “become as respected in 20 years as
Hewlett-Packard”
Internal transformation logic: The goal for GE in the 1980s was to “become number
one or number two in every market we serve, and revolutionize this company to have
the strengths of a big company combined with the leanness and agility of a small com-
pany”; Rockwell in 1995 wanted to “transform this company from a defense contractor
into the best diversified high-technology company in the world.”
A further component of envisioned future, vivid descriptions, consists of vibrant,
passionate, and engaging descriptions of what it will be like in the future when goals
are achieved. Envisioning the future is a creative process, engaging staff across the
organization.
The Complete Vision at Merck
Collins and Porras (2005) argue that complete
visions have three components: a core ideology
(values and purpose); an envisioned future (big,
hairy, audacious goals); and vivid descriptions. They
offer the following example from the pharmaceuti-
cal company Merck in the 1930s:
Core Ideology Envisioned Future
core values: social responsibility, excellence, and science-based innovation
BHAG: to transform from a chemical manufac- turer to a world drug company with research capacity rivalling major universities
Purpose Vivid Description
to preserve and improve human life with the tools we have supplied, science will be advanced, knowledge increased, and human life win ever greater freedom from suffering and disease
The work of Collins and Porras offers a sensitive
treatment of the relationship between vision and
change. Vision (which they also call “industry fore-
sight”) is broken down into component parts, some
of which remain stable and some of which change
over time. Many change models that refer to the
need for vision to guide organizational change lack
this degree of sophistication. Vision is often pre-
sented as something that guides change, handed
down to the organization by the chief executive
and the top management team. However, for Col-
lins and Porras, vision (as core ideology) serves as
an enduring background component, not so much
guiding change as reflecting how change will be
achieved (by following core values, for example).
It is the envisioned future of vision that offers con-
crete change direction, concerning what should be
changed, and how.
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 197
EXERCISE 6.1
Interview-
ing Change
Recipients
Your task is to interview three employees; they can be in the same or different organiza- tions. Ask them to think back to an organizational change that they experienced, and to answer the following questions:
1. Were they presented with an organizational vision for this change, and if so: What was the vision? What effect did this have on them? Were they involved in developing the vision? To what extent did the vision motivate them to engage in the change? How central was the vision to implementing the change?
2. If your interviewees were not given an organizational vision for this change, ask them: Would a vision have helped them to understand and become involved in the change? How important is vision to achieving organizational change?
When you have completed your interviews, consider the responses that you have doc- umented. What general conclusions emerge regarding the relationship between vision and organizational change? What have you learned from this exercise?
LO 6.1
EXERCISE 6.2
Analyze
Your Own
Organiza-
tion’s Vision
Consider your own current organization, or another with which you are familiar, which could be the institution where you are studying.
Refer back to the description, from Collins and Porras (2005), of “The Complete Vision at Merck.” Identify your chosen organization’s vision in those terms: core ideology (and values), envisioned future, BHAGs, and vivid descriptions.
Does your organization’s vision help to drive change, or not? Why? Is the vision just a “public relations” exercise, or is it used in practice? How can you
tell? LO 6.2
EXERCISE 6.3
The Role
of Vision
at Mentor
Graphics
As you read this case, consider the following questions:
1. How would you describe the way vision was used at Mentor Graphics?
2. Did it strengthen or weaken the company? How? Why?
3. Of the reasons discussed in this chapter concerning why visions fail, which are appli- cable to Mentor Graphics?
4. What is your assessment of the vision content and the process through which it was intro- duced in the Mentor Graphics context? What lessons emerge from your assessment?
5. Based on what happened at Mentor Graphics, what are the implications for the three debates discussed in this chapter: whether vision drives change or emerges during change; whether vision helps or hinders change; and whether vision is an attribute of heroic leaders or heroic organizations?
6. Of the six change images outlined in table 6.1, which images of vision can be applied to this case study? What lessons emerge from this?
LO 6.5
198 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
Gerard Langeler (1992), president of Mentor Graphics Corporation, described the role of vision in his company over a decade. Formed in the early 1980s, Mentor Graphics started with an unarticulated vision to “Build Something That People Will Buy.” On this basis, they spent a number of months interviewing potential customers and designing a computer-aided engineering workstation product.
At the same time, a competitor, Daisy Systems, was engaged in the same task and, in the early years, outcompeted Mentor Graphics. Eventually, “Beat Daisy” became the new vision, driven by the need to survive as a business.
By 1985 Mentor’s revenues were higher than Daisy’s; their vision had been real- ized. The company continued to grow despite the recession, but it suffered from typical growth problems, including decline in product quality and problems of internal company coordination. Stock value also suffered, and a number of staff approached Langeler seek- ing a new vision for the company.
The new vision was developed based on “Six Boxes,” which represented the six differ- ent businesses in which the company sought market leadership. The “Six Boxes” became a company mantra, but in the late 1980s, one of the businesses, computer-aided pub- lishing, was not paying dividends. However, the fact that it constituted one of the “Six Boxes” meant that they could not shut it down, and be left with a “Five Boxes” vision. In this case, the existence of the vision disrupted the ability to make sound financial judge- ments. It also stopped them from moving more quickly to using Sun platforms, some- thing they thought was too conventional for them.
A new vision was developed—the “10X Imperative”—that mirrored the push other companies were making toward quality through Six Sigma and other similar quality pro- grams. However, customers did not really understand the new vision: it was too abstract and elusive.
In 1989 yet another vision emerged: “Changing the Way the World Designs Together.” In retrospect, Langeler depicts this vision as “the final extension of vision creep that began with Six Boxes.” It was very grand and had little to do with the actual businesses in which Mentor Graphics operated, including the development of its new 8.0 generation of software.
The realization, by the early 1990s, that the company’s vision detracted from what the company was actually trying to achieve led to the dumping of the vision and its replace- ment with one that echoed the early beginning of the company: “Our current short-, medium-, and long-term vision is to build things people will buy.” This was seen as a more pragmatic vision for a company that had lost its way, caught up in a cycle of visions that were increasingly irrelevant to the core business and which inhibited their ability to make sound business decisions.
Hollensbe, E., Wookey, C., Hickey, L., and George, G. 2014. Organizations with purpose.
Academy of Management Journal 57(5):1227– 34. Discusses vision and purpose in terms
of the “greater good” and the organization’s contribution to society. Argues that an orga-
nization’s sense of purpose must recognize the interdependence of business and society.
Ibarra, H. 2015. Act like a leader, think like a leader. Boston: Harvard Business Review
Press. Offers advice on thinking strategically and avoiding the distractions of short-term
priorities. Citing George W. Bush and his dismissive comment about “the vision thing,”
Additional Reading
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 199
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this chapter,
in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Explain the arguments for and against the concept of vision, and how approaches to this
issue depend on the image held of managing organizational change.
Some commentators argue that vision is indispensable, providing direction, purpose,
and inspiration, and also strengthening the motivation to accept and become involved
in change. Others, however, argue that the concept of vision is abstract and vague,
becoming meaningless—and attracting cynicism—when most organizations articu-
late similarly bland visions that typically incorporate excellence, social responsibility,
empowered employees, and delighted customers.
The concept of vision varies with the image of change management that is in use.
For example, the director image assumes that responsibility for framing vision lies with
senior leaders. The caretaker assumes that an organization’s vision is shaped primarily
by external forces. The coach facilitates the consultation and co-creation process through
which vision is developed by staff across the organization. The nurturer sees visions
emerging from the clash of unpredictable forces, and therefore as temporary constructs.
LO 6.1
Herminia Ibarra argues that “the ability to envision possibilities for the future and to share
that vision with others distinguishes leaders from nonleaders” (p. 40).
Kotter, J. P. 2012b. Accelerate! Harvard Business Review 90(11):44–52. (Also available in a
book with the same title.) Develops his work on transformational change, first published in
1995, and echoes the arguments in his 2012 book Leading Change. This article puts vision
at the heart of designing, implementing, and accelerating the pace of change: formulate a
strategic vision, communicate the vision, and accelerate movement toward the vision. Kotter
describes this as a “head and heart, not just head” approach (p. 49).
Roundup
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
What criteria do you use in order to decide whether
a particular vision or vision statement is likely to
be useful in your organization? What other criteria
might you wish to take into account?
What is your preference: a short vision statement
or a longer vision story? Why? How do you use
vision statements or stories?
How do you distinguish vision from mission, plan-
ning, and goals? Are these important distinctions? In
your organization, how aligned is vision with these
other factors? Are there competing visions in your
organization? How are these resolved?
What is your experience: are visions more likely
to “take” in some organizations or cultural contexts
compared with others? Why is this the case? What
criteria can you develop to help assess when you
should use vision to assist in organizational change?
What process have you used, or seen in use, to
craft an effective vision? Do you have a personal
preference toward an intuitive or an analytical
approach to vision development? Why?
Is there an “inner voice” in your organization?
What are the “bread-and-butter” issues? Are there
“undiscussable” issues in your organization?
What is your judgement: When do visions fail,
and when does their effectiveness fade? Can visions
be revitalized? How?
What is your position: Does vision drive change?
Does vision help change? Does vision need vision-
ary leaders?
200 Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change
Identify the characteristics of effective visions.
Evidence and experience suggest that, to be effective, visions should be clear, appeal-
ing, vivid, ambitious, and attainable, providing a sense of direction and guiding deci-
sion making, but also flexible enough to accommodate initiative and change. Effective
visions also describe a desirable—perhaps ideal—future for the organization. A further
emotional property of the effective vision, although difficult to define, is that it “feels
good.” Some commentators argue a vision should be expressed in a brief, memorable
statement. Others, however, claim that lengthier and more detailed “vision stories” can
provide a better frame of reference for change and answer the question that all those
who are involved will ask: what will this future mean for me?
Assess how the context in which a vision is developed affects its meaning.
For the purposes of this discussion, “context” includes the organization’s culture as well
as the external environment. We identified four stereotypical organizational contexts:
rigid, bold, overmanaged, and liberated. These contexts vary in terms of degree of accep-
tance of the need for change, and resource availability. Rigid organizations are character-
ized by low acceptance and resources. Bold organizations have limited resources but high
acceptance. Overmanaged organizations have high resource availability but little accep-
tance of the need to change. The context in which vision processes are most likely to be
effective is the liberated organization, with high acceptance and high resource availability.
National cultures can also be influential. A corporate vision that would be accept-
able and effective in Japan, where organizations are more closely linked to national and
social interests, would be less acceptable in the United States, where organizations are
more preoccupied with financial performance.
Apply different methods and processes for developing vision.
There are many approaches to developing vision, ranging on the familiar continuum
from “tell” (the chief executive determines the vision) to “co-create” (everyone partici-
pates in the development). There is no “one best way,” and choice is influenced by the
change management image in use. Leader-dominated methods can be rapid, and may
be inspirational, but are not consistent with the concepts of employee empowerment
and engagement. Most commentators suggest that co-creation methods, where the role
of senior leaders is to “orchestrate” the vision-crafting process, are more likely to pro-
duce better visions and more successful change.
Other approaches to crafting vision have been described as intuitive, analytical, and
benchmarking. Intuitive approaches rely on imagination and creative imagery: what are
our personal and organizational priorities, and what do we need to do to work toward
our desired future? An analytical approach links vision to purpose and goals, using
questions such as: Who do we serve? What do we do? Where do we place most of our
efforts? How do we operationalize those efforts? A benchmarking approach is more
externally focused and develops vision in relation to key competitors: What do our
competitors do well? How can we do better than them? How should we measure our
achievement? What will it be like when those standards have been met?
Explain why some visions fail.
Visions can fail for many reasons: too specific, too vague, too complex, fails to address
known problems, detached from the business, unrealistic, or does not offer a clear view
of the future. Lack of adaptation to changing circumstances can make a vision obsolete,
LO 6.2
LO 6.3
LO 6.4
LO 6.5
Chapter 6 Vision and the Direction of Change 201
contributing to decisions that are not consistent with new environmental conditions and
constraints. Visions also fail because of “vision collisions”—the presence of too many
competing visions for an organization.
Explain the arguments concerning the relationship of vision to organizational change.
We explored three key debates. First, does vision drive change, or does vision emerge
from the organizational change process? Second, does vision contribute to or hinder
the organizational change process? Third, are visions attributes of heroic leaders, or of
heroic organizations? With compelling arguments on both sides of these debates, the
answers are not clear.
The traditional view sees the vision of the heroic, charismatic leader driving and
contributing positively to the organizational change process. There is evidence and
argument to challenge that perspective. The importance of charisma and vision may
have been exaggerated. Charismatic senior figures perhaps contribute less to sustained
organizational effectiveness than embedded visions, core values, and enduring ide-
ologies. Visions are emergent because it is difficult to articulate a clear image of the
future at the start of a disruptive transformational change process. Visions can impede
change by making strong emotional appeals to the future instead of focusing on cur-
rent operational problems, and where organizational capabilities are inadequate to
achieving the vision.
The change manager must be aware of these debates and tensions and take these
considerations into account before embarking on a vision development process at a par-
ticular time in a specific context. The weight of commentary, from academic research
and management consultants, appears to endorse the value of articulating clear and
compelling visions. However, this perspective should not be taken for granted, and a
more cautious, skeptical, critical approach is perhaps advisable. The role of and need
for vision should be assessed in relation to each specific organizational change situa-
tion. What has been effective for one organization, given its history, current challenges,
and future aspirations, may not be wholly appropriate for another organization with a
different background, a different set of problems, and a different desired future.
LO 6.6
Ambler, G. 2013. 10 characteristics of an effective vision. Online blog accessed October
14, 2014: http://www.georgeambler.com/10-characteristics-of-an-effective-vision/.
Auster, E. R., Wylie, K. K., and Valente, M. S. 2005. Strategic organizational change:
Building change capabilities in your organization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Beaver, G. 2000. The significance of strategic vision, mission and values. Strategic
Change 9(4):205–7.
Belgard, W. P., and Rayner, S. R. 2004. Shaping the future: A dynamic process for creat-
ing and achieving your company’s strategic vision. New York: Amacom.
Boal, K. B., and Hooijberg, R. 2001. Strategic leadership research: Moving on. Leader-
ship Quarterly 11(4):515–49.
Collins, J. C., and Porras, J. I. 1991. Organizational vision and visionary organizations.
California Management Review 34(1):30–52.
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7Chapter Change Communication Strategies
Learning objectives
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 7.1 Identify key elements in the change communication process.
LO 7.2 Understand how gender, power, and emotion affect change communication
processes.
LO 7.3 Understand the power of language in influencing responses to change.
LO 7.4 Explain and assess appropriate strategies for communicating change.
LO 7.5 Understand how successful communication processes vary with the type and
stage of organizational change.
LO 7.6 Assess the utility of a range of different change communication channels, including
applications of social media.
1 2 3 R
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206 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
LO 7.1 The Change Communication Process
The ways in which changes are presented and discussed are critical to success. All of
the approaches to change management explored in chapters 9 and 10 give communica-
tion a central role in the process. Understanding and commitment depend largely on
how change proposals are communicated. From their review of the literature on change
processes, Karen Whelan-Berry and Karen Somerville (2010) note that communica-
tion is one of the most frequently identified change drivers, by explaining the need for
change and how change will be achieved. Poor communication is a leading explana-
tion for change failure. The evidence also suggests that change communication should
be two-way—telling and listening. Communication is thus important throughout the
change process, and not just at the beginning—and it should be resourced accordingly,
addressing resistance, encouraging individual adoption and support, highlighting key
issues, and sustaining momentum.
Whelan-Berry and Somerville (2010, p. 181) define change-related communication
as “Regular two-way communication specifically about the change initiative, its
implementation, related successes, challenges and their resolution.” With regard to taking
the corporate vision to groups and individuals, communication “facilitates employee
understanding and engagement” and “addresses employees’ questions and concerns
through two-way communication, which allows individuals to remain committed to the
change. It also ensures that any obstacles are properly identified and removed” (p. 181). To
sustain momentum, communication “signals the organization’s commitment to the change
initiative, communicates successes and challenges, and ongoing change implementation”
(p. 181).
Lars Christensen and Joep Cornelissen (2011) offer a novel, counterintuitive perspec-
tive on the significance of change communication. They first note that communication
has attracted increasing attention due to a number of factors: the nature and consequences
of stakeholder communications; the emergence of ideas such as corporate social respon-
sibility, sustainability, and corporate citizenship; and the growing numbers of corporate
communication professionals, procedures, and systems. They see communication as
“an important force of organizing” and as “the building block of organizations” (p. 398)
because the act of communicating constructs or defines the change in the understanding of
those who are going to be involved. In other words, change communication is a key part of
the process of collective sense-making (see chapter 9).
Change communication, they note, aims to influence the opinions of many different
audiences, inside and external to the organization. This suggests that clarity and consis-
tency are important. However, Christensen and Cornelissen (2011, pp. 402–3) argue that
organizations have to work with many voices, with different views and ideas (technical
term, “polyphony”). In other words, it may often be desirable for change communications
to be ambiguous and inconsistent, for the following reason:
[V]ague and equivocal language allows organizations to talk about themselves in ways
that integrate a variety of members and stakeholders without alienating anyone. Too much
clarity and consistency in the formulation of “shared values” may actually prevent managers
from establishing accord with some corporate audiences. Although writings in corporate
communication and branding call for organizations to eliminate ambiguity, ambiguity is
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 207
essential in promoting “unified diversity,” the ability for differences to coexist within the
unity of the organization. Ambiguity and polyphony may even be a conscious management
strategy designed to foster identification and reduce tension by allowing different audiences
to apply different interpretations to what is seen as one corporate message.
The process of communicating change—what is going to happen and why—can there-
fore be more complex than it first appears. In this chapter, we explore the communication
process and then discuss different communication strategies, before considering the evolv-
ing role of social media in corporate communication. First, however, we will consider how
images of change management influence communication strategies, and the implications
for change managers.
Communication Is Not a “Soft” Function
The American consulting company Towers Watson
(2013) argues that communication is key to organi-
zational performance. From a global survey of 650
organizations, they found that those with effective
communication practices were three times more
likely to show superior financial performance, com-
pared with those that did not use those practices.
The best practices were:
1. Helping employees to understand the business
2. Educating employees about organization culture
and values
3. Providing information on financial objectives and
organizational performance
4. Integrating new employees
5. Communicating how employee actions affect
customers
6. Providing information about the value of individ-
uals’ total compensation package
7. Asking for rapid feedback from employees about
their opinions of the company
Borrowing from consumer marketing, Towers
Watson also argue that effective organizations cat-
egorize employees into groups based on the value
of their skills and on personal characteristics. This
approach to employee “segmentation” means that
communication strategy can be tailored to focus
on behaviors that are critical to performance. The
most effective companies pay close attention to
employees when they are planning change, evalu-
ating culture, and assessing employee readiness and
the impact that change will have. Middle and front-
line managers need to be good at articulating what
employees need to do differently to be successful,
communicating what change means to individ-
ual employees, and creating a sense of ownership
about change initiatives.
Three factors in particular now put a premium
on “communication effectiveness”:
• Workforce: Increasingly diverse workforce, with rising expectations of the employment deal
• The stakes: The competitive advantage to be gained from “discretionary effort”—the will-
ingness of employees to “go the extra mile” to
improve company performance
• Shorter timelines: The need to communicate rapidly, driven by developments in technol-
ogy and globalization, tighter resources, and
increased concerns for security
They conclude:
Today, top-performing organizations are build-
ing community—fostering the sense that
employees at all levels are in it together. These
organizations create the opportunity for social
interaction using the latest new media tech-
nologies, display the appetite and courage to
hear from employees, and establish ongoing
forums conducive to collaboration rather than
top-down communication. Those that do this
well typically see better financial performance.
( Towers Watson, 2013, p. 9)
208 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
Dianne Gayeski and Jennifer Majka (1996) argue that one of the challenges for com-
municators concerns the expectation of what can be achieved. They argue that an outdated
“director” image has dominated our understanding, linking corporate communication with
control and manageability. They claim that communication is better understood in terms of
chaos and complexity (a “nurturer” image). The nurturer image may decrease the frustra-
tion of not being able to control events in the way that a director image assumes. Change
managers may be able to shape but not always control the communication of change.
More generally, each of the six images of change outlined in chapter 2 is associated with a
different strategy for communicating change; see table 7.1.
We will first outline a classic model of the communication process, indicating how lan-
guage, power, gender, and emotions are central to an understanding of how this operates.
We will then consider how this model applies to change communication, and explore the
dilemmas facing the manager designing a change communication strategy. Is it possible
TABLE 7.1 Change Images and Communication Purpose
Image Purpose of Communication
Director Ensure that people understand what is going to happen and what is required of them. Answer the why, what, who, how, and when questions. Present the “value proposition” of the change. Modify leadership style and information to “fit” the type of change and organizational levels affected. Avoid “spray and pray” methods, which lead to message overload. Do not distort the message.
Navigator Outline the nature of the change, paying attention to the range of interests affected, power relationships, and actions that could disrupt the change. Problems identified can thus be addressed, and the change “replotted” if necessary to generate the best outcomes in the situation. To win staff over, “tell and sell” communication methods are appropriate.
Caretaker Let people know the “why” of the changes, their inevitability, and how best to cope and survive. This involves the use of reactive communication methods, recognizing employee concerns and responding accordingly (“identify and reply”).
Coach Ensure that people share similar values, and understand what actions are appropriate to those values. Model consistency in actions and words. The director “gets the word out”; the coach “gets buy-in” to change by drawing on values and positive emotions. Team-based communications are effective (not top-down led by chief executive). Key messages are emphasized to check understanding and encourage two-way dialogue (“underscore and explore”).
Interpreter Give employees a sense of “what is going on” through storytelling and metaphors. Recognize the multiple sense-making that occurs in different groups with regard to change. Present a persuasive account of the change to ensure that as many people as possible will have a common understanding. Recognize that not everyone will accept the change story. Aim to provide the dominant account using “rich” personal and inter- active communications (media richness is discussed below).
Nurturer Reinforce the view that change processes cannot always be predicted, and that creative and innovative outcomes can be achieved, even though few in the organization could have anticipated these.
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 209
to communicate too much? How can communication strategy be tailored to the type of
change, and to the phases of the change process? Should the aim be to “get the word
out” or the “get buy-in,” or both? Where should responsibility for communicating change
lie? The different images in table 7.1 are likely to offer different answers to these ques-
tions. Finally, as explained earlier, we will then assess the use of different media for com-
municating change, including the evolving use of different forms of social networking
technologies.
Modelling the Communication Process Interpersonal communication typically involves much more than the simple transmis-
sion of information. Pay close attention to the next person who asks you what time
it is. You will often be able to tell how they are feeling, and about why they need to
know—if they are in a hurry, perhaps, or if they are anxious or nervous, or bored with
waiting. In other words, their question has a purpose or a meaning. Although it is not
always stated directly, we can often infer that meaning from the context and from their
behavior. The same considerations apply to your response. Your reply suggests, at least,
a willingness to be helpful, may imply friendship, and may also indicate that you share
the same concern as the person asking the question (“We are going to be late”; “When
does the film start?”). However, your reply can also indicate frustration and annoyance:
“Five minutes since the last time you asked me!” Communication thus involves the
transmission of both information and meaning.
This process of exchange is illustrated in figure 7.1, which illustrates the main compo-
nents of interpersonal communication. This model is based on the work of Claude Shan-
non and Warren Weaver (1949), who were concerned with signal processing in electronic
systems, rather than with organizational communication.
At the heart of this model, we have a transmitter sending a message through an
appropriate channel to a receiver. We will consider the range of change communication
channels later. It is helpful to think of the way in which the transmitter phrases and
expresses the message as a coding process. The success of communication depends on
FIGURE 7.1 Exchanging
Meaning: A
Model of the
Communica-
tion Process coding channel
message
decoding
receiver
feedback
context
context
transmitter
noise noise
perceptual filters perceptual filters
210 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
the accuracy of the receiver’s decoding; did the receiver understand the language used,
and also tone and implications of the message. Feedback is therefore critical, to check
understanding. Communication often fails where transmitters and receivers have different
frames of reference and do not share experience and understanding, even if they share a
common language. We make judgements—which may or may not be accurate—about the
honesty, integrity, trustworthiness, and credibility of others, and decode their messages
and act on them accordingly. When communicating details of a major change initiative,
therefore, it cannot be assumed that all of the recipients of the message will have the same
understanding as each other, and as the transmitter.
Perceptual filters also play a role here, particularly affecting our decoding. This can
involve, for example, a readiness or predisposition to hear, or not to hear, particular kinds
of information. Preoccupations that are diverting our attention can also filter information.
Past experience affects the way in which we see things today, and can influence what we
transmit and how, and what we receive. In an organizational setting, people may have time
to reflect, or they may be under time pressure, or experience “communication overload,”
which again means that some content may be filtered out.
The physical, social, and cultural context in which change communication takes place
is also significant. In organizations where staff are widely dispersed across a number of
locations, the ability to share and compare views is more difficult than when everyone
is in the one place. The logistics of communicating with a large number of dispersed
staff can be complex and costly. The casual remark by a colleague across a café table
(“We could all be laid off by the end of the year”) could be dismissed with a laugh.
The same remark made by a manager in a formal planning meeting could be a source
of alarm. If an organization’s culture emphasizes openness and transparency, staff may
become suspicious if communication is less informative than expected. However, staff
may also become suspicious if management (without a good explanation) suddenly start
to share large amounts of information openly in a culture that has in the past been less
transparent.
Context is particularly important when considering change communication, as this can
influence how receivers will decode a message. One aspect of an organization’s context
that is critical in this respect is past history. Change communication is more likely to be
welcome in an organization with a track record of successful changes than in one where
past changes have been seen as ineffective or damaging. Current circumstances are also
a key feature of the communication context. Is change a positive response to business
growth and development, or a defensive approach to problems that will lead to budget and
staffing cuts? If staff feel that they have been misled by management in the past concern-
ing the goals and consequences of change, that perception is likely to have an influence on
the decoding of further communication concerning change proposals.
When designing a communication strategy, it is therefore important to assess how
aspects of the context could affect the coding and decoding of the message, and to
design the message content and channels accordingly. Terry Nelson and Helene Cox-
head (1997) highlight three particular problems to consider when designing change
communications:
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 211
Message overload: More new information is provided more quickly than recipients can
process.
Message distortion: Intentional or unintentional misinterpretation when transmitting or
receiving the message.
Message ambiguity: As noted earlier, ambiguity allows different interpretations, but this
should not exceed recipients’ ability to tolerate ambiguity (which can be reduced by anxiety).
These problems can be avoided by adopting a common language with regard to the
change, and where top management consistently model the desired behaviors. Enhancing
employee involvement and self-esteem, and using specialist staff to monitor the change
process, can also help to reduce communication errors.
Anything that interferes with a communication signal is called noise by electronics
experts, and this applies to interpersonal and organizational communication, too. This
does not just refer to the sound of equipment, or other people talking. Noise includes cod-
ing and decoding problems and errors, perceptual filters, and any other distractions that
damage the integrity of the communication channel, including issues arising from the con-
text. Relationships can introduce noise, affecting the style and content of conversation
(formal or informal) and what we are prepared to share. Status differences can introduce
noise; we do not reveal to the boss what we discuss with colleagues. Motives, emotions,
and health can also constitute noise; coding and decoding are affected by anxiety, pres-
sure, stress, and also by levels of enthusiasm and excitement. This last point is particularly
significant, as change communication itself can, of course, generate anxiety and stress, or
stimulate excitement.
LO 7.2 Gender, Power, and Emotion
The basic communication model that we have discussed can help to explain why com-
munication sometimes breaks down. However, we also need to understand the impact
of gender, power, and emotion on communication in general, and on change communi-
cation in particular.
Gender Gender differences also affect the communication process. Here are two examples:
Confidence and boasting. Women tend to emphasize their doubts and uncertainty, but
men tend to express greater confidence and play down their doubts.
Asking questions. Women are more likely to ask questions than men; the downside is that
male managers may interpret women as knowing less than their male peers.
An assessment by a male manager of how well a woman is coping with change, com-
pared with male colleagues, may thus conclude: “She seems very uncertain since she is
212 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
always asking questions.” However, this assessment may have more to do with gender
differences related to a willingness to question (about the change) than to real differences
in attitude toward the change itself.
Deborah Tannen (1995, p. 141) also observes that even the apparently simple choice of
which pronoun to use can influence who gets the credit:
In my research in the workplace, I heard men say “I” in situations where I heard women say
“We.” For example, one publishing company executive said, “I’m hiring a new manager.
I’m going to put him in charge of my marketing division,” as if he owned the corporation.
In stark contrast, I recorded women saying “we” when referring to work that they alone had
done. One woman explained that it would sound too self-promoting to claim credit in an
obvious way by saying, “I did this.” Yet she expected—sometimes vainly—that others would
know it was her work and would give her the credit she did not claim for herself.
Other gender differences relate to how feedback is given and received, how compli-
ments are exchanged, and whether the communication is direct or indirect. Kate Lude-
man and Eddie Erlandson (2004) argue that many senior managers are “alpha” males: fast
thinkers who have opinions on every topic, who are analytical, data-driven, impatient, and
think that they are smarter than most other people. As a result, their communication style
can intimidate those around them. Alpha males are not good listeners, they miss subtleties,
and they put others under extreme pressure to perform.
The alpha male communication style can be softened with coaching (see exercise 7.2),
but this is not an easy transformation. When a male manager changes to a communication
style that is not direct, competitive, confrontational, and authoritative, they can be seen
as “going soft,” becoming “touchy-feely,” and “losing their grip” (Linstead et al., 2005,
p. 543). The change manager may therefore need to find a balance between maintaining
credibility with colleagues while adopting a communication style that is appropriate to the
change context and to those who are involved.
Power The use of language can also reflect underlying power and gender relationships—
factors that can also interfere with the change communication process (as with com-
munications in general). For example, the manner in which change managers seek staff
comments on proposals can reinforce power differentials. Telling staff to provide input
may result in responses different from those obtained when the request conveys respect
for their opinions. Power differences are normally a barrier to communication. Those
who are more powerful may not wish to disclose information that could make them
appear to be less powerful or that could weaken their power base. Those who are less
powerful may not wish to disclose information that could potentially be used against
them.
The term “power tells” describes the various signs and clues that indicate how powerful
someone is—or how powerful they want to be (Collett, 2004). The power tells of domi-
nant individuals include:
• sitting and standing with legs far apart (men);
• appropriating the territory around them by placing their hands on their hips;
• using open postures;
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 213
• using invasive hand gestures;
• smiling less, because a smile is an appeasement gesture;
• establishing visual dominance by looking away from the other person while speaking,
implying that they do not need to be attentive;
• speaking first, and dominating the conversation thereafter;
• using a lower vocal register, and speaking more slowly;
• being more likely to interrupt others, more likely to resist interruption by others.
The power tells of submissive individuals include:
• modifying speech style to sound more like the person they are talking to;
• more frequently hesitating, using lots of “ums” and “ers”;
• adopting closed postures;
• clasping hands, touching face and hair (self-comfort gestures);
• blushing, coughing, dry mouth, heavy breathing, heavy swallowing, increased heart
rate, lip biting, rapid blinking, and sweating are “leakage tells” which reveal stress and
anxiety.
We can thus “read” the power signals of others. More importantly, however, change
managers may need to control their own “tells” in order to appear less dominant and less
powerful, particularly when communicating change in a manner that will encourage staff
feedback, engagement, and support.
Emotion Communication models have been criticized for ignoring the role of emotions in
organizational change, focusing instead on the rational and cognitive dimensions of
communication. Nevertheless, change managers need to be aware of, to understand,
and where appropriate to respond to emotional responses to change. Emotions can
interfere with the communication process, but emotions can also be a positive resource,
contributing to staff willingness, commitment, and support for change.
Shaul Fox and Yair Amichai-Hamburger (2001) emphasize the need for congruence
between cognitive understanding of change and emotional perceptions. Emotional appeals
communicate vision and urgency and can aid the formation of powerful change coalitions.
Table 7.2 summarizes the range of practical steps that can help establish the “positive
emotions” that generate “excitement and anticipation” around a change program. Michele
Williams (2007) suggests that the anticipation that change will be personally threatening
or harmful can generate negative emotions and a loss of trust in management, thus making
cooperation and engagement difficult to achieve. Change managers can avoid this situation
by:
Perspective taking: Thinking about how others are likely to think and feel about a
change.
Threat-reducing behavior: Engaging in intentional, interpersonal interactions with staff to
minimize their perceptions that changes are likely to lead to harm for them.
Reflection: Self-evaluation to reduce the emergence of negative emotions and to identify cor-
rective actions where necessary.
214 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
TABLE 7.2 How to Get Emotional Commitment to Change
Address These Issues How This Is Done
The Core Message
Emotional arguments Positive words signal future success; negative terms indicate what will happen if change fails
Metaphors The use of familiar metaphors can help staff to picture the future and make it appear less strange or unusual
Packaging the Message
Emotional mode Capture attention with music, color, slogans, pictures—but avoid excessive use of any one mode
Humor Humor can reduce the gap, and tension, between manager and staff Display emotion Use feelings, tone of voice, body language, and facial expressions to
generate warmth and confidence Change leader characteristics Messages are perceived as more credible and attractive when they are
consistent with leader behavior
Change Manager Behavior
Fairness and justice Decisions should be seen to be fair and follow legitimate, recognized procedures, with opportunities to raise issues
Setting
Group dynamics Use groups and teams to strengthen commitment to change Ceremonies Stimulate emotions and reinforce the benefits of change with
celebrations that also signal departure from the past Atmosphere Speak in warm, informal terms, to produce positive feelings toward the
change (not formal and cold)
Source: Based on Fox and Amichai-Hamburger (2001, pp. 87–92).
Understanding the emotional side of change is important. However, whether change
managers can produce positive emotional responses to change is open to question for four
reasons. First, there is an underlying assumption that emotions are produced and contained
within the organization. The impact of external factors (how friends and family talk about
a change, how change is presented in the media) can be overlooked. Second, an underly-
ing assumption is that all people respond in the same way to the same emotional appeals.
This view overlooks differences in work motivation, and how these influence perceptions
of change. With increasing workforce diversity, we also have to be aware of cultural dif-
ferences in modes of emotional expression and response. Third, not all change managers
have the skills or the credibility to manage the emotional responses of staff to change, and
to achieve positive emotional responses. Finally, it may be easier to achieve positive emo-
tional responses to some (exciting, developmental, progressive) changes and not others
(routine, tedious, defensive).
Table 7.3 summarizes the main barriers to successful organizational change
communication.
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 215
TABLE 7.3 Barriers to Effective Organizational Change Communication
Language Choice of words and tone of message can lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations
Gender differences Men and women use different communication styles, which can lead to misunderstanding; men tend to talk more; women tend to listen, and ask more questions
Power differences Research shows that employees distort upward communication, and that superiors often have a limited understanding of subordinates’ roles, experiences, and problems
Context Organization culture and history, as well as physical setting, can color the way in which change communications are transmitted and interpreted
Cultural diversity Different cultures have different expectations concerning formal and informal communication; lack of awareness of those norms creates misunderstanding
Emotion Emotional arousal interferes with message transmission and receipt, and emotional responses to change communication can be negative (anxiety, anger) or positive (exciting, stimulating)
The communication process appears to be simple, but it is prone to errors arising on
both sides of the exchange. We cannot confidently assume that receivers will always
decode our messages in a way that gives them the meaning that we intended to transmit.
Communication is central to organizational change, but this claim has practical implica-
tions. It seems that organizations function better where:
• communications are open,
• relationships are based on mutual understanding and trust,
• interactions are based on cooperation rather than competition,
• people work together in teams, and
• decisions are reached in a participative way.
These features are not universal, and are not present in all countries, cultures—or
organizations.
LO 7.3 Language Matters: The Power of Conversation
As we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, communication does not just involve
a transfer of information or ideas. The language that we use to describe reality also
helps to create—or to constitute—that reality for others; communication thus involves
the creation and exchange of meaning. For example, Deborah Tannen (1995) points
out that language reflects and reinforces underlying social relationships. She offers
216 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
the following illustrative statements, which each require the same response but signal
different information about the relationship between those involved:
“Sit down!” This signals higher status of the person uttering the statement, perhaps
indicating anger, and informal conversation is not appropriate.
“I would be pleased if you would sit down.” This signals respect, or possibly sarcasm,
depending on the tone of voice and the situation.
“You must be so tired. Why don’t you sit down?” This signals either a concern and closeness
for the person, or condescension.
Language is particularly important in organizational change contexts due to the
sensitivity of the issues (“Will I lose my job?”) and the possibility for confusion (“That is
not what management said last week”). The choice of language that the change manager
uses can therefore affect whether proposals will be seen as exciting or routine, as clear or
muddled, as progressive or mundane, as threatening or developmental. These meanings
can be shared in documentation and through formal meetings. However, for the change
manager, the understanding of change is typically shared in a range of formal and informal
meetings and conversations. Even brief, unplanned, casual conversations can be powerful
channels for exchanges of ideas and understanding between the change manager and those
who are involved in the proposals. Silence during a conversation also sends signals.
Managing change also involves different conversations at different stages of the change
process. Conversations across those stages, however, must have “linguistic coherence,”
and managers should try to align their use of language with the type of change that is
being implemented. It is also important to create a shared language of change among the
stakeholders who are involved.
Talking in Stages Jeffrey and Laurie Ford (1995) do not see communication simply as a tool for produc-
ing intentional change; rather, it is through communication that change happens. In
There’s Nothing Like a Good Story
As chief executive at Hewlett-Packard (HP), Mark
Hurd wanted the company to develop a more
sales-oriented culture. To reinforce this message,
he told the story about how, in his first week as
a newcomer at NCR, he made a successful sale
to a San Antonio tractor maker for some printing
equipment. However, he failed to fill in the order
form correctly and the person in the NCR billing
department refused to process the order because
of a minor mistake that he had made in the
paperwork. When Hurd informed his manager
about the situation, his manager phoned the guy
in billing:
“Hey, did my man just come down here with
an order?” asked the manager as Hurd listened.
“The next time he does, I want you to get your
ass out from behind your desk, and I want you to
shake his hand. And I want you to thank him for
keeping your ass employed. If there’s anything
wrong with the order, I want you to fix it so that
he can get about the job of continuing to keep
you employed.” (Lachinsky, 2006, p. 93)
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 217
other words, “the management of change can be understood to be the management of
conversations” (p. 566). Drawing on “speech act theory,” they argue that change takes
place through four types of conversation.
Initiative conversations draw attention to the need for change, whether reactive or
proactive, and can take the form of:
assertion “We have to bring the finances under control.”
request “Can you restructure your division to achieve greater operating efficiencies?”
declaration “We are going to increase market share.”
Conversations for understanding help others to appreciate the change issues and the
problems that need to be addressed, through three main elements:
specifying the “conditions of satisfaction” that will make the change successful: “We need to
make sure that there are no more than two customer complaints per thousand units produced”
enabling the involvement of those affected by the change
confirming interpretations and enabling shared meaning and understanding
Conversations for performance focus on producing the change, and involve the action
stage when:
promises are made
obligations are entered into
accountabilities are established
deadlines are set
Conversations for closure signal the completion of the change, and facilitate the move-
ment of people into new projects and initiatives. These conversations involve:
acknowledgements
celebrations
rewards
Breakdowns in change and conversations occur when:
• Initiative conversations are held with people who are not in a position to proceed with
the change.
• There is a lack of shared understandings about the intended changes and the expecta-
tions for the “conditions of satisfaction.”
• There is shared understanding, but performance conversations do not take place, so
people do not know who is accountable for specific actions.
• Requests for action and performance are not rigorous and fail to specify intentions
regarding results and deadlines.
• Closure conversations do not take place, and people feel that they are still involved with
the change, while being asked to move on to new initiatives.
Ford and Ford (1995) emphasize that change managers need skills in handling change
conversations, while recognizing that not all change conversations take place in a linear
218 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
manner; some stages may be skipped during the process. The practicing change manager
thus needs to consider the following:
• Where managers are engaged in multiple change processes, there will be issues
relating to how smoothly they are able to transition themselves among the different
conversations.
• The stages of the conversations may be open to multiple interpretations among par-
ticipants. Where managers assume that some conversations are complete and that it is
appropriate to move on to another stage in the change conversations, others may have
differing views.
• It is not clear that all managers are able to be trained or are able to exhibit all of these
conversation skills successfully. For example, some managers may have more affinity
with initiative conversations rather than performance conversations, and so on.
• Change managers need to confront the notion of power. The willingness of participants
to be involved meaningfully in each of the four change conversations may be affected
by significant power imbalances. Some understandings may thus need to be enforced
rather than shared.
Talking Coherently John Sillince (1999) also emphasizes the role of language in change conversations,
focusing on the coherence of change conversations. Drawing on linguistic and political
science theories, he outlines four dominant language forms that are found in organiza-
tional change conversations:
ideals which express preferences
appeals which seek support
rules which seek to direct the behavior of others
deals which serve as a form of bargaining and exchange
An overreliance on one of these language forms can lead to problems. For example, a
focus on deals rather than ideals may encourage an individualist culture. Sillince (1999,
p. 492) argues that “motivating change during the early stage of organizational change
requires the communication of appeals for support and statements of goals or ideals, and
that the later stage requires the communication of rules and the negotiation of deals.” He
illustrates this with the restructuring at AT&T in the 1970s and 1980s. Sillince (1999, p.
499) concludes that, despite the absence of a planned communication process, a logical
sequence of language forms can be detected:
moving from attacking current ideals in 1973 (corresponding to the “unfreezing” stage in
Lewin, 1951), to supporting new ideals in 1973–1978, to attacking current rules or the lack
of rules in 1979–1980, and increasingly supporting new ideals and new rules after 1981 (the
“change” stage in Lewin, 1951). The few deals referred to occur after 1981. Appeals tend to
be promises and warning before change takes place and requests for support and exhortations
to action during and after change.
In comparing successful changes at AT&T with less successful changes at Chrysler,
Sillince notes that the former had a linguistic coherence that was lacking at Chrysler. He
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 219
concludes that linguistic coherence in the use of different forms of language at different
stages is a hallmark of successful change. (See box, “IBM’s Script for Offshoring Jobs.”)
Sillince gives us a macro-level analysis, in which different change phases unfold over
lengthy periods of time. It is therefore interesting that he sees these phases as underpinned
by Lewin’s (1951) model of unfreezing, moving, and refreezing. As we have discussed
in previous chapters, however, change is rarely a tidy, orderly, sequential process, and it
may be difficult to maintain coherence across different chaotic and nonsequential stages.
Nevertheless, this perspective alerts the change manager to the different linguistic modes
that are available when communicating change, and highlights the option of switching
from one linguistic mode to another if appropriate when, for example, one approach is not
having the desired effect.
Aligning Language with the Change Robert Marshak (1993) argues that change fails when the imagery and metaphors
used by managers are not aligned with the type of change being implemented. This
lack of alignment confuses those who are involved in the change. He describes a sit-
uation where a large corporation had to reposition fundamentally its business due
to a decline in the government contracts that had been a mainstay of the company.
Unfortunately, when communicating the need for this change to middle management,
the chief executive’s explanation was based on the need to build on the company’s
past success, as a way of developing into the future. Instead of shifting the company
in radically new directions, middle managers continued to develop past practices. The
imagery of “developing” was not aligned with the “transformational” change that was
necessary.
IBM’s Script for Offshoring Jobs
Internal IBM documents reported in The Wall Street
Journal in January 2004 suggested that IBM was
planning to move high-cost programming jobs
offshore to countries such as Brazil, India, and
China, where labor costs were lower (Bulkeley,
2004). Rather than pay $56 per hour in the United
States, the documents indicated that a comparable
programming job would cost only $12.50 per hour
in China. The documents also revealed that IBM was
aware that this “offshoring” process was a sensitive
issue and provided managers with a draft “script”
for presenting information to affected staff.
One memo instructed managers to ensure that
any written communication to employees should
first be “sanitized” by communications and human
resource staff (“Do not be transparent regarding
the purpose/intent”), and also directed that
managers should not use terms such as “onshore”
and “offshore.” Part of the “suggested script” for
informing staff that their jobs were being moved
offshore was to say, “This is not a resource action”
(an IBM euphemism for being laid off), and that the
company would try to find them jobs elsewhere.
This script also proposed that the news should
be conveyed to staff by saying, “This action is a
statement about the rate and pace of change in this
demanding industry. It is in no way a comment on
the excellent work you have done over the years.”
And, “For people whose jobs are affected by this
consolidation, I understand this is difficult news.”
220 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
To avoid such problems, Marshak advises managers to align their language closely
with the planned change. He identifies four different images of change and the language
appropriate to each:
Machine
imagery
Based on a “fix and maintain” view, portraying the organization as “bro-
ken,” and the change as a “fix.” The change manager is the repairperson;
terms such as repair, adjust, and correct are aligned to this type of change.
Developmental
imagery
Based on a “build and develop” view, in which the organization has to
improve performance by building on past and current practices. The
change manager is trainer or coach; terms such as nurturing, growing,
and getting better are aligned to this type of change.
Transitional
imagery
Based on a “move and relocate” view, in which change is designed to alter
how the organization operates, for example by introducing online sales
and services. The change manager is guide or planner; terms such as mov-
ing forward and leaving the past behind are aligned to this type of change.
Transforma-
tional imagery
Based on a “liberate and re-create” view, where change involves rein-
vention, or radical change to the nature of the business or market in
which the organization trades. The change manager is visionary, helping
to discover new possibilities; terms such as reinvention, re-creation, and
adopting a new paradigm are aligned to this change.
These insights concerning the need to align language and change highlight how change
managers can easily communicate mixed signals with regard to what is required. Change
managers are thus advised to reflect on how their metaphors for describing and communi-
cating about their organizations and changes may be trapped and influenced by dominant
or root metaphors. New insights, actions, and unanticipated directions can be generated by
adopting new language and new metaphors (see “The NASCAR Model”). We must also rec-
ognize that managers may not always be able to introduce metaphors that will necessarily
resonate with staff throughout an organization. New metaphors often compete with dominant
The NASCAR Model
Apparelizm (pseudonym) is a Fortune 500 retailer,
with over 1,000 stores nationwide, which began a
major organizational change effort resulting from
a review of its strategy. As part of the effort to build
support, the change team drew from a NASCAR anal-
ogy, NASCAR being a sport well understood and liked
by many of the staff. The change team argued that
store staff were like a NASCAR race crew. Past store
practice was likened to a race crew member driving
the car, pumping the gas, and changing the tires
during the race. A “pit crew” would do the ordering
and receiving of goods and put them on the shelves
after they arrived. The “drivers” would be responsi-
ble for helping customers as they moved around the
store. The “racetrack manager” would monitor the
traffic flow in the store, removing the “multicar pile-
ups” that happened when sales associates/“drivers”
congregated together (rather than servicing custom-
ers). The metaphor was further extended to a parallel
between the need for NASCAR racing teams “to be
fast, responsive, and knowledgeable” if they were to
be successful. A similar point was made with regard
to the need for excellent communication between
the “drivers,” “pit crew,” and so on.
The metaphor worked well. Staff understood and
accepted the analogy and saw how the changes
would help them to work more like an effective rac-
ing team (based on Roberto and Levesque, 2005).
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 221
logics, embedded ways of operating, ingrained ways of perceiving the organizational world,
and formal policies and procedures. Change managers need to focus on redesigning policies,
systems, and processes that conflict with the language of the change. For example, if change
concerns “leaving the past behind,” then transformational metaphors may be weakened if, say,
compensation and performance appraisal systems remain based on past practice.
Creating a Common Change Language Managers are not alone in using—or misusing—terms and phrases in ways that cause
amusement and confusion. It is important to check the assumption that different indi-
viduals and groups involved in change have a shared view of the terms—the language—
being used. (See “Misused Terminology?”)
Choice of terms has a significant impact on the way in which an issue such as organiza-
tional change is understood by others. Problems will thus arise when those who are responsible
for managing a change cannot among themselves adopt a “common language.” Checking the
shared meanings of concepts in use is thus important in order to avoid confusion and conflict.
For example, Loizos Heracleous and Michael Barrett (2001) attribute the failed implemen-
tation of an electronic risk management system in the London insurance market to the lack
of shared language and meaning among the parties that were involved. Over a period of five
years, they studied the language of the main stakeholders, including market leaders, brokers,
and underwriters, and also observed how the language of those stakeholders changed over time.
Misused Terminology?
Term Meaning?
Emergent strategy Justifies a lack of strategic thinking; if a strategy does emerge, we do not have to do anything
Learning organization We were right to neglect training; all we have to do is tell employees that we like them to learn for themselves
Empowerment A magic word which, if we repeat it often enough, will make a down- sized and delayered structure work without any further effort from us
Culture Culture is what we say we will change when we cannot think of any- thing else to do
Source: Based on Hussey (1998).
Heracleous and Barrett distinguish between “surface-level” communication and the
underpinning “deep discursive structures.” Deep structures include interpretive schemes,
central themes, root metaphors, and rhetorical strategies. A focus on the different discur-
sive structures explains the resistance of brokers and underwriters to the new system, and
the failure of the project:
[W]e saw stakeholder groups talking past each other, rather than to each other, because of
their almost diametrically opposed discourses, at both the deeper structure levels and com-
municative action levels, and their lack of common ground on which to base a dialogue.
(Heracleous and Barrett, 2001, p. 774)
222 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
Change managers thus need to understand the deep discursive structures that underpin
the surface communication of different stakeholders, in order to support major organiza-
tional and technology changes. Surface agreement may be artificial and tenuous where
there is a lack of understanding of those deeper structures that may explain inertia or resis-
tance. Although they acknowledge that understanding the interpretive schemes of different
stakeholders will not guarantee success, Heracleous and Barrett (2001, p. 774) conclude
that “Uncovering and appreciating other stakeholders’ deep structures, however, can be of
help in avoiding dead ends and self-defeating compromises in change implementation.”
LO 7.4 Change Communication Strategies
Culture, Language, and Change in General Motors Poland
General Motors (GM) began to develop its Opel
Polska car plant on a greenfield site in Poland in
1996. One of the key tasks for management was
to develop working practices consistent with a car
plant that could be competitive in the twenty-first
century. Although part of the challenge was due to
the lack of exposure to competition during decades
as part of the Soviet bloc, there seemed to be a more
fundamental issue rooted in hundreds of years of
Polish culture. A high value was placed on fantazja
(imaginativeness), which was directly opposed to
the idea of being systematic or well organized—the
latter being equated with boring and unnecessary.
Fantazja was also associated with independence
and freedom from subjugation—the opposite to fol-
lowing standard operating procedures.
The practices designed for the new plant clearly
required a high level of discipline and coordination.
Managers were concerned that while fantazja could
contribute to the continuous improvement pro-
cesses that were to be part of the plant’s operating
model, the cultural tolerance for disorder could be
damaging. There was no shortage of Polish workers:
46,000 applied for 1,800 positions in the new plant,
which meant that the company was in a very pow-
erful position (but threats of job loss for noncompli-
ance were not to be used). The European managers
met with their new employees (along with trans-
lators). Although cultural values and linguistics
appeared to lie at the heart of employee resistance
to GM’s working practices, the solution was also
found in the same roots. As in English, the term
“development” in Polish can mean “to start some-
thing” and also “to progress.” In turn, “to progress”
is the opposite of stagnation. For the Poles, stagna-
tion is something that lacks fantazja. Through dis-
cussion, “disciplined organization” was positively
reframed using concepts and values that were
already part of Polish culture. By 2000, the plant
had the best quality and performance figures of all
GM plants worldwide (based on Dobosz-Bourne
and Jankowicz, 2006).
The Importance of High-Quality Communication
Researchers have focused on the importance
of effective communication with employees
during change. Empirical research has demon-
strated that high-quality change communi-
cation increases acceptance, openness, and
commitment to change. Furthermore, the failure
to provide sufficient information or providing
poor-quality information can result in a number
of problems, including cynicism about change
and widespread rumors, which often exaggerate
the negative aspects of change (Rafferty et al.,
2013, p. 122).
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 223
In this section, we will focus on the communication strategy questions facing the
change manager: Can you communicate too much, how to get “buy-in,” when to use
communication strategies other than “spray and pray,” and who will take responsibility
for communicating the change? We will also explore two contingency approaches to
communication strategy, one based on the type of change and the other related to dif-
ferent phases of the change process.
In spite of its importance, change communication is an issue that many organizations
overlook. A survey of 100 UK employers (Wolff, 2010) found that only 40 percent had
formal communication strategies. However, companies with formal strategies were four
times more likely to agree that this contributed to their success. The main goals of internal
communications were keeping staff informed of changes and strategies, staff engagement,
and providing information about policies and procedures. The most popular communi-
cation methods were department meetings, one-on-one meetings with line managers,
team meetings, letters and memos, and email. Social media were unpopular: online video,
instant messaging, internal blogging, wikis, Skype, and podcasts were used by very few
organizations. There was no one best communication method. Face-to-face was seen as
more effective than print or computer-based methods. Intranet sites were only used for
information on policies, procedures, and legal requirements. Top management briefings
were considered best in terms of employee engagement, opinion surveys the best way to
encourage feedback, and meetings with line managers the best way to improve individual
performance. What are the best ways to communicate change?
Can You Communicate Too Much? The claim that “we need more communication around here” is common. Many com-
mentators argue that it is not possible to overcommunicate, but this view is not shared
by all change managers and researchers. Geigle and Bailey (2001) describe a reengi-
neering project that affected 400 employees in a federal agency. The change team
was committed to open, organization-wide communication regarding the project, to a
degree that was unprecedented in the organization’s history. The outcome of this strat-
egy was change recipient anxiety and cynicism about the change, for two reasons.
First, staff suffered information overload, one saying, “It’s almost like they know
with all this information, we won’t read it.” Information overload can be problematic in
organizations where employees are already in receipt of a high volume of other infor-
mation. Second, the agency’s communication strategy did not involve real participation.
The change team had no strategy for incorporating feedback into the change program: “I
feel like they may be informing me of everything that’s going on, but I have absolutely
zero say in what goes on.” Geigle and Bailey (2001) conclude that there may be symbolic
importance in pursuing an open communication strategy, but that this is not sufficient for
success. They argue that a change team is at its best when acting not as reporters, but as
sense-makers, facilitating understanding for change recipients and helping them to iden-
tify (filter and distill) what is important. This distinction is instructive: from her research,
Laurie Lewis (1999) argues that change managers act more often as reporters, disseminat-
ing information, than as sense-makers, seeking and processing feedback during planned
change processes. For a more detailed exploration of the perspective that sense-making
brings to organizational change, see chapter 9.
224 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
Getting the Word Out, or Getting Buy-In? The federal agency example illustrates the difference between “getting the word out”
(providing information about a change) as opposed to “getting staff buy-in” (support
and involvement). Both are important (Guaspari, 1996). We cannot always assume
that management alone has all the good ideas concerning what is required to make a
change successful. We do know, however, that those who are going to be affected by
change need to be informed about what is happening, and that when frontline staff
are allowed to take the initiative to drive change, the success rate is higher (Keller
et al., 2010).
Communication designed to generate “buy-in” involves capturing from staff informa-
tion that will be useful in delivering the change, identifying what is important to them, and
discovering what they see as the costs and benefits. It is therefore important to identify
a clear “value proposition” that addresses the interests and motives of individual staff.
Examples include (Guaspari, 1996, p. 35):
“As a result of the new skills you’ll learn in order to perform your job in the newly reengi-
neered organization, you will have significantly increased your value internally and your
marketability externally.”
“The work will be backbreaking. The pace will be relentless. You stand to make a ton of
money.”
“We are making these changes to enable us to rewrite the rules in our industry, to improve by
orders of magnitude the value we can create for our customers.”
Getting “buy-in” depends on what people are being asked to purchase. Do they see
this as having personal value? Have the changes been adequately justified? The evidence
indicates that explaining and justifying the need for change relates positively to perceived
fairness with regard to both the change process and the outcomes. From his study of
183 employees in companies that had relocated to Chicago, Joseph Daly (1995) found
that management’s justification was particularly important when the move was viewed
unfavorably by staff. However, that justification was not as important where the move
was welcomed. Daly (1995, p. 426) concludes that some managers may thus be tempted
to avoid explaining change decisions to employees if they think that the change outcomes
will be welcome anyway. However, that may not apply to staff judgements about the
change process.
[E]mployees are likely to expect an explanation for a change decision regardless of whether
the outcomes are positive or negative. If those employees are not given an explanation, they
are likely to feel that the procedures used to make and implement the decision were unfair,
leading in many cases to resentment against the decision process and the decision makers.
Daly’s (1995) findings are consistent with other research, which has found that manag-
ers are more likely to be trusted by staff when they:
• provide accurate information and feedback;
• adequately explain the basis for their decisions;
• use open communication, enabling an exchange of ideas.
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 225
Beyond “Spray and Pray” Phillip Clampitt and colleagues (2000) locate communication strategies on the
continuum shown in figure 7.2. At one end of this continuum is “spray and pray,”
transmitting lots of information, to little effect. At the other extreme, “withhold and
uphold” offers little information, and is also ineffective. All five strategies on this
continuum are summarized in table 7.4. The authors argue that “underscore and
explore,” which involves dialogue, is more likely to succeed, by allowing staff concerns
to be combined with management initiatives. They note that some organizations mix
these strategies. For example, in one organization, “spray and pray” (also known as
the “communication clutter” approach) was used to “bombard” staff with information
on organizational performance. However, when faced with downsizing and operational
Thirteen Points for an Effective Communication Strategy
1. Convince top management that communica-
tion is important.
2. Build alliances across the organization to sup-
port initiatives.
3. Recognize that no one method will be effective.
4. Use a mix of approaches and use all available
channels where relevant.
5. Target communication to the audience; differ-
ent methods for shop floor and managers.
6. Respect cultural diversity and vary approaches
accordingly.
7. Make sure that messages are consistent, over
time and between audiences.
8. Ensure clarity of message and keep things
simple.
9. Train managers in communication skills.
10. Develop and sustain two-way communication,
dialogue, and feedback.
11. Ensure that employees feel that they can say
what they think without discomfort.
12. Ensure that communication is built into the
planning stages of all activities.
13. Review communication initiatives to check what
has worked, what hasn’t, and why
Source: Cannell (2010), pp. 2–3.
High
Efectiveness
level
Low
Spray &
pray
Tell &
sell
Underscore
& explore
Identify &
reply
Withhold
& uphold
Little
Amount of information
Great
FIGURE 7.2 The Communi-
cation Strategy
Continuum
Source: Clampett,
The Communication
Strategy Continuum,
Academy of
Management Journal,
p. 48, 2000.
226 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
changes, a “withhold and uphold” strategy was used, in order to avoid exposing staff
to promises about the future that they were not able to meet. This dual approach led
to discontent and mistrust, as staff saw management providing them with significant
amounts of information, but avoiding the issues about which they cared the most.
This argument supports the use of “underscore and explore” change communication
strategies, the benefits of which arise from dialogue and engagement. This approach,
TABLE 7.4 Communication Strategies
Strategy Actions
Spray and pray Shower employees with a range of information; more is better. Managers pray that staff will see what needs to be done. Benefit: Staff are exposed to company informa- tion. Downside: Staff overloaded with information, may not be able to identify what is more important, and may be able to understand what is happening, but not why.
Tell and sell Limit the information provided to core issues. Management tells staff about the changes and “sells” them on why these are necessary. Benefit: Can be done rapidly. Downside: Staff are passive recipients, and lack of dialogue opens potential for staff skepticism and cynicism.
Underscore and explore
Focus on fundamentals, but engage employees in dialogue to identify obstacles and misunderstandings that need to be addressed. Benefit: Staff engagement solves problems, strengthens support for change and can generate useful ideas. Downside: Takes time.
Identify and reply Defensive approach to identifying and responding to rumors and innuendo, and to reduce staff confusion about changes. Benefit: Can resolve problems at an early stage. Downside: Reactive approach that assumes (sometimes incorrectly) that staff understand the organizational problems that the changes need to address.
Withhold and uphold
Withhold information until it is absolutely necessary to communicate. Management publicly defend the change strategy. Information is not disclosed openly. Benefit: Man- agement retain a high degree of control. Downside: Staff bitterness and resentment.
Source: Based on Clampitt et al. (2000).
A Dozen Tips from the Experts
Rebecca Saunders (1999) has collected the follow-
ing suggestions for communicating change:
1. Specify the nature of the change.
2. Explain why.
3. Let staff know the scope of the change, includ-
ing the good and the bad news.
4. Continually repeat the purpose of the change
and how it will occur.
5. Use graphics.
6. Make the communication two-way.
7. Target supervisors.
8. Support change with new learning.
9. Point to progress emanating from the change.
10. Don’t limit communications to meetings and
print.
11. Institutionalize information flow about the
change.
12. Model the changes yourself.
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 227
however, takes time to organize. This may not be appropriate—and could cause damaging
delays—if rapid organizational change action is necessary. The best strategy may thus
depend on the situation.
Who Should Be Responsible for Communicating the Change? A common view is that chief executives should be personally involved in the communica-
tion of change in order to demonstrate their commitment. It could be damaging to delegate
this responsibility to others, signalling a lack of top management support. However, other
commentators argue that first-line supervisors are more appropriate change communica-
tors, because they are opinion leaders, who are more likely to be known to and trusted by
staff. This is the view adopted by T. J. and Sandar Larkin (1996). First-line supervisors are
in regular personal contact with staff, in small groups (rather than in large formal assem-
blies), and are thus better able to communicate about change. They propose the two-stage
supervisory briefing strategy summarized in table 7.5.
Jeanie Duck (1993, p. 110) argues that the key to change communication lies with “man-
aging the conversation between the people leading the change effort and those who are
expected to implement the strategies.” This does not necessarily give priority to the role of
either the chief executive or supervisors. She maintains that managers often fail to realize that
they are sending out messages even when they are not formally communicating. For exam-
ple, a change task force may meet to discuss how to accomplish a change, feeling that there
is no need to communicate more widely at that time. Duck (1993, p. 110) points out that this
TABLE 7.5 Two-Stage Supervisory Briefing Strategy
Round One: Seek Opinions and Recommendations
Round Two: Report Back to Supervisors
What to Do Why What to Do Why
One senior manager meets with 8 to 10 supervisors for a maximum of 90 minutes
Makes clear that all ideas and opinions are welcome; relatively short meeting maintains focus
The same manager meets with the same group of supervisors
Makes clear that they are dealing with a management representative
Single sheet of paper with two columns: “not willing to change” (what management want to retain) and “willing to change” (for supervisors’ recommendations)
Clarifies the ground rules—what is not going to change—and gives an opportunity for supervisors to make suggestions to take back to the senior change management team
Single sheet of paper with supervisors’ recommendations and senior management responses; answer questions without argument and defensiveness
Convey what has happened with regard to their recommendations, not attempting to convince supervisors of the merits of what has happened
Ensure that supervisors understand that final decisions rest with the senior change management team
Clarifies that opinions are being sought, and not their permission
Distribute a booklet outlining the change and draw attention to major features
Help supervisors in the face-to-face conversations that they will have with their staff
Source: Based on Larkin and Larkin (1996, pp. 102–3).
228 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
LO 7.5 Contingency Approaches to Change Communication
We explore contingency approaches to change implementation in chapter 8. Contingency
perspectives have also been applied to the design of change communication strategies.
Two main contingencies—or dependencies—concern the type of change and the stage of
change.
Communication Strategy and Type of Change Doug Stace and Dexter Dunphy (2001) argue that a communication strategy must
reflect the type of organizational change that is being proposed:
• Developmental or incremental transitions aim for widespread involvement, emphasiz-
ing face-to-face communication and the use of change teams to identify initiatives and
broaden commitment.
• Task-focused transitions seek to align employee behavior with management initiatives,
so these are primarily top-down in nature, using formal communication channels such
as email broadcasts and memos.
• Charismatic transformations need to stimulate emotional commitment to new ways of
working, and thus require more personalized top-down forms of communication, ide-
ally combined with at least symbolic two-way communication.
• Turnarounds tend to follow from organizational crises, and draw on formal, top-down
modes of communication that attempt to force compliance with the new direction.
Stace and Dunphy outline how these approaches vary in terms of communicating
goals, who is to be involved, the kinds of issues that will be addressed, the communication
Communicating Change through Tag Teams
USAA is a financial services company that employs
25,800 people, has over 10 million members, and is
based in San Antonio, Texas. In moving through an
organizational change, USAA used “tag teams” to
ensure that change occurred in different units at the
same time, minimizing disruption to existing oper-
ations. A core team worked on a particular change
but was joined by “tag teams” comprised of volun-
teers from different parts of the organization who
attended core team meetings. They were charged
with asking questions about how change initiatives
would affect customer services and with conveying
the concerns and fears of their colleagues in relation
to the change. After the core team meetings, they
returned to their jobs and acted as informal con-
duits, taking information back to their colleagues
and work groups (based on Olofson, 1999).
“virtually guarantees that the change effort will fail,” because people will be aware that the
task force is meeting, rumors will circulate, and people will avoid buy-in to the final outcome.
Instead, she suggests setting up a “transition management team,” which is a group of senior
staff who work full time on the change initiative and who report to the chief executive. The
role of the transition management team is to stimulate conversation and allow information
to be shared across (potentially obsolete) internal organizational boundaries. The concept of
managing conversations is also reflected in the use of “tag teams” (see box).
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 229
Bill Quirke (2008, p. 236) also argues that communication strategy should be deter-
mined by the degree of change that is going to be implemented. The more significant the
change, the more employees need to be involved. He uses “the communication escalator”
(figure 7.3) as a guide to designing communications strategy. Degrees of involvement thus
range from awareness, understanding, support, and involvement, to commitment.
Open the Files
Think back to a recent change in your organization,
and consider the following questions:
1. Did your organization have a strategy for initially
announcing the change?
2. What strategy was used to communicate infor-
mation during the change process? Was one or
more of the strategies from figure 7.2 used? Was
this strategy adopted consistently, and for all
members across the organization?
3. On a scale from 1 (ineffective) to 5 (very effec-
tive), how would you rate the communication
strategy overall?
4. With hindsight, what changes would you have
made to improve the effectiveness of the change
communication strategy?
5. To what extent will those recommendations
apply to future changes in this organization?
To what extent will that depend on the further
changes that are proposed?
Newsletter
Video
Electronic Mail
Roadshows
Video
conferencing
Customer forums
Seminars
Training
courses
Business forums
Multimedia
Degree of Involvement
D e
g re
e o
f C
h a
n g
e
Team meetings
Feedback
forums
Speak up
programs
Interactive
conferencing
Updates
Team problem-
solving
Talkback
Awareness Understanding
Support
Involvement
Commitment
FIGURE 7.3 The Com-
munication
Escalator
channels and directions (top-down, lateral, one-way/two-way) that will be used, and the
balance of power that will need to be managed among relevant parties.
