



Opposition to the 22nd Amendment: The National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency and its Activities, 1949-1951

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On March 24, 1947, as a posthumous slap at Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his unprecedented four terms in the White House, the Republicans of the 80th Congress passed the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution limiting presidents to two terms. With the ratification by a 36th state (Nevada), it finally became law on February 26, 1951. According to Massachusetts Congressman Joseph Martin of the Grand Old Party, this landmark event represented nothing less than a "victory for the people and their republican form of Government [and] a defeat for totalitarianism and the enemies of freedom" (*New York Times*, February 28, 1951). For his part, Harry S. Truman, after his presidency, vehemently opposed such an amendment, describing it as "bad" (H. Truman 1959), "stupid" (M. Truman 1989, 237), and "one of the worst that has been put into the Constitution, except for the Prohibition Amendment" (H. Truman 1960, 44).¹ In his view, "there are clearly times when more than two terms are both necessary and wise" (M. Truman 1989, 5). Among the organizations also critical of this measure, the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency, founded in 1949, was certainly the most active.

Surprisingly, there are no secondary sources concerning this pressure group. Even Frederick Zucker's doctoral dissertation of 1958 entitled "The Adoption of the Twenty-Second Amendment", clearly the most exhaustive study on the adoption of this measure, ignored this committee. Zucker contended that no pressure or interest groups "were closely involved in the process by which the 22nd Amendment found its way into the Constitution" (Zucker 1958, 129).² As he tried to explain: "Perhaps interested groups that might have backed the measure saw it was certain to pass and did not waste resources on it. The same would apply to potential opposing groups" (Zucker 1958, 129).

This article particularly seeks to examine the arguments of this private organization and to explain why the activities of such a pressure group did not prevent the enactment of the Twenty-second Amendment. Interestingly enough, such a study as this article of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency is not without addressing some concerns that are pressing today. Suffice it to say that Senate Democrats only recently killed a proposal for congressional term limits (*Washington Post*, April 24, 1996)³ and that the now former House Speaker Newt Gingrich had promised to make term limits for Capitol Hill's members a top priority as a subject of discussion in 1997.⁴

The "only organized opposition to the amendment"

Although one cannot provide an exact birthdate for the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency, we know at least that its founding occurred near the beginning of 1949. Illustrative of this is a letter dated February 12, written by Daniel Francis Clancy, founder of the committee, in which he declared that "in an effort to prevent ratification of the 22nd Amendment . . . I am forming a National Committee against Limiting the Presidency" (Records of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency [NCALP hereafter], Daniel Francis Clancy to Senator Scott Lucas, 1949). Information on Clancy is limited. A review of the records of this organization only reveals that this former Logansport, Indiana, newspaperman, supporter of the Democratic party and member of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Hon. Harry S. Truman, 1951; U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 1951, v. 97, A4895), lived in Springfield, Ohio, and that he

obtained several national awards for journalistic achievements (NCALP, Statement, 1951). Another source indicates that this journalist, born in 1918, respectively worked for the *Springfield Daily News* (1946-47) and the *Springfield Sun* (1947-56) during the Truman and Eisenhower years. Incidentally, Clancy would move in 1956 to the *Columbus Dispatch* and work there as reporter until his retirement in 1980 (*Who's Who in the Midwest* 1982, 122).

More information is available on Clancy's arguments as director of the committee, which was composed of Harold L. Ickes, Franklin D. Roosevelt's interior secretary; Michael Francis Doyle, president of the Electoral Colleges of the United States; Maury Maverick, a Texas lawyer and member of the 74th and 75th Congresses; Joseph F. Guffey, the former U.S. senator from Pennsylvania; C. F. Richards, a Texas attorney; and Edmund C. Gorrell, a newspaper editor from Winamac, Indiana (NCALP, Statement, 1951).⁵ In a series of letters, Clancy explained why he opposed the Twenty-second Amendment. In one of them, dated April 26, 1949, and sent to Alabama Governor James Folsom, he asserted the need to respect the document that had emerged from the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and to rely on the American people: "We of this committee are against the amendment, which would limit Presidents to two terms — believing that the Presidency should be left as it was planned in the Constitution, and that the people can be trusted to know how long they want a President" (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Hon. James E. Folsom, 1949). A letter to Harold Ickes dated September 23 of the same year expressed similar arguments and said that "the wise nation will set up no barrier against utilizing ability or exploiting experience" (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Harold L. Ickes, 1949).

