Discussion assignment

Carl J. Friedrich on Responsibility and Authority Author(s): Jeremy F. Plant Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (May | June 2011), pp. 471-482 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23017504 Accessed: 30-04-2018 19:13 UTC

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Hindy Lauer Schachter, Editor

Jeremy F. Plant Penn State Harrisburg

Carl J. Friedrich on Responsibility and Authority Book Review Essay

Jeremy F. Plant is a professor of public

policy and administration and coordinator

of graduate programs in public administra

tion and homeland security in the School

of Public Affairs, Penn State Harrisburg. He

teaches and conducts research on public

management, transportation policy, human

resource management, homeland security,

and ethics. His published work has ap

peared in such journals as Public Admin

istration Review, American Review of

Public Administration, Public Works

Management and Policy, Public

Integrity, Review of Policy Research,

and Policy Studies Review.

E-mail: [email protected]

Carl J. Friedrich's concept ofadministrative responsibility

is examined in his published works from 1935 to

1960. Friedrich's idea of responsibility encompassed

not only political and personal responsibility within

the hierarchy of bureaucratic organizations, but also

functional responsibility based on scientific knowledge

and professional standards required by the reality

of administrative discretion. Friedrich's notion of

responsibility is contrasted with that of Herman

Finer, who espoused strict obedience to political and

administrative superiors. An examination of the

NOMOS series of edited volumes from the later stage of

Friedrich's career reflects the consistency of his views on

responsibility and on the relationship of responsibility

to authority based on reasoned communication.

Friedrich's optimism regarding such authority contrasts with Hannah Arendt's view that authority is no longer

an operative concept in modern society. Friedrich

lays an important foundation for continued interest

among public administrative scholars in the concept of

administrative responsibility.

In recent years, the concept of administrative responsibility has received a great deal of attention from scholars in public administration (Bertelli

and Lynn 2003; Burke 1986; Cooper 2006; Denhardt and Denhardt 2007; Jackson 2009; O'Leary 2006).

Is responsibility the same as accountability, or does it require a greater degree of ethical and professional awareness than simply following orders faithfully

within a hierarchy? How do we expect administra tors to exercise responsibility under conditions of

complexity and uncertainty? What role, if any, should

professional administrators play in policy formation? Underlying all of the discussions is the realization that administration inescapably involves discretion

and judgment and the power to act on judgmental decisions. How can this be reconciled with democratic

constitutionalism and personal freedom?

Responsibility as a concept in political and admin istrative thought dates back at least to the writings of Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers.1 In

public administration thought, however, the guid ing figure in advancing the idea of administrative

responsibility is Carl Joachim Friedrich. Beginning with his examination of Swiss bureaucracy in the early 1930s and his famous debates with Herman Finer between 1935 and 1941, and continuing through his work with the American Society for Political and

Legal Philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s, Friedrich developed a consistent approach to administrative responsibility that required professional civil servants to reconcile what he called the personal aspects of

accountability—compliance with authority within an

organization—with objective or functional responsi bility, which essentially required administrators to be

capable of answering why a particular decision was made or an action taken, based on solid professional

or scientific grounds.

This review looks at Friedrich's development of the

idea of responsible administration by examining two

major works from the pre—World War II era and two

later essays published in the NOMOS series, the an nual publication of the American Society for Political

and Legal Philosophy, an interdisciplinary learned society that he helped form in 1955.2 Friedrich's posi tions on responsibility and authority are contrasted with those of Herman Finer on responsibility and Hannah Arendt on authority. They collectively pro vide valuable insights on one of the most significant

questions facing public administration: how to recon cile demands for professional expertise in administra tion with the need for accountable and responsible action, a theme that is as relevant to todays world of

public administration as it was in Friedrich's lifetime.

Background: Friedrich and Public Administration

Friedrich was born in 1901 in Leipzig, the son of a

distinguished professor of medicine and a Prussian countess. Brilliantly educated in the finest German

gymnasium tradition, he graduated from the Uni versity of Heidelberg, from which he received his

undergraduate degree in 1925 and a doctorate in

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1930. In 1926, Friedrich joined the faculty of the Department of Government at Harvard University, which remained his primary professional attachment

until his retirement in 1971. Friedrich was a prolific

author whose work encompasses a wide range of top ics in political science. He wrote or edited more than

50 books and 60-plus articles and book chapters.3 He passed away in 1984.

The concept of responsible administration was the re

curring theme in Friedrich's work on public adminis tration from the 1930s through the 1960s. Friedrich's view of responsible government administration was

first in evidence in a book published in 1932, Respon sible-Bureaucracy: A Study of the Swiss Civil Service,

coauthored with Taylor Cole. Switzerland's public service attracted Friedrich as a subject, he later noted, because its system put responsibility ahead of such

purely bureaucratic values of efficiency, rule compli ance, and obedience to authority:

For perhaps there is a species of bureaucracy which is not destructive of popular govern ment, just as there are microbes that are not

destructive of human life. A deep interest in

this possibility caused the author some time ago to investigate the various aspects of the public service of so firmly established a democratic

government as that of Switzerland. It appeared in the course of this investigation that the

public services of Switzerland, while exhibiting certain characteristics of bureaucracy, did not exhibit others which are closely associated with the notion of bureaucratic government as it is generally held. (Friedrich 1935, 17)

The source of this quote is Friedrich's first major work

on American public administration, a 72-page mono graph written for the Commission of Inquiry on Pub lic Service Personnel and published along with four other studies in Problems of the American Public Service

in 1935. The title of the monograph, "Responsible Government Service under the American Constitu

tion," reflects Friedrich's interest in viewing responsi ble administrative conduct within the constitutional

framework of a given political system. Friedrich be gins by summarizing the history of the United States,

noting five factors that have been most significant in determining how government service has evolved: the

absence of powerful neighbors, pioneer traditions, the

melting pot of races and peoples, the multiplicity of churches, and the two-party system. At the conclusion of his analysis of these historical factors, Friedrich ad

vances a novel approach to the relationship of politics and merit for a responsible government service:

A way, therefore, must be found to mark out for

patronage such positions as do not require spe cial knowledge—and the postmasterships, for

example, seem to offer a good opportunity—in order to enable the parties to carry on. If that

sort of arrangement could be supplemented by a cautiously initiated and well-considered scheme

of public honors to be bestowed upon deserv ing men of affairs, it would probably make it

possible to take out of patronage some of the

important policy-forming and yet highly techni cal positions of administrative leadership, and to put them under the civil service, i.e., to make

them part of the responsible government service,

without at the same time sending the Ameri

can party system tumbling to the ground and American democracy with it. (1935, 14—15)

Friedrich thus disposes of the simplistic notion

that politics and administration can be kept wholly

separate by turning the equation on its head: policy positions should be accorded to the civil servant, and

merely honorific or routine positions to patronage. The concept of responsibility is in need of rethinking in the age of administration, in Friedrich's view, in

two respects. First, he notes that "there is a widespread belief in English-speaking countries that there are

two kinds of responsibility, political and personal, the

one enforceable through elections, the other through courts" (1935, 30). But in developed administra tive systems, these are not in themselves adequate:

"something beyond these broader types of general responsibility must be found to fill in the interstices,

where government service is far-flung and technically competent" (1935, 32). This is what Friedrich terms a

third sort of responsibility—objective and functional responsibility. The civil servant, tenured and thus both

protected from political manipulation and encour aged to be creative, has a responsibility to be able to exercise discretion and justify acts of judgment by supplying sound reasons based on scientific evidence for such decisions.

Second, responsibility for administrative action must be seen as a corporate matter, not an individual one. This requires special administrative courts of the sort

he looked at favorably in his study of Swiss public

service (1935, 46-47). Friedrich worded this require ment for corporate responsibility strongly, expressing

the view that "if the people through their government

are unwilling to accept corporate responsibility for the acts of their officers, they do not yet know what

it means to conduct a responsible government in an industrial age" (1935, 46). Liability is moved from the individual and affixed to the corporate entity.

As Friedrich notes, "what is the use of granting such [discretionary] powers to various government services

if the individual officer recoils from responsible action because he is held personally liable?" (1935, 45).

What emerges from Friedrich's discussion of responsi bility is a nuanced view of the politics-administration

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dichotomy—or, stated another way, a politics but not

policy—administration dichotomy. In moving in this direction, Friedrich expresses confidence that adminis trators will not misuse their discretionary power:

We realize today, owing to the contributions of

modern psychology, that there is no such thing

as a specific "will of the people" with regard to the technicalities of revenue collection or any

other "objective" task or function. All the people

want is "good" execution of the task. Conse quently "responsibility" to the people does not

require partisans of a particular general outlook, whether Republican or Democrat, conservative,

progressive, or socialist, but it does require spe cialists who "know the ropes" and will therefore

effectively execute the general rules decided

upon by executive or legislative leadership. Fortunately, people aware of such "objective" standards and sensitive therefore to such "objec

tive" responsibility within a given function are

usually glad to be relieved of the obligation of

making decisions where no objective standards are available. The very passion for objectivity and

impartiality which renders them judicially or sci entifically minded, or both, makes them shrink

from any rash and arbitrary decision. (1935, 38)

Friedrich's 1935 monograph has been quoted in some detail because it represents the first expression of the

concept of administrative responsibility, which is the foundation of his view of proper public administra

tion. Summarizing his major points, responsible administration is distinguished from simple bureauc

racy by the use of, and legal control of, administrative

discretion, grounded in the historical realities of a

given constitutional framework. Responsible adminis tration builds on the simplistic notion of bureaucracy

by adding (not substituting) professional judgment to compliance with hierarchical control and coercion (1935, 54) and the requirement for what he calls

"publicity," the "task to educate the public by making available his findings as a responsible administrator

of existing legislation." Responsibility is enforced not only through the hierarchical chain of command but also through administrative courts and commissions of inquiry. All of this, Friedrich adds, is compatible with American traditions, constitutional arrange

ments, and federalism. It also shows the method of

argumentation that Friedrich typically employed throughout his career, using history, logic, and aware

ness of government practice to build a strong case for

a given position. The only major omission from his usual tool kit is the absence of a grounding of ideas in

classical political philosophy.

The Friedrich-Finer Debates Friedrich's contrast between traditional accountabil

ity and administrative responsibility triggered what

most students of public administration know about his work, the so-called Friedrich-Finer debates of

the immediate pre—World War II years (Bertelli and

Lynn 2003; Cooper 2006; Denhardt and Denhardt 2007; Jackson 2009). The subject of the debate was

the proper understanding of administrative account ability and responsibility within government agencies in democratic systems of government. Finer of the

University of London took exception to Friedrich's distinction between personal responsibility and what, to him, was the more nebulous and troubling concept

of functional responsibility. Finer's view was that re

sponsibility was synonymous with obedience to exter nal controlling authorities (1936, 580) and not to any sense of professionalism or broader scientific truth.

As might be expected, Finer found "truly startling"

and wrong-headed (1936, 581) Friedrich's idea that discretionary authority is best lodged in career public administrators and not politically appointed officials.