Each of these change communication strategies makes different demands on the capa-
bilities of the change manager. Developmental transitions demand sophisticated social and
interpersonal skills. Task-focused transformations rely on carefully crafted formal mes-
sages. Charismatic transformations need to be underpinned by visionary and inspiring
messages. In the interests of speed and effectiveness, post-crisis turnarounds may require
a directive, autocratic style, with which many experienced change managers may be
uncomfortable, especially if they are accustomed to more participative, engaging modes of
change communication and implementation.
230 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
The escalator indicates the communications methods appropriate to each degree of
involvement (suggestions—these are not comprehensive). For commitment, the organiza-
tion should consider using all of those types of communication methods, and any others
Communication in a Crisis What Can We Learn from BP’s Mistakes?
Communication in a crisis is critical, affecting
the organization’s reputation and performance.
Aikaterini Valvi and Konstantinos Fragkos (2013)
assess BP’s communication after the explosion on
the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig in the Gulf
of Mexico in April 2010. The incident killed 11 of
the 126 crew members, and injured 17 others. Oil
poured from the wellhead on the seabed and drifted
toward the Louisiana coast, threatening wildlife and
the local fishing and tourism industries. Spilling 5
million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf, this was
the biggest environmental disaster in the United
States since the Exxon Valdez spilled 750,000 barrels
in Prince William Sound in 1989. With financial
penalties and reputational damage, BP struggled to
restore profitability.
Crises are expected to trigger significant
organizational change to prevent a recurrence.
Many stakeholders are involved—employees,
shareholders, local businesses, the public, regulatory
agencies, government. Tony Hayward, BP’s chief
executive, took personal responsibility for providing
information following the Deepwater incident.
He was slow to respond to the crisis, and made
five other mistakes in his communication with the
media, government, and public:
1 The fake images: Fake photographs were given
to the press, with the claim that these related to
blank spots on the video; original images were
quickly supplied, but this damaged BP’s credibility.
2 “I want my life back”: Under pressure from various
sources, Hayward in a television interview in May
said, “I want my life back.” As the Deepwater
incident had caused 11 deaths, this damaged his
credibility and reputation.
3 The incident with the yacht: With oil still spilling
into the Gulf, Hayward took time off to watch
his yacht, Bob, compete in the UK Isle of Wight
island race.
4 We were not prepared: Speaking to the Financial
Times in Texas, Hayward said, “We did not have
the tools you would want in your toolkit”—not a
reassuring statement.
5 Self-interest: During a hearing with the U.S.
C a b i n e t , H a y w a r d a p p e a r e d t o s h o w a n
overriding concern with his own position, which
he believed was not under threat, saying that he
was ignoring press and television accounts of the
disaster so as not to “cloud his judgement.”
U.S. president Barack Obama criticized BP for
spending $50 million on radio, television, and
online advertising during the crisis, suggesting
that it would have been better to spend that
money on dealing with the oil spill. The company
made this worse by issuing a statement claiming
that “not a cent” had been diverted from their
response to the oil spill to pay for advertising.
BP’s communication with its own employees was
ineffective. When staff involved in the oil cleanup
operation were hospitalized with dizziness,
headaches, and respiratory problems, Hayward
blamed food poisoning, showing lack of concern
for their well-being. Strategies for communicating
with shareholders were more effective, reminding
them of BP’s past record, blaming other companies
for the disaster, and promising to meet long-term
dividend obligations. Nevertheless, Hayward was
replaced in October 2010.
What advice can other organizations take from
this experience? Develop a crisis communication
plan. Appoint experienced staff to work from a
designated public relations office. Communications
with the media must be direct and sincere. Use
press conferences, a crisis web page, and social
network accounts. Monitor media reports closely,
and respond immediately to clarify issues when
appropriate. Do not run advertising campaigns to
promote your image during a crisis. Concentrate on
restoring trust. Finally, make it clear from the start
that “things will change.”
(Other aspects of this incident are discussed in
chapter 5.)
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 231
that are available. At the awareness level, the focus is simply on providing information.
However, for involvement and commitment, communication also needs to concentrate on
improving the quality of interactions and relationships.
Communication Strategy and Stage of Change Adopting a differing contingency focus, Kathleen and Kevin Reardon (1999) suggest
that the most appropriate communication strategy depends on the stage of the change
process. First, they identify four leadership styles, each of which uses different com-
munication processes and strategies:
Commanding style: Leaders are performance- and results-oriented, and their communication
style is directive.
Logical style: Leaders explore the available strategic options through analysis and reasoning,
and their communication style involves explaining their intentions and their plans.
Inspirational style: Leaders develop a vision of the future around which they seek to encour-
age cohesion, and their communication style involves creating trust and mobilizing people
around the change program.
Supportive style: Leaders are concerned with creating an open and consensual environment,
and their communication style is based on involvement.
Reardon and Reardon (1999) argue that different modes of communicating should be
used at different stages of the change process. Using a five-stage process, their argument is
summarized in table 7.6.
Stage Leadership Style
Planning Focus on identifying what needs to change requires a combination of logical and inspirational leadership styles
Enabling As people are selected and trained in relation to the change process, a combination of logical, inspirational, and supportive styles are needed
Launching As change unfolds, combine logical and commanding styles
Catalyzing Use inspirational and supportive leadership styles to motivate and engage
Maintaining To encourage staff to continue with a change effort, perhaps in the face of obstacles, inspirational and supportive leadership styles are helpful
TABLE 7.6 Stages of
Change and
Leadership
Style
This framework recognizes that no one individual is likely to have all the change man-
agement skills required at different stages of a change process. More than one style—or
more than one image of change management—may be necessary. As discussed in the fol-
lowing chapter, however, change management can often be more of a team effort than a
solo performance. Team members may thus have different strengths—or styles—which
they can use to compensate for each other.
232 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
This framework has some drawbacks. First, change rarely unfolds in the logical manner
shown in table 7.6 (see chapter 10). Second, there may be several changes unfolding at
once, but each at a different pace in an organization, raising questions about the manage-
ment styles of those involved in more than one initiative. Third, it can be difficult to iden-
tify when one stage has ended and another has begun, as these can overlap significantly.
Fourth, the model offers clear advice, but without supporting evidence. Finally, to apply
this framework, change managers are required to have a good self-understanding of their
leadership and communication preferences and styles. As with many such frameworks,
this is useful as long as it is treated as a guide and not as a rigid set of rules.
LO 7.6 Communication Channels and the Role of Social Media
Getting the (Change) News What Works Best for You?
You are an employee of a large organization about
to go through a major restructuring.
1. What do you think you need to know about the
restructuring?
2. From whom would you like to get this informa-
tion? Why?
3. Would you prefer to receive this information in
person or in a group setting?
4. What for you would be the best channel (e.g.,
management briefing, email, video) for receiving
this information? Why?
5. As a change manager, how will you use your
answers to these questions to help design a
communication strategy?
At the heart of our model of communication (figure 7.1) sits a key issue that we have
not directly discussed: the channel, or the medium through which the message will be
transmitted. This is not a mere technical issue. As Marshall McLuhan (1964) argued,
“the medium is the message,” suggesting that the properties of a chosen medium can
influence the meaning of a message and its interpretation. The change manager select-
ing an inappropriate medium with which to transmit important information to key
groups affected by a change proposal may not be taken seriously, may be seen as insen-
sitive, or may strengthen disaffection. In the final section of this chapter, therefore, we
will consider the characteristics of different media, and how these can affect change
communication. We then explore the impact on change communication of develop-
ments in social media and mobile technology.
Media Richness One of the main characteristics on which communication media vary is “information
richness,” a concept developed by Robert Lengel and Richard Daft (1988). Richness
concerns the amount and the kind of information that can be transmitted. The three
characteristics of a communication medium that affect richness are (1) the ability to
handle many items of information at the same time, (2) the availability of rapid feed-
back, and (3) the ability to establish a personal focus. Based on these characteristics,
they classify media on the “hierarchy of richness” shown in figure 7.4.
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 233
Face-to-face communication is the richest because it meets all three criteria: multiple
information cues, immediate feedback, and personal focus. Moving down the hierarchy,
telephone allows quick feedback, but the information cues that are available from nonver-
bal behavior in face-to-face communication are absent; body language such as eye contact,
posture, gesture, and head movements. Written communications can be directed at indi-
viduals, but carry limited information, and feedback is likely to be delayed. At the bottom
of the hierarchy, impersonal bulletins and computer reports are limited on all three criteria
and are therefore “information poor” or “lean.”
This is not an argument in favor of rich communications. On the contrary, the degree
of richness that is appropriate depends on the nature and content of what is being com-
municated, and in particular on where the issue lies on a continuum from routine to
nonroutine. Routine issues are commonplace, simple, rational, straightforward, and con-
tain no surprises. Nonroutine issues, in contrast, concern novel, complex, unexpected
events and are often characterized by time pressure, ambiguity, and surprise. The poten-
tial for misunderstanding is thus greater with nonroutine issues, and a richer exchange
of information is therefore necessary in order to establish a common frame of reference.
Lengel and Daft (1988, pp. 229–31) suggest six rules for “matching” media richness to
the message:
Rule 1: Send nonroutine, difficult communications through a rich medium—preferably
face-to-face.
Rule 2: Send routine, simple communications through a lean medium.
Rule 3: Use rich media to extend your personal presence throughout the organization.
Rule 4: Use rich media for implementing company strategy.
Rule 5: Don’t let the media in use “censor” information about critical issues; formal
written reports simplify multidimensional issues and mask the nonroutine.
Rule 6: Evaluate new communication technology as a single channel in the media
spectrum.
Physical presence (face-to-face)
Media
richness
Highest
Lowest
Interactive media (telephone,
electronic media)
Personal static media (memos,
letters, tailored computer reports)
Impersonal static media (flyers,
bulletins, generalized computer
reports)
FIGURE 7.4 Media
Richness
Hierarchy
Source: Lengel and
Daft, Media Richness
Heirarchy, Academy of
Management Execu-
tive, p. 226, 1988.
234 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
For the change manager, these rules indicate that incremental changes that simply build
on current practice may be comparatively routine, and they should be communicated as
such, using lean media. This is more suited, for example, to the transmission of factual
or technical information. On the other hand, information-rich media should be used when
changes are novel, more complex, and widespread in their implications. Information rich-
ness may be more difficult to achieve in a large organization, and the change manager may
need to consider a wider range of options, including the use of the social technologies
discussed shortly. In most instances of nonroutine change, it is likely that a portfolio of
communication strategies will be desirable, tailored to the particular circumstances.
Adopting a different contingency approach, Bill Quirke (2008) suggests that different
change communication media are better suited to some audiences than to others. With
regard to change communication he suggests that there are four types of target audience,
whose needs differ:
Waking up They will be affected by the change, but have not noticed, yet
Engaging They know that they will be affected, and are interested and concerned
Educating They will affected marginally, and only need to be told about what is
happening
Reassuring They will also be marginally affected, but are concerned nevertheless
Media-rich face-to-face communication needs to be directed toward those who will be
most impacted by change—those who need waking up, and those who need to be engaged.
Leaner forms of communication can be used with those who only need education or
reassurance.
A New Range of Communication Tools—the Potential Uses of Social Media The social networking service Facebook was launched in 2004. This is now one of many
Internet-mediated tools that allow people to create, share, and exchange information, ideas,
pictures, and videos. Unlike previous “flat” Internet applications, these social media tools
allow two-way, real-time communication, interaction, collaboration, and co-creation. To
use social media, one needs some form of Internet access, which used to mean a computer.
The development of mobile technology has made social media independent of traditional
computing; we are now more likely to access the Internet with a laptop, smart television,
tablet, ebook reader, or smartphone. Social media and mobile technologies are also “low
friction” tools: they are ubiquitous, easy to use, flexible, and do not require specialized
equipment. Another feature is their rapid development; this section of this chapter will be
out of date before this book is published.
A study by McKinsey Global Institute concluded that social media could increase the
productivity of knowledge workers by 20 to 25 percent, as people would spend much less
time looking for information (Chui et al., 2012). In January 2015 Facebook launched a
corporate version of its social networking platform, called Facebook at Work. A number of
corporate “partners” were asked to experiment with its possibilities, to discover if this could
increase employee productivity by sharing ideas through posts, groups, and messages. This
development was triggered by the observation that Facebook’s own staff were using the
network instead of email for internal communication. This new platform sought to address
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 235
organizational concerns over data security, intellectual property, and privacy. Unlike “per-
sonal” Facebook, information shared on Facebook at Work belonged to the employer, and
employees who leave will not have access to their corporate account (Kuchler, 2015).
Social media are therefore “information rich,” close to the top of the hierarchy in
figure 7.4, and they are in widespread use, especially by younger employees. In 2015,
Facebook, with a market value of $209 billion, had over 1.35 billion monthly active users;
Twitter had 250 million. These technologies could thus make significant contributions
to organizational communication in general, and to change communication in particular.
Jonny Gifford (2013) argues that the main applications include:
Efficient communication: Increase efficiency of communication and knowledge
transfer, getting the right information to the right people.
Employee voice: Seek employee views, giving employees a platform.
Networking and collaboration: Create meaningful connections with people we would
otherwise not know, and facilitating collaboration.
Learning and development: Use social media to support e-learning and development
and to encourage self-directed learning.
Recruitment and job hunting: Social networking sites are now widely used for recruit-
ment; employers and job seekers use social media to
check each other to inform their choices.
Can social media help organizations to become more innovative and responsive to
change? Applications in marketing and recruitment are straightforward. The use of social
media in relation to employee engagement, productivity, innovation, and communication,
however, is more diffuse. The applications listed above have the potential to transform
change communication by tailoring information to individuals and groups, with the ability
to communicate simultaneously with large numbers regardless of location, creating dia-
logue concerning change proposals, encouraging networks and collaboration, and provid-
ing flexible change-specific training. Social networking sites can also reveal (to potential
employers) information concerning candidates’ openness to change, and also reveal (to
potential employees) an organization’s receptiveness to change and innovation.
Social Media Drivers
A survey of executives found that the main drivers
of social media adoption were (Matthews, 2015):
1. Responding faster to changing needs
2. Optimizing business processes
3. Increasing revenue and profits
4. Attracting the best talent in a competitive market
5. Better-engaged employees
Change managers thus have a set of new and
powerful tools to help with two-way communica-
tion, staff participation, and change implementation.
How are these media being applied in practice? In 2011, the consulting company
McKinsey held a contest to find companies using social media tools and technologies
in innovative ways, to improve management methods and engage frontline employees
236 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
( McKinsey & Company, 2011). Demonstrating the uses and benefits of these tools, here
are some of the winners:
The Dutch Civil Service
Dutch government employees faced bureaucratic hurdles, such as having to book meeting
rooms in their own buildings through an external agency, which was time-consuming and
costly. Following a frustrated tweet from one staff member, a group formed, and they used
open-source software to develop their own reservation system. This now covers over 50
offices and over 550 workplaces in government buildings across the country.
Essilor International
Essilor is a global manufacturer of ophthalmic lenses and has a training program that uses
personal and social media methods to share best practices across 102 sites in 40 countries.
It now takes one year to reach the level of skill that once took three years, and social net-
working allows coaching across different locations. A lens-processing center in Thailand
developed a game to teach new employees how to understand the shape of a particular
type of lens, and this game is now also used in Brazil.
Best Buy
Best Buy is a consumer electronics retailer with 1,500 locations and 100,000 employees.
To ensure that top management understood what frontline staff learned from customers,
the company created an online feedback system that allowed everyone to see the customer
information gathered in all the stores. This influenced a range of company practices, from
improving shop signs to complex decisions about implementing a national promotion. This
was a fast, flexible, and inexpensive way of responding to “the voice of the customer.”
Cemex
Cemex is a large Mexico-based cement company, which developed an approach to
employee collaboration called Shift. This helped to reduce the time taken to introduce
new products and process improvements. Shift uses wikis, blogs, discussion boards, and
web-conferencing to help employees around the world collaborate with each other. For
example, 400 employees working on ready-mix products helped to identify which worked
well, and which were obsolete, slimming the product line and updating the global cata-
logue. Now, with over 500 active communities, Shift is used to solve local problems, using
global resources, as well as storing and sharing the knowledge that is generated.
These organizations may be relatively rare examples. A survey of 2,100 UK employees
and 590 human resource management staff suggests that development of novel uses of social
media has been slow (Gifford, 2013). Applications have been mainly driven by personal
access, rather than by organization strategy; employees are probably more sophisticated in
the use of social media tools in their private lives than are employers with regard to organi-
zational applications. Where organizations were using these technologies, they were more
likely to be targeting external (customers, other stakeholders) rather than internal audiences.
Applications of “employee voice” were superficial, with management seeking employee
views, but not necessarily being more responsive or open to influence as a result. The tech-
nology is in place, but most employees tend to use their laptops, smartphones, and tablets
for personal purposes. There seems to be limited corporate support for BYOD (bring-your-
own-device) practices, and some organizations ban the use of social media at work.
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 237
A study in 2013 examined how chief executives in American organizations used four
social networks: Twitter, LinkedIn, Facebook, and Google Plus. Around 30 percent were
LinkedIn members, but participation in other networks was “dismal.” Faced with those
findings, Linda Pophal (2014, p. 23) asks, “Is it any wonder that so many of us are stymied
in our ability to sell the C-suite on the value of social media? It appears that few CEOs and
other senior executives are familiar with, or convinced of, the benefits of communicating
via social media.” Access to social networking and mobile technology is not a barrier; a
perceived lack of organizational relevance is.
The development of enterprise-specific social networks may help to realize the poten-
tial of these technologies. Employees can be involved in two-way discussions using a
secure “gated” corporate networking platform for incubating ideas and feeding these to
senior management. This can also be used to facilitate ad hoc communication and collabo-
ration. Social networking can be a more engaging medium than traditional communication
tools, to send corporate messages, quickly capture employee reactions, check that mes-
sages have been understood, and for information-sharing in general. A corporate social
network could strengthen the sense of shared purpose by celebrating achievements, rein-
forcing mission and values, and strengthening identification with the organization.
Antisocial Media
Lloyds Bank has a company intranet, which provides
opportunities for staff to give feedback to senior man-
agement. In January 2015, during a major reorgani-
zation that involved cutting costs and the closure of
150 branches with job losses, the human resources
director Rupert McNeill decided to assess staff morale.
He posted an intranet article that praised employees,
describing them as “a fantastic team” and an “agile
workforce.” Staff were asked to leave comments, and
hundreds responded. Most of the feedback expressed
resentment and complaints (Donellan, 2015):
“If you want promotion do every extracurricular
task that you can. Don’t worry about the quality
of the work as it is irrelevant.”
“Either execs are lying, or somewhere down
the line people are misrepresenting what is
being communicated from above.”
“Why should we trust you after what you did
on pensions?”
Most complaints concerned the decision to close
the generous final salary pension scheme. This hap-
pened at the same time as the chief executive was
awarded a £586,000 pension contribution as part of
his £7.8 million annual package, and was seen as “a
disgraceful display of double standards.” Staff were
also critical of excessive bureaucracy and a lack of
top management support. The corporate intranet
makes it easy for management to capture staff feed-
back. That feedback, however, may be unfavorable,
particularly when management actions are seen as
being inconsistent or unfair.
From a study of seven organizations with internal networks, Gifford (2014) offers this advice:
• Enterprise networks need a clear rationale or purpose if they are to be used and become
embedded. They need to support day-to-day activities.
• The process of identifying uses is better developed bottom-up, coming from staff them-
selves. But effective uses need to be identified and replicated if they are to spread and
be sustained.
238 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
• It helps if there is a key individual, or a team of “community champions,” guiding and
encouraging the use of social media until this reaches critical mass.
• Enterprise social networks are time-efficient ways for senior leaders to engage with
large numbers of staff and to increase their visibility. However, the effects will be neg-
ative if senior management challenge or criticize comments with which they disagree.
• Social networks should be self-managed and not censored; policies should be “light
touch” (with an expectation that posts will be “respectful”); negative comments should
be dealt with frankly and openly; employees should be informed if comments have
caused offense.
Social media offer the change manager a novel range of powerful, flexible, “informa-
tion-rich” communication channels, which appear to have valuable uses. Organizations
that have experimented with these technologies have achieved significant benefits. Most
of the tools are public and require little skill to use. In order to develop beneficial appli-
cations, it also seems that creativity, innovation, and experimentation will be necessary in
order to tailor these new methods to local conditions and organizational goals.
When they were developing their theory of media richness, Robert Lengel and Richard
Daft (1988) may not have foreseen the development of social media and mobile technol-
ogies in the twenty-first century. However, their conclusions with regard to computing
technology in general speak to the change manager today. They observed that “electronic
media” were just one potential channel in the media spectrum. All the other channels have
their uses and advantages. They also concluded that “there is no electronic substitute for
face-to-face discussions when issues are nonroutine” (Lengel and Daft, 1988, p. 231).
Social media can therefore be misused. They should not, for example, be used to provide
an excuse to avoid difficult interpersonal conversations—about forthcoming organiza-
tional changes, perhaps, or other controversial or sensitive issues.
EXERCISE 7.1
Deborah Tannen (1995) argues that the way we communicate reinforces power and gender differences. This can affect our interpretations of what we think is happening in a particular situation.
1. Observe a work meeting, preferably with up to 10 people.
2. Listen to the language being used. What different types of languages in use can you observe, such as commanding, respectful, demonstrating concern, displaying conde- scension?
3. Do individuals tend to use one type of language in their interactions?
4. Who does most of the talking? Who asks most of the questions?
5. To what extent does the talk convey information about power and gender differences? For example, who takes credit, who exudes confidence, who asks more questions?
6. What conclusions can you draw from your analysis about the way language constructs and reinforces differences within the organization?
7. As a change manager, how will your awareness of these differences influence your future interactions with staff?
Listen to
Who’s
Talking
LO 7.2
LO 7.3
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 239
EXERCISE
7.2
Many alphas think that looking interested when someone speaks to them demonstrates a high degree of openness when, in fact, that’s just the bare minimum one must do not to be labeled defensive. Alphas can use this tool to chart their progress toward a more constructive state of mind and to see how their behavior appears to others.
Are you open, or defensive? What are your normal behaviors? Where are your prefer- ences? What do you need to change? How would this improve your relationships and personal effectiveness?
How Defen-
sive Are
You?
LO 7.2
Highly Open
+10
+9
+8
+7
+6
+5
+4
+3
+2
–1
–2
–3
–4
–5
–6
–7
–8
–9
–10
+1
Plan the change, engage others, set milestones, and implement.
Communicate genuine enthusiasm about making a change.
Think out loud, making new associations about the problem.
Take full responsibility for the problem and its ramifications.
Request information and examples about the problem.
Openly wonder about your role in creating the problem.
Express genuine curiosity about the issue and how to resolve it.
Express appreciation for the messenger, regardless of delivery.
Summarize key points without interjecting your own thoughts.
Look interested, breathe, demonstrate an open posture.
Show polite interest while inwardly preparing your rebuttal.
Provide a detailed explanation of your point of view.
Justify actions with compelling logic and an interpretation of events.
Interrupt to give your perspective.
Interpret comments as attacks and feel misunderstood.
Convince them that you’re right and they’re wrong.
Make snippy replies and show your irritation nonverbally.
Blame or complain about someone who’s not present.
Intimidate or attack the messenger.
Appear to comply, with no intention of doing what you say you’ll do.
Highly Defensive
Breakthrough: choosing curiosity over being right
Source: Ludeman, K. and Erlandson, E., “Highly Open/Highly Defensive”, Harvard Business Review, No. 5, 2004. Copyright © 2004
Harvard Business School Publishing. All rights reserved. Harvard Business Publishing is an affiliate of Harvard Business School.
240 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
EXERCISE 7.3
“In the past, institutional mission and strategic vision were reviewed every four years; now, they are reviewed every time someone posts to Facebook, comments on a blog, or opens a new Twitter account.”
—Dana Allen-Greil and colleagues
Social media could themselves trigger dramatic organizational changes, as well as cre- ating new channels of communication with regard to other changes. For example, social media are changing the ways in which museums interact with the public, and also how museum staff communicate and work with each other. Dana Allen-Greil and colleagues (2011) argue that, used effectively, social media can further the mission of the organiza- tion and foster more agile and collaborative organization cultures. There are many wider cultural, political, and social pressures encouraging openness and collaboration. Social media offer a new set of tools with which organizations can respond to those pressures.
Allen-Greil and colleagues studied three museums: the Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History (NMAH); Monticello, a historic house and research institution; and the J. Paul Getty Trust (the Getty). These museums have adopted different approaches to the use of social media.
At NMAH, social media contribute to public programming, focusing on education and visitor services, complementing the existing email newsletter, website, and other online communications. At Monticello, the focus lies with relationships building, and in particular on increasing the organization’s “social media outreach.” This means using social media to increase the number of “online visitors.” In contrast, the Getty is using social media to “get off the hill.” The Getty has a reputation for being inaccessible, as it is located on a hill above the 405 freeway, and visitors have to take a quarter-mile tram ride to get up there. Social media thus allow the Getty to “take the collections and programs into the commu- nity” and to promote their educational and research work.
Sometimes the Best Thing Managers Can Do Is Get Out of the Way
Staff who have collaborated on social media projects in these museums have created new channels of communication and new ways of thinking and working with each other. The leadership of these initiatives was mainly “bottom-up,” and did not rely on senior management experts. Allen-Greil and colleagues note that “effective collaboration means staff members need to cross lines traditionally drawn between different working groups, and probably across lines drawn between hierarchical levels within the institution.” Social media may thus lead to flatter hierarchies and “horizontal working.” The study also found that an increased level of online engagement with the public led to an increase in face-to-face conversations among staff. Why? Social media project staff had to meet with colleagues across the organization: human resources, legal department, registrars, publishers, educators. The authors argue: “Social media are pushing us together in a very personal way. New conversations between staff members who have never had any reason
to talk before are establishing new relationships and new lines of engagement.”
A Perpetually Beta State of Mind
Senior managers need to encourage staff to experiment with social media to develop more efficient and effective processes. However, at the Getty, the use of different social media platforms by different groups of staff meant that initiatives were often uncoordi- nated, and some even competed with each other: “In a large, hierarchical institution, this
Social
Media at the
Museum
LO 7.3
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 241
Chui, M., Manyika, J., Bughin, J., Dobbs, R., Roxburgh, C., Sarrazin, H., Sands, G., and
Westergren, M. 2012. The social economy: Unlocking value and productivity through social
technologies. New York and London: McKinsey & Company/McKinsey Global Institute.
Analyzes the economic impact and business potential of social technologies, considering
current applications and future possibilities. Argues that the use of social technologies to
improve collaboration within and across organizations has reached only a fraction of its
potential. Improvements in value creation and productivity will depend on finding innova-
tive ways to exploit these technologies, while protecting individual and corporate rights.
Keller, S., Meaney, M., and Pung, C. 2010. What successful transformations share. Chi-
cago and London: McKinsey & Company. Identifies the tactics that lead to successful
change. Emphasizes the power of widespread employee engagement, collaboration,
co-creation, sense of ownership, and in particular the importance of ongoing communica-
tion and involvement.
Rafferty, A. E., Jimmieson, N. L., and Armenakis, A. A. 2013. Change readiness: A mul-
tilevel review. Journal of Management 39(1):110–35. Stresses the role of communication
to influence cognitive and emotional responses to increase change readiness. Argues that,
to influence emotions, the use of pictures (see following recommendation), color, music,
and atmosphere are helpful. Concludes that high-quality change communication can
increase readiness, and that poor communication can damage the change process.
Additional Reading
kind of testing, rapid prototyping, and risk-taking is pushing the boundaries of the usual, highly-controlled content development processes.” Although exciting for staff, sponta- neous experimentation may not be sustainable. However, Allen-Greil and colleagues ask us to consider: “What would it really be like if we could work in a perpetually beta state of mind? If we could try, fail, and try again? We are closer than you think because it’s already happening at every museum that uses social media.”
Now that you have read this case, consider the following questions:
1. In what ways could social media applications contribute to the mission of your organization?
2. How could social media change or strengthen the culture of your organization, with regard to widening collaboration and becoming more agile and responsive?
3. To what extent will your current organization silos and hierarchies inhibit the com- munication and collaboration opportunities opened up by social media? Or, will social media help you to break down those silos and hierarchies, and encourage more “horizontal working”?
4. How should your organization balance the need for management control with the desire to open up conversations more widely across the organization in order to encourage experimentation with social media?
5. In your assessment, would your organization benefit or suffer from working in a “per- petually beta” state of mind, constantly experimenting, learning—and improving— from the mistakes?
242 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
Sibbet, D. 2013. Visual leaders: New tools for visioning, management, and organizational
change. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. Introduces an innovative range of visual
tools for improving corporate communications and visual IQ. Demonstrates how visual-
ization can engage, inspire, and contribute to thinking. Argues that these tools are particu-
larly useful in driving organizational change. Describes with case studies (the GM Saturn
project; the quality improvement program at HealthEast) a “storymapping” approach for
anticipating, managing, and communicating the stages of the change process.
Identify key elements in the change communication process.
We emphasized the argument that communication is not a “soft” topic, but one that has a
direct impact on organizational effectiveness and financial performance. We introduced
a well-known model of the change communication process—a process for exchanging
meaning as well as transmitting information. A transmitter codes a message, which is
transmitted through a chosen channel to a receiver, who then decodes that message and,
depending on the channel, provides feedback. A number of factors can interfere with
this apparently simple process: perceptual filters, noise, and the wider organizational
context in which communication takes place. The organization’s past history of change
is important, as this can influence responses to current change proposals.
LO 7.1
Roundup
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
1. In what ways does your personal use of language
reinforce power and gender differences in your
organization? What effect do you think this
has in terms of how your change messages are
received? What modifications to your approach
would help you to communicate change more
effectively?
2. Do you see yourself as a reporter of change
information? Or are you a sense-maker, helping
staff to understand change actions, and seeking
input from them?
3. To what extent do you focus on getting the word
out, rather than seeking staff buy-in? Do you
tend to use the same communication methods,
or do you adopt different approaches depend-
ing upon the type of change? Do you “spray and
pray” information or “underscore and explore”?
4. Are you more comfortable using “rich” commu-
nication media (face-to-face), or “leaner” media
(email)? Do you adopt different forms of com-
munication depending on the type or stage of
change? With which communication media have
you had the most success, and why?
5. Does your organization have a strategy for using
social media? If so, how would you assess the
effectiveness of this approach, and what rec-
ommendations would you make in order to
strengthen the benefits of using social media
tools? If not, how would you advise your orga-
nization in developing a social media strategy,
balancing the benefits and risks?
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this chapter,
in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies 243
Understand how language, gender, power, and emotion can affect the change commu-
nication process.
The use of language, gender and power differences, and emotional responses can all
have an effect on the success of the communication process. Men and women can
communicate in different ways. Women emphasize doubts and uncertainties, and men
display confidence and minimize concerns. Women ask more questions, which men
can mistakenly interpret as a comparative lack of knowledge. Power differences are
also a barrier to effective communication, as the powerful may not wish to disclose
information that could weaken their power, and the less powerful may not disclose
information that could be damaging to them. Change managers must be alert to the
significance of emotional responses to change proposals, and we identified a number of
strategies for strengthening emotional commitment to change.
Understand the power of language in influencing responses to change proposals.
We explored the proposition that the management of change involves the management
of conversations. For the change manager, even informal conversations are powerful
tools for exchanging meaning and influencing perceptions of change proposals, as
well as ways of assessing responses. Choice of language in such conversations is
therefore critical. That language may need to reflect the stage of the change process;
we discussed different conversations for initiating, understanding, performing, and
finally closing change initiatives. There is clearly a need for coherence and for shared
understanding in order to avoid confusion. It is also appropriate, we argued, to align
choice of language and imagery with the type of change that is proposed, once again in
the interests of avoiding “mixed signals.”
Explain and assess appropriate strategies for communicating change.
We addressed a number of key practical questions.
Is it possible to communicate too much? Probably not, as long as information over-
load is avoided, and the communication process is two-way, capturing and exploring
concerns and ideas as well as transmitting information.
Is it more important to get the word out, or to get buy-in? Both are important; but
without buy-in, the chances of change failure are increased.
Which strategies are more effective than others? A communication strategy of
“underscore and explore,” which involves a genuine dialogue with those involved,
is the most effective approach. Two strategies in particular, “spray and pray” and
“withhold and uphold,” are likely to be less effective because the communication is
one-way, and the staff who are going to be affected have no opportunity to comment
or discuss.
Who should be responsible for communicating the change? The “obvious” answer,
the chief executive, may not always be the correct answer. This indeed may not be the
right question, which is concerned with how to manage the conversation between those
who lead the change and those who will have to implement it. The role of opinion lead-
ers in the organization may be key, whether these are senior staff or first-line supervi-
sors, or dedicated transition teams.
LO 7.2
LO 7.3
LO 7.4
244 Chapter 7 Change Communication Strategies
Understand how successful communication processes vary with the type and stage of
organizational change.
Communication should be tailored to the type of change. Widespread face-to-face com-
munication is effective with developmental changes. However, task-focused transitions
and post-crisis turnarounds may need to be driven with formal top-down communi-
cation. Charismatic transformations also require top-down communication, but with a
more personalized approach, allowing dialogue. The “communication escalator” also
suggests that the degree of employee involvement, and the range of communication
media used, should reflect the degree of change: significant change calls for a wider
range of communication and a high degree of staff involvement.
Communication and leadership style should also be tailored to the stage of the change
process: at the planning stage, a combination of logical and inspirational styles; at the
enabling stage, a combination of logical, inspirational, and supportive styles; at the
launch stage, a combination of logical and commanding styles; at the catalyzing stage,
inspirational and supportive styles; at the maintenance stage, inspirational and support-
ive styles. One change manager may not have all of the skills and the behavioral flexi-
bility required, reinforcing the importance of building a capable change team.
Assess the utility of a range of different change communication channels, including
applications of social media.
Communication media vary in terms of “information richness,” which involves han-
dling many items of information simultaneously, rapid feedback, and personal focus.
Face-to-face communications are information rich; reports and flyers are lean. Infor-
mation-rich media are more appropriate when dealing with complex nonroutine issues.
Lean media are more appropriate for simple routine matters. Social media based on
mobile technologies are information rich, allowing two-way communication and
encouraging information sharing, networking, and collaboration. Social media thus
have the potential to transform organizational change communication. However, most
organizations have been slow to exploit these technologies for internal communication;
most applications address external audiences. Employees may be more sophisticated in
their use of these new technologies in their private lives than employers with regard to
organizational applications. The development of enterprise-specific networks may help
to realize the potential of these technologies.
LO 7.5
LO 7.6
Allen-Greil, D., Edwards, S., Ludden, J., and Johnson, E. 2011. Social media and
organizational change. Paper presented at Museums and the Web 2011 Conference,
Philadelphia, April 6–9, http://museumsandtheweb.com/mw2011/papers/social_media_
and_organizational_change, accessed February 5, 2015.
Bulkeley, W. M. 2004. IBM documents give rare look at sensitive plans on
“offshoring.” The Wall Street Journal, January 19. http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB107438649533319800 (accessed March 9, 2015).
Cannell, M. 2010. Employee communication factsheet. London: Chartered Institute of
Personnel and Development.
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249
8Chapter Resistance to Change
Learning objectives
On completion of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 8.1 Explain the benefits of resistance to change, as well as the disadvantages.
LO 8.2 Understand the causes of resistance to change.
LO 8.3 Identify the symptoms of resistance to change.
LO 8.4 Recognize and diagnose middle management resistance to change, which
could be a blockage, or could be highly beneficial.
LO 8.5 Understand and apply different approaches to managing resistance.
w w
w .s
im o n k n e e b o n e .c
o m
250 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
WIIFM, WAMI, and the Dimensions of Resistance
WIIFM stands for “What’s In It For Me?” (sometimes WIIFT: “What’s In It For Them?”).
WAMI stands for “What’s Against My Interests?” If “it” is an organizational change, and
if there is nothing in it for me but frustration and grief, then I will resist. If it is not in my
interests, then I will resist. Convince me of the benefits, and persuade me that it is in my
interests, and then you have my support. Managing resistance to change can be seen as no
more complex than that. Is it really so simple?
Resistance offers a plausible explanation for the apparently high failure rate of organi-
zational change. Many commentators see resistance to change as a problem to be solved, a
barrier to overcome, an enemy to defeat. Resistance stimulates strong emotions and strong
language. Foote (2001) describes resistance as “one of the nastiest, most debilitating work-
place cancers,” claiming that “there isn’t a more potent, paradoxical or equal- opportunity
killer of progress and good intentions.” Geisler (2001) refers to “bottom-feeders” who
complain about and resist change because of its potential to remove the “waste” that
they need to survive: infighting, bureaucracy, autocratic posturing. Maurer (2010, p. 23)
observes, “The mere mention of the word unleashes a torrent of negative thoughts—fear,
opposition, conflict, hassles, pain, annoyance, anger, suspicion.” This kind of language
encourages an adversarial approach to resistance, which can make the problem worse.
However, research and experience show that resistance takes many forms, and it can be
constructive as well as damaging.
Change can fail for many other reasons, even when widely supported. Attributing prob-
lems to resistance can obscure the ways in which management practices contribute to
change implementation problems. We thus have to explore the various dimensions of what
is commonly termed resistance, and ask whether this term, with its negative connotations,
is still a helpful one.
Following this introduction, the chapter has five sections. First, we explore the argu-
ment that resistance to change, when seen and managed as a resource rather than as a
problem, can often be helpful and beneficial. Second, we will explore the causes of resis-
tance. Causes can include resistance to the substance or content of change, and resis-
tance to the way in which changes are implemented, or the change process. Third, we
then consider the signs or symptoms of resistance, some of which are public and easily
recognizable, and some of which are covert and harder to detect. Fourth, we examine
the stereotype of middle managers as “change blockers.” The evidence suggests that
this popular view is often wrong. Middle managers can subvert changes proposed by
senior executives when they believe that those proposals are ill advised, and will not be
effective.
Finally, as resistance can be a difficulty in some circumstances, we consider strategies
for avoiding and if necessary managing resistance to change. The concepts of individual
readiness for change and stakeholder management are relevant to this discussion, but as
those topics were covered in chapter 4, they will not be revisited in detail in this chapter.
Table 8.1 provides a brief reminder.
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 251
Five Components of Individual Readiness
Five Components of Stakeholder Management
Belief that change is necessary
Belief that change is an appropriate response
Perceived individual capability to implement
Belief that resources will be provided
Personal evaluation of costs and benefits
Identify all stakeholders
Establish what they expect to gain or lose
Check their "track record" on response to change
Use planned benefits to strengthen support
Address concerns by reducing losses
LO 8.1 Benefits
We come now to a most important point. Resistance to change is not only normal but in some
ways even desirable. An organization totally devoid of resistance to change would fly apart at
the seams. It must be ambivalent about radical technical innovation. It must both seek it out and
resist it. Because of commitments to existing technology and to forms of social organization asso-
ciated with it, management must act against the eager acceptance of new technical ideas, even
good ones. Otherwise, the organization would be perpetually and fruitlessly shifting gears.
(Schön, 1963, p. 82)
Is resistance to change a “natural” human response? If that were true, then we would
never become bored with our jobs or look for promotion and more challenging work. If
that were true, then manufacturers, from Apple to Ford, would have problems bringing
new products to market. Does resistance to change strengthen with age? If that were
true, then we would not see retirees set up new businesses, build “portfolio” or “encore”
careers, and develop other new skills and interests. Florian Kunze et al. (2013) present
evidence showing that resistance to change decreases with age. Resistance is a topic
shrouded in myths. Another of these myths is that resistance is a problem.
Resistance is not inevitable. As noted earlier, change is unlikely to be challenged if
those who are going to be affected believe that they will benefit in some way—if “WIIFT”
is clear and positive. Outcomes that can encourage support for change thus include
( Kirkpatrick, 2001):
Security Increased demand for particular skills; stronger organizational
competitive position and improved job security
Money Higher remuneration
Authority Promotion, power, more discretion in decision making
Status Prestige assignments with matching job titles, a bigger office
Responsibility Increased job scope, visibility
Better conditions Improved physical environment, new equipment
Self-satisfaction Greater sense of challenge and achievement
Personal contacts More chances to meet and work with influential people
Less time and effort Operational efficiencies
TABLE 8.1 Individual
Readiness and
Stakeholder
Analysis—a
Reminder
252 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
Resistance, when it does occur, is not necessarily damaging. Donald Schön (1963)
argued that resistance was not just desirable, but necessary, in order to prevent the imple-
mentation of weak ideas and ineffective proposals. Unity and consensus are often viewed
as desirable, while conflict and disagreement are bad. However, in some settings, a diver-
gence of opinions can be constructive if this exposes the dimensions of an argument or the
full range of consequences—positive and negative—of a change proposal. Several other
commentators have thus argued for the need to recognize the utility of resistance (Waddell
and Sohal, 1998; Mabin, 2001; Atkinson, 2005). Maurer (2010, p. 23) says, “Sometimes
we need to hear the resistance in order to know that our plans are doomed to failure.”
Jeffrey and Laurie Ford (2009) argue that resistance to change provides valuable feed-
back on what is being proposed. Resistance is a resource, even if it sounds like complaints
and arguments. They suggest that there is no point in blaming resisters. Treated as a threat,
they become defensive and uncommunicative, and the resource is no longer available. On
the contrary, it is important to understand resistance, which can often be well founded.
Resistance is not always irrational or self-serving. Ford and Ford (2009, p. 100) argue,
“Even difficult people can provide valuable input when you treat their communication
with respect and are willing to reconsider some aspects of the change you’re initiating.”
What to you as the change manager is an annoying complaint may be a genuine expres-
sion of concern from the person who raised it. Resisters believe that they are being helpful
and constructive, while you believe that they are being negative and disruptive.
Furthermore, different people interpret change, and therefore respond to change, in dif-
ferent ways, at different times, depending on their current role and past experience (Ford
et al., 2002). We may resist your current proposals because your previous initiative did not
work. We may find some parts of your proposals exciting and welcome, while being horri-
fied by some of your other change ideas.
Ford and Ford (2009) identify five ways in which resistance can be used productively:
1. Encourage dialogue Keep the conversation alive—even with complaints—to
increase awareness of the change ideas and allow those
affected to think through the implications.
2. Clarify the purpose Those affected need to understand why their roles have
to change.
3. Consider new possibilities Assess and if appropriate accept the ideas of those who
are resisting; the most outspoken are often closest to the
operations affected and care about getting it right.
4. Listen to the voices Encourage participation and engagement; people want
to be heard, and noting concerns can generate novel and
valuable options.
5. Deal with the past Current responses to change can be based on previous
failures in which today’s managers were not involved; it
may be necessary to resolve any “leftover” issues before
going ahead with new plans.
For some change managers, adopting a “welcoming” approach to resistance to change
may sound unrealistic, and personally challenging. However, Todd Jick and Maury Peiperl
(2010) suggest that change managers should “rethink” the concept of resistance, recogniz-
ing this as a natural part of the process of adapting to change and thus as a potential source
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 253
of energy and feedback. Rick Maurer (2010) also argues that the power of resistance can
be used to build support for change. Treating resisters with respect strengthens relation-
ships and improves the chances of success. He also advises the change manager to relax,
to resist the temptation to “push back” when attacked, to learn from the resistance, to look
for common ground. Although advocating this perspective, Maurer (2010) also accepts
that there are situations where focusing attention on dissent can be counterproductive. This
can occur, for example, where challenges to the change proposals are not well informed,
or where change is necessary for organizational survival.
For the benefits to be gained, resistance must be active. But resistance can sometimes be
passive, and involve silence, and withholding cooperation and information. Encouraging
complaints and challenges may sound perverse, but by encouraging the dialogue, active
resistance can be stimulated, and the feedback and ideas can then be used constructively.
This section has focused on the positive dimensions of resistance. We also have to rec-
ognize the damage that resistance can cause, to an organization, its members, and some-
times even to those who are resisting. Job security, for example, may be jeopardized by
a failure to introduce new systems, procedures, practices, and technology. It is important,
therefore, to adopt a balanced perspective on this topic, recognizing the negative as well as
the positive implications.
LO 8.2 Causes
The American composer, John Cage, once said: “I can’t understand why people are frightened
of new ideas. I’m frightened of the old ones”
(http://www.quotationspage.com)
Resistance can have seriously damaging organizational and individual consequences,
leading to reduced performance and competitiveness, failure to acquire new capabilities,
and job loss. Why then do people resist change? There are probably as many answers
to that question as there are members of organizations faced with change. Broadly, the
reasons fall into three categories concerning the content or substance of the change, the
process through which change is implemented, and the uncertainty that change can gen-
erate (Hughes, 2010). We will explore in this section the common causes of resistance.
Be aware that this is not an exhaustive list. It is important, however, for the change man-
ager to diagnose the cause—or causes—of resistance before taking action.
Innate Dislike of Change Some of us just do not like change. It is common to hear the complaint that the main imped-
iment that managers face in introducing change is that people dislike change and will resist
it. We have already argued, however, that this view is oversimplified and does not explain
why people sometimes welcome and even seek change. It is not wise to assume that a dis-
like of change is necessarily an innate human characteristic that we all share. As individu-
als, we vary in our approach or “disposition” to change. Some of us prefer routine, become
tense and anxious when confronted with change, do not like to change our plans, and are
more rigid in our thinking. Those who have high dispositional resistance toward change are
therefore less likely to accept change in general and are more likely to resist when change
is imposed. But some of us dislike routine, are animated by new ideas and plans, and are
comfortable with changing our minds when presented with fresh information.
254 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
While our individual disposition toward change may be a relatively stable personality
trait, context is also important. Shaul Oreg (2003; 2006), for example, argues that trust
in management and having the right amount of information can positively influence
dispositions toward change. Information overload, however, can reinforce negative
perceptions and strengthen resistance. Another significant feature of the context
concerns the substance or content of the changes. You may find some ideas attractive
even if you have high dispositional resistance to change in general. We therefore cannot
automatically predict your reaction to the next change based on your response to current
proposals.
For most of us, therefore, our responses are more likely to depend on the organizational
context and the characteristics of the proposed changes than on our personality. If correct,
this conclusion has profound practical implications for the change manager. We cannot
manage your personality. We can, however, change our proposals, and we can manage or
adjust aspects of the organizational context. The change manager has to accept, however,
that some individuals, in some contexts, may have extremely high dispositional resistance
to change that cannot easily be altered.
Low Tolerance of Uncertainty Do you enjoy being taken by surprise? You look forward to the “mystery tour,” destina-
tion unknown. Or do you need to know precisely what will happen next? You want to
know all the journey details in advance. There are individual differences in our toler-
ance of uncertainty and ambiguity. If you are not confident that you have the skills and
capabilities that the proposed changes will demand, then the uncertainty will be magni-
fied. Uncertainty can of course be reduced, and support strengthened, by making clear
the strategic intent of the change, and the actions that are expected of those involved.
The key point here is that lack of support for change may not be due to overt resistance,
or apathy, but to uncertainty and ambiguity, based on lack of information—a lack that
can be remedied.
This Is Not in My Interests We noted earlier that resistance can be based on the perception that change will work
against the interests of those who will be affected. The term “interests” can cover a
range of factors: authority, status, rewards (including remuneration), opportunities to
apply expertise, membership of friendship networks, autonomy, security. People find
it easier to support changes when their interests are not threatened, and they may resist
when they perceive that their interests will be damaged.
The key term here is “perception.” Seen from a different standpoint (long-term job
security, for example), proposed changes may support the interests of those involved,
whose focus on short-term implications (loss of currently valued skills, for example) may
take priority. It is the perceptions of those who are involved that determine their responses
to change, and not the perceptions of others. Perceptions are difficult to manage and to
change, but the quality and volume of available information, and the roles of opinion lead-
ers and networks, can be significant in this regard.
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 255
Fear That YouTube Will Change
Managers need to consider the way in which a pro-
posed change—or even just the belief that a change
is about to be made—can produce a reaction from
stakeholders outside the organization. Managing
the expectations of the external constituency, such
as customers, can be as important as handling the
concerns of those inside the organization.
In 2014, when Google appointed Susan Wojcicki
as its senior vice president in charge of YouTube,
she received a lot of correspondence from pas-
sionate fans who were worried that she would
make changes that would weaken the YouTube
experience that they currently enjoyed. One user
expressed her concern very succinctly: “So please,
I’m begging you, please, please, please, don’t f*** it
up” (La Porte, 2014, p. 60).
Attachment to Organization Culture and Identity The “image” of the organization as a cultural system is a popular one. A cultural sys-
tem includes values, artifacts, and beliefs concerning “the way we do things around
here.” Resistance to change can thus be influenced by the degree of attachment to the
existing culture. Rhonda Reger and colleagues (1994, p. 33–34) argue that members of
an organization interpret change proposals through their existing mental models:
A particularly powerful mental model is the set of beliefs members hold about the organi-
zation’s identity. Identity beliefs are critical to consider when implementing fundamental
change because organizational identity is what individuals believe is central, distinctive, and
enduring about their organization. These beliefs are especially resistant to change because
they are embedded within members’ most basic assumptions about the organization’s
character.
Reger et al. (1994) also argue that two mental barriers can undermine the acceptance
of change initiatives that are seen as inconsistent with the current organizational identity.
First, passive resistance (apathy, anxiety) can occur when the meaning and purpose of the
change have not been made clear. Second, active resistance can be triggered when change
is seen to be in direct conflict with key aspects of the organization’s identity. Change man-
agers cannot assume that other members of the organization share their mental models
concerning the need for change. Strong resistance may therefore be triggered by change
proposals that are perceived as threatening basic assumptions. One strategy for the change
manager, therefore, is to avoid changes that carry such threats. A second approach con-
cerns presenting proposals in a way that minimizes challenges to the current order. Third,
it may be necessary to develop an overwhelmingly compelling case for fundamental cul-
ture change, if threats to current assumptions cannot be minimized or avoided.
Perceived Breach of Psychological Contract Our understanding of the nature of the reciprocal relationship that we have with an
employer has been called the “psychological contract” (Rousseau, 1995; Coyle- Shapiro
and Shore, 2007). A breach or violation of this contract occurs when employees believe
that the employer is no longer honoring their side of the deal. As the label suggests, the
256 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
psychological contract is in part defined by a formal written agreement (job descrip-
tion, terms and conditions, performance appraisal), and also in part by informal social
and psychological dimensions. The informal aspects are not expressed in writing.
These concern expectations regarding organizational values, trust, loyalty, and recog-
nition—features that can have just as significant an effect on employee perceptions as
formal written terms. Perceived breaches of the psychological contract can thus lower
performance and reduce adaptability to change (McDermott, Conway, et al., 2013).
Research has explored relationships between psychological contract and responses to
change. From their study in a textiles company in Scotland, Judy Pate and colleagues
(2000) found a link between perceived breaches of psychological contracts and resis-
tance to strategic and organizational change. They conclude, “When organizations fail
to respect employee interests, the low-trust relationships and levels of cynicism that
invariably result severely constrain the potential for effective strategic change” (p. 481).
Sjoerd van den Heuvel and René Schalk (2009, p. 283), in a study of Dutch organiza-
tions, conclude, “The more the organization had fulfilled its promises in the employ-
ee’s perception, the less the employee resisted organizational change. By maintaining
good psychological contracts with employees, organizations can build trust, which could
prevent resistance to change.”
Lack of Conviction That Change Is Necessary The work of the change manager is more straightforward if there is widespread belief
across the organization that change is needed. However, what seems obvious to some
(“We have to change”) is not necessarily viewed in the same way by others (“What’s
the problem?”). There are many reasons for complacency: a past track record of suc-
cess, the absence of a visible crisis, inconsistent top management comments. We react
negatively to change when we feel that there is no need for it.
Lack of Clarity as to What Is Expected Sometimes proposed changes, and particularly strategic changes, are not accompanied
by clear information about the implications for those who will be affected. How will
my role change? What new knowledge, skills, and behaviors will be required? Where
questions such as those are not answered, there is a heightened probability of resistance
and lack of support from those who feel that they have not been adequately informed.
In other words, “A brilliant business strategy is of little use unless people understand it
well enough to apply it” (Gadiesh and Gilbert, 2001, p. 74). For the change manager,
the key point is that resistance may not be due to opposition to the changes that have
been proposed. The absence of support may instead be due to a lack of clear under-
standing of what will be involved for those who are going to be affected.
Belief That the Proposed Changes Are Inappropriate Those affected by a proposed change are likely to form a view that it is either an appro-
priate response to current issues (“We need to do this”) or a bad idea (“Whose crazy
plan is this?”; “It’s a fad”). This view is likely to influence readiness for change. As
change advocate and manager, it is easy to see those who support the change as astute
and to criticize those who do not as blinkered. The latter are then categorized as “resis-
tant to change.” However, this is not necessarily an accurate label, because resistance
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 257
to this change does not necessarily mean resistance to all change. We should also con-
sider that, in some cases, the resisters may be right; the changes may have been poorly
thought through and inadequately planned. Here is another situation where resistance
is valuable.
Change can also be seen as inappropriate due to fundamental differences in “vision,”
which is achieved through the organization’s strategy. Change, as a key component in
the enactment of strategy, can thus expose widely divergent views of how to achieve that
vision.
Perception That the Timing Is Wrong The change may be welcome, but the timing may be seen as wrong; “yes, but not now.”
This may be due to change fatigue (see next heading). Or it may be that, if the change
were to be implemented now, it would have a negative impact on, say, customers or
suppliers or employees or joint venture partners. Change the timing, and those undesir-
able outcomes would be avoided.
Excessive Change: The Consequences
In their study of “excessive change,” Inger Stensa-
ker et al. (2002) identified three common conse-
quences: “musical chairs,” “orchestrating without a
conductor,” and “shaky foundations.”
Musical chairs (a reference to the children’s
game) occurs when managers move frequently
between a declining number of positions in a regu-
larly changing structure. Unless carefully managed,
this can have detrimental effects. For example, the
most capable managers are the most likely to leave
because they will be seen as attractive to other
organizations. In addition, the “churn” in positions
leaves fewer managers with a strategic grasp of the
purpose behind all those change initiatives.
Orchestrating without a conductor refers to the
related situation where lower-level employees feel
that they have been abandoned, as middle man-
agers seem incapable of handling the change pro-
cess. Middle managers may be unable to translate
change proposals in a way that makes sense to the
staff who will be affected. Why? Because due to the
constant management restructuring, those middle
managers are not sufficiently familiar with the work
of those employees.
Shaky foundations refers to the resulting sense
of chaos. Staff find themselves in an uncomfortable
limbo between partly abandoned past practices and
partly introduced new practices. Where waves of
change are involved, the new practices are in vari-
ous stages of implementation, from just introduced
to nearly complete.
Too Much Change Too much change can of course induce “initiative fatigue,” “initiative overload,” and
burnout, especially when new initiatives are launched before the last changes have been
fully embedded. Those suffering from initiative fatigue are likely to feel overworked
and under pressure and are unlikely to welcome further change, regardless of how
desirable it may seem.
Heike Bruch and Joche Menges (2010) argue that intense market pressures have
increased the number and pace of change initiatives, which becomes “the new normal.”
This can lead an organization, they claim, into “the acceleration trap”; the pressure is
258 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
unrelenting, staff are demotivated, focus is scattered, and customers become confused.
They identify three damaging patterns. Overloading: Staff are asked to do too much and
have neither the time nor the resources to do it. Multiloading: Staff are asked to cover too
many different kinds of activities, reducing the focus on what they do best. Perpetual load-
ing: The organization is operating close to capacity, denying staff any chance to escape or
to “recharge”; “When is the economizing going to come to an end?” Organizations caught
in this acceleration trap are thus likely to encounter more resistance to further change than
organizations that have avoided or escaped from this trap. Escape strategies include halting
the less important work, clarifying strategy, and having a system for prioritizing projects.
At one company, the chief executive cut the number of top-priority goals that managers set
from 10 down to a maximum of 3 “must-win battles,” to focus attention and energy.
Yong-Yeon Ji et al. (2014) support this argument. From their study of 4,900 U.S. orga-
nizations in 18 industries, they conclude that the disruption of employment instability
reduces organizational performance. However, they also found that very low instability
could damage competitiveness; stable organizations are rigid and inflexible. They advise
a “slow and steady” response to external conditions, rather than acting too quickly and
aggressively.
The Cumulative Effects of Other Life Changes Readiness for change at work is affected by what else is going on in an individual’s life.
Measures of stress, for example, typically include elements from a range of aspects
of one’s life, and not just those associated with employment. As a result, people may
Does Your Organization Have an Acceleration Culture?
Answer “yes” to five or more of these questions and
you may be caught in the acceleration trap:
Are activities started too quickly?
Is it hard to get the most important things done
because too many other activities diffuse focus?
Is ending activities considered a sign of
weakness?
Are projects carried out pro forma because peo-
ple fear ending them publicly?
Is there a tendency to continually drive the orga-
nization to the limits of its capacity?
Is it impossible for employees to see the light at
the end of the tunnel?
Does the company value attendance at work
and meetings more than goal achievement?
Does it value visibly hard effort over tangible
results?
Are employees made to feel guilty if they leave
work early?
Do employees talk a lot about how big their
workload is?
Is “busyness” valued?
Are mangers expected to act as role models by
being involved in multiple projects?
Is “no” a taboo word, even for people who have
already taken on too many projects?
Is there an expectation in the organization that
people must respond to emails within minutes?
Do countless people routinely get copied on
emails because employees are trying to protect
themselves?
In their free time, do employees keep their cell
phones or messaging devices on because they
feel they always need to be reachable?
Source: Bruch, H. and Menges, J.I., “Does your organization have an acceleration culture?”, Harvard Business Review, No 4, 2010. Copyright © 2010 Harvard Business School Publishing. All rights reserved. Harvard Business Publishing is an affiliate of Harvard Business School.
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 259
resist organizational change in the belief that the change will add to the burden of pres-
sures that they are already experiencing.
Perceived Ethical Conflict Sandy Piderit (2000) argues that resistance is multidimensional and can often be moti-
vated by a desire to act ethically. Resistance to change may thus be based on positive
intentions, designed to protect the interests of the organization and its employees. The
belief that some individual or groups will be disadvantaged or unreasonably pressured
by proposed changes could lead to resistance. Piderit (2000) also notes, however, that
resistance in these situations is likely to be covert, if perceived threats to job security
and promotion discourage open expressions of concern.
The Legacy of Past Changes Past experience is one predictor of responses to current change proposals. As our
experiences shape expectations of the future, resistance may be grounded in previous
bad experiences of change, while support may be strengthened by past successes.
From a sense-making perspective (see chapter 9), we learn “how change works in
this organization,” and use that understanding as a lens through which further change
initiatives are assessed (Gioia and Chitipeddi, 1991). The change manager can thus be
the fortunate beneficiary, or the unfortunate victim, of sense-making experiences in
which they played no part, and of which they may be unaware. The impact on responses
to current change proposals may be more intense where the same organization,
managers, and staff are involved. Sense-making based on personal past experience
is more credible, and more powerful, than the reassurances of today’s change
managers.
Where past experience of change has been bad, cynicism and resistance may be default
responses to fresh initiatives. Stensaker et al. (2002, p. 304) note that BOHICA (Bend
Over, Here It Comes Again) is a response based on learning from experience. Cynicism
can be particularly difficult to deal with because it is usually accompanied by strong emo-
tions such as anger, resentment, and disillusionment.
Managing Change, Managing Memories
1. Begin change initiatives with a systematic inquiry
into organizational members’ memories of past
changes.
2. Do not tell people to leave their past behind.
That is not going to happen. The power and
credibility of past experiences cannot be erased
to order. Attempts to suppress those experiences
may mean that they “go underground,” but
they will remain influential.
3. If past experiences are impediments to change,
their influence will only be challenged if those
involved are directly and fully engaged with
current proposals, in ways that enable them to
learn that the change experience this time can
be different—and positive.
Source: Based on Geigle, 1998.
260 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
Disagreement with How the Change Is Managed The idea that resistance to change—that is, to the substance of change—is a natural human
response, diverts attention away from the quality of the change management process. “Over-
coming natural resistance to change,” in some situations, may actually involve “overcoming
natural resistance to poor management,” or “highlighting change management mistakes”
(Dent and Goldberg, 1999a and b). Kahn (1982, p. 416) thus advised:
In considering obstacles to change, we must keep in mind the deceptive nature of our con-
cepts. When we want change, we speak of those who do not as presenting obstacles and
resistance. When we want stability, we speak of perseverance and commitment among those
who share our views. Behavior of people in the two situations might be identical; it is their
stance relative to our own that dictates the choice of language.
In other words, labelling behavior as “resistance to change” may be an example of the
fundamental attribution error—blaming individuals while overlooking the context (Ross,
1977). If those who are managing change can attribute unsatisfactory outcomes to the
behavior (resistance) of others, the spotlight may not then fall on inadequate change man-
agement practices. This “blame game” can also work in the opposite direction, with orga-
nization members attributing change failures to management faults, rather than to their
own behavior (Piderit, 2000).
It is therefore easy to understand how a change manager can be attracted to the propo-
sition that the lack of success of a change program was due to resistance to change. This
explanation shifts attention away from management capabilities and practices and onto
the change recipients. The popular notion that people have a natural resistance to change
also makes this a plausible explanation. As we argued earlier, resistance may be a natural
response to change that has not been adequately considered and planned. If such resis-
tance prompts a review, then it will have been valuable. Mark Hughes (2010) argues that
the term resistance has negative connotations, and is thus misleading and inappropriate.
He suggests that it should now be “retired” in favor of “employee responses” to change,
recognizing the broad spectrum of potential reactions—positive, neutral, and negative—to
organizational change initiatives.
LO 8.3 Symptoms
Despite assertions to the contrary, people aren’t against change—they are against
royal edicts. (Hamel and Zanini, 2014, p. 2)
How can resistance to change be detected? The answer to this question is not as
straightforward as it might seem, because the symptoms—the signs and clues—can be
difficult to detect, and to interpret. For example, resistance can be overt and visible, but
it can also be covert and hidden. Open criticism and heated debate are of course easier to
detect than whispered private conversations. Given the potential benefits of challenges to
change proposals, overt resistance may be of more value to the organization, to the change
manager, and ultimately to the change process. Resistance is also three-dimensional,
with emotional, cognitive, and behavioral components (Oreg, 2003). In short, the change
manager has to be sensitive to how people feel about change, how they think about it, and
what they intend to do about it (see the sidebar “Merger in Adland”).
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 261
Kenneth Hultman (1995) draws a useful distinction between active and passive
resistance. Table 8.2 identifies typical active and passive resistance behaviors. This
illustrates the distinction, but these lists are not comprehensive, and the various symptoms
are not necessarily mutually exclusive (ridiculing, and being critical, for example).
Nevertheless, the change manager must be alert to the various ways in which resistance
to change can be demonstrated. Hultman also reminds us that identifying the symptoms
does not explain why people are resisting change, and that it is important to be clear about
symptoms and causes (as in this chapter) and not to confuse one with the other.
TABLE 8.2 Active and Passive Resistance
Symptoms of Active Resistance Symptoms of Passive Resistance
Being critical, finding fault, ridiculing, arguing
Appealing to fear, starting rumors
Using facts selectively, distorting facts
Blaming, accusing, intimidating, threatening
Manipulating, sabotaging
Blocking, undermining
Agreeing in person but not following through
Failing to implement change
Procrastinating, dragging one’s feet
Feigning ignorance
Withholding information, suggestions, support
Standing by and allowing change to fail
Source: Based on Hultman, 1995.
Merger in Adland: Symptoms of Resistance?
When the Australian advertising agencies Mojo and
MDA merged, they decided to locate all staff in the
same building. However, as an interim step, all the
creative staff (copywriters, art directors, produc-
tion) moved into the Mojo offices and management
(“the suits”) went to the MDA offices.
One of the Mojo people required to move was
the finance director, Mike Thorley. Mike was one
of the original Mojo employees and had come to
think of himself more as a partner in the business
than as an employee. However, he was quickly dis-
abused of this notion when, with all the other Mojo
employees, he was given no warning of the merger.
He reacted with shock and anger. To add insult to
injury, he had to move to the MDA offices—which
felt like banishment—where he would report to
MDA’s finance director, who was now in charge of
finance for the merged organization.
The Mojo culture was much less formal than that
of MDA. Mojo staff would often have a few drinks
together after work, sitting around an old white
bench in the office. In an attempt to make Thor-
ley and his Mojo colleagues feel at home, a modern
black laminate bar was installed in the MDA offices.
One morning, Mike Thorley arrived at work with a
chainsaw and cut the bar in two.
Source: Based on Coombs, 1990.
LO 8.4 Managers as Resisters
Most discussions of resistance present managers as advocates of change and cast
employees in the role of resisters. However, resistance is not monopolized by “the man-
aged.” Managers can also resist change, for all the reasons identified earlier, and are
therefore not always passionate advocates. Managers can be considered collectively,
262 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
as a group, but sometimes differences within management can be significant. Changes
proposed by one department or division may be opposed by another. Changes directed
by top management may not be welcomed by middle managers. In other words manag-
ers, at least as much as any other category of employee, are likely to have within their
ranks a range of opinions concerning proposed changes. Even where there is no ques-
tion as to the dedication of managers to the long-term interests of the organization, it is
normal to find different views as to which initiatives or changes are most appropriate.
The stance of middle managers in particular can have a critical effect on the outcome of
change initiatives because they are often responsible for implementation. It is not unusual
for this role to involve tensions for middle managers, who are likely to be both recipients
of change initiatives from senior management, as well as implementers.
Middle managers have long been stereotyped as change blockers. However, research
has consistently painted a different picture. The positive contributions of middle manage-
ment to innovation and change are now widely recognized, partly due to the work of Bill
Wooldridge and Steven Floyd (1990; Wooldridge et al., 2008). They argue that middle
management involvement in shaping strategy leads to better decisions, higher degrees of
consensus, improved implementation, and better organizational performance. They also
emphasize the coordinating, mediating, interpreting, and negotiating roles of middle
managers, arguing that it is the pattern of influence of middle managers that affects per-
formance. The mediating role, combining access to top management with knowledge of
frontline operational capabilities, gives middle management a valuable perspective, where
appropriate acting as a counter to the strategic view of the top executive team.
With regard to blocking change, Inger Boyett and Graeme Currie (2004) report how
middle managers in an Irish telecommunications firm subverted the intent of senior
management by designing an alternative strategy that was more profitable. Julia Balo-
gun (2008) argues that, even when middle managers are “change recipients,” the way
in which directives are interpreted and implemented may differ from—and significantly
Resistance to Change at Bloomberg
Earlier in this chapter, a range of beliefs, percep-
tions, and attitudes were identified as having the
potential to be the underlying causes of resistance
to change. Even the most senior of managers in
an organization are not exempt from holding such
beliefs, which may manifest as resistance.
By 2012, Bloomberg had become the world’s
largest financial data provider. However, after three
decades of growth, it was now facing a flattening
growth rate, leading to what business journalists
Peter Elkind and Marty Jones (2013, p. 130) called
“a traumatic identity crisis.”