Such a stance was not new for Clancy, as he stated in a letter of February 1949: "Since 1940, when I wrote a booklet called *The Two Term Tradition*, I have been convinced that attempts to limit Presidential tenure are based mostly on partisanship and are contrary to sound political philosophy" (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Senator Scott Lucas, 1949). Indeed, it was in this booklet, written just before the American people chose to elect Franklin D. Roosevelt to a third term, that the founder of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency publicly conveyed his viewpoint for the first time on the matter. Clancy's primary goal in this document was to demonstrate the incongruity of the two contentions upon which the opponents to a third term based their arguments. To the first contention saying that it is

foolish to assert that at any one time there is only one man in a nation of 130,000,000 people who is fitted to be Chief Executive, he retorted that "the choice is not one in 130,000,000 but, in nomination, one in six or a dozen and, in election, one in two" (NCALP, *The Two Term Tradition*, 1940). Clancy added that he could not give credence to such an assertion, since he deeply believed in the theory of indispensability, "that is, that for certain periods in a nation's political history one man may be better fitted for leadership than any of the other eligible aspirants" (NCALP, *The Two Term Tradition*, 1940). As for the second contention which suggested the danger of making self-perpetuation possible through the long-term implementation of powerful bureaucratic mechanisms, he replied "that the real issue involved in the perpetuity in office argument is PARTY patronage and not PERSONAL patronage, since actual obtainment of the office is a matter of election and only party patronage influences elections" (NCALP, *The Two Term Tradition*, 1940). Convinced that the tradition of two terms was supported far more by prejudice and partisanship than by sound political philosophy, Clancy concluded his booklet by mentioning that long governmental tenure in other democratic countries tended to be without ill effects and was quite common. That was especially true for the United States' northern neighbor, as he contended:

Turning to the Dominion of Canada . . . , we find that four men have held the office of prime minister for longer than eight years—Prime Minister Borden for slightly over eight years, Prime Minister Laurier for fifteen years, Prime Minister MacDonald (1867-73 and 1878-91) for nineteen years, and Prime Minister King (1921-30, excepting a two month interval in 1926, and from 1935 to the present) (NCALP, *The Two Term Tradition*, 1940).

Other members of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency echoed Clancy's arguments during the Truman era. For instance, in March 1949, Michael Francis Doyle insisted on the need to honor the Constitution: "It is my belief that this great document should not be changed for temporary or for local reasons. . . . There is no valid reason whatsoever in limiting the Presidency to two terms. Another Congress may want to limit it to one term; others may want to limit to three terms" (NCALP, Michael Francis

Doyle to Daniel Francis Clancy, 1949). That same month, Harold Ickes, who launched a campaign in 1940 in favor of a third term for Roosevelt (Graham and Wander 1985, 423), deplored what he saw as the lack of faith of the supporters of the Twenty-second Amendment in Congress when he said that "it is really nothing less than sneering impertinence of the politicians to disregard the will of the people as expressed both in 1940 and 1944, and attempt to force on them a limitation of presidential tenure which clearly they do not want" (NCALP, Harold L. Ickes to Daniel Francis Clancy, March 1949). In a letter of February 1951, Truman's former secretary of interior expressed once again the need to remain confident in the American electors: "I am against that amendment as a matter of principle. I believe that the people ought to have the right to choose, for as many terms as they may elect, all of the officers for whom the Constitution gives them the right to vote" (NCALP, Harold L. Ickes to Sam Rayburn, 1951). In another statement, Ickes evoked the pernicious consequences which might have resulted from an earlier adoption of the Twenty-second Amendment: "If the proposed amendment had been in effect in 1940, no one looking back at that critical and fateful period can even imagine the confusion, the utter disunity . . . that might have resulted under some other President, however patriotic and well-intentioned he might have been" (NCALP, "Presidential Tenure Amendment", 1949). He added that "the brilliant conception of lend lease, a law which made it possible for us to keep our allies in the war until we ourselves got ready, of itself justified the reelection of President Roosevelt for a third term" (NCALP, "Presidential Tenure Amendment", 1949).

