Summary on Chapter from Modules 05-08 philosophy

M07Lec01: Why Do Species Matter?

This lecture will help you understand: • Arguments for protecting

biodiversity • Criticisms of those arguments • The “murkiness” of the concept of

species • Aesthetic criteria for preservation • Why duties are to “individuals”

Biodiversity

• Biodiversity: the variability among living organisms both within and between species and within and between ecosystems

• Of the authors that we have read (Singer, Regan, Rolston, Schweitzer, Leopold, Naess, etc.), who would protect biodiversity for the sake of protecting biodiversity?

• Is there any moral reason for protecting biodiversity?

Reasons for Protecting Biodiversity

1. Biodiversity has immediate and potential economic value

2. Biodiversity performs environmental services beyond price

1. Biodiversity’s Economic Value

• Many industries depend on the natural world. • One third of modern medicines are derived

from plants and molds. • It is estimated that the number of species

living is 10-30 million, with only 1.7 million named.

1. We ought to protect those things of value to humans. 2. The biologically diverse natural world has value. 3. So, we ought to protect that biologically diverse

natural world.

2. Biodiversity Performs Services Beyond Price

• Nature serves more that human's economic interests.

• Nature and natural processes are irreplaceable and are of significant value to humans and human interests (e.g., pollination, conversion of carbon dioxide into oxygen, etc.).

1. We ought to protect things that are irreplaceable or priceless.

2. The biologically diverse natural world is irreplaceable or priceless.

3. We ought to protect the biologically diverse natural world.

Intrinsic Value

• “When a species vanishes from nature, the world is thereby diminished. Species do not just have instrumental value. . . . They have a value in their own right, an intrinsic value.” Nicholas Rescher, Pittsburgh

University

“Preciousness” • “The preciousness of individual

[animals] ... is inversely proportional to the population of the species .... [T]he human population has become so disproportionate from the biological point of view that if one had to choose between a specimen of Homo sapiens and a specimen of a rare even if unattractive species, the choice would be moot.”

J. Baird Callicott University of North Texas

“Intrinsically Worse”

• Sylvan asks us to consider whether killing the last animal of its species is “intrinsically worse” than just killing the animal. He thinks that it is worse.

Richard Sylvan (né Routley) (1935- 1996)

Lilly-Marlene Russow

• What moral obligation, if any, do we humans have toward species?

• Why do species matter? Do they matter? • Are we justified in treating one species, even if

endangered, differently from other species?

Obligations to Species and Individuals

• Russow argues that while we might have obligations to individual animals, these obligations do not extend to an entire species.

Test Cases

• Russow provides eight “test cases” which challenge our assumptions and intuitions about: – what a species is – importance of sheer diversity or number of species – importance (or lack) of some species over others – what is being preserved--species or subgroup of

species? – what makes one group of animals special with respect

to other animals – cases in which one can override a species’ preservation

Case 1. The snail darter

Case 2. The Chinese Père David's deer

also known as the Milu

(Chinese: 麋鹿; pinyin: mílù)

Case 3. The red wolf (Canis rufus)

Case 4. The Northern Oriole

Baltimore Oriole

Bullock’s Oriole

Northern Oriole

Case 5. The Appaloosa

Case 6. Lab rats

Case 7. Mosquito

Case 8. Zebra

Test Cases Reveal (1)

• Our concept of what a species is is ambiguous. What counts as a species is a matter of current fashion in taxonomy. – If a species is only a category or class, and the class is

nothing more than a convenient grouping of its members, then what is so important about species?

– Darwin once wrote, “I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other.“

4 Different Conceptions of What a Species Is

1. Morphological account, taxonomists consider a form, including the shape, the flowers, the organs of the specimen, and groups it with others of like morphology.

2. Phylogenetic account, taxonomists place together organisms with identical, or nearly identical, evolutionary histories, so they will need evidence of the organism’s past if they can get this in the fossil record.

3. “Biological” account, biologists define a species as an isolated interbreeding population giving rise to fertile offspring. So they place together all individuals that do or could interbreed, and watch to see if they mate and the offspring are fertile.

4. Nominalist account, species are more like proper-named individuals (Steve Jobs, Chicago), than like the natural kinds (such as humans or oak trees).

Test Cases Reveal (2)

• These test cases, according to Russow, also show that is not the sheer diversity or number of species that matters. – If one believes that diversity

itself is a value, one would have the obligation of creating a new species wherever possible, even harmful or bizarre ones that serve no purpose!

Test Cases Reveal (3)

• There is also the question is what we are trying to preserve.

• Clearly not all varieties are of interest. Nobody cares about the various strains of lab rats, but we seem to care a lot about the Appaloosa, so much so that a concerted effort is being made to gather together the few remaining specimens and reestablish the breed.

Three General Replies to "Why do species matter?"