As Michael Jackson (2009) notes in his compre hensive review of the Friedrich-Finer interchanges,

much of the debate centered around two points of

divergence: the ability of political principals—min isters—to control and supervise all of the details of administration, and the role that nonpolitical career

administrators should play in the policy—administra

tion cycle. Finer argued the traditional view in both the objective question—can ministers in fact oversee all aspects of administrative discretion in complex

public bureaucracies?—and the normative ques tion—is this the proper relationship between politics and administration? Friedrich, while not amassing a

great deal of empirical data to support his position, argued for a revisionist view in both regards. To him, administration had evolved to the point that it was

impossible for political principals to oversee all the aspects of work done by their agents, the professional administrators. He also clearly added a normative

element as well: it was preferable for career adminis trators to make discretionary judgment, as they had

a base of knowledge that was in excess of that of the

politician, and a professional code of conduct, even if implicit, that led to rational judgment and the ability to provide reasoned answers for why discretionary decisions were made.

Finer and Friedrich continued the debate in a pair of articles in 1940 and 1941. Friedrich revisited his

views on responsible administration in 1940 in an article in Public Policy titled "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility." He was par

ticularly busy in 1939 and 1940 as war erupted and the full nature of the evils of totalitarian regimes was

revealed, leading to the beginning of his groundbreak

ing analysis of the origins of totalitarianism in Greek and Hegelian deification of the state (Friedrich 1939, 1940a). His article in Public Policy restated many of the themes from the 1935 monograph but also

Carl J. Friedrich on Responsibility and Authority

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presented a probing criticism of the failure of British

parliamentary government to deal effectively with the

challenges posed by the rise of fascism.4 Triggered no doubt by Finer's criticism of his positions on respon

sibility, the 1940 article is written with an underlying passion and sense of personal involvement that sets

it apart from the rather slow-moving and careful ap

proach employed in the 1935 monograph, although the argument is essentially the same, as shown by the number of times Friedrich quotes his earlier work. It is full of quotable passages that summarize Friedrich's

position on administrative responsibility, which

remains tied to both the technical and political aspects of responsible action:

The pious formulas about the will of the people are all very well, but when it comes to these

issues of social maladjustment the popular will has little content, except the desire to see such maladjustments removed. A solution which

fails in this regard, or which causes new and

perhaps greater maladjustments, is bad; we have

a right to call such policy irresponsible if it can

be shown that it was adopted without proper regard to the existing sum of human knowledge concerning the technical issues involved; we

also have a right to call it irresponsible if it can

be shown that it was adopted without proper regard for existing preferences in the communi

ty, and more particularly its prevailing majority. Consequently, the responsible administrator is one who is responsive to these two dominant

factors: technical knowledge and popular senti ment. (Friedrich 1940b, 12)

Responding to the criticism of Herman Finer and oth

ers that the British system of parliamentary responsi bility is superior to the American system of constitu tional separation of powers, Friedrich is dismissive:

As contrasted with the detailed and continuous

criticism and control of administrative activity

afforded by Congressional committees, this par liamentary responsibility is largely inoperative and certainly ineffectual. When one considers

the extent of public disapproval directed against Franklin D. Roosevelt's Congressional sup porters who were commonly dubbed "rubber

stamps," it is astonishing that anyone extolling the virtues of British parliamentarianism should

get a hearing at all. For what has the parlia mentary majority in Britain been in the last few

years but a rubber stamp of an automatic docil ity undreamt of in the United States? (1940b, 10)

Friedrich also expands the idea of "publicity" intro

duced in his 1935 monograph by arguing for a vigor ous public relations function:

Put quite broadly, it may be said that the public relations work of the administrative agencies has the task of anticipating clashes between the ad ministrative efforts of effectuating a policy and

the set habits of thought and behavior of the public which constitutes its "environment" . . .

Many of the questions asked of the informa

tion services of important federal agencies have

no answer. The questions raise issues of policy which either have not been anticipated, or at least have not been settled by the administrative

officer involved, or reported back to Congress for settlement. (1940b, 18-19)

Friedrich's idea of publicity raises issues of the right of

dissent and free speech within administrative agencies.

In this regard, his approach is clear and unambiguous: there cannot be what he calls a "gag rule" imposed from above that is based solely on bureaucratic no tions of personal responsibility. Rather, officials bear

the objective responsibility of "addressing themselves to their colleagues in a frank and scientifically candid manner" (1940b, 23).

The only sound standard in a vast and techni cally complex government such as ours is to

insist that the public statements of officials be

in keeping with the highest requirements of

scientific work. If a man's superiors disagree with him, let them mount the same rostrum

and prove that he is wrong; before the goddess of science all men are equal. (1940b, 23)

The 1940 essay essentially lays out Friedrich's view of

proper administration. It is proactive, guided by and respectful of both professional and political aspects of responsibility. The aspect of administrative manage ment that is crucial to its success is personnel manage ment, to ensure that morale in agencies is high, rules allowing for responsible conduct are promulgated and enforced, and employees are allowed "a status at least

equal in dignity and self-respect to the status its labor

laws impose upon and demand from private employ ers" (1940b, 21). Friedrich's connection to the field

of public administration throughout the decade of 1930-40 consisted almost entirely of work that in one

way or another connected him to the emerging field of personnel administration (Friedrich 1935, 1937,

1940b), in large part because responsible administra tion was reliant on civil servants, and the role of civil

servants was defined by the personnel system within which they operated.