During its short life, the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency seemed to resort exclusively to epistolary activities to further its cause. Thus, Clancy presented the arguments of his organization by writing letters to the editors of newspapers such as the *Washington Post* (NCALP, "On Limiting the Presidency", 1951). He also wrote to William M. Boyle, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, to inquire whether he was "in any way actively opposing ratification of the 22nd Amendment" (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Hon. William M. Boyle, Jr., 1951). President Truman himself presumably received such a letter, since Boyle did not take the time to answer the written message of the director of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Hon. Harry S. Truman, 1951). Furthermore, Clancy, who was lauded by Harold Ickes

for his efforts in the anti-third term fight (NCALP, Harold L. Ickes to Daniel Francis Clancy, 1951), wrote to some governors to obtain the names of key members of state legislatures (majority leaders, President of the Senate, etc.) in order to send them "some brief background material on the proposed 22nd Amendment" (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Hon. James E. Folsom, 1949). During 1949, for instance, he contacted the governors of Alabama and Florida (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Hon. James E. Folsom, 1949; Fuller Warren to Daniel Francis Clancy, 1949). In addition, he wrote to Thomas P. O'Neill, Speaker of the Massachusetts House (Daniel Francis Clancy to Hon. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., 1949). The reason was simple: the legislatures of these states, as Clancy explained to Harold Ickes, were among those which were supposed to consider the Twenty-second Amendment during that year (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Harold L. Ickes, April 1949)⁶ and, as he admitted a few months later, he considered it important to provide the "opponents of the amendment with background literature enabling them to combat it on logical grounds" (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Hon. William M. Boyle, Jr., 1951). Interestingly enough, the measure did not pass the Massachusetts General Court (NCALP, Chester A. Dolan, Jr., to Daniel Francis Clancy, 1949) in 1949, nor the Alabama (NCALP, Geo. C. Hawkins to Daniel Francis Clancy, 1949) or Florida (Zucker 1958, 180)⁷ legislatures either.

Daniel Francis Clancy, naturally, was not alone in his efforts to prevent the ratification of the Twenty-second Amendment by the states. An examination of the records of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency, as mentioned above, shows that Harold Ickes contributed as well. This can be illustrated best by the fact that he addressed letters in 1949 to various Capitol Hill senators, such as Claude Pepper of Florida and Lister Hill of Alabama, asking them to influence the legislators of their respective states concerning the proposed amendment (NCALP, Harold L. Ickes to Daniel Francis Clancy, May 1949). According to Ickes, his efforts were not in vain, at least for the Alabaman delegation, as he acknowledged in a letter dated August 22, 1949:

In letters that I had received from both of these Senators [Lister Hill and John Sparkman], I was inclined to believe that they would do what they could to help to defeat this amendment. Now I have a letter

from each of them advising me that, although the ratifying resolution passed the House, they believe that it will be blocked in the Senate. Both of them assured me that they had taken what action they could on the long distance telephone to bring pressure to bear upon the Senate against the resolution (NCALP, Harold L. Ickes to Daniel Francis Clancy, August 1949).

These activities of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency therefore seem to support Clancy's contention that his pressure group did in fact represent the "only organized opposition to the amendment" (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Miss Fleeson, 1951).

Was the Passing of the Twenty-second Amendment Inevitable?

In spite of all the activities of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency, the Twenty-second Amendment was finally passed in 1951. For many reasons, this result, which was already regretted by scholar Clinton Rossiter in the fifties,⁸ was to be expected.