• “Why do we have a least a prima facie duty not to cause a species to become extinct, and in some cases, a duty to try actively to preserve species?” Because: 1. We are stewards" or "caretakers” 2. Species have extrinsic value 3. Species have intrinsic value

1. Steward or “Caretaker” View

• Feinberg: we are rational custodians of the planet and have an obligation to be stewards and preserve species.

• Russow: the job of a custodian is to protect that which has value. But, whether species have value is what is trying to be answered. So, either the Steward View – assumes that what has value is what the steward is

steward of, thus begging the question OR – or, it does not answer the question as to what has value

for the sake of preservation

2. Species-Have-Extrinsic-Value View

• View: species matter because they form or are a part of some other good a. Extrinsic good as warning: vanishing species tell us when

something is wrong or harmful to the environment (e.g., DDT) and, thus, harmful to humans

b. Extrinsic good as alternative use: vanishing species may provide important medicines for human use

c. Extrinsic good as essential ecosystem niche: extinction of a species will lead to ecosystem imbalance and preservation of species is good for the whole ecosystem

d. Extrinsic good as link in evolutionary chain: preservation of species is important in maintaining links in evolutionary chain

Replies to Species-Have-Extrinsic-Value Views

• Reply to Alternative Use: one could likely find some subspecies or other species of comparable use to humans

• Reply to Niche: problem of test cases--zoos are of no significance; David deer are isolated from ecosystems and have no ecological “role” to play; Appaloosa horse is no better or worse situated than any other domesticated horse and, thus, has no special value; encephalitis-bearing mosquitoes ought to be preserved because they have adapted; why fight invasive species if the ecosystem continues to function?

• Reply to Darwin: extinction of a species and replacement by another is part of evolution

3. Species-Have-Intrinsic-Value View

• View: A species has intrinsic value and ought to be preserved for no other reason than it is valuable in itself

• Reply: What grounds intrinsic value? What makes something intrinsically valuable? Is there some non-arbitrary, non- anthropocentric way of determining what has intrinsic value or how much intrinsic value a species has? – Russow thinks not: "If intrinsic value does not spring from anything, if

it becomes merely another way of saying that we should protect species, we are going around in circles without explaining anything."

– Even if we could determine what has intrinsic value, we cannot determine how much intrinsic value something has: "In short, to say that something has intrinsic value does not tell us how much value it has, nor does it allow us to make the sorts of judgments that are often called for in considering the fate of an endangered species."

Aesthetic-Preservation-of-Species View

• Preserving species is often compared to preserving natural wonders – Natural wonders ought be

preserved because of their beauty and splendor

– Analogously, species ought be preserved because of their aesthetic value

Implications of Aesthetic-Preservation-of-Species View

1. Some species have no aesthetic value, thus they are not worth preserving (e.g., snail darter)

2. The aesthetic value of species can be compared and ranked, and the allocation of resources determined appropriately

3. Aesthetic value of a species can be overridden for a greater good a. We would be justified in expending more resources to preserve

some species over other species b. The extinction of a species for pure economic gain may be immoral,

but the extinction of a species for some other justifiable human good might be moral (e.g., malaria-carrying mosquito)

4. We could not explain why an endangered species is more valuable than an unendangered species

a. Each species is unique, regardless of how many there are

Clearing Up a Fundamental Confusion

• We really do not admire species at all. They really do not have aesthetic or any other value. What we value is the existence of individuals with appropriate aesthetic qualities.

• Russow argues that changing the focus from species to individuals allows us to make sense of our feelings about endangered species in two ways:

1. Rarity

• “First, the fact that there are very few members of a species--the fact that we rarely encounter one--itself increases the value of those encounters. I can see turkey vultures almost every day, and I can eat apples almost every day, but seeing a bald eagle or eating wild strawberries are experiences that are much less common, more delightful just for their rarity and unexpectedness. Even snail darters, which, if we encountered them every day would be drab and uninteresting, become more interesting just because we don't--or may not see them everyday.”

2. Possible Future Encounters • “Second, part of our interest in an individual carries over to

a desire that there be future opportunities to see these things again (just as when, upon finding a new and beautiful work of art, I will wish to go back and see it again). In the case of animals, unlike works of art, I know that this animal will not live forever, but that other animals like this one will have similar aesthetic value. Thus, because I value possible future encounters, I will also want to do what is needed to ensure the possibility of such encounters--I.e., make sure that enough presently existing individuals of this type will be able to reproduce and survive. This is rather like the duty that we have to support and contribute to museums, or to other efforts to preserve works of art.”

Russow’s Summary

• "We have moral obligations to protect things of aesthetic value, and to ensure . . . their continued existence; thus we have a duty to protect individual animals (the duty may be weaker or stronger depending on the value of the individual), and to ensure that there will continue to be animals of this sort (this duty will also be weaker or stronger, depending on value). . . We value and protect animals because of their aesthetic value, not because they are members of a given species."

The Tiger by William Blake

Tiger, tiger, burning bright, In the forest of the night,

What immortal hand or eye Could frame thy fearful symmetry?