Bloomberg’s success had been built so much on
one product—the service that provided customers
with financial data and which generated 85 per-
cent of its revenue—that significant resistance arose
within the ranks of senior management whenever
a new direction was suggested. One such instance
occurred when CEO Dan Doctoroff attempted to
“diversify the business and impose professional
order on a chaotic enterprise where screaming
and infighting have long passed for management”
(Elkind and Jones, 2013, p. 131). Founder Michael
Bloomberg, due to return in January 2014 after
being mayor of New York City from 2002 to 2013,
would be returning to a situation of “an internal war
raging between old and new factions” (Elkind and
Jones, 2013, p. 130).
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 263
improve upon—senior management intentions. From their study of change in the Irish
health service, Edel Conway and Kathy Monks (2011) describe how ambivalent middle
managers who resisted top-down directives played a vital role by championing and imple-
menting their own initiatives. Those initiatives assisted in dismantling outdated structures
and processes, and provided solutions to the problems that those directives had identified
in the first place. Aoife McDermott et al. (2013) show how middle managers and other
change recipients often tailor, add to, and adapt top-down change directives so that they
will work in particular local contexts.
The negative middle management stereotype thus has to be adjusted in two respects.
First, middle managers are likely to attempt to block or undermine senior management
directives if they believe that those proposals will not work well. This is a reasonable
“self-defense” position because, were those senior management plans to be put in place
and then fail, middle management would probably be blamed for mishandling the imple-
mentation. Second, where middle managers have better ideas and plans of their own,
they are likely to attempt to implement those instead of senior management proposals.
Employee resistance is more likely to arise at the point of implementation, by which stage
it may be too late. Management resistance, however, is more likely to occur at the concep-
tualization and planning stage, when options still remain open. We are thus faced with yet
more examples of “positive resistance,” where middle management “change blocking” is
not as disruptive as the label implies, but can lead to improved organizational outcomes.
LO 8.5 Managing Resistance
How widespread is the problem of resistance to change? In 2010, the consulting com-
pany McKinsey surveyed 1,890 executives who had recent experience of organiza-
tional redesign. One third of those who replied said that “employees actively resisted
change or became demoralized,” and a quarter said that “leaders resisted, undermined,
or changed the plans for reorganization” (Ghislanzoni et al., 2010, p. 6). The problem
most frequently cited as harmful in those organizations where redesign had been suc-
cessful concerned senior managers undermining the change. One explanation is that
“redesign that fundamentally changes the way the organization works frequently upsets
those who rose to the top in the old system” (Ghislanzoni et al., 2010, p. 7).
Does it matter if some people resist a particular change? Not necessarily. Peter Senge
(1990) argues that dispositions toward change vary on a continuum from commitment,
through varying degrees of compliance, to noncompliance, and apathy (table 8.3). From a
change management perspective, it is useful to understand the dispositions of those who
are going to be affected. It is also important to be aware that dispositions can change, as
understanding of the implications develops.
It may be reassuring to have everyone fully committed to an organizational change.
Senge argues, however, that this is not necessary. Rather than attempt to persuade every-
one to “commit,” it can be more useful to analyze the level of support required from each
of those individuals and groups who are involved, and to direct change management atten-
tion and energies to winning that support. With a critical mass of support in place, the
noncompliance or apathy of others may have little or no impact.
264 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
Despite what we have said regarding the benefits, and the misleading nature of the label,
resistance to change can be self-interested, deliberately disruptive, badly informed—and a
problem for the change manager. How can such resistance be managed effectively? Given
what we know about the many possible causes of resistance, there is no “one best way” to
handle this situation. We will therefore explore three approaches to this task, suggesting
that these should be seen as complementary rather than as competing. The first concerns
allowing those who will be affected by change to recognize and to adjust to the implica-
tions in their own time; in short, “let nature take its course.” The second concerns develop-
ing “attraction strategies,” which seek to overcome or avoid resistance before it develops.
The third involves a “contingency approach” to managing resistance, choosing and using
methods that are appropriate to the context.
Let Nature Take Its Course Individual reactions to change typically involve working through a series of natural
psychological stages. This progression is known as the coping cycle, and models of
this process are often based on the work of Elizabeth Kübler-Ross (1969), who studied
human responses to traumatic events such as the death of a close relative. The appli-
cation of her work to change management is based on the assumption that, for at least
some people, major organizational and career changes can also be very traumatic.
Under those conditions, resistance to change is predictable. Cynthia Scott and Dennis
Jaffe (2006), for example, describe a coping cycle with four stages:
TABLE 8.3 The
Commitment-
Compliance
Continuum
Disposition Response to Change
Commitment Want change to happen and will work to make it happen Willing to create whatever structures, systems, and frameworks are necessary for it to work
Enrollment Want the change to happen and will devote time and energy to making it happen within given frameworks Act within the spirit of the framework
Genuine compliance See the virtue in what is proposed, do what is asked of them, and think proactively about what is needed Act within the letter of the framework
Formal compliance Can describe the benefits of what is proposed and are not hos- tile to them—they do what they are asked and no more Stick to the letter of the framework
Grudging compliance Do not accept that there are benefits to what is proposed and do not go along with it, but do enough of what is asked of them not to jeopardize their position Interpret the letter of the framework
Noncompliance Do not accept that there are benefits and have nothing to lose by opposing the proposition, so will not do what is asked of them Work outside the framework
Apathy Neither support nor oppose the proposal, just serving time Don’t care about the framework
Source: Based on Senge, 1990, pp. 204–5.
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 265
Denial This involves a refusal to recognize the situation; “this can’t be happen-
ing,” “it will all blow over.” The person is not receptive to new informa-
tion and refuses to believe that he or she needs to behave differently, or
is prepared to make only minor adjustments.
Resistance This stage begins with the recognition that the situation is real; the
past is mourned, and stress may increase; active and passive forms of
resistance may be demonstrated. This can be seen as a positive stage,
as the individual lets go of the past and becomes more confident in his
or her ability to deal with the future.
Exploration This involves reenergizing and a preparedness to explore the possibili-
ties of the new situation.
Commitment The individual finally focuses attention on new courses of action.
This is an “ideal” picture of the coping cycle. There are individual differences in how
this cycle is experienced. Different people work through these stages at different paces,
with some moving more quickly while others become “stuck.” The organizational context
may also affect progress, through sharing experience with others (or not) and encountering
fresh information.
If individual responses conform broadly to this pattern, then one approach to managing
resistance is to step back, to monitor what is happening, and to let nature take its natural
and necessary course. However, if key individuals do become “stuck,” say at the resistance
stage, then doing nothing may be unwise, and some form of intervention may be helpful.
Table 8.4, “Individual Resistance and Management Responses,” offers a guide to dealing
with different expressions of resistance.
TABLE 8.4 Individual Resistance and Management Responses
The Person Says … Comment Your Response …
I don’t want to (“the block”)
An authentic response, unambig- uous, and easy to handle
Why? What’s your concern?
Tell me exactly what you want me to do (“the rollover”)
Ambiguous—may be a genuine request for information, or a form of passive resistance (if you don’t tell me, I won’t be responsible for the outcomes)
Tell me what you need to know.
I’ll get on it first thing next week (“the stall”)
May reflect lack of awareness of urgency, or indicate a desire to avoid complying
Is there anything serious that would prevent you from starting tomorrow?
Wow, what a great deal! (“the reverse”)
May be genuine, but resisters will say this to keep you happy with no intention of supporting
I am pleased that you feel this way. What exactly can I count on you to deliver, and when?
I think it would be better if this were implemented first in X division (“the sidestep”)
Could be correct, but resisters use this to shift the pressure to change onto somebody else
I understand your concern, but we have other plans for X. What I specifically want you to do is this.
(Continues)
266 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
X isn’t going to like this (“the projected threat”)
Implies the threat that someone important will not be happy (could be true)
X has been part of this process and is fully supportive. OR I’ll be speaking to X about this, but at the moment I’m more interested in your views.
You owe me one (“the press”)
Involves asking to be exempt as reciprocity for a past favor
I haven’t forgotten that, but I need your support right now.
See what you’re making me do (“the guilt trip”)
An attempt to deflect attention by focusing on the change man- ager’s actions
I am sorry that you have a prob- lem, and we can discuss how to help, but it is important for this change to go ahead.
But we’ve always done it the other way (“the tradition”)
Traditions should only be main- tained if they still work; but old ways often feel safer, less threatening
The other way has served us well for a long time, but things have changed. What could we do to incorporate the best of our tradi- tional approach?
Source: Based on Karp (1996).
Attraction Strategies From their work with healthcare professionals in U.S. hospitals, Paul Plsek and Charles
Kilo (1999, p. 40) conclude, “Change is not so much about resistance, as it is about
creating attraction.” What is often described as “resistance,” they note, is actually
“attraction” to aspects of the current system. The change manager’s task is to find new
attractors or to use effectively those that already exist.
Find the Attractor
Physician leader Roger Resar, MD, tells of an office
assistant who was resistant to a proposed change
that would offer same-day appointments to patients
and dramatically reduce the booking of future
appointments. The assistant was attracted to the
comfort of the existing scheduling system, chaotic
though it was, because she understood it so well.
“Rather than simply labelling her a ‘resister,’
Resar engaged her in a friendly conversation about
the most appealing and unappealing aspects of her
job. One prominent dislike was having to call 30 or
more patients to reschedule appointments when the
doctor needed to be away. When Resar pointed out
that the open access system would virtually elimi-
nate the need for this activity, the assistant became
actively attracted to the new idea—the same idea
that she was seen as resisting just moments before.
The proposed change was now associated with
the comfort attractor and the resistance vanished”
(Plsek and Kilo, 1999, p. 41). Martin Lippert, chief
executive of the Danish telecommunications com-
pany TDC, describes how middle management
resistance to the introduction of “lean manage-
ment” was addressed:
“It was a big change for them. Before, middle
managers spent only about 10 or 15 percent of their
time on real leadership—performance management,
coaching, finding out what’s going on in their organi-
zation. Instead, almost all of their time was consumed
by projects, mostly to fix problems. That’s a very inef-
ficient way of working. We needed to reverse those
numbers so that managers could spend 80 percent
TABLE 8.4 (Continued)
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 267
To identify appropriate attractors, change managers must have a good understanding of
the issues and concerns that are important to those whose behavior they want to change—
and those issues may differ from those of the change manager. Close relationships are
therefore important: “Attractors are easier to create when working together in cooperative,
positive relationships of trust” (Plsek and Kilo, 1999, p. 42). The focus should lie with
system changes and improvements, rather than with changing the behavior of individuals
in an existing system (see sidebar, “Find the Attractor”). Questions that can be helpful in
identifying the attractors in a particular situation include:
• How will this change benefit individual staff, the team, customers/clients?
• How will current problems and frustrations be addressed?
• How does this relate to the interests and priorities of staff?
• How will those involved gain recognition for their efforts?
• How will performance be improved?
• How could efficiency gains be used to make further improvements?
W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne (2003, p. 62) also claim that “once the beliefs
and energies of a critical mass of people are engaged, conversion to a new idea will spread
like an epidemic, bringing about fundamental change very quickly.” In other words, that
critical mass forms a “tipping point,” beyond which change can be straightforward and
rapid. They further note that:
The theory suggests that such a movement can be unleashed only by agents who make unfor-
gettable and unarguable calls for change, who concentrate their resources on what really
matters, who mobilize the commitment of the organization’s key players, and who succeed in
silencing the most vocal naysayers.
Kim and Mauborgne (2003) illustrate their theory using the experience of Bill Bratton, an
American police chief well known for his achievements in “turning around” failing or prob-
lem forces, such as in Boston and New York. One of the main hurdles to overcome, they
argue, is motivational. This concerns establishing the desire to implement change, as well
as making clear the need. One of the most powerful strategies that Bratton used to motivate
change involved targeting the small number of key influencers in the organization. In the
New York Police Department, that meant the city’s 76 precinct commanders, who were each
responsible for up to 400 staff. The key influencers are people with power, based on extensive
networks inside and outside the organization, and on their influencing skills. Once the key
influencers become attracted to the change program, they complete the task of persuading and
motivating others, freeing the change manager to focus on other issues.
Attraction strategies suggest, therefore, that resistance can be avoided if the change
manager is able to design and present proposals in ways that are appealing and compelling
of their time being managers and leaders. Some of
the managers were truly unable or unwilling to make
the change. But eventually most of them saw that
what we were providing was a set of techniques that
they could adapt as they needed. In working together
with the front line and senior leadership to design the
transformation in their teams, the managers gradu-
ally came to recognize how the whole system of lean
management could help them accomplish more. It
took time, of course, but once they did, we saw more
involvement from them than ever before” (McKinsey
& Company, 2014, p. 157).
268 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
to those who will be involved. We will meet this argument again, in a different form, in
chapter 10. One way in which to ensure that change is attractive is to involve those who
will be directly affected in deciding what and how to change in the first place.
Contingency Approaches There is no “one best way” to manage resistance. As suggested in the last section,
action to deal with resistance should be based on a diagnosis of the cause or causes;
people may resist change for more than one reason. Those resisting a particular change
may do so for different reasons; different stakeholders thus have to be managed differ-
ently. Allies and supporters need to be kept on your side. Opponents need to be con-
verted or neutralized. These observations point to the need for a contingency approach,
with actions tailored to the circumstances and the context.
One of the most widely cited contingency approaches to managing resistance was
developed by John Kotter and Leo Schlesinger (2008). Their approach has two dimen-
sions, concerning pace and management strategies. With regard to pace, they advise the
change manager to decide the optimal speed of the change; how quickly or how slowly
should this happen? They suggest moving quickly if there is a crisis affecting performance
or survival. They suggest moving slowly where:
• information and commitment from others will be needed to design and implement;
• the change manager has less organizational power than those who will resist;
• resistance will be intense and extensive.
They then identify the six strategies for managing resistance summarized in
table 8.5: education, participation, facilitation, negotiation, manipulation, and coercion.
Those strategies each have advantages and drawbacks. Education is time-consuming—a
disadvantage. Coercion can be quick—a key advantage in some contexts. Personal
values and social norms suggest that the first three of those strategies will be more
common. But in practice, there are times when negotiation, manipulation, and coercion
should be considered. The conditions in which each strategy is appropriate are also iden-
tified in table 8.5 (“Use When …”), and these strategies can be used in combination, if
appropriate.
Building Commitment to Change Make the Process Attractive
Attraction strategies to overcome resistance can
focus on the change process as well as the substance
of the changes. Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1985, p. 55)
suggests how to do this:
• Allow room for participation in the planning of the change.
• Leave choices within the overall decision to change.
• Provide a clear picture of the change, a “vision” with details about the new state.
• Share information about change plans to the fullest extent possible.
• Divide a big change into manageable and familiar steps; let people take a small step first.
• Minimize surprises; give people advance warning about new requirements.
• Allow for digestion of change requests—a chance to become accustomed to the idea of change
before making a commitment.
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 269
Clayton Christensen et al. (2006) also advocate a contingency approach to manag-
ing resistance. They argue that the organizational context of change varies on two main
dimensions. The first concerns the extent to which people agree on the outcomes or goals
of change. The second concerns agreement on the means, on how to get there. Low agree-
ment and high agreement contexts need to be managed in different ways. Where there
is low agreement concerning both goals and means, they argue—along with Kotter and
Schlesinger—that coercion, threats, fiat, and negotiation become necessary.
When dealing with resistance, the change manager thus has a range of tools and
approaches. Give those affected time to come to terms with what is required and the impli-
cations. Find ways to avoid resistance by identifying the features that will make change
attractive to those who will be involved. Select an appropriate strategy or strategies
depending on the cause or causes of the resistance. These three broad sets of approaches
are not mutually exclusive, and it may be appropriate to deploy a number of approaches, at
the same time, with the same or different individuals and groups.
• Repeatedly demonstrate your own commitment to the change.
• Make standards and requirements clear—tell exactly what is expected of people in the change.
• Offer positive reinforcement for competence; let people know they can do it.
• Look for and reward pioneers, innovators, and early successes to serve as models.
• Help people find or feel compensated for the extra time and energy change requires.
• Avoid creating obvious “losers” from the change. (But if there are some, be honest with them—
early on.)
• Allow expressions of nostalgia and grief for the past—then create excitement about the future.
TABLE 8.5 Strategies for Dealing with Resistance to Change
Strategies Advantages Disadvantages Use When Resistance Is Caused By
Education and communication
increases commitment, reconciles opposing views
takes time misunderstanding and lack of information
Participation and involvement
reduces fear, uses individ- ual skills
takes time fear of the unknown
Facilitation and support
increases awareness and understanding
takes time and can be expensive
anxiety over personal impact
Negotiation and agreement
helps to reduce strong resistance
can be expensive and encourage others to strike deals
powerful stakehold- ers whose interests are threatened
Manipulation and co-optation
quick and inexpensive future problems from those who feel they were manipulated
powerful stakehold- ers who are difficult to manage
Explicit and implicit coercion
quick and overpowers resistance
change agent must have power; risky if people are angered
deep disagreements and little chance of consensus
270 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
EXERCISE 8.1
Diagnosing
and Acting
Consider a change in which you were involved and that was seriously affected by resistance.
1. When did you first become aware of resistance?
2. What form did the resistance take?
3. What were your first thoughts (anger, betrayal, confusion, relief)?
4. What made you decide that you had to do something?
5. What actions did you take?
6. What was the impact in (a) the short term and (b) the long term?
7. If you could “rewind the tape,” what would you do differently?
EXERCISE 8.2
Jack’s
Dilemma
Jack White is the newly appointed general manager of the pet food division of Strick- land Corporation. He has completed a strategic review that has convinced him that the division needs to undergo rapid and substantial change in a number of areas, given the recent strategic moves of key competitors.
Although Jack is new, he is familiar enough with the company to know that there will be significant resistance to the changes from a number of quarters. He also suspects that some of this resistance will come from people with the capacity to act in ways that could seriously impede successful change.
Jack reflects on the situation. He believes that it is important to introduce the proposed changes soon, but he also recognizes that if he acts too quickly, he’ll have virtually no time to have a dialogue with staff about the proposed changes, much less involve them in any significant way.
One option is to act speedily and to make it clear that “consequences” will follow for anyone not cooperating. He certainly has the power to act on such a threat. The risk, Jack knows, is that even if no one shows outright resistance, there’s a big difference between not cooperating and acting in a manner that reflects commitment. He knows that he needs the cooperation of key groups of staff, and that sometimes “minimum-level compliance” can be as unhelpful as resistance when it comes to implementing change. “But maybe I’m exaggerating this problem,” he thinks to himself. “Maybe I should just go ahead with the change. If people don’t like it, they can leave. If they stay, they’ll come around.”
But Jack is not sure. He considers another option. Maybe he should spend more time on building up support at least among key groups of managers and staff, if not more broadly across the organization. “Maybe,” he reflects, “the need to change is not quite as immediate as I think. I just know that I’d feel a whole lot better if this consultation could happen quickly.”
Your Task
Jack respects your opinion on business matters and has asked you for your views on his situation. What would be your recommendation? What factors should Jack take into account in deciding what course of action to take?
LO 8.2
LO 8.5
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 271
EXERCISE 8.3
Moneyball
The New York Times best seller Moneyball (Lewis, 2003) is a book about baseball. It describes how Billy Beane, the general manager of the Oakland Athletics, revolutionized Major League Baseball (MLB) by introducing a new approach (sabermetrics) to assessing the value of a player to a team (see Wolfe et al., 2006). The established approach to assessing player talent favored future potential, but sabermetrics focused on past perfor- mance. Also, the established approach focused on the statistics of batting average (BA) and earned run average (ERA). The new approach was based on the argument that dif- ferent statistics such as on-base percentage and slugging percentage (OSP) were better predictors of a player’s performance. Beane introduced sabermetrics, but the underly- ing concept was not his. The writer Bill James had argued (and been ignored) for three decades that research attested to its superiority as a basis for determining a player’s true value to a team.
Beane’s application of the new approach was successful, and the Oakland Athletics moved close to the top of the league despite being outspent by most of their competi- tors. As a result, the team had approaches from many interested businesses and sporting bodies, including teams from the NFL and MLB, Fortune 500 companies, and Wall Street firms.
However, other MLB teams continued to show a lack of interest in the new approach, and some were openly hostile to it. Why? The MLB was bound in tradition and char- acterized by deep respect for convention and precedent. Sabermetrics challenged trea- sured orthodoxies for two reasons. First, it questioned the value of established predictors of performance. Second, sabermetrics based decisions on statistics, and thus reduced the importance of professional judgement. In other words, sabermetrics sidelined the field managers who had previously enjoyed significant control over talent selection and in-game tactics. Sabermetrics thus threatened the job security of many who had been appointed on the strength of their knowledge of individual characteristics and aspects of the game that were no longer considered to be important.
We can explore how the introduction of sabermetrics affected team management and players in the movie Moneyball (2011, director Bennett Miller). Brad Pitt plays Oakland’s manager, Billy Beane, who is losing his star players to wealthier clubs. The Athletics’ owner Stephen Schott (Bobby Kotick) will not provide more money. How can he build a competitive team with a limited budget? Beane hires an economics graduate, Peter Brand (Jonah Hill). Brand introduces him to James’ statistics-based approach to picking talent, looking at the complementary skills of the players in the team as well as focusing on individual capabilities. Using this method, Beane puts together a team of previously unknown players. However, Beane’s senior manager Art Howe (Philip Seymour Hoffman) will not allow Beane to use these recruits, and refuses to discuss the matter. The team’s talent scouts do not like the new method either. As you watch this movie, consider the following questions:
1. Who is resisting this change and why?
2. What behaviors are used to demonstrate that resistance?
3. What role do emotions play, on both sides of this argument?
4. What tactics and behaviors do Billy Beane and Peter Brand use to overcome resistance to their new approach?
5. What lessons can you take from this experience concerning the nature of resistance and methods for overcoming resistance to change?
LO 8.2, 8.3, 8.5
272 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
Battilana, J., and Casciaro, T. 2013. The network secrets of great change agents. Harvard
Business Review 91(7/8):62–68. Explores the importance of the change agent’s networks
in dealing with resisters and fence-sitters, as well as with those who support the change.
Ford, J. D., and Ford, L. W. 2009. Decoding resistance to change. Harvard Business
Review 87(4):99–103. Argues that vigorous resistance can be valuable and suggests prac-
tical ways to use resistance productively.
Harvey, T. R., and Broyles, E. A. 2010. Resistance to change: A guide to harnessing
its positive power. Lanham, MD: R&L Education. Develops the view that resistance is
natural, positive, and necessary, rather than destructive, offering practical guidance with
illustrations.
Maurer, R. 2010. Beyond the walls of resistance. 2nd ed. Austin, TX: Bard Books. An
easy-to-read, “no nonsense” practical guide to resistance, its benefits, its causes, and its
management.
Additional Reading
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
• What symptoms of resistance to change have
you observed? Have you observed both active
and passive forms? Have you as a recipient
resisted change? Have you experienced resis-
tance while responsible for initiating and manag-
ing a change?
• Which of the various causes of resistance to
change do you believe to be the most com-
mon? What are the “top three” causes in your
experience?
• As a change manager, which of the various rea-
sons for resisting change do you believe to be
the most difficult to deal with? What are your
“top three” in this regard?
• When senior managers resist change at the stra-
tegic level, they are in a position to cause more
damage than employees resisting changes at an
operational level. Have you worked in an orga-
nization where you believe that there was man-
agement resistance to change? As a manager,
what action would you take to prevent this?
• Which particular approaches to the management
of resistance attract you? Why do you make this
choice? Do you think those approaches are more
effective, or do your choices relate to your views
about how people should be managed?
• From your experience as a change manager,
what are the three main pieces of advice that
you would give to someone new in this role con-
cerning diagnosing and managing resistance?
Resistance is a multifaceted topic. The negative label suggests damage, but we have seen
how resistance can be constructive, and we have argued that the term itself is thus poten-
tially misleading. Resistance can have a number of different causes, takes several different
forms, and reveals itself in a range of symptoms. However, there are several approaches or
strategies available for managing resistance effectively, where that becomes necessary, and
depending on a diagnosis of the situation. In sum, resistance is not the change manager’s
worst nightmare, as some commentary has suggested.
Roundup
Chapter 8 Resistance to Change 273
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this
chapter, in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Explain the benefits and disadvantages of resistance to change.
Resistance can threaten organizational performance, competitiveness, and survival, and
lead to job loss in some cases. Resistance can also mean a failure to learn new skills and
abilities, with long-term implications for individual employability. However, those who
resist are those who are going to be affected directly by change, and who therefore have
a good understanding of how it might work. Their feedback can be particularly valu-
able in identifying whether or not change has been adequately considered and planned.
Resistance can therefore be seen not as damaging, but as constructive feedback. This
may not happen in every instance; there can be many reasons behind displays of resis-
tance. However, the change manager who views resistance positively, and who listens
with genuine interest to the concerns and challenges that are raised, is more likely to
implement an effective change, while improving relationships with those involved.
Understand the causes of resistance to change.
There are many potential causes for resistance, and we have only explored a number
of the most common in this chapter. Diagnosing cause in a given situation is a key
task for the change manager. In making that diagnosis, the change manager must be
aware of two issues. First, resistance may be underpinned by several causes, not just
one (although there may be one main concern). The management response thus has to
take this into consideration. Second, the cause or causes of resistance can change over
time, as an initiative develops, as other parallel initiatives are introduced, and as new
information is uncovered. The task of diagnosing resistance is thus an ongoing one.
Identify the symptoms of resistance to change.
Once again, there are many potential symptoms of resistance, which can be active or
passive. The passive resistance may be more difficult to detect. Paradoxically, active
resisters—those who shout and complain the loudest—may be more valuable. At least
the change manager knows what they are thinking and can address that, and they may
have genuine concerns that could inform and improve change design, planning, and
implementation.
Recognize and diagnose middle management resistance to change, which could be a
blockage, or could be highly beneficial.
We know that managers at all levels can sometimes resist change and that such behav-
ior is not restricted to frontline or operational staff. However, the stereotype of the mid-
dle manager as change blocker is not consistent with the evidence. Middle managers
often subvert or block top leadership directives, but only to put in place something
more effective.
Understand and apply different approaches to managing resistance.
We explored a range of resistance management strategies: allow people naturally
to adjust, develop “attractors” to avoid or minimize resistance in the first place, and
develop a contingency approach depending on the cause or causes of the resistance. As
in most management contexts, there is no “one best way,” and action has to be based on
a diagnosis of the problem.
LO 8.1
LO 8.2
LO 8.3
LO 8.4
LO 8.5
274 Chapter 8 Resistance to Change
TABLE 8.6 Images of Change Management and Perspectives on Resistance
Image Perspective on Resistance
Director Resistance is a sign that not everybody is on board in terms of making the change. Resistance can and must be overcome in order to move change forward. Change man- agers need specific skills to ensure that they can deal with resistance.
Navigator Resistance is expected. It is not necessarily a sign of people being outside their comfort zone but that there are different interests in the organization and some of these may be undermined by the change. We cannot always overcome resistance, but this should be achieved where possible.
Caretaker Resistance is possible but likely to be short-lived and ultimately futile. This is because changes will occur in spite of attempts to halt them. At best, resistance might temporar- ily delay change rather than halt its inevitable impact.
Coach Resistance needs to be recognized and expected as change takes people out of their comfort zones. Change managers need to work with resistance to show how these actions are not consistent with good teamwork.
Interpreter Resistance is likely where people do not fully understand what is happening, where the change is taking the organization, and the impact it will have on those involved. Making sense of the change, helping to clarify what it means, and linking individual identity with the process and the expected outcomes of the change will help to address the underlying problems that led to the resistance.
Nurturer Resistance is irrelevant to whether or not change happens. Changes will occur but not always in predictable ways. Therefore, resisting change will be a matter of guesswork by the resister, as change often emerges from a clash of chaotic forces and it is usually not possible to identify, predict, or control the direction of change.
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279
9Chapter Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
Learning objectives
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 9.1 Appreciate more clearly the organizational change approaches underpinning
the coach and interpreter images of managing change.
LO 9.2 Understand the organization development (OD) approach to change.
LO 9.3 Be aware of extensions of the OD approach such as appreciative inquiry, posi-
tive organizational scholarship, and dialogic OD.
LO 9.4 Understand the sense-making approach to change.
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280 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
LO 9.1 Alternative Approaches to Managing Change
Of the six images of managing change, the caretaker and nurturer images have their founda-
tions in the field of organization theory; the other four images—director, coach, navigator,
and interpreter—have stronger foundations in the organizational change field. This chapter
and the next delve further into the foundations of the four images that are rooted in the organi-
zational change field and explore their implications for how to manage organizational change.
They are also the four images that, in various ways, assume that the change manager has
an important influence on the way change occurs in organizations. In contrast, the first two
images, caretaker and nurturer, have in common an assumption that change managers receive
rather than initiate change. This chapter, and the one that follows, therefore explore the four
images that assume that change managers have an active role in the initiation, support, and
outcomes of organizational change. This chapter considers the foundational approaches asso-
ciated with the coach and interpreter images; the following chapter considers the founda-
tional approaches associated with the director and navigator images.
Underpinned by the coach image, the organization development (OD) approach is one
where its adherents present their developmental prescriptions for achieving change as
being based, at least traditionally, upon a core set of values, values that emphasize that
change should benefit not just organizations but the people who staff them.
OD has played a central role in the organizational change field for over half a century. In
their 2012 review of OD, Burnes and Cooke (p. 1396) argue that it “has been, and arguably,
still is, the major approach to organizational change across the Western world, and increasingly
globally.” However, as this chapter and the next illustrate, different images of change manage-
ment are associated with different ideas about what sort of approaches (and techniques) should
be used to try to bring about change within organizations. It is not surprising, therefore, that
OD’s long history has been accompanied, from time to time, by expressions of concern as to its
continuing relevance, leading some writers to raise the question of whether OD is “in crisis”;
both the Journal of Applied Behavioral Science (vol. 40, no. 4, 2004) and OD Practitioner (vol.
46, no. 4, 2014) have had special issues focused on the question of OD’s ongoing relevance. A
long-standing criticism of OD has been the claim that it has been sidelined from the concerns
of the business community because of its preoccupation with humanistic values rather than
with other issues such as business strategy (Hornstein, 2001; Beer, 2014).
Approaches to managing change other than OD have emerged. For example,
underpinned by the interpreter image, the sense-making approach maintains that change
emerges over time and consists of a series of interpretive activities that help to create in
people new meanings about their organizations and about the ways in which they can
operate differently in the future.
We begin by considering the approaches underpinned by the coach image and then move on
to the interpreter image. Further approaches to managing change are addressed in chapter 10.
LO 9.2 Organization Development (OD)
In this section, we consider the underlying tenets of the OD approach to managing
change, along with the role of the OD practitioner. We then review a number of chal-
lenges that have been directed at OD, including the continuing relevance of the values
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 281
underlying the OD approach, the universal applicability of these values, and the rele-
vance of OD to large-scale change.
Traditional OD Approach: Fundamental Values As set out in table 9.1, OD as a change intervention technique has developed over
time, being influenced by a number of different trajectories. As such there is no single,
underlying theory that unifies the field as a whole. Rather, it is informed by a variety
of differing perspectives, including theorists such as Herzberg, Maslow, Argyris, and
Lewin (Bazigos and Burke, 1997). In drawing together the common threads of these
perspectives, Beckhard (1969) depicts the classic OD approach as one that has the
following characteristics:
• It is planned and involves a systematic diagnosis of the whole organizational system, a
plan for its improvement, and provision of adequate resources.
• The top of the organization is committed to the change process.
• It aims at improving the effectiveness of the organization in order to help it achieve its
mission.
TABLE 9.1 The Evolution of Organization Development (1940s–1980s)
Period Background Developers Focus
1940s/1950s+ National Training Lab- oratories (NTL) and T-groups
Kurt Lewin, Douglas McGregor, Robert Blake, Richard Beckhard
Interpersonal relations, leadership and group dynamics; use of team building to facilitate personal and task achievement
1940s/1950s+ Action research and sur- vey feedback
Kurt Lewin, John Collier, William Whyte, Rensis Likert
Involvement of organizational members in researching them- selves to help create new knowl- edge and guide change actions
1950s/1960s+ Participative management
Likert Assumption that a human rela- tions approach, with its emphasis on participation, is the best way to manage an organization
1950s/1960s+ Productivity and quality of work-life
Eric Trist and Tavistock Institute, W. Edward Deming, and Joseph Juran
Better integration of people and technology through joint participation of unions and management, quality circles, self- managing workgroups; creation of more challenging jobs; total quality management
1970s/1980s+ Strategic change Richard Beckhard, Chris- topher Worley
Need for change to be strategic, aligning organization with tech- nical, political, cultural, and envi- ronmental influences
Source: Developed from Cummings and Worley (2015).
282 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
• It is long term, typically taking two or three years to achieve effective change.
• It is action-oriented.
• Changing attitudes and behavior is a focus of the change effort.
• Experiential-based learning is important as it helps to identify current behaviors and
modifications that are needed.
• Groups and teams form the key focus for change.
Though it is commonly presented as being aimed at incremental, developmental,
first-order change, other writers claim that what unifies the OD field, at least traditionally,
is an emphasis on a core set of values. These values build upon humanistic psychology and
emphasize the importance of developing people in work organizations and helping them to
achieve satisfaction (Nicholl, 1998a). Three value sets are involved:
• Humanistic values relate to openness, honesty, and integrity.
• Democratic values relate to social justice, freedom of choice, and involvement.
• Developmental values relate to authenticity, growth, and self-realization (Nicholl, 1998c).
Human development, fairness, openness, choice, and the balance between autonomy
and constraint are fundamental to these values (Burke, 1997). It is said that these val-
ues were radical and “a gutsy set of beliefs” in relation to the time in which they were
developed; that is, in the 1940s and 1950s when organizational hierarchy was dominant,
emphasizing authority, rationality, and efficiency rather than humanism and individuality
(Nicholl, 1998b). In this sense, the traditional practice of OD has as its focus people and
is not necessarily meant to be solely focused on the interests of management or the profit-
ability of the firm (Nicholl, 1998a).
The OD Practitioner Central to the traditional OD approach is the role of the “OD practitioner,” who may be
either internal or external to the organization. A typical OD practitioner helps to “struc-
ture activities to help the organization members solve their own problems and learn to
do that better” (French and Bell, 1995, p. 4). Where this is based upon action research,
it involves a variety of steps, such as (Cummings and Worley, 2015):
1. Problem identification. Someone in the organization becomes aware of what that per-
son thinks is a problem that needs to be addressed.
2. Consultation with an OD practitioner. The client and the practitioner come together,
with the latter endeavoring to create a collaborative dialogue.
3. Data gathering and problem diagnosis. Interviews, observations, surveys, and analysis
of performance data occur to assist in problem diagnosis. Each of these techniques is rec-
ognized as an intervention in itself in the sense that it involves an interaction with people.
4. Feedback. The consultant provides the client with relevant data, at the same time pro-
tecting the identity of people from whom information was obtained.
5. Joint problem diagnosis. As part of the action research process, people are involved in
consideration of information and discuss what it means in terms of required changes.
6. Joint action planning. The specific actions that need to be taken are identified.
7. Change actions. The introduction of and transition to new techniques and behaviors occur.
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 283
8. Further data gathering. Outcomes of change are determined and further actions
identified.
In coaching people through such change processes, Cummings and Worley (2015) argue
that OD practitioners need a variety of skills, including:
1. Intrapersonal skills: having a well-developed set of values and personal integrity
including the ability to retain their own health in high-stress organizational situations.
2. Interpersonal skills: which are needed in order to work with groups, gain their trust,
and “provide them with counseling and coaching.”
3. General consultation skills: including knowledge about intervention techniques (such
as those discussed in chapter 4) to assist them in diagnosing problems and designing
change interventions.
4. Organization development theory: to ensure that they have a current understanding of
the specialist field of which they are a part.
Underpinning these OD practitioner interventions is the classic change process model
developed by Kurt Lewin (1947). He developed a three-stage model of how change occurs:
unfreezing how the organization operates, changing the organization in specific ways, and
then refreezing the changes into the operations of the organization. How Lewin’s model of
change relates to the actions of the OD practitioner is set out in table 9.2.
TABLE 9.2 Classic OD Change Intervention Processes
Lewin’s Change Process OD Action Research Change Process
Unfreezing: establishing the need for change • Identification of problems
• Consultation with OD practitioner
• Gathering of data and initial diagnosis
Movement: to new behavior through cognitive restructuring
• Client group feedback
• Joint problem diagnosis
• Joint planning of change actions
• Engagement in change actions
Refreezing: integration of new behaviors into social and organizational relationships
• Post-action data gathering and evaluation
Sources: Adapted from French and Bell (1995), Cummings and Worley (2015).
Criticisms of OD As application of OD as an approach to managing change became more widespread, so
did attention to its limitations. Even advocates of the OD approach began to acknowl-
edge that there are problems in the field. For example, French and Bell (1995) identi-
fied six of these:
1. OD definitions and concepts. OD may consist of single or multiple interventions over
different periods of time, so establishing the relationship between “OD” and its ability
to enhance “organizational effectiveness” is difficult, especially given that the latter
term itself also lacks precise definitions.
284 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
2. Internal validity problems. This relates to whether the change that occurred was caused
by the change intervention or a range of other factors.
3. External validity problems. This is the generalizability question and relates to whether
OD and its techniques are appropriate to all organizational settings.
4. Lack of theory. There is no comprehensive theory of change to assist researchers in
knowing what to look for in what they study.
5. Problems with measuring attitude changes. Using pre-change and then post-change
surveys to measure attitudinal changes is problematic, as people may view the scale
differently when they answer it a second time.
6. Problems with normal science approaches to research. The ability to use these tech-
niques (hypothesis testing, assessing cause–effect relationships, etc.) is questioned in
relation to OD being a process based on action research.
French and Bell (1995, p. 334) adopted an optimistic view of this situation, arguing
that “these do not appear to be insurmountable problems at this time, although they con-
tinue to plague research efforts.” However, other writers were critical of such optimism,
pointing out that the approach is largely descriptive and prescriptive, often failing to ade-
quately consider the inherent limitations and underlying assumptions of its own tech-
niques (Oswick and Grant, 1996). OD has been presented with a range of other criticisms
relating to the extent to which it deals adequately with issues such as leadership, strategic
change, power, and reward systems (Cummings and Worley, 2015). Three further criti-
cisms relate to the current relevance of OD’s traditional values, the universality of those
values, and the ability of OD to engage in large-scale change. Each of these issues is
addressed next.
OD and the Challenge of Managing Covert Processes
Bob Marshak is a very experienced and highly
regarded OD consultant. For Marshak, one of the
great OD challenges is dealing with what he describes
as “covert processes,” those “powerful processes that
impact organizations but remain unseen, unspoken,
or unacknowledged [and which] include hidden agen-
das, blind spots, organizational politics, the elephant in
the room, secret hopes and wishes, tacit assumptions,
and unconscious dynamics” (Marshak, 2006, p. xi).
To reduce the likelihood that covert processes
thwart an attempt to bring about organizational
change, Marshak (2006) identifies five “keys” to
dealing with covert processes in the context of an
OD intervention:
1. Create a (psychologically) safe environment
Do whatever you can to create a climate of trust
and respect where people feel safe to reveal their
thoughts and beliefs
2. Seek movement, not exposure
Focus on moving the situation forward, not
being judgmental about matter revealed (i.e.,
progress, not punishment).
3. Assume that people are trying their best
Put the focus on inquiry rather than judgement.
4. Look in the mirror
Be self-aware so that your behavior as the con-
sultant is driven by the situaion of the people
you are working with and not your own covert
norms and beliefs.
5. Act consistently with expectations
Stay within the scope of your brief as explained
to participants at the outset unless you explicitly
renegotiate expectations with them.
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 285
Current Relevance of OD’s Traditional Values Despite its longevity, or perhaps because of it, the issue of the ongoing relevance of the
values underlying OD continues to be a matter of debate, the topic still featuring heavily
in 2014 in the pages of the journal OD Practitioner (vol. 46, no. 1). Going back 20 years,
prominent OD thought leader Warner Burke (1997, p. 7) argued that, for many experi-
enced OD practitioners, “the profession has lost its way—that its values are no longer
sufficiently honored, much less practiced, and that the unrelenting emphasis on the bottom
line has taken over.” This sentiment was a reaction to the growing role of some OD prac-
titioners as advisers on corporate restructurings, mergers and takeovers, and so on, despite
the lack of evidence of the values core to OD being central to such changes.
As a result, a view formed that “OD has lost some of its power, its presence, and per-
haps its perspective” (Burke, 1997, p. 7). An editor of OD Practitioner at the time, Dave
Nicholl, agreed with Burke’s general assessment, pointing to how many of the values of
OD are confrontational to many of the values held in our organizations, leading to “stark
contrasts” between being relevant and value-neutral or being value-laden and marginal
(Nicholl, 1998c). Nicholl argued that OD practitioners need to remind themselves of the
dilemma they face, of assisting both individual development and organizational perfor-
mance—which he characterizes as “contradictory elements.” By delving back into OD’s
heritage, Nicholl (1999) suggested that they regain their humility and present to clients
not certainty but educated conjecture. Finally, he proposed the need for a paradigm shift
in how the corporation is viewed and rebuilt, allowing space to recognize that corporations
are not necessarily just institutions for profit but social institutions.
Other OD writers have challenged managers to make their organizations more inclu-
sive (multiple levels of involvement in decision making), to create mutual accountability
OD Values An Anachronism or Something Worth Preserving?
The valuing of inclusion, open communication,
collaboration, and empowerment has caused OD
to struggle in recent decades in the face of a per-
ception that these are values from a “gentler” time
and inconsistent with fiercely competitive markets
where only rapid change, driven by top-down
edict, can give hope of survival. However, Burnes
and Cooke (2012) query this characterization of
OD. Instead they ask, are we in a time when the
issue of values has never been more important?
They suggest that many countries are struggling
with the impact of organizations exhibiting uneth-
ical, and financially or environmentally unsustain-
able, practices. If this is so, they (2012, p. 1417)
argue, OD “with its humanist, democratic and
ethical values, wide range of participative tools and
techniques, and experience in promoting behavior
changes, is ideally placed ... to play a leading role
in the movement to a more ethical and sustainable
future.”
Similarly, a widely experienced professor and
consultant, Harvard Business School’s Mike Beer
(2014, p. 61), argues:
With the corporate scandals of the past decade,
clear evidence that we are doing damage to our
planet, and the great recession of 2008, higher
ambition CEOs are reframing the purpose of
their firm from increasing shareholder value to
contributing to all stakeholders. This trend is
opening up new opportunities for the field of
OD to help these higher ambition leaders to cre-
ate a better world. Higher ambition companies
integrate head, heart, and hands.
286 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
(linking performance remuneration to adherence to core values, stakeholders, and corpo-
rate sustainability), to reinforce interdependence (between individuals, organizations, and
the wider society), to expand notions of time and space (such as considering the impact of
decisions for future generations), to ensure the wise use of natural resources (such as con-
sideration of renewable and nonrenewable resources), and to redefine the purpose of the
organization in terms of multiple stakeholders (including customers, stockholders, com-
munity, planet, descendants, organizational leaders, employees, and directors) (Gelinas
and James, 1999).
Are OD Values Universal? One challenge leveled at OD is whether the approach and the values underpinning it
are relevant outside of the United States, where it was predominantly developed. As
with the issue of the continuing relevance of OD values over time (as discussed above),
debate over the global appropriateness of OD values continues (see, e.g., Sorenson and
Yaeger, 2014).
Some advocates portray OD change values as being universal, with cultural differences
serving as “a veneer which covers common fundamental human existence” (Blake et al.,
2000, p. 60). For example, Blake et al. (2000) claim that the classic Managerial (or Lead-
ership) Grid framework developed by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton in the 1960s has
been applied successfully in many different countries. For Blake et al. (2000, p. 54), this
framework was “probably the first systematic, comprehensive approach to organizational
change” and had played a central role in the development of OD. They argue that the grid
sustains and extends core OD values in seeking greater candor, openness, and trust in
organizations. The grid maps seven leadership styles that vary in terms of their emphasis
on people versus results: controlling, accommodating, status quo, indifferent, paternalist,
opportunist, and sound—the latter style being preferred insofar as it portrays a leadership
style that is concerned for both results and people (Blake et al., 2000).
The grid has been used as the basis for change leadership seminars, helping to establish
both individual awareness and skills. In response to the question of the grid’s applicabil-
ity outside of the United States, they claim that it has been used extensively in a variety
of countries (including within Asia), in part because of “its ability to effectively employ a
universal model of effective management and organizational development within diverse
cultures” (Blake et al., 2000, p. 59).
Similarly, for Sorenson and Yaeger (2014, p. 58) the evidence from years of application
of OD in diverse countries is that national cultural values are more akin to “a veneer that
covers more fundamental and universal needs, needs which are reflected in the fundamen-
tal values of OD.”
However, other OD advocates are more circumspect about how far the OD approach
is relevant across cultural boundaries. For example, Marshak (1993) contends that there
are fundamentally different assumptions underlying Eastern (Confucian/Taoist) and
Western (Lewinian/OD) views of organizational change. These differences are outlined
in table 9.3. Marshak’s (1993) view is that OD practitioners need to view with care any
assumptions they may hold that OD practices have universal applicability, while Mirvis
(2006) recommends that OD become more open to a pluralism of ideas by drawing from
both Eastern and Western styles of thought. Similarly, Fagenson-Eland et al. (2004,
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 287
p. 461), based on the findings of a seven-nation study, conclude that “OD practitioners
should carefully consider dimensions of national culture when recommending specific OD
interventions.”
Engaging in Large-Scale Change One of the biggest challenges to the traditional OD field was the criticism that it was ill
suited to handle large-scale organizational change. Traditional OD techniques focused
on working with individuals and group dynamics through processes such as survey
feedback and team building. Such methods came under attack as being insufficient to
deal with the large-scale changes needed by organizations to cope with the hypercom-
petitive business world that confronts them (Manning and Binzagr, 1996, p. 269). OD
was seen as “too slow, too incremental and too participative” to be the way to manage
change at a time when organizations often faced the need to make major change and to
do so with speed (Burnes and Cooke, 2012, p. 1397).
As a result of such criticisms, many OD practitioners began to move their focus from
micro-organizational issues to macro, large-system issues, including aligning change to
the strategic needs of the organization (Worley et al., 1996). This has led to the devel-
opment of a range of techniques designed to get the whole organizational system, or at
least representatives of different stakeholders of the whole system, into a room at the
same time.
Whole system techniques take a variety of forms and names, including search confer-
ence (see table 9.4), future search, real-time strategic change, World Café (see box), town
hall meetings, simu-real, whole-system design, open-space technology, ICA strategic
planning process, participative design, fast-cycle full participation, large-scale interactive
process, and appreciative future search (Axelrod, 1992; Bunker and Alban, 1992, 1997;
Dannemiller and Jacobs, 1992; Emery and Purser, 1996; Fuller et al., 2000; Holman et al.,
2007; Klein, 1992; Levine and Mohr, 1998; Manning and Binzagr, 1996). Such techniques
are typically designed to work with up to thousands of people at a time.
TABLE 9.3 Is OD Change
Culture-
Bound?
Lewinian/OD Assumptions Confucian/Taoist Assumptions
• Linear (movement from past to present to future)
• Progressive (new state more desirable) • Goal oriented (specific end state in
mind) • Based on creating disequilibrium (by
altering current field of forces) • Planned and managed by people
separate from change itself (application of techniques to achieve desired ends)
• Unusual (assumption of static or semi- static state outside of a change process)
• Cyclical (constant ebb and flow) • Processional (harmonious movement
from one state to another) • Journey oriented (cyclical change,
therefore no end state) • Based on maintaining equilibrium
(achieve natural harmony) • Observed and followed by involved
people (who constantly seek harmony with their universe)
• Usual (assumption of constant change, as in the yin-yang philosophy, each new order contains its own negation)
Source: Adapted from Marshak (1993).
288 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
The various techniques do entail differences. Some techniques assume that organiza-
tional participants can shape and enact both their organization and its surrounding envi-
ronment; others are based on the assumption that the environment is given (although its
defining characteristics may need to be actively agreed upon) and that organizations and
their participants join together democratically to identify appropriate adaptation processes.
Other differences relate to the extent to which the technique includes a majority of orga-
nizational members and stakeholders. Some techniques are highly structured and use a
consultant who manages the process, whereas others utilize a more flexible self-design
approach (Manning and Binzagr, 1996).
TABLE 9.4 An Example of
a Search Con-
ference Format
Phase 1 Identifying relevant world trends = shared understanding of global environment
Phase 2 Identifying how trends affect specific issue, organization, institution = how global trends impact on operations of the system
Phase 3 Evolution of issue, organization, institution = creation of its history including its chronology (timeline)
Phase 4 Future design of issue, organization, institution = use of small-group creativity and innovation to design a consensus scenario for the way forward
Phase 5 Strategy formulation = generation of agreed action plans
Source: Adapted from Baburoglu and Garr (1992).
World Café
World Café is a large-scale OD intervention tech-
nique developed by Juanita Brown and David Isaacs
(2005). It has been described by Jorgenson and
Steier (2013, p. 393) as “one of a new generation of
methods that attempt to achieve collective change
by bringing all members or stakeholders of a system
together in one place, using a highly structured pro-
cess of movement to create flexible and coevolving
networks of conversations.”
Typically, the event is held away from the nor-
mal workplace and uses small face-to-face group-
ings seated at a collection of small café-like tables
as the basis for rounds of conversations. Convened
by one or more facilitators, the World Café involves
a series of issues/questions being addressed by
participants. Table membership changes between
various rounds (of questions), although one person
usually remains as the “table host.” Each table usu-
ally “reports back” (orally) to the group as a whole
between rounds, and the meeting ends with the
whole group discussing what has occurred.
Jorgenson and Steier (2013, p. 393) note:
The event is densely symbolic. Tables are often
covered with red and white checked tablecloths
reminiscent of an Italian restaurant as well as bud
vases with flowers. Sheets of butcher block paper
laid on each table along with colored markers or
crayons are intended to evoke an atmosphere of
play and allow participants, if they desire, to cap-
ture emerging ideas with sketches or notes.
Source: Adapted from Jorgenson and Steier (2013).
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 289
What unites these techniques is an underlying assumption that “the few are no longer
left in the position of deciding for the many” as a result of the inclusion of “new and dif-
ferent voices” in the change process (Axelrod, 2001, p. 22). These techniques are designed
to assist organizations in being responsive to their current business conditions by provid-
ing the means “for getting the message to the total system by enhancing everyone’s under-
standing of the organization’s situation and its context. This reframing leads to a common
recognition of the changes required and becomes the impetus for concerted actions”
(Bunker and Alban, 1992). An example of this technique in a large setting, involving over
4,000 people who came together to identify how the World Trade Center 9/11 site should
be developed, is outlined below.
Large-Scale Interventions “Listening to the City”: Town Hall Meeting on Rebuilding the World Trade Center after 9/11
In New York City on July 20, 2002, over 4,300 New
York citizens came together for what has been
billed as the largest town hall meeting ever held.
The meeting was organized by AmericaSpeaks, a
nonprofit organization headed by Carolyn Lukens-
meyer that uses twenty-first-century town meet-
ings to design and facilitate large-scale dialogues
on public issues. Up to 5,000 people are grouped
into one room and profiled in such a way that
they represent the various interests and stakehold-
ers associated with the issues for discussion and
debate. They are arranged into small groups of
around a dozen people, each having a facilitator.
Each group has a networked computer that records
the ideas of participants and a wireless network
within the room transfers these data to a central
computer. This enables a “theme team” to read the
data from each group, identify key themes in real
time, distill them, and present them back to the
whole room via large overhead video screens. Each
participant in the room has a wireless keypad that
he or she can then use to vote in relation to the dis-
tilled themes. This provides instant feedback to the
entire group, which, at the conclusion of the day,
receives a summary of the major issues and out-
comes. Involving key decision makers in the meet-
ing is an important way of trying to ensure that the
outcomes of the day have a meaningful input into
public policy.
In the case of the World Trade Center, the town
hall meeting was held after five months of orga-
nizing, sponsored in part by the Lower Manhattan
Development Corporation (LMDC) and the Port
Authorities of New York and New Jersey. During
this period, a representative sample of New York-
ers was identified and invited to the July 20 meet-
ing, which was titled “Listening to the City.” The
room contained 500 tables, each with a facilitator.
Theme team members provided feedback through-
out the day, and issue experts were on hand to
answer specific questions from participants. Rep-
resentatives from various federal, state, and city
agencies also were present. A key outcome of the
meeting was an expression of dissatisfaction with
the six memorial site options being considered and
a demand for one having more open space; the
meeting also made recommendations regarding
expansion of the transit service and more afford-
able housing. The outcome was that the LMDC
began a new planning process for the World Trade
Center and the Port Authority agreed to reduce
the amount of commercial development planned
for the site in order to enable more space for hotel
and retail. As reported by the New York Daily News
(July 21, 2002), “the process was an exercise in
democracy.”
Sources: Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2002; New York Daily News,
http://www.nydailynews.com, July 21, 2002.
290 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
Although designed, as the name suggests, for application in large-scale system-wide
situations such as that represented in the World Trade Center example, these methods have
also been applied in smaller-scale situations such as that described below involving the
Museum of Science and Technology.
Proponents of large-scale intervention approaches are glowing, sometimes almost evan-
gelical, in expounding their benefits. Weisbord (1992, pp. 9–10) claims that future search
conference outcomes “can be quite startling” and produce restructured bureaucratic hierar-
chies in which “people previously in opposition often act together across historic barriers
in less than 48 hours.” Results emerge “with greater speed and increased commitment
and greatly reduced resistance by the rest of the organization” (Axelrod, 1992, p. 507),
enhancing “innovation, adaptation, and learning” (Axelrod, 2001, p. 22).
However, alongside testaments to the success of these techniques are disagreements
regarding both the origin of large-scale, whole-system change techniques and their likely
effectiveness in highly volatile environments. Some writers disagree with the version of
“OD history” that depicts the field as having moved over time from a micro to a macro
focus. They maintain that large-scale techniques have always been part of the OD approach
and that “ODers have a strong tendency to neglect their past” (Golembiewski, 1999, p. 5).
Others, such as Herman (2000), maintain that because of the need for more rapid responses,
system-wide culture change programs are less relevant today than more specific, situa-
tional interventions such as virtual team building and management of merger processes.
World Café on a Small Scale—the Museum of Science and Industry
The Museum of Science and Industry (MOSI) is in
Tampa, Florida, and has used a World Café format for
various purposes, including meetings that involved
staff and members of the local community in the
discussion of planning and design matters. Having
had World Café experience, a decision was made to
try this format for a meeting of its 30-member exec-
utive board that was scheduled to explore possible
futures—and identify “actionable ideas”—for MOSI.
World Café was seen as an approach that would sig-
nal to members that this was intended to be a very
different sort of meeting from the highly structured
ones which were the executive board norm in its
usual setting (a traditional boardroom with members
seated around the one large elliptical table).
Participants sat at small round tables (seating
four). The purpose of the event and the World Café
process was explained, and the first round began
with them being asked to discuss their own experi-
ences of really good conversations and what it was
about those conversations that made them “really
good.” Future rounds included asking respondents to
discuss questions such as “What could MOSI be like
in five years?” and “We’re now five years in the future
and MOSI has attained these goals. What did we do
to get here?” (Jorgenson and Steier, 2013, p. 396).
Postscript: Reactions to this use of World Café
differed between participants. While several of the
board members agree with one colleague’s enthusi-
astic response that “this was the first time in a long
time that we really talked to each other” and that
“maybe this is what a board meeting could be like,”
another responded rather ambiguously, “Yes, this
has been great but now let’s get down to business”
(Jorgenson and Steier, 2013, p. 396). For some peo-
ple, an experience like World Café opens up a new
set of possibilities as to how they could work with
each other in the future; for others, it is dismissed as
a (possibly interesting) diversion before they return
to “business as usual.”
Source: Jorgenson and Steier (2013).
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 291
Aligned with this critique is the issue of the feasibility of system-wide changes in an
era when “[t]he old model of the organization as the center of its universe, with its custom-
ers, share-owners, suppliers, etc. rotating around it, is no longer applicable in ‘new-era’
organizations” (Herman, 2000, p. 110). As one OD practitioner argues, “I’m not sure that
‘system wide’ change is really possible, since the real system often include[s] a number of
strategic partners who may never buy into changes that fit one company but not another”
(cited in Herman, 2000, p. 109).
However, others disagree. For OD consultant Susan Hoberecht and her colleagues
(2011), the increasing centrality of interorganizational alliances and networks in the busi-
ness world provides an opportunity for change methods with a system-wide focus, because
in such an environment a greater than ever premium is placed on the effective operating
of interdependencies. In such an environment, Hoberecht et al. (2011) argue, large-scale
interventions have particular relevance.
For an empirically based assessment of various aspects of the effectiveness of large-
scale interventions, see Worley, Mohrman, and Nevitt (2011).
LO 9.3 Appreciative Inquiry (AI)
Techniques of “inclusion” appropriate to large-scale or large-group interventions led to
them being labelled as part of a new “engagement paradigm” (Axelrod, 2001, p. 25), a
“new type of social innovation” (Bunker and Alban, 1992, p. 473), a “paradigm shift”
(Dannemiller and Jacobs, 1992, p. 497), and “an evolution in human thought, vision
and values uniquely suited to our awesome 21st Century technical, economic, and
social dilemmas” (Weisbord, 1992, p. 6). They represented a shift from the emphasis
on problem-solving and conflict management, common to earlier OD programs, to a
focus on joint envisioning of the future. For example, Fuller and colleagues (2000,
p. 31) maintain that with a problem-solving approach comes the assumption that “orga-
nizing is a problem to be solved,” one that entails steps such as problem identification,
analysis of causes and solutions, and the development of action plans.
Contrary to this logic, Fuller et al. (2000) point to the assumptions underlying the
appreciative inquiry approach to change, which seeks to identify what is currently work-
ing best and to build on this knowledge to help develop and design what might be achieved
in the future. They outline the technique as involving four steps:
• Discovery or appreciating the best of what is currently practiced.
• Building on this knowledge to help envision (or dream) about what the future could be.
• Designing or co-constructing (through collective dialogue) what should be.
• Sustaining the organization’s destiny or future.
The technique is also depicted diagrammatically in figure 9.1. An illustrative sample of
questions for this four-step process is provided in table 9.5.
In these techniques the act of participation or inclusion of a wide variety of voices itself
constitutes a change in the organization: the “what” to change and the “how” to change
cannot be easily separated.
292 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
Discovery What gives life
(The best of what it is) Appreciating
Destiny How to empower, learn, and
adjust/improvise? Sustaining
Affirmative topic
choice
Design What should be the ideal?
Co-constructing
Dream What might be
(What the world is calling for)
FIGURE 9.1 Appreciative
Inquiry 4-D
Cycle
TABLE 9.5 An Illustrative Sample of Appreciative Inquiry Questions
The following questions were part of an AI-based OD engagement that consultant Meghana Rao (2014, p. 81) carried out in a U.S. social services agency.
Stage Questions
Discovery “Describe a time when you were most proud to be a member of your organization. What was the situation? Who was involved? What made it a proud moment?”
Dream “Imagine yourself and your organization have been fast-forwarded by five years. What do you see around you? What does the structure look like? How have clients been created, retained, and expanded?”
Design “What will your ideal organizational structure look like?—people, systems? . . . What struc- tures need to be in place for the organization to sustain and for employees to flourish?”
Destiny “What are the action items that we need to cover to create the organization of the future? What additional resources will be needed?”
In their outline of the benefits of appreciative inquiry, Fuller et al. (2000, p. 31) claim
that it “releases an outpouring of new constructive conversations,” “unleashes a self-
sustaining learning capacity within the organization,” “creates the conditions neces-
sary for self-organizing to flourish,” and “provides a reservoir of strength for positive
change.” These are not minor claims. Certainly, the techniques have been reportedly
used successfully in a variety of organizational settings (Weisbord, 1992). However,
whether these approaches are successful in achieving their outcomes is difficult to estab-
lish, being based most often on the assertions of their proponents rather than on rigorous
research evidence.
Source: Reprinted with permission of the publisher. From Appreciative Inquiry, copyright 2007 by Cooperrider/Whitney,
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., San Francisco, CA. All rights reserved. www.bkconnection.com
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 293
LO 9.3 Positive Organizational Scholarship (POS)
Dubbed as a “new movement in organizational science,” positive organizational
scholarship (POS) is an umbrella term that emerged in the early 2000s to encompass
approaches such as appreciative inquiry and others, including positive psychology and
community psychology (Cameron and Caza, 2004, p. 731). POS developed out of a
view that for most of the history of OD, attention had mainly been paid to identifying
instances of “negatively motivated change” (or problems) in organizations and design-
ing change programs to eliminate them (Cameron and McNaughtan, 2014). Following
this line of argument, thinking about the positive aspects of organizational life—and
building change programs to spread these aspects elsewhere in organizations—has
been relatively neglected.
To take a POS perspective involves what one of its founders, Kim Cameron, describes
as “four connotations” (Cameron and McNaughtan, 2014, p. 447):
(i) “adopting a positive lens,” which means that whether one is dealing with celebra-
tions/successes or adversity/problems, the focus is on “life-giving elements”;
(ii) “focusing on positively deviant performance,” which means investigating outcomes
that are well in excess of any normally expected performance, that is, outcomes that
are spectacular, surprising, or extraordinary;
(iii) “assuming an affirmative bias” involves holding the view that positivity generates in
individuals, groups, and organizations the capacity for greater achievements; and
(iv) “examining virtuousness” involves assuming that all “human systems” are inclined
toward “the highest aspirations of mankind.”
Appreciative Inquiry at Roadway Express
Roadway Express, a North American industrial and
commercial transportation company, adopted an
appreciative inquiry approach in order to change
its culture and management. Working with Case
Western Reserve University, the company embarked
on a major leadership training program in order
to develop skills and capabilities for sustained eco-
nomic performance. In what was called the Break-
through Leadership Program, 150 Roadway Express
leaders went through personal discovery exercises
involving developing personal vision statements,
identifying personal strengths and weaknesses,
developing personal learning plans, and experi-
menting with these back in the work setting. Execu-
tive coaches served to facilitate these processes.
In the next phase, David Cooperrider, who
co-founded appreciative inquiry, worked with them
in convening summits (large group meetings), each
held over two days and consisting of a cross section
of stakeholders (customers, staff, suppliers, dock
workers, and others). The aim of these summits was
to identify what the “ideal” was for the organiza-
tion in relation to a variety of business issues. Each
summit went through the four AI stages (discovery,
dream, design, and destiny) in order to facilitate
cooperation and collaboration throughout the orga-
nization. From 2000 to 2004, 8,000 Roadway peo-
ple experienced this process, with over 70 summits
being held in this time. At the end of each summit,
in what was referred to as the “open microphone”
segment, participants “publicly pledged their com-
mitment to each other to see the changes embod-
ied in the action plans through to completion” (Van
Oosten, 2006, p. 712).
Source: Van Oosten (2006).
294 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
In line with the coaching metaphor, POS can be depicted as coaching organizations to
identify their “best plays,” to understand the behaviors and dynamics underlying them, and
then to work out how to spread them to other parts of their “game” (the organization).
POS has had its critics. Fineman (2006, pp. 270–73) raises four issues that question
whether POS can really live up to its “positive” aims. First, he questions whether we can
really agree on which behaviors are “positive.” What passes for being positive will vary in
different environments. For example, in reviewing a number of research studies, he points
out how “‘courageous,’ ‘principled’ corporate whistle-blowers are also readily regarded
as traitors, renegading on the unspoken corporate code (‘virtue’) to never wash one’s dirty
linen in public.”
Second, he (2006, pp. 274–75) questions whether the positive can be separated from the
negative or whether they are really “two sides of the same coin, inextricably welded and
mutually reinforcing.” For example: “Happiness may trigger anxiety (‘will my happiness
last?’). Love can be mixed with bitterness and jealousy. Anger can feel energizing and
exciting.” By focusing on positive experiences, he maintains, approaches such as apprecia-
tive inquiry fail “to value the opportunities for positive change that are possible from neg-
ative experiences, such as embarrassing events, periods of anger, anxiety, fear, or shame.”
Third, he (2006, p. 276) points to how what are regarded as positive behaviors and
emotions differ, not just in different organizational environments but across different cul-
tural environments. Drawing on the work of writers on culture, he points out how “[e]
ffusive hope, an energizing emotion in the West, is not a sentiment or term prevalent in
cultures and sub-cultures influenced by Confucianism and Buddhism.”
Fourth, he (2006, p. 281) suggests that there is “an unarticulated dark side to positive-
ness.” This occurs where there is a lack of recognition that there are different interests
in organizations and that not all people respond well to so-called positive programs like
empowerment and emotional intelligence or practices that impose a “culture of fun” in the
workplace. These programs “have a mixed or uncertain record, and some can produce the
very opposite of the self-actualization and liberation they seek” (Fineman, 2006, p. 281).
In response to these criticisms, defenders of POS argue that their perspective comple-
ments and expands rather than replaces the perspective of those who “only wrestle with the
question of what’s wrong in organizations” (Roberts, 2006, p. 294). Indeed, those whose
focus is on the latter question “may inadvertently ignore the areas of human flourishing
that enliven and contribute value to organizations, even in the face of significant human and
structural challenges” (Roberts, 2006, p. 295). POS is presented as “concerned with under-
standing the integration of positive and negative conditions, not merely with an absence
of the negative” (Cameron and Caza, 2004, p. 732). Rather than assume that there are no
universally positive virtues, the task of POS is to “discover the extent to which virtues and
goodness are culturally influenced” (Roberts, 2006, p. 298). Roberts (2006) suggests that
criticism of POS may be due to a combination of the critics not wanting to step outside
of their comfort zone—an approach to managing change that is focused on identifying
problems—and lack of consideration for the relative infancy of POS as an area of practice.
Where does this leave the manager of change? On the one side, proponents of POS
wish to change organizations with “an implicit desire to enhance the quality of life for
individuals who work within and are affected by organizations” (Roberts, 2006, p. 294).
On the other side are critical scholars who do not lay out an alternative call to action for
agents of change so much as caution them if they assume that they will be successful
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 295
in their “positive” ventures. Instead, the critics of POS urge POS advocates to recognize
how underlying power relationships and interests in organizations (and beyond) will limit
their actions; they also are urged to recognize that what passes as being positive will vary
in different contexts and may not be shared by all. However, such critical reflections do
not seem to have dented, in any significant way, the increasing momentum that the POS
movement has gained, at least in North America. Whether it achieves the same momentum
outside of the United States remains to be seen.
