Alternative Methods of Treatment other than Presсrіption Medications to Improve the Mental Health of Veterans with PTSD

The paper analyzes the reports published by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) since 2016 to identify the factors contributing to civil aviation accidents and includes suggestions for internal studies relating to the research. The purpose of this research is to draw the attention of airline executives toward the primary causes of the accidents so that they can improve flight safety through preflight checklist awareness, improvement of aircraft technology, and improved safety standards.

There are many factors that go into the safety of a flight. Reliability seems to be a large focus, but how much does human error contribute to aviation accidents? For resources to be properly allocated and lives to be saved, questions like this must be answered.

Human error is a significant factor in the cause of aviation accidents. This is very prevalent in the general aviation industry but is also a major factor in commercial aviation. After compiling data from the thirteen NTSB reports into a synthesis grid, It was found that 84% of accidents were a result of human error. It was also found that 45% was non compliant behavior.

Technology has advanced to provide for much safer and reliable aircraft. This has greatly increased safety and lowered the chance of mechanical failure. However, there are still accidents as a result of human error which have comparatively been neglected. The result is a large majority of all accidents stem from some form of human error.

1. Airlines would benefit from cameras in cockpits to observe activity during high risk activities such as take-off and landing.

2. Random observations must also take place in maintenance areas to ensure mistakes are caught before causing a disaster.

3. Training and observations need to be continually updated to prevent mistakes and catch new ones.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) considers unethical behavior of pilots as the number one factor resulting in the accidents and loss of life. Human error is the biggest contributor to the accidents, whether it is the human error during the maintenance operation or immature discussing making behaviors of the pilots in the deck. Since human error can be made at any instance of the flight, there was a need for technology that can track any mistake made by the pilot and be able to either provide a procedure that the pilot can follow to solve the problem or the system does it automatically. Some studies also suggest that these accidents can be prevented if there was proper prior planning and the economic management was well organised. As the aviation industry is falling back in the safety practices and management systems area, more funding should be dedicated towards that area rather than in the maintenance. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports suggest that preflight inspections were poorly conducted which lead to various problems during and after the flight. Thus, a proper protocol has to be put into effect and followed accordingly. This protocol must include training pilots for all kinds of situations that may arise during a flight and also updating the safety standards. Moreover, efforts should be made in convincing pilots to work on their responsibility and take care of the actions that they take while flying an aircraft.

Every year there are preventable accidents in aviation that are a result of human error. These result in tragic loss of life and are required to be investigated to make sure they never happen again. The NTSB is the U.S organization that investigates domestic accidents and produces public reports on them. These reports can give an insight into the factors that cause these accidents to occur and what steps must be taken to prevent them from happening again. Largely it can be seen that human error whether it is in maintenance or flight decisions from the pilots is a major factor. The FAA has listed pilot error as the number one cause of accidents for general aviation, showing that this is a serious issue. One of these major sources of pilot error is unprofessional pilot behavior in the flight deck most notably, not keeping a sterile flight deck. According to the University Of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign the installation of Human Factors Analysis And Classification Systems (HFACS), which helps limit human error, has greatly improved many fleets. This data shows that human error is a large factor in the safety and functionality of flight operations and has room to be improved upon.

The purpose of this causal analysis is to inform policy changes at commercial airlines by identifying and addressing the factors of civil aviation accidents. The National Safety Transportation Board is the government agency responsible for investigating these accidents, and releases reports throughout the year. Within their reports they identify the probable causes of the accident and make proposals to address them. Of the factors that contribute to these accidents, the most frequently occuring are noncompliant airlines and ineffective Federal Aviation Administration policies. By presenting this information to airline executives, they may make the necessary changes to their safety procedures.

The scope of the team is to conduct research under the following question: Based upon accident reports published by the National Transportation Safety Board over the last five years, what percentage identified human error as a major factor? Through this research question, we had considered the following variables, and addressed them accordingly.

· New improvements to technology in aircrafts.

· How have airlines addressed dangerous behavior in pilots?

· How can we increase preflight and checklist awareness?

· How can airlines create systems to ensure that positive safety procedures are followed?

As our research was conducted about the percentage of accidents regarding human factors, my team and I will be observing the airplane accident reports provided by Embry-Riddle’s Hunt library. The research will be minimized to the sources from the year 2015 to the current year 2020 to allow for efficient research and for the ability to provide the most recent and effective changes in the airlines. The new found knowledge provided through our research will then be implemented into our writing. The information will be provided via tables, which will be easy to follow and will exhibit the proper percentages of human to aircraft error and how we can design both the aircraft and the pilots ability to correct for these accidents. After the research and formatting has been completed, the team will continue to provide their new knowledge on what technology and procedure can be implemented to improve the airline industry and how we can decrease accidents in relation to human factors.

When the Section 8 Orange Team formed, we each had three research questions for a total of twelve to choose from to pursue a line of research. We settled on a question that asked what role does noncompliance play in civil aviation accidents, whether it be at the corporate or pilot level? Seeking to obtain a current and reliable source of data, we identified the National Transportation Safety Board as the primary source with which to base our research. Keeping the report current, we decided to limit the causal analysis to all thirteen accident reports published since 2016, accessed through the Hunt Library.