First, there was what some observers have characterized as "party rancor and personal hatred" (Willis and Willis 1952, 469) in the post-World War II American political landscape. Indeed, numerous Republicans tended to despise the late Franklin D. Roosevelt. This is understandable since he appeared as the man who had kept the Grand Old Party from power for more than a decade (Zucker 1958, 144). Many believed, in addition, that the Democratic politician from Hyde Park, in what they felt was his lust for power, broke in 1940 the two-term tradition inaugurated by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson (Zucker 1958, 106, 144-145). Criticizing Roosevelt's action, Senator Kenneth Wherry, a Republican from Nebraska and a vociferous foe of New Deal liberalism (Dalstrom 1965, 143), said for instance in 1943:

The moment the unwritten law was ignored by the occupant of the White House, the way was opened to a life presidency. Such executive tenure is entirely foreign to the fundamental principles of American government. . . . When any incumbent of our highest executive office utterly disregards a precedent established by unwritten law, then we must enact a written restriction to curb insatiable ambitions (Wherry 1943).

These considerations may explain why historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has characterized the Twenty-second Amendment as primarily a repudiation of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Schlesinger, Jr. 1974, 131). However that may be, if Capitol Hill's Republicans had tried to introduce resolutions during the Second World War to amend the Constitution for limiting any President to two terms, they would have met with an important problem: the pro-Roosevelt New Deal Democrats held a majority in the legislative branch. Nevertheless, the context became less favorable for these Democrats after the November 1946 elections: Republicans were in majority in both houses of Congress. Best known for its assault on New Deal programs and its refusal to consolidate the welfare state (Hartmann 1971, 1-2), the conservative 80th Congress introduced, as early as January 1947, several resolutions to limit the presidential term of office to eight years. Among them was House Joint Resolution 27, destined to become the Twenty-second Amendment, which was approved by the lower house in February by a vote of 285 to 121 and a few weeks later by the upper house by a vote of 59 to 23 (Willis and Willis 1952, 473-474). Not surprisingly, all of the Republicans in both houses endorsed this resolution (Strout 1957, 5) while most Democrats opposed it (Willis and Willis 1952, 475). Incidentally, Democratic Congressman Adolph Sabath of Illinois was particularly harsh on the Republican supporters of House Resolution 27, qualifying their triumph as a "pitiful victory over a great man now sleeping on the banks of the Hudson" (Zucker 1958, 61). Interestingly enough, Frederick Zucker noted that of the 47 Democratic supporters of the resolution in the lower house, almost all of them were anti-New Dealers and represented southern states (Zucker, 1958, 85, 150, 171-172).

The passage of the Twenty-second Amendment was all the more inevitable because a slim majority of state legislatures was controlled by the Grand Old Party from 1947 onwards (Zucker 1958, 178). This was significant as all of the 25 Republican-controlled legislatures ratified the Twenty-second Amendment between 1947 and 1951 (Zucker 1958, 229).⁹ Although most of the Democratic state legislatures were opposed to this measure during the same period, they did not present the same degree of unity: all of the southern Democratic legislatures, for instance, voted in favor of the Twenty-second Amendment (Zucker 1958, 226).¹⁰ Moreover, it must be noted that several influential newspapers such as the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Washington Star*