Cameron and McNaughtan (2014, p. 456) revisit the findings of a decade of applica-
tion of POS ideas to organizational change covering such variables as virtuous practices
(e.g., compassion), humanistic values, the meaningfulness of work, high-quality inter-
personal communication, hope, energy, and self-efficacy. They summarize the results as
“provid[ing] support for the benefits of positive change practices in real-world work set-
tings.” However, adding a note of caution, they (2014, p. 456) state that the relative new-
ness of the approach means that not enough is yet known to be able to be sure of “what,
how or when” it is most successful.
LO 9.3 Dialogic Organizational Development
As OD developed through its various manifestations such as large group interventions
and appreciative inquiry, it was moving more and more away from the classic, diagno-
sis-driven approach to OD (as described in the initial sections of this chapter). Gervase
Bushe and Bob Marshak (2009) characterized this change by contrasting the traditional
“diagnostic OD” with what they described as “dialogic OD.”
Bushe and Marshak (2009) contrast the characteristics of diagnostic and dialogic OD.
Whereas traditional/diagnostic OD emphasizes that any problem requiring change could
be addressed by first applying an objective diagnosis of the circumstances of the situation,
From the Originators of Dialogic OD Gervase Bushe and Bob Marshak
By 2005 each of us had separately concluded that
various OD change methods were being practiced
that didn’t follow the basic orthodoxies found in
OD textbooks. Although we didn’t really know
each other at that time, we decided to collaborate
on defining the premises and practices we believed
underlay approaches as disparate as Open Space
Technology, Appreciative Inquiry, and the Art of
Hosting, to name a few. In a 2009 article we orig-
inated the name and concept of “Dialogic OD,”
based on the principle that change comes from
changing everyday conversations, and contrasted it
with the foundational form of OD we named “Diag-
nostic OD.”
Later we articulated key ideas derived from the
interpretive and complexity sciences that lead to a
Dialogic OD Mindset and the “secret sauce” of ingre-
dients that in combination produce transformational
change. Those ingredients, occurring in no specific
order, include: disruption of ongoing patterns of
social agreement such that the emergence of new
patterns of organizing become possible; introduc-
tion of a “generative image,” for example sustainable
development, that stimulates new thinking and possi-
bilities not previously considered; and development
of new narratives that become part of the day-to-day
conversations that guide how organizational actors
think about and respond to situations. (Continued)
296 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
dialogic OD treats reality as subjective so that the priority in intervening in an organiza-
tion was to identify and acknowledge different stakeholders’ interpretations of what for
them was “reality.” In parallel with this, the role of the OD consultant moved from being
the provider of data for fact-driven decision making to being the facilitator of processes
that encouraged “conversations” around change issues (Marshak, 2013).
Central to the dialogic OD approach is the view that “real change” only occurs when
mindsets are altered and that this is more likely to occur through “generative conversa-
tions” than persuasion by “facts.” Altered mindsets are represented by changes at the level
of language and associated changes at the level of actions taken by organization members.
This changed approach is also associated with moves away from (i) seeing change as a
relatively manageable, plannable, linear process to one that could be unpredictable, with
far from predictable moves from diagnosis to outcomes, and (ii) “the shift from fixing a
problem to cultivating a system capable of addressing its own challenges” (Holman, 2013,
p. 20) (see table 9.6).
For more detail on dialogic OD, see Gervase Bushe and Robert Marshak, Dialogic
Organization Development: The Theory and Practice of Transformational Change
( Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2015), or the earlier OD Practitioner (vol. 45, no. 1, 2013)
special issue on this topic.
We believe Dialogic OD is especially effective in
a VUCA [volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambi-
guity] world of continual change. Given those
conditions, instead of trying to control the uncon-
trollable, Dialogic OD asks leaders to enrich stake-
holder networks, promote open-ended inquiry, and
support groups that self-generate small experiments
that challenge conventional wisdom and may
lead to new outcomes not previously considered.
Leaders stay involved by amplifying and embedding
new ideas and practices that work. In brief, leaders
become sponsors and framers of dialogic processes
that stimulate innovation and invention, rather than
trying to maintain illusory control as directors or
managers of planned change.
Source: Private correspondence from Bob Marshak to the authors,
March 11, 2015.
TABLE 9.6 How Dialogic OD and Diagnostic OD Are Different—Base Assumptions
Dialogic OD Diagnostic OD
How the OD prac- titioner influences the organization
Working with people in a way that creates new awareness, knowledge, and possibilities
Carrying out diagnosis of the organizational situation before intervening
What makes change happen?
Engaging with stakeholders in ways that disrupt and shift existing patterns of norms, beliefs, and behaviors, leading to the emergence of new possibilities and associated commitments
Applying known expertise to identify, plan, and manage the change in a systematic unfreeze-change-refreeze sequence
The consultant’s orientation
As an involved facilitator who becomes part of the situation being changed
As a neutral facilitator who retains a separateness/distance from those being affected
Source: Adapted from Marshak (2015), table 1, p. 48.
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 297
Michael Beer on What OD Must Do to Be Influential
Michael Beer is Professor Emeritus at Harvard Business
School, and cofounder and Chairman of management
consulting firm TruePoint Partners. Reflecting on 50
years of involvement in the field of OD (Beer, 2014,
pp. 60–61), he argues that OD is “at a crossroads”
in terms of its capacity to be influential. According to
Beer, even if the specific nature of their engagement
directly involves just one of the following processes,
the OD practitioner must consider how what they are
doing will enhance all three of:
(i) Performance alignment – high performance that
flows from the organization’s design, processes,
and capabilities being aligned with its strategy.
(ii) Psychological alignment – the commitment of
people that follows from alignment between the
organization’s culture and humanistic values.
(iii) Capacity for learning and change – the organi-
zation supporting, on an ongoing basis, hon-
est conversations on any matters that inhibit (i)
and (ii).
OD in Different Settings
1. The United States Army
Kohnke, A., and Gonda, T. 2013. Creating a
collaborative virtual command center among
four separate organizations in the United States
Army: An exploratory case study. Organization
Development Journal, Winter:75–92.
2. Nonprofit organization
Fox, H. L. 2013. The promise of organizational
development in nonprofit human services
organizations. Organization Development Journal,
Summer: 72–80.
3. Military hospital
Regan, A.-M. C., and Hobbs, L. M. 2012. Walter
Reed Bethesda—much more than changing
names. OD Practitioner 44(3):31–36.
4. Private company
Blesoff, D. E. 2011. Making sustainability
sustainable: Lessons from Radio Flyer. OD
Practitioner 43(4):17–22.
5. Media organization
Birmingham, C. 2012. How OD principles of
change still matter in an impossible situation. OD
Practitioner 44(4):61–64.
6. Mergers and acquisitions
Marks, M. L., and Mirvis, P. H. 2012. Applying
OD to make mergers and acquisitions work. OD
Practitioner 44(3):5–12.
7. Big data
Church, A. H., and Dutta, S. 2013. The promise
of big data for OD. OD Practitioner 45(4):23–31.
As OD continues to evolve, it remains a major “school of thought” as to how
organizational change should be managed. However, not all OD practitioners are sure that
a move from [diagnostic] OD to dialogic OD is sufficient to position OD optimally for
being able to have an influence on how change in organizations is managed. For example,
both Worley (2014) and Bartunek and Woodman (2015) argue that the diagnostic-dialogic
dichotomy is unhelpful and that “we should be talking about whether a comprehensive
and systematic diagnostic OD can be integrated with a really good dialogic OD to create
a powerful change process” (Worley, 2014, p. 70). For Worley (2014, p. 70), the dialogic-
diagnostic focus places too much attention on “OD as process”; he argues that for OD “to
capture its full potential,” practitioners must complement their process skills with skills and
knowledge “related to the principles and frameworks of strategy and organization design.”
298 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
LO 9.4 Sense-Making
As discussed in chapter 2, the interpreter image emphasizes the role of the change
manager as a “manager of meaning,” that is, it emphasizes that a core skill of a change
manager is the capacity to frame meaning for those involved. Times of change can be
confusing to those affected, and a key element of what change managers do through their
various actions and communications is convey a sense of “what’s going on.” Organiza-
tional change is a process which is “problematic” in terms of its outcomes “because it
undermines and challenges [people’s] existing schemata, which serve as the interpretive
frames of reference through which to make sense of the world” (Lockett et al., 2014).
Change often means that the leaders of an organization are seeking to take it in a sig-
nificantly new direction and/or to have the organization function in a significantly differ-
ent manner. In order to do so, the sense-making process is likely to involve a sequence
that Mantere and colleagues (2012) describe as beginning with “sense-breaking” (as the
leaders challenge the appropriateness of the status quo), followed by “sense-giving” (their
attempts to reshape people’s understandings of the direction they should be heading).
Managers lacking self-awareness will often convey a message that is other than they
would intend. People in organizations interpret managers’ actions symbolically and, par-
ticularly where formal communications leave ambiguity, such interpretations will fill the
“meaning gap.” Good change managers are likely to have a high level of self-awareness
and recognize that their capacity to provide a narrative along the lines of “what’s going on
and why?”—that is, acting as an interpreter—can meet a need.
Drawing on the interpreter image of managing organizational change, Karl Weick’s (2000;
Weick et al., 2005) sense-making model provides an alternative approach to the OD school.
Weick’s (2000) point of departure is to argue against three common change assumptions.
The first is the assumption of inertia. Under this assumption, planned, intended change
is necessary in order to disrupt the forces that contribute to a lack of change in an organi-
zation so that there is a lag between environmental change and organizational adaptation.
He suggests that the central role given to inertia is misplaced and results from a focus on
structure rather than a focus on the structuring flows and processes through which orga-
nizational work occurs. Adopting the latter perspective leads one to see organizations as
being in an ongoing state of accomplishment and re-accomplishment, with organizational
routines constantly undergoing adjustments to better fit changing circumstances.
The second assumption is that a standardized change program is needed. However, Weick
(2000) says that this assumption is of limited value since it fails to activate what he regards as
the four drivers of organizational change. As outlined in chapter 2, these drivers are:
• Animation (whereby people remain in motion and may experiment, e.g., with job descriptions).
• Direction (including being able to implement, in novel ways, directed strategies).
• Paying attention and updating (such as updating knowledge of the environment and
reviewing and rewriting organizational requirements).
• Respectful, candid interaction (which occurs when people are encouraged to speak out
and engage in dialogue, particularly when things are not working well).
These drivers emerge from a sense-making perspective that assumes “that change
engages efforts to make sense of events that don’t fit together” (Weick, 2000, p. 232).
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 299
For Weick, most programmed or intentional changes fail to activate one or more of these
sense-making forces that assist individuals in managing ambiguity.
The third assumption is that of unfreezing, most often associated with Kurt Lewin’s
unfreezing–changing–refreezing change formula. Unfreezing is based on the view that
organizations suffer from inertia and need to be “unfrozen.” However, “if change is con-
tinuous and emergent, then the system is already unfrozen. Further efforts at unfreezing
could disrupt what is essentially a complex adaptive system that is already working”
(Weick, 2000, p. 235). If there is deemed to be ineffectiveness in the system, then his posi-
tion is that the best change sequence is as follows:
• Freeze (to show what is occurring in the way things are currently adapting).
• Rebalance (to remove blockages in the adaptive processes).
• Unfreeze (in order to enable further emergent and improvisational changes to occur).
In this view of organizational change, change agents are those who are best able to
identify how adaptive emergent changes are currently occurring, many of which often are
dismissed as noise in the system.
As noted in chapter 2, from a sense-making perspective, it is up to managers of change
“to author interpretations and labels that capture the patterns in those adaptive choices
[and] within the framework of sense-making, management sees what the front line says
and tells the world what it means” (Weick, 2000, p. 238). Sense-making is “a social pro-
cess of meaning construction and reconstruction through which managers understand,
interpret, and create sense for themselves and others of their changing organizational con-
text and surroundings” (Rouleau and Balogun, 2010, p. 955).
More Than Noise in the System? Change as Ongoing Patching
An alternative to large-scale structural change is
what Eisenhardt and Brown (1999) term “patching.”
They argue that this is a strategic process of small-
scale changes that enable constant realignment of
organizational processes to external changes. Patch-
ers have distinct mindsets that involve making many
small organizational changes in relation to target
markets, including additions, splits, exits, transfers,
and combinations. Change managers with patching
mindsets create organizational routines to support
the process:
For instance, Cisco’s pattern for adding busi-
nesses includes routines for selecting acquisition
targets (the preference is for new companies
about to launch their first product), for mobiliz-
ing special integration teams, for handling stock
options, and for tracking employee retention
rates. The routines also cover mundane details
like when and how to change the contents of
the vending machines at the acquired company.
(Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999, p. 76)
Similar patching processes are also found, Eisen-
hardt and Brown argue, in high-performance com-
panies such as Hewlett-Packard, 3M, and Johnson
& Johnson. They suggest that patching decisions
should be made quickly, the direction of the patching
should emerge from consideration of three or four
alternative ways of proceeding, in some cases part of
the organization should experiment with it to reduce
major errors and problems, and scripts need to be
developed to help with the ongoing coordination of
tasks, work, and people as the new patch is applied.
The authors argue that patching helps organizations
“to stay poised on the edge of chaos” and under-
pins shareholder value by helping to drive business
growth (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999, pp. 77–80).
Source: Eisenhardt and Brown (1999). Selections reproduced with
permission of Harvard Business School Publishing.
300 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
In a landmark study in using and extending the sense-making framework to the man-
agement of organizational change, Jean Helms Mills (2003) investigated organizational
change within Nova Scotia Power, a large electrical utility company based on the eastern
shore of Canada. From 1982 to 2002, Nova Scotia Power went through a variety of major
organizational changes, including:
• The introduction of a cultural change program.
• Privatization.
• Downsizing.
• Business process reengineering.
• Strategic business units.
• Balanced scorecard accounting.
Helms Mills (2003) found that there were a variety of interpretations within the
organization about these change programs. Drawing on the work of Weick (2000), she
argues that these differing sense-making activities across the organization are indicative
of the importance of understanding change as the accomplishment of ongoing processes
for making sense of organizational events. She uses Weick’s (2000) eight features of a
sense-making framework to show how they impacted on understandings of organizational
changes in the company. She draws out from each feature its implications for change
managers (see table 9.7).
TABLE 9.7 Eight Features of a Sense-Making Framework
Sense-Making Framework Feature
Definition
Implications for Change Managers
Sense-making and identity construction
The different ways in which people make sense of the same organizational change events and how it is related to their understanding of the way their identities are constructed within organizations (Helms Mills, 2003, p. 126).
The “top-down initiatives requiring dramatic changes of self (i.e., from humanist to efficiency focused) are highly problematic and need either to be avoided or handled with great skill” (Helms Mills, 2003, p. 145).
Social sense-making
The need that people have to make sense of their situations not just as individuals but as social individuals is connected to a variety of influences on them such as supervisors, management, trade unions, and so forth.
An understanding of social sense-making highlights the need for managers to identify the social factors that influence sense-making in their organizational contexts.
Extracted cues of sense-making
The need for managers of change to be aware of the way people draw on a variety of “cues” or ideas and actions, perhaps taken from the external environment, in order to make sense of various decisions.
Change managers need to identify appropriate cues and match them to intended change programs. The way in which these cues are interpreted, however, may inadvertently create problems for staff in accepting the legitimacy of the change program and its intended purposes.
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 301
Ongoing sense-making
Sense-making changes over time as new cues are experienced and events addressed.
Change managers need to understand “that on-going sense-making stabilizes a situation and how change acts as a shock, generating emotional response and new acts of sense-making” (Helms Mills, 2003, p. 164).
Retrospection Reference to Karl Weick’s argument that people make sense of their actions retrospectively.
Change managers need to understand that different groups will apply their own retrospective sense-making in order to understand emerging organizational events.
Plausibility The way that change management programs need to be sold so that the “story” about the change is plausible rather than necessarily accurate.
Change managers need to understand the way the context and power relations impact on their ability to provide plausible stories that gain widespread acceptance of the need for change.
Enactment Whereas the above aspects of sense- making act as influences on sense-making, “enactment is about imposing that sense on action” (Helms Mills, 2003, pp. 173–74).
Enactment alerts change managers to the need to connect sense-making to actions.
Projective sense-making
The ability of a powerful actor to project sense-making onto a situation, shaping the interpretations of others.
The implication of this is that using legitimate power to impose sense-making on parts of the organization may be an important aspect of understanding the implementation of change.
Source: Based on Helms Mills (2003).
Similarly, in a study of downsizing in Telenor, Norway’s main telecom organiza-
tion, Bean and Hamilton (2006) point to the way its corporate leaders used sense-mak-
ing to frame changes to the company in terms of making it an innovative, flexible,
learning organization. After the downsizing, while some staff accepted the corporate
“alignment” frame, others adopted an “alienated” frame, feeling marginalized and fear-
ing for their job security. The researchers suggest that framing of change is fragile,
with employees’ interpretations of senior management pronouncements varying from
frame-validating (accepting) to frame-breaking (challenging). That is, when the change
manager acts as interpreter, there is no guarantee that the manager’s interpretations will
not be contested.
As noted in chapter 8 on the topic of resistance to change, people in organizations can
hold very strong views about an organization including what it “stands for” and how it
should operate, and these views (“mental models”) can make people resistant to change
that they see as inconsistent with these views. Another way of expressing this same point
is that people in organizations can be disinclined to accept the change manager’s construc-
tion of events (i.e., his/her interpretation). As noted in chapter 7 on change communication
strategies, the communicated message is not necessarily the message as understood by the
302 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
receiver. In regard to the construction of events as provided by the change manager, it is
not just that there may be some misunderstanding of the “story” the manager is seeking to
communicate; the story may be well and truly understood, but not accepted as “the facts
of the situation.”
The sense-making approach alerts change managers to the different facets that influ-
ence interpretations of events. At the same time, it is clear that these influences are often
deeply embedded and less tangible than a clear set of steps that can be followed. Intangi-
ble does not mean less important or helpful, but they do require change managers to be
what Bolman and Deal (2003, p. 19) call more “artistic” than “rational.” Managing change
as artistry “is neither exact not precise. Artists interpret experience and express it in forms
that can be felt, understood, and appreciated by others.”
Change managers who are comfortable with these concepts are likely to find the
sense-making framework of assistance to them in exploring the “tangled underbrush” of
organizational change (Bolman and Deal, 2003, p. 13). At the same time, they need to be
mindful of organizational limitations on their sense-making abilities. This point is made
by Balogun and Johnson (2004, p. 545) in their study of sense-making by middle man-
agers when they “question the extent to which leaders can manage the development of
change recipients’ schemata, particularly in the larger, geographically dispersed, modular-
ized organizations we are increasingly seeing.”
In reviewing the sense-making framework, it is clear that it provides less a set of
prescriptions for managers of change and more a set of understandings about how to
proceed. It acknowledges the messiness of change and accepts that competing voices
mean that not all intended outcomes are likely to be achieved. However, critical to engag-
ing these competing voices is the ability to shape and influence how they make sense of
organizational events.
Contested Interpretations in Metropolitan Police Department
Metropolitan (a pseudonym) Police Department
began a change process that involved an organiza-
tional restructuring in which an increased share of
resources was allocated to proactive policing (intelli-
gence gathering) and to a mode of organizing that
prioritized having the capacity to rapidly deploy
police when and where they were needed. The
change managers’ narrative emphasized the impor-
tance of the need to make these specific changes so
that the police could be more “flexible” and by so
doing deal more effectively with organized crime,
which was demonstrating a capacity to speedily
form and/or disband criminal teams to meet current
needs.
However, the framing of the need for change as
a matter of needed “flexibility” was not viewed that
way by many of the police because the change was
experienced by them as involving regular turnover
in squad membership. The significance of this expe-
rience was that consistency and longevity of squad
membership were seen by many police as vital ele-
ments in producing both deep knowledge about
specific areas of crime (e.g., armed robbery) and
deep relations of trust (between squad members),
which they saw as central to effective policing.
Source: Based on Dunford et al. (2013).
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 303
Can Sense-Making Success Become a Problem?
“The Office” is a Nordic organization that began a
change process as a result of an announced forth-
coming merger with another organization. As part
of the change process, the top management of the
Office put a lot of effort into convincing staff that
the current organization was substantially under-
performing due to being overly bureaucratic and as
a result failing to be the innovative organization that
it was intended to be. The strategy of the Office was
presented by top management to staff as outdated
and inappropriate.
The discrediting of the current arrangements
at the Office—as described above—provided the
basis for “sense-breaking.” “Sense-giving” occurred
through top management framing the merger as a
way in which the staff of the Office would become
part of a new and much higher-performing entity,
capable of operating with a quality, flexibility, and
level of customer service that the Office could not
deliver in its present form. This “sense-giving”
succeeded, and the staff of the Office bought into
the message being “sold.”
Unfortunately, complications then arose in the
interorganizational negotiations, and the merger
was abruptly cancelled less than a week before the
planned merger date. The Office’s top management
presented the failed merger as a good outcome and
announced the reintroduction of a strategy almost
identical to the one they had been following for 10
years. The reaction from the Office staff: “a sullen
lack of enthusiasm” (Mantere et al., 2012, p. 186),
even a sense of betrayal.
The top management had done such a good
job of sense-breaking and sense-giving that the pre-
merger version of the Office had been reframed by
staff as no longer appropriate or acceptable, and
this situation/interpretation was not changed just
because the merger had not proceeded.
Source: Based on Mantere et al. (2012).
Managing Change from a Sense-Making Perspective Some Basic Advice
1. Change managers should try to provide a clear
narrative that articulates the what, why, and how
of a proposed change.
2. Humans are creatures who abhor a “meaning
vacuum”; in the absence of clear communica-
tion they will draw conclusions, that is, attribute
meaning to fill the void. This is something that
an organization should try to avoid at a time of
change, as all sorts of misconstructions might
take hold and make change more difficult to
achieve.
3. There is no guarantee that change managers’
attempts at sense-giving will be successful, as
organizational members live in a world of multi-
ple narratives and, regardless of authority struc-
tures, the interpretation being presented by a
change manager need not have greater credi-
bility than other narratives. For example, some
organizations are characterized by a very strong
sense of identity, which can give the “what we
stand for, how we do things, what we value” an
almost moral quality that can make organiza-
tional members very disinclined to “switch nar-
ratives.”
4. Managers (including those in change manage-
ment roles) are “creators of meaning” whether
they like it or not. They cannot choose to opt
out of this role. Their only choice is how con-
sciously/explicitly to play it. Managers’ actions
have symbolic meaning and will be interpreted
(by other organizational members) in this way.
In this regard, see exercise 9.4.
While (as noted earlier in this chapter) OD has been subject to critique as it has evolved,
this is much less the case for sense-making. For an exception, see Sandberg and Tsoukas
(2015).
304 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
EXERCISE 9.1
Reports
from the
Front Line
This exercise requires you to interview two organization development practitioners about how they go about doing their work. Compare and contrast them in terms of the follow- ing issues:
• Their background.
• The values they espouse.
• The steps that they say they use in approaching a consulting assignment.
• The tensions they identify in working as an OD practitioner.
• Their perceptions of the way the OD field has changed and likely will change into the future.
What general conclusions do you draw about the practice of OD?
EXERCISE 9.3
Making
Sense of
Sense-
Making
Identify a current change in an organization with which you are familiar. Alternatively, identify a current public issue about which “something must be done.” Consider what sense-making changes might need to be enacted and how you would go about doing this. Assess this in terms of the eight elements of the sense-making framework suggested by Helms Mills as set out in table 9.7:
identity construction
social sense-making
extracted cues
ongoing sense-making
rospection
plausibility
enactment
projection
Which did you feel you might have the most/least control over? Why? What implications does this have for adopting a sense-making approach to organizational change?
EXERCISE 9.2
Designing a
Large-Scale
Change
Intervention
Choose a current issue in your local neighborhood. The aim of this exercise is to design a large-scale change intervention program in relation to this issue. Consider the following:
• How many people would it make sense to involve?
• Where and when would you hold it?
• How would you ensure that you have a representative cross sample of relevant people in the room at the same time? What data sources would you need to achieve this?
• Who are the key decision makers in relation to this issue? What arguments will you use to get them to attend the meeting?
• How will you structure the agenda of the meeting? What would be the best way of doing this so that people who attend on that day have appropriate buy-in to it?
• How would you run the actual meeting?
• What technology would you need to make it work well?
• What would people take away from the meeting?
• What follow-up actions would you plan to ensure that actions and decisions flowed from it?
• What possible funding sources might you draw on to finance the meeting?
• As a result of considering such questions, what new issues emerge for you, as a large- scale change intervention agent, to consider? What specific skills would you need to make such an event work well? Which of these skills would you need to develop more?
LO 9.2
LO 9.4
LO 9.2
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 305
EXERCISE 9.4
Interpret-
ing the
Interpreter:
Change at
Target
Target is the U.S. third-largest retailer after Walmart and Costco, but in the last decade it has seen its earnings drop from $3.2 billion to $1.5 billion (in 2014) with net income as a percentage of sales similarly dropping from 4.6 percent to 2 percent during this period. These were key elements of the context into which Brian Cornell arrived in August 2014 as Target’s new CEO. Since arriving, some of the actions that Brian has taken include:
1. He made an impromptu and incognito visit to a Target store in Dallas to talk to cus- tomers. Unrecognized by store employees or customers, he sought candid opinions from shoppers. This was a surprise to Target executives because it was a significant departure from normal practice. Prior to Cornell’s arrival, store visits did occur— supposedly as intelligence-gathering exercises—but they were “meticulously planned affairs, only less formal than, say, a presidential visit,” with the store managers notified in advance and “the ‘regular shoppers’ handpicked and vetted” (Wahba, 2015, p. 86).
2. When he first arrived at Target’s headquarters (in Minneapolis) he was allocated the newly refurbished CEO’s suite, but he insisted that he be moved to a smaller office close to Target’s global data nerve center. The 10 staff in this center monitor live feeds from social media—including Pinterest, Facebook, and Twitter—and TV stations for stories/information on product launches, customer comments, and so on. The nerve center staff watch these media on large screens and use software to aggregate data for later analysis.
3. With the intention of putting pressure on Amazon and Walmart, he changed Target policy to one offering free shipping for online orders during the holidays, a “decision that was made in a matter of days rather than the months it would have taken in the past” (Wahba, 2015, p. 88).
4. It is not unusual for him ask colleagues about their “work-life” balance and especially their workout habits. He encourages colleagues to take time for fitness activities and “isn’t the type who exalts the machismo of outlandish hours” (Wahba, 2015, p. 88). Cornell relaxed the company’s dress code and eats in the company café, where he mixes with staff. He has moved the company’s recruitment policy to change the situa- tion where Target was “long populated by lifers” to one making more effort to “recruit outsiders with fresh ideas” (Wahba, 2015, p. 94).
Consider the proposition that managers’ actions have symbolic meaning and will be interpreted (by other organizational members) in this way:
1. What do you see as the symbolism associated with Target CEO Brian Cornell’s actions?
2. If you were a Target employee, what might you conclude about the nature of the change happening in Target?
Source: Wahba (2015).
LO 9.4
306 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
EXERCISE 9.5
Change at
DuPont
As we walked through the manufacturing areas of DuPont, the plant manager, Tom Harris, greeted each worker by name. The plant was on a site that stretched over 10 acres beside the South River on the edge of town, and it was the major employer in the community.
The plant seemed to be a permanent fixture, or at least more permanent than most things. There had been changes, big ones, but the plant was still the plant. The Orlon manufacturing operation had been shut down, the equipment dismantled and sent to China. As far as I could find out early in my work there, these changes, despite their magnitude, were seen as doing the regular business of the enterprise. No one framed the changes as needing unusual attention, so there was no change management design. The projects—getting rid of one operation and installing another—were planned and exe- cuted just like any project. Change management was not a rubric used to either accom- plish or explain what was going on. More changes were coming, whether there was any formal practice of change management or not. The plant would soon enough look very different from what I saw on that first tour with Tom.
I first met Tom when he came to the University of Virginia seeking to make contact with the academic community in order to bring some of the latest thinking in business to his operation. His interest lay in introducing his managers to new ideas and in applying those ideas to improving the plant. He was not, he said, looking for solutions to specific problems, but rather to improve overall organization effectiveness. This was important because he was under increasing pressure to do more with less.
In February this general bulletin was sent to all employees, and I began the fieldwork from which a portrayal of the work culture would be built.
Gib Akin, a professor from the University of Virginia, will be spending time at the plant. He has been asked to give us some new perspectives on our work and our organization that we might use to help us develop people and continually improve. Most importantly, he is here to help us appreciate and develop what goes right, assist us in building on our strengths, to make the plant work better for everybody. His presence is not due to any particular problem, but is a result of our desire to continu- ously improve.
Over the next six months I conducted interviews with workers and managers, spend- ing time in the workplace, learning about everyday life there. This yielded a thick descrip- tion of the shared stock of knowledge that organizational members used to interpret events and generate behavior. What we made explicit with this process was the local, widely used, everyday, commonsense model of work performance unique to this scene. In a sense, this was the local organization theory that people used for getting along at work.
Of course, this theory was more important than any imported academic theory of organization, because it had to work well or the users would not be successful in their work. This was the practical theory in use every day and by everyone. Such culturally embedded theory also tends to create what it is intended to explain, thus making it even more powerful and generative. For example, in this plant, the local model of teamwork was organized around a Southern stock car racing metaphor, which was not only used to explain teamwork but was also the pattern for accomplishing it. And since everyone knew the metaphor, and used it, it became so.
Tom and the other managers were surprised to learn of the NASCAR (the premier stock car racing organization) metaphor, but it explained why they had not recognized
LO 9.1, 9.2, 9.4
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 307
existing teamwork in the workplace (they had a different metaphor for teamwork) and gave them a language in which to introduce change for improvement. Similarly, illumi- nation of the local meaning of effective supervision, high performance, and what con- stituted a good day at work gave those with leadership roles constructs to work with for making improvements, and the language for introducing change.
Managers, and particularly first-line supervisors, were asked to use this new under- standing gained from the findings of the study. Their new understanding could be used to interpret the local meaning of effective work to capitalize on strengths to expand and develop existing good practices in order to swamp problems, that is, to render problems less troublesome even if unsolved.
The findings of the study also could be used as the basis for experiments. Mem- bers of the so-called Leadership Core Team were instructed to introduce change as an experiment—something to be tried and watched closely, and after a designated time, if it is not working as hoped, it can be stopped. Framing changes as experiments requires thinking through what is expected and how and when to measure the results. And by interpreting the possible results before they happen, all outcomes can be positive. Even if things don’t go as hoped, what does happen can yield learning. All experiments are successes at one level or another.
Tom embraced the framing of change as experiment, and it was probably his most pervasive concept regarding change. “A notion I use all the time is that everything is an experiment. If you describe every change as an experiment, the ability of people to digest it goes up an order of magnitude. And that goes for officers as well as people on the shop floor. As a matter of fact, nothing is forever anyway.”
Questions
1. To what extent are the following approaches to change embedded in the DuPont story (justify your answer, providing specific examples)?
a. OD
b. Appreciative inquiry
c. Sense-making
2. In your opinion, how compatible are these three approaches? Why? What evidence is there in the DuPont story for your answer? As a change manager, to what extent could you utilize insights from each approach?
3. Imagine you are an OD practitioner brought into DuPont at the time of the Orlon manufacturing operation closure. Describe the steps you would take to help manage this change based upon action research.
4. As a class, decide on a fictional large-scale change that could affect DuPont. Divide the class into three groups (and role-play the situation in two acts). In Act 1, one group will take a problem-solving approach and introduce the change with the second group (DuPont staff affected by the change). In Act 2, a third group (the appreciative inquiry group) will introduce the change with the second group (DuPont staff affected by the change). After the exercise, compare and contrast the steps taken in each approach. From the point of view of group two (DuPont staff), which approach seemed to work better? Why? From the point of view of groups one and three, how easy/difficult was it adopting this approach? What broad conclusions can be drawn?
308 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
Bunker, B. B., and Alban, B. T. 2006. The handbook of large group methods: Creating
systemic change in organizations and communities. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Provides
details on methods used in large group interventions and multiple cases studies illustrat-
ing the successful use of large group methods in a range of industries and countries.
Burnes, B., and Cooke, B. 2012. The past, present and future of organization develop-
ment: Taking the long view. Human Relations 65(11):1395–1429. Provides a concise
treatment of the history of OD and some speculation about its future.
Bushe, G. R., and Marshak, R. J. (eds.). 2015. Dialogic organizational development: The
theory and practice of transformational change. Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler. A com-
prehensive introduction to the evolving field of dialogic OD from the originators of this
approach to managing organizational change.
Cameron, K., and McNaughtan, J. 2014. Positive organizational change. Journal of
Applied Behavioral Science 50(4):445–62. Provides a concise summary of positive orga-
nizational change and its roots within POS.
Cooperrider, D. L., Whitney, D., and Stavros, J. M. 2008. The appreciative inquiry hand-
book: For leaders of change. 2nd ed. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. A detailed guide to
the application of AI, including rationale and examples, from originators of the concept.
Cummings, T. G., and Worley, C. G. 2015. Organization development and change. 10th
ed. Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning. A comprehensive and classic textbook on “diagnos-
tic” OD.
Lewis, S. 2011. Positive psychology at work: How positive leadership and appreciative
inquiry create inspiring organizations. West Essex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. Written by a
consultant for a manager/practitioner audience, this book links research within the POS
tradition to management interventions/practices designed to address various management
challenges.
Maitlis, S., and Christianson, M. 2014. Sense-making in organizations: Taking stock and
moving forward. Academy of Management Annals 8(1):57–125. Provides a comprehen-
sive review of the sense-making in organizations literature that goes well beyond just
sense-making and organizational change.
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this chapter,
in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Appreciate more clearly the organizational change approaches underpinning the coach
and interpreter images of managing change.
While two of the change images—caretaker and nurturer—present change managers
as receiving rather than initiating change, the other four images—director, coach, nav-
igator, and interpreter—present the change manager as having an active, as opposed to
reactive, role in how change occurs in organizations. The image of the change manager
as coach is particularly strong in the approach to change that has developed with what
is known as organizational development (OD) and its derivatives including appreciative
Roundup
LO 9.1
Additional Reading
Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches 309
inquiry (AI), change as viewed from within the perspective of positive organizational
scholarship (POS), and dialogic OD. The coach link is that each of these approaches
involves encouraging a willingness to change and the developing of change capabilities
in people, rather than seeking to bring about change by top-down edict. The image of
the change manager as interpreter links closely to a sense-making view of the role of
the change manager.
Understand the organization development (OD) approach to change.
Underpinned by the coach image, the organization development (OD) approach is one
where its adherents present their developmental prescriptions for achieving change as
being based, at least traditionally, upon a core set of values, values that emphasize that
change should benefit not just organizations but the people who staff them. The valu-
ing of inclusion, open communication, collaboration, and empowerment and an asso-
ciation with incremental change has meant that there is an active debate as to whether
OD represents the essence of how to successfully bring about change in organizations
or an approach inconsistent with the demands of rapidly changing, highly competitive
environments.
Be aware of extensions of the OD approach such as appreciative inquiry, positive orga-
nizational scholarship, and dialogic OD.
OD incorporates a diverse and still evolving range of approaches. Appreciative inquiry
uses a four-stage framework—discovery, dream, design, and destiny—which begins
with a focus on (appreciation of) the best of the current organization rather than the tra-
ditional problem-based point of entry. In a similar vein, positive organizational schol-
arship looks for the positive in human behavior (even in adverse circumstances) and
assumes that a focus on the positive is the way to inspire people to greater performance.
While some developments within OD move it more in the direction of delivering tan-
gible, measurable outputs, POS explicitly asserts the importance of organizational
interventions that improve the “human condition” in ways that are not reducible to
LO 9.2
LO 9.3
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
• Do you model the change behavior you desire?
• Whose interests do you serve when you engage
in change?
• Is your approach value-laden or value-neutral? If
value-laden, can you articulate what these values
are? Are you comfortable with them?
• What do you mean when you talk about a
change being successful? What criteria do you
use? Do they relate to organizational perfor-
mance? How can you determine this?
• Are there other people, inside or outside your
organization, who have differing perspec-
tives on such questions? What would you say
are the criteria they use to evaluate change? Is
your organization open to having conversations
around this issue?
• If you manage across different countries, to
what extent have you observed the necessity
for different ways of engaging in organizational
change in those countries? Why is this the case?
• Can you identify different sense-making activ-
ities going on during organizational change?
What ability do you have to influence these? Do
you exercise power in your attempts to influence
the interpretations others have of change situa-
tions? With what success? What are the implica-
tions of this?
310 Chapter 9 Organization Development and Sense-Making Approaches
“traditionally pursued organizational outcomes” such as profitability (Cameron and
McNaughtan, 2014). Dialogic OD takes the view that real change only occurs when
mindsets are altered and that this is more likely to occur through “generative conversa-
tions” than persuasion by “facts.” The dialogic approach is associated with moves away
from seeing change as a relatively manageable, plannable, linear process to one that
could be unpredictable, with far from predictable moves.
Understand the sense-making approach to change.
As Helms Mills’ study of Nova Scotia Power showed, there are a number of different
levels on which the change manager as interpreter operates, each of which requires
attention. At the same time, this approach does not imply that mastering each of these
levels will always enable intended outcomes to be achieved. Wider forces, both inside
and outside the organization, will ensure that there will always be competing forces
vying for a privileged place in providing for organizational members an interpretation
of “what’s going on here” as well as “what needs to go on here.” The interpreter image
therefore points out to change agents the need to have a realistic view of what can be
achieved in undergoing organizational change. While managers of change may find
the sense-making approach to be more difficult given that it is less tangible in terms
of “what needs to be done,” it is also likely to give other managers comfort in reaf-
firming their experience of the messiness of change and identification of new ways of
approaching it.
Axelrod, D. 1992. Getting everyone involved: How one organization involved its
employees, supervisors, and managers in redesigning the organization. Journal of Applied
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Axelrod, R. H. 2001. Terms of engagement: Changing the way we change organizations.
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Baburoglu, O. N., and Garr, M. A. 1992. Search conference methodologies for
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Balogun, J., and Johnson, G. 2004. Organizational restructuring and middle manager
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Bartunek, J. M., and Woodman, R. W. 2015. Beyond Lewin: Toward temporal
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Bazigos, M. N., and Burke, W. W. 1997. Theory orientations of organization development
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315
10Chapter Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
Learning objectives
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 10.1 Understand and identify the factors that can cause change to fail.
LO 10.2 Assess the strengths and limitations of checklists for managing change
effectively.
LO 10.3 Evaluate the advantages of stage models of change management.
LO 10.4 Assess the theoretical and practical value of processual perspectives on change.
LO 10.5 Understand and apply contingency approaches to change management.
w w w .C a r to o n S to c k .c o m
316 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
Alternative Approaches to Managing Change
The checklists, models, perspectives, and frameworks discussed in this chapter offer
“technical” advice on managing change. These approaches make no mention of, or
concessions to, the personal styles and preferences of different individual change man-
agers. Let us fill this gap before we proceed.
The Director and Navigator Images of Change Management Two of our six images of change management are particularly relevant to the approaches
explored in this chapter. The director image underpins the change management
approaches associated with the work of large consulting companies, and also of aca-
demics who work as change consultants in this field. Those who adopt such approaches
take a strategic view, adopting a pragmatic, managerialist approach to achieving last-
ing organizational change. The checklists and stage models that we explore fall into
this category: they suggest that change can be managed and controlled in a predictable
manner as long as the correct steps are taken, in more or less the correct sequence.
However, given the number of different sets of recipes and frameworks that are avail-
able, it is not always clear which to adopt, or the criteria on which the choice should be
made.
Contingency frameworks can also be seen as consistent with the director image. Rather
than claiming to have discovered “the one best approach,” however, these frameworks
argue that “it depends” on a number of context factors, such as the scale and urgency of
the proposed changes. But one of these contingency frameworks, the change kaleidoscope
(Hope Hailey and Balogun, 2002), does not offer prescriptive advice on how to implement
change in particular contexts. That framework instead highlights for the change manager
the contextual issues to consider when reaching an informed judgement with regard to
change implementation design options. This approach is consistent to some extent with
the navigator image of change management: change can be controlled in part, but external
factors (contextual enablers and constraints, competing interests) can generate emergent
and unintended outcomes over which the change manager has little or no influence.
The idea of establishing the correct “fit” between implementation and organizational
context is not consistent with a processual view of change. As discussed in chapter 2,
process theories see change unfolding over time in a messy and iterative way and thus rely
more heavily on the image of change manager as navigator. Here, the change outcomes
are shaped by a combination of factors, including the past, present, and future context in
which the organization functions; the substance of the change; the implementation pro-
cess; political behavior, inside and outside the organization; and the interactions between
these factors. The role of the change manager is not to direct, but to identify options, accu-
mulate resources, monitor progress, and to navigate a path through the complexity.
It is therefore important for change managers to be fully aware of, and perhaps on
many occasions to put to one side, their preferred image of change management. It is also
important that managers are comfortable with their actions, with regard to both personal
capability and how actions are perceived to fit with the context. However, implementation
design decisions should ideally be more heavily influenced by the context factors that we
explore in this chapter than by personal considerations.
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 317
LO 10.1 Why Change Fails
“Anyone who has never made a mistake has never tried anything new.”
—Albert Einstein
“Trying is the first step towards failure.”
—Homer Simpson
In this chapter, we explore approaches to implementing organizational change
effectively, drawing on a range of change management, processual, and contingency
perspectives. First, however, we will explore why change fails. If we understand the
common mistakes, perhaps we can avoid them.
Ask a group of managers to reflect on their experience and to identify what to do in
order to make organizational change fail. Their response usually comes in two stages.
First, they laugh. Second, they generate without difficulty a list of practical actions to
guarantee that an initiative will not be successful. Table 10.1 shows the typical results
of such a discussion, produced by a small group of Australian managers in 2013. This
invites two conclusions. First, ensuring that change fails—should one wish to do that—is
not difficult. There are many tools at one’s disposal, involving a combination of actions
and inactions. Second, if we have such a good understanding of what can go wrong, then
getting it right should not be difficult. Just turn the negatives around: clear vision, com-
mitment and leadership support, honest communication, simplicity, break down the silos,
highlight successes and positives, and so on. Sadly, while this approach is helpful, “getting
it right” is not quite this easy.
TABLE 10.1 How to Make
Change Fail
Choose the most expensive way to do it Demotivate the group Distort the vision Don’t buy into the process Highlight past failures Lack of honesty Political games Team up with others
Commitment without leadership support Do not recognize the power of the team Divert attention and resources Don’t follow the process Highlight the negatives No communication Set up silos Too many policies and procedures
From his research into over 100 companies (most, but not all, American), John Kotter
(2007) argues that transformational changes often fail because of the mistakes that are
identified in table 10.2. The fourth of those mistakes involves “undercommunicating the
vision by a factor of ten” (Kotter, 2007, p. 100). In his book on the subject, Kotter (2012a)
sets out the following argument:
Assume that an employee receives 2,300,000 words or numbers in corporate communica-
tions over a three-month period. A typical vision statement for an organizational change
might consist of one 30-minute speech, one hour-long meeting, one 600-word article, one
2000 word memo. That adds up to around 13,400 words or numbers over three months. Do
the math:
13,400 ÷ 2,300,000 = 0.0058
318 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
We will meet this work again, in our section on “Stage Models of Change Manage-
ment,” as Kotter turns these mistakes into a model of successful transformation. That
involves careful planning, working through these issues more or less in sequence, and
not missing or rushing any of them—which takes time. However, given the rapid pace of
contemporary change, many organizations perhaps try to take too many shortcuts, in an
attempt to put change in place quickly, and get it wrong as a result.
While it may be an oversimplification to claim that successful change just means avoid-
ing these mistakes, they should be avoided nevertheless. It is also important to recognize
that there are many of these mistakes, and that in any particular setting, several of those
factors may be combining to ensure that the change program fails. Success or failure can
rarely be explained with reference to only a single factor. What are the costs involved in
avoiding these mistakes? Almost all of the remedies are cost-neutral, involving changes in
leadership and management style, and in organizational policies and procedures. In short,
while ensuring that change will fail involves little or no cost, most of the actions required
to “get it right” are also free.
TABLE 10.2 Why Transformation Efforts Fail
Mistakes Nature and Remedy
No urgency If employees don’t see the need, then they will not be motivated to change; management must create a sense of urgency
No coalition One or two people acting on their own can’t drive big change; management must create a coalition with the expertise and the power to make it happen
No vision Without a picture of the future that is easy to explain and understand, a change program becomes confusing; change needs a clear vision
Poor communication Giving people an important message once is not enough; the vision must be communicated repeatedly by management, in words and actions
Obstacles not removed Structures, design of jobs, reward and appraisal systems, and key individuals can get in the way; the obstacles must be confronted and removed
No wins Change takes time, and momentum can be lost without interim achievements to celebrate; management should create and reward short-term wins
Premature victory The job is not done when improvements appear; it is a mistake to “declare victory” too soon, before the changes are embedded
No anchoring Change that is not seen to be beneficial will decay, and the next generation of managers may not continue the work; the change must be seen to have worked, and successors must champion the changes of their predecessors
Source: Based on Kotter (2007 and 2012a).
Based on this calculation, information about your change initiative constitutes about
half of one percent of an employee’s total quarterly exposure to corporate communica-
tions. This does not take into account the quality of the communication, the inspirational
nature of the message, the enthusiasm with which it is delivered, or the motivation of staff
to pay attention. Kotter thus asks, what impact is your “half percent sound bite” likely to
have on the response to change?
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 319
LO 10.2 Change by Checklist
“There is a certain relief in change even though it be from bad to worse; as I have
found travelling in a stage-coach, it is often a comfort to shift one’s position and be
bruised in new places.” —Washington Irving
The landscape of practical advice for the change manager is dominated by simple
checklists. These have also been described as “n-step recipes,” where “n” is the number
of items on the list. This approach is open to the criticism that it oversimplifies a com-
plex process. However simplified, it is probably accurate to claim that, in most cases,
if the change manager does not follow most of the advice in these checklists, then the
change program could run into trouble.
Checklist approaches to change management assume that the process is logical and lin-
ear, and can therefore be controlled by planning and then following the correct set of steps.
This “rational linear”’ model of change has been widely criticized (e.g., Graetz and Smith,
2010), but it remains popular with professional bodies and management consultancies.
This is probably because these checklists or recipes codify what is usually a messy and
iterative process, and thus offer the busy change manager straightforward advice on what
to do in order to improve the chances of success. In this section, we will consider some of
these checklists, and assess the strengths and limitations of this approach.
For example, from their review of the research evidence, and recognizing the messy
nature of change, Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert Sutton (2006) advise change managers to
focus on four issues to ensure that, once the decision to go ahead has been taken, change
happens fast and is effective:
1. Create Dissatisfaction If people are happy with the way things are, they will be more reluctant to change. A
key change management task, therefore, is to make people unhappy with the status quo.
They All Say the Same Thing
Considering the findings of research into IT project
failure, Richard Bacon and Christopher Hope (2014,
p. 2) conclude that:
They all say roughly the same thing: if what you
want keeps changing; or you can’t commit the
required money; or you keep changing the per-
son in charge; or the person at the top doesn’t
care about the project or you have an unrealistic
timetable; or you fail to test the system properly;
or if you don’t provide enough training; or you
don’t have a Plan B; or you don’t realize that the
bigger the project the greater the chance of its
being overtaken by events or new technology;
or you don’t realize that the suppliers are quite
capable of telling you that they can deliver when
they can’t; then don’t be surprised if you end
up with a mess that damages your organization,
costs much more than it is supposed to, and
doesn’t work.
320 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
2. Give Direction People need to know what they are expected to do, and why. The change manager must
therefore be relentless in communicating the message (as Kotter, 2012a, also advises),
over and over again.
3. Have Faith The change manager must make it clear that the benefits will be worth the time, money,
and effort, balanced with discussion of the uncertainties and problems, taking new
information into account.
4. Embrace the Mess Change is an untidy business. Despite careful planning, there will always be mistakes
and setbacks. This is normal. Management must learn from and fix the problems, and
not focus on who is to blame.
Reducing the task to four dimensions provides reassurance that, in spite of the uncer-
tainties and untidiness, change can be controlled and managed effectively in a more or
less logical and predictable manner. Also, having to handle such a small number of issues
appears to lessen the scale of the challenge that the change manager has to face. Success
appears to be pretty much guaranteed.
The UK Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD, 2014) offers another
example of a simple checklist, with what they call “the seven Cs of change,” which are:
1. Choosing a team: Identify key roles and responsibilities, perhaps with different people
making different contributions as the change process unfolds.
2. Crafting the vision and path: Establish a flexible “road map” or process framework to
guide the development of change, from vision, through planning, to implementation.
3. Connecting organization-wide change: Establish processes to recognize linkages to
other initiatives, and to areas (e.g., roles, policies, facilities) that will be affected.
4. Consulting stakeholders: Anticipate the reactions, positive and negative, of the different
stakeholders in the change, and plan how they will be managed.
5. Communicating: Establish regular, consistent, and targeted communications to internal
and external stakeholders, making creative use of a range of existing and new channels.
6. Coping with change: Change is stressful, subjecting those involved to an emotional
roller coaster, which differs in timing and significance from one person to another.
7. Capturing learning: Given the pace and scale of changes, develop the organizational
capability to reorganize effectively on a regular basis.
These “seven Cs” offer more detailed advice than Pfeffer and Sutton (2006), but some
of these guidelines overlap: give direction/communicating; have faith/coping with change;
embrace the mess/capturing learning. This overlap is a common feature of change man-
agement checklists.
Management consulting companies often develop their own recipes, often with a mem-
orable acronym. The DICE model developed by the Boston Consulting Group, for exam-
ple, identifies four factors that determine whether a change program will “fly or die”:
duration, integrity, commitment, and effort. These four factors are outlined in table 10.3
(Harold Sirkin et al., 2005).
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 321
Change managers are advised to calculate scores for each of the DICE factors. For exam-
ple, duration scores highly if the overall project timescale is short with frequent reviews, but
scores badly if reviews are more than eight months apart. Integrity scores well if a skilled
and motivated project team has a capable and respected leader, and scores badly if those
features are absent. Are those who will be affected by the change enthusiastic and support-
ive (high commitment score), or are they concerned and obstructive (low score)? Does the
project require a small amount of additional work (high effort score) or a lot of extra effort
on top of an already heavy load (low score)? The combined scores reveal whether a project
is in the win zone, the worry zone, or the woe zone. Knowing where the weaknesses are,
management can develop an action plan to move the change into the win zone.
The ADKAR change model was developed by the consulting company Prosci (Jeff Hiatt,
2004 and 2006). Here, the acronym is based on five elements: awareness, desire, knowledge,
ability, and reinforcement. Many commentators have observed that organizations change by
changing one person at a time (e.g., McFarland and Goldsworthy, 2013). Following that premise,
the focus of the ADKAR model lies with the individuals who will be involved in and affected by
change. In other words, the change manager is advised to concentrate on individual awareness,
individual desire, individual knowledge, individual ability, and the extent to which reinforcement
is meaningful and relevant to the individual. The ADKAR elements are described in table 10.4.
As with DICE, the change manager can use ADKAR as a diagnostic and planning tool,
to identify areas of potential resistance, to develop communication and staff development
strategies, and to strengthen change implementation by addressing gaps and problems.
Paying close attention to individual perceptions, strengths, and weaknesses is a strength
of the ADKAR approach, particularly with regard to generating enthusiasm, overcom-
ing resistance, and developing new skills. In addition, this is one of the few models that
explicitly addresses the issue of sustaining change (which we will explore in chapter 11).
However, ADKAR pays less attention to the nature and implications of the wider organi-
zational context and the process of change—factors that are emphasized in other models.
Our final example of a change checklist was developed by the consulting company
McKinsey, and it offers a sharp contrast to the individual focus of the ADKAR approach.
From a global survey of 2,500 executives, Scott Keller and colleagues (2010) identify the
tactics that make transformational change successful. They define transformational change
as “any large-scale change, such as going from good to great performance, cutting costs,
or turning around a crisis” (p. 1). The executives who were surveyed identified four sets of
tactics that had contributed to the success of their changes: goals, structures, involvement,
and leadership (table 10.5). Individual perceptions, motivations, and capabilities are only
TABLE 10.3 DICE—Will Your Change Program Fly or Die?
DICE Factor Meaning
Duration The duration of time until the program is completed if it has a short life span; if not short, the amount of time between reviews or milestones
Integrity The project team’s performance integrity; its ability to complete the initiative on time, which depends on members’ skills relative to the project’s requirements
Commitment The commitment displayed by top management and employees who are affected
Effort The effort required that is over and above the usual demands on employees
322 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
TABLE 10.5 The McKinsey Checklist for Successful Transformational Change
Tactics Explanation
Goals Go for growth and progressive, developmental change, with “stretch” targets Avoid defensive transformations that are reactive and focus on cost cutting Focus on strengths and achievements, not just problems Set unambiguous measures of success and monitor progress
Structures Logical program design Break processes down into clearly defined initiatives Allow those involved to co-create the program Clear roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities
Involvement High levels of engagement and collaboration Frontline ownership of events Initiative to drive change also comes from the front line High levels of communication and involvement at all stages
Leadership Personal commitment and visible involvement of the chief executive Leaders “role model” the desired changes and “mindset” Develop capacity and capability for continuous improvement Culture becomes more receptive to further innovation
TABLE 10.4 ADKAR—Five Elements Influencing Change Success
ADKAR Elements Factors Influencing Change Success
Awareness of the need for change
Individual views of the current state and problems Credibility of those sending the awareness messages Circulation of rumors or misinformation Contestability of the reasons for change
Desire to support and participate in change
The nature and impacts of the change Perception of the context or environment for change Each individual’s personal situation Intrinsic motivators
Knowledge of how to change
The individual’s knowledge base Personal capability to absorb new knowledge Education and training resources available Access to the required information
Ability to apply new skills and behaviors
Psychological blocks and physical capabilities Intellectual capability Time available to develop the required skills Availability of resources to support skills development
Reinforcement to sustain the change
Meaningful and specific to the person affected Link with demonstrable progress No negative consequences Accountability system to continually reinforce the change
Source: Based on Hiatt, 2006, p.45.
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 323
implicit in this model, which lays the emphasis instead on leadership and management
behaviors, and on organizational characteristics and processes.
Goals: Progressive Change with “Stretch” Targets One of the main themes from this study concerned the need to focus on strengths and
achievements, and not just on problems. It was also important to have unambiguous
measures of success, using “stretch targets,” with milestones and information systems
to ensure that progress was constantly monitored and problems could be addressed
quickly. Interestingly, they also found that progressive transformations (going for
growth, improved performance, expansion) succeeded 50 percent more often than
defensive transformations (reactive, cutting costs).
Structures: Logical Program Success was linked to breaking the change process down into specific, clearly defined
initiatives, with a logical program, which those who were involved were allowed to
shape or to “co-create.” Almost a quarter of the successful change initiatives had used
planning groups of 50 or more, compared with only 6 percent of unsuccessful change
programs. Clear roles and responsibilities, so that staff felt accountable for producing
results, were also important success factors.
Involvement: Ownership and Engagement Success was also associated with high levels of employee engagement and collaboration.
Changes were more likely to be successful when frontline staff felt a sense of ownership
of what was happening and took the initiative to drive the changes. This meant high levels
of communication and involvement at all stages of the transformation process.
Exercising Strong Leadership Leadership capabilities are important, along with the personal commitment and visible
involvement of the chief executive. Leaders should “role model” the desired changes,
focusing on organization culture and developing capacity for continuous improvement.
Staff gain new capabilities through the transformation process, and organization cul-
tures become more receptive to further innovation.
Goals, structures, engagement, leadership—these are common themes in change man-
agement advice. They appear in similar ways in the other checklists that we have explored
in this section, and we will meet them again when considering stage and contingency
models of change. However, Keller and colleagues also found that these four sets of tactics
were more powerful when they were combined. Of the organizations that used all of these
tactics, 80 percent met their aims, compared with only 10 percent of those organizations
that had used none of these approaches. Even with defensive transformations, the chance
of success using all of these tactics was 64 percent. A survey carried out by McKinsey in
2014 found that companies adopting this comprehensive transformation approach reported
a 79 percent success rate, which was three times the average (Jacquemont et al., 2015).
Checking the Checklist How should the change manager choose between the checklists and recipes that are on
offer? The length of these checklists varies; some are much longer than those we have dis-
cussed here. While the contents of these checklists are often similar, they can also highlight
324 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
different aspects of the change management process. Pfeffer and Sutton (2006) emphasize
change management behaviors. The CIPD (2014) identifies implementation factors. DICE
(Sirkin et al., 2005) advises the change manager to calculate scores for the change timing,
team, commitment, and demands on staff. ADKAR (Hiatt, 2006) focuses on individual per-
ceptions, motivations, and capabilities. The McKinsey model (Keller et al., 2010) indicates
that success lies with leadership, management, and organizational properties.
Will Heinz Swallow the 3G Capital Recipe?
What do you think would be the elements in a
checklist if one was used to introduce change in
Heinz?
What in your assessment are the strengths and
limitations of the 3G change checklist?
In 2013, Heinz, the iconic food company with an
annual revenue of $11.6 billion, was bought for $29
billion by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway and
the Brazilian private equity firm 3G Capital.
The new owners wasted no time making changes.
Eleven of the twelve most senior executives were
replaced, 600 staff were laid off, the corporate planes
were sold, individual offices were dispensed with,
executives when travelling were to stay at a Holiday
Inn hotel and not at the Ritz-Carlton, and much lon-
ger working hours were expected. Micromanage-
ment limited each member of staff to 200 copies a
month; printer usage was tracked. Executives were
allowed only 100 business cards per year.
Many of the Heinz employees referred to “an
insular management style in which only a small
inner circle knows what is really going on.” One
commented, “It’s a bit like God—you feel there’s a
grand plan, but you aren’t sure what it is” (Reingold
and Roberts, 2013, p. 189). On the other hand, 3G
had a young team of mostly Brazilian executives,
who moved as directed from company to company
across countries and industries, loyal first and fore-
most to 3G, not Heinz, and driven to work hard in
order to receive bonuses or stock options.
The driving force behind these changes was
“the 3G way”—a philosophy that 3G had used to
bring about change in previous acquisitions, such
as Burger King. Efficiency was key, everything was
measured, “nonstrategic costs” were slashed. In
this perspective, “leanest and meanest” wins, and
human capital was not seen as a key component of
corporate success. Employees were assumed to be
motivated by the economic returns that came from
owning company shares rather than by any sense of
purpose or mission.
Those likely to be affected by a 3G deal often
saw a “how to” guide written by consultant Bob
Fifer as a “must read,” because it had been pop-
ular with the partners at 3G (as it had been with
Jack Welsh, the iconic chief executive at GE). The
guide was titled “Double Your Profits: 78 Ways to
Cut Costs, Increase Sales, and Dramatically Improve
Your Bottom Line in 6 Months or Less.” Chapter
titles included “Cut Costs First, Ask Questions Later”
and “Don’t Be Afraid to Use a Shotgun.”
However, in the minds of many food industry
experts, while some of 3G’s previous acquisitions
would have been prime candidates for a regime
of cost cutting, Heinz was not the most obvious
candidate to “hack and slash.” The company had
already been through several years of efficiency
improvements (“slimming and trimming”), and it
was already a relatively lean and efficient operation.
Summing up the situation, business journalists
Jennifer Reingold and Daniel Roberts (2013, p. 186)
speculated that “the experiment now under way will
determine whether Heinz will become a newly invig-
orated embodiment of efficiency—or whether 3G
will take the cult of cost cutting so far that it chokes
off Heinz’s ability to innovate and make the products
that have made it a market leader for almost a cen-
tury and a half.” In March 2015, Heinz and the food
industry giant Kraft announced a merger that would
create an entity with annual revenue of $28 billion,
the third largest food company in the United States
and the fifth largest in the world. Annual cost savings
of $1.5 billion were expected.
Sources: Reingold, J., and Roberts, D. 2013. Squeezing Heinz. Fortune, October 28:184–92. http://fortune.com/2013/10/10/squeezing-heinz/
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 325
One answer to “how to choose?” may simply be—does it matter? As long as advice
in this form is used as a structured starting point, then the details and issues that are rele-
vant to a specific change in a particular organization should emerge in the discussion and
the planning. Another answer concerns “fit”; some models and approaches will be more
appropriate than others to a particular context. This will depend on the size of the organi-
zation, the nature, scale, and urgency of the change, the problems to be solved, numbers
affected, the organization’s history of change, and so on. The third answer, of course, is
why choose? Why not work through several of these approaches and assess their value in
application? Two or more approaches applied to the same change program may suggest
similar—or widely different—implications for practice. The similarities can be reassur-
ing. The differences may trigger further insights and investigation, and contribute to better
implementation planning.
These recipes are “high-level” guides, not detailed “best practice” road maps. They can
be useful in practice as long as they are used in that way (although academics complain that
they are atheoretical). Unlike the recipes in your kitchen cookbook, these guidelines list the
ingredients without explaining how to cook the dish. You have to “fill in the blanks” and
work that out for yourself. This can be a source of frustration for change managers seeking
concrete advice on “what works and what doesn’t.” Checklists just identify factors that need
to be addressed; the challenge is to construct a change implementation process that fits the
organizational context (Rod et al., 2009). That is the hard part. Change from this perspective
is to some extent a technical exercise, understanding the issues to consider, but also requires
a blend of local knowledge, informed judgement, and creative flair.
LO 10.3 Stage Models of Change Management
Kanter’s Law: “Welcome to the miserable middles of change. Everything looks like a failure
in the middle. Everyone loves inspiring beginnings and happy endings; it is just the middles
that involve hard work.”
(Rosabeth Moss Kanter, 2009)
Change can be viewed, not just as a checklist of “to dos,” but as a series of stages
unfolding over time, from initiation, through implementation, to conclusion. This stage
approach does not necessarily disqualify the checklists and recipes. However, stage
models suggest that the actions that the change manager is advised to take will vary
over the implementation cycle. The steps that are necessary to initiate change are thus
to be different from those that are required during the implementation stage, and differ-
ent actions again are necessary to conclude and sustain the change. Stage models can
thus complement the checklist approach by introducing this temporal dimension.
Probably the most famous model of this kind was developed by Kurt Lewin (1951),
who argued that change has three main stages, each requiring different actions from the
change agent:
Unfreezing Changing attitudes by making people feel uncomfortable about the
way things are because they could be improved, and so establishing the
motive to change
Moving Implementing the change to move to the desired new state
326 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
Refreezing Embedding or institutionalizing the new behaviors, to prevent people
from drifting back to previous ways of doing things
It is not difficult to see how each of these three stages makes different demands on the
change manager: first, convincing those involved of the need to change; second, putting
the change in place; third, redesigning roles, systems, and procedures to prevent a return
to past practice. With regard to “unfreezing,” Pfeffer and Sutton (2006) were referring
to Lewin’s model when they argued that, if people are happy with the way things are,
they will be more reluctant to change. The change manager’s first task in this perspec-
tive, therefore, is to make people unhappy. But this is a “positive dissatisfaction,” which
encourages people to believe that “we can do better.”
Lewin’s second stage can invoke “Kanter’s Law” (from Rosabeth Moss Kanter, quoted
earlier), which says that change often looks like a failure in the middle. This “law” was
captured by David Schneider and Charles Goldwasser (1998), who plotted “the classic
change curve” (figure 10.1). In the middle of the curve sits the “valley of despair.” Those
who are affected start to realize that this could mean loss and pain for them. Schneider and
Goldwasser (1998, p. 42) argue that this is probably inevitable, but that it is useful to be
aware of this and to weaken the impact if possible:
A leader of change must anticipate employees’ reactions, another key factor in the process.
As shown [figure], these reactions occur along a “change curve.” The solid line represents
what is, unfortunately, typical. Unrealistically high expectations at the outset of a program
lead to a relatively deep “valley of despair” when change doesn’t come as quickly or easily
High
expectations
Realization of
efort and
complexity
Much better
than before
Light at the end
of the tunnel
Time
Typical program Despair
P e
rf o
rm a
n c e
Efective program
+
–
THE CLASSIC CHANGE CURVE
X
FIGURE 10.1 The Classic Change Curve
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 327
as anticipated. Over time, employees do see a “light at the end of the tunnel” and the change
eventually produces some positive results. The dashed line illustrates what is possible with
effective change management: a less traumatic visit to the valley and greater results as the
program reaches completion. Can you avoid the “valley of despair” altogether? Probably not.
All change programs involve some loss. The best approach is to acknowledge that employees
will mourn the loss of business as usual, much as people experience stages of grieving when
trauma invades their personal lives.
Most contemporary stage models of change have followed Lewin’s approach, offering
more detail and using some different terms. For example, the U.S. Institute for Health-
care Improvement (IHI) advocates a five-stage implementation framework for large-scale
change (figure 10.2), starting with “make the status quo uncomfortable,” followed by
“execute change,” and closing with “sustain improved levels of performance” (Reinertsen
et al., 2008, p. 4). Does the terminology sound familiar?
1. Set Direction: Mission, Vision, and Strategy
2. Establish the Foundation
Make the status quo uncomfortable Make the future attractive PULLPUSH
3. Bulld Will 4. Generate Ideas 5. Execute Change
î Plan for improvement
î Set aims/allocate resources
î Measure system performance
î Provide encouragement
î Make financial linkages
î Learn subject matter
î Work on the larger system
î Reframe operating values
î Build improvement capability
î Prepare personally
î Choose and align the senior team
î Build relationships
î Develop future leaders
î Read and scan widely, learn from other industries and disciplines
î Benchmark to find ideas
î Listen to customers
î Invest in research and development
î Manage knowledge
î Understand organization as a system
î Use model for improvement for design and redesign
î Review and guide key initiatives
î Spread ideas
î Communicate results
î Sustain improved levels of performance
FIGURE
10.2 The Institute
for Healthcare
Improvement
Large-Scale
Change
Framework
The IHI framework details the stages more comprehensively than did Lewin, with
detailed advice (checklists) for “building will,” “generating ideas,” and “executing and
sustaining the change.” This framework also highlights the importance of “establishing
the foundation,” which involves personal preparation, building relationships and organiza-
tional change capability, getting top team commitment, and developing future leaders. The
healthcare sector in all developed economies faces a range of pressures—social, demo-
graphic, medical, economic, technological, political—and is therefore not sheltered from
the need for large-scale transformational change.
Probably the most widely cited and widely applied stage model of change is the one
developed by John Kotter (2007 and 2012a), mentioned earlier in this chapter. Kotter’s
model is summarized in table 10.6. This is sometimes presented as another checklist, but
328 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
this is a misrepresentation. Note how his eight-stage approach to transformational change
opens with “create a sense of urgency” (unfreeze), passes through “empower others to act”
(move), and ends with “institutionalize new approaches” (refreeze). Lewin’s echo can be
heard in this model, too.