Finer responded to Friedrich's refined and expanded notion of responsibility with an article in the first vol ume of Public Administration Review that reinforced

his earlier contention that a strict interpretation of

the politics-administration dichotomy is needed to

ensure accountability to the public through obedience

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of administrators to their political superiors (Finer 1941).5 From the first paragraphs of the article, it

is clear that Finer's purpose is targeting Friedrich's

position on the role of the career administrator in exercising discretion in the name of professional

responsibility:

My chief difference with Professor Friedrich

was and is my insistence upon distinguishing

responsibility as an arrangement of correction

and punishment even up to dismissal both of politicians and officials, while he believed and believes in reliance upon responsibility as a

sense of responsibility, largely unsanctioned,

except by deference or loyalty to professional standards. (1941, 335)

Finer then proceeds to make his argument in two

ways: to restate and defend his position on strict

political accountability and to critically examine Frie drich's 1940 article. The tone is combative and often

tart, with Finer noting that "most of the things I have

to say are extremely elementary, but since it has been

possible for a writer of eminence to discount their

significance I may be forgiven for reaffirming them" (1941, 335). On administrative discretion, he is clear:

"My answer is that the servants of the public are not to decide their own course; they are to be responsi

ble to the elected representatives of the public, and these are to determine the course of action of public

servants to the most minute degree that is technically feasible" (1941, 336). To do otherwise is to discard the basic framework of democracy:

But when Professor Friedrich advocates the

official's responsibility to "the fellowship of science," the discard of official anonymity, the

entry of the official into the political arena as an advocate of policy and teacher of fact versus

"partisan extravagance," the result to be feared is the enhancement of official conceit and what

has come to be known as "the new despotism."

(1941, 340)

Finer is on stronger ground when he challenges Frie

drich's optimistic view of the ability of professionals through their professional organizations to use techni cal knowledge to advance their view of the public

interest. He rejects Friedrich's notion that functional

responsibility requires professional judgment outside

the policies that reflect the will of the people, stating that "it is demonstrable that the will of the people has

content, not only about what it desires, but how mal

adjustments can be remedied, and some of its ideas

are quite wise" (1941, 346). Finer here plays the role of the populist against Friedrich's professional elitism:

Responsibility in the sense of an interper sonal, externally sanctioned duty is, then, the

dominant consideration for public administra tion; and it includes and does not merely stand

by the side of responsibility to the standards of one's craft in the dubious position of a Cin derella. (1941, 347)

Finer's final criticism of Friedrich concerns the latter's

notion of "publicity." Whereas Friedrich advocates

open communication between administrators and the public in instances in which factual information can and should be provided for the public to reach ration al conclusions on issues of policy, Finer again takes the

opposite position, arguing for a closed bureaucracy communicating to the public only through its elected

representatives and political institutions:

A wise civil servant, careful to preserve his own

usefulness and that of his colleagues, and not reckless in the face of the always imminent cry

of bureaucracy and despotism, would not urge

a policy upon it. Still less would he use public advocacy to spur on his political chief or con nive with reformist groups having a purpose

ful policy. He would rather confine himself to frank private demonstration of the alternatives and their advantages and disadvantages, to his

political chief, or where the political system

requires, to the committee of the assembly at their request. (1941, 349)

Finer concludes his biting attack on Friedrich with a statement of his belief in the "adequately sagacious"

nature of the public and their political leaders, who "know not only where the shoe pinches, but have a shrewd idea as to the last and leather of their foot

wear" (1941, 350). Administrative discretion may be found to have a role in modern democratic govern ance, but should result in advice to political officials,

not autonomy to speak and act according to profes

sional judgment:

Contemporary devices to secure closer coopera tion of officials with public and legislatures are

properly auxiliaries to and not substitutes for

political control of public officials through exer tion of the sovereign authority of the public.

Thus, political responsibility is the major con cern of those who work for healthy relationships

between the officials and the public, and moral

responsibility, although a valuable conception and institutional form, is minor and subsidiary.

(1941,350)

Friedrich chose not to respond to Finer, and thus ended the famous debate. Each man gave as good as

he got, with the developing field of public administra tion the winner by having the sides so clearly drawn on the role of administration in developed democratic nation-states. After 1940, Friedrich moved away from

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his earlier concern with personnel administration

toward broader concerns raised by the war and the postwar peace (Friedrich 1943, 1945, 1947a, 1947b). During this time, he published for the first and only time in Public Administration Review, an article titled

"Planning for the Greater Boston Metropolitan Area"

(Friedrich 1945). But his concern with public admin istration was largely embedded in his broader exami nation of constitutional government and federalism

(Friedrich 1948, 1949a, 1949b, 1950, 1953), political theory and philosophy, and dictatorship and totalitari anism. By the mid-1950s, as the NOMOS series was

launching, Friedrichs concern was increasingly the in tersection of political science, law and jurisprudence, and philosophy. He never returned to his earlier ef

forts to share his work directly with the field of public administration, but he did use the NOMOS series to

advance the concept of administrative responsibility to

the broad interdisciplinary community that he helped form as vehicle to explore the pressing problems of modern society.

The NOMOS Series

In 1955, Friedrich played the leading role in organ izing the American Society for Political and Legal Phi losophy. The new learned society was, as described by Friedrich, "founded in 1955 by a group of friends in the social sciences, law, and philosophy who share an

interest in the range of problems traditionally treated

within the broad framework of political and legal philosophy" (1958a, v). The society's activities were based around an annual conference and an annual

volume on a topic determined for the annual confer ence.6 The annual volume series was called NOMOS, which Friedrich described as "the broadest Greek term for law, because in this term there are also tradition

ally comprised the notions of a basic political order and of customs and a way of life (1958a, v). The series afforded an opportunity for Friedrich to revisit for the

first time since his debate with Finer the meaning of

administrative responsibility and its critical impor tance to the balance of professional expertise and democratic accountability in modern society.

Authority

The first volume of the NOMOS series, Authority, ap peared in 1958 and represented the discussion on the

topic at the 1956 meeting of the society. Like subse

quent volumes in the series, it was not simply a set of

proceedings, but a combination of papers delivered

at the meeting along with papers developed afterward

from comments at the meeting or elicited by Friedrich "to round out and balance the presentation" (Friedrich

1958a, vi). Friedrich offered a short preface, but not, at

least in his role as editor as opposed to contributor, an

introduction to the separate essays or a summation or synthesis at the end. This light editorial touch, initiated in Authority, became characteristic of all the NOMOS

volumes. After all, this was a society of equals, and the

contributors were the superstars of their day, whose work and reputations stood on their own.