and the *New York Times* took editorial positions for the amendment (Zucker 1958, 123). The latter newspaper, for instance, said in March 1947 that the proposed amendment should be rapidly ratified, pleading that it would prevent a Chief Executive from building "his personal power to irresistible proportions" (*New York Times*, March 23, 1947). In addition, although Truman did not hesitate to attack the Twenty-second Amendment after his presidency, he did not support Clancy's pressure group in 1949-51. As a matter of fact, the incumbent of the White House seemed rather indifferent to the general debate over this amendment, as Frederick Zucker has noted: "Truman would be expected to oppose the amendment as a legislative encroachment designed to weaken a President in his second term. . . . [Nevertheless, he] did not play any active part in the process by which the 22nd Amendment was proposed and ratified. His role was strictly passive" (Zucker 1958, 131). Truman's laconic reaction to the ratification of February 1951¹¹ corroborated such a viewpoint. Among the hypotheses which might explain Truman's passivity towards the Twenty-second Amendment was the fact that his Administration faced overwhelming foreign problems in 1949 and especially in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean conflict. As presidential adviser Clark Clifford said in this respect: "The Korean war changed forever the character of the Truman Administration. Priorities were suddenly reversed, as the nation and its leaders once again had to put a faraway war ahead of domestic needs" (Clifford 1991, 275). In short, whatever the reasons underlying Truman's attitude, the Chief Executive hardly provided a stimulus or an inspiration source for members of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency.

This particular conjuncture alone, however, was not sufficient to explain the enactment of the Twenty-second Amendment. A structural factor, linked to the fears generated by the vast expansion of the presidency's authority during the Great Depression and especially during the Second World War,¹² must also be taken into account. Indeed, many Americans, after 1945, aware that the presidency was not the only institution, came to believe that Chief Executive's long tenure threatened the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances (Willis and Willis 1952, 477). Such a belief appeared all the sounder in that the phenomenal growth of presidential powers, in this incipient Cold War context, did not seem to wane with Franklin D. Roosevelt's successor. As historian Donald McCoy has underscored:

[Truman] was able to expand presidential authority as commander in chief and chief diplomat in order to maintain a powerful American presence internationally. . . . [He] had qualms about the costs of mounting military power, but, as he saw it, at stake were the nation's survival and its way of life. Thus he was seldom timid about using his powers. Truman, for example, held that the president could determine when there was a national emergency endowing him with inherent extra powers . . . ; was not required to give Congress confidential information . . . ; had "discretionary power" in spending appropriations . . . ; and could engage in military action when necessary (McCoy 1989, 286).

Significantly, Truman, who had long shared Woodrow Wilson's and FDR's view that the presidency was crucial to the accomplishment of high ideals at home and abroad (McCoy 1989, 285), was also not thrifty in using the veto power: "Of the thirty-eight presidents who served from George Washington through Jimmy Carter, only two - Franklin Roosevelt with 635 vetoes and Grover Cleveland with 584 - cast more vetoes than Harry Truman, who disapproved of 250 laws passed by Congress" (Watson 1989, 377).

Fearing the dangers of unrestrained executive authority, quite a few Americans argued that a constitutional two-term limit would help rebalance the scales of governmental power in favor of the legislative branch (Zucker 1958, 176) - a "legislative branch" that Truman, during episodes such as the Berlin crisis and the Korean war, tended to ignore (Haynes 1989, 70). Representative Joseph Martin, who appeared in his capacity as Speaker the driving force behind House Joint Resolution 27, greeted this argument favorably. Congress represented in his view "the people's special instrument of control over their government and their public officials" (Zucker 1958, 137). Naturally, the state legislatures could hardly deny the desirability of such a development, as scholar Louis Koenig has revealed: "In sending the [22nd] amendment to the state legislatures . . . , Congress was relying upon bodies endowed with impressive experience in trammeling executive authority. . . . In fourteen states governors can serve only one term, and in six states not more than two" (Koenig 1964, 64-65).

On the whole, the atavistic fear of dictatorship, so prevalent in American history and particularly intensified during the post-World War II period with the deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union,

must certainly not be overlooked to understand the enactment of the Twenty-second Amendment. Needless to say, the same was true for what we call the "mythical power" of the two-term tradition. This significant element, for example, largely explains why a Chief Executive such as Theodore Roosevelt, who "loved being President" (Troy 1991, 112) and who "still had much to accomplish" (Troy 1991, 119) decided not to run in 1908 for a second full term, as historian Gil Troy has claimed: "Roosevelt's decision to retire in 1909 stemmed from his vision of the presidency and the continuing American fear of power. Although he had been elected only once, he was President for over seven years and did not want to appear to violate George Washington's two-term precedent. The vast power a president wielded obligated him to keep it only for 'a limited time', Roosevelt explained" (Troy 1991, 119).