Kotter advises the change manager to work through those eight stages more or less in
sequence. To rush or to miss out on any of the stages increases the chance of failure. How-
ever, Kotter also recognizes that this is an “ideal” perspective, as change is often untidy
and iterative. As with the checklists, this model codifies the stages of change in a clear
and easily understood manner. However, the change manager still has to combine local
knowledge with creative thinking in order to translate this advice into practical actions that
are appropriate to the organizational context and to the nature of the changes that are being
proposed. There are many ways, for example, in which to “create a sense of urgency”
or to “communicate the vision” or to “institutionalize new approaches.” As with check-
lists, these stage models are also “high-level” guides, rather than detailed “best practice”
frameworks.
Steven Appelbaum and colleagues (2012) have reviewed the evidence relating to the
effectiveness of Kotter’s transformational change model. They found support for most of
the individual steps in the model. However, despite Kotter’s argument about integrating
the eight stages, no studies had evaluated the framework as a whole. On the other hand,
TABLE 10.6 Kotter’s Eight-Stage Model of Transformational Change
Stage What Is Involved
1. Establish a sense of urgency Examine market and competitive realities Identify and discuss crises and opportunities
2. Form a powerful guiding coalition
Assemble a group with power to lead the change Encourage this group to work together as a team
3. Create a vision Create a vision to direct the change effort Develop strategies to achieve that vision
4. Communicate the vision Communicate thoroughly the vision and strategies Have the guiding coalition model the new behaviors
5. Empower others to act on the vision
Remove obstacles to change Change systems or structures that undermine the vision Encourage risk taking and unconventional thinking
6. Plan for and create short-term wins
Plan for visible performance improvements Reward employees involved in improvements
7. Consolidate gains, produce more change
Change systems, structures, and policies that don’t fit the vision Hire and develop staff who can implement the vision Maintain momentum with new themes, projects, and change agents
8. Institutionalize new approaches
Link the new behaviors clearly with corporate success Ensure leadership development and succession
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 329
there was no evidence to challenge the practical value of the approach, which remains
popular. The authors argue that “Kotter’s change management model appears to derive
its popularity more from its direct and usable format than from any scientific consensus
on the results” (Appelbaum et al., 2012, p. 764). They conclude, therefore, that Kotter’s
model is useful in change implementation planning but should be complemented by other
tools in order to adapt the change process to local conditions.
Kotter (2012b, p. 52) subsequently revised his framework, arguing that the components
identified in table 10.6 should be seen as “change accelerators,” to speed up change. The
new argument has three aspects. First, Kotter argues that the accelerators must operate
concurrently, rather than in sequence. Second, change must not rely on a small powerful
core group, but on many change agents from across the organization. Third, traditional
hierarchy must be complemented by flexible and agile networks. Kotter is not alone in
advocating the use of multiple levers to pursue goals, adopting a “distributed” approach to
change leadership, and strengthening organizational flexibility.
Stage models thus complement a checklist approach by highlighting the manner in
which change unfolds over time, developing through different phases. As we have noted,
change is likely to make different demands on the change manager—and on those who
are affected by change—at each of those different stages. Although the manner in which
change unfolds is rarely tidy, knowing in advance the probable sequence of events, and
how that sequence may be disrupted, allows the change manager to anticipate and to
prepare for potential difficulties.
Stage models are open to three critical observations. First, despite the emphasis on
events unfolding over time, these models rarely refer to what has gone before the current
intervention. What has happened in the past, however, with regard to previous change
attempts, will influence responses to current change proposals. Consider, for example, the
change management actions that may be required in order to “create a sense of urgency”
in an organization that has seen many unsuccessful changes that senior management drove
with a “sense of urgency,” and where top team credibility is now low. Contrast this with
the organization where the opportunity or threat is clear to all staff, who, on the basis
of recent experience of change, place a high degree of trust in the top team. It may thus
often be helpful to extend the timeline backwards, and to identify (and if necessary to
compensate for) previous events and outcomes that may influence today’s action plans.
Second, it may also be helpful to extend the timeline forwards, beyond “consolidate”
and “institutionalize.” Even changes that are successful will eventually decay without
appropriate maintenance. Paradoxically, successful changes can also inhibit the
implementation of further innovation, which may be seen as novel, risky, and a threat
to currently effective operations. The issues that arise in managing the sustainability of
change are explored in chapter 11.
Finally, as with change checklists, stage models offer further “high-level” guidance,
leaving change management to determine how in practice to apply that advice in a given
context. There is no clear, unambiguous statement of “this is what to do.” The contingency
approaches to change management explored in the section below, however, seek to advise
the change manager how to adjust implementation strategy effectively to different contexts
and conditions.
330 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
Management did not want to stifle staff enthusi-
asm and commitment by insisting that the benefits
of a change should be specified in detail at the start.
When implementing something new, the potential
benefits are often unclear, which is why the model
only asks that they be “sighted” then “ranged”
and so on as the work develops, and the outcomes
crystallize. They chose the term “trial” instead of
“pilot” because the latter usually means a carefully
designed project that will be made to work before
being “rolled out” across other units or divisions. A
“trial,” on the other hand, can be a rapidly devel-
oped, small-scale initiative, which can be aban-
doned, with little or no cost, and no reputational
damage, if it does not work out as anticipated. This
transformation program and five-stage process
saved the hospital £40 million over four years and
improved staff engagement and quality of care.
Benefits Management at Nottingham University Hospitals Trust UK
Stage models tend to focus on implementation
and do not always address in any detail the issues
of achieving the outcomes, meeting the goals, and
realizing the benefits of change. Faced with multi-
ple pressures, Nottingham University Hospitals Trust
in England (14,500 staff, £825 million revenue)
launched an ambitious transformation program,
based on a five-step change process. They designed
this process themselves, for use by staff to imple-
ment their own project ideas within the overall pro-
gram (Guyler et al., 2014). Benefits management
was a key component, evolving through the differ-
ent stages of the project:
Project Stage Involves Benefits
1. Setup and plan
Engage key stakeholders and establish scope; identify potential benefits; set up team and hub
Define project objec- tives; identify potential outcomes and associ- ated benefits
Sighted
2. Discovery Detailed analysis to establish areas requiring change; value or process mapping of current and future state; identify issues and problems to be solved
Benefits dependency map; benefits measures
Ranged
3. Design and trial
Test future state in a real environ- ment; assess whether trials deliver anticipated benefits
Construct benefit pro- files; produce benefits realization plan
Targeted
4. Implementation and rollout
Controlled implementation and/or rollout of future state and realiza- tion of benefits identified
Refine benefits and measures
Implemented
5. Embed and sustain
Ensure changes are sustain- able; handover to operational environment
Monitor and deliver benefits
Realized
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 331
LO 10.4 Process Perspectives on Change
Change is a process, and not an event. This is a straightforward observation and is
reflected in the stage models of change management discussed in the previous section.
Process perspectives, however, highlight other significant aspects of organizational
change and draw the attention of the change manager to issues not covered by either
checklists or stage models. While potentially making change appear to be more com-
plex, process thinking encourages the change manager to adopt a more comprehensive
approach to designing, planning, implementing, and reviewing change activities.
One of the original architects of the processual perspective, Andrew Pettigrew (1985,
1987), cautioned against looking for single causes and for simple explanations for change.
Instead, he pointed to the many related factors—individual, group, organizational, social,
political—that can affect the nature and outcomes of change. Pettigrew observed that
change was indeed a complex and “untidy cocktail” that included rational decisions
mixed with competing individual perceptions, often stimulated by visionary leadership
and spiced with “power plays” to recruit support and to build coalitions behind particular
ideas.
In this view, the unit of analysis is not “the change”: a new organization structure. The
unit of analysis is “the process of change in context”: how a new structure will be imple-
mented and developed in this particular organizational setting. This subtle shift in per-
spective has two related implications. First, this means paying attention to the flow of
events and not thinking of change as either static or as neatly time-bounded with defined
beginning and end points. Second, this also means paying attention to the wider context in
which change is taking place and not thinking in terms of a particular location in time and
geography (this new machine in this factory bay). In short, process perspectives argue that,
to understand organizational change, one has to understand how the substance, context,
and process interact over time to produce the outcomes.
This processual perspective has been developed further by Patrick Dawson (2003;
Dawson and Andriopoulos, 2014). Dawson also makes it clear that, to understand change,
we need to consider:
1. The past, present, and future context in which the organization functions, including
external and internal factors.
2. The substance of the change itself, which could be new technology, process redesign, a
new payment system, or changes to organization structure and culture.
3. The transition process, tasks, activities, decisions, timing, sequencing.
4. Political activity, both within and external to the organization.
5. The interactions between these factors.
This argument is summarized in figure 10.3 (Dawson and Andriopoulos, 2014, p. 213),
which emphasizes the role of the politics of change. This is a feature that the checklists
and stage models that we have examined so far either do not mention, or deal with briefly
(form a powerful coalition, for example). As organizations are political systems, and
as change is inevitably a politicized process, Pettigrew and Dawson both argue that the
change manager must be willing to intervene in the politics of the organization. In this
respect, the key task is to legitimize change proposals in the face of competing ideas. The
332 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
management of change can thus be described as “the management of meaning,” which
involves symbolic attempts to establish the credibility of particular definitions of problems
and solutions, and to gain consent and compliance from other organization members. Part
of this task, therefore, is to do with “the way you tell it,” or more accurately with “the way
you sell it” to others.
Dawson identifies five aspects of the internal context: human resources, administrative
structures, technology, product or service, and the organization’s history and culture. The
organization’s history is critical. As noted earlier, it is easy to forget how past events can
Substance of Change
Scale of Change
Defining Characteristics
Perceived Centrality
Organizational Time Frames
Politics of Change
External Political Activity
(e.g., consultation, negotiation,
conflict, and resistance,
which occur at various
levels within and outside
an organization during the
process of managing change)
Internal Political Activity
Context of Change
(Past, Present, and Future)
External Context
(e.g., market, legislation)
Internal Context
(i) Human resources (e.g., Work relations/teamwork)
(ii) Administrative structures (e.g., job design/work structures)
(iii) Technology (e.g., plant, machinery, tools)
(iv) Product or service (e.g., core business activity)
(v) History and culture (e.g., contextual evolution of shared beliefs and assumptions)
THE
CHANGE
PROCESS
FIGURE
10.3 Determinants
of Organiza-
tional Change
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 333
From Hot Breakfasts to Strategic Change How Did That Happen?
Process theory argues that the outcomes of change
are produced by the interactions of several factors
over time in a given context. What does this look
like in practice? Donde Plowman and colleagues
(2007) give a fascinating narrative of what they
call “radical change accidentally.” They studied the
turnaround of Mission Church, a failing organization
in a large Southwestern U.S. city.
The organizational context was unstable. The
church was faced with a potentially terminal
problem. Seen as a traditional “silk stockings”
church, the organization was asset rich but cash
poor. Attendance and membership were declining.
There were ongoing conflicts involving a KKK
plaque, the playing of jazz in the church, and
whether gays and lesbians should be accepted
as members. The purpose and identity of the
church created further tensions, particularly with
regard to including the homeless and others who
were excluded. With several previous changes in
leadership, there had been two pastors in three
years, resulting in the controversial appointment of
two co-pastors.
How did change begin? A group of youngsters
who did not like the traditional church school
program had the idea of providing hot breakfasts
f o r h o m e l e s s p e o p l e o n S u n d a y m o r n i n g s .
Some of those youngsters were not even church
members; they were soon serving 500 people
every Sunday. The hot breakfasts idea was never
intended to produce radical change. However,
Plowman and colleagues argue that small actions
such as this were “amplified” by the unstable
context.
What were the outcomes? Church membership
recovered, involving a wider range of the local
population including the homeless and minorities.
Homeless individuals joined the church, sang in the
choir, and served as ushers. The style of worship,
formality of dress, and music changed, as did the
profile of the congregation; this was no longer a
“silk stockings” church. The church got city funding
to provide a day center, which offered shelter to
several thousand homeless and was soon serving
over 20,000 meals a year. In addition to breakfasts
and clinics, the church provided legal assistance,
job training, laundry services, and shower facilities.
The church motto changed to include “justice into
action.”
W h y d i d t h i s h a p p e n ? T h e “ c o n t e x t u a l
configuration” that encouraged ongoing change
included:
• the dissatisfied youngsters who came up with
the hot breakfasts idea
• a doctor working as a volunteer offered to treat
medical problems instead, and soon recruited
others, leading to full-scale medical, dental, and
eye clinics as part of the Sunday activity
• the removal of the KKK plaque—a major
symbolic act
• leaders acting as “sense-givers,” providing
meaning rather than directing changes, and
choosing the language labels; “purging,”
“recovering,” “reaching out to the marginalized”
• affluent members left as the church focused
increasingly on the homeless, and new (less
affluent) members were attracted by the
message of inclusivity
The features of the organizational context
encouraged a series of small changes to emerge,
and amplified these into an unplanned, radical,
and successful change process. There was no top-
down transformation designed by senior leaders.
This is a good example of a processual account
of change unfolding over time, illustrating how
factors at different levels of analysis interact to
produce the outcomes. Plowman et al. offer the
following advice for the change manager. First, be
sensitive to context. Second, be prepared to be
surprised; the emergence of small changes is not
an orderly process. Third, view those small changes
opportunistically, in terms of how they might be
developed.
334 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
shape current responses. He also identifies four key features of the substance of change:
the scale, its “defining characteristics,” its perceived centrality, and the time frame of
change initiatives. The substance of change affects the scale of disruption to existing struc-
tures and jobs. The transition process may be incremental and slow, or rapid. In addition,
managers can draw upon evidence from the context and substance of change to marshal
support and to legitimate their own proposals through political action. It is the interaction
between context, substance, and political forces that shape the process of change.
From their processual perspective, Dawson and Andriopoulos (2014) identify eight
“general lessons” concerning change management practice.
1. There are no universal prescriptions or simple recipes for how best to manage change.
2. Change is a political process, and change leaders need be politically sensitive and astute.
3. Time, planning, and flexibility are essential in changing attitudes and behaviors and in
gaining commitment for change.
4. They advocate “critical reflection,” challenging taken-for-granted assumptions—
for example with regard to resistance, which may be desirable if it subverts a weak
initiative.
5. It is important to learn from both positive and negative experiences.
6. Education, training, and development should be aligned with new operating procedures.
7. Communication is fundamentally important in steering processes in desired directions.
8. “Contradictions provide health food for critical reflection”: change requires constant
adaptation to contextual circumstances.
Most of this advice echoes the guidance from checklists and stage models. However,
where the checklists say, “do this,” process accounts advise, “be aware of this,” noting that
there are no universal “best practice” recipes for change. Process perspectives differ in
the emphasis placed on the role of politics in shaping change outcomes. One implication
of this emphasis is that the change manager must be politically skilled, and be both will-
ing and able to use those skills. The capabilities of the change manager are explored in
chapter 12, where this theme will be developed further.
Processual perspectives on change thus appear to have three strengths.
1. They recognize the complexity of change, drawing attention to the interaction between
many factors at different levels, shaping the nature, direction, and consequences of
change.
2. They recognize change as a process with a past, a present, and a future, rather than as a
static or time-bounded event or discrete series of events.
3. They highlight the political nature of organizations and change, emphasizing the impor-
tance of political skill to the change manager.
A processual/contextual perspective has three limitations:
1. Change in this perspective is in danger of being presented as overly complex and over-
whelmingly confusing, and thus as unmanageable.
2. Those who are involved in the change process are sometimes portrayed as minor charac-
ters in a broad sequence of events, relegated to the role of sense-givers and interpreters
controlled by social and contextual forces, rather than as proactive “movers and shakers.”
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 335
3. It does not lend itself readily to the identification of specific guidelines, focusing on
awareness rather than prescription. Advice is thus limited to those issues to which
change management should be sensitive: complexity, process, context, political influ-
ences, opportunity.
LO 10.5 Contingency Approaches to Change Management
Dawson and Andriopoulos (2014) are not alone in noting that there are no universal
prescriptions for how best to manage change. This has led to the development of con-
tingency approaches, which argue that the best way to manage change depends on con-
textual and other factors. In this section, we will explore four contingency approaches:
where to start?, the change leadership styles continuum, the Stace-Dunphy contingency
matrix, and the Hope Hailey-Balogun change kaleidoscope.
Where to Start? The problem has been diagnosed, and appropriate organizational changes have been
agreed. What to do next? Where to begin? Veronica Hope Hailey and Julia Balogun (2002,
p. 158) discuss this briefly in their contingency model (explained in the following pages),
arguing, “Change can start from top-down, bottom-up, or some combination of the two,
or as another alternative, be developed from pockets of good practice. Should change be
implemented throughout the organization simultaneously, or can it be delivered gradually
through pilot sites?” The change manager is thus faced with a range of options.
Adopting a novel approach to the question of where to start, Marco Gardini et al. (2011)
argue that change should begin with those staff whose contributions will have the most
significant impact on the aspects of performance that need to change. Identifying those
“pivotal roles” is vital, but this is not always obvious. They reached this “pivotal roles”
conclusion from experience with a large European retail bank. This bank, with 6,000
branches, faced increasing competition from more “customer-friendly” local banks. To
deal with this threat, management developed a new organizational model, which reduced
central supervision and control and gave branch managers more autonomy to tailor their
marketing, promotions, and offering to their local areas. The new model was communi-
cated quickly to all staff, and the way in which the new roles would work was explained.
Top management did this through road shows, memos, intranet articles, and by publishing
the new organization charts. Everyone received the same information, and the changes
were all to happen at the same time.
Reviewing progress a few months later, however, most staff had not changed their
working practices. In particular, the branch managers were still using the previous struc-
ture and procedures because they were afraid of making mistakes or annoying more senior
staff. The regional supervisors were meant to act as coaches to the branch managers, but
many did not have coaching skills, and many branch managers did not have the skills
to run their own branches and make their own decisions. Realizing that they had tried
to change too much at the same time, top management decided to focus on those who
could deliver the change the fastest. The regional managers, perhaps, or the branch super-
visors? Neither of those groups qualified; they had no impact on daily branch activities,
could therefore not affect results, and had little credibility with frontline staff. The branch
336 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
managers themselves had the greatest influence on the outcomes of the planned changes
because:
• their work had direct and significant impact on the revenue stream;
• they were connected with many other groups across the organization;
• they could decide how people got things done.
In other words, the branch managers combined managerial impact with local control,
but they lacked the skills and attitudes to drive change quickly. The change implementa-
tion plan was redesigned, now focusing initially on the 6,000 branch managers. The train-
ing designed specially for them began with their role in the new organizational model,
and it covered commercial skills, credit and asset management capabilities, quality and
customer satisfaction principles, and other skills such as managing people, communica-
tions, and conflict resolution. Only when the branch managers were ready—six months
later—did the bank start to work with other staff and supervisors, with different programs
designed for different roles. This time the results were much better. Eighteen months later:
• the number of products sold per branch rose by 15 percent;
• the time spent making credit decisions fell by 25 percent;
• branch relationship managers were spending 30 percent more time with customers due
to the streamlined process;
• customer responses to marketing campaigns doubled, with a national survey showing a
20 percent improvement in customer satisfaction;
• knowledge sharing and mutual support increased, and the bank became more receptive
to ideas from frontline staff.
Gardini et al. (2011) conclude that change is more likely to be successful if implemen-
tation has two key components. First, start with the “pivotal people,” whose work is clos-
est to the activities that need to be improved. Second, design a comprehensive program
with clear and meaningful goals, linking those in pivotal roles with the changes that the
rest of the organization has to make. This question of “where to start?” is not addressed
explicitly by the checklist, stage model, or processual approaches. This of course is not the
only contingency affecting the appropriate mode of change implementation.
The Change Leadership Styles Continuum One of the oldest contingency approaches addresses the question of change manage-
ment style, which can range over a continuum from autocratic to democratic (Tan-
nenbaum and Schmidt, 1958, p. 96). The cultures—or, at least, the management
textbooks—of developed Western economies have endorsed more participative
approaches to change management, for which evidence has long established the ben-
efits (e.g., Coch and French, 1948). Those who are involved in the design and imple-
mentation of change are more likely to contribute to its success than those on whom
change has been imposed. However, the change manager should be aware of the range
of choice available with regard to style, and of the disadvantages and advantages of
these (table 10.7). For example, “telling” people without participation is quick and
decisive (but may cause resentment, and does not capture staff ideas). On the other
hand, “inviting participation” increases commitment and access to useful information
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 337
(but is time-consuming and involves a loss of management control). In a crisis where a
rapid response is required, “inviting participation” can be damaging. In an organization
that values the knowledge and commitment of its staff, the resentment caused by “tell-
ing” them about planned changes can also be damaging. Choice of change management
style thus needs to reflect the context.
The Stace-Dunphy Contingency Matrix However, participative approaches to change management have also been challenged
by the work of two Australian researchers, Doug Stace and Dexter Dunphy (Stace
and Dunphy, 2001). Their approach begins by establishing a scale of change, from
“fine-tuning” to “corporate transformation” (table 10.8; see also our “Assessing Depth
of Change” model, chapter 1, figure 1.1). They then identify four styles of change
(table 10.9; see also table 10.7).
Plotting scale of change against style of change produces the matrix in figure 10.4.
This identifies four strategies: participative evolution, charismatic transformation, forced
evolution, and dictatorial transformation. Figure 10.4 also advocates the use of different
change management styles depending on the attributes of the context. Stace and Dunphy
TABLE 10.7 Change Management Styles—Disadvantages and Advantages
Style Disadvantages Advantages
Tell May cause resentment Does not use staff experience and ideas
Quick, decisive, unambiguous Management in full control
Tell and sell May be seen as cosmetic, especially if consequences for staff are negative and serious
Selling can be fairly quick Management remains in control
Consult Time-consuming Resentment if staff views are then ignored
More information, better decisions Staff commitment higher if views have influenced decisions
Invite participation Time-consuming Logistics can be problematic Conflicts with concept of management accountability Management lose some control over outcomes
Uses all available information Should lead to better decisions Higher commitment from staff who share ownership of the decision-making process
TABLE 10.8 Scale of
Change
Fine-tuning Refining methods, policies, and procedures, typically at the level of the division or department
Incremental adjustment
Distinct modifications to strategies, structures, and management processes, but not radical enough to be described as strategic
Modular transformation
Restructuring departments and divisions, potentially radical, but at the level of parts of the organization and not the whole
Corporate transformation
Strategic change throughout the organization, to structures, sys- tems, procedures, mission, values, and power distribution
338 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
(2001) thus argue that participative strategies are time-consuming as they expose conflict-
ing views that are difficult to reconcile. Where organizational survival depends on rapid
and strategic change, dictatorial transformation is appropriate:
Perhaps the toughest organizational change program in Australia in recent years has been
the restructure of the New South Wales Police Force. The person leading that restructure and
playing a classic Commander role is Police Commissioner Peter Ryan. Ryan was appointed
from the United Kingdom to stamp out corruption in the force and modernize it. In his
own words, he initially adopted a management style that was “firm, hard and autocratic,
and it had to be that because that is what the organization understood.” (Stace and Dunphy,
2001, p. 185)
Once again, we have a contingency perspective that argues that, while collabora-
tive-consultative modes will work well under some conditions, there are circumstances
where directive-coercive modes of change management are likely to be more appropriate
TABLE 10.9 Styles of
Change
Collaborative Widespread employee participation in key decisions
Consultative Limited involvement in setting goals relevant to areas of responsibility
Directive The use of authority in reaching decisions about change and the future
Coercive Senior management impose change on the organization
FIGURE 10.4 The Stace-
Dunphy Contin-
gency Approach
to Change
Implementation
Scale of change: Incremental change
strategies
Transformative change
strategies
Style of change: Participative evolution Charismatic transformation
Collaborative—
consultative modes
Use when the organization
needs minor adjustment to
meet environmental
conditions, where time is
available, and where key
interest groups favor change
Use when the organization needs
major adjustments to meet
environmental conditions, where
there is little time for
participation, and where there is
support for radical change
Forced evolution Dictatorial transformation
Directive—coercive
modes
Use when minor adjustments
are required, where time is
available, but where key
interest groups oppose change
Use when major adjustments are
necessary, where there is no time
for participation, where there is
no internal support for strategic
change, but where this is
necessary for survival
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 339
and effective. In particular, where major changes are necessary for survival, where time
is short, and where those affected cannot agree on the changes, then dictatorial transfor-
mation may be the necessary choice of style. Inviting participation under those conditions
would take time and would be unlikely to produce any agreement.
The Hope Hailey-Balogun Change Kaleidoscope Veronica Hope Hailey and Julia Balogun (2002; Balogun, 2006) also advocate a
context-sensitive approach to the design and implementation of change. Their frame-
work identifies the characteristics of the organizational context that should be taken
into consideration when making change implementation design choices. They describe
this framework as “the change kaleidoscope,” shown in figure 10.5 (based on Hope
Hailey and Balogun, 2002, p. 156).
The argument that change implementation should reflect the organizational context is
not a novel one, but Hope Hailey and Balogun argue that other contingency models focus
on too narrow a range of factors such as type of change, time frame, the power of the
change manager, and the degree of organizational support for change. The eight context
factors in the change kaleidoscope are:
Time Depending on urgency, what is the necessary speed of the change?
Scope How narrow or broad is the scope of the change agenda?
Preservation Is there a need to maintain a degree of continuity on some dimensions,
in some areas?
Diversity Are the attitudes and values of those affected similar, or are there diverse
subcultures?
FIGURE 10.5 The Change Kaleidoscope
Organizational change
Context factors:
enablers and constraints
Timing
Scope
Need for continuity
Diversity of attitudes
Capability of those involved
Capacity of the organization
Readiness for change
Power of the change manager
What type of change is required?
Where should we start?
What implementation style will we use?
What targets are we aiming for?
What intervention strategies will be appropriate?
What change implementation roles are needed?
Implementation options
340 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
Capability Do the individuals involved have the necessary skills and knowledge?
Capacity Does the organization have the resources to implement more change?
Readiness What is the degree of acceptance of or resistance to change?
Power What is the power of the change manager relative to other stakeholders?
These eight context factors can be either constraints (e.g., shortage of time, low capa-
bility) or enablers (e.g., broad agreement on need for change, powerful change manager).
The point is that the design of the change implementation process should be influenced by
the nature of those context factors. Hope Hailey and Balogun (2002, p. 161) identify the
six design options summarized in table 10.10.
TABLE 10.10 Change
Kaleidoscope
Implementation
Options
Design Options Meaning
Type The scope and speed of the proposed change
Start point Top-down, bottom-up, a combination, or pilot sites and pockets of good practice
Style From coercive to collaborative, varied by staff group and phase of change
Target Focus on changing outputs, behaviors, attitudes, and values
Interventions Levers and mechanisms: technical, political, cultural, education, communication
Roles Responsibility for implementing: leadership, change teams, exter- nal facilitation
As well as offering a diagnostic approach to understanding context, and identifying the
range of options, Hope Hailey and Balogun (2002, p. 154) also argue that the kaleidoscope
“encourages an awareness of one’s own preferences about change and how this limits the
options considered.” In other words, the change manager who adopts a director image
may use the kaleidoscope in a manner quite different from the manager adopting the nav-
igator image.
The aim of this framework, therefore, is to trigger a questioning approach to the context
and an informed approach to choosing design options. There is no mechanistic way to
“read” a particular configuration of design choices from the results of an analysis of the
context. As with all of the approaches in this chapter, the change manager’s local knowl-
edge and informed judgement are key to choosing the contextually appropriate change
design from the wide range of options available, as Hope Hailey and Balogun (2002,
p. 163) explain:
Understanding the contextual constraints and enablers is key to understanding the type of
change an organization is able to undertake as opposed to the type of change it needs to
undertake, and therefore what sort of change path is required. Similarly, understanding the
contextual constraints and enablers is central to making choices about startpoint and style.
More participative change approaches require greater skills in facilitation, a greater readiness
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 341
for change from those participating, more time, and therefore, often, more funds. Choices
about the change target and interventions may obviously be affected by the scope of change,
but also by, for example, capacity. Management development interventions can be expensive
and may not be accessible to organizations with limited funds. In reality choosing the right
options is about asking the right questions and exercising change judgement.
The argument that “the best approach” depends on context is an appealing one. Con-
tingency approaches, however, are not beyond criticism. First, the idea of “fitting” change
implementation to a particular type of change in a given context may be easier to explain
in theory than to put into practice. As the change kaleidoscope implies, the change man-
ager needs considerable depth and breadth of understanding of the change context in
order to make informed judgements. Second, contingency approaches are more ambig-
uous and difficult to explain than the simpler “off the shelf” competition from check-
lists and stage models. Third, contingency approaches require a degree of behavioral
flexibility, especially with regard to style, with which some senior managers may be
uncomfortable if they lack the necessary capabilities. Fourth, if managers adopt different
approaches at different times and in different conditions, will this weaken their credibility
with staff? Finally, is everything contingent? Are there no “universals” when it comes to
organizational change?
EXERCISE 10.1
Develop
Your Own
Change
Model
In this chapter, we have explored five change checklists, four stage models of implementation, the processual approach to change, and four contingency frameworks. These approaches are similar in some respects and different in others. Can they be combined? Try the following experiment:
1. Bring the advice from these different models into a single list, omitting the overlaps.
2. Reflecting on your own experience and knowledge of organizational change, consider what issues and steps are missing from these guidelines; add these to your master list. Now create your own composite change management model; if possible, do this as a group activity.
3. Can you prioritize this advice? What items are more important, and which are less important? Taking a contingency approach, in which organizational contexts do particular items become more or less significant?
4. Can you identify a preferred sequence of change implementation steps? And can you explain and justify this recommendation?
5. Looking at your composite change management model, identify three management skills associated with each of the elements. Use this as the basis of a personal assessment; what are your strongest and your weakest change management skills?
6. Looking at the elements in your composite change management model, and reflecting on your own experience of organizational change, which elements are usually handled well, and which are often handled badly? Why do you think this is this the case?
LO 10.1–10.5
342 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
EXERCISE 10.2
The British
Airways
Swipe Card
Debacle
As you read this case, consider the following questions:
1. With reference to John Kotter’s eight-stage model of change, what mistakes did BA make in this instance, and what aspects of the change management process did they handle well?
2. How can the union’s response to the introduction of swipe cards for check-in staff be explained from a processual perspective? If those who were managing this change had adopted a processual perspective, what particular issues would have appeared to be more important, and how would they have addressed those issues?
3. Choose one of the contingency frameworks that was introduced in this chapter and carry out a similar assessment. Which aspects of the organizational context of this change were addressed in an appropriate and effective manner? Which context fac- tors were overlooked?
4. In your judgement, is there any one change management approach, or combination of approaches, that provides the best understanding of the swipe card debacle? Why?
5. You are a change management consultant hired to advise BA top management on how to avoid a situation like this happening in the future. What advice will you offer, and on which change implementation perspectives will your advice be based?
The Strike
On Friday, July 18, 2003, British Airways (BA) staff in Terminals 1 and 4 at London’s busy Heathrow Airport held a 24-hour wildcat strike. The strike was not officially sanctioned by the trade unions but was a spontaneous action by over 250 check-in staff who walked out at 4 pm. The strike occurred at the start of a peak holiday season weekend, which led to chaotic scenes at Heathrow. Around 60 departing flights were grounded, and over 10,000 passengers were left stranded. The situation was heralded as the worst indus- trial situation BA had faced since 1997 when a strike was called by its cabin crew. BA’s response was to cancel its services from both terminals, apologize for the disruption, and ask those who were due to fly not to go to the airport as they would be unable to service them. BA also set up a tent outside Heathrow to provide refreshments, and police were called in to manage the crowd. BA was criticized by many American visitors, who were trying to fly back to the United States, for not providing them with sufficient information about what was going on. Staff returned to work on Saturday evening, but the effects of the strike flowed on through the weekend. On Monday, July 21, BA reported that Heathrow was still extremely busy. Their news release said: “There is still a large backlog of more than 1,000 passengers from services cancelled over the weekend. We are doing everything we can to get these passengers away in the next couple of days.”
As a result of the strike, BA lost around £40 million and its reputation was severely dented. The strike also came at a time when BA was still recovering from other environ- mental jolts such as 9/11, the Iraq war, the SARS outbreak, and attacks on its markets from budget airlines. Afterwards, BA revealed that it lost over 100,000 customers as a result of the dispute.
The Swipe Cards
BA staff were protesting about the introduction of a system for electronic clocking-in that would record when they started and finished work for the day. Staff were concerned that the system would enable managers to manipulate their working patterns and shift hours.
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Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 343
The clocking-in system was one small part of a broader restructuring called the Future Size and Shape recovery program. Over the previous two years, this had led to approximately 13,000 (almost one in four) jobs being cut within the airline. As The Economist (2003) noted, the side effects of these cuts were emerging, with delayed departures resulting from a shortage of ground staff at Gatwick and “a high rate of sickness causing the airline to hire in aircraft and crew to fill gaps. Rising absenteeism is a sure sign of stress in an organization that is contracting.”
For BA management, introduction of the swipe card system was a way of modernizing BA and “improving the efficient use of staff and resources.” As one BA official said, “We needed to simplify things and bring in the best system to manage people” (Tran, 2003). Staff, however, saw this as a way to radically change their working hours, cut their pay, and demand that they work split shifts. One check-in worker said, “This used to be a job which we loved but we are now at the end of our tether. What comes next? They will probably force us to swap shifts without agreement and all this for less money than work- ing at Tesco” [a supermarket] (Jones, 2003).
One commentator argued that “the heart of the issue is that the workforce wants respect”; it was not until the strike that CEO Rod Eddington was aware that “there was a respect deficit to be plugged.” Specifically, staff were concerned that “BA will try to turn them into automata, leaving Heathrow at quiet times of the day only to be brought back at the busiest moments, while not paying any extra for the disturbance. Women, in particular, want to preserve their carefully constructed capacity to balance the demands of work and home” (Hutton, 2003). Although BA denied that the system would be used to make staff change their hours without notice, staff did not accept this promise— wondering why the system was being introduced if that was not the intended use. A union official said, “We know that BA breaks its agreements” (Webster, 2003). Another worker said that the strike was meant to be a “short, sharp shock” for BA: “They would then be able to bring us in any time they wanted, which is just not on, especially for those of us with families” (McGreevy and Johnston, 2003).
The Change Process
Unions argued that the walkout was triggered when BA senior management abandoned talks over the introduction of swipe cards and announced that they would be imposed with five days’ notice. This unilateral decision by BA, and the lack of consultation with affected staff, were cited as the key reasons for the strike. Even BA’s pilots, who did not oppose a check-in system, were said to be sympathetic with the check-in staff, as they also felt that the implementation of the swipe cards had been mishandled by the airline. One commentator described the change process as a “commercial disaster,” which served as “an important warning about the dangers of management by diktat, certainly, but, more profoundly, about an incipient revolt against the close control and monitoring of our lives and movements that modern information technology enables” (Hutton, 2003).
The Economist newspaper argued that it was a mistake to introduce new working prac- tices at the beginning of the summer quarter—when the airline generates most of its revenue. Similarly, The Times (2003) also said that this was a major management blunder: “To pick July, the start of the peak holiday season, to launch an unpopular new clock-in system, is asking for trouble. To push through a scheme without realizing the extent of the resistance by those involved suggests a management aloof from the mood of its employees. And to allow managers to give contradictory statements on the use of the new cards seems guaranteed to foment mistrust.”
(Continued)
344 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
As Hutton (2003) argued, with 20,000 other BA workers using the swipe card system, “Imposing them after months of inconclusive talks must have seemed—especially given the pressure to contain costs, with the airline set to report its worst ever quarterly loss of £60 million this week—a risk worth taking. It was a massive miscalculation of the work- force’s mood.” This miscalculation was related to staff cynicism and bitterness about the redundancy program that had been conducted, staff fears of a lack of consultation, poor pay rates, and dissatisfaction with management, who would have considerable knowl- edge on which to act in the future. The Guardian (2003) echoed this viewpoint, noting that “the trigger was undoubtedly the back-handed way BA management at Heathrow tried to force the introduction of swipe cards at exactly the wrong time, when the peak of the summer boom was approaching. They should have known how important it was to approach any potential changes in the working patterns of women juggling with child- care schedules in a very sensitive way.”
Rod Eddington, chief executive of BA, acknowledged that it was wrong of senior man- agement to introduce the new clock-in system in the way they did. On BBC Radio, pre- sented with the claim that BA was guilty of “bad management” and “crass stupidity” for not predicting the level of anger to the swipe card, he replied, “With the gift of hindsight, it’s difficult to disagree with you” (Clark, 2003).
The Resolution
As a result of the walkout, BA’s news release on Tuesday, July 22, said that it would hold talks with representatives from three unions: Amicus MSF, Transport and General Workers Union, and GMB. The introduction of the swipe cards would be delayed until Wednesday, July 23. Following further talks, BA finally announced on July 30 that they had reached agreement with the unions to delay making the swipe card system operational until Sep- tember 1. They also agreed to a 3 percent pay rise for administrative staff for 2003, not on the basis of introducing the swipe card system, but based on being “confident that the remaining Future Size and Shape cost efficiencies will be delivered.”
As one person observed: “You have to ask, how important was this scheme to the future operation of BA in the first place? How much money was it going to save and wouldn’t it be better to wait a few months for discussion to reassure the staff they are not going to get turned over?” (Behar, 2003).
EXERCISE 10.3
The Italian
Job
As you read this case account, consider the following questions:
1. Refer to the change kaleidoscope, and identify the contextual constraints and enablers affecting the changes that Erick Thohir and his management team want to implement.
2. Based on your analysis of the context, what advice can you give to Erick Thohir and his team about the change implementation design options that they should consider?
3. Also based on your context analysis, what major mistakes would you advise them to avoid when implementing their proposed changes?
The Background
The Indonesian business tycoon Erick Thohir acquired a 70 percent share in the famous Italian football club Inter Milan in 2013. The previous owner of Inter Milan, Massimo Moratti, retained the remaining share. Thohir thus became the first Indonesian business- man to buy a leading European team, and only the second foreign owner of a top Italian
LO 10.5
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 345
club. A sports fan, Thohir had previously set up the Indonesian basketball association, but then he became interested in U.S. sports, which are much more business-oriented. He invested in the Philadelphia 76ers basketball team in 2011, and in the Washington major league soccer team, D.C. United, in 2012.
The Problem
In 2013, Inter Milan had an estimated enterprise value of around €375 million but was heavily in debt. Inter Milan had won five Italian championships between 2006 and 2010, and also won the Champions’ League in 2010. Since then, however, the team’s performance had been poor, finishing only fifth in Italy’s premier league (known as Serie A) between 2011 and 2013. The team’s fans were disappointed. The club culture was heavily “Italo-centric,” using Italian players and management. Italy’s “hardcore” football fans—the “ultras”—had a reputation for xenophobia, racism, and violence.
In 2013, with €169 million in revenues, the club dropped to fifteenth in the Football Money League produced by the accounting group Deloitte. The Serie A league had a reputation for being corrupt and inward-looking, and it was only now opening up to overseas investment. Few clubs made significant profits, and ageing stadiums were not suitable for families and corporate hospitality. Inter Milan was one of six teams under investigation by the governing body, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), for breaching “financial fair play” rules.
The Solution
As the new owner, Thohir wanted to develop a different approach to running the club:
Football is changing. I want to use the US model, where sport is like the media business, with income from advertising and content, mixed with the consumer goods industry, selling jerseys and licensed products.
Thohir’s goal was to turn Inter Milan into one of the world’s 10 biggest revenue- generating clubs. However, he had to change the club’s organization culture, as well as fixing the finances. He decided to recruit British and American executives with experience in media as well as sport. Michael Bolingbroke, previously chief operating officer at Manchester United (one of the most profitable football clubs in the world), was appointed as chief executive. Thohir recruited a marketing director from Apple iTunes, a head of global partnership from the U.S. sports and entertainment group AEG, and a chief financial officer from D.C. United.
Inter Milan had 280 million fans around the world, 60 percent of whom were in Asia, with 18 million in Indonesia alone. Thohir and his new management team, therefore, wanted to focus on Asia, where Inter Milan was not as popular with middle-class football fans as Manchester United, Liverpool, and Real Madrid. Thohir saw growing opportunities in Asia to develop the Inter Milan brand, increase merchandise sales, sign country-based sponsorship deals, and generate more revenue from close-season tours. When he recruited Nemanja Vidic’ from Manchester United in 2014, Inter Milan fans asked what this ageing defender could do for their club. The answer was that Vidic’ was “a good brand for the Asian market.” The management team asked, “Will this player help us compete on the field, and what about on the marketing side?” Considering the pressure from fans and the Italian sporting media, Thohir commented, “When you’re standing on top of the hill, the wind blows hard.”
Sources: Bland, B. 2014. The Italian job: Erick Thohir, Inter Milan. The Financial Times, October 5.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6e2769c0-4970-11e4-9d7e-00144feab7de.html#axzz3FRxv4AFC.
This case was written in mid-2014, as this edition of our book was being developed. Check the further success of Thohir’s change
strategy on Inter Milan’s website: http://www.inter.it/en/hp.
346 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
Dawson, P., and Andriopoulos, C. 2014. Managing change, creativity and innovation.
London: Sage Publications. Comprehensive and clearly explained account of a processual
perspective on change and innovation, theoretical and practical.
Hamel, G., and Zanini, M. 2014. Build a change platform, not a change program. London:
McKinsey & Company. Argue that the leader’s role is not to design a change program, but
to build a change platform, by allowing anyone in the organization to set priorities, diag-
nose barriers, suggest solutions, recruit support, and initiate change. The executive role is
less change agent and more “change enabler in chief,” creating the environment in which
deep change addressing pressing issues can happen anywhere, at any time.
Ji, Y.-Y., Gutherie, J. P., and Messersmith, J. G. 2014. The tortoise and the hare: The
impact of employee instability on firm performance. Human Resource Management Jour-
nal 24(4):355–73. Studied 4,900 U.S. organizations in 18 industries. Some organizations
(“hares”) respond rapidly to changing conditions. Others (“tortoises”) focus on consis-
tency and make smaller adjustments. Found that employment instability was disruptive,
and lowered performance. But also found that while very high instability was damaging,
so was very low instability; highly stable organizations can be too rigid and inflexible.
Advise a “slow and steady” approach, changing in response to external conditions, retain-
ing talented employees. Organizations that react too quickly damage their competitiveness.
Kotter, J. P. 2012b. Accelerate! Harvard Business Review 90(11):44–52. Explains how
to drive strategic, transformational change without disrupting daily operations. This is a
development of Kotter’s original eight-stage model of transformational change.
Pustkowski, R., Scott, J., and Tesvic, J. 2014. Why implementation matters. Sydney:
McKinsey & Company. Identifies seven core change implementation capabilities from an
executive survey: organization-wide ownership, focus on priorities, clear accountability,
program management, early planning for sustainability, continuous improvement, and suffi-
cient resources. Describes implementation as an individual discipline that can be developed.
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this chapter,
in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Understand and identify the factors that can cause change to fail.
Making change fail is relatively easy; there are many things that one can do, and not
do, to achieve that result. John Kotter identifies eight main failure factors: lack of
urgency, no supportive coalition, no vision, poor communication, obstacles to change
not removed, no “wins” or achievements to celebrate, declaring victory too soon, and
not anchoring or embedding the changes. Lack of communication is a particularly sig-
nificant cause of change failure.
Assess the strengths and limitations of checklists for managing change effectively.
We introduced five checklists or “recipes” for managing change:
• The big four (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006)
• The seven Cs of change (CIPD, 2014)
• DICE (Sirkin et al., 2005)
Additional Reading
Roundup
LO 10.1
LO 10.2
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 347
• ADKAR (Hiatt, 2006)
• Successful transformational change (Keller et al., 2010)
One strength of these approaches is that they provide clarity and simplicity in an
area that can be complex and untidy. Another strength is that different checklists tend to
offer much the same advice, which is reassuring. One limitation is that these checklists
tend to lack any theoretical underpinning, relying often on an argument that sounds
like, “This worked for us, so it should work for you.” From a practitioner perspective,
another limitation is that these are generic “high-level guides,” and not detailed “best
practice” road maps. The change manager is left with the often challenging task of
translating this general guidance into a detailed change implementation plan that will
fit the organizational circumstances. These checklists do not substitute for local knowl-
edge, informed judgement, and creativity.
We discussed the question concerning when to use each of these checklists. As they
tend to offer broadly similar advice, it may not matter. However, some of these check-
lists appear to apply to relatively straightforward, well-bounded changes, while the
McKinsey model applies to large-scale transformational changes. The more appropriate
question, we argued, is how to use these checklists. They should be seen as high-level
guides and not detailed road maps, and will be helpful as long as they are not used in
a tightly prescriptive manner, but to trigger discussion, diagnosis, and planning. These
comments concerning when and how to use change management guidelines apply to all
of the models and frameworks in this chapter.
Evaluate the advantages of stage models of change management.
We introduced four stage models of change management:
• Unfreeze, move, refreeze (Lewin, 1951)
• The IHI large-scale change framework (Reinertsen et al., 2008)
• Kotter’s eight-stage model (Kotter, 2012a)
• Nottingham Hospitals’ five-step process (Guyler et al., 2014)
LO 10.3
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
• Do you work with a “one size fits all” approach
to change management? To what extent do you
adapt your approach to the scale and timing of
the change, staff readiness, your own relative
power, and other context features identified in this
chapter?
• How capable are you in adopting more than
one change image? Are you more comfortable
with a top-down or a bottom-up approach—
or somewhere in between? Do you need to
develop any particular skills to achieve greater
flexibility (assuming you believe that flexibility
will give you an advantage)?
• Is there a dominant change approach in your
organization? If so, how appropriate is it? What
would you need to do in order to modify or
replace that dominant approach?
• How do you handle the many different change
initiatives that are unfolding in your organization
or business unit at a given time—when these are
all at different stages? Is this a problem? If not,
why not? If it is, what is your preferred solution?
If possible, share and discuss your responses to
this question and the others in this “reflection”
with colleagues.
348 Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches
Stage models complement a checklist approach by emphasizing how change unfolds
and develops over time, making changing demands on the change manager, and on
those who are affected, at each stage. Although change rarely develops in a neat and
tidy manner, approaching the process in this way encourages the change manager to
anticipate and to prepare for possible future problems. It may also be helpful to con-
sider a more extended timeline, considering how past events could influence current
proposals, and how changes will be sustained, and eventually decay, into the future.
Assess the theoretical and practical value of processual perspectives on change.
A process perspective argues that the outcomes of change are shaped by the combina-
tion and interaction of a number of factors over time in a given context. Those factors
include the context and substance of the change, the implementation process, and also
the internal and external organizational politics. One strength of the process perspective
is that it recognizes and emphasizes the role of organizational politics, which is often
overlooked or regarded as marginal by other approaches. The practical advice flowing
from this perspective is broadly similar to that provided by checklists and stage models:
plan, train, communicate, learn from mistakes, adapt to circumstances. However, where
some practical change management advice recommends “do this,” the process perspec-
tive advocates “be aware of this,” leaving the change manager with the task of reaching
informed judgements with regard to appropriate action.
Process perspectives highlight the complexity and politicized nature of change, and
view change as a process with a past, present, and future, rather than as a static or time-
bounded event. However, there are dangers in this perspective, in presenting change
as overly complex and unmanageable, in placing the focus on context at the expense
of individual and team contributions, and in the focus on awareness rather than clear
direction.
Understand and apply contingency approaches to change management.
We presented four contingency approaches:
• Where to start? (Gardini et al., 2011)
• The change leadership styles continuum (Tannenbaum and Schmidt, 1958)
• The Stace-Dunphy contingency matrix (Stace and Dunphy, 2001)
• The change kaleidoscope (Hope Hailey and Balogun, 2002)
Contingency approaches argue that change implementation should take into account
the attributes of the organizational context concerned. However, these approaches dif-
fer with regard to the contingencies—the key factors—that the change manager needs
to consider. For example, “where to start?” argues that change should begin with the
“pivotal roles,” where changes will have the biggest impact on the behavior and per-
formance that is of concern. Those “pivotal roles” will vary from one change initiative
to another. The styles continuum suggests choosing a change leadership style based on
considerations of available time, use of available expertise, and staff commitment. A
dictatorial approach to management in general, and to change management in partic-
ular, probably runs counter to most management beliefs. However, the Stace-Dunphy
contingency framework suggests that, where change is vital, time is short, and consen-
sus is unlikely, a dictatorial approach is more likely to be effective. The most elaborate
of these models, the change kaleidoscope, identifies eight sets of organizational context
LO 10.4
LO 10.5
Chapter 10 Change Management, Processual, and Contingency Approaches 349
factors and six sets of change implementation design options. The design options, this
approach argues, need to reflect the context diagnosis.
It may seem obvious to argue that “the best approach” depends on the context. How-
ever, this idea of “fitting” change to the setting is easier to explain in theory than to put
into practice. A detailed diagnosis of the context takes time and requires considerable
local knowledge and insight. A contingency approach also demands flexibility in style
from change leaders and managers, who may in some instances be required to move
out of their “comfort zones,” and inconsistent behavior may weaken management cred-
ibility. Our two final questions are: is everything contingent in this area, and are there
no universals in organizational change?
Appelbaum, S. H., Habashy, S., Malo, J.-L., and Shafiq, H. 2012. Back to the future:
Revisiting Kotter’s 1996 change model. Journal of Management Development 31(8):
764–82.
Bacon, R., and Hope, C. 2014. The billions we have spent on IT that doesn’t work.
The Times, August 20:2–3.
Balogun, J. 2006. Managing change: Steering a course between intended strategies and
unanticipated outcomes. Long Range Planning 39(1):29–49.
Behar, D. 2003. BA to back down in Heathrow strike. Daily Mail, July 30:32.
Bland, B. 2014. The Italian job: Erick Thohir, Inter Milan. The Financial Times,
October 5. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6e2769c0-4970-11e4-9d7e-00144feab7de.
html#axzz3FRxv4AFC.
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. 2014. Change management factsheet.
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Clark, A. 2003. BA bosses share the blame. Guardian, August 1.
Coch, L., and French, J. R. P. 1948. Overcoming resistance to change. Human Relations
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Dawson, P. 2003. Reshaping change: A processual approach. London: Routledge.
Dawson, P., and Andriopoulos, C. 2014. Managing change, creativity and innovation.
London: Sage Publications.
The Economist. 2003. Britain: Terminal; British Airways. July 26:31.
Gardini, M., Giuliani, G., and Marricchi, M. 2011. Finding the right place to start
change. Rome and Milan: McKinsey & Company.
Graetz, F., and Smith, A. C. T. 2010. Managing organizational change: A philosophies of
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353
3 Running Threads: Sustainability, and the Effective Change Manager
CHAPTER 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
CHAPTER 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
Part 3 focuses on two themes which are distinct from, but which run through, the first two
parts of this book. The first of these “running threads” concerns the sustainability of orga-
nizational change. We know that even successful changes can “decay,” and the benefits
be lost. What actions are necessary to ensure, or at least to improve, the sustainability of
change? In many of the implementation models that we explored in part 2, sustainability
is treated as the final step in the change process. Chapter 11 argues that sustainability
has to be considered from the start, built into the implementation process. In most cases,
it will be too late to treat sustainability as an issue to be managed after implementation
has been completed. The second running thread, the core theme that this text as a whole
addresses, concerns what it takes to be an effective change manager. We consider who the
change managers are in an organization, and if they are necessarily senior leaders. The
role of middle managers—traditionally seen as change blockers—turns out to be key in
initiating and implementing change. Finally, we set out a six-step approach to developing
personal change management capabilities.
PART
355
11Chapter Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
Learning objectives
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 11.1 Understand the causes of initiative decay—threats to the sustainability of
change.
LO 11.2 Distinguish between change initiatives that are “blameworthy,” and should
not be sustained, and those that are “praiseworthy.”
LO 11.3 Identify and apply actions that can contribute to the sustainability of change.
LO 11.4 Understand the pitfalls that can arise when seeking to sustain change.
P e te
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h e N
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C o ll
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356 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
LO 11.1 Initiative Decay and Improvement Evaporation
Your reorganization was implemented successfully. Significant benefits were achieved.
Revisiting the initiative some months later, however, you find that the new working
practices and increased performance levels appear not to have been maintained. Things
have gone back to where they were before you started. How did this happen? Unfor-
tunately, this is a common story. Even successful initiatives can decay, leading to “the
improvement evaporation effect” as the gains are lost.
For many organizations, it is a strategic imperative to embed, to have “stickability,”
to maintain changes and their contribution to performance. This chapter focuses on the
problems of sustaining change and on the practical steps that can be taken to increase the
probability that changes once implemented will endure, that they will become institution-
alized and regarded as normal practice. This is not a new problem, having been famously
identified by Kurt Lewin (1951) as the need to “refreeze” behavior once change has taken
place. The attention of practicing managers and academic researchers has focused on the
first two stages of his model, “unfreezing” and “moving.” The problems of refreezing, or
sustaining change, are less well understood. There may be a widespread assumption that,
if changes have been successful, they will automatically be sustained. That assumption,
however, appears often to be incorrect. Paradoxically, for the change manager, sustaining
changes may in some instances present a more difficult challenge than implementing them
in the first place.
Sustainability implies that new working methods and performance levels are main-
tained for an appropriate period, or that new practices and processes are routinized until
they become obsolete. What are the causes of initiative decay? What steps can be taken
to increase the probability that changes will be sustained and become embedded in the
organization as routine practice? As we have explored in other chapters, what is consid-
ered to be achievable with regard to sustaining change depends on how managing change
is understood. The views of sustainability from each image of change management are
summarized in table 11.1.
TABLE 11.1 Images of Managing and Sustaining Change
Image View of Sustainability
Director It is the responsibility of the change manager to design the change process and direct others to comply, to ensure that planned objectives are achieved.
Navigator The change manager designs the change process to fit the context, recognizing that modifications will be required and that the outcome may not be as intended.
Caretaker Change outcomes will be determined primarily by contextual factors, and not by man- agement intervention.
Coach The change manager’s main role is to help others to develop the capabilities necessary to achieve the intended outcomes of the change.
Interpreter The change manager develops understanding of the meaning and significance of the changes and what will count as successful outcomes.
Nurturer Change outcomes are in constant flux, and are largely beyond management control.
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 357
We have to recognize that management may have no direct control over many of the
factors that can jeopardize the sustainability of change. That does not mean, however, that
it is not possible to anticipate and to counter those factors in some manner.
For changes to “stick,” they must “seep into the bloodstream,” become “the new
norm,” “baked into the organization” or, as Kotter (2007, p. 103) observes, accepted
as “the way we do things around here.” That is, it must become an integral part of the
organizational culture, or what has also been described as the “mind-set” of the orga-
nization’s members (Lawson and Price, 2003). This means that new structures, pro-
cesses, and working practices are no longer seen as “change,” with all the emotional,
political, and operational connotations that accompany that term. Unless this happens,
change may prove to be just a passing diversion, a temporary disruption. However, as we
explored in chapter 5, culture change is not a straightforward process. As Lou Gerstner
(2002, pp. 182 and 187) once said, referring to his leadership of the successful transfor-
mation of IBM:
I came to see, in my time at IBM, that culture isn’t just one aspect of the game—it is the
game. Vision, strategy, marketing, financial management—any management system, in
fact—can set you on the right path and can carry you for a while. But no enterprise—
whether in business, government, education, health care, or any area of human endeavor—
will succeed over the long haul if those elements aren’t part of the DNA. . . .
What you can do is create the conditions for transformation. You can provide incentives.
You can define the marketplace realities and goals. But then you have to trust. In fact, in the
end, management doesn’t change culture. Management invites the workforce itself to change
the culture.
What are the main threats to the sustainability of change? David Buchanan et al. (2007)
identify the “top ten” factors that can lead to initiative decay:
Momentum Busters
Robert Reisner (2002) examines the U.S. Postal
Service, which, during the 1990s, “transformed
itself from the butt of sitcom jokes into a profit-
able and efficient enterprise” (p. 45). By 2001,
however, morale and performance were low, and
losses were predicted. Why was the transformation
not sustained? Reisner (vice president for strate-
gic planning) blames three “momentum busters”:
the indifference of senior managers, who regarded
some aspects of strategy as a “distraction”; resis-
tance from trade unions, whose role and voice
had been marginalized; and inability to steer fund-
ing through a budget process that favored tradi-
tional initiatives over innovations. Innovation was
also stifled by governance constraints. What one
competitor, UPS, achieved, the Postal Service could
not have initiated without a prior hearing process
before the Postal Rate Commission, and major
structural changes would have required congres-
sional sanction. The situation was exacerbated by
a weak economy, problems with e-commerce, and
terrorist assaults on the American postal service.
Reisner’s (2002, p. 52) conclusion is optimistic:
“Despite the limits to any transformation effort,
accomplishing meaningful change in even the larg-
est, most complex, and tradition-bound of orga-
nizations is achievable.” However, the leadership,
organizational, and contextual causes of initiative
decay need to be addressed in order to sustain
these changes (Buchanan et al., 2005).
358 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
1. The initiators and drivers move on. Managers who have been successful at imple-
menting change may be more interested in moving on to the next change challenge
than in staying around for a period of relative stability. In addition, experienced and
successful change agents may be sought by other divisions or organizations, which
have other novel change agendas to progress. It can be difficult to turn down promo-
tion opportunities such as these.
2. Accountability for development has become diffuse. The responsibility for driving
change is normally (but not always) clear, with formal change or project management
roles, often accompanied by steering groups, task forces, and implementation teams.
Once the changes are in place and operational, those individuals and groups return to
their normal roles. There are change managers, but organizations tend not to appoint
“sustainability managers.” Just who is accountable for ensuring that the changes are
now embedded, that they become the new norm, is often unclear.
3. Knowledge and experience with new practice are lost through staff turnover. Change
initiatives that involve new skills and knowledge are usually supported by staff train-
ing and development programs. Everyone who is going to be affected will be invited
to attend these programs, creating a “critical mass” of participants for training ses-
sions. However, as individuals subsequently leave and are replaced, it may be difficult
to repeat those development sessions for small numbers of participants. The knowl-
edge that is lost when staff leave is therefore not replaced.
4. Old habits are imported with recruits from less dynamic organizations. Linked to
factor 3, new recruits bring with them habits and working practices from previous
employers. Once again, they are unlikely to be offered retraining, but instead expected
to learn new practices “on the job,” by observation. The likelihood of initiative decay
thus increases with the numbers of new recruits.
5. The issues and pressures that triggered the initiative are no longer visible. As we
discussed in chapter 3, organizations usually change in response to a combination of
internal problems, external environmental challenges, and new opportunities. Those
triggers, however, may not be durable; the problems are solved, the challenges are
addressed, the opportunities are developed. The rationale for change can thus fade
with the triggers, and again lead to initiative decay.
6. New managers want to drive their own agendas. For personal satisfaction, visibility, and
reputation, newly appointed managers often want to appear to be innovative and energetic,
and to “make a mark” on their new organization. This means enhancing their careers by
designing and implementing their own change initiatives. Continuing with work that was
started by others is less interesting and satisfying, and could limit one’s promotion prospects.
7. Powerful stakeholders are using counter-implementation tactics to block progress.
Successful implementation does not always silence the powerbrokers. They may
remain in post, and if they did not welcome the changes, they may wait for opportu-
nities to undermine the changes. This becomes easier if factor 1 applies; the initiators
are no longer there to protect their changes.
8. The pump-priming funding runs out. Many changes are allocated additional fund-
ing in order to support the implementation costs. This can include the temporary
appointment of specialist staff or external consultants, and the cost of training pro-
grams to provide new skills and knowledge. As those resources are consumed, and the
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 359
temporary appointments and the training come to an end, support for the changes is
weakened, and initiative decay becomes more likely.
9. Other priorities come on stream, diverting attention and resources. Most organizations
today do not suffer a shortage of internal and external pressures for change. As other
urgent problems and opportunities arise, the focus inevitably shifts away from past
pressures and the changes that those prompted. If those past problems have indeed
been addressed, then it may be appropriate for attention and resources to move to more
urgent issues. However, this will generate problems if the shift in focus to new priori-
ties simply recreates the situation that past changes were implemented to address.
10. Staff at all levels suffer initiative fatigue, enthusiasm for change falters. The experi-
ence, or the perception, of “too much change,” successful or not, can threaten sustain-
ability by generating a desire to “get back to normal.” Initiative decay can result when
management do not pay attention to the pace and timing of the changes that staff are
expected to deal with, and generate burnout and initiative fatigue by attempting to
drive too many changes too rapidly (Abrahamson, 2004).
Initiative decay can be caused by many factors, at different levels of analysis. Several
of those factors may be operating in a given context at any one time. In the absence of
proactive management steps to address those factors, initiative decay, and not sustained
change, may be the norm.
LO 11.2 Praiseworthy and Blameworthy Failures
The failure of an intended change is not always a problem that needs to be solved. A
change can fail because it was inappropriate for some reason. Mitchell Marks and Rob-
ert Shaw (1995) argue that “productive failure” is valuable, if an organization has the
capacity to add the learning from such experiences to its store of knowledge rather than
to conduct a witch hunt to find who to blame. A learning organization treats occasional
failure as natural and as an opportunity to develop better understanding and to improve
future performance. Marks and Shaw also argue that an organization may gain more in
the long term from a productive failure than from an “unproductive success”—a change
that has gone well, but nobody quite knows why: “We must be doing something right.”
Some changes, if they do not meet their intended goals, must therefore be allowed to
decay. Most organizations, however, do treat such “failures” harshly. Those who were
responsible may even be punished in some manner, and perhaps find that their career
opportunities have become more limited. In chapter 3, we discussed the work of Amy
Edmondson (2011, p. 50), who describes a spectrum of reasons for failure (table 11.2),
from blameworthy at one extreme, to praiseworthy at the other. Not all of these failure
modes concern change, but those that do are more likely to be praiseworthy.
Most managers, Edmondson argues, do not distinguish blameworthy from praisewor-
thy failures, treating them all equally. This is not helpful, and is potentially wasteful:
When I ask executives to consider this spectrum and then to estimate how many of the
failures in their organization are truly blameworthy, their answers are usually in single
digits—perhaps 2% to 5%. But when I ask how many are treated as blameworthy, they say
(after a pause or a laugh) 70% to 90%. The unfortunate consequence is that many failures go
unreported and their lessons are lost. (Edmondson, 2011, p. 50)
360 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
Productive Failure at McDonald’s
In 2001, McDonald’s opened two four-star Golden
Arch hotels in Switzerland. They were distinctive,
with a 24-hour McDonald’s restaurant attached, and
rooms with a patented curved wall, arch-shaped
headboards, and a cylindrical, see-through shower
(that was partially in the bedroom). The idea had
been proposed by the McDonald’s Switzerland
chairman, Urs Hammer, in response to a push from
the parent company for diversification and new ideas.
The hotels were not a financial success. There
were problems with the interior design (lack of
privacy in the shower) and the phrase “golden
arches” is not associated with McDonald’s in
German-speaking countries (it also didn’t help that
“arch,” when pronounced by German speakers,
sounded like a vulgar German word for posterior).
Also, and more importantly, although the restaurant
venture made use of many of the company’s core
competencies in areas such as franchising and real
estate management, the McDonald’s brand simply
didn’t work when applied to a four-star hotel.
However, international marketing professor
Stefan Michel (2007) argues that the decision by
McDonald’s to pilot this initiative was not as bizarre
as it seemed. For example: (1) diversifying into hotels
gave McDonald’s a chance to test the multibillion-
dollar restaurant industry; (2) it required what was
a relatively small investment for McDonald’s; (3)
the damage to the McDonald’s brand was limited
through the use of the name Golden Arches, and
restricting the experiment to Switzerland; and
(4) the losses on real estate and operations were
insignificant in relation to the overall McDonald’s
business. Most significantly, the venture was a
statement of support for entrepreneurial ideas
within the company, and the outcome was treated
as an important, and relatively inexpensive, learning
experience (based on Michel, 2007).
TABLE 11.2 A Spectrum of Reasons for Failure
Reason Description
Deviance An individual chooses to violate a prescribed process or practice.
b la
m e w
o rth
y
p ra
ise w
o rth
y
Inattention An individual inadvertently deviates from specifications.
Lack of ability An individual doesn’t have the skills, conditions, or training to execute a job.
Process inadequacy A competent individual adheres to a prescribed but faulty or incomplete process.
Task challenge An individual faces a task too difficult to be executed reliably every time.
Process complexity A process composed of many elements breaks down when it encounters novel interactions.
Uncertainty A lack of clarity about future events causes people to take seemingly reason- able actions that produce undesired results.
Hypothesis testing An experiment conducted to prove that an idea or a design will succeed fails.
Exploratory testing An experiment conducted to expand knowledge and investigate a possibil- ity leads to an undesired result.
Changes that fail can therefore be valuable, discouraging further experiments of that
kind and revealing what adjustments may be necessary in order to make the next attempt
successful. To build such a learning culture, experimentation should be encouraged, and
failures (including near misses) need to be detected and subjected to an analysis that
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 361
looks beyond the obvious. It is also necessary to avoid making the “fundamental attribu-
tion error,” which means blaming individuals and ignoring the context in which they were
working (Ross, 1977).
Based on experience at a children’s hospital in Minnesota, Edmondson (2011,
pp. 52–53) describes five practices for building a “psychologically safe environment” in
which to learn from failures:
1. Frame the work accurately. People need a shared understanding of the kinds of failures
that can be expected to occur in a given work context (routine production, complex
operations, or innovation) and why openness and collaboration are important for sur-
facing and learning from them. Accurate framing detoxifies failure.
2. Embrace messengers. Those who come forward with bad news, questions, concerns, or
mistakes should be rewarded rather than shot. Celebrate the value of the news first and
then figure out how to fix the failure and learn from it.
3. Acknowledge limits. Being open about what you don’t know, mistakes you’ve made,
and what you can’t get done alone will encourage others to do the same.
4. Invite participation. Ask for observations and ideas and create opportunities for people
to detect and analyze failures and promote intelligent experiments. Inviting participa-
tion helps defuse resistance and defensiveness.
5. Set boundaries and hold people accountable. Paradoxically, people feel psychologi-
cally safer when leaders are clear about what acts are blameworthy. And there must
be consequences. But if someone is punished or fired, tell those directly and indirectly
affected what happened and why it warranted blame.
Will adopting such a “soft” and “understanding” management approach to failures
make staff more careless, and encourage more mistakes? Edmondson (2011, p. 55) argues
Sustaining Successful Change Means Permanently Changing Mindsets
Emily Lawson and Colin Price (2003) argue that the
success and sustainability of change relies on people
thinking differently about their jobs, and not just on
persuading them to change the way they work. This
is particularly the case with fundamental changes to
organization culture, for example, from reactive to
proactive, from hierarchical to collegial, from intro-
spective to externally focused. There are four condi-
tions for the necessary change in mindsets.
First, those who are affected by a change need to
understand the purpose, and agree with it. There is
no point in management telling people that things
must be done differently: “Anyone leading a major
change program must take time to think through
its ‘story’—what makes it worth undertaking—and
to explain that story to all of the people involved in
making change happen, so that their contributions
make sense to them as individuals” (p. 33).