Authority is in many ways the strongest and most use ful of the nine NOMOS volumes edited by Friedrich. In the aftermath of World War II and the rise of the

Cold War, authority became entangled with authori tarian rule and totalitarian excess, so it was a logical first topic for the society to explore under Friedrich's

guidance. Friedrich's essay, "Authority, Reason, and Discretion," appeared as the second of 13 contribu

tions, which were grouped into three parts: authority in general; authority in historical perspective; and authority in sociopolitical perspective. Contributors included such well-known writers as Hannah Arendt,

Herbert J. Spiro, Bertrand de Jouvenel, David Easton, and Talcott Parsons.

For our purposes, it is the contrast between the

views of authority posed by Friedrich and by Arendt that is most useful to explore. By this time, Friedrich

and Arendt were arguably the leading thinkers on authority and totalitarianism, so the variance in

their perspectives is worth examining in some detail. Most relevant for our discussion, Friedrich used

the essay on authority to revisit some of the themes

contained in his earlier writings on responsible administration.

Friedrich begins his essay with a statement of the problem he will address:

Ever since the eighteenth-century revolt against the established authorities in church and state,

there has been a marked tendency among free

dom-loving intellectuals to view "authority" with a jaundiced eye, if not to denounce it. (1958b, 28)

Why has this been the case? Authority has been con fused or conflated with power; or, authority has been seen as related to tradition and faith rather than rea

son. Friedrich quickly moves to advance the view that

there is a rational component of authority, and that analysis of this rational element is the key to under

standing why authority is critical to the functioning of

modern society. To arrive at a proper understanding of

the concept, Friedrich carefully separates the meaning of authority from power, and from a concern solely with authority as a political phenomenon. Instead, it becomes a particular sort of communications:

When I speak of authority, I wish to say that

the communications of a person possessing it exhibit a very particular kind of relationship to reason and reasoning. Such communication, whether opinions or commands, are not dem

onstrated through rational discourse, but they possess the potentiality of reasoned elaboration—

they are "worthy of acceptance." (1959b, 35)

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Such a definition allows Friedrich to expand the no

tion of authority from power or politics to roles based

on education, expertise, and professional standing, such as the scholar, teacher, lawyer, and doctor. It is

also strikingly similar to the justification for respon sible administration found in his earlier writings: the

professionally trained civil servant, more than the

political appointee, is able, in fact obligated, to engage in such communications. As he points out later in the

essay, the theory of authority drawn from this defini

tion justifies—indeed, demands—discretion to be placed in the hands of administrators:

Authority interpreted as involving the potential

reasoning in interpersonal communications, that is to say as the capacity for reasoned elabo

ration, provides the clue to the problem of why discretion is both indispensible and manageable

in all political and legal systems. (1958b, 40)

It is important to point out that Friedrich's idea of

rationality is not limited to a strictly fact-based or

positivistic approach; rather, "the fact that his deci sions, commands, or other communications could be

reinforced by reasoned elaboration relating them to established values and beliefs will lend his acts that

'authority' without which discretion becomes arbitrary

abuse of power" (1958b, 45).

Friedrich thus not only accepts authority but also sees

it as a necessity for civilization. He ends his essay with

language reminiscent of Max Weber in "Politics as a Vocation."7

As long as we can maintain a measure of authority, that is to say, as long as those who

wield power recognize their responsibility for discretionary acts in the sense of an obliga tion to retain the regard for the potentiality of reasoned elaboration, a constitutional order can

be maintained. Once this regard is lost—and it

may be lost by man at large no longer accept

ing reason as a guide—the night of meaningless violence is upon us. (1958b, 48)

The argument advanced in the essay is largely the same one advanced by Friedrich in his 1935 and 1940 works on responsible administration. The dif ference is largely one of context: in the earlier works,

Friedrich's position on responsibility was challenged by those such as Finer who argued for traditional notions of bureaucratic and parliamentary control and command. In the context of the 1950s, the

challenge to authority came from those who saw it as an element of totalitarianism or those who saw

the preconditions for its acceptance as relics of a fast-receding past order. Friedrich was also more

explicit in drawing the connection between authority, responsibility, and effective communication, as one

recent scholar has noted in a highly perceptive essay

(Herbst 2006).

The use of the past tense in the title of Hannah Arendt's contribution, "What Was Authority?" imme

diately suggests a very different perspective from that of Friedrich. While Friedrich sees the potential for rational communication as the foundation of genuine

authority, Arendt feels that "authority has vanished from the modern world, and if we raise the question

what authority is, we can no longer fall back upon au thentic and undisputable experiences common to all" (1958, 81). Like Friedrich, Arendt bases her thoughts

on authority with reference to the difference between

power and authority and the need to see it as related to communications, but she comes up with a very

different conclusion. She poses a dichotomy between authoritarian command and egalitarian persuasion that does not include the possibility for the "reasoned elaboration" so basic to Friedrichs position:

Since authority always demands obedience, it

is commonly mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet, authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used,

authority itself has failed. Authority, on the

other hand, is incompatible with persuasion,

which presupposes equality and works through

a process of argumentation. Where arguments are used, authority is left in abeyance. Against

the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the authoritarian order which is always hierarchical.