The last reason which prevented the defeat of the Twenty-second Amendment deals with the nature of Clancy's pressure group itself. In fact, in spite of its efforts and the renown of some of its members, the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency was hindered by two factors which undermined its effectiveness: a lack of cohesion and a lack of money.

The first disadvantage was exemplified by the fact that the organization had some problems fully mobilizing its membership strength for political action. Indeed, much of the committee's efforts were generated by two members: Daniel Francis Clancy and Harold Ickes. An examination of the committee's records reveals that the contribution of its other members was not substantial. Interestingly enough, such an examination also shows that the pressure group's efforts to increase its membership did not appear very successful. Suffice it to mention that the former New York Governor Herbert Lehman (NCALP, Thomas V. Brunkard [Lehman's assistant] to Daniel Francis Clancy 1949) and James Roosevelt gave different reasons for turning down Clancy's invitation to join its organization.¹³ For instance, FDR's son, an active supporter of the movement to draft Dwight Eisenhower for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1948, said to Daniel Francis Clancy in February 1949: "It is with much regret that I must turn down your kind invitation for me to join your Committee, but due to the fact that I do not feel I should be associated with any organization in which I cannot be active, I think it is inadvisable for me to accept your kind invitation" (NCALP, James Roosevelt to Daniel Francis Clancy, 1949). Incidentally, it must be noted that James Roosevelt, following the Democratic National Convention

of 1948, was particularly busy: he resigned his post of chairman of the California State Democratic Central Committee to prepare for the California gubernatorial primary in 1950 (Schoenebaum 1978, 475).

The second handicap, which was related to the limited size of the committee's membership (eight regular members scattered throughout the country),¹⁴ was illustrated by the fact that Clancy's organization resorted exclusively to epistolary activities for promoting its cause. For instance, no speaker forums or public conferences were organized. As for the epistolary activities, it must be noted that they were certainly not expensive since the committee did not distribute its booklet *The Two Term Tradition* to a large audience and did not seem to have publicized its position in full-page newspaper advertisements.¹⁵ Undoubtedly, such a financial limit was particularly detrimental, as political scientists have tended to characterize money as "perhaps the most important resource available to a [pressure] group in influencing public policy" (Ornstein and Elder 1978, 70). In any case, that may explain to a certain extent why American public opinion was generally uninformed and apathetic about the issue of the Twenty-second Amendment during the Truman years (Zucker 1958, 229); a reality that prompted the editor of the catholic weekly *America* to state in 1951 that "it is simply amazing how little discussion there was on the 22nd Amendment" (NCALP, Robert C. Hartnett to Daniel Francis Clancy, 1951). One can also understand why Ohio Congressman George Bender, in presenting Daniel Francis Clancy to the House of Representatives in the summer of 1951, made no reference to his activities as head of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency (U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 1951, v. 97, A4895).

In short, these were the elements which made the ratification of the Twenty-second Amendment inevitable, a measure that Dwight Eisenhower, the first Chief Executive to feel its impact, did not hesitate in 1956 to qualify as being "not wholly wise" (Davis 1979, 291).