Second, reward and recognition systems need to
be consistent with the new behaviors. Third, staff
must have the necessary skills, and be given time
to absorb new information, to link that to existing
knowledge and to apply it effectively in practice.
And finally, “they must see people they respect
modelling it actively” (p. 32). We all tend to model
our behavior on “significant others” and especially
those in influential positions. Management at all lev-
els thus become role models, and must “walk the
walk” if mindsets are to change (p. 35).
362 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
that a failure to encourage experimentation, combined with a failure to learn from the inev-
itable mistakes, poses greater risks to organizational change and effectiveness. Change ini-
tiatives that do not work cannot be sustained. However, if management want to sustain the
generation of further new ideas for change, then those who develop praiseworthy failures
should be recognized and rewarded, and not blamed and punished.
LO 11.3 Actions to Sustain Change
What actions will increase the probability that change will be sustained? No specific
set of steps can guarantee success, but awareness of the threats to sustainability can
lead to timely and effective responses. Action to secure sustainability is often identified
as the final point in the “change recipes” that we discussed in chapter 10. For example,
“institutionalize new approaches” is step 8 in John Kotter’s (2007) eight-step model
of transformational change. However, sustainability depends not just on what happens
after implementation, but also on the cumulative effects of decisions and actions during
the change process. In other words, it is more effective to plan for sustainability from
the beginning than to regard this as an issue that can be left until a later stage.
Here are eight sets of actions that should be considered when designing a change ini-
tiative, in order to build sustainability into the process from the beginning, or at least from
an early stage.
Busting the Momentum Busters
Reflecting on his experience of the “momentum
busters” that derailed transformational change
in the U.S. Postal Service, Robert Reisner (2002,
pp. 51–52) identifies “four hard lessons” for
organizations undertaking a major change initiative
in a turbulent economic environment:
1. Don’t miss your moment
We missed numerous market opportunities that
competitors such as UPS seized. Furthermore,
we let pass at least two chances to capitalize
on high morale and momentum within the
Postal Service, moments that provided the
best opportunity to overcome organizational
resistance to change
2. Connect change initiatives to your core business
Most of the innovative programs we launched
to boost revenue existed at the fringes of our
business. And we never established a path for
them to migrate to the heart of our operations.
3. Don’t mistake incremental improvements for
strategic transformation
[O]ur tremendous success in improving delivery
times, which we enthusiastically celebrated,
blinded us to the need for strategic change. For
a time, we slipped into complacency, ignoring
our competition and challenges and declaring
ourselves the winner in a race with ourselves.
4. Be realistic about your limits and the pace of change
[I]n a change initiative, it is important to
identify which obstacles are in your control
and which aren’t. Some of what we wanted
to do may simply not have been possible,
at least at the time. . . . While some of our
constraints—our regulatory framework, if not
our very size and complexity—are specific to
us, every organization has limits of one kind or
another. It may seem heretical to say so in the
can-do environment of American business, but
sometimes you need to accept those limits. A
failure to acknowledge that you sometimes can’t
do certain things can breed discouragement and
cynicism, ultimately undermining those change
initiatives that are achievable.
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 363
Redesign Roles Organizational change, particularly where new structures, processes, and technologies
are involved, often leads to the redesign of existing roles and to the creation of new
ones. However, these role changes may be a critical dimension of the process, and
not just a product of change. Michael Beer et al. (1990) argue that most change
programs do not work because they focus on attempts to change attitudes and beliefs
by introducing new perspectives. The assumption that underpins this approach, that
changes in behavior will follow changes in attitudes, is in their view fundamentally
flawed. The causal arrow, they suggest, runs in the opposite direction. Behavior is
influenced by the context in which people find themselves—by their responsibilities,
relationships, and roles. In short, first redesign roles, which require new behaviors,
and attitude change will then follow. It is difficult to revert to past behavior with a
new formal role definition, which is one of a network of similarly redesigned roles.
Sustainability is not guaranteed by this approach, but it is significantly encouraged.
Redesign Reward Systems Beer and Nohria (2000, p. 267) also observe, “There are virtually no fundamental changes
in organizations that do not also involve some changes in the reward system.” This is
one consequence of redesigning roles and responsibilities. Anne Fisher (1995, p. 122)
cites the example of Integra Financial, a $14 billion (in assets) bank holding company
that was formed through a merger. In order to reinforce the company’s commitment to
a teamwork initiative, management implemented a carefully designed evaluation and
reward system, “to discourage hot-dogging, grandstanding, filibustering, and other ego
games” and to ensure that “the best team players get the goodies.” Fisher (1995, p. 122)
also notes, “One thing that you can count on: Whatever gets rewarded will get done.” This
also means that whatever is not rewarded (such as pre-change working practices) will not
get done. Changing the reward system can thus contribute significantly to sustainability by
removing the financial motivation to return to old behaviors.
Rewards should also include public recognition of behaviors that are consistent with
the desired change: this both reinforces individual behavior and sends strong signals to
others. The opposite also applies: management failure to respond to behavior that is in
direct opposition to the change undermines the credibility of the program. Lack of action
in this respect can increase rapidly the rate of initiative decay. The organization’s pay
system can thus support or derail a change initiative.
Link Selection to Change Objectives Staff selection, and promotion processes, can be subtle but powerful ways in which
to embed and sustain assumptions and values—to change and to maintain the
organization’s culture. As with the rewards system, appointments and promotions,
particularly to key and influential roles, have symbolic significance in signalling
whether top management really support a change, or not. A single inappropriate senior
appointment during the change process can quickly derail all the implementation work
that has already been undertaken.
To support organizational changes with selection, a number of organizations have
adopted “values-based recruitment” systems, which seek to select staff whose motives,
attitudes, and values support what the organization is trying to achieve. For example,
364 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
Jonathan Rapping (2009) describes a values-based recruitment, training, and mentoring
program for selecting and developing public defenders to represent poor clients in criminal
cases in Georgia. Poor defendants often have problems finding lawyers, who then refuse to
visit them in jail. To change this traditional culture, recruitment and selection changed to
emphasize values relating to enthusiastic and loyal representation, advocating the client’s
cause, studying and preparing the case, and communicating with the client.
Triggered by failures in quality of social care in the United Kingdom, Jacqui Goode
(2014) describes a values-based recruitment toolkit to help employers to find people
with values appropriate to working in this sector. This toolkit includes sample job
advertisements, an online personality profiling questionnaire, and suggested values-based
interview questions such as: “What excites you about working in adult social care?” and
“Can you give an example of where your understanding of what another person may be
going through has helped you to develop your compassion for that person?” and “Tell me
about a time when you have ‘gone the extra mile’ at work.” The answers to these kinds of
questions reveal candidates’ behavior and their values with regard to care and compassion.
Walk the Talk This is a well-known cliché. However, senior management can seriously jeopardize
the sustainability of change if their words and actions are interpreted by employees as
signalling, “We don’t really mean it.” In other words, if the top team does not support
this change, why should we? Little is more damaging to the credibility of a change
program than a lack of consistency between the statements and behaviors of the change
advocates. Even if management did not mean to send negative signals, “unintentional
hypocrisy” can be equally damaging (Fisher, 1995).
One indicator of consistency concerns changes in management practices that are clearly
aligned with the goals of the change. For example, who is praised and promoted and why?
Is management enthusiastically advocating teamwork while still rewarding individual
performance? Where are resources—finance, staffing, expertise—being allocated? The
commitment of resources to an initiative in such a way that to withdraw would be extremely
costly conveys unambiguous management support (as Alan Lafley did—see box). All of
these management decisions and actions have symbolic as well as tangible effects. Edgar
Schein (2010) argues that managers signal what is important by what they systematically pay
attention to. “Communication” is not confined to conversations, meetings, presentations, and
emails, but includes all management actions—and omissions—that send signals concerning
goals and priorities (and we have also to recognize that those signals may or may not be
interpreted in the manner that management intended).
Alan Lafley’s Moment of Truth
Early in his time as chief executive at Procter &
Gamble, Alan Lafley had to decide whether to
approve a major marketing effort to launch several
new products. This would require significant com-
mitment of funds, and P&G had just missed earnings
targets two quarters in a row. But Lafley had been
working hard communicating the message that
innovation was P&G’s lifeblood. Lafley describes his
response: “So we locked arms and we went ahead.
I had to make choices like these to convince P&G
managers we were going to go for winning” (Gupta
and Wendler, 2005, p. 4).
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 365
Encourage Voluntary Acts of Initiative John Kotter (2012) emphasizes the value of having many change agents in an organi-
zation, and not just the usual small elite team, arguing that vision and strategy should
be communicated in a manner that creates buy-in and attracts a growing “volunteer
army” (p. 52). From their four-year study of organizational change in six corporations,
Michael Beer et al. (1990) conclude that in encouraging change, the most effective
senior managers specified the general direction in which they wanted the company to
move and left the details of specific changes to be decided “closer to the action,” lower
down the organization. They found that change was more likely to become embedded
if those at the operational level were supported when they developed for themselves the
specific changes that they believed appropriate for their local circumstance.
Measure Progress A focus on measurement is important for two reasons. First, metrics and milestones are
fundamental to tracking the progress of change, highlighting the need for any corrective
action. Second, what gets measured can significantly affect how people act, because
measurement signals the importance of that aspect of performance. Less attention is
paid to dimensions of performance that are not measured. From a survey of the change
experiences of over 2,000 executives, Giancarlo Ghislanzoni et al. (2010, p. 8) found that
two of the top five procedures used by organizations whose changes had been successful
were “defining detailed metrics for reorganization’s effect on short- and long-term
performance and assessing progress against them” and “using detailed plans, split into
workstreams with milestones for delivery and someone accountable for reaching each.”
Progress measurement is thus important both for implementation and for sustainability.
It is important to choose appropriate metrics (see “Change Metrics: The Continental
Airlines Experience”). David Nadler (1997) argues that organizations should carry out a
comprehensive progress check on major change initiatives within six months after they
have begun, and then annually thereafter. These checks should use a combination of quan-
titative performance measures, attitude surveys, focus groups, and interviews with indi-
viduals. Kanter et al. (1992) suggest that two kinds of measures are particularly helpful.
First, results measures: How will we know that we have achieved our objectives? Second,
process measures: How will we know that we are doing what is necessary to achieve
those objectives, and how plans may need to be adjusted? The Price Waterhouse Change
Integration Team (1995) argue that a balanced set of performance measures should include:
• Leading measures, which reveal the immediate results of a new initiative, such as
changes in processing time, or time-to-market for new products
• Lagging measures, such as financial performance, and corporate image, that can take
time to become apparent
• Internal measures, focusing on intra-organizational processes and efficiencies
• External measures, such as the perspectives of stakeholders, customers, and suppliers,
and how the organization compares with benchmark competitors
• Cost-based measures, that are directly financial
• Non-cost measures, such as market share and brand image
Exercise 11.1 asks you to apply these measures to a current change in your own organi-
zation, or one with which you are familiar. Do all of these measures apply? If not, why not?
366 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
Celebrate en Route Months or years can pass before the outcomes of a change initiative are fully realized. Most
of those who are involved expect to see convincing evidence that their efforts are being
rewarded. A lack of clear evidence of success strengthens the views of those who initially
resisted the change. Skepticism concerning the value of the change may thus be increased by
delays in demonstrating the benefits. However, it is often the case that some tangible benefits
can be identified at an early stage in the process. John Kotter (2012, p. 52) thus argues that
one of the “accelerators” of change is to celebrate significant short-term wins. Celebrating
the early benefits, even if they are relatively small in scale, recognizes and rewards those who
are involved, strengthens the credibility of the program, and helps to weaken the skepticism.
Celebrating Success at Sandvik
Sandvik Materials Technology produces advanced
alloys and ceramic materials, and employs over 8,000
people in 50 production and 30 sales units across the
world. When a change program focusing on business
processes was introduced, some of Sandvik’s units
soon achieved very significant improvements. People
from these units then visited other units, in particular
those where there was skepticism about the change.
These visits spread knowledge of successes and
helped people in other units see what improvements
could be achieved through the change initiative.
Later, when a key financial target was reached, this
was acknowledged by having a photograph taken of
the Sandvik management team standing on top of a
pile of gravel. However, according to Sandvik pres-
ident Peter Gossas, “When we looked at the photo
we thought, ‘Yes, success should be celebrated but
hey, this is the wrong message.’ So we added five
bigger piles to symbolize mountains we have yet to
climb” (Ahlberg and Nauclér, 2007, p. 3).
Change Metrics The Continental Airlines Experience
When Gordon Bethune became chief executive
of Continental Airlines in 1994, it had been losing
money for most of the previous decade, had a debt-
to-equity ratio of 50 to 1, and had served some
time in Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy code.
During this period, Continental had emphasized
competing on the basis of cheaper fares than its
major competitors. However, although it achieved
the lowest cost per available seat mile (of the major
airlines), it also had the lowest revenue per available
seat mile and a loss overall. Bethune reflects on this
situation:
I firmly believe that what you measure is what
you get. This is an example of a company that
said that it couldn’t compete with the big boys
In addition, the links between changed systems and working practices and organi-
zational performance should be made clear. Staff who have to work out those links for
themselves may not make accurate assumptions. And successes, if they are effectively pub-
licized and widely understood, can act as catalysts for further changes (see “ Celebrating
Success at Sandvik”). A further implication of the focus on celebrating “en route” con-
cerns the allocation of resources to priority areas; those areas that need the most urgent
attention may provide the best opportunities to demonstrate clear and immediate benefits,
which can then be celebrated as short-term wins. Failure to establish those priorities at an
early stage in the change process may be a direct cause of change failure.
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 367
Fine-Tuning Despite careful advance planning, most change initiatives do not unfold as anticipated.
The need for corrective action is to be expected. Making timely modifications in the
light of experience will normally be more effective than attempting not to deviate from
plan. Problems arise for two main reasons. First, by definition, the implementation
of change always involves doing something new, something that has never been done
before. A particular type of change program may of course have been implemented in
another division, or another organization—but that change will always be new here, in
this organization, in this division, at this time, for these reasons, with those resources,
affecting our staff. In other words, change management always involves “building
the plane as you fly,” and it is not surprising if parts fall off. Second, organizational
changes are multifaceted, affecting many different factors that are themselves inter-
linked. It is therefore difficult to anticipate all of the “knock on” effects or “ripples”
that a change in one area will have elsewhere.
For the change manager, this means adjusting and refining aspects of the implementation
process without this being seen as an admission of failure. This can be difficult in practice,
because “we have learned from experience” can also be described as “you made mistakes in
the planning.” This can be addressed by communicating the fine-tuning in terms of consis-
tency with the original goals. As we have noted elsewhere, part of the change management
responsibility is to help others to make sense of what is happening, to shape and to retell the
story, and to explain that the core principles that lie behind the change remain intact.
unless it was able to have cheaper fares. That set
the culture and mind-set. So, we had a culture
that said, “Cost is everything.” That’s the Holy
Grail. We even had pilots turning down the
air-conditioning and slowing down airplanes to
save the cost of fuel. They made passengers hot,
mad and late. That’s a dysfunctional measure,
a measure some accountant dreamed up who
does not understand our business.
Bethune responded by investigating what factors
most influenced passengers’ level of satisfaction with
airlines. This revealed that on-time performance
was the most significant factor. Unfortunately, at
the time of Bethune’s arrival, Continental ranked
10th of the 10 largest U.S. carriers on this criterion.
Nonetheless, Bethune changed the core metric used
inside Continental to on-time performance:
We use that measure for two reasons. One
because it is the single most vital sign of a func-
tioning airline, and two, it’s ranked by our Gov-
ernment and we can’t screw the metrics.
To reinforce the centrality of this factor, a new
system of rewards was established in which bonuses
were paid to all staff each month that Continental
was ranked in the top 5 of the 10 largest U.S. carri-
ers for on-time performance. The cost of the bonus
payments was more than covered by the reduction
in the amount—that had risen to $6 million per
month—that Continental had been paying to put
passengers on other airlines, put them up in hotels,
bus them across town, and so forth.
The next month, March 1995, we wound up in
first place. We had never been in first place in
60 years. I mean, Continental, the worst com-
pany in America for the last 20 years, is first place
in “on time” which is a metric everyone kind of
understands.
By 1996 (and again in 1997), Continental had
won the J. D. Power & Associates award for cus-
tomer satisfaction as the best airline for flights of
500 miles or more and was in the top three in terms
of fewest customer complaints and lost baggage.
From 1995 to 1998, Continental’s market capitaliza-
tion rose from $230 million to $3 billion.
Source: Copyright © 1998 by Joel Kurtzman. Used with permission
of the author.
368 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
In this section, we have discussed eight sets of actions to consider when designing a
change initiative, in order to build sustainability into the process from the beginning, or
at least from an early stage. These include redesign roles, redesign reward systems, link
selection to organizational objectives, walk the talk, encourage voluntary acts of initiative,
measure progress, celebrate en route, and fine-tuning. Finally, based on a study by David
Buchanan et al. (2007) of the UK National Health Service, one of the largest employing
organizations in the world, table 11.3 summarizes key sustainability “actions and cau-
tions.” This research emphasizes that sustainability relies on local management judgement
and on two main forms of action: preventive maintenance and developmental maintenance.
Preventive maintenance involves action to sustain the status quo, to keep new working
Fine-Tuning at Ford
In 1995, Ford Motor Company introduced a series
of changes to the way the company designed and
manufactured its cars and trucks. This involved
changing from an existing functional structure,
consolidating activities into five vehicle centers, and
using a reduced number of platforms for its vehi-
cle range. After a year and a half, senior manage-
ment decided to make modifications in light of the
initial experience. However, the changes had been
viewed with some skepticism by some groups and
individuals both inside the company and in the
financial community. As a result, when the time
came to announce the modifications (e.g., consol-
idating further from five to three vehicle centers),
the company paid a lot of attention to making
sure that the further changes were presented as a
refinement, that is, a logical adjustment completely
in keeping with the spirit and intent of the original
change (Nadler, 1997).
TABLE 11.3 Managing the Improvement Evaporation Effect
Sustainability Actions Sustainability Cautions
Define what “sustainability” means in your context: a static or a dynamic perspective, and what timescale?
Do not defer sustainability planning, as some modes of development and change implementation will damage sustainability
Identify the factors (contextual, temporal, organizational, political) that affect the sustainability of new methods in your context
Do not expect changes to survive because they are now working; staff leave, resources are reallocated, novel ideas become familiar
Determine what combination of factors can you control and adjust in order to increase the probability of sustaining change
Do not ignore the risk factors: if you are unable to sustain successful changes, that will reduce the probability of other sites adapting the approach and will jeopardize future changes
Monitor the support conditions and implement an appropriate mix of preventive and developmental maintenance
Do not allow efforts to sustain change to block the development of other good ideas
Allow or encourage changes to decay when they no longer fit the context or when better methods become available
Do not withdraw preventive and developmental maintenance as long as you wish the approach to be sustained
Source: Based on Buchanan et al. (2007).
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 369
practices operating as intended, to meet predetermined targets and objectives. Develop-
mental maintenance involves continuing to adapt the changes to local circumstances in
order to sustain an improvement trajectory, to exceed expectation, to meet higher targets.
Preventive maintenance sustains the changes; developmental maintenance both sustains
and builds on the benefits.
LO 11.4 Words of Warning
It can be difficult to manage sustainability after a change has been successfully imple-
mented; by then, it may be too late. Building sustainability into a change initiative from
the beginning provides no secure guarantees, but it is more likely to be an effective
approach. However, there are a number of further factors about which the change man-
ager needs to be aware.
Expect the Unanticipated Most change initiatives will generate unanticipated consequences, unless the links
between the changes and outcomes are controllable and predictable (which is rare).
Unanticipated consequences may be positive and support the change process. For
example, staff may demonstrate greater levels of enthusiasm and commitment to mak-
ing the changes work than was initially anticipated; cost savings may be higher than
planned; processing times may be cut more dramatically. On the other hand, support
may be more limited than expected, causing disruption and delay; cost savings may not
materialize; time savings may be minimal. Unanticipated outcomes are not necessarily
a sign of management failure; in complex change processes, the unexpected is to be
expected. No amount of careful preplanning is likely to overcome this.
The change management challenge is to respond in timely and appropriate ways to the
unexpected, which, on some occasions, may be early warnings of more serious problems,
requiring a combination of resilience and improvisation.
Unanticipated Consequences at FedEx
Federal Express (FedEx) introduced a new aircraft
routing system with the intention of increasing the
productivity of its pilots. More powerful computers
and developments in scheduling algorithms made
this seem feasible, the estimated savings in the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars made it attractive, and
the pilots had a record of supporting measures
intended to improve competitive efficiencies.
However, things didn’t work out as planned.
The new system produced flight plans that required
pilots to cross the time zones of two hemispheres,
undertake back-to-back trans-Pacific and trans-
Atlantic flights, and spend hours travelling by land
to change aircraft. Efforts by FedEx to improve the
working of the new system failed to produce any
improvement, but the company persisted with the
new system. In response, the pilots’ union, despite
having a reputation for compliance with manage-
ment requirements, threatened a work stoppage if
the system was not abandoned. Then, having taken
this stance, their demands extended to a substan-
tial wage increase, fewer flying hours, and improved
retirement benefits.
Faced with the prospect of a strike by the
pilots—which would have been the first pilot strike
in the company’s history—FedEx management
relented, and the new scheduling system was aban-
doned (from Pascale et al., 2000).
370 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
Beware the Limitations of Measurement The benefits derived from new ways of doing things (online customer satisfaction,
brand image, and reputation) may not immediately be reflected in traditional measures
(sales per square foot, stock turnover, market share). The credibility of a new idea may
be threatened if it does not succeed on established criteria. However, in some circum-
stances, a change may be regarded as successful even where the intended aims have not
been met—such as a major process redesign initiative that achieved few of the intended
goals but which increased the organization’s receptiveness to and capacity for further
changes. Assessing the effectiveness of change is therefore complex and challenging.
“Premature measurement” can also create problems. As discussed earlier, celebrating
short-term wins can be valuable, but measuring the overall success of a change initiative
should be related to the timescale over which benefits are expected to be delivered. A
focus on short-term gains and quick fixes can weaken the persistence that is often required
in order to achieve gains that develop over a longer period. In addition, organizational
change rarely flows in a linear fashion, and the outcomes tend to be shaped by the combi-
nation and interaction of multiple factors. At times, change may appear to be progressing
rapidly, while at other times, it may appear to have stalled. In some instances, performance
may deteriorate before it improves, as people learn how to adjust to and work with new
structures, systems, procedures, and practices. This initial dip followed by an uptick in
performance is known as the “J-curve” (figure 11.1). This is also known as (Rosabeth
Moss) “Kanter’s Law,” which states that “Everything can look like a failure in the middle”
(Kanter, 2009).
P e rf o rm
a n c e
Time
Original performance level
FIGURE 11.1 The J-curve
The shape of the J-curve, and the timescale over which it operates, will of course vary
from one setting to another (performance may not dip in some cases, and may never
recover in others). Assessment of how well a change is progressing must consider not only
which metrics to apply, but also the timing of those measurements. The J-curve can be
helpful in managing the expectations of others, with regard to justifying a deterioration in
performance, and also explaining the rate at which the benefits of the change are likely to
become apparent.
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 371
Beware Premature Declaration of Victory Embedding and sustaining organization culture change can take a considerable amount
of time—years in some cases. For any transformational change, John Kotter (2012, p. 52)
advises the change manager to “never let up; keep learning from experience; and don’t
declare victory too soon.” In other words, celebrate the wins, but do not declare overall
victory. Until a change is firmly embedded, the possibility of a return to previous work-
ing practices will remain possible. There may be significant numbers of people who are
hoping that the change will not succeed, and that “things will return to normal.” Those
who feel this way may not make their views known. Anne Fisher uses the term “vicious
compliance” to describe those who display support in public (“they will nod and smile and
agree with everything that you say”) but are resentful of the change and are waiting for the
opportunity to return to the “old ways” of working to which they remain committed.
Beware the Escalation of Commitment It is important to recognize that not all proposed changes are going to be beneficial. If
a change is not producing the desired outcome, then this may be a “praiseworthy fail-
ure,” which it would be wise to discontinue. However, it is also wise to guard against
the understandable tendency of the advocates of this change to argue that failure to
deliver is due to insufficient funding and that more time is needed to demonstrate the
benefits. If those arguments are accepted, then further resources will be allocated to the
initiative, creating an “escalation of commitment.” Barry Staw and Jerry Ross (2004)
identify four factors that can lead to escalation:
1. Project determinants. Commitment is likely to increase where the lack of progress is
considered to be due to a temporary problem, or where additional funding is considered
likely to be effective, or where the relative payoff to come from additional investment is
considered to be large.
2. Psychological determinants. “Sunk costs are not sunk psychologically.” Escalation can
result from self-justification biases in which having been personally responsible for a
decision can lead to continued commitment in order to try to avoid being associated
with losses.
3. Social determinants. Escalation may occur as those most closely identified with a proj-
ect commit more resources in an attempt to revive it and thereby save face by not being
associated with a failure. This response is encouraged by the existence of “the hero
effect,” or the “special praise and adoration for managers who ‘stick to their guns’ in
the face of opposition and seemingly bleak odds” (Staw and Ross, 2004, p. 209).
4. Organizational determinants. Organizational units are likely to resist the abandonment
of a project that is seen as central to their identity. Staw and Ross cite the example
of Lockheed’s L1011 Tri-Star Jet program, arguing that the company persisted with
this project for more than a decade, despite huge losses—and predictions that it was
unlikely to earn a profit—because to abandon it would have meant admitting that they
were simply a defense contractor and not, as they preferred to believe, a pioneer in
commercial aircraft.
How can escalation of commitment be avoided? Mark Keil and Ramiro Montealegre
(2000) identify the following advice:
372 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
• Don’t ignore negative feedback or external pressure.
• Hire an external assessor to provide an independent view on progress.
• Don’t be afraid to withhold further resources/funding; as well as limiting losses, it has
symbolic value in that it is a fairly emphatic signal that there is concern with progress.
• Look for opportunities to redefine the problem and thereby generate ideas for courses
of action other than the one being abandoned.
• Manage impressions. Frame the “de-escalation” in a way that saves face.
• Prepare your stakeholders, because, if they shared the initial belief in the rationale for
the change, their reaction to an announcement of the abandonment of the change may
be to resist.
• Look for opportunities to deinstitutionalize the project; that is, to make clear that the
project is not a central defining feature of the organization, so that “stepping back” does
not imply any weakening of commitment to the central mission of the organization.
Dipankar Ghosh (1997) suggests three further steps that can help to reduce the escala-
tion of commitment. First, unambiguous feedback on progress reduces escalation. Where
feedback is ambiguous, the tendency to filter information selectively can lead to escala-
tion by those who are already committed to the change. Second, regular progress reports,
including explanations for deviations from budget. If progress reports are not a require-
ment, then they will not necessarily be requested before further resources are committed.
Sustainable Organizations
Jeffrey Pfeffer (2010) argues that, in order to build
sustainable organizations, we need to treat human
sustainability as seriously as we do environmen-
tal and ecological concerns. Organization policies
and management practices influence the human
and social environment and affect employee well-
being in various ways: provision of health insurance,
effects of layoffs, working hours and work-life bal-
ance, job design and stress, income inequalities,
organization culture, and emotional climate:
Companies that do not provide health insur-
ance, lay people off, pay inadequate wages, and
have work arrangements that stress and over-
work their employees also impose externalities
that others pay for even as they save on their
own costs. (p. 42)
However, “green management,” which is con-
cerned with environmental awareness, energy effi-
ciency, and carbon emissions, has not been matched
by a parallel focus on employee welfare, “even
though that might be an interesting and informative
indicator of what companies are doing about the
sustainability of their people” (p. 36). Actions affect-
ing the physical environment are more visible:
You can see the icebergs melting, polar bears
stranded, forests cut down, and mountaintops
reshaped by mining, and experience firsthand
the dirty air and water that can come from com-
pany economic activities that impose externali-
ties. Reduced life expectancy and poorer physical
and mental health status are more hidden from
view. Even the occasional and well-publicized act
of employee or ex-employee violence has multi-
ple causes and is often seen as aberrant behavior
outside of the control and responsibility of the
employer. (p. 41)
Pfeffer proposes a research agenda to explore
the implications of “human sustainability” policies
on both employee welfare and organizational effec-
tiveness. What steps is your organization taking to
address human and social sustainability? What fur-
ther action would be desirable, and why?
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 373
Third, information on future benefits. In the absence of these data, decisions will be too
heavily influenced by historical costs.
Awareness of the phenomenon of escalation of commitment is the starting point for
identifying solutions. However, this can be a challenging problem to manage, as the line
between optimistic “can-do-ism” and overcommitment can be difficult to establish.
EXERCISE 11.1
A Balanced
Set of
Measures
It is helpful to consider appropriate measures of success for a change initiative. Thinking of a change initiative that is currently under way in your organization (or a change that is taking place in an organization with which you are familiar), identify the measures that you think should be applied, and list them in the following table. By ticking the appro- priate column ), note which type of measures you have identified. It may be possible to classify any one measure in more than one category; brand image, for example, may be lagging, external, and non-cost.
If the measures that you are proposing do not include all six types of measures, you need to explain why the “missing” types are not included. If you cannot give a good explanation, you may need to propose additional measures.
Type of Measure
Measure Leading Lagging Internal External Cost Non-cost
1. . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LO 11.3
LO 11.3
EXERCISE 11.2
Treating
Initiative
Decay
Earlier in this chapter, we identified “the top ten” causes of initiative decay. Which of these factors apply to the recent changes in your organization? What additional factors, not men- tioned here, could cause initiative decay in your organization? Considering each cause in turn, what treatment would you prescribe in order to avoid or to reduce the decay?
Cause Prescribed Treatment
1. Initiators move on
2. Accountability becomes diffuse
3. Knowledge lost through staff turnover
4. Old habits imported with new recruits
5. Change triggers no longer visible
6. New managers with their own agendas
7. Powerbrokers blocking progress
8. Pump-priming funds have run out
9. Other priorities diverting attention
10. Initiative fatigue, lack of enthusiasm
11. Other
LO 11.3
374 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
EXERCISE 11.3
The Chal-
lenger and
Columbia
Shuttle
Disasters
We discussed the 2003 Columbia shuttle disaster in chapter 3. There, we explored reasons why organizations (in this case NASA) often fail to change following accidents such as this one, having previously lost the shuttle Challenger in 1986. We also explored the organization culture at NASA in chapter 5, emphasizing that, while the blame for both shuttle losses was linked to technical problems, the more significant contributory factors lay with leadership, management, and organization culture issues. This is a familiar pattern, seen in many major catastrophes. Here is a fuller account of both disasters, which contain lessons concerning organizational change in general and the sustainability of change in particular. The space exploration program is unique in many respects, but from a change management perspective, the lessons from these experiences are generic.
As you read this case account, consider the following questions:
1. What aspects of NASA practice revealed following the Columbia disaster suggest that the changes that were recommended following the Challenger disaster were not sustained?
2. This chapter has discussed actions that can be taken to sustain change. In your judgement, which of the following would have been most useful to NASA after the Challenger disaster?
• Redesign roles
• Redesign reward systems
• Link selection to organizational objectives
• Walk the talk
• Encourage voluntary acts of initiative
• Measure progress
• Celebrate en route
• Fine-tuning
3. This chapter has explained “words of warning” in terms of what to be alert to in regard to sustaining change. Which of the following do you see as most applicable to NASA?
• Recognize productive, praiseworthy failures
• Expect the unanticipated
• Beware the limitations of measurement
• Beware premature declaration of victory
• Beware the escalation of commitment
The Challenger Disaster
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger rose into the sky, its seven crew strapped into their padded seats while the 2,000-ton vehicle vibrated as it gained speed and altitude. The launch was going perfectly. Seventy seconds had passed since liftoff and the shuttle was already 50,000 feet above the earth. From NASA Mission Control at Houston’s Johnson Space Center, Spacecraft Communicator Richard Covey instructed, “Challenger, go at throttle up.” “Roger, go at throttle up,” replied Challenger commander Dick Scobee.
LO 11.3,11.4
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 375
In the next few seconds, however, Challenger experienced some increasingly violent maneuvers. The pilot, Mike Smith, expressed his sudden apprehension: “Uh-oh.” In Mission Control, the pulsing digits on the screen abruptly stopped. Mission Control spokesman Steve Nesbitt sat above the four console tiers. For a long moment he stared around the silent, softly lit room. The red ascent trajectory line was stationary on the display screen. Finally he spoke: “Flight controllers here looking very carefully at the situation. Obviously a major malfunction.”
Headed by former secretary of state William Rogers, the Presidential Commission that was set up to investigate the cause of the Challenger disaster had little trouble identifying the physical cause. One of the joints on a booster rocket failed to seal. The “culprit” was one of the synthetic rubber O-rings that were designed to keep the rockets’ superheated gasses from escaping from the joints between the booster’s four main segments. When one of the O-rings failed, the resulting flames burned through the shuttle’s external fuel tank. Liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen then mixed and ignited, causing the explosion that destroyed Challenger.
However, the Rogers Commission investigations also revealed a great deal about the internal workings of NASA. It was a geographically dispersed matrix organization. Headquarters were in Washington, DC, where its most senior managers, including its head, NASA administrator James Begg, were mainly involved in lobbying activity, reflecting the dependence on federal funds (and its vulnerability to fluctuations in funding). Mission Control was located at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. All propulsion aspects—main engines, rocket boosters, fuel tanks—were the responsibility of the Marshall Space Center in Huntsville, Alabama. Assembly and launch took place at the Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, Florida.
These various centers existed in an uneasy alliance of cooperation and competition. The Marshall Center in particular was known for its independent stance based on its proud tradition going right back through the Apollo program to the early days of rocketry with Werner von Braun. One manifestation of this pride, reinforced by its autocratic leader William Lucas, was that loyalty to Marshall came before all. Any problems that were identified were to be kept strictly “in-house,” which at Marshall meant within Marshall. Those who failed to abide by this expectation—perhaps by speaking too freely to other parts of NASA—could expect to receive a very public admonishment. Marshall was also at the center of a “can-do” attitude within NASA, supporting the idea that great objectives are achievable if only the will is there. Born of the Apollo success, this took form in Marshall as pride in the achievement of objectives and strongly held views that if a flight was to be delayed for any reason, it would never be because of something caused by Marshall.
The Commission also concluded that NASA was working with an unrealistic flight schedule. The formal schedule demanded twelve flights in 1984, fourteen in 1985, seventeen in 1986 and again in 1987, and twenty-four in 1988. In practice, NASA had managed five launches in 1984 and eight in 1985. Congressional critics had begun to question the appropriateness of continuing the current (high) level of program funding when NASA was falling so far short in meeting its own goals. However, rather than revise its schedules, these were retained and senior NASA managers increased the pressure on staff and contractors to meet the schedules.
Most of the design and construction work in the shuttle program was contracted out. One of the contractors was Morton Thiokol, a Brigham City, Utah-based company that had won the contract to produce the solid rocket boosters. At the time of the Challenger launch, Thiokol and NASA were in the middle of contract renewal negotiations.
(Continued)
376 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
The Commission revealed that there had been doubts about the reliability of the O-rings for some time. Since 1982, they had been labelled a “criticality 1” item, a label reserved for components whose failure would have a catastrophic result. However, despite evidence of O-ring erosion on many flights, and requests from O-ring experts both from NASA and Thiokol that flights be suspended until the problem was resolved, no action had been taken. There was no reliable backup to the O-rings. This violated a long-standing NASA principle, but each time a flight was scheduled, this principle was formally waived.
A cold front hit Cape Canaveral the day before the scheduled launch. Temperatures as low as 18°F were forecast for that night. Engineers from Thiokol expressed their serious reservations about the wisdom of launching in such conditions because the unusually cold conditions at the launch site would affect the O-rings’ ability to seal. As a result, a teleconference was called for that evening.
At the teleconference, Roger Boisjoly, Thiokol’s O-ring expert, argued that temperature was a factor in the performance of the rings, and Robert Lund, Thiokol’s vice president for engineering, stated that unless the temperature reached at least 53°F, he did not want the launch to proceed. This position led to a strong reaction from NASA, and from Lawrence Mulloy, Marshall’s chief of the solid rocket booster program, and George Hardy, Marshall’s deputy director of science and engineering. Hardy said that he was “appalled” at the reasoning behind Thiokol’s recommendation to delay the launch, and Mulloy argued that Thiokol had not proven the link between temperature and erosion of the O-rings, adding, “My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?” A view expressed at the Commission was that the Thiokol engineers had been put in a position where, in order for a delay to be approved, they were being required to prove that the O-rings would fail, rather than to prove that they would be safe at the low temperatures before a go-ahead was approved.
The teleconference took a break, to allow the Thiokol management team to consider their position. The Thiokol engineers were still unanimously opposed to a launch. Jerald Mason, Thiokol’s senior vice president, asked Robert Lund to “take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat.” Polling just the senior Thiokol managers present, and not any of the engineers, Mason managed to get agreement to launch. The teleconference was then reconvened. The Thiokol approval was conveyed, no NASA managers expressed any reservations, and the OK to launch was given.
Post-Challenger Changes at NASA
The Commission’s recommendations included that NASA restructure its management to tighten control, set up a group dedicated to finding and tracking hazards with regard to shuttle safety, and review its critical items as well as submitting its redesign of the booster joint to a National Academy of Sciences group for verification. The official line within NASA was that the necessary changes had been successfully implemented. A NASA news release on January 22, 1988, stated that:
In response to various reviews of NASA safety and quality programs conducted in the aftermath of the Challenger accident and associated recommendations for improvements, NASA has acted to elevate agency emphasis on safety and implement organizational changes to strengthen SRM&QA [Safety, Reliability, Management & Quality Assurance] programs. There has been a 30 percent increase in NASA personnel assigned to SRM&QA functions since January 1986.
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 377
The Columbia Disaster
On February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia’s braking rockets were fired as the shuttle headed toward a landing at Kennedy Space Center. As it passed over the United States, observers spotted glowing pieces of debris falling from the shuttle. At 8:59:32 am EST, commander Rick Husband replied to a call from Mission Control, but his acknowledgment ceased mid-transmission. About a minute later, Columbia broke up, killing its seven astronauts.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB or Board) was formed to identify what had happened. In its August 2003 final report, it identified the physical cause of the accident. A 1.67-pound slab of insulating foam fell off the external fuel tank 81.7 seconds after Columbia was launched (on January 16), hit the left wing, and caused a breach in the tiles designed to protect the aluminum wing from the heat of reentry. On reentry, the breach allowed superheated gas into the wing, which, as a result, melted in critical areas.
But the Board also addressed the nonphysical factors that contributed to the disaster. Because of no improvement in the level of NASA funding, NASA administrator Daniel Goldin pushed a “Faster, Better, Cheaper” (FBC) initiative that impacted on the shuttle program.
The premium placed on maintaining an operational schedule, combined with ever- decreasing resources, gradually led shuttle managers and engineers to miss signals of potential danger. Foam strikes on the orbiter’s thermal protection system (TPS), no matter what the size of the debris, were “normalized” and accepted as not being a “safety-of- flight risk.”
The shuttle workforce was downsized, and various program responsibilities (including safety oversight) had been outsourced. Success was being measured through cost reduction and the meeting of schedules, and the shuttle was still being mischaracterized as operational rather than developmental technology.
The Board particularly identified NASA’s organization culture as being as much to blame as the physical causes. According to the Board:
Though NASA underwent many management reforms in the wake of the Challenger accident, the agency’s powerful human space flight culture remained intact, as did many practices such as inadequate concern over deviations from expected perfor- mance, a silent safety program, and schedule pressure.
Cultural traits and organization practices detrimental to safety and reliability were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engi- neering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements/specifications); organizational barriers which prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differ- ences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements, and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes that oper- ated outside the organization’s rules.
According to the Board: “NASA’s blind spot is that it believes it has a strong safety culture [when in fact it] has become reactive, complacent, and dominated by unjustified optimism.” The Board found that while NASA managers said that staff were encouraged to identify safety issues and bring these to the attention of management, there was evidence to the contrary, including insufficient deference to engineers and other technical experts. Also, while NASA’s safety policy specified oversight at headquarters combined
(Continued)
378 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
with decentralized execution of safety programs at the program and project levels, the Board found that NASA had not been willing to give the project teams the independent status for this to actually work.
The external tank of the shuttle was designed with a layer of insulation tiles that were designed to stick to the tank, not to be shed. Similarly, the shuttle’s heat shield was not designed to be damaged; the tiles were fragile, such that the shuttle wasn’t allowed to fly in rain or stay outside in hail.
However, the experience of previous launches was that foam sometimes did fall off and tiles sometimes were damaged. But this was occurring without any noticeable negative effect on the functioning of the shuttle. Of 112 flights prior to the fatal Columbia flight, foam had been shed 70 times, and tiles had come back damaged every time. Over time, NASA managers got used to the idea that such damage would occur and convinced themselves there was no safety-of-flight issue. The Board reported that “program management made erroneous assumptions about the robustness of a system based on prior success rather than on dependable engineering data and rigorous testing.”
The report cites eight separate “missed opportunities” by NASA during the 16-day flight to respond to expressions of concern or offers that could have assisted. For example, engineer Rodney Rocha’s email four days into the mission, asking Johnson Space Center if the crew had been directed to inspect Columbia’s left wing for damage, had been left unanswered. Also, NASA had failed to accept the U.S. Defense Department’s offer to obtain spy satellite imagery of the damaged shuttle.
The CAIB faulted NASA managers for assuming that there would be nothing that could be done if the foam strike had indeed caused serious damage to the TPS. After the accident, NASA engineers, working on the request of the CAIB, concluded that it might have been possible either to repair the wing using materials on board Columbia or to rescue the crew through a sped-up launch of the shuttle Atlantis. The Board also criticized NASA managers for not taking steps to ensure that minority and dissenting voices were heard, commenting:
All voices must be heard, which can be difficult when facing a hierarchy. An employ- ee’s location in the hierarchy can encourage silence. Organizations interested in safety must take steps to guarantee that all relevant information is presented to decision makers. This did not happen in the meetings during the Columbia mission. Program managers created huge barriers against dissenting opinions by stating preconceived conclusions based on subjective knowledge and experience, rather than on solid data.
The NASA Intercenter Photo Working Group had recommended that the loss of foam be classified as an in-flight anomaly—a much more critical designation than it currently had—but this was not approved by the program requirements control board. The engineers were placed in the situation of having to prove that a safety-of-flight issue existed before the shuttle program management would take action to get images of the left wing. The Board found that this was just one example of a more general situation where those concerned with safety found themselves having to prove that a situation was unsafe, whereas it might be reasonably expected that the emphasis would be on proving instead that a high level of safety existed. The Board also concluded that there was an unofficial hierarchy among NASA programs and directorates that hindered the flow of communications:
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 379
Management decisions made during Columbia’s final flight reflect missed opportuni- ties, blocked or ineffective communication channels, flawed analysis, and ineffective leadership. Perhaps most striking is the fact that management displayed no interest in understanding a problem and its implications. Because managers failed to avail them- selves of the wide range of expertise and opinion necessary to achieve the best answer to the debris strike question—“was this a safety-of-flight concern?”—some space shut- tle program managers failed to fulfill the implicit contract to do whatever is possible to ensure the safety of the crew. In fact, their management techniques unknowingly imposed barriers that kept at bay both engineering concerns and dissenting views, and ultimately helped create “blind spots” that prevented them from seeing the dan- ger the foam strike posed.
The Board concluded that the post-Challenger changes “were undone over time by management actions” and that “the pre-Challenger layers of processes, boards and panels that had produced a false sense of confidence in the system and its level of safety returned in full force prior to Columbia.”
Sources:
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Buchanan, D. A., Fitzgerald, L., and Ketley, D. (eds.). 2007. The sustainability and
spread of organizational change: Modernizing healthcare. London: Routledge. Reports
a study of the problems of diffusing and sustaining new working practices in the UK
National Health Service. Based on case studies of sustainability practice in different areas
of healthcare, offers practical advice on the dissemination of new ideas and the steps nec-
essary to sustain those once implemented. The organization and management issues—and
implications for practice—apply to other organizations and sectors and are not confined
to healthcare.
Mahler, J. G., and Casamayou, M. H. 2009. Organizational learning at NASA: The Chal-
lenger and Columbia accidents. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Offers
a fresh analysis of the two NASA shuttle disasters, in terms of organizational learning.
What did NASA learn from the Challenger disaster? How much of that learning was
symbolic, and not substantive? What did NASA not learn? And what did NASA learn and
then forget—thus contributing to the loss of the shuttle Columbia? External political and
budgetary pressures were often to blame for the non-learning and forgetting, and these are
factors that also jeopardize the sustainability of the kinds of organizational changes that
NASA was advised to make.
Additional Reading
380 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
Pfeffer, J. 2010. Building sustainable organizations: The human factor. Academy of Man-
agement Perspectives 24(1):34–45. Argues that environmental sustainability has attracted
most of the attention and that human and social sustainability are equally important.
Suggests that, while “green management” can benefit an organization financially and in
terms of reputation, a similar focus on human sustainability should also generate returns.
Proposes a research agenda to explore links between human and social sustainability
practices and organizational effectiveness.
Sull, D., Homkes, R., and Sull, C. 2015. Why strategy execution unravels—and what to
do about it. Harvard Business Review 93(3):58–66. Strategy execution seems to be more
problematic than developing strategy, because execution is misunderstood. The problem
is not alignment, but coordination; research shows that people in other units (internal and
external) are not reliable. Execution does not mean “sticking to the plan” where changing
conditions demand flexibility. Communications from top management may be frequent,
but they are often inconsistent; only half of middle managers can name any of their orga-
nization’s top priorities. Does execution require a “performance culture”? Perhaps, but
agility, teamwork, and ambition should also be rewarded. The idea that execution should
be driven from the top is a myth; execution “lives and dies with managers in the middle—
but they are hamstrung by the poor communication from above” (p. 66). Concludes that
fostering coordination and building agility are key to strategy execution: the same guide-
lines apply to change implementation.
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this chapter,
in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Understand the causes of initiative decay—threats to the sustainability of change.
This chapter has emphasized that even changes that have been implemented success-
fully are liable to decay. Sustainability cannot be taken for granted. The “improvement
Roundup
LO 11.1
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
• If you have been involved previously as a manager of change, how would you rate yourself in terms of your handling of the need to take actions that sustain change? What have you done well? What not so well?
• When you have been on the receiving end of the change initiatives of others, how well have they handled the need to take actions that sustain change? What have they done well? What not so well?
• Of the cases presented in this chapter, which one resonates best with you? What is it about this case that you can relate to? Are
there any implications for how you would act in the future?
• How good are you at handling unantici- pated outcomes? How could you improve in this area?
• If there was one main idea that you took away from this chapter that you believe can be of most use to you as a change manager, what would it be?
• If you were to add an idea, suggestion, or practice to the treatment of sustaining change that is provided in this chapter, what would be your contribution?
Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay 381
evaporation effect,” as the benefits from change are lost, is common. The change man-
ager may have little direct control over the factors that lead to initiative decay, but mea-
sures can be put in place to counter those factors and to increase the probability that
change will be sustained. Initiative decay can be caused by many factors, and we identi-
fied 10: initiators move on, accountability becomes diffuse, knowledge is lost with staff
turnover, old habits are imported with new recruits, the change triggers are no longer
visible, new managers have their own agendas, powerbrokers block progress, start-up
funding runs out, other priorities emerge, staff suffer initiative fatigue—and enthusiasm
for change drops. The change manager thus has to remain vigilant with regard to poten-
tial threats to sustainability such as these. Many of the change models and frameworks
discussed in chapter 10 identify sustainability as a final step in the process. Managing
sustainability as an afterthought, however, can be problematic. It is more appropriate to
design sustainability into a change initiative from the start.
Distinguish between change initiatives that are “blameworthy,” and should not be sus-
tained, and those that are “praiseworthy”.
We also emphasized that, when a change does not work out as planned, this is not nec-
essarily a problem. Failures are not always bad. We discussed the distinction between
blameworthy and praiseworthy failures. The former include deliberate or inadvertent
deviations from prescribed practice. Experiments designed to improve performance,
and reasonable actions that have undesirable but unpredictable outcomes, are praise-
worthy—because they offer opportunities from which to learn. Many organizations,
however, treat most failures as blameworthy. This is wasteful, because the lessons are
lost, and those who are inappropriately punished are likely to be demotivated. The
change management challenge is to establish a psychologically safe environment that
welcomes experimentation, recognizes and rewards praiseworthy failures, and enables
learning.
Identify and apply actions that can contribute to the sustainability of change.
Although some of the threats to sustainability are beyond direct management con-
trol, awareness of those threats and their impact can generate timely and appropriate
responses. We discussed eight sets of possible actions to strengthen the sustainability of
a given change: redesign roles, redesign reward systems, link staff selection to change
objectives, “walk the talk,” encourage voluntary acts of initiative, measure progress,
celebrate “smaller wins” en route, and fine-tune the approach when the process (as
almost always happens) does not unfold as anticipated. We also distinguished between
sustaining the substance of change (new working practices, for example) and an
improvement trajectory (further reductions in time to market, for example). Preventive
maintenance involves action to sustain the former, to keep those practices operating as
intended. Developmental maintenance, on the other hand, involves adapting to circum-
stances to gain increasing benefits.
Understand the pitfalls that can arise when seeking to sustain change.
We closed the chapter with a number of words of warning for the change manager.
First, expect the unexpected and manage the (positive and negative) unintended
consequences. Second, beware the limitations of measurement, and recognize the
LO 11.2
LO 11.3
LO 11.4
382 Chapter 11 Sustaining Change versus Initiative Decay
implications of the J-curve and Kanter’s Law, which states that “Everything looks like
a failure in the middle.” Third, beware the premature declaration of victory, which
may divert energy and attention from the change process, but continue to celebrate the
“small wins” as appropriate. Finally, beware the escalation of commitment to strug-
gling change initiatives, by accepting the requests of advocates for further resources,
when it is becoming clear that the initiative is not going to deliver the planned out-
comes (but may be a praiseworthy failure).
Abrahamson, E. 2004. Change without pain: How managers can overcome initiative
overload, organizational chaos, and employee burnout. Boston: Harvard Business School
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385
12Chapter The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
Learning objectives
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
LO 12.1 Recognize the nature and significance of the contributions of change managers
at all levels of an organization, regardless of their formal roles or responsibilities.
LO 12.2 Appreciate the challenges and rewards that accompany performing a change
management role.
LO 12.3 Identify the competencies in terms of the skills, knowledge, and other attributes
that are ideally required in order to be an effective change manager.
LO 12.4 Understand the significance of political skill to the role and effectiveness of
change managers.
LO 12.5 Develop an action plan for improving your own change management capabilities.
S id
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a rr
is T
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Y o rk
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e c ti
o n /T
h e C
a rt
o o n B
a n k
It’s all right to do your regular work, Sanders, but haven’t you caught on yet?
The big money is in breakthroughs.
386 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
LO 12.1 Change Managers: Who Are They?
This chapter explores the personal competencies—skills, knowledge, and other attributes—that are ideally required in order to design and implement organizational change. First, we need to identify those who carry out these responsibilities, as this can involve significant numbers of people. Change is rarely a solo performance. Typically, many members of an organization, from across all levels, can be involved in encouraging, catalyzing, facilitating, supporting, driving, and otherwise contributing to the implementation of change. That involvement is not always associated with a formal leadership or management job title. There may even be circumstances in which a formal title could be a barrier to generating participation and support, stimulating suspicion and distrust instead. Having identified who an organization’s change managers are likely to be, we then consider what kind of role this is, in terms of the challenges and rewards. We will then explore the competency requirements.
Given the numbers of people involved, and the range of contributions which they can make, many commentators use the general term “change agent” to cover all those engaged in implementing change (we discussed this terminology issue at the start of chapter 2). To be consistent with the rest of this book, however, we will continue to use the term change manager.
Champions, Deviants, and Souls-of-Fire A number of other terms have been used to describe change managers, often indicating the nature of the role, and the kinds of people and capabilities involved. Donald Schön (1963, p. 85) studied product champions, senior managers with “considerable power and prestige.” Tom Peters and Bob Waterman (1983, p. 40) describe those who “damn the bureaucracy and take it on themselves to maneuver their projects through the system” as change champions. Modesto Maidique (1980) distinguishes the role of technological entrepreneur from those of sponsor (senior manager) and executive champion (power broker). Richard Ottaway (1983) identifies three categories of change manager: change generators, change implementers, and change adopters. Patrick Connor and Linda Lake (1988) identify four roles: the catalyst, who encourages dissatisfaction with the status quo; the solution giver, who offers suggestions for improvement; the process helper, who assists others; and the resource linker, who brings together people, funding, and knowledge. Carol Beatty and John Gordon (1991) distinguish senior management patriarchs, who originate ideas, from evangelists, who implement them. Torbjörn Stjernberg and Åke Philips (1993) argue that change relies on a small number of committed individuals whom they call souls-of-fire, from the Swedish “eldsjälar,” meaning “driven by burning enthusiasm.” Michel Syrett and Jean Lammiman (2002) identify five roles in innovation and change: sparks, sponsors, shapers, sounding boards, and specialists, noting that those who generate ideas can come from any level in an organization. Discussing “your company’s secret change managers,” Richard Pascale and Jerry Sternin (2005) advise a bottom-up approach that encourages the positive deviants in the organization. These are people who are already doing things differently and better. They also argue that “the key is to engage the members of the community you want to change in the process of discovery, making
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 387
them the evangelists of their own conversion experience” (Pascale and Sternin, 2005, p. 74). Arguing for the importance of networking skills, Julie Battilana and Tiziana Casciaro (2013) stay with the conventional term “change agent.”
These labels are summarized in table 12.1. Some of these terms offer clues concerning those who become change managers: catalysts, champions, deviants, evangelists, genera- tors, shapers, sparks, souls-of-fire. Motivation and commitment thus appear to matter as much as technical and professional capabilities. This discussion also suggests that change relies on the complementary contributions, advice, and support of a number of change managers, rather than on small select groups of senior staff. Change management respon- sibilities can be widely dispersed across all levels of the organization hierarchy.
Changing from the Middle Research has consistently demonstrated the key role that middle managers play in organizational change. We discussed this issue briefly in chapter 8, challenging the stereotype of middle managers as change blockers. This challenge is not new. Joseph Bower (1970) was one of the first to recognize the importance of middle managers as change managers, exerting upward influence on strategy based on their knowledge of the frontline operational context and by nurturing, testing, and championing initiatives. Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1982, p. 95) argues that “a company’s productivity depends to a great degree on how innovative its middle managers are,” adding that loosely defined roles and assignments encourage managers to develop and promote their own ideas.
Bill Wooldridge and Steven Floyd (1990; Wooldridge et al., 2008) develop a typology of four kinds of middle management contributions to organizational innovation, change, and strategy:
1. Gathering and synthesizing information
2. Justifying and championing alternatives
3. Facilitating adaptability by relaxing rules and “buying time”
4. Translating goals into action and selling initiatives to staff
They also emphasize the coordinating, mediating, interpreting, and negotiating roles of middle managers, arguing that it is difficult to isolate an individual’s contribution, because it is the pattern of influence of middle managers that affects organizational change and outcomes.
TABLE 12.1 The Other Names That Change Managers Have Been Called (Alphabetic Order)
Catalyst Change adopter Change champion Change generator Change implementer Evangelist Executive champion Patriarch Positive deviant Process helper
Product champion Resource linker Shaper Solution giver Souls-of-fire Sounding board Spark Specialist Sponsor Technological entrepreneur
388 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
Susan Ashford and James Detert (2015, p.73) argue
that “organizations don’t prosper unless managers
in the middle ranks identify and promote the need
for change.” However, when it comes to sharing
those ideas, middle managers are often discour-
aged by the top leadership style (“if an idea was
any good, we would have already thought of it”),
and valuable opportunities are missed. Ashford and
Detert asked middle managers to describe their
experiences of selling three kinds of ideas: new
products, processes, or markets; improvements to
existing products and processes; and better ways
to meet employees’ needs. This helped them to
identify seven influence tactics that middle man-
agers use to attract senior executive attention and
resources:
One example, discussed in chapter 8, concerns a study of change in the Irish health service, which showed how middle managers who resisted top-down directives played a vital role in change by championing and implementing their own initiatives, and mediating between different parts of the organization (Conway and Monks, 2011). The changes championed by those middle managers helped to dismantle outdated structures and processes, while also solving the problems that the top team had initially identified. The middle management role is thus not necessarily confined to implementing changes directed by others. Aoife McDermott et al. (2013) also show how middle managers and
Tactic Base Your Approach on These Questions
Tailor your pitch
Where does my audience stand on this issue? What does my audience find most convincing or compelling?
Frame the issue
How can I connect my issue to organizational priorities? How can I best describe its benefits? How can I link it to other issues receiving attention? How can I highlight an opportunity for the organization?
Manage emotions
How can I use my emotions to generate positive rather than negative responses? How can I manage my audience’s emotional responses?
Get the timing right
What is the best moment to be heard? Can I “catch the wave” of a trend, or tap into what’s going on in the outside world? What is the right time in the decision-making process to raise my issue?
Involve others
Which allies from my network can help me sell my issue? Who are my potential blockers, and how can I persuade them to support me? Who are my fence-sitters, and how can I convince them that my issue matters?
Adhere to norms
Should I use a formal public approach, an informal casual one, or a combination?
Suggest solutions
Am I suggesting a viable solution? If not, am I proposing a way to discover one, instead of just highlighting the problem?
Ashford and Detert offer three other pieces of
advice to middle managers. First, choose your audi-
ence; your immediate boss may not be the best
place to start to promote your idea. Second, use
several of these tactics rather than just one or two;
they are more powerful in combination. Finally,
choose your battles; some ideas can just be too dif-
ficult to sell.
Leading Change from the Middle How to Win Support for New Ideas
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 389
other “change recipients” become change managers, by tailoring, adding to, and adapting top-down directives so that they work more effectively in particular local contexts.
Middle managers may not always be free to exercise those organizational change roles. Donald Kuratko and Michael Goldsby (2004) identify the conditions that can discourage what they describe as the entrepreneurial middle manager from taking risks
and innovating:
• systems and policies that encourage consistent, safe, conservative behavior;
• complex approval cycles with elaborate documentation;
• controls that encourage micromanagement;
• top-down management and lack of delegated authority.
Middle managers can thus be key to change implementation. Their understanding of frontline operations and issues is usually much better than that of senior management. They are therefore able to mediate between front line and top team. However, the organi- zational context has to enable them to make these contributions. Otherwise, they may be a misunderstood and underutilized resource.
Stealth and Hustle below the Radar Do we really need transformational leaders to bring about transformational change? Some commentators argue that transformational leaders can damage an organization’s performance. For example, Rakesh Khurana (2002) argues that charismatic, transfor- mational leaders are a curse because they can destabilize organizations in dangerous
Kaiser Permanente’s Innovation Consultancy
Lew McCreary (2010) describes how Kaiser Per-
manente, a managed care consortium based in
Oakland, California, has developed a novel approach
to innovation and improvement. The company set
up its own internal Innovation Consultancy unit.
This unit employs change experts to observe people,
ask them how they feel about their work, take notes
and photographs, make drawings, and identify bet-
ter ways of doing things. This involves, McCreary
(p. 92) suggests, “a combination of anthropology,
journalism, and empathy,” exploring how staff and
patients live, work, think, and feel before trying to
solve a problem.
A key part of the approach involves “uncover-
ing the untold story”—finding out “what is really
going on here?” For example, to prevent nurses
being interrupted during medication rounds, and
thus to reduce errors, a “deep dive” event was
held, including nurses, doctors, pharmacists, and
patients. The event generated around 400 ideas,
some straightforward and some “outlandish.” This
led to the design of a smock that said “leave me
alone” on it (known as “no-interruption wear”) and
a five-step process for ensuring the correct dispens-
ing of medication.
Another example concerned the exchange of
patient information between nursing shifts. This
used to take 45 minutes, and delayed the next shift’s
contact with patients. In addition, nurses would
compile and exchange information in idiosyncratic
ways, potentially missing important details. The
revised Nurse Knowledge Exchange is faster and
more reliable, with new software and with informa-
tion presented in standard formats.
Members of the Information Consultancy unit
do not dictate the changes that are to be made,
but work with staff as “codesigners” on change
projects. This approach allows Kaiser Permanente
to achieve the aim of implementing innovation and
change quickly and economically.
390 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
ways. As we have already noted, research has demonstrated that change management can be found at all levels of an organization, and that major changes that are not driven from the top can be just as effective. Debra Meyerson (2001a and b) stresses the impor- tance of the modest and less visibly heroic change that takes place behind the scenes, or “below the radar.” The quiet change managers or tempered radicals that she describes do not belong to the top management group, and they may not have middle manage- ment roles either. They are, however, instrumental in challenging the prevailing culture, initiating and driving change by leveraging “small wins” and engaging others. Using those approaches, they can bring about transformational change by incremental means. Joseph Badaracco (2001 and 2002) makes a similar argument for “a quiet approach to leadership” that is neither glamorous nor heroic, and that focuses instead on “small things, careful moves, controlled and measured efforts” (Badaracco, 2001, p. 126). Badaracco’s quiet leaders drive change and improvement effectively by being patient, buying themselves time, managing their political capital, and bending the rules.
Paddy Miller and Thomas Wedell-Wedellsborg (2013) advise innovative change man- agers not to take their new ideas directly to senior management for approval. This puts an untested idea in the “corporate spotlight,” and it may never go ahead if the idea is turned down. If the idea does get backing, however, the initiator comes under pressure to demon- strate results. Instead, they suggest “going into stealth mode” and “innovating under the radar.” This is especially appropriate where there are many “gatekeepers” to navigate, when bureaucratic processes will slow things down, where the risks of failure are low, and when the reputational damage from being discovered will be minimal.
The first challenge for the stealth innovator is to find sponsors and allies. These are likely to be colleagues at the same level in the organization, or one or two grades higher. They may not have top executive power, but they are more numerous and are easier to access, they are more likely to understand the context for the idea, and they can help to get the project started. A second challenge is to generate “proof of concept”—evidence that the idea works and will generate real benefits. This involves conducting small-scale experiments, build- ing a prototype, demonstrating viability, and making it work. The stealth innovator must have access to funding and other resources to keep the project running; beg, borrow, barter, and scavenge is the advice here. Finally, the stealth innovator needs “stealth branding,” or a “cover story,” in order to work on the project without attracting attention. This means giving credible answers when asked about how their time is being spent, and being careful with the choice of language (avoiding the word “project,” for example). A final piece of advice for the stealth innovator is this (Miller and Wedell-Wedellsborg, 2013, p. 97):
[M]eet regularly with your advisers, providing them with frequent updates, and solicit their feedback. Informal sponsors within the organization are not just a means to getting your ideas off the ground; they serve as a trusted, level-headed sounding board that can give you perspective on your own actions. Use your advisers, and use them constantly. With the right backing and some hustle and ingenuity, young breakthrough ideas can be nurtured into suc- cessful corporate initiatives.
We have introduced more new labels: tempered radicals, quiet leaders, and stealth innovators. These take us far from the stereotype of change managers as senior figures, working on their own, often from outside the organization, using conventional change management methods. These labels, and the roles that they describe, highlight the
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 391
importance of creativity, ingenuity, networks, interpersonal relationships, communication skills, risk-taking, and the political skills involved in working quietly, stealthily, below the corporate radar. In sum, an organization’s most valuable change managers may not be vis- ible, and may not be those who have been formally appointed to change roles.
Spotting Your Souls-of-Fire If some (or all) of the key change managers in an organization are champions, entrepre- neurial middle managers, quiet leaders, and stealth innovators who operate below the radar, how can they be recognized? One answer comes from the work of Fiona Patter- son (1999), who identified four sets of behaviors (summarized in table 12.2) that can reveal the innovative thinker and change manager.
TABLE 12.2 The Profile of
the Innova-
tive Change
Manager
Behavioral Area Indicators
Motivation to change: high Bored easily, thrives on change
Challenging behaviors: high Assertive, nonconforming, doesn’t ask for permission
Adaptation: low Thinks of imaginative ways to solve problems
Consistency of work style: low Undisciplined, doesn’t follow procedures or instructions
These indicators may help us to identify the souls-of-fire, but they also highlight the management problems. How many organizations want to employ people who are eas- ily bored, act without permission, are not adaptable, and do not follow instructions? It is important to recognize that:
• change managers can be difficult nonconformists, mavericks who take risks and who do not always present themselves well in an employee selection context;
• change managers are often regarded as troublemakers who break rules, and they may be blamed when things go wrong;
• an organization needs a balance of personalities—too many radical innovators can be just as ineffective as having too many conformists who do what they are told.
Adopting a similar perspective to seeking out the key change managers, Thomas Davenport et al. (2003) studied the ideas practitioners who bring new management ideas into an organization. Consistent with the findings of other research, they found this to be a diverse and scattered group, but with common ways of working. Ideas practitioners seem to work in four stages:
Scouting They read a lot, attend conferences, explore interdisciplinary perspec- tives, and look to other fields for ideas
Packaging They translate and tailor their ideas for a wider audience, and express ideas in terms of key issues—innovation, efficiency, effectiveness—that interest senior management
Advocating They sell, run marketing campaigns, find early adopters, persuade other managers
Implementing They make things happen, manage change, roll it out from boardroom to front line
392 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
Patterson (1999) and Davenport et al. (2003) suggest that change managers (innovative thinkers, ideas practitioners) have particular characteristics, personalities, and capabilities. They are “special people,” who can be identified if we know what attributes to look for. In contrast, from their work on those whom they call disruptive innovators, Jeff Dyer et al. (2011) argue that anyone can be innovative, by learning the five habits that we discussed in chapter 5 (table 5.2): associating (making connections), questioning (challenging assump- tions), observing (watching for new ways of doing things), experimenting (testing new ideas), and networking (attending conferences and social events).
Some of us are more creative and innovative than others, and disruptive innovators can be identified by observing their behavior. But Dyer et al. (2011) suggest that we can all become more innovative if we learn those five habits and collaborate with “deliv- ery-driven” colleagues. They also argue that organization policies can reinforce these habits, by encouraging staff to connect ideas, challenge accepted practices, observe what others are doing, take risks, experiment, and get out of the organization to meet others. As well as attempting to identify the organization’s change managers, therefore, here is an approach to creating more of them.
From their study of change in Britain’s National Health Service (one of the 10 largest employing organizations in the world), Julie Battilana and Tiziana Casciaro (2013, p. 64) also found that the success of change managers depended on their informal networks. They identify different types of networks. In cohesive networks, the members know each
Who Are Your Most Capable Strategic Change Leaders?
Research by the consulting company Pricewater-
houseCoopers (PwC) has found that only 8 percent
of senior managers have the strategic leadership
capabilities required to drive organizational change
(Lewis, 2015). From a survey of 6,000 managers in
Europe, the highest proportion of strategic lead-
ers were women over the age of 55—a group that
has traditionally been overlooked in the search for
change agent skills.