(1958, 82)

The difference between Friedrich and Arendt on

authority, so striking given their similar intellectual and cultural heritage, and their shared criticism of the

Greek tradition in political theory,8 seems to rest on two fundamental differences in outlook. First, Arendt

does not give to reason and scientific method the role that Friedrich ascribes, to be the basis of noncoercive

authority relations between those with knowledge and those who appreciate the need to defer to those

with greater knowledge and expertise. Thus, reasoned explanations from professionals do not figure into Arendt's view of social dynamics. In fact, we are left without tradition and faith to counter power:

To live in a political realm with neither author

ity nor the concomitant awareness that the source of authority transcends power and those

who are in power, means to be confronted anew, without the protection of tradition and self-evident standards of behavior, by the

elementary problems of human living-together. (Arendt 1958, 110)

Second, Friedrichs interests reside more closely with

the practical application of his theory than do those

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of Arendt. Friedrich's interest in professional admin

istration, the discretionary use of expert power, and

the development of constitutional government in the aftermath of political collapse provided him a view of the actual operations of government that Arendt's ca

reer did not. Or, to state it differently, Friedrich never

stressed the tragic element in human existence that is so evident in the work of Arendt.

Responsibility

The second of the NOMOS series, Community, was, in Friedrich's own assessment, a disjointed and some what vague set of essays. The following volume, Re

sponsibility, could be expected to have a much sharper focus given Friedrich's quarter century of concern with

the topic. The volume is divided into four major parts: responsibility in general, criminal responsibility, re

sponsibility in modern government, and responsibility

of citizenship. Friedrich might have been expected to

author the first chapter, as he did in Community, given the central role that responsibility plays in this work. Instead, his essay, "The Dilemma of Administrative

Responsibility," appears as the second in the section

on responsibility in modern government. Nonetheless, the lead essay by J. Roland Pennock, titled "The Prob

lem of Responsibility," echoes many of the thoughts of Friedrich's prior work on the subject.

Pennock begins with a statement that parallels Frie drich's thinking on responsibility:

I believe that among various usages (possibly not all usages) of the word "responsibility" there is a common core of meaning, that part of the core relates to the exercise of discretion, and

that herein lies the modern problem of responsi bility. (1960, 4)

He follows a line of reasoning almost identical to that developed earlier by Friedrich. Pennock notes that

"'responsibility'" has two primary meanings, or what I have called the core of meaning has two facets, (a) ac countability and (b) the rational and moral exercise of

discretionary power (or the capacity or disposition for such exercise), and that each of these notions tends to

flavor the other" (1960, 13). Like Friedrich, Pennock

notes that responsibility "implies deliberation and

rationality as well as liability" (1960, 17), and must be paired with power, that is, the actor must have the

necessary power to carry out the tasks for which she

is assumed to be responsible. Responsibility is thus

the "exercise of judgment and discretion in light of careful analysis and conscientious weighing of values" (1960, 27), identical to the idea of responsibility laid out by Friedrich in his debates with Finer two decades

earlier. Pennock acknowledges his debt to Friedrich in a footnote, noting that "the classical statement of

this argument has been set forth by the editor of this

volume" in the 1940 essay (1960, 25). The only major

difference between the two scholars is Pennock's fail

ure to relate the concept to the work of professional administrators.

By 1960, Friedrich must have known that his posi tion on responsibility had won the debate on the relationship between the political and administra tive aspects of modern government. Would he use the NOMOS essay as an opportunity to restate his earlier position, or to stake out new territory? The answer is the former. "The Dilemma of Administra

tive Responsibility" is largely a restatement, albeit

a concise, focused, and highly persuasive one. That the essay is a reflection on his earlier views and not

an attempt to move much beyond them is indicated by his several references to "Authority, Reason and

Discretion" in Authority and the 1940 essay, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibil ity." The essay is also relatively brief, only 14 pages in length.

Friedrich begins the essay by linking the concept of

responsibility to public administration, stating that "among the spheres within which the problem of responsibility is of primary importance, administra

tion ranks high. No large-scale administration, no

rationalized bureaucracy, whether governmental or

non-governmental, is possible, without making the staff members responsible for their work, and to their superiors" (Friedrich 1960, 189). The connection of

public administration to authority is made early in

the essay. Noting that "responsible conduct is closely linked to the problems of authority" Friedrich sees it in principal—agent terms:

Whenever B is responsible to A, the presump tion is that A has conferred upon B discretion to act upon certain issues, to decide them on As behalf, i. e., to choose between several avail

able alternatives or to discover a new one, not

arbitrarily, but in accordance with what the

situation requires. (1960, 190)

As he identified in 1940, the dilemma of responsibil ity for Friedrich lies in the existence of two aspects of responsible behavior, the personal and the functional.

The problem is exacerbated by the increasingly com plex and technical nature of public policy:

For this gulf of technical knowledge which

separates the professional from the layman

causes the most serious conflicts arising in the field of administrative responsibility. They are most serious in the government service, because the prevailing tendency to stress the will of the

principal, be it the people or its representa

tives, creates an irresolvable conflict. Only an approach which will bridge the gap between the personal and the functional aspect of

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responsibility can show a way out of these dif ficulties. (1960, 193)

What is this bridging approach? Friedrich here suc cumbs to the temptation to dance on the grave of

the losing side in the Finer debates, noting that the development of the "science of public administration" "clinches the argument about the 'inner check' which must reinforce the crumbling institution of parlia

mentary responsibility" (1960, 194). The dichotomy between policy formation and execution is seen to be false. The responsible administrator, armed with

discretionary authority, needs to be responsive to two factors, technical knowledge and popular sentiment,

in both policy formation and execution (1960, 199).

Having assumed that the position on responsible ad ministrative behavior he has staked out over the years

has achieved universal acceptance, Friedrich turns to the issue of enforcement. This is perhaps the section of

the essay that shows the greatest degree of originality and development over his earlier works on the topic.