Endnotes

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1. However, Truman's attitude towards the idea of limiting Presidential tenure to two terms was not so clear-cut before his White House departure, as Paul Davis has revealed: "The position of Truman in 1940 seemed clearly in favor of the two-term tradition. By 1947, he had apparently changed his views enough to endorse a limitation of three terms, though in 1950 and 1952, he seemed to again support the two-term limitation"(Davis 1979, 290).
2. Incidentally, it must be noted that "attempts to establish differences between 'interest' and 'pressure' groups have usually been based on claims that interest groups are concerned with hard, material goals, while pressure groups are concerned with less self-interested, more altruistic goals and policies" (Wilson 1981, 4).
3. Indeed, it was on April 23, 1996 that Democrats of the upper house blocked consideration of a constitutional amendment to limit terms of Congress' members to 12 years, which was a key element in the "Contract with America" the GOP used to win control of the House of Representatives (*Washington Post*, April 24, 1996). At the same time, surveys showed that seven in 10 Americans want congressional term limits (*USA Today*, April 23, 1996).
4. The Georgia Republican made this promise in April 1996 should the Grand Old Party retain control of Congress (*USA Today*, April 24, 1996). For his part, Senator Hank Brown, a Colorado Republican, expressed his belief a few months earlier that Congress will approve term limits this decade (*New York Times*, September 19, 1995).
5. Incidentally, a letter written by Clancy and dated February 10, 1951 referred to another member named Kenesaw M. Landis II (NCALP, Daniel Francis Clancy to Hon. Harry S. Truman, 1951). Lawyer and newspaper columnist from Logansport, Indiana, the latter was however a posthumous member since he died in July 1949 at the age of 39 (*New York Times*, July 13, 1949).
6. It is worth noting that the process of state ratification on the proposed Twenty-second Amendment began as early as March 31, 1947 when the Maine legislature was the first to vote for it (Zucker 1958, 205-207).
7. However, these two southern legislatures, in spite of their large Democratic make-up, changed their minds and finally endorsed the Twenty-second Amendment in 1951 (Zucker 1958, 180-181).
8. Rossiter said in 1956: "In persuading the country to adopt the Twenty-second Amendment . . . , the opponents of the strong Presidency have struck a mighty blow for their cause. Their cause, I am bound to say, is ill-considered and ill-starred. It is ill-considered because any major reduction now in the powers of the President would leave us naked to our enemies, to the invisible forces of boom and bust at home and to the visible forces of unrest and aggression abroad. In a country over which industrialism has swept in great waves, in a world where active diplomacy is the minimum price of survival, it is not alone power but a vacuum of power that men must fear. It is ill-starred because the Whigs, who may win skirmishes and even an occasional battle, cannot win a war against American history. The strong Presidency is the product of events that cannot be undone and of forces that continue to roll" (Rossiter 1956, 159-160).
9. Incidentally, only simple majorities were required in the state legislatures in contrast to Congress (Zucker 1958, 228).
10. It must also be noted that southern politicians on Capitol Hill, sharply critical of Truman's civil rights program, frequently entered into informal voting arrangements with Republicans during these years in spite of their Democratic loyalty. In the same vein, it was notorious that many of these southern politicians disliked Truman's broad conception of

- presidential power, as well as his taxing and spending policies, which challenged the jurisdiction of Jim Crow (Grantham 1989, 331).
11. He simply said: "I have no comment; it does not affect me" (*New York Times*, February 28, 1951).
 12. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has argued that the significant revival of the presidential prerogative after Pearl Harbor must be understood "as a direct reaction to what happened when Congress tried to seize the guiding reins of foreign policy in the years 1919 to 1939" (Schlesinger, Jr. 1974, 105).
 13. Brunkard justified Lehman's attitude on the grounds that "the Governor has made it a policy not to serve on any committees sponsoring or opposing Federal legislation" (NCALP, Thomas V. Brunkard [Lehman's assistant] to Daniel Francis Clancy, 1949).
 14. Suffice it to mention that members such as Harold Ickes, Michael Francis Doyle and Maury Maverick lived respectively in Washington, D.C., Philadelphia and San Antonio.
 15. In this respect, the situation of the National Committee Against Limiting the Presidency seemed to contrast with another pressure group of the Truman era: the Committee for the Marshall Plan. Formed in November 1947 to raise public support for the European Recovery Program, this private organization, whose membership reached more than three hundred citizens at its peak (Committee for the Marshall Plan, Statement by Robert P. Patterson, 1948), distributed, in January 1948, 70 000 copies of its booklet *4 Essentials of the Marshall Plan* (Committee for the Marshall Plan, Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, 1948) and a few weeks later organized an important conference in Washington, D.C. (Committee for the Marshall Plan, Conference on the European Recovery Program, 1948).

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