PwC defines a strategic leader as someone who
has “wider experience of settings, people, and also
of failure, which engenders humility or perspective
and resilience, so that they know what to do when
things don’t work” (Lewis, 2015, n.p.). Women
over 55 were more likely to:
• see situations from multiple perspectives;
• think and work outside the existing system;
• identify what needs to change;
• be able to persuade or inspire others to follow
them;
• use positive language;
• be open to frank and honest feedback;
• exercise power courageously.
One consultant (female) at PwC said, “Histor-
ically women over the age of 55 would not have
been an area of focus, but as the research suggests,
this pool of talent might hold the key to trans-
formation and in some cases, business survival”
(Lewis, 2015).
In terms of personality, ideas practitioners tend to be intelligent, optimistic, passion- ate about ideas, intellectually restless, mild-mannered (not fanatical), and self-confident. They also tend to be boundary spanners with extensive personal networks. Davenport et al. (2003) argue that if ideas practitioners are not recognized and supported, they will leave. They must be allowed to pursue ideas, and they need to be rewarded with recognition and intellectual stimulation as well as money.
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 393
other, and their actions are easier to coordinate. The members of divergent networks are connected indirectly by their link to the change manager, and these networks can be a source of new ideas and information. Change managers were more successful where:
• they held central positions in the organization’s informal network, regardless of their roles in the formal hierarchy;
• the nature of their network matched the type of change that they were pursuing;
• they also had good relationships with “fence-sitters” who were ambivalent about the changes.
The organization chart is not a good guide to finding the champions, the ideas practi- tioners, the souls-of-fire, the change managers. Lili Duan et al. (2014) argue that manag- ers need to find these “hidden influencers.” They claim, however, that managers asked to identify the influencers in their organizations are almost always wrong. Informal influ- encers are those to whom other staff turn for advice, and they can have a major impact on attitudes to change. Retail cashiers, for example, can have considerable influence because they are well connected with many others. Spotting the change managers thus involves understanding the informal organizational networks, and how these function.
Case Study Boosting Factory Yields
Aaron De Smet et al. (2012, p. 4) describe the fol-
lowing example of a change manager faced with
a particularly difficult challenge. How would you
assess his approach? Is this a style that you would
be prepared to use in your own organization? Or
would you consider this style to be too risky?
Conor, as we’ll call one European plant manager,
needed to boost yields using the company’s new
production system. In the past, the industrial
giant would have assigned engineers steeped
in lean production or Six Sigma to observe the
shop floor, gather data, and present a series of
improvements. Conor would then have told
plant employees to implement the changes,
while he gauged the results—a method consis-
tent with his own instinctive command-and-con-
trol approach to leadership. But Conor and
his superiors quickly realized that the old way
wouldn’t succeed: only employees who actu-
ally did the work could identify the full range of
efficiency improvements necessary to meet the
operational targets, and no attempt to get them
to do so would be taken seriously unless Conor
and his line leaders were more collaborative.
Workers were skeptical: a survey taken at
about this time (in 2009) showed that plant
workers saw Conor and his team as distant and
untrustworthy. Moreover, the company couldn’t
use salary increases or overtime to boost morale,
because of the ongoing global economic crisis.
Conor’s leadership training gave him an
opportunity to reflect on the situation and pro-
vided simple steps he could take to improve it.
He began by getting out of his office, visiting
the shop floor, and really listening to the work-
ers talk about their day-to-day experiences, their
workflows, how their machines functioned, and
where things went wrong. They’d kept all this
information from him before. He made a point
of starting meetings by inviting those present
to speak, in part to encourage the group to find
collective solutions to its problems.
Conor explained: “As I shared what I thought
and felt more openly, I started to notice things
I had not been aware of, as other people
became more open. We’d had the lean tools
and good technology for a long time. Trans-
parency and openness were the real break-
through.” As the new atmosphere took hold,
workers began pointing out minor problems
and additional areas for improvement specific
to their corners of the plant; within just a few
months its yields increased to 91 percent, from
87 percent. Today, yields run at 93 percent.
394 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
LO 12.2 Change Managers: What Kind of Role Is This?
Forget Nice
Do managers have to be assholes? Do they have
to be tough, ruthless bastards who drive through
change at any cost?
Management surely is about taking difficult
decisions either in the interests of shareholders
or (if one prefers) in the interests of the company
more broadly. That means often having to pass
over, demote or fire perfectly decent human
beings, some of whom you may quite like. It
means having to grow a thick skin and care little
whether other people like you.
Nice people mind if they hurt other people’s
feelings. They are self-effacing, generous, patient
and sometimes have bouts of self-doubt. You
would willingly offer them a seat at your breakfast
table—but we should continue to insist that they
never get anywhere near a seat on the board.
Source: From Kellaway (2000), pp.116–17.
The Change Manager’s Experience
• The change manager’s job is demanding; it
can be lonely and risky. This is not a job for
everyone.
• It involves big highs and lows—rewarding
when it’s going well and awful when it’s not.
• It involves pursuing goals that are often intan-
gible, and the outcomes are not always under
your control, but it offers rare opportunities to
make a difference.
• You acquire new skills and discover new oppor-
tunities, so this is an opportunity for personal
and career development.
• The main rewards are not necessarily financial,
and recognition may be lacking.
• You need to believe in it to do it well.
• The job is never finished.
Source: Based on Hutton (1994, pp. 252–58).
Before exploring the specific competencies of the change manager, it is useful to con- sider the nature of the role, and in particular the challenges and potential rewards that it can bring. From the previous discussion concerning who becomes a change manager, it is clear that this is not necessarily a formal appointment, that the most effective change managers do not always occupy senior positions on the organization chart. In addition, much of the work may be done behind the scenes, below the radar.
The evidence shows that the experience of many change managers has two main, and perhaps opposing, dimensions. First, this can be a challenging, stressful, high-pressure, fast-paced, high-risk role. Senior management expect rapid results. There may be open and covert resistance from those who are affected. Any concerns, complaints, and some- times anger may be directed at the change manager in person. Change managers thus have to be comfortable with and able to handle conflict. Those who need to be liked by others and who do not like to lose friends will be uncomfortable in a change management role.
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 395
One study of an organization redesign program (Buchanan, 2003) found that change man- agers not only had to cope with personal stress but also had to deal, at the same time, with the stress experienced by those involved in the change, who were described as “scarred” and as “hurt and bruised people.” Those who help others to cope with the stress of change have themselves been described as “toxic handlers,” with skills in listening and problem- solving (Frost and Robinson, 1999). Finally, when change goes wrong, regardless of why, the change manager will be blamed.
Given the pressure, pace, stress, risks, and vulnerability of the role, change managers ideally need to be resilient. Resilience can be defined as “the successful adaptation to life tasks in the face of social disadvantage or highly adverse conditions” (CIPD, 2011, p. 2). Conditions for change managers are not always “highly adverse” but are rarely prob- lem-free. Other terms that describe resilience include adaptability, equanimity, persever- ance, self-reliance, mental toughness, and bouncebackability. These are capabilities that we all benefit from on occasion. Change managers in particular, however, need to be able to “bounce back” when plans go wrong, and to persevere in spite of difficulties. Some of us are more resilient than others, but resilience is an attribute that can be developed. Exer- cise 12.2 at the end of this chapter provides a diagnostic, “How Resilient Are You?” This diagnostic invites you to assess your level of resilience and to consider actions to develop your resilience if necessary.
Confessions of a Change Manager If the change manager’s role is so demanding, why would anyone accept the respon- sibility? We met a Finnish woman who was working with a large utility company in South Australia. She described her change manager’s role as risky, pressured, and stressful, just as we have discussed here. So we asked, “Why did you take this job?” This was her answer:
I wanted a job to look forward to in the morning, and not want to leave in the evening. I saw it as a great opportunity to learn. I get charged up with more learning. I need that. I needed to get my hands dirty. It gave me a chance to show my capabilities. It is a very tiring and frus- trating job. On the other hand, it gives you a great opportunity to excel.
I am a risk taker. I need some excitement and power play while at work. It gave me an opportunity to work with some highly motivated and committed individuals. Together we were able to make it happen. I believe that the only way to meet the challenges of the exter- nal business environment is to offer the customer what they really want.
I have thick skin. I realized that I was going to make some enemies during the change process—as well as some very influential and powerful friends. I was able to accept the chal- lenge due to the stage of my personal lifestyle (boyfriend overseas, dog at home). I sacrificed my spare time for the company—and for the financial and nonfinancial rewards.
Even though I was an inexperienced change manager, I was confident that I had skills, knowledge, and attributes to make it happen. Or that I could find an expert (internal or external) to assist me to make it happen. If I would fail, I could still work with [this organiza- tion]—or elsewhere, because I am tolerant of ambiguity.
This account reveals the second and more positive dimension of the change man- ager’s experience. Especially with “deep” changes (figure 1.1), the change manager is exposed to a wider range of internal and external corporate and strategic issues than is
396 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
the case in most general or operational management positions, which tend to be more narrowly defined. As a consequence, the role of change manager can be challenging in an exciting, stimulating, and energizing way. Here is an opportunity to demonstrate one’s capabilities, to pick up new knowledge, to develop new skills, and to add powerful and influential colleagues to one’s network. Successful experience as a change manager has “resumé value.”
Our Finnish change manager made several comments that reveal aspects of her person- ality: “I get charged up with learning”; “I need to get my hands dirty”; “I am a risk taker”; “I need excitement and power play”; “I have thick skin”; “I realized that I was going to make enemies”; “I was confident that I would be able to make it happen”; “I am tolerant of ambiguity.” These attributes appear to be appropriate for someone working in such a chal- lenging role. Personality is only one factor contributing to personal effectiveness; capabil- ity and context are also important. However, the need for action, learning, excitement, and power play, along with tolerance of ambiguity, risk, and conflict, all appear to be useful personal attributes for a change manager to possess, or to develop.
On the one hand, the role of the change manager is stressful and the position is a vul- nerable one. On the other hand, the role can offer substantial opportunities for personal development and for career progression. As we mentioned in chapter 1, when interviewed for the next promotion, stories about the success and impact of the changes (preferably deep changes) for which one has been responsible are typically more likely to impress than stories about shallow initiatives—or no stories at all. John Beeson (2009, p. 103) identifies
Look In
Nate Boaz and Erica Fox (2014, p. 1) argue that
changes often fail because the leaders overlook the
need to make basic changes in themselves. Two
common mistakes, they claim, concern focusing
on business outcomes and on developing skills.
These “outward-looking” preoccupations ignore
the changes in “mindset” that have to be made, to
translate new behaviors into better performance.
Change leaders also need to “look in,” to engage
in self-discovery and self-development. This involves
developing “state awareness” and “profile aware-
ness.” State awareness concerns “what’s driving
you at the moment”: mindset, beliefs, hopes and
fears, desires and defenses, impulses to act. Those
impulses may need to be controlled, so that actions
are appropriate to the context. Profile awareness
concerns habits, emotions, and hopes. Change
leaders need to understand their profile and how
this can affect others. Profile awareness concerns
managing “the big four” of your “inner team”:
Inner Negotiator
Focus of Attention
Power Source
Chief executive officer: inspirational
What I want, what I don’t want
Intuition
Chief financial officer: analytical
My opinion, my ideas
Reason
Chief people offi- cer: emotional
How we both feel, our level of trust
Emotion
Chief operating officer: practical
What task to do, what line to draw
Willpower
This inner team governs how change leaders
function. Which inner executive are you going to
call on in this situation, at this time, for this pur-
pose? Can you use each of the “big four” con-
sciously and effectively to deal with different issues?
Boaz and Fox argue that the success of long-term,
high-impact change relies on a combination of
“looking out and looking in.”
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 397
the “core selection factors” for senior executive appointments. Most of these do not relate to business knowledge or technical ability but to “soft” skills. Here are four of those core selection factors, all related to demonstrable change implementation capabilities:
• Setting direction and thinking strategically; spotting marketplace trends and developing a winning strategy that differentiates the company.
• Managing implementation without getting involved at too low a level of detail; defining a set of roles, processes, and measures to ensure that things get done reliably.
• Building the capacity for innovation and change; knowing when new ways of doing business are required; having the courage, tolerance for risk, and change management skills to bring new ideas to fruition.
• Getting things done across internal boundaries (lateral management); demonstrating organizational savvy; influencing and persuading colleagues; dealing with conflict.
Change managers thus enjoy several intrinsic rewards: challenge, excitement, personal development, and job satisfaction. The extrinsic rewards in terms of career progression can also be substantial.
LO 12.3 Change Management Competencies
What competencies—skills, knowledge, and other attributes—do change managers ide- ally require? This question is significant for at least three reasons. First, change that is badly managed can cause serious damage to the organization and units involved, to those who are directly affected by the change, and to other stakeholders. Second, although this work is often carried out by full-time change managers and external con- sultants, many general and functional managers combine change responsibilities with their regular duties. Third, as discussed earlier in this chapter, responsibility for change management has become increasingly distributed, involving staff at all organizational levels. In other words, the demand for change management competencies is also now widely distributed.
When discussing this topic, it is difficult to escape from competency frameworks, which each itemize the various skill and knowledge requirements. These lists can make tedious reading, especially when one framework says much the same as the next, with only subtle variations in content and emphasis. One variation concerns simply the number of items in the framework. We can choose between “the nine habits of successful change leaders” (Wooldridge and Wallace, 2002) and “the ten commitments of a change leader” (Kouzes and Posner, 1995). These frameworks tend to agree, however, on two funda- mental issues. First, the change manager’s role is a multifaceted one. Second, change management roles make considerable demands on those who perform them—as we have already seen.
We will describe three competency frameworks, two from the 1990s and one more recent. We will then explain a controversial approach to encouraging change, based on intimidation. This choice illustrates the similarities and contrasts between frameworks. We also need to note that these models should be seen not as rigid prescriptions, but as guides that have to be tailored to fit specific contexts.
398 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
TABLE 12.3 The McBer Competency Model for the “Top-Notch Change Manager”
Interpersonal Skills
• Ability to express empathy
• Positive expectations of people
• Genuineness
Diagnostic Skills
• Knowledge of the principles of individual and organization development
• Ability to collect meaningful data through interviews, surveys, and observations
• Ability to draw conclusions from complex data and make accurate diagnoses
Initiation Skills
• Ability to influence others and market your skills, to persuade internal customers to use your services
• Ability to make presentations in a concise, interesting, and informative manner
• Ability to manage groups and group dynamics
• Problem-solving and planning skills, making recommendations and helping customers with problem-solving, goal setting, and planning to improve organizational performance
Organizational Skills
• Ability to design adult learning curricula and organization development exercises
• Ability to administer resources such as personnel, materials, schedules, and training sites
First, from a management consultancy rather than an academic research source, the McBer competency model, described by Edward Cripe (1993), has been widely cited and applied. The competencies of the “top-notch” change manager are listed in table 12.3, which identifies a combination of interpersonal, diagnostic, initiation, and organizational skills. This model relates to formally appointed change managers who have to “market their skills to internal customers” in order to initiate changes and stimulate performance improvements. Such roles are common, in central corporate organization development and change management support units, and in program management offices. However, those four sets of skills would perhaps also be valuable to quiet leaders, stealth innovators, ideas practitioners, and other “below the radar” change managers.
Our second (research-based) model was developed by David Buchanan and David Boddy (1992), who asked middle and senior managers who were in charge of information technology projects to keep a diary of their change management experiences. The result- ing model is shown in table 12.4, which identifies 15 competencies in five areas: goals, roles, communication, negotiation, and managing up.
Neither of these frameworks (McB and BB) claims to be fully comprehensive. Cripe (1993) suggests that organizations should customize this model, omitting less relevant competencies and adding others. The frameworks are similar. The McB “interpersonal skills” can be found under the BB “communication” heading. The McB “diagnostic skills” are listed under “goals” in the BB model. “Initiation skills” in McB are covered by BB under the “goals,” “roles,” and “negotiation” headings.
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 399
There are, however, two main differences. First, the McB framework identifies “orga- nization” skills (designing learning and “administering resources”), which BB does not mention. Second, the BB model identifies a set of competencies under the heading “man- aging up”: political awareness, influencing skills, and helicopter perspective. The McB model does cite “persuading others” as a competence, but does not mention political skills. Many of the competency frameworks in this area overlook the political dimension of organizational change, and the need for change managers to have political skill—which we explore in the following section.
TABLE 12.4 The Buchanan-Boddy Change Manager Competency Model
Goals
1. Sensitivity to changes in key personnel, top management perceptions, and market conditions, and to the way in which these impact the goals of the project in hand.
2. Clarity in specifying goals, in defining the achievable. 3. Flexibility in responding to changes outside the control of the change manager, perhaps requiring
major shifts in project goals and management style—and risk taking.
Roles
4. Team building capability, to bring together key stakeholders and establish effective working groups, and clearly to define and delegate respective responsibilities.
5. Networking skills, in establishing and maintaining appropriate contacts, within and outside the organization.
6. Tolerance of ambiguity, to be able to function comfortably, patiently, and effectively in an uncertain and unpredictable environment.
Communication
7. Communication skills, to transmit effectively to colleagues and subordinates the need for changes in project goals and in individual tasks and responsibilities.
8. Interpersonal skills across the range, including selection, listening, collecting appropriate information, identifying the concerns of individuals, and managing meetings.
9. Personal enthusiasm in expressing plans and ideas. 10. Stimulating motivation and commitment in those involved in the change process.
Negotiation
11. Selling plans and ideas to others by creating a desirable vision of the future. 12. Negotiating with key players for resources, or for changes in procedures, and resolving conflict.
Managing Up
13. Political awareness, in identifying potential coalitions, and in balancing conflicting goals and perceptions.
14. Influencing skills, to gain commitment to change ideas and initiatives from potential skeptics and subversives.
15. Helicopter perspective, to stand back from the immediate project and take a broader view of priorities.
400 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
TABLE 12.5 The CMI Change Manager Master Level—Competency Model
Skill Area Demonstrates Understanding of/Capabilities In
Facilitating change Principles of change; the environment Business focus; change readiness; culture awareness
Strategic thinking Vision; assess readiness Strategic view; sustainable outcomes
Thinking and judgement Analytical thinking; holistic perspective; decision making
Influencing others Customer/stakeholder focus; professional presence Networking; interpersonal skills (selling ideas; use of power)
Coaching for change Adult learning principles; change management Needs analysis; organizational capability to manage change Role model; champion new skills
Project management Plan development; monitor and manage progress Cost management; risk and opportunity management; vendor manage- ment; review project outcomes
Communication Relationships building; empathy; oral and written communication Measures effectiveness of communication
Self-management Personal responsibility; prioritization and time management Resilience; flexibility; emotional intelligence
Facilitation—meetings and workshops
Design; participatory environment Structure (agenda, physical environment) Process (facilitation tools, inclusion, timing)
Professional development Updates knowledge and develops skills Promotion of change management
Specialist expertise (1) Learning and development
Needs identification; training plan Solution delivery; evaluation
Specialist expertise (2) Communication
Needs identification; plan; solution design and development; Solution delivery; evaluation
Table 12.5 summarizes a third “change manager master level—competency model,” developed by the Change Management Institute (CMI), a global not-for-profit organiza- tion headquartered in Australia (Leys, 2012). This model identifies twelve skill areas, with up to six capabilities under each heading (over 50 capabilities in total). This model again relates to the full-time professional change manager, heading up or working in a specialist corporate unit, or hired as an external adviser or consultant. We have already seen most of the capabilities identified here in the other two models: understanding the change process, interpersonal and communication skills, influence and persuasion, self-management. The CMI model also emphasizes a more strategic perspective, expecting the “master” change manager to have environmental knowledge, stakeholder focus, and sustainable outcomes. Based on the CMI model, table 12.6 identifies the two or three key competencies that are particularly relevant to each of our six images of change management. For the director,
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 401
strategic thinking and facilitating change are critical. For the nurturer, facilitation, learning and development, and communication are more important. Self-management and profes- sional development apply to all six images.
The Great Intimidators Echoing the quote at the beginning of the section on the nature of the change management role, Roderick Kramer (2006) challenges the view that change managers must be nice and not tough, and should be humble and self-effacing rather than intimidating. Kramer argues that intimidation is an appropriate style when an organization has become rigid or unruly, stagnant or drifting, and faces inertia or resistance to change. Abrasive leadership, he argues, gets people moving. Intimidators are not bullies, but they can use bullying tactics when time is short and the stakes are high. Kramer (2006, p. 90) makes his positive view of intimidators clear when he argues, “They are not averse to causing a ruckus, nor are they above using a few public whippings and ceremonial hangings to get attention. They’re rough, loud, and in your face.”
Intimidators have what Kramer calls “political intelligence.” Socially intelligent man- agers focus on leveraging the strengths of others, using empathy and soft power. Politi- cally intelligent managers focus on weaknesses and insecurities, using coercion, fear, and anxiety. However, working for an intimidating leader can be a positive experience. Their sense of purpose can be inspirational, their forcefulness is a role model, and intimidators challenge others to think clearly about their objectives. Kramer (2006, p. 92) quotes a
TABLE 12.6 Images of Change and Key Competencies
Image Sound Bite Approach to Change Key Competencies
Director “This is what is going to happen”
Management choice, com- mand and control
Strategic thinking Facilitating change
Navigator “I will tell you what I’d like to happen”
Plan with care, but expect the unexpected
Facilitating change Project management
Caretaker “Let us explore what might be possible”
Accept the force of exter- nal context and adapt as necessary
Thinking and judgement Influencing others
Coach “How can we develop capa- bility to deal with change?”
Shape systemic capabilities— values, skills, drills—to respond effectively to change
Coaching for change Influencing others
Interpreter “We need to think differently about this”
Managing meaning through interpretations that explain and convey understanding
Learning and development Communication
Nurturer “This is everybody’s problem—how will we fix it?”
Develop resilience, encour- age involvement, continuous learning, and self-organizing
Facilitation Learning and development Communication
402 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
journalist who said, “Don’t have a reputation for being a nice guy—that won’t do you any good.” Intimidation tactics include:
Get up close and personal: Intimidators work through direct confrontation, invading your personal space, using taunts and slurs to provoke and throw you off balance.
Get angry: Called “porcupine power,” this involves the “calculated loss of temper” (use it, don’t lose it), using rage and anger to help the intimidator prevail.
Keep them guessing: Intimidators preserve an air of mystery by maintaining deliberate distance. Transparency and trust are fashionable, but intimidators keep others guessing, which makes it easier to change direction without loss of credibility.
Know it all: “Informational intimidators” who appear to have mastery of the facts can be very intimidating indeed. It doesn’t matter whether “the facts” are correct, as long as they are presented with complete confidence at the right time.
This is a style that will not work well in all situations. Kramer is careful to suggest, however, that this approach may be appropriate—even necessary—in order to overcome either apathy or resistance to change. As a change manager, do you feel that intimidation is appropriate in some circumstances? Are you comfortable using the four intimidation
tactics that Kramer identifies?
A Great Intimidator at Work
The Devil Wears Prada (2006, director David Frankel)
is based on the novel by Lauren Weisberger. The
movie tells the story of a naive, young aspiring
journalist, Andrea Sachs (played by Anne Hathaway)
who gets a job as assistant to the famous editor in
chief of the New York fashion magazine Runway. The
magazine’s powerful and ruthless editor, Miranda
Priestly (Meryl Streep) is a legend in the industry.
At the beginning of the movie, we see Andrea
arriving for her job interview as “second assistant”
with Miranda’s “first assistant” Emily Charlton
(Emily Blunt), but Miranda decides to conduct the
interview herself. Start watching as Andrea comes
out of the lift and heads for the Runway reception
desk. Stop when Emily runs after Andrea and calls
her back into the office.
1. How would you describe Miranda Priestly’s
management style?
2. What impact does Miranda’s style have on the
performance of those around her?
3. Good boss or bad boss: what is your assessment
of this management style?
4. Given her style, why do so many people desper-
ately want to work for Miranda?
5. Why do you think Miranda Priestly gave Andrea
Sachs the job?
Kramer (2006) defines “political intelligence” in a narrow way. In the following sec- tion, we will explore organization politics and use a wider definition of the concept of “political skill.”
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 403
LO 12.4 Political Skill and the Change Manager
Political awareness and political intelligence appeared in the previous discussion as capabilities relevant to the change manager. Organizations are political systems, and change is almost always a politicized process. Why? Individuals, groups, and divisions have to compete with each other for resources of different kinds (people, money, space), and political tactics are tools that can be used in that competition. Change can often upset the established allocation of resources among stakeholders, thus triggering even more intense conflict. The change manager must be aware of the organization politics, but must also be prepared to engage with the politics—to “play the game.” Political skill is particularly important in addressing resistance to change (see chapter 8). David Buchanan and Richard Badham (2008) argue that the change manager who is not polit- ically skilled will fail. It is rarely possible for the change manager to escape from this dimension of the role.
Case Study Closing a Plant
Aaron De Smet et al. (2012, pp. 4–5) describe the
following example of a change manager faced with
a particularly difficult challenge. What is your assess-
ment of his approach? Could you use this open
and “authentic” style in your own organization? Or
would you consider this to be difficult and risky?
Pierre, as we’ll call him, was managing a plant
in France during the darkest days of the global
financial crisis. His plant was soon to close as
demand from several of its core customers went
into a massive and seemingly irreversible tailspin.
The company was in a tricky spot: it needed the
know-how of its French workers to help trans-
fer operations to a new production location in
another country, and despite its customers’
problems it still had €20 million worth of orders
to fulfill before the plant closed. Meanwhile,
tensions were running high in France: other
companies’ plant closures had sparked protests
that in some cases led to violent reactions from
employees. Given the charged situation, most
companies were not telling workers about plant
closures until the last minute.
Pierre was understandably nervous as he went
through leadership training, where he focused
intently on topics such as finding the courage to
use honesty when having difficult conversations,
as well as the value of empathic engagement.
After a lengthy debate among company exec-
utives, Pierre decided to approach the situation
with those values in mind. He announced the
plant closing nine months before it would take
place and was open with employees about his
own fears. Pierre’s authenticity struck a chord by
giving voice to everyone’s thoughts and feelings.
Moreover, throughout the process of closing the
plant, Pierre recounts, he spent some 60 per-
cent of his time on personal issues, most notably
working with his subordinates to assist the dis-
placed workers in finding new jobs and provid-
ing them with individual support and mentoring
(something other companies weren’t doing). He
spent only about 40 percent on business issues
related to the closure.
This honest engagement worked: over the
next nine months, the plant stayed open and
fulfilled its orders, even as its workers ensured
that their replacements in the new plant had the
information they needed to carry on. It was the
only plant in the industry to avoid violence and
lockouts.
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Organization politics is a topic that is generally regarded as unsavory and damaging, asso- ciated with backstabbing and dirty tricks. “Machiavellian” is an insult, not a compliment. Henry Mintzberg’s (1983, p. 172) definition is a popular one, and has been widely cited:
Politics: “individual or group behavior that is informal, ostensibly parochial, typically divi- sive, and above all, in the technical sense, illegitimate—sanctioned neither by formal author- ity, accepted ideology, nor certified expertise.”
This is one source of the enduring negative perception of politics—parochial, divi- sive, illegitimate. How could managers in general, and change managers in particular, be advised to develop capabilities such as these? However, research has revealed the positive, constructive uses of political tactics. This involves the use of political skill. Ferris et al. (2000, p. 30) provide this definition:
Political skill: “an interpersonal style construct that combines social astuteness with the ability to relate well, and otherwise demonstrate situationally appropriate behavior in a disarmingly charming and engaging manner that inspires confidence, trust, sincerity, and genuineness.”
Ferris and colleagues call this “savvy and street smarts,” and they argue that politi- cal skill has four key dimensions. Social astuteness concerns the ability to observe and to understand the behavior and motives of others. Interpersonal influence concerns the ability to engage and influence others in a compelling way. Networking ability involves building a variety of relationships across and outside the organization. Apparent sincerity means being seen as forthright, open, honest, and genuine. This model is summarized in table 12.7 (Ferris et al., 2005a and 2007; Brouer et al., 2006). They have also developed an assessment inventory, to measure individual skills in those four areas. Studies using uni- versity staff and students as participants produced the following conclusions:
• political skill correlates with measures of self-monitoring and emotional intelligence;
• those who score high on political skill display less anxiety and are less likely to per- ceive stressful events as threatening;
• political skill is not correlated with general intelligence;
• political skill predicts job performance and subordinate evaluations of leadership ability;
• the dimension of political skill related most strongly to performance rating is social astuteness.
Age and Treachery The Inescapable Reality of the Politics of Change
Bill Bratton is an American police chief known for his
achievements in “turning around” failing or prob-
lem forces.
“In 1980, at age 34 one of the youngest lieuten-
ants in Boston’s police department, he had proudly
put up a plaque in his office that said: Youth and
skill will win out every time over age and treachery.
Within just a few months, having been shunted
into a dead-end position due to a mixture of office
politics and his own brashness, Bratton took the
sign down. He never again forgot the importance
of understanding the plotting, intrigue, and politics
involved in pushing through change.” The advice is:
know who the key players are, understand how they
play the politics game, and know their attitudes and
positions in relation to change proposals (Kim and
Mauborgne, 2003, p. 68).
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 405
TABLE 12.7 Dimensions of Political Skill
Dimension Definition Sample Inventory Items
Social astuteness Attuned observers, good interpreters of behavior, self-aware, sensitive to others, clever
I understand people very well. I pay close attention to people’s facial expressions.
Interpersonal influence
Subtle and convincing style, calibrate actions to the situation, to the “target,” be flexible
I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me. I am good at getting people to like me.
Networking ability Adept at using networks, develop friendships and build alliances eas- ily, skilled in negotiation and conflict resolution
I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others. At work, I know a lot of important peo- ple and am well connected.
Apparent sincerity Appear honest and open, and to have integrity, authenticity, sincerity, genu- ineness, no ulterior motives
It is important that people believe I am sincere in what I say and do. I try to show a genuine interest in other people.
To what extent do the statements in the “sample inventory items” column describe you? Are these not characteristics that all managers should perhaps have? Describing those with a high degree of political skill, Ferris et al. (2005a, p. 128) observe that:
Politically skilled individuals convey a sense of personal security and calm self-confidence that attracts others and gives them a feeling of comfort. This self-confidence never goes too far so as to be perceived as arrogance but is always properly measured to be a positive attri- bute. Therefore, although self-confident, those high in political skill are not self-absorbed (although they are self-aware) because their focus is outward toward others, not inward and self-centered. . . . We suggest that people high in political skill not only know precisely what to do in different social situations at work but how to do it in a manner that disguises any ulterior, self-serving motives and appears to be sincere.
Political skill is only one factor affecting the personal effectiveness of change man- agers, managers, and leaders. Used effectively, however, political skill can be a powerful way to influence others and to motivate action to change, while strengthening the change manager’s reputation. How does political skill work in practice? David Buchanan and Richard Badham (2008) identify the following categories of political tactics, from rela- tively harmless image building, to disreputable “dirty tricks”:
Image building We all know people who didn’t get the job because they didn’t look the part—appearance is a credibility issue
Information games Withholding information to make others look foolish, bending the truth, white lies, massaging information, timed release
Structure games Creating new roles, teams, and departments, abolishing old ones, in order to promote supporters and sideline adversaries, and to signal new priorities
406 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
Scapegoating This is the fault of another department, external factors, my pre- decessor, trading conditions, a particular individual
Alliances Doing secret deals with influential others to form a critical mass, a cabal, to win support for and to progress your proposals
Networking Lunches, coffees, dinners, sporting events, to get initiatives onto management agendas, improve visibility, gather information
Compromise All right, you win this time, I won’t put up a fight and embar- rass you in public—and perhaps you will back me next time
Rule games I’m sorry, but you have used the wrong form, at the wrong time, with the wrong arguments; we can’t set inconsistent precedents
Positioning Switching and choosing roles where one is successful and vis- ible; avoiding failing projects; position in the building, in the room, at the table
Issue-selling Packaging, presenting, and promoting plans and ideas in ways that make them more appealing to the target audience
Dirty tricks Keeping dirt files for blackmail, spying on others, discrediting and undermining, spreading false rumors, corridor whispers
If you are a practicing manager and/or change manager, you are probably using some of these kinds of tactics already. Choice of tactics is of course dependent on your goals, the context, and those whom you are seeking to influence. Is image building really harm- less? This is also called “impression management,” and it involves appearing and behav- ing in a manner that presents the public image or “persona” that you want others to see. Dress and act differently, and others will see a different persona. Image building can thus be a good way to manipulate the perceptions, beliefs, and behavior of others. At the other end of that list of political tactics, can you imagine any circumstances in which those “dirty tricks” could be seen as useful, ethical, appropriate, professional manage- ment actions?
Take a Moment and Think about a Leader
Take a moment and think about a leader in your
organization whom you would consider to be
political. How would you describe that leader?
Some common descriptions that may immedi-
ately come to mind are self-serving, manipula-
tive, phony, or untrustworthy. You may conjure
up images of secret pacts made behind closed
doors or on the golf course. Or, perhaps, you
came up with descriptions such as influential,
well-connected, trustworthy, or concerned for
others. Often, the idea of a leader being politi-
cal is associated with negative perceptions and
behaviors. In reality, though, political skill is a
necessity and can be a positive skill for leaders to
possess when used appropriately. Indeed, when
we view political skill through this lens, it is diffi-
cult to envision any leader being effective with-
out it (Braddy and Campbell, 2014, p. 1).
One of the political tactics that we have just mentioned is “issue-selling.” This is not captured by Ferris’ model of political skill but, for obvious reasons, is particularly rele- vant to the change manager. Novel ideas for improvement, development, and change in
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 407
an organization are always competing with other good ideas; and as we know, good ideas do not always sell themselves. Most organizations find it difficult to resource all of the good ideas that are circulating at any one point in time, so those ideas are competing with each other. How can you, as a change manager, increase the probability that your ideas are implemented, and not the plans of others? Jane Dutton et al. (2001) identify three sets of issue-selling tactics, which they call “behind-the-scenes moves to promote ideas for change.”
Packaging moves concern the ways in which ideas are “wrapped” to make them more appealing, urgent, and acceptable. This means linking the proposals to “the bottom line” and other issues such as profitability or market share, repeatedly raising the idea to prepare the audience for the full proposal, and where appropriate “chunking” big ideas into com- ponent parts to make them more acceptable.
Involvement moves concern the ways in which relationships can be exploited to build support for ideas. For the change manager, this means knowing who to involve and when, clearing ideas with a senior sponsor, involving other departments and outside consultants, and where appropriate using formal committees and task forces to legitimize the ideas.
Process moves concern the groundwork that may need to be done in advance of sell- ing the issues. There are choices regarding preparation, timing, and degree of formality. The change manager needs to consider the amount of background information to collect in order to persuade others to back the idea. Another choice concerns knowing when to move, when to hold back, and when to persist, depending on the level of support for the idea. Finally, there will be situations where an informal approach (to assess top team sup- port, for example) may be advisable, and times when formality may be appropriate (to finalize agreement on funding, for example).
Skills of the Change Architect How to Block Interference
We discussed the management of resistance to
change in chapter 8. Looking at resistance through
the lens of organization politics, Rosabeth Moss
Kanter (1983, p. 231) identifies the following eight
tactics for blocking interference to a change initia-
tive. As we mentioned previously, those who are
blocking may not be displaying open resistance.
They may, however, be using political tactics them-
selves, to “run interference” on a change initiative.
Political tactics such as these may therefore be use-
ful in countering that behavior:
Wait them out They should eventually go away
Wear them down
Keep pushing and arguing, be persistent
Appeal to higher authority
You had better agree because they do
Invite them in Ask them to join the party
Send emissaries Have friends in whom they trust talk to them
Display support Have “your” people present and active at key meetings
Reduce the stakes
Make concessions in areas that are especially damag- ing to them
Warn them off Let them know that senior management will notice their dissent
408 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
The popular perception of politics as damaging is only partly correct. Political tactics can benefit the individuals involved and the organization as a whole. The nature of change puts a premium on political skill for those who manage the process. The change manager who is not comfortable playing politics will find the role challenging. Some managers argue that playing politics is a time-wasting diversion from the real work. For the change manager, however, managing the organization politics is the real work. Dealing with polit- ical issues can take time, but that investment early in the change process often means that events move more quickly at later stages, because barriers have been addressed and sup- port has been won. In addition, skilled organization politicians experience less anxiety and stress. Some change managers even enjoy the political dimension of the role.
How can the change manager develop political skill? This requires a combination of self-awareness, careful observation of the motives and behaviors of others, modelling the approaches and actions of politically skilled colleagues, and practice. This also involves finding and nurturing your inner Machiavelli. Playing politics involves taking informed risks, and one also has to be prepared to make mistakes—and to learn from those. Phillip Braddy and Michael Campbell (2014, p. 15) have developed the short self-assessment in table 12.8. This is based on the four dimensions of the political skills model introduced earlier. More checks on the right indicate that you are already effectively using political skill. More checks on the left indicate room for improvement.
If necessary, how will you develop your profile? To develop social awareness, for example, focus on understanding the language and body language, feelings, motives, and agendas of others, and on how your proposals can help them to meet their goals. To develop interpersonal influence, ask more questions, listen actively, use self-disclosure, play down power differences, learn about others’ professional and personal interests, and sell your ideas instead of imposing them. Networking ability can be developed by mon- itoring who you approach for advice, giving them something in return, building a more
The Gang of Four: Middle versus Senior Management
Ole Hope (2010) examines how middle managers
“redefined” senior management plans for change
in the claims handling division of a Nordic insur-
ance company. The claims handling process was
time-consuming and costly, and it was difficult for
customers to use. Middle management, however,
did not agree with senior management plans, and
a back office management team, who called them-
selves “The Gang of Four,” decided to implement
their own proposals instead. The “micro practices”
that they used in order to influence the change out-
comes included:
• Disobeying management decisions about proj-
ect representation
• Handpicking loyal and skilled people to fill
project roles
• Taking control over the subproject staffing
• Controlling information gathering by deciding
what questions were to be asked
• Producing a memo supporting their own posi-
tion and aims
• Holding back information, and distributing
information selectively
• Questioning the expertise of the external
consultants
• Taking advantage of the new division head and
his lack of direct local experience
• Rejecting unfavorable decisions and insisting
on a “replay” to reach different outcomes
Middle management were thus able to implement
their more effective proposals.
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 409
diverse network through new relationships outside your team or department, and taking time to maintain those relationships. To strengthen apparent sincerity, follow through on your commitments, ensure that others see you as authentic, do not appear to be withhold- ing information, be prepared to reveal your emotions and vulnerabilities, and “Don’t rush trust; it takes a long time to build and only a short time to lose” (Braddy and Campbell, 2014, p. 19).
Machiavelli’s Memorandum
“So if, in the coming months, you find that your enemies call you Machiavellian, do not be disheartened.
It means you are doing something right” (The Economist, 2013).
TABLE 12.8 Political Skills Assessment
Which statements describe you? For each pair of statements, place a check mark by the statement that best describes your behavior:
Do I behave like this? Or do I behave like this?
Social Awareness
Focus primarily on my own agenda and myself Try to understand other people’s motives
Struggle with knowing how to present myself Consistently make positive impressions on others
Have difficulty making small talk or carrying on conversations
Naturally know the right things to say to influence others in most situations
Interpersonal Influence
Find it difficult to establish rapport with others Put people at ease
Struggle to communicate with others Interact easily and effectively with colleagues
Have difficulty getting to know others Have a knack for getting others to like me
Networking
Stay to myself and spend virtually all my time at work completing job-related tasks
Deliberately spend time networking with others at work
Primarily spend time with a close group of cowork- ers and friends with whom I feel comfortable
Invest in building relationships with diverse and influential people
Almost exclusively rely on formal processes for securing resources and getting things done
Often leverage my networks and relationships to secure valuable resources and get things done
Sincerity
Only show interest in others when I need some- thing from them
Take time to regularly show genuine interest in people at work
Come across as being manipulative because I say and do what is needed to get what I want
Act sincerely around others
Have a tendency to be very secretive and to keep people on a strict “need to know” basis
Communicate openly and transparently with others
410 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
LO 12.5 Developing Change Management Expertise
We explored the development of political skill in the previous section. Finally, we will consider, using a six-step approach, the development of this and other change manage- ment capabilities.
1. Career Moves First, is this the right role for you at this point in your career? You know what being a change manager involves, and you understand the capabilities that are required in order to be effective. But do you still want the job? David Hutton (1994) argues that this is not a job for everyone, because it can be demanding, tiring, lonely, and risky, as well as satisfying. Hutton also describes the desirable and undesirable characteristics of change managers, and these are summarized in table 12.9. The question is, which of these profiles fits you? If you have more of the undesirable characteristics, then it may be advisable to consider other career choices, or to change your behavior where appropriate. Become more persistent and enthusiastic, more flexible and approachable. Become less impatient, less arrogant, less risk averse, less adversarial.
TABLE 12.9 Desirable and
Undesirable
Characteristics
of the Change
Manager
Desirable Undesirable
Believes that this is the right thing to do
Patient, persistent
Honest, trustworthy, reliable
Positive and enthusiastic
Confident but not arrogant
Good observer and listener
Flexible and resourceful
Not easily intimidated
Good sense of humor
Willing to accept risks and challenges
Recognizes and deals with office politics
Prefers an inclusive, cooperative style
Sees this job as a stepping stone in career
Impatient, lacking persistence
Devious, unreliable, untrustworthy
Unable to convey enthusiasm
Has high need for praise and recognition
Poor listener, insensitive to others’ feelings
Inflexible, arrogant, cold, unapproachable
Moral putty, changes view to fit context
Status-conscious
Risk averse, protective of image and career
Political and manipulative
Prefers a secretive, adversarial style
2. Repositioning Second, refer back to figure 1.1, “Assessing Depth of Change.” Where does your past and present change management experience sit in that framework? Mostly shallow, mainly deep, or a mix? Although all experience can be useful, deep change is more challenging and risky, because there is a higher chance that things could go wrong. However, deep change offers much greater potential for personal development, and it also increases the visibility and reputation of the change managers responsible, as long as things go well. Interview panels and promotion boards are likely to be more impressed by involvement in successful deep change than in shallow change. Given this assessment and your recent and current roles, do you need to consider “repositioning”
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 411
yourself with regard to current and forthcoming change initiatives in your organiza- tion? Do you need to become associated more closely with the deeper, high-impact changes, as long as you are confident that these are likely to succeed? Where possible, of course, avoid association with initiatives that are likely to fail.
3. The Politics Third, are you comfortable with the political dimension of change management? As we have seen, some managers see this as unethical and time-wasting. However, this is an aspect of the change management role from which it is difficult to escape, and political skill is a prerequisite for success in most if not all general management and leadership positions. Given the contested nature of much organizational change, politi- cal skill is at a premium for the change manager. Political skill can be developed, as we explored in the previous section, but if you are not comfortable with these behaviors, these “games,” then developing and using political skill will be difficult.
4. Strengths Fourth, refer back to table 12.5 and the “CMI Change Manager Competency Model,” and add intimidation and political skills to the model’s list of competencies. Most of these competencies apply to most general management positions. As an experienced manager, you will probably find that you are already well-equipped to handle the challenges of change, if you have not already done so. However, it may still be useful to confirm—what skills, knowledge, and other attributes do you already possess that are relevant to a change management role? The question here is, how do you plan to maintain and to build on those capabilities and strengths? Will this involve further training and development, care- ful “repositioning” with regard to future experience (step 2 above), or internal and external job moves to consolidate, diversify, and improve those existing skills?
5. Gaps Fifth, looking again at table 12.5 and the other competencies identified in this chapter, where do you see personal gaps? Realistically, is it going to be possible for you to fill these gaps? Remember that this may not be necessary, as other colleagues are likely to have different and overlapping skill sets. Decide which areas of competence you feel that you must develop as a matter of priority, which areas are less important for you, and which you feel that it would be acceptable to avoid.
6. Action Finally, prepare a personal action plan that covers these three issues:
1. Building strengths: How will I maintain and build on the strengths that I currently have as a change manager?
2. Allowable weaknesses: Which of my weaknesses will I not try to develop, as this would be unnecessary, or time-consuming, or particularly difficult for some reason?
3. Filling gaps: Which skills, knowledge, and attributes do I need to strengthen as a matter of urgency? What are my options for building those capabilities: taking on further change responsibilities, partnering with others in change management teams, secondments, net- working, mentoring, specialist training and development, guided reading, other?
412 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
The actions required to develop change management capabilities are not necessarily costly. Most of the possibilities are free, because they are experience-based, but they do involve a significant time commitment. In terms of personal and career development, however, that investment can generate returns in terms of personal skills development and career progression.
EXERCISE 12.1
Networking—
How Good
Are You?
Networking is a core change manager capability. Use the following diagnostic to assess your own networking skills and to determine what action you may need to take to improve.
Tick whether you agree, or disagree, with each of the following statements.
Agree Disagree
I enjoy finding out what other people do. ❑ ❑ 1
I feel embarrassed asking people for favors. ❑ ❑ 2
I send Christmas cards to ex-colleagues and business contacts.
❑ ❑ 3
I usually call or email former colleagues and contacts when I am struggling with a particularly difficult problem.
❑ ❑ 4
I do not like to waste time going to conferences. ❑ ❑ 5
I cannot remember the names and family details of all my team members.
❑ ❑ 6
I cut out articles from the press that I think might interest colleagues.
❑ ❑ 7
I prefer to write emails or letters to picking up the phone. ❑ ❑ 8
I am quick to return phone calls. ❑ ❑ 9
I pursue opportunities to work on committees, task forces, and projects.
❑ ❑ 10
I like to solve problems on my own. ❑ ❑ 11
I am happy to ask people for their business cards. ❑ ❑ 12
I go to social events with people outside my team. ❑ ❑ 13
I have lost touch with my ex-bosses. ❑ ❑ 14
I use the Internet to make contact with people in my field. ❑ ❑ 15
I do not mix work and social life. ❑ ❑ 16
LO 12.3
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 413
Networking: How Did You Score?
Give yourself one point each if you agreed with these items, scoring up to 9:
1 3 4 7 9 10 12 13 15
Give yourself one point each if you disagreed with these items, scoring up to 7:
2 5 6 8 11 14 16
Add these two scores to produce your final total score out of 16:
❑ Score: Implications:
0 to 5 You do not appear to do much networking, and you may need to be careful that you are not overlooked for promotion. What can you do to lift your profile, to make yourself more visible?
6 to 9 You network a little, but you could do more to develop relationships that would improve your career opportunities. Where are the gaps in your net- working efforts, and how can you fill them?
10 to 13 You are a competent networker, but you could improve. What areas are you not covering? Do you need to do more external networking?
14 to 16 It looks like you are a natural networker. However, you may need to be careful not to overplay this aspect of your profile building, as there is a danger that this can annoy some people.
Based on Yeung (2003).
EXERCISE 12.2
How Resil-
ient Are
You?
Rate your agreement with each of these 25 statements, and put your score in the right- hand column.
Disagree Agree Score
1 When I make plans I follow through with them
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 I usually manage one way or another 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 I am able to depend on myself more than anyone else
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 Keeping interested in things is import- ant to me
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 I can be on my own if I have to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LO 12.2
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414 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
Disagree Agree Score
6 I feel proud that I have accomplished things in my life
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 I usually take things in my stride 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 I am friends with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 I feel that I can handle many things at a time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10 I am determined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11 I seldom wonder what the point of it all is
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12 I take things one day at a time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13 I can get through difficult times because I’ve experienced difficulty before
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14 I have self-discipline 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15 I keep interested in things 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16 I can usually find something to laugh about
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17 My belief in myself gets me through hard times
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18 In an emergency, I'm someone people generally can rely on
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19 I can usually look at a situation in a number of ways
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20 Sometimes I make myself do things whether I want to or not
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21 My life has meaning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22 I do not dwell on things that I can't do anything about
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23 When I'm in a difficult situation, I can usually find my way out of it
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24 I have enough energy to do what I have to do
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25 It's okay if there are people who don't like me
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Your Total:
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 415
Resilience Scoring
Add the scores that you have given to each of the 25 items. Your resilience score total will lie between 25 and 175. Higher scores reflect higher resilience. The scores of adults on this test normally lie between 90 and 175, with a mean of 140. A resilience score of 150 or above is considered to be high.
• If you have a low resilience score, say below 140, what steps do you think you could take to improve your resilience?
• How would you advise a colleague with a low resilience score?
Source: This diagnostic is based on Wagnild and Young (1993).
EXERCISE 12.3
How Polit-
ical Is Your
Organiza-
tion?
To what extent do the following statements describe your organization? Tick the appropriate box on the right:
Disagree Maybe Agree
1: Who you know around here matters a lot more than what you know.
❑ ❑ ❑
2: The most competent people in the business don’t always get promoted.
❑ ❑ ❑
3: Decisions are often taken outside formal meetings or behind closed doors.
❑ ❑ ❑
4: Resource allocations between departments are a source of argument and conflict.
❑ ❑ ❑
5: You have to be prepared to socialize to build effective networks and alliances.
❑ ❑ ❑
6: Information is jealously guarded and not shared openly between groups and departments.
❑ ❑ ❑
7: People suspect that there are “hidden agendas” behind management decisions.
❑ ❑ ❑
8: Some individuals always seem to be better informed than everyone else.
❑ ❑ ❑
9: Individuals are having their reputations damaged by “whispers in the corridors.”
❑ ❑ ❑
10: Those who take the credit are not always those who made the biggest contribution.
❑ ❑ ❑
11: You have to know how to “play the rules”—breaking and bending them—to get things done.
❑ ❑ ❑
12: When mistakes are made, people are quick to start putting the blame on others.
❑ ❑ ❑
13: Most people recognize that you’re not going very far here unless you have the support of the key players.
❑ ❑ ❑
14: Being open and honest all the time can seriously damage your career.
❑ ❑ ❑
15: People will criticize others’ ideas merely to help win support for their own proposals.
❑ ❑ ❑
Scoring instructions on next page →
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416 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
Battilana, J., and Casciaro, T. 2013. The network secrets of great change managers. Harvard Business Review 91(7/8):62–68. Describes the nature and functions of two dif- ferent kinds of networks—cohesive and divergent. The power and influence of change managers depends not on formal title or seniority but on position in the organization’s informal networks. Offers practical advice to change managers on developing and lever- aging these networks effectively.
Buchanan, D. A., and Badham, R. 2008. Power, politics, and organizational change: Win- ning the turf game. 2nd ed. London: Sage Publications. Comprehensive discussion of the
Additional Reading
How Political Is Your Organization? Scoring
Give yourself:
• 1 point for each item where you ticked “disagree”
• 3 points for each item where you ticked “maybe”
• 5 points for each item where you ticked “agree”
Total
This will give you a score between 15 and 75
The politics-free zone: if you score around 25 or lower. We are all coming to work with you. Your organization has a relatively low level of political behavior. Either that, or you are just not aware of the degree of politics going on behind your back. In such a politics-free zone, are you concerned that:
• There is not enough discussion and debate before key decisions are made?
• There is not enough constructive conflict and debate to stimulate creativity?
The free-fire zone: if you score around 65 or above. There is a high level of political behavior in your organization. Either that, or you are reading too much into routine deci- sions and actions. In such a free-fire zone, are you concerned that:
• Too much time and energy is going into the politics game, and not enough into stra- tegic thinking and performance improvement?
• The discussions and debates are motivated more by personal goals and are less related to the organization’s strategies and goals?
The average behavior zone: score between approximately 30 and 60. Your organization is typical, middle of the road in terms of the degree of political behavior that you can expect to witness. In such an average behavior zone, are you concerned that:
• There is still too much political behavior to stimulate the quality of discussion and debate around key issues and decisions?
On the basis of your scoring, what advice applies to you and to other change manag- ers with regard to dealing with the politics in your organization?
Source: This diagnostic is from Buchanan, D.A. and Badham, R. (2008). Power, Politics, and Organizational Change: Winning
the Turf Game. London: Sage Publications, Second Edition.
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 417
nature, tactics, and ethics of organization politics. Describes the constructive use of political tactics to maintain personal reputation and further organizational objectives. Offers guidance on the use of political tactics and advice on the development of political skill or expertise.
Dutton, J. E., Ashford, S. J., O’Neill, R. M., and Lawrence, K. A. 2001. Moves that mat- ter: Issue selling and organizational change. Academy of Management Journal 44(4):716– 36. Describes the academic research that developed the “issue-selling” tactics described in this chapter—tactics for “successfully shaping change from below by directing the attention of top management” (p. 716).
Pfeffer, J. 2010. Power play. Harvard Business Review 88(7/8):84–92. Argues that power and influence are prerequisites for management success and offers advice on leveraging power. Concludes: “So, welcome to the real world. It may not be the world we want, but it’s the world we have. You won’t get far, and neither will your strategic plans, if you can’t build and use power. Some of the people competing for advancement or standing in the way of your organization’s agenda will bend the rules of fair play or ignore them entirely. Don’t bother complaining about this or wishing things were different. Part of your job is to know how to prevail in the political battles you will face” (p. 92).
Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager
1. How would you describe your role as a change
manager using the terms introduced in this
chapter: champion, soul-of-fire, quiet leader,
positive deviant, disruptive innovator? How
is this reflected in your behavior? Would you
become more or less effective as a change man-
ager if you “dropped below the radar”?
2. How effectively do you use your informal net-
works to drive change in your organization?
How could you develop and make better use of
those networks?
3. Do you feel that you have the resilience required
to operate effectively as a change manager? If
necessary, what steps can you take to maintain
and to strengthen your resilience?
4. As a practicing manager, you probably already
have most of the required capabilities of the
change manager. But how do you feel about
using intimidation to motivate others to change?
Are there circumstances when this would be
appropriate in your organization?
5. Are you politically skilled? Do you use political skills
to advance your change agenda? Who are the
other “politicians” in your organization? Are you
able to manage their support, and to block their
attempts to interfere with your change agenda?
Here is a short summary of the key points that we would like you to take from this chapter, in relation to each of the learning outcomes:
Recognize the nature and significance of the contributions of change managers at all
levels of an organization, regardless of their formal roles or responsibilities.
Change managers can be found at all levels of an organization. Given the pace and scale of change in most organizations, the shared leadership of change has become a necessity. Contrary to the popular stereotype, middle managers are often among the most important change managers in an organization. The power and influence of many
LO 12.1
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418 Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take?
change managers come not from a formal, senior position, but from their position in the informal networks in an organization. Those with more informal connections can be more influential, and the organization chart is not a good guide to identifying them. The terminology that commentators have used to describe this variety of change manager offers insights into the nature of the role, and of those who take on these responsibil- ities: champions, evangelists, positive deviants, souls-of-fire, tempered radicals, quiet leaders, stealth innovators, ideas practitioners, disruptive innovators. Those innovators and “souls-of-fire” are highly motivated and assertive, but they are also nonconformists and do not follow instructions, and they can thus be difficult to manage.
Appreciate the challenges and rewards that accompany a change management role.
The role of the change manager is often a demanding one: challenging, lonely, stress- ful, fast-paced, and risky. Dealing simultaneously with senior management expecta- tions and different modes of resistance from those who are going to be affected can make the role particularly pressured. However, the opportunities for personal develop- ment and career progression can be significant, and the role is especially satisfying and rewarding when the change process is successful. Given the pressures, a high degree of resilience is often required. Resilience can be developed, and exercise 12.2 offers a personal diagnostic.
Identify the competencies in terms of the skills, knowledge, and other attributes that are
ideally required in order to be an effective change manager.
We considered three competency frameworks. The most comprehensive of these was developed by the Change Management Institute. Their model identifies over 50 capa- bilities under 12 skills headings: facilitation, strategic change, judgement, influencing, coaching, project management, interpersonal and corporate communications, self-man- agement, facilitation, professional development, learning and development. While this appears to be a daunting specification, most of those capabilities are relevant to most general management positions. We also discussed the value of “intimidation” as a change management style. While many managers may feel uncomfortable with this approach, it can be appropriate in certain circumstances, particularly when an organi- zation has become rigid, apathetic, stagnant, and change-resistant. We also discussed a small number of intimidation tactics: confrontation, the “calculated loss of temper,” maintaining an air of mystery, and “informational intimidation,” which involves the appearance of having mastered the facts.
Understand the significance of political skill to the role and effectiveness of change
managers.
Organizations are political systems, and change is a politicized process. Politics is often seen in negative terms, as damaging and unnecessary. However, effective lead- ers and change managers need political skill in order to exert influence over others. Change managers must be aware of the perceptions and agendas of other stakeholders, and be able to engage them in consultation where their views are valuable, and also when necessary to counter attempts to subvert or resist change with political tactics. We identified several types of political tactics: image building, information games, structure games, scapegoating, alliances, networks, compromise, rule games, position- ing, issue-selling, and “dirty tricks.” One model of political skill identifies four key
LO 12.2
LO 12.3
LO 12.4
Chapter 12 The Effective Change Manager: What Does It Take? 419
dimensions: social astuteness, interpersonal influence, networking ability, and apparent sincerity. We offered a self-assessment covering those four skill dimensions, and sug- gested ways in which political skill can be developed.
Develop an action plan for improving your own change management capabilities.
We set out a six-step approach to personal development. First, do you still want this job, knowing how challenging and stressful it is, and what kinds of attributes contribute to success? Second, do you need to consider your personal positioning with regard to the depth of the change initiatives for which you are responsible, or with which you are associated? Deeper changes can be more risky, but they offer greater opportunities for personal development. Third, make sure that you are comfortable with the political dimension of the role, and follow the guidelines for developing political skill—if you feel this is relevant with regard to your current and future change management roles. Fourth, identify your strengths as a change manager, and determine how to maintain those capabilities. Fifth, identify gaps in your capability profile, and decide whether or not it is possible and desirable to address those—or to delegate those aspects of your change management role to other team members. Finally, develop a practical action plan to build on your strengths, recognize and manage allowable weaknesses, and address the gaps in your profile with further development.