First, he rejects the idea of dismissal as an approach to enforcement as "crude" and instead lists five meas

ures that have greater promise: disciplinary measures

short of dismissal, promotional measures, financial

measures, judicial measures, and professional approval and disapproval (1960, 201). His preferred approach is a melding of the judicial and the professional. This echoes his thoughts on the value of administrative law as a factor in responsible administration, which date back to his works on Swiss government in 1932 and

responsible administration in 1935 and 1940. If done properly, "when such institutionalization occurs, the professional standards become assimilated to judicial measures as a means of maintaining administrative

responsibility" (1960, 201). Friedrich notes "favorable

signs" that this European approach may be develop ing in the English-speaking nations, but he offers few

specifics on the professionalization of administration in the United States.

Friedrich concludes the essay with a passionate appeal to view administrative responsibility within the con

text of public policy development:

Only within well-developed policy can respon sible conduct on the part of administrative

officials be expected. As we have seen, well

developed policy means a policy developed with the active and responsible participation of the officials who are to execute it. (I960, 201).

The dilemma of the title, between personal and

functional responsibility, is thus related to the need to

dispense with the idea that public policy formation is the task of political officials and not professional civil servants. It is not enough that responsible administra tors exercise discretion in a reasoned manner. Policy

itself must be "adequately discussed and rationally

adapted to changing situations and their require ments" (I960, 202).

Discussion: Is Friedrich Still Relevant to Public Administration? Friedrich's revisitation and refinement of the concept

of administrative responsibility in the NOMOS

volumes represent his final contribution to the field of

public administration. After Responsibility appeared, two subsequent volumes, The Public Interest (1962) and Rational Decision (1964), offered Friedrich an

opportunity to connect the major topic with public administration, but in neither case was this opportu

nity taken. Friedrich's vision of a professionalized and responsible public service remains his primary contri bution to public administration. From the 1930s to his final essay on the topic in Responsibility in 1960, Friedrich established the importance of responsibility

as transcending simple bureaucratic accountability to

require administrators to engage in reasoned judg ment when exercising discretion. His work stimulated others in the field to examine this critical aspect of

administration (Gaus 1936). By arguing that simple notions of accountability based on a clear distinction

between policy making and policy execution were neither feasible or desirable, he helped establish the

idea of public administration as a professional field,

with responsibilities beyond simple accountability for actions within a hierarchy.

Since the Friedrich-Finer debates and the final con

tributions of Friedrich in the NOMOS essays, a good

deal has fundamentally altered the debate over what

constitutes the proper grounds for administrative

responsibility. Public administration, either in its pro fessional or in its academic dimension, is profoundly

different than it was in the period of time, from the 1930s to the 1960s, that Friedrich witnessed. Faith in

government, and especially in the role of bureaucracy, has been replaced by cynicism and a lack of trust. The uncomplicated view of administrative agencies imple menting legislation in a direct and monopolistic man ner has been challenged by the reform ideas of New

Public Management, the rise of "hollow government," and third-party policy implementation. The view of

public responsibility and the public interest as derived from political theory has been countered by ideas whose theoretical foundations rest in economics, such

as public choice theory and market economics. Public

management is now seen in the context of networks, where accountability and responsibility are diffuse and

often the question is whether anyone is in charge and answerable to the public.

As it was for Friedrich and Finer in the years before

World War II, the key issue for public administration

is the appreciation and proper use of administra tive discretion. The successors to Finer, whether they

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acknowledge his position or simply follow the same

logic, seek ways to limit discretion either by admon ishing political institutions to create policy that is

unambiguous and restrictive, or by enforcing strict standards of accountability and performance (Moe and Gilmour 1995). Those who tack more to Frie

drich's position on the need for inner checks stress the

inevitability of administrative discretion and the need

to exercise judgment in ways that meet high ethi cal standards (Cooper 2006), dialogue with citizens (Denhardt and Denhardt 2007), or administrative leadership to correct the flaws in the constitutional

order (Behn 1998; Bertelli and Lynn 2003).

Although it would be misleading to characterize Friedrich as an ethicist, more than any other factor, it has been the development of administrative ethics as a

prominent element in public administration that has

kept Friedrich's work part of the ongoing dialogue in

the field. The Friedrich-Finer debates highlighted the issue of whether external or internal controls should

guide administrative behavior. Since the time of the

debates, there has been an explosion of external ethical controls—ethics laws, standards and codes of conduct,

inspectors general and internal auditors—and a grow ing body of literature arguing for an administrative ethic focused on inner checks and a concern for the

public interest (Burke 1986; Cooper 2006). Account ability to political and administrative superiors has been seen as requiring balance with a broader sense of

responsibility to citizens and the community (Den hardt and Denhardt 2007; O'Leary 2006).

It is important to recognize, however, that, especially by today's standards, Friedrich's contribution is lim

ited in several important respects. First is his disinter

est in moving beyond the theoretical to empirical examinations of how administrators actually perform their tasks and use discretion. While he did venture

into applied research, especially in regard to the devel opment of constitutional government in the aftermath

of World War II, he did little applied work directly related to public administration. Had he chosen to

do so, it would probably have been in examining the exercise of professional discretion in policy formation

and execution, and in the personnel rules and proce dures best adapted to professionalized administration.

It fell on such later writers as Frederick Mosher (1968) and Don K. Price (1962) to examine in detail the

impact of professionalization within administrative agencies.9

The approach taken in NOMOS, of collecting a series of essays on broad topics with little editorial

explanation of the connections between the separate contributions, makes the contribution of the series

to public administration problematic. Even the most

relevant of the group, Authority and Responsibility,

have only modest value to todays major issues in

public administration, largely the contributions of Friedrich and one or two others in each volume. What

is most useful, though, is the recognition that the major problems faced by today's administrators can be

traced through historical analysis and the literature of

political philosophy to the present.

A third limitation of Friedrich's work is perhaps his assumption that administrative behavior be measured

by its quotient of rationality. His formulas are not only ungrounded in empirical evidence but also rela

tively optimistic—one might even say naive—regard ing the acceptance by politicians and the public of the expanded role of nonelected career civil servants.