Though before the reports could be used to prove any trends, they needed to be grouped into datasets. After reading through them our team identified the most frequently occurring factors among all thirteen relating to the topics of causes, noncompliance, proposed improvements, and policy. There is a significant amount of overlap across the categories as noncompliant behavior in a flight crew might be both mentioned in the report as an occurrence and a direct cause of the accident.

The accident reports demonstrate that there is no one cause for any accident, but a multitude of factors. Though however unique any such event might be, there are factors that persist across most of them. As shown in Figure 1, the ones that occurred most frequently were human error, insufficient technology usage, and insufficient safety standards.

Across all categories there is potential for noncompliant behavior, so in order to differentiate human error from insufficient safety standards, it should be understood that human error refers to pilots, flight crews, etc. whereas insufficient safety standards refers to management. It should also be understood that here noncompliant behavior is any behavior that does not conform to existing regulation or is not informed by good judgment. Insufficient in regard to safety standards means that regulation has been in place and is not obeyed or does not yet exist when it should. As it relates to technology usage, insufficient could mean that technology may have malfunctioned, it may not have been used properly, or it was not present when it should have been.

The “Probable Causes” section of an NTSB report is immediately followed by “Recommendations” and “Reiterated Recommendations”. These two sections formed the basis for our group’s research relating to proposed improvements. The method for identifying the improvements was the same as with the causes. In this case we identified professional development, technology, and safety standards as the three main areas for improvement as shown by Figure 2.

In cases of noncompliant, human error, the reports cited professional development as the solution. Our group found far less examples of noncompliant pilot behavior than expected, however it was still significant and appeared in close to a third of all thirteen reports. When noncompliance existed at the corporate level, there would exist a lack of safety standards in agreement with existing Federal Aviation Administration regulation. The NTSB often cited this as a cause titled, “lack of FAA oversight”. Lack of FAA oversight appeared in “Reiterated Recommendations”, demonstrating that whichever report it appeared in, was written for a preventable accident. Reports that made suggestions for new policy were outliers, representing freak accidents that typically involved technology more so than pilot or corporate error. Recommendations for technological improvement typically accompanied reports that included causes human and technological. These recommendations suggested new technologies to supplement existing systems, replace outdated ones, or fulfill a role not previously met by any existing technology.

There is no one cause for any accident, but the three most common according to our findings are human error, insufficient safety standards and technology. Human error could be an honest mistake or non-compliant behavior at an individual level, insufficient safety standards could be a lack of impossible foresight or noncompliance at a corporate level, and technology usage may be misused, dangerous or insufficient. Oftentimes certain safety standards are put in place by the FAA that address many of the problems that show up in the reports. The NTSB acknowledges this and frequently cites "lack of FAA oversight" as a cause of accidents. This typically accompanies a cause relating to poor management by the company. Far more infrequently but still common enough to be trends are technological errors and non-compliant behavior among pilots and flight crews not adhering to the existing regulations. These last two causes show a failure of management to effectively prevent accidents and protect the safety of crew and customers. The responsibility is not just on the pilots and maintenance crew but also others who may not see themselves as directly involved in safety.

Incorporating observations in high risk areas of the airline industry will be an effective way to catch mistakes before they cause accidents. Airlines can install cameras in cockpits and monitor them for mistakes to notify them before accidents can happen. The best times to do this would be during take-off and landing which are the most dangerous times during a flight. Another effective way of observation is to have experienced pilots work with and observe new pilots to correct errors. This can also be implemented in the maintenance areas as well in order to cover all risk areas of human error. Executives must also be observed; a large portion of accidents are non compliance to FAA standards so executives must be held accountable for enforcing these. The results of these observations can be compiled into a list of common mistakes that can then be integrated into the training of new employees. Further observations can then continue to take place allowing for training to be continually modified and refined. The end result is a continuously improving method of preventing accidents and creating a safer environment for employees and customers. It must also not be forgotten that there are emerging technologies that pertain to both maintenance crews and pilots that can help stop mistakes as they happen. Airlines need to constantly be researching and adopting new and effective ways to increase safety.

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National Transportation Safety Board, (2018a). Left Engine Failure and Subsequent Depressurization Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 Boeing 737-7H4, N772SW. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Aircraft Accident Report, Washington D.C.

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National Transportation Safety Board, (2016b) Impact with Power Lines Heart of Texas Hot Air Balloon Rides Balóny Kubíček BB85Z, N2469L. Lockhart, Texas. Aircraft Accident Report, Washington D.C.

National Transportation Safety Board, (2018b). Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and Subsequent Ditching Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH. New York, New York. Aircraft Accident Report, Washington D.C.

National Transportation Safety Board, (2015a). Runway Excursion During Landing Delta Air Lines Flight 1086. New York, New York. Aircraft Accident Report, Washington D.C.

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Appendix

Frequency of Causes Across All 13 Accident Reports Published Since 2016

Note. This figure shows how prevalent different causes are in accidents from 13 NTSB reports. Some reports list more than one cause.

Frequency of Proposed Improvements Across All 13 Accident Reports Published Since 2016

Note. This figure shows how prevalent different proposed improvements are in accidents from 13 NTSB reports. Some reports propose more than one improvement.