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423
Name Index
A
Abbasi, K., 7, 28
Abrahamson, E., 66, 93, 96, 359, 382
Ahlberg, J., 366, 382
Aiken, C., 14, 29, 62, 98
Alban, B. T., 287, 288, 297, 308, 311
Aldrick, P., 141, 166
Allen-Greil, D., 240–241, 244
Aller-Stead, G., 176, 202
Ambler, G., 177, 201
Amichai-Hamburger, Y., 213, 214, 245
Anderson, D., 48, 57
Anderson, L. A., 48, 57
Andriopoulos, C., 4, 29, 39, 58, 331, 334, 335, 346, 349
Angwin, D., 116, 135
Ante, S. A., 89, 96
Appelbaum, S. H., 328, 329, 349
Arkin, A., 111, 134
Armenakis, A. A., 14, 30, 122, 136, 222, 241, 247
Arndt, M., 64, 98
Arnold, M., 141, 166
Ashford, S. J., 388, 417, 419
Ashill, N., 325, 351
Atkinson, P., 252, 274
Auster, E. R., 176, 201
Avolio, B. J., 194, 202
Axelrod, D., 41, 57, 287, 289, 290, 291, 310
B
Baburoglu, O. N., 288, 310
Backoff, R. W., 175, 179, 180, 182, 204
Bacon, R., 319, 349
Badaracco, J. L., 390, 419
Badham, R., 16, 28, 403, 405, 416, 420
Bailey, M. R., 223, 245
Baker, L. T., 333, 351
Balogun, J., 262, 274, 299, 302, 310, 314, 316, 335, 339,
340, 348, 349, 350
Bannon, D., 158, 159, 166
Barabba, V., 149, 167
Barge, J. K., 42, 57
Barker, V. L., 79, 81, 100
Barr, P. S., 80, 96
Barrett, M., 221–222, 245
Barrett, R., 65, 71, 78, 97, 98
Barry, B., 81, 99
Bartunek, J. M., 297, 310
Bate, P., 142, 167
Battilana, J., 55, 57, 272, 274, 387, 392, 416, 419
Baum, J. R., 176, 203
Bazigos, M. N., 281, 310
BBC, 83, 89, 96
Bean, C. J., 301, 310
Beard, A., 93, 96
Beatty, C. A., 386, 419
Beaudan, E., 38–39, 57
Beaumont, R., 302, 312
Beaver, G., 173, 201
Beck, T. E., 333, 351
Beckhard, R., 281, 310
Beer, M., 280, 285, 297, 311, 363, 365, 382
Beeson, J., 144, 167, 396, 419
Behar, D., 344, 349
Belgard, W. P., 173, 176, 183, 201
Bell, C. H., 282, 283, 284, 312
Benn, S., 94, 96
Benne, K. D., 36, 58
Bennis, W. G., 35, 57
Bercovici, J., 89, 96
Binzagr, G. F., 287, 288, 313
Birkinshaw, J., 64, 67, 96, 160, 167
Bisognano, M., 327, 347, 351
Blake, R., 286, 311
Bland, B., 345, 349
Blenko, M. W., 130, 134
Boal, K. B., 175, 201
Boaz, N., 396, 419
Boddy, D., 398, 399, 420
Bogner, W. C., 80, 96
Bolman, L. G., 33, 57, 107, 134, 302, 311
Bower, J. L., 387, 419
Bowers, L., 85, 97
Boyd, B. K., 80, 97
Boyett, I., 262, 274
Braddy, P., 406, 408, 409, 419
Brazeal, D. V., 40, 60
Breen, B., 87, 97
424 Name Index
Brewis, J., 212, 246
Brigham, S., 289, 313
Brooker, K., 89, 97
Brouer, R. L., 404, 419
Brown, J., 288, 311
Brown, S. L., 299, 312
Broyles, E. A., 272, 275
Bruch, H., 62, 97, 257, 258, 274
Brynjolfsson, E., 163, 167
Buchanan, D. A., 16, 29, 32, 33, 42, 57, 59, 70,
84, 85, 94, 97, 98, 330, 347, 350, 357, 368, 379,
382, 395, 398, 399, 403, 405, 416, 420, 421
Buckley, C., 67, 97
Bughin, J., 94, 97, 234, 241, 245
Bulkeley, W. M., 219, 244
Bunker, B. B., 287, 288, 297, 308, 311
Burke, W. W., 35, 58, 103, 134, 281, 282, 285, 286,
310, 312
Burnes, B., 14, 28, 36, 41, 58, 280, 285, 287, 308, 311
Burns, T., 124, 134
Burrows, P., 80, 97
Bushe, G. R., 295, 296, 308, 311
Byrnes, N., 80, 97
C
Cameron, K. S., 57, 59, 293, 294, 295, 308, 310, 311
Campbell, M., 406, 408, 409, 419
Cannell, M., 225, 244
Carlile, P. R., 27, 28
Carlisle, D., 55, 58
Carlson, B., 286, 311
Casamayou, M. H., 153, 168, 379, 383
Casciaro, T., 55, 57, 272, 274, 387, 392, 416, 419
Caza, A., 293, 294, 311
Chatman, J., 55, 58
Child, J., 80, 97
Chin, R., 36, 58
Chitipeddi, K. C., 259, 275
Chittenden, M., 68, 99
Christensen, C. M., 19, 27, 28, 143, 146, 148, 149, 167,
168, 269, 275
Christensen, L. T., 206, 245
Christianson, M., 308, 313
Chui, M., 94, 97, 234, 241, 245
Clampitt, P. G., 225, 226, 245
Clark, A., 344, 349
Cody, S., 287, 312
Coghlan, D., 142, 167
Cohen, W. M., 118, 134
Collett, P., 212, 245
Collins, J. C., 191, 195, 196, 197, 201, 202
Colvin, G., 155, 167
Connor, P. E., 386, 420
Conway, E., 263, 275, 388, 420
Cook, B., 41, 58
Cooke, B., 280, 285, 287, 308, 311
Coombs, A., 261, 275
Cooper, E., 87, 97
Cooperrider, D. L., 292, 308, 311
Cornelissen, J., 206, 245
Costello, M., 141, 167
Coxhead, H., 210, 246
Coyle-Shapiro, J. A-M., 255, 275
Craig, N., 185–186, 202
Cripe, E. J., 398, 420
Cuganesan, S., 302, 312
Culik, C. T., 27, 29
Cummings, T. G., 282, 283, 284, 291, 308, 311
Cunliffe, A. L., 33, 58, 151, 167
Currie, G., 262, 274, 298, 313
Cushman, T., 225, 226, 245
Czarniawska, B., 4, 28
D
Daft, R. L., 232, 233, 238, 246
Daly, J. P., 224, 245
Daniel, E., 19, 30, 145, 169
Daniels, K., 109, 135
Dannemiller, K. D., 287, 291, 311
D’Aveni, R., 76, 97
Davenport, T. H., 391, 392, 420
Davidson, H., 176, 177, 183, 189, 202
Dawson, P., 4, 29, 39, 42, 57, 58, 331, 334, 335, 346, 349
Deal, T. E., 33, 57, 107, 134, 302, 311
Deetz, S. A., 176, 177, 183, 202
DeKoch, R. J., 225, 226, 245
Denis, J.-L., 21, 29
Denning, S., 27, 29, 181, 202
Dent, E. B., 260, 275
De Smet, A., 393, 403, 420
Dess, G. G., 80, 97, 113–115, 136
Detert, J., 388, 419
Devane, T., 287, 312
Dickey, C., 90, 97
DiMaggio, P. J., 41, 58, 65, 71, 97
DiTomaso, N., 151, 168
Name Index 425
Dobbs, R., 234, 241, 245
Dobosz-Bourne, D., 222, 245
Domm, D. R., 177, 202
Donaldson, L., 190–191, 202
Donellan, A., 237, 245
Dooley, K., 4, 29
Downey, D., 106, 107, 134
Dressang, J., 78, 98
Drori, I., 176, 193, 203
Duan, L., 393, 420
Duck, J. D., 227, 245
Dunford, R., 34, 59, 302, 312
Dunphy, D., 38, 60, 94, 96, 176, 204, 228, 247, 337,
338, 351
Dutton, J. E., 407, 417, 420
Dyer, J., 149, 167, 392, 420
E
Eccles, T., 117, 134
Edmondson, A., 83–84, 98, 160, 167, 359, 361–362, 382
Edwards, S., 240–241, 244
Eisenhardt, K. M., 299, 312
Elkind, P., 262, 275
Elliott, D., 85, 100
Emery, M., 287, 312
Emery, R. E., 156, 167
Ensher, E. A., 286, 312
Erlandson, E., 212, 239, 246
Erstad, M., 88, 98
Eyres, S., 85, 97
F
Fagenson-Eland, E., 286, 312
Faircloth, A., 70, 98
Faust, D., 88, 98
Fayol, H., 35, 58
Ferlie, E., 135
Fernandez, S., 29
Ferris, G. R., 404, 405, 406, 420
Fineman, S., 294, 312
Finley, M., 192, 204
Finn, R., 298, 313
Fisher, A. B., 363, 364, 371, 382
Floyd, S. W., 262, 277, 387, 422
Fombrun, C., 78, 98
Foote, D., 250, 275
Ford, J. D., 193, 202, 216–217, 245, 252, 272, 275
Ford, L. W., 216–217, 245, 252, 272, 275
Forgues, B., 43, 60
Fox, E. A., 396, 419
Fox, S., 213, 214, 245
Foy, H., 157, 167
Fragkos, K. C., 230, 247
Francis, D., 128, 136
Franckeiss, A., 172, 204
French, W. L., 282, 283, 284, 312
Friedman, M., 70, 98
Friedman, W. H., 40, 60
Friedrich, R., 69, 98
Frost, P., 395, 421
Fuller, C., 287, 291, 292, 312
G
Gadiesh, O., 256, 275
Galbraith, J., 106, 107, 134
Gardini, M., 130, 134, 335, 336, 348, 349
Gardner, W. L., 194, 202
Garr, M. A., 288, 310
Gayeski, D. M., 208, 245
Geigle, S. L., 223, 245, 259, 275
Geisler, D., 250, 275
Gelinas, M. V., 286, 312
George, G., 118, 136, 185, 198, 203
Gerstner, L. V., 191–192, 202, 357, 382
Ghislanzoni, G., 263, 275, 365, 382
Ghosh, D., 372, 382
Gifford, J., 158, 159, 160, 168, 235–237, 245
Gilbert, C. G., 79, 98
Gilbert, J. L., 256, 275
Gioia, D. G., 259, 275
Giuliani, G., 130, 134, 335, 336, 348, 349
Goff, S., 141
Goffee, R., 86, 100, 194, 202
Goldberg, S. G., 260, 275
Goldsby, M. G., 389, 421
Goldsworthy, S., 321, 350
Goldwasser, C., 326, 351
Golembiewski, R., 290, 312
Goode, J., 364, 382
Gordon, G. G., 151, 168
Gordon, J. R. M., 386, 419
Gottlieb, J., 157–158, 168
Graban, M., 150, 168
Graetz, F., 319, 349
426 Name Index
Grange, A., 85, 97
Grant, D., 284, 302, 312, 314
Gratton, L., 94, 98, 163, 168, 182, 202
Gregersen, H., 149, 167
Griffin, T., 287, 291, 292, 312
Griffiths, A., 94, 96
Grundy, T., 123, 134
Guaspari, J., 224, 245
Gulick, L., 35, 58
Gunther, M., 78, 98
Gupta, R., 187, 202, 364, 382
Gutherie, J. P., 346, 350
Guyler, T., 330, 347, 350
H
Habashy, S., 328, 329, 349
Haines, S. G., 176, 202
Hall, C., 85, 97
Hambrick, D. C., 112, 113, 135
Hamel, G., 47, 58, 125, 135, 190, 202, 260,
275, 346, 350
Hamilton, F. E., 301, 310
Hammer, M., 146, 147, 168
Harris, L. C., 188, 189, 202
Harrison, M. I., 40, 58
Harvey, T. R., 272, 275
Harwell, D., 93, 98
Hatch, M. J., 33, 58
Hay, M., 180, 202
Helms Mills, J., 300, 301, 304, 310, 312
Hemp, P., 85, 98
Hempel, J., 159, 168
Heracleous, L., 221–222, 245
Herbold, R. J., 85–86, 98
Herman, S., 290, 291, 312
Hewlett, S. A., 69, 98
Hiatt, J. M., 126, 135, 321, 322, 324, 347, 350
Hickey, L., 185, 198, 203
Higgins, J. M., 105, 135
Hilmer, F. G., 190–191, 202
Hinterhuber, H. H., 172, 203
Hirt, M., 156, 157, 168
Hitchin, D. E., 287, 314
Hoberecht, S., 291, 312
Hollensbe, E., 185, 198, 203
Holman, P., 287, 296, 312
Holmes, M. E., 4, 29
Holmes, S., 64, 98
Holpp, L., 181, 183, 203
Homkes, R., 380, 384
Hooijberg, R., 175, 201
Hope, C., 319, 349
Hope, O., 408, 421
Hope Hailey, V., 316, 335, 339, 340, 348, 350
Hornik, R., 93, 96
Hornstein, H., 280, 312
Hoving, E., 177, 204
Huczynski, A. A., 70, 98
Hughes, M., 27, 29, 253, 260, 275
Hultman, K. E., 261, 275
Hussey, D. E., 221, 246
Hutton, D. W., 394, 410, 421
Hutton, W., 343, 344, 350
Huy, Q. N., 38, 58
Hwang, J., 148, 168
I
Ibarra, H., 198–199, 203
Iles, V., 14, 29
Isaacs, D., 288, 311
J
Jackson, A., 35, 59, 320, 324, 346, 351
Jacobs, R. W., 287, 291, 311
Jacquemont, D., 14, 29, 323, 350
Jaffe, D. T., 264, 277
James, R. G., 286, 312
Jankowicz, A. D., 222, 245
Jansen, J. J. P., 118, 135
Ji, Y.-Y., 258, 276, 346, 350
Jick, T. D., 187, 189, 190, 203
Jick, T. J., 252, 276
Jimmieson, N. L., 14, 30, 122, 136, 222,
241, 247
Johnson, E., 240–241, 244
Johnson, G., 115–116, 135, 172, 179, 203,
302, 310
Johnson, J. H., 82, 99
Johnston, C., 343, 350
Jones, A., 343, 350
Jones, G., 194, 202
Jones, M., 14, 30, 262, 275
Jorgenson, J., 288, 290, 312
Joseph, B., 291, 312
Name Index 427
K
Kahn, E. F., 260, 276
Kanter, R. M., 89, 98, 119, 120, 124, 131, 135,
189, 190, 203, 268, 276, 325, 326, 350,
365, 370, 382, 383, 387, 407, 421
Karp, H. B., 266, 276
Kates, A., 106, 107, 134
Keenan, P., 35, 59, 320, 324, 346, 351
Keil, M., 371–372, 383
Kellaway, L., 394
Keller, S., 14, 29, 36, 58, 62, 98, 224, 241, 246,
321, 323, 324, 347, 350
Kelly, M., 181, 183, 203
Khurana, R., 389
Kilo, C. M., 266, 267, 277
Kim, W. C., 267, 276, 404, 421
Kimes, M., 10, 29
Kingston, J., 72, 99
Kirkpatrick, D. L., 76, 77, 79, 251, 276
Kirkpatrick, S. A., 176, 203
Kirn, S. P., 88, 100
Klein, D. C., 287, 312
Kneafsey, M. B., 156, 159, 168
Kolk, A., 178, 203
Koster, A., 69, 98
Kotter, J. P., 32, 38, 58, 62, 73–74, 99, 174,
175, 177, 199, 203, 268, 269, 276, 317,
318, 320, 327, 329, 346, 347, 350, 357, 362,
365, 366, 371, 383
Kouzes, J. M., 397, 421
Kowitt, B., 92–93, 99
Kramer, R. M., 401–402, 421
Kramer, S., 14, 30
Kübler-Ross, E., 264, 276
Kuchler, H., 235, 246
Kulkarni, M., 333, 351
Kulkowski, L., 87, 97
Kumar, V., 76, 99
Kunze, F., 251, 276
Kupers, R., 131, 136
Kuratko, D. F., 389, 421
Kurtzman, J., 367, 383
L
Labich, K., 70, 99
Lachinsky, A., 87, 99, 216, 246
Lake, L. K., 386, 420
Laming, W., 82–83, 99
Lammiman, J., 386, 422
Lamothe, L., 21, 29
Landau, D., 176, 193, 203
Langeler, G. H., 198, 203
Langley, A., 4, 21, 29, 39, 59
La Porte, N., 76, 99, 255, 276
Larkin, S., 227, 246
Larkin, T. J., 227, 246
Lavelle, L., 78, 99
Lawler, E. E., 63, 100, 124–127, 136
Lawson, E., 43, 59, 154–155, 168, 357, 361, 383
Leana, C. R., 81, 99
Lee, L., 80, 97
Lengel, R. H., 232, 233, 238, 246
Leppard, D., 68, 99
Leroux, M., 141, 167
Levesque, L. C., 220, 247
Levin, I. M., 176–179, 203
Levine, L., 287, 313
Levinthal, D. A., 118, 134
Lewin, K., 121, 135, 181, 203, 218, 246, 283, 313, 325,
326, 327, 328, 347, 350, 356, 383
Lewis, G., 392, 421
Lewis, L. K, 223, 246
Lewis, M., 271, 276
Lewis, S., 308, 313
Leys, F., 400, 421
Lichtenstein, B. B., 44, 59
Linstead, A., 212, 246
Linstead, S., 212, 246
Lipton, M., 188, 191, 194, 203
Lissack, M., 191–193, 203
Lockett, A., 298, 313
Lowitt, E., 75, 99
Ludden, J., 240–241, 244
Ludema, J. D., 287, 291, 292, 312
Ludeman, K., 212, 239, 246
Lukensmeyer, C. J., 289, 313
Lynn, M. L., 82, 99
M
Mabin, V. J., 252, 276
MacLachlan, R., 91, 99
Mahler, J. G., 83, 99, 153, 168, 379, 383
Maidique, M. A., 386, 421
Main, J., 181, 204
Maitlis, S., 308, 313
428 Name Index
Majka, J., 208, 245
Malo, J.-L., 328, 329, 349
Mankins, M. C., 130, 134
Manning, M. R., 287, 288, 313
Mantere, S., 298, 303, 313
Manyika, J., 94, 97, 234, 241, 245
Maor, D., 14, 29, 323, 350
Marin, D. B., 40, 60
Marks, M. L., 359, 383
Marricchi, M., 130, 134, 335, 336, 348, 349
Marshak, R. J., 45, 59, 219–220, 246, 284, 286,
287, 295, 296, 308, 311
Martin, G., 156, 159, 168, 298, 313
Matlack, C., 64, 98
Matthews, D., 235, 246
Mauborgne, R., 267, 276, 404, 421
Maurer, R., 250, 252, 253, 272, 276
Mayo, E., 35, 59
McAfee, A., 163, 167
McCorvey, J. J., 77, 99
McCreary, L., 55, 59, 389, 421
McDermott, A. M., 256, 263, 276, 388–389
McFarland, W., 321, 350
McGreevy, R., 343, 350
McKee, L., 135
McKee, R., 26, 29, 286, 311
McKinlay, J., 176, 202
McKinley, W., 79, 81, 100
McLuhan, M., 232, 246
McNaughtan, J., 293, 295, 308, 310, 311
Meaney, M., 36, 58, 224, 241, 246, 321, 323,
324, 347, 350
Menges, J. I., 62, 97, 257, 258, 274
Messersmith, J. G., 346, 350
Metais, E., 191, 203
Metz, I., 27, 29
Meyerson, D. E., 390, 421, 422
Meznar, M. B., 82, 99
Michel, S., 360, 383
Miller, P., 131, 135, 390, 422
Milne, R., 157, 168
Mintzberg, H., 33, 35, 37, 59, 404, 422
Mirvis, P., 286, 313
Mitchell, C., 189, 204
Mitchell, R., 111, 135
Mizzi, P. J., 82, 99
Mohr, B. J., 287, 313
Mohr, L. B., 4, 29
Mohrman, S. A., 63, 100, 291, 314
Mone, M. A., 79, 81, 100
Monks, K., 263, 275, 388, 420
Montealegre, R., 371–372, 383
Moore, C., 16, 29, 32, 33, 59
Morgan, G., 33, 59
Morrison, M., 109, 135
Muoio, A., 88, 100
N
Nadler, D. A., 193–194, 204, 365, 368, 383
Nauclér, T., 366, 382
Nelson, T., 210, 246
Nevitt, J. A., 291, 314
Nicholl, D., 282, 285, 313
Nijman, H., 85, 97
Nohria, N., 363, 382
Nutt, P. C., 175, 179, 180, 182, 204
O
Obstfeld, D., 298, 314
Ogbonna, E., 188, 189, 202
Ogburn, W. F., 17, 29
Oliver, C., 42, 57
Olofson, C., 228, 246
Oreg, S., 254, 260, 276
Ottaway, R. N., 386, 422
Overdorf, M., 148, 149, 167
P
Palmer, I., 34, 59, 302, 312
Parry, E., 67, 100
Pascale, R. T., 45, 55, 59, 369, 383, 386, 387, 422
Pasmore, W. A., 193, 202
Pass, S., 160, 167
Pate, J., 256, 277
Patterson, F., 391, 392, 422
Peiperl, M., 252, 276
Pendlebury, J., 176, 182, 190, 204
Pentland, B. T., 4, 29
Perlow, L. A., 163, 168
Peters, T. J., 104, 105, 136, 144, 168, 386, 422
Name Index 429
Peterson, M., 69, 98
Pettigrew, A. M., 42, 57, 59, 135, 331, 350
Pfeffer, J., 173, 204, 319, 320, 324, 326, 347, 351, 372,
380, 383, 417, 422
Philips, A., 386, 422
Phillips, J. R., 104, 105, 136
Phillips, L., 85, 97
Pickard, J., 68, 100
Picken, J. C., 113–115, 136
Piderit, S. K., 259, 260, 277
Plowman, D. A., 333, 351
Plsek, P. E., 266, 267, 277
Poole, M. S., 4, 29, 30, 39, 40, 60
Pophal, L., 237, 246
Popp, W., 172, 203
Porras, J. I., 176, 191, 193, 195, 196, 197, 201, 202, 203
Porter, M. E., 74–75, 100
Posner, B. Z., 397, 421
Powell, W. W., 41, 58
Prahalad, C. K., 47, 58, 190, 202
Price, C., 43, 59, 154–155, 168, 357, 361, 383
Pugh, M. D., 327, 347, 351
Pung, C., 36, 58, 224, 241, 246, 321, 323, 324, 347, 350
Purser, R. E., 287, 312
Pustkowski, R., 346, 351
Q
Quinn, R. E., 185, 190, 204
Quinn, R. T., 88, 100
Quirke, B., 229, 234, 246
R
Rafferty, A. E., 14, 30, 122, 136, 222, 241, 247
Rainey, H. G., 29
Rao, M., 292, 314
Rapping, J., 364, 383
Rasheed, A. M. A., 80, 97
Rashford, N. S., 142, 167
Rayner, S. R., 173, 176, 183, 201
Raynor, M. E., 192, 204
Reardon, K. J., 231, 247
Reardon, K. K., 231, 247
Reddington, M., 156, 159, 168
Reed, S., 89, 100
Reger, R. K., 255, 277
Regnér, P., 116, 135
Reich, A., 14, 29, 323, 350
Reinertsen, J. L., 327, 347, 351
Reingold, J., 14, 30, 324, 351
Reinhardt, F. L., 74–75, 100
Reisner, R. A. F., 27, 30, 357, 362, 383
Reynolds, S., 83, 100
Robbins, H., 192, 204
Roberto, M. A., 220, 247
Roberts, D., 324, 351
Roberts, L. M., 294, 314
Rod, M., 325, 351
Roethlisberger, F. J., 35, 59
Rogers, C., 185, 195, 204
Rogers, E., 147–148, 169
Rogers, P., 130, 134
Romanelli, E., 145, 169
Roos, J., 191–193, 203
Ross, J., 371, 384
Ross, L., 260, 277, 361, 383
Ross, W. L., 287, 314
Rouleau, L., 299, 314
Rousseau, D. M., 255, 277
Roxburgh, C., 234, 241, 245
Rucci, A. J., 88, 100
S
Salter, C., 70, 100
Salz, A., 145, 154, 169
Sandberg, J., 303, 314
Sands, G., 234, 241, 245
Sarrazin, H., 234, 241, 245
Saunders, R. M., 226, 247
Saunders, S., 325, 351
Scase, R., 86, 100
Schalk, R., 256, 277
Schein, E. H., 32, 59, 163, 169
Schildt, H. A., 298, 303, 313
Schlesinger, L. A., 268, 269, 276
Schmidt, W. H., 336, 348, 351
Schneider, D. M., 326, 351
Schoemaker, P. J. H., 191, 204
Scholes, K., 116, 135, 172, 179, 203
Schön, D. A., 251, 252, 277, 386, 422
Scott, C. D., 264, 277
430 Name Index
Scott, J., 346, 351
Scott-Morgan, P., 177, 204
Semler, R., 44, 59
Senge, P., 263, 264, 277
Shafiq, H., 328, 329, 349
Shannon, C. E., 209, 247
Sharman, A., 141, 166
Shaw, R. B., 190, 193, 204, 359, 383
Sherbin, L., 69, 98
Shirom, A., 40, 58
Shore, L., 255, 275
Sibbet, D., 242, 247
Sillince, J. A., 218–219, 247, 298, 303, 313
Simpson, A., 85, 97
Simpson, J. L., 176, 177, 183, 202
Sirkin, H. J., 35, 59, 320, 324, 346, 351
Smallman, C., 39, 59
Smedley, T., 73, 100, 162, 169
Smircich, L., 80, 100
Smit, H., 177, 204
Smith, A. C. T., 319, 349
Smith, D., 85, 100
Snook, S. A, 185–186, 202
Sohal, A. S., 252, 277
Solansky, S. T., 333, 351
Somerville, K. A., 206, 247
Sorenson, P. F., 286, 311, 314
Southern, N., 291, 312
Spencer, J., 291, 312
Stace, D. A., 38, 60, 176, 204, 228, 247, 337, 338, 351
Stalker, G. M., 124, 134
Stanford, N., 159, 169
Stavros, J. M., 308, 311
Staw, B. M., 371, 384
Steele, C., 302, 312
Steier, F., 288, 290, 312
Stein, B. A., 189, 190, 203
Stensaker, I., 257, 259, 277
Sternin, J., 45, 55, 59, 386, 387, 422
Stjernberg, T., 386, 422
Stubbart, C., 80, 100
Sull, C., 380, 384
Sull, D., 80, 100, 380, 384
Sumberg, K., 69, 98
Sutcliffe, K. M., 298, 314
Sutherland, K., 14, 29
Sutton, R. I., 319, 320, 324, 326, 347, 351
Symons, J., 188, 204
Syrett, M., 386, 422
T
Tannen, D., 212, 215, 238, 247
Tannenbaum, R., 336, 348, 351
Tesvic, J., 346, 351
Tetenbaum, T. J., 45, 60
Thietart, R. A., 43, 60
Thompson, J. D., 82, 93, 100
Thornton, E., 89, 100
Toft, B., 83, 100
Tracy, S. J., 176, 177, 183, 202
Tran, M., 343, 351
Travis, D. V. T., 333, 351
Treanor, J., 141, 169
Trist, E. L., 156, 167
Tsoukas, H., 39, 59, 303, 314
U
Urwick, L., 35, 58
Urwin, P., 67, 100
V
Valente, M. S., 176, 201
Valvi, A. C., 230, 247
van den Heuvel, S., 256, 277
Van Der Slot, A., 177, 204
Van de Ven, A. H., 4, 29, 30, 39, 40, 59, 60
Van Oosten, E. B., 293, 314
van Riel, C., 78, 98
Vaughan, D., 83, 100
Ven Den Bosch, F. A. J., 118, 135
Verity, J., 111, 136
Victor, P., 172, 204
Volberda, H. W., 118, 135
W
Waddell, D., 252, 277
Wagnild, G. M., 415, 422
Wahba, P., 305, 314
Wallace, L., 397, 422
Ward, J., 19, 30, 145, 169
Ward, P., 330, 347, 350
Waring, J., 298, 313
Waterman, R. H., 104, 105, 136, 386, 422
Name Index 431
Waters, J. A., 37
Weaver, W., 209, 247
Webster, B., 343, 351
Wedell-Wedellsborg, T., 131, 135, 390, 422
Weick, K. E., 42, 43, 60, 142, 169, 298, 299, 300, 314
Weisbord, M. R., 41, 60, 103, 104, 136, 290, 291, 292,
314
Wendler, J., 187, 202, 364, 382
Westergren, M., 234, 241, 245
Wheat, A., 78, 98
Whelan-Berry, K. S., 206, 247
White, M. C., 40, 60
Whitney, D., 292, 308, 311
Whittington, R., 116, 135, 172, 179, 203
Wiggins, J., 72, 100
Wilkinson, A., 131, 136
Williams, M., 213, 247
Williamson, P., 180, 202
Willmott, P., 157–158, 168
Wind, J. W., 181, 204
Wofford, J. C., 176, 203
Wolfe, R., 271, 277
Wolff, C., 223, 247
Woodcock, M., 128, 136
Woodman, R. W., 57, 59, 297, 310
Wookey, C., 185, 198, 203
Wooldridge, B. J., 262, 277, 387, 397, 422
Worley, C. G., 124–127, 136, 281, 282, 283, 284, 287,
291, 297, 308, 311, 314
Wylie, K. K., 176, 201
Y
Yaeger, T. F., 286, 311, 314
Yeung, R., 413, 422
Young, H. M., 415, 422
Yuanqing, Y., 151, 169
Z
Zahra, S. A., 118, 136
Zanini, M., 125, 135, 260, 275, 346, 350
Zellner, W., 64, 98
433
Subject Index
A
Ability, as ADKAR element, 322
Absorptive capacity, 118
acquisition, 118
assimilation, 118
exploitation, 118
transformation, 118
The Academy Online, 160
Acceleration trap, 18, 257, 258
Accountability, 358
Acquisition, 118
Acrobat, 73
Actionability, 175
Action plan, 411–412
allowable weaknesses, 411
building strengths, 411
filling gaps, 411
Active resistance, 261
Adaptability, 81
Adapting vs. shielding, 82
Ad hoc communication, 237
ADKAR change model, 321–322
ability, 322
awareness, 322
desire, 322
knowledge, 322
reinforcement, 322
Adnams, 160
Adobe, 73
Advantage Capital, 87
Advocating, 391
Age management policies, 68
Alliances tactics, 406
Alpha males, 212
Amazon, 76, 147
American International Group (AIG), 87
America Online (AOL), 78
Amgen Inc., 85
Analytical approach, 183–184
Animation, 42, 43, 298
Antisocial media, 237
AOL Time Warner, 78
Apathy, 264
Apparent sincerity, 405, 409
Appeals, 218
Apple Computer, 75, 77
Appreciative inquiry, 291–292
4-D cycle, 292
building, 291
designing, 291
discovering, 291
questions, 292
Roadway Express (example), 293
sustaining, 291
Appropriate, 122
Arenas, 112
Articulation, 175
Artificial intelligence, 66
Aspirations, 141
Assessment, political skills
interpersonal influence, 408–409
networking ability, 408–409
sincerity, 409
social awareness, 408–409
Assimilation, 118
Associating habit of disruptive innovator, 150
AT&T, 178, 218
Attention, 42, 43, 298
Attitudes and behavior, changing, 282
Attitudinal transformation, 284
Attraction strategies, 266–268
Authority, 251
Autonomous, self-directed work groups, 66
Awareness, as ADKAR element, 322
B
Baby Boomers, 67–70
Balanced scorecard accounting, 300
Bank of America, 88
Barclays, 68, 141, 153, 155
BBC, 89
Benchmarking approach, 183–184
Bertelsmann, 78
Best Buy, 236
434 Subject Index
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (BID),
5–7, 21–23
change outcome, 7
change story, 5–7
financial meltdown, 5
leadership styles, 19
lessons from, 17–18
management change, 5–7
sense of urgency at, 5
transparency, 6
Better conditions, 251
BHAGs (big hairy audacious goals), 195
Big data, 66, 297
Blameworthy failures, 359–362
Blocking interference, 407
Blogger, 158
Bloomberg, 262
Blue world, 111
BMW, 178
Board of directors, 78
Boeing Co., 64, 72
Bold organizations, 180
Boo.com, 191
Boomsday, 67
Boston Consulting Group, 320
BP, 78, 153–155, 230
Bridging (adapting) vs. buffering
(shielding), 82
Bronfman family, 89
BT (British Telecommunications), 75
Buchanan-Boddy change manager competency
model, 398–399
communication, 399
goals, 399
managing up, 399
vs. McBer competency model, 399
negotiation, 399
roles, 399
Buddhism, 294
Buffering strategies, 82
Built-to-change organization, 66, 124–127
Burson-Marsteller, 159
Business environment pressures, 77
Business model, 141
Business Process Reengineering (BPR), 66
Buy-ins, 224
BYOD (bring-your-own-device), 236
C
Canon, 181, 190
Capability, 340
Capacity, 340
Capital markets, 81
Capital One Financial, 125–127
Career moves, 410
Caretaker image, 39–41, 52
communication and, 208
diagnostic model, 102
institutional theory, 41
key competencies and, 401
life-cycle theory, 39–40
organization development and, 280
population ecology theory, 40–41
pressures for change and, 63
sustaining change and, 356
vision and, 174
Carrefour, 178
Case studies
boosting factory yields, 393
Challenger and Columbia disasters, 374–379
closing a plant, 403
Leonard Cheshire, 53–56
Catalyst, 387
Catalyzing stage, 231
Cemex, 236–237
Challenger and Columbia disasters case study, disaster,
83, 374–379
Change communication
barriers to, 214–215
importance of high-quality, 222
power of conversation, 215–222
process of, 207
significance of, 206
suggestions for, 226
target audience and, 234
Change communication strategies, 207, 222–228
briefing supervisors, 227
buy-in, 224
charismatic transformations, 228
contingency approaches to, 228–232
continuum of, 225
developmental/incremental transitions, 228
effective points for, 225
getting the word out, 224
identify and reply, 226
leadership styles and, 231–232
Subject Index 435
opening the files, 229
overcommunication, 223
responsibility of, 227–228
spray and pray, 225–227
stage of change and, 231–232
tag teams, 228
task-focused transitions, 228
tell and sell, 226
turnarounds, 228
type of change and, 228–231
underscore and explore, 226
value propositions, 224
withhold and uphold, 226
Change deviant, 386–397
Change forces vs. stability forces, 81
Change generator, 387
Change implementer, 387
Change kaleidoscope, 339–341
context factors in, 339–340
design options in, 340
implementation options, 340
Change leaders, 32–33
Change management
alternative approach to, 280
assessing depth of, 18–19
assumptions about, 47
challenges in technological developments, 160
checklist approach to, 320–325
communication strategy and, 225
competencies (see Change management
competencies)
components of vision to, 176
consequences in, 67–68
contingency approaches, 38, 335–341
defensive, 84
diagnostic models and use of for, 102–103
director image of, 37–38, 52
disagreement over, 260
dominant images of, 47–48
frames for, 33–34
fundamental propositions of, 103
general lessons for, 334
images of, (see also Images of managing change)
implicit models, 102–103
Kotter’s eight-step model and, 327–329
lessons of, 17–18
life-cycle stages and, 39–40
nevertirement and nevertirees, 68
organizational strategy and, 108–117
power of conversation and, 215–222
practical implications of, 143–145
processual approaches, 39
progressive, 84
from sense-making perspective, 303
Silver tsunami and, 67–70
Stace-Dunphy contingency matrix, 337–338
stage models of, 326–330
stories about, 4–14
tensions and paradoxes in, 4–18, 14–18
unanticipated outcomes, 369
vision (see Vision)
warnings at, 369–373
Change management capabilities, 410–412
action plan, 411–412
career moves, 410
personal gaps, 411
politics and, 411
repositioning, 410–411
strengths and, 411
Change management competencies, 397–403
Buchanan-Boddy competency model, 398–399
CMI change manager master level, 400–401
McBer competency model, 398
Change management styles, 337
advantages/disadvantages of, 337
Change manager, 32–33
assumptions about, 47
boosting factory yields, 393
Buchanan-Boddy competency model, 398–399
caretaker image, 39–41, 52
challenges for, 147–149
as champions, 386–397
characteristics of, 392
CMI master level-competency model, 400–401
coach image, 41, 52
comments over personality, 396
competencies of, 397–403
confessions of, 395–397
context of change, 48
core selection factors for, 397
defense of sustaining innovation, 149–150
desirable/undesirable characteristics of, 410
developing political skill, 408–409
as deviants, 386–397
as director, 37–38
as disruptive innovator, 149, 392
dominant images of change, 47–48, 52
experience, 394
436 Subject Index
Change manager (continued )
as great intimidators, 401–402
heroic leaders, 193–195
as ideas practitioners, 391–392
informal networks and, 391–392
innovative, 391
interpreter image, 42–43, 52
intimidation tactics of, 402
issues focused by, 319–321
managing emotions, 213–215
managing older workers and, 68
McBer competency model, 398
middle managers, 387–389
multiple images/perspectives, 48–49
navigator image, 38–39, 52
nurturing image, 43–44, 52
other names of, 387
phase of change, 48
political intelligence, 402
political skills and, 403–409
power and, 218
as quiet leaders, 390
resistance to change and, 252–253, 269
as resisters, 261–263
role of, 396
simultaneous involvement/multiple
changes, 48–49
social media and, 238
as souls-of-fire, 391–393
as stealth innovator, 390
as strategic leaders, 392
as tempered radicals, 390
Change outcomes, 34
images of, 34–37
intended outcomes, 36
partially intended outcomes, 37
unintended outcomes, 37
Change process, 283
resistance to change and, 250
Change readiness. See Readiness for change,
diagnosing of
Change(s). See also Environmental pressures;
Organizational change
accelerators, 329
actions, 281, 282
adopter, 387
agent, 32–33
assessing depth of, 143
blockers, 250
breakdowns in, 217
building commitment to, 268–269
champion, 386–397
by checklist, 320–325
communicating of, 224
cultural, 150–155
diagnosing readiness for, 117–123
dispositional resistance to, 122
first, second, and third-order, 142–146
incremental vs. transformational, 142
models of, 320–322
news, 232
process perspectives on, 331–335
reason for failures, 317–319
receptiveness to, 117–118
resistance to (see Resistance to change)
scale of, 337
seven Cs, 320
souls-of-fire, 386–397
stages of, 231–232
styles of, 338
technological, 156–158
types of, 140–146
value proposition in, 224
vision and, 171–174, 189–196, 257
Channel of communication, 209
Chaos theory, 44–45
Charismatic leaders, 194–195
Charismatic transformations, 228
Charlie’s Angels, 119
Checklist approach
ADKAR model, 321–322
to change management, 320–325
checking the, 323–325
DICE model, 320–321
direction, 320
dissatisfaction, 319
embracing the mess, 320
faith, 320
McKinsey, 321–323
seven Cs of change, 320
stage models and, 326–330
3G change, 324
ChevronTexaco, 70, 178
Chief executive officer (CEO)
communication responsibilities of, 227–228, 237
new broom pressures, 88–89
Child abuse, 82–83
Chrysler, 194, 218
Cisco, 299
Classic change curve, 326
Subject Index 437
Climatic change
issues concerning, 75
organizational responses and, 75
Cloud control, 73
CMI master level-competency model, 400–401
Coach image
communication and, 208
diagnostic model and, 102
key competencies and, 401
organization development and, 280
positive organizational scholarship (POS), 293–295
pressures for change and, 63
sustaining change and, 356
vision and, 174
Coca-Cola, 70, 72, 172
Co-creating vision technique, 182
Coding process, 209
Coercive isomorphism, 71
Coercive pressures, 41
Coercive style, 338
Coherence, 193
Cohesive networks, 392
Collaborative style, 338
Collectivity stage, 40
Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster, 152–153
Commanding leadership style, 231
Commitment, 264, 265, 268–269
culture, 151
as DICE factor, 321
escalation of, 371–373
Common enemy logic, 196
Communication
change-related, 206
in a crisis, 230
education and, 269
emotional commitment, 214
emotion and, 213–215
importance of, 206
power of conversation, 215–222
Communication channels, 209
media richness, 232–234
and social media, 232–238
Communication escalator, 229
Communication process, 206–211
barriers to, 214–215
change images and, 208
gender, power and emotion, 211–215
message ambiguity, 211
message distortion, 211
message overload, 211
modeling of, 209–211
problems in, 211
Communication skills. See Change communication
strategies
Communication tools, 234–238
real-time, 234
two-way, 234
Community involvement, CSR, 71
Competitive advantage, 81
Compliance, 264
Compromise tactics, 406
Confucian/Taoist assumptions, 44, 287
Consensus, 114
Consultative style, 338
Consulting vision technique, 182
Consult style, 337
Content of vision, 173
Context, 39, 331–332
organizational contexts, 180–181
vision and, 174, 180–181
Continental Airlines, 365, 366–367
Contingency approaches, 38, 316, 335–341
to change communication, 228–232
change leadership styles continuum, 336–337
Hope Hailey-Balogun change kaleidoscope,
339–341
to resistance management, 268–269
scale of change, 337
Stace-Dunphy contingency matrix, 337–338
styles of change, 338
Continuum, 264
Control, 81
management as, 35
systems, 116
Controlling activities, 35
Conventional wisdom, 32
Coordinating, 35, 87
Core business, 362
Core purpose, 195
Core selection factors, 144
Core values, 195, 196
Corporate code, 294
Corporate culture. See Organization culture
Corporate identity, 87–88
Corporate reputation, 78
Corporate scandals, 70
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), 70
policies and practices, 71
Corporate transformation, 337
Cost-based measures, 365
438 Subject Index
Cost containment, 81
Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB), 90
Credibility pressures, 78
Cross-docking, 146
Cultural change, 300. See also Organization culture
Cultural mapping, 115
Cultural web, 115–117
Culture, 141. See also Organization culture
D
Data analytics, 66
Data gathering, 283
Deals, 218
Dean Witter & Discover Financial
Services Inc., 89
Decision-making processes, 86
Decoding, 210
Deepwater Horizon disaster, 153–155
Defensive change management, 84
Defensive transformations, 323
Dell Computers, 75–78, 80, 146
Delphi Corporation, 77–78
Democratic values, 282
Demographic pressures, 67–70
Denial as coping cycle stage, 265
Depth metaphor, 143
Desirability, 175
Desire, as ADKAR element, 322
Destabilizing the market, 191
Deutsche Bank, 189
Developmental imagery, 220
Developmental maintenance, 369
Developmental stage, 40
Developmental values, 282
Deviance, 360
The Devil Wears Prada (Weisberger), 402
Diagnostic models, 102–103. See also Organizational
models
usefulness of, 103
Diagnostic skills, 398
Dialogic organization development, 295–297
vs. diagnostic OD, 296
originators of, 295–296
Dialogic Organization Development: The Theory and
Practice of Transformational Change, 296
DICE change model, 320–321
DICE factors
commitment, 321
duration, 321
effort, 321
integrity, 321
Differentiators, 112
Digitization, 156–158
affecting organization, 163
strategic opportunities of, 156
technological development and, 156–158
Dimensions of resistance, 250
Direction, 42, 43, 298
Directive style, 338
Director image, 35, 37–38, 52, 316, 340
communication and, 208
diagnostic model, 102
key competencies and, 401
pressures for change and, 63
sustaining change and, 356
Dirty tricks, 406
Discrepancies, 122
Disruptive innovation, 66, 143, 146–147
Disruptive innovator, 392
change manager as, 149
habits of, 150
Divergent networks, 393
Diversity, 339
Downsizing, 66, 141, 300
Dresdner Bank, 189
Dropbox, 76, 77
Duration as DICE factor, 321
Dutch Civil Service, 236
E
Early wins, 144
E-commerce, 75, 76
Economic logic, 112
The Economist, 89
EDS, 87
Education and Communication, 269
Efficacy, 122
Effort as DICE factor, 321
Eight-Step change management model (Kotter),
327–329
Elaboration stage, 40
Elle, 88
Emergent changes, 140
Emergent strategy, 221
Emotional commitment, 214
Emotions, 213–215
Subject Index 439
Empirical-rational strategies, 36
Employee assistance programs (EAPs), 66
Employee engagement, 66
Empowerment, 221
Enabling stage, 231
Enactment, 301
Encircling competitors, 191
Engagement paradigm, 291
Enrollment, 264
Enron, 78
Enterprise-specific social networks, 237
Entrepreneurial feel, 87
Entrepreneurial middle manager, 389
Entrepreneurial stage, 40
Environmental pressures, 62–78
bridging (adapting) vs. buffering (shielding), 82
demographic pressures, 67–70
external mandate, 70–72
fashion pressures, 64–67
globalization and geopolitical pressures, 72–75
hypercompetition, 76–78, 80–81
image of managing change and, 63
objective entity vs. cognitive construction, 80–81
organizational learning vs. threat-rigidity, 79–80
reputation/credibility pressures, 78
stability forces vs., 81
Environment policies, CSR, 71
Envisioned future, 195
Equal opportunities, CSR, 71
Equity and Fairness Task Force, 70
Escalation of commitment, 371–373
advice for, 372
organizational determinants, 371
project determinants, 371
psychological determinants, 371
regular progress reports, 372
social determinants, 371
steps to limit, 372–373
unambiguous feedback, 372
Essilor International, 236
Ethical conflict, 259
Excitement, 144
Experiential-based learning, 282
Experimenting, habit of disruptive innovator, 150
Explicit/implicit coercion, 269
Exploitation, 118
Exploration, 265
Exploratory testing, 360
External forces, 37
External mandate, 70–72
formal coercive pressures, 71
informal coercive pressures, 72
External measures, 365
External pressures, 62, 73, 122
Extracted cues of sense-making, 300
Extreme contexts, 84
Exxon, 73, 75, 178, 230
F
Facebook, 158, 159, 234–235, 237
Face-to-face communication, 228, 233, 234
Facilitation and support, 269
Facilitation approach, 182
Failures
to adopt, 188–189
learning from, 361
management approaches to, 361–362
reason for, 360
Failures, reason for, 360
deviance, 360
exploratory testing, 360
hypothesis testing, 360
inattention, 360
lack of ability, 360
process complexity, 360
process inadequacy, 360
task challenge, 360
uncertainty, 360
Fake images, 230
Fashion pressures, 64–67
Fast-cycle full participation, 287
Federal Express, 369
Feedback, 210, 282
unambiguous, 372
Financial meltdown, 5
Finding attractor, 266–267
Fine-tuning, 144, 337
Flanking, 191
Flash Player, 73
Force-field analysis, 121
Forces for change vs. forces for stability, 81
Ford Motor, 75, 368
Formal coercive pressures, 71
Formal compliance, 264
Formalization stage, 40
Forte Hotel Group, 87
440 Subject Index
Fortune, 92
Four-frame model, 107–108
human resource frame, 107, 108
political frame, 107, 108
structural frame, 107, 108
symbolic frame, 107, 108
Frames, 194
breaking, 301
for change management, 33–34
validating, 301
Freshness, 144
FSC Securities, 87
Fukushima nuclear power plant, failures at, 72
G
Gap analysis, 108–109
Gaps, personal, 411
Gazprom, 178
Gender, power and emotion, 211–215
General consultation skills, 283
General Electric, 64, 105, 190, 196
General Mills, 92
General Motors, 77, 222
Generation C, 67, 69–70
Generation X, 67–68
Generation Y, 67, 69
Genomics Oncology, 90
Genuine compliance, 264
Geopolitical pressures, 72–75
Getting the word out, 224
Gillette, 89
Globalization, 72–75
Global warming, 74–75
Goals, 179–180, 322, 323
Google, 76, 77, 87, 157, 186, 255
Google Plus, 237
Green management, 372
Green world, 111
Growth of organizations, 85–87
Grudging compliance, 264
H
Harper’s Bazaar, 88–89
Harris Tweed, 150
Harvard Business School, 297
Heritage Hotels, 88
Hero effect, 371
Heroic leaders, 193–195
Heroic organizations, 195–196
Hewlett-Packard (HP), 75, 195, 215, 299
High-performance organizations, 66
High reliability organizations (HROs), 66
Home Depot, 178
Honda, 72
Hope Hailey-Balogun change kaleidoscope, 339–341
HSBC Holdings, 178
Humanistic values, 282
Human resource frame, 107, 108
Hypercompetition, 76–78, 80–81
Hypothesis testing, 360
I
IBM, 79, 89
Gerstner and vision, 192
offshoring jobs script, 219
organization culture at, 357
transformational change, 357
Ideals, 218
Ideas practitioners, 391–392
advocating, 391
implementing, 391
packaging, 391
scouting, 391
Identify and reply strategy, 226
Identity construction, 300
Identity crisis, 88
Image building tactics, 405
Images of managing change, 33–34, 280
assumptions about change, 47
caretaker image, 35, 39–41, 63, 102, 280, 401
coach image, 35, 41, 52, 63, 102, 280, 401
communication and, 208
director image, 35, 37–38, 52, 63, 102, 316, 340, 401
hard factors in, 35
interpreter image, 35, 42–43, 52, 63, 102, 280,
298–303, 401
key competencies and, 401
management as control, 35
management as shaping, 35–36
multiple images and perspectives, 48–49
navigator image, 35, 38–39, 52, 63, 102, 316, 340,
401
nurturing image, 35, 43–46, 52, 63, 102, 280, 401
pressures for change and, 63
Subject Index 441
six-images framework, 34–37, 46-49
sustaining change and, 356
Implementing, ideas practitioners and, 391
Implicit models, 103
Improvement evaporation effect, 356–359
managing, 368
sustainability actions vs. sustainability cautions, 368
Inattention, 360
Incremental adjustment, 337
Incremental change, 142, 362
Individual readiness and stakeholder analysis, 251
Individual resistance vs. management responses,
265–266
Individual’s change readiness, 122
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 178
Inertia, 298
Informal coercive pressures, 72
Information
games tactics, 405
on future benefits, 373
Initiation skills, 398
Initiative conversations, 217
Initiative decay, 356–359
factors for, 358–359
Innovation, 145–150
disruptive, 143
disruptive vs. sustaining, 146–147
innovators to laggards, 148
operational, 146
probability of, 148–149
sustaining, 143
Innovative organization, 119–120
Innovators to laggards, 148
Inspirational leadership style, 231
Instagram, 159
Instant messaging, 223
Institute for Healthcare Improvement Large-Scale
Change, 327
Institutionalism, 81
Institutional theory, 41
coercive pressures, 41
mimetic pressures, 41
normative pressures, 41
Integra Financial, 363
Integration and coordination, 87
Integrative structures, 119
Integrity as DICE factor, 321
Intended change outcomes, 36
empirical-rational strategies, 36
normative-re-educative strategies, 36
power-coercive strategies, 36
Interaction, 42, 43, 298
Internal achievability, 144
Internal blogging, 223
Internal context enablers, 122
Internal dimension, 180
Internal forces, 37
Internal measures, 365
Internal networks, 237–238
Internal organization change drivers, 85–90
growth, 85–87
integration and coordination, 87
new chief executive, 88–89
power and politics, 89–90
Internal pressures, 62–63
Internal-transformational logic, 196
International geopolitical tensions, 73
International Hotels, 87
International Standards Organization 9000
(ISO 9000), 66
Internet, business challenges of, 76–77, 80
Interpersonal influence, 405, 408–409
Interpersonal skills, 283, 398
Interpreter image, 35, 42–43
animation and, 42, 43
communication and, 208
diagnostic model, 102
direction and, 42, 43
implementing change and, 298–303
interaction and, 42, 43
key competencies and, 401
organization development and, 280
pressures for change and, 63
sense-making approaches, 298–303
sustaining change and, 356
vision and, 174, 185
Interventions, 340
Interviewing change recipients, 197
Intimidation tactics, 402
Intrapersonal skills, 283
Intuit, 105
Intuitive approach, 183–184
Invensys, 89
Invite participation style, 337
Involvement, 322
Involvement moves, 407
Issue-selling tactics, 406–407
involvement moves, 407
packaging moves, 407
process moves, 407
442 Subject Index
J
J. C. Penney, 24–26
change story, 10–14
falling profitability, 10–14
high-low pricing strategy, 11
leadership styles, 19
lessons from, 17–18, 26
reactions to change, 13–14
recession in, 11
transformational of culture in, 12–13
J-curve, 370
Job enrichment, 66
Johnson & Johnson, 299
Joint action planning, 282
Joint problem diagnosis, 282
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 280
K
Kaiser Permanente, 389
Kanter’s Law, 370
KFC, 155
Knock-on effect, 140
Knowledge, as ADKAR element, 322
Knowledge and experience, 358
Kodak, 149
Komatsu, 190
Kraft, 92
L
Lack of ability, 360
Lack of clarity, 256
Lack of conviction, 256
Lack of shared vision, 188
Lack of vision, 173
Lagging measures, 365
Large-scale interactive process, 289
Large-scale transformations, 34
Lateral capability, 106
Launching stage, 231
Leader-dominated approach, 182
Leadership. See also Change manager
commanding style, 231
communication processes and strategies, 231–232
exercising strong, 323
heroic leaders and, 193–195
inspirational style, 231
leader-dominated approach, 182
logical style, 231
McKinsey Checklist and, 322, 323
purpose-driven, 186
styles of, 231, 336–337
supportive style, 231
thinking about leader and, 406
Leading measures, 365
Learning from failures, 361
accurate framing, 361
acknowledge limits, 361
embrace messages, 361
invite participation, 361
set boundaries and hold people
accountability, 361
Learning organization, 221
Legacy of past changes, 259
Legends of Chima, 157
Lego, 157
Lego Fusion, 157
Lego Movie, 157
Lego Universe, 157
Lehman Brothers collapse, 41
Le Meridien Hotels, 88
Lenovo, 77, 151
Less time and effort, 251
Let nature take its course, 264–266
Lewinian/OD assumptions, 287
Liberated organizations, 181
Life-cycle theory, 39–40
change management issues and, 39
collectivity stage, 40
elaboration stage, 40
entrepreneurial stage, 40
formalization stage, 40
Linguistic coherence, 216
LinkedIn, 76, 158, 237
Lockheed, 371
Logical leadership style, 231
London Hotels, 87
Lower Manhattan Development Corporation
(LMDC), 289
M
Machine imagery, 220
Maintaining stage, 231
Management. See also Change management
Subject Index 443
age policies, 68
approach to failures, 361–362
as controlling, 35, 62
control vs. shaping, 36
managers as resisters, 261–263
middle, 387–389
pressures to change, 62
reputation, 144
resistance to change and, 250
as shaping, 35–36, 62
styles, 68
sustained change and, 364
Management by objectives (MBO), 66
Managerial (or Leadership) Grid (Blake and
Mouton), 286
The managerial grid, 66
Managing change. See Change management
Managing resistance, 263–269
attraction strategies, 266–268
contingency approaches to, 268–269
finding attractor, 266–267
individual resistance vs. management responses,
265–266
let nature take its course, 264–266
Manipulation and co-optation, 269
Market strategy, vision and, 180
Mary Kay Cosmetics, 195
McBer competency model, 398
Buchanan-Boddy competency model vs., 399
diagnostic skills, 398
initiation skills, 398
interpersonal skills, 398
organizational skills, 398
McCormick & Schmick’s restaurant, 151
McDonald, 92–93, 151
productive failures at, 360
McKinsey & Company, 14, 36, 104, 157, 195, 234,
235–236, 263, 321–323
Meaning, 215
Media organization, 297
Media richness, 232–234
hierarchy of, 233
Mental grid, 113
Mental models, 33–34
Mental organization images, 33–34
Merger in Adland, 261
Mergers and acquisitions, 297
Message, 209
ambiguity, 211
distortion, 211
overload, 211
Metropolitan Police Department, 302
Microculture image, 34
Microsoft, 77, 85–87, 194
Middle managers, 387–389
acts as key to change implementation, 389
entrepreneurial, 389
Irish health service example, 388–389
kinds of management by, 387
roles of, 387
vs. senior management, 408
Military hospital, 297
Mimetic isomorphism, 67
Mimetic pressures, 41
Minecraft, 157
Mission vs. vision, 172, 179–180
Mitsubishi, 72
Modular transformation, 337
Mojang, 157
Momentum busters, 357
Money, 251
Moneyball, 271
Morgan Stanley, 89
Movement, 283
Moving, 325
Multiloading, 258
Multiple perspectives, 15, 33–34
Musical chairs, 257
N
Nampak Story, case study, 161–162
Narrative knowing, 4
NASA, 152–153
NASCAR model, 220
National Cancer Institute, 145
National Training Laboratories (NTL), 281
Natural disasters, 72
Navigator image, 38–39, 52, 316, 340
communication and, 208
contextualist approaches and, 39
diagnostic model, 102
key competencies and, 401
pressures for change and, 63
processual approaches and, 39
sustaining change and, 356
vision and, 174
Negotiation and agreement, 269
Nestlé, 80, 178
444 Subject Index
The networked enterprise, 66
Networking
ability, 405, 408–409
habit of disruptive innovator, 150
tactics, 406
Nevertirement/nevertirees, 68
New broom phenomenon, 88–89
New chief executive, 88–89
New York Police Department (NYPD), 90
Nike, 75, 79, 189, 196
Nissan, 72
Noise, 211
Noncompliance, 264
Non-cost measures, 365
Nonprofit organization, 297
Normative pressures, 41
Normative-re-educative strategies, 36
Nottingham University Hospitals Trust UK, 330
Nova Scotia Power, 300
N -step models, 38
Nurturing image, 43–46, 52
chaos theory, 44–45
communication and, 208
Confucian/Taoist theory, 44–45
diagnostic model, 102
key competencies and, 401
organization development and, 280
pressures for change and, 63
sustaining change and, 356
vision and, 174
NYTimes.com, 76
O
Objective entity vs. cognitive construction, 80–81
Observing, habit of disruptive innovator, 150
OD Practitioner, 280, 285, 296
Ongoing sense-making, 301
Online video, 223
Open-space technology, 287
Operational innovation, 146
Orchestrating without a conductor, 257
Orange world, 111
Organizational capabilities, 16–17
Organizational change
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (BID) change
story, 5–7
climatic change and organizational responses, 75
determinants of, 332
external mandate, 70–72
external pressures, 73
fashion pressures, 64–67
globalization and geopolitical pressures, 72–75
hard/soft factors of, 35
hypercompetition, 76–78
images of managing change, 33–34, 63
J. C. Penney change story, 10–14
middle managers and, 387–389
reputation and credibility pressures, 78
Sears Holdings change story, 8–10
vision and, 189–196
Organizational contexts, 180–181
bold organizations, 180
liberated organizations, 181
overmanaged organizations, 180–181
rigid organizations, 180
Organizational culture, 66, 150–155, 221
assessment of, 162
at Barclays, 153, 155
at BP, 153–155
Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster and, 152–153
Deepwater Horizon disaster and, 153–155
importance at IBM, 357
at Lenovo, 150–151
mapping of, 115
at NASA, 152–153
risky, 153
social media and, 159
strong vs. weak, 151
Organizational design
built-to-change, 124–127
segmentalist vs. integrative, 124
Organizational determinants, 371
Organizational failures, 83–84
Organizational features
stimulate vs. smother innovation, 119–120
Organizational learning, 62
threat-rigidity vs., 79–80
Organizational models
four-frame model, 107–108
fundamental propositions of, 103
7-S framework, 104–105
six-box model, 103–104
star model, 106–107
usefulness of, 103
Organizational performance. See Performance
measurement
Subject Index 445
Organizational retention, 40
Organizational roles, redesign of, 363
Organizational selection, 40
Organizational silo structure, 140
Organizational skills, 398
Organizational social capital, 81
Organizational structure, 116
Organizational turnarounds, 89
Organizational variation, 40
Organization development (OD)
appreciative inquiry, 291–292
characteristics of, 281–282
classic intervention process, 283
covert processes and, 284
criticisms of, 283–284
as culture-bound, 286–287
current relevance of traditional values, 285–286
definitions and concepts, 283
dialogic, 295–297
dialogic vs. diagnostic, 296
evolution of, 281
fundamental values, 281–282
internal/external validity, 284
large-scale change, 287–291
positive organizational scholarship (POS), 293–295
traditional approach to, 281–282
values as universal, 286–287
Organization development (OD) practitioner, 282–283
action research steps, 282–283
skills needed for, 283
Organization development theory, 41, 283
Organizations after crises, 82–85
Challenger disaster, 83
child abuse, 82–83
Columbia disaster, 83
organizational failures, 83–84
routine and extreme contexts, 84
Organization strategy, 108–117
assumptions and, 114
cultural web, 115–117
elements of strategy, 112–113
gap analysis, 108–109
key evaluation criteria for, 112, 113
PESTLE framework, 109–110
scenario planning, 111
strategic inventory, 113–115
strategic opportunities of digitization, 156–158
testing quality of, 113
vision and, 179–180
Overloading, 258
Overmanaged organizations, 180–181
Ownership culture, 151
P
Packaging, 391
Packaging moves, 407
Paradigm, 116
Partially intended change outcomes, 37
Participation and involvement, 269
Participative design, 287
Participative management, 281
Partners, 172
Passive resistance, 261
Patagonia, 75
Patching, 299
People, 172
People Express, 181
People practices, 106
Perceptual filters, 210
Performance measurement, 363, 365
Continental Airlines example, 366–367
cost-based measures, 365
external measures, 365
internal measures, 365
lagging measures, 365
leading measures, 365
limitations of, 370
non-cost measures, 365
Sears example, 365
vision and, 175–176, 191
Performing, 194
Perpetual loading, 258
Personal contacts, 251
Personnel policies, CSR, 71
Perspectives, 33–34
PESTLE framework, 102, 109–110
Photoshop, 73
Pinterest, 158
Pioneer culture, 151
Pizza Hut, 155
Planet, 172
Planned changes, 140
Planning stage, 231
Plausibility, 301
Podcasts, 223
Political feasibility, 144
446 Subject Index
Political frame, 107, 108
Political instability, 73
Political pressures, 89–90
Political skills, 411
assessment, 409
categories of political tactics, 405–406
change manager and, 403–409
development, 408–409
dimensions of, 405
interpersonal influence, 408
networking ability, 408
social awareness, 408
Political tactics, 405–406
alliances, 406
blocking interference, 407
compromise, 406
dirty tricks, 406
image building, 405
information games, 405
issue-selling, 406
networking, 406
positioning, 406
rule games, 406
scapegoating, 406
structure games, 405
Politics of change, 331, 332
Population ecology theory, 40–41
Portfolio, 172
Positioning tactics, 406
Positive organizational scholarship (POS), 293–295
four connotations, 293–294
Positive resistance, 263
Possibility, 175
Postbureaucratic environment, 76
Posthouse Hotels, 88
Post-incident contexts, 84
Postmodern organizational paradigm, 76
Power, 89–90, 340
gender relationships and, 212–213
and politics, 89–90
Power-coercive strategies, 36
Power-interest matrix, 123
Power of conversation, 215–222
aligning language with change, 219–221
breakdowns in, 217
common change language, 221–222
conversation for closure, 217
conversation for performance, 217
conversation for understanding, 217
development imagery, 220
GM Poland example, 222
language matters in, 215–222
machine imagery, 220
misused terminology, 221
silence in, 216
talking coherently, 218–219
talking in stages, 216–218
transformational imagery, 220
transitional imagery, 220
Power structures, 116
Practical implications
management reputation, 144
matching solutions with problems, 143–144
punctuated equilibrium theory, 145
shallow change management, 144
Praiseworthy failures, 359–362
Predictability and uncertainty reduction, 81
Preservation, 339
Price Waterhouse Change Integration Team, 365
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 392
Principal support, 122
Privatization, 300
Problem identification, 282
Process complexity, 360
Processes and lateral capabilities, 106
Process inadequacy, 360
Process moves, 407
Process narratives, 4
Process perspectives, 331–335
context change, 331–332
general lessons from, 334
interaction between change factors, 331
limitations for, 334–335
politics of change, 331–332
strategic change, 333
strengths of, 334
substance change, 331–332
transition process change, 331–332
Process theories, 4
Processual approaches to change, 39
Procter & Gamble (P&G), 85, 187, 195, 364
Product, CSR, 71
Productive failures, 359–362
at McDonald’s, 360
reasons for, 360
Productivity, 172, 281
Profit, 172
Program evaluation and review technique (PERT), 66
Subject Index 447
Program management offices (PMOs), 145
Progressive change management, 84
Progressive transformations, 323
Project determinants, 371
Projective sense-making, 301
Psychological contract, 255–256
Psychological determinants, 371
Pump-priming
approach, 182
funding, 358–359
Punctuated equilibrium theory, 145
Purposes, 103
from bad to good, 186
beyond profit, 185
-driven leadership, 186
to impact planning, 186
Q
Quality circles, 66
Quality of working life movement (QWL), 66, 281
Questioning, habit of disruptive innovator, 150
R
Racial discrimination, 70
Readiness, 339
Readiness for change, diagnosing of, 117–123, 128–130
absorptive capacity, 118
force-field analysis, 121
individual’s readiness, 122
innovative organization, 119–120
receptive organizational context, 117–118
stakeholder analysis, 122–123
Real-time communication tool, 234
Real-time strategic change, 287
Receptive organizational context, 117–118
Red Star Corporation, 119
Reengineering, 300
Refreezing, 283, 326
Regular progress reports, 372
Reinforcement, as ADKAR element, 322
Relationships, 103
Repositioning, 410–411
Reputation pressures, 78
Resilience, 395
Resistance, 265. See also Managing resistance
positive, 263
Resistance to change
active vs. passive resistance, 261
attachment to culture and identity, 255
attraction strategies, 266–268
benefits, 251–253
change managers and, 269, 252-253, 261-263
commitment, compliance, continuum, 264
content of, 253
cumulative effects, 258–259
damaging patterns and, 258
disagreement with change management, 260
dispositional resistance to, 253–254
ethical conflict and, 259
excessive change, 257
individual readiness and stakeholder
analysis, 251
innate dislike of change, 253–254
interests and, 254
lack of clarity, 256
lack of conviction, 256
legacy of past changes, 259
managing resistance, 263–269
past experience, 259
perceptions and, 254
positive dimensions of, 252–253
process of, 253
proposed change as inappropriate, 256–257
psychological contract breach, 255–256
strategies with, 269
substance/content, 250
symptoms, 260–261
uncertainity and, 253, 254
ways to use, 252
WIIFM, WAMI, and the dimensions of, 250
wrong timing, 257
Responsibility, 251
Retrospection, 300
Reward systems, 103, 106, 363
Rigid organizations, 180
Ripple effect, 140
Risk tolerance, 122
Rituals and routines, 116
Roadway Express, 293
Roche, 89–90
Role model logic, 196
Roles, 340
Routine contexts, 84
Royal Alliance, 87
Rule games tactics, 406
Rules, 218
448 Subject Index
S
Samuel Adams Boston lager, 150
Sandvik Materials Technology, 366
Santa Fe Group, 160
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), 70
Scale of change, 337
corporate transformation, 337
fine-tuning, 337
incremental adjustment, 337
modular transformation, 337
Scapegoating tactics, 406
Scenario analysis, 102
Scenario planning, 111, 127
blue world, 111
green world, 111
in high-risk world, 111
orange world, 111
Scope, 339
Scouting, 391
Scripting, 194
Search conference format, 288
Sears, 88, 177, 365
Sears Holdings Corporation, 23–24
business operating profit, 9–10
change diagnostics, 23–24
change story, 8–10
falling profitability at, 8–10
internal marketing, 8
leadership styles, 19
lessons from, 17–18
managing a merger, 8–9
messy approach, 8–9
online shopping, 8–10
Security, 251
Segmentalist organization, 119
Segmentalist vs. integrative, 124
Self-confidence, 122
Self-efficacy, 122
Self-organization, 44, 142
Self-renewal, 142
Self-satisfaction, 251
Selling vision technique, 182
Semco, 44
Senior management, middle managers vs., 408
Sense-making approaches, 42
assumption of inertia, 298
from change management, 303
contested interpretations, 302
features of, 300–301
freeze-rebalance-unfreeze, 299
standardized change, 298
Sensitivity training, 66
Sentra Securities, 87
September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, 73
Seven Cs of change
capturing learning, 320
choosing a team, 320
communicating, 320
connecting organization, 320
consulting stakeholders, 320
coping with change, 320
crafting, 320
7-S framework, 104–105
Intuit example, 105
skills, 105
staff, 104
strategy, 104
structure, 104
style, 104
superordinate goals, 105
systems, 104
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 73
Shaky foundations, 257
Shallow changes, 19
Shaping an organization, 35–36
Shareholder value, 62
Silence, 216
Silver tsunami in change management, 67–70
Sinopec, 178
Six-box organizational model, 103–104
Skills, 105
Skype, 223
Smothering innovation, 119–120
Social astuteness, 405
Social awareness, 408–409
Social determinants, 371
Social media, 158–160
antisocial media, 237
CEO’s communication through, 237
change manager and, 238
drivers of, 235
efficient communication, 235
employee voice, 235
internal networks in, 237–238
learning and development, 235
networking and collaboration, 235
potential uses of, 234–238
recruitment and job hunting, 235
Social sense-making, 300
Subject Index 449
Sony, 72
Souls-of-fire, 391–393
Soundness in competitive or regulatory terms, 144
Southwest Airlines, 148
Speech act theory, 217
Spelman, 87
Spotify, 76
Spray and pray strategy, 225–227
Stace-Dunphy contingency matrix, 337–338
Staff and staffing, 104–105, 363–364
Stage models
change management, 326–330
moving, 325
refreezing, 326
unfreezing, 325
Stage of change and leadership style, 231–232
Staging, 112, 194
Stakeholder analysis, 122–123
resistance to change and, 251
Stakeholders, 78, 81
counter-implementation tactics by, 358
interest vs. power, 123
track record, 123
Star model, 106–107
Start point, 340
Star Wars, 157
State Auto Insurance Company, 145
Status, 251
Stealth innovator, 390
Stifling innovation, 120
Stimulating innovation, 119–120
Stories and storeytelling, 116
vision as, 177–179
Strategic business units, 300
Strategic change, 281, 333
Strategic drift, 113
Strategic intent, 190
Strategic inventory, 113–115
Strategy. See also Organizational strategy
attraction, 266–268
modeling organizations, 106, 107
resistance to change and, 266–268, 269
vision and, 191
Structural frame, 103, 107, 108
Structure games tactics, 405
Structures, McKinsey checklist and, 322, 323
Style, 104–105, 340
Substance of change, 331–332
Subway, 92–93
SunAmerica, 87
Sunderland City case analysis, 91–92
Sun Microsystems, 194
Superordinate goals, 104, 105
Suppliers, CSR, 71
Supportive leadership style, 231
Survey feedback, 281, 287
Sustainability, thirsty for, 72
Sustainability actions, 368
Sustainability cautions, 368
Sustainable organizations, 372
Sustained advantage, 81
Sustained change
actions for, 362–369
celebrating successes, 366
fine-tuning of, 366
initiative decay and improvement evaporation,
356–359
learning from failures, 360
management approaches to failures, 361–362
in management practices, 364
measure progress, 365
momentum busters and, 357
praiseworthy and blameworthy failures, 359–362
productive failures, 359–362
reason for failures, 360
reward system redesign, 363
role redesign, 363
staffing selection and change objectives,
363–364
vicious compliance and, 371
voluntary acts of initiative, 365
Sustaining innovation, 143, 146
Suzuki, 72
Swiss watches, 150
SWOT analysis, 115
Symbolic frame, 107, 108
Symbols, 116
Systematic tools-based approach, 16
Systems, 104–105
T
Taco Bell, 155
Tag teams, 228
Taoist theory, 44–45
Target, 340
Target audience, 234
Task challenge, 360
Task-focused transitions, 228
450 Subject Index
Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, 281
Team
building, 287
tag teams, 228
Technological developments, 155–160
change management challenges in, 160
impact of digitization, 156–158
social media applications and, 158–160
sociotechnical design and, 156
Technology, 141
Telenor, 301
Tell and sell strategy, 226
Tell and sell style, 337
Telling vision technique, 182
Tell style, 337
Tempered radicals, 390
Testing vision technique, 182
T-groups, 66, 281
Threat-rigidity, 79–80
3G change checklist, 324
3M, 195, 299
Time, as context factor, 339
Timing of change, 257
Top-down hierarchical view of management, 35
Top management briefings, 223
Total quality management (TQM), 66
Toyota Motor, 72, 178
Lean production system, 146
Traditional development planning, 186
Transaction costs, 81
Transformation dimension, 118
Transformational change, 16, 48–50, 142
IBM, 357
Kotter’s eight-step model and, 327–329
McKinsey Checklist for, 321–323
progressive/defensive, 323
transformational leaders and, 389–391
Transformational imagery, 220
Transformation efforts, failures in, 318
Transitional imagery, 220
Transition process change, 331–332
Transparency as management theme, 6–7
Travelodge, 88
Tsunami, 72
TT Games, 157
Turnarounds, 228
Twitter, 158, 237
Two-way communication tool, 234
Tyco, 78
Type 1/2 error, 80
U
UK Chartered Institute of Personnel and
Development, 320
UK Hotels, 87
UK National Health Service, 368
Unambiguous feedback, 372
Uncertainty, 81, 360
low tolerance of, 254
resistance to change, 253, 254
Underscore and explore strategy, 226
Unfreezing, 218, 283, 299, 325
Unintended change outcomes, 37, 369
United States Army, 297
Updating knowledge, 298
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 76
U.S. Mint, 88
U.S. Postal Service, 178, 357, 362
V
Valence, 122
Value propositions, 224
Values, OD values, 282, 285, 286–287
Vehicles, 112
Vicious compliance, 371
Vinyl LPs, 150
Vision
adaptability of, 188–189
analytical approach, 183–184
attributes of, 175–179
benchmarking approach, 183–184
caretaker image and, 174
change and, 171–174, 176, 189–196, 257
as change driver, 190
characteristics of effective, 174–180
coach image and, 174
Coco-Cola company, 172
cognitive/affective component, 175
competing visions, 188
components of, 175
concept of, 173
content of, 173, 174–180
context and, 174, 180–181
crafting of, 181–182
definitions of, 175–176
development of, 183–184
director image and, 174
emerging during change, 190–191
Subject Index 451
external dimension of, 180
facilitation approach, 182
failures of, 187–189
features of, 173–174, 176
as helping change, 191
heroic leaders and, 193–195
hindering change and, 191–193
images of managing change and, 174
inner voice and, 185–186
internal dimension of, 180
interpreter image and, 174, 185
intuitive approach, 183–184
lack of, 173
leader-dominated approach, 182
market strategy and, 180
at Mentor Graphics, 197–198
Merck example, 196
mission and goals, 172, 179–180
navigator image and, 174
nurturer image and, 174
organizational performance and, 175–176
process of, 173, 182–183, 194
pump-priming approach, 182
questions for, 183–184
as stories, 177–179
Visionary leaders, 195
Vision statements, 176
from Fortune 100 companies, 178
Vivendi Universal, 78, 89
Vogue, 88
W
Walmart, 75, 78, 142, 178, 195
Walt Disney, 78, 79, 195
WAMI of resistance, 250
Web 2.0 technologies, 158, 160
Weberian “ideal type,” 46
Whistle-blowers, 294
WhoCanFixMyCar.com, 157
Whole-system design, 287
WIIFM of resistance, 250
Wikis, 223
Withhold and uphold strategy, 226
Wordpress, 158
Workforce diversity, 214
World Café, 288, 290
WorldCom, 78
X
Xerox, 190
Y
YouTube, 76, 157, 158, 159, 255
Yum Brands, 155