The belief in reasoned analysis and scientific analysis of issues downplayed the ethical issues involved in the

wicked problems encountered in public policy and administration. Friedrich's rather elitist ideas of ad

ministrators educating the citizenry based on superior knowledge runs counter to ideas of administrators as

facilitators of dialogue between citizens and govern ment. Again, it has fallen to later writers in public

administration such as Terry Cooper (2006), Janet

and Robert Denhardt (2007), and Rosemary O'Leary (2006) to explore the ethical dimension of responsi bility under the less than optimal conditions of actual governance activities.

Despite their limitations, Friedrich's thoughts on administrative responsibility and political authority

remain relevant today. By seeing responsibility as the most significant issue raised by the development of the modern administrative state, Friedrich combined

public administration's concern for administrative

competence with deeper questions of institutional and

personal responsibility in a constitutional democracy.

They are, as Friedrich notes, only a chapter in dealing with the competing demands for individual freedom and the collective public good in a constitutional order.

Notes

1. Pennock (1960, 5 n.) provides a useful discussion of the use

of the term "responsibility" in the literature on politics. The

earliest example of the term in the Oxford English Dictionary

is from Alexander Hamilton's discussion of the concept in

Federalist No. 63, published in 1787. Pennock notes, however,

that Jeremy Bentham used the term 11 years earlier in A Frag

ment of Government, and it was used as early as 1643 in regard

to the king being "responsible" to Parliament. Most agree,

though, that Hamilton's Federalist No. 63 was the first example

of political theory based around the concept.

2. The title of the series, NOMOS, is usually but not always

treated with all capitals; I use that usage throughout.

3. His work appeared in such major journals as Foreign Affairs,

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,

American Journal of Sociology, Political Science Quarterly, Ameri

can Political Science Review, Journal of Politics, Public Opinion

Quarterly, Review of Politics, Public Administration Review,

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Harvard Educational Review, Western Political Quarterly, Public

Policy, Harvard Law Review, Orbis, and many others. For those

who categorize by specialty, the most common designation for

Friedrich was political theorist. But a review of his corpus of

works suggests that political theory was more a foundation for

all of his work than a narrow specialization.

4. Friedrich's harsh criticism of the British failure to address the

threat posed by Nazi Germany in the 1930s is an often over

looked aspect of the Friedrich-Finer debate. Finer responded in

kind by associating the sort of administrative discretion favored

by Friedrich with a form of despotism associated with such

regimes as Nazi Germany, a harsh accusation given Friedrich's

expatriate status.

5. Finer s choice of the new journal founded by the American

Society for Public Administration must surely have pleased the

society's founders, who anticipated that Public Administration

Review would become the major forum for debating the critical

issues of the field.

6. The annual meeting of the American Society for Political and

Legal Philosophy rotates on a three-year cycle in conjunction

with the annual meetings of the American Association of Law

Schools, the American Political Science Association, and the

American Philosophical Association; the presidency of the

society also rotates among the three disciplines.

7. Although the language is similar, Friedrich is critical of Weber's

conflation of authority and legitimacy. In a footnote, he notes

that "the close relation between the psychological and the

nominalist misinterpretation of phenomena like authority is

strikingly illustrated in the approach of Max Weber, who, con

fusing authority with legitimacy, misses one of the key aspects

of authority, by minimizing its rational aspect" (1958b, 32).

Somewhat curiously, Friedrich does not cite Weber extensively

in his treatment of bureaucracy and political responsibility. In

his major public administration essays, in 1935 and 1940, he

relies instead on American students of public administration

such as Leonard White and Luther Gulick to derive his descrip

tion of bureaucracy.

8. Friedrich's criticism of Greek political theory is most evident

in his 1940 essay, "Greek Political Heritage and Totalitarian

ism" (Friedrich 1940a). Friedrich's argument is that the Greek

political tradition exalts the state, which, in turn, is based

solely on power. Friedrich considers the legacy of Greek politi

cal thought "the adoration of power for its own sake" (1940a,

224). In other writings, he also condemns the Greek tradition

for failing to come up with a theory of federalism that could

unite the micro-states of ancient Greece politically. Friedrich

concludes his essay, written as Europe descended into war and

barbarism, with a defense of the role of religion outside the

control of the state as a counterforce to the exaltation of the

state. Noting the line of thinking from the Greeks through

Cromwell, Bonaparte, Hegel, Marx, and fascism, he opines

that if we continue this line of state worship and state power,

"culture will wither and perhaps die, as the ruthless pursuit of

power in the name of the secular church-states leads to ever

more exhausting struggles for power and supremacy. Therefore,

let us beware of the heritage of the Greek polis: it is a veritable

Trojan horse, smuggled into our Christian civilization" (1940a,

225). Arendt bases her major critique of Greek thought on

the fact that "in the realm of Greek political life there was no

awareness of authority based on immediate political experi

ence" (1958, 97-98); instead, political theory was based on

Utopian notions of the polis as a way of fusing the individual

and the state.

9. While serving as Frederick Mosher's research assistant in the

1970s, I do not recall him referencing Friedrich as a source

of inspiration for his work on professionalism. He credited

Don K. Price and his work on science and government as a

major factor in examining government professionalization in

Democracy and the Public Service. Mosher was, however, famil

iar with the NOMOS series and acquired the first volumes for

his private library collection.

References

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Cooper, Terry L. 2006. The Responsible Administrator: An Approach

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SAVE THE DATE!

2011 Southeastern Conference for Public Administration (SECoPA)

September 21-24, 2011 HOTEL MONTELEONE

New Orleans, Louisiana

Visit: http://www.aspaonline.org/secopa

482 Public Administration Review • May | June 2